Daniel Akaka

Mr. AKAKA

Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. AKAKA

Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, last Friday, December 3, 2004, Secretary of Health and Human Services Tommy Thompson, in his resignation speech, stated, ``For the life of me, I cannot understand why the terrorists have not attacked our food supply because it is so easy to do so.'' These are strong words coming from the man charged with protecting the Nation's food supply. Yet this sort of warning is not news to those of us who follow this issue. The security of our Nation's food supply is of great concern to me. Over the past year, the United States has been reminded repeatedly of the vulnerable nature of the American agriculture system and the ease with which terrorists could manipulate that vulnerability. In 2003, mad cow disease surfaced for the first time in Washington State and various strains of the avian influenza began cropping up across Asia and in the United States. I have come to the floor repeatedly over the past few years to call attention to this growing problem. I also introduced legislation to strengthen prevention and response efforts as early as 2002. At a November 2003 Governmental Affairs Committee hearing, ``Agroterrorism: The Threat to America's Breadbasket,'' Dr. Peter Chalk, a RAND policy analyst, testified that an attack on American livestock could be extremely attractive to a terrorist for the following four reasons: one, a low level of technology is needed to do considerable damage; two, at least 15 pathogens have the capability of severely harming the agriculture industry; three, a terrorist would not need to be at great personal risk in order to carry out a successful attack; and four, a disease could spread quickly throughout a city, State, or even the country. Dr. Tom McGinn, formerly of the North Carolina Department of Agriculture, demonstrated a computer-simulated attack of foot-and- mouth, or FMD, disease at our hearing where FMD was introduced in five States. According to Dr. McGinn's simulation, after five days 23 States would be infected; after 30 days 40 States would be infected. In this scenario, it would be likely that the disease would not be detected until the fifth day and a national order to stop the interstate movement of livestock would take place a few days later. Using Dr. McGinn's assumptions, over 23 million animals would die from illness or need to be destroyed. It is horrifying that such a massive blow could strike one of the United States' largest markets by simply coordinating the infection of five animals. As a senior member of the Governmental Affairs Committee, one of my greatest concerns is the lack of governmental organization--Federal, State, and local--to address this problem. Over 30 Federal agencies have jurisdiction over some part of the response process in the event of a breach of agricultural security. In a report on the country's preparedness for responding to animal- bourne diseases issued in August 2003, Trust for America's Health, a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization founded to raise the profile of public health issues, stated: The U.S. is left with a myriad of bureaucratic jurisdictions that respond to various aspects of the diseases, with little coordination and no clear plan for communicating with the public about the health threats posed by animal-borne diseases. Protecting America's agriculture and its citizens requires Federal agencies to have clear areas of responsibility that leave no ground uncovered and open lines of communication, both between agencies and with the public. State and local officials, and the communities they serve, are the front lines of defense for American agriculture. Without adequate resources, both in terms of funding and advice, these defenses will fail. Yet agriculture and food security have not been given the national attention necessary to prevent this failure. On December 7, 2001, I stood on the floor of the Senate and warned of the vulnerability of American agriculture. To address my concerns, I introduced S. 2767, the Agriculture Security Preparedness Act, on July 22, 2002. My bill was not acted upon in the 107th Congress, so I continued my efforts in the 108th Congress with the introduction of S. 427, the Agriculture Security Assistance Act, and S. 430, the Agriculture Security Preparedness Act. The Agriculture Security Assistance Act would assist States and communities in responding to threats to the agriculture industry by authorizing funds for: animal health professionals to participate in community emergency planning activities to assist farmers in strengthening their defenses against a terrorist threat; a biosecurity grant program for farmers and ranchers to provide needed funding to better secure their properties; and the use of sophisticated remote sensing and computer modeling approaches to agricultural diseases. The Agriculture Security Preparedness Act would enable better interagency coordination within the Federal Government by: establishing senior level liaisons in the Departments of Homeland Security, or DHS, and Health and Human Services to coordinate with the Department of Agriculture and all other relevant agencies on agricultural disease emergency management and response; requiring DHS and USDA to work with the Department of Transportation to address the risks associated with transporting animals, plants, and people between and around farms; requiring the Attorney General to conduct a review of relevant Federal, State, and local laws to determine if they facilitate or impede agricultural security; and directing the State Department to enter into mutual assistance agreements with foreign governments to facilitate the sharing of resources and knowledge of foreign animal diseases. While some in the administration will say the situation is under control and there is no need for legislation from Congress, I would point to the failure of the Food and Drug Administration to comply with the basic food safety requirements in the Bioterrorism Act of 2002 in a timely manner. On Monday, the FDA published regulations requiring all companies involved in food production, processing, manufacturing, and transportation to keep detailed records identifying the source from which a food product was received and/or the recipient to whom a product was sent. The Bioterrorism Act required that these regulations be issued by December 2003--a full 12 months ago. The administration will continue to drag its feet on this issue if we in the Congress are not attentive. In the wake of Secretary Thompson's remarks, there has been much national attention given to the vulnerability of the American food supply. Some who had not focused on this issue in the past are publicly expressing concern about the safety of American food, and the national media is broadcasting special investigative reports on agroterrorism. President Bush was questioned about the issue during his press briefing with President Musharraf on Saturday. The spotlight is being focused on this glaring weakness in U.S. security. We must do more to protect the American public from what experts describe as an obvious and vulnerable target. The real, and perceived, security of the Nation's food supply is critical to the continued prosperity of the United States. I will reintroduce S. 427 and S. 430 in the 109th Congress, and I urge my colleagues to cosponsor my bills. Together we can move this legislation forward and demonstrate that Congress is protecting our food supply.

Mr. AKAKA

Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I rise today to express my support for the conference report on legislation creating a Director of National Intelligence. Before doing so, I commend the tremendous effort made by Senator Susan Collins, the chairman of the Governmental Affairs Committee, and Senator Joe Lieberman, the ranking member, who have dedicated the last few months to ensuring this legislation was passed. I salute them. Passage of this legislation ensures that many of the key recommendations of the 9/11 Commission become law. Most important of these are the establishment of a Director of National Intelligence, DNI, and a National counterterrorism Center, NCTC. However, much still remains to be done. I continue to believe that the key to a stronger America lies not just in clarifying institutional lines of authority but in ensuring that we have the best and brightest on the front lines of our national defense. One of the important objectives driven home by the 9/11 Commission's report and in testimony before the Governmental Affairs Committee is the need to have the right people in the right places in our Government, both civilian employees and military personnel, to combat future threats. We must ensure that our Federal workforce remains trained and ready to respond to the challenges we may face in the future, just as Federal employees have responded with courage when called upon in the past. There is a human capital crisis in the Federal Government. Not only are we losing decades of talent as civil servants retire, we are not doing enough to develop and nurture the next generation of public servants. Nowhere is this more evident than in our intelligence services. Time and time again senior officials note the lack of trained linguists, the lack of trained analysts to evaluate information, and the lack of scientific technical expertise needed to confront these new threats. Staffing new interagency intelligence operations centers on a 24/7 basis, developing new human intelligence, HUMINT, operations and interpreting the information coming into our intelligence analysts pose management problems of massive proportions. We continue to be seriously understaffed. I have been calling attention to this problem, along with my colleague, Senator Voinovich, for a number of years. Thus, I am pleased that the legislation we vote on today contains provisions similar to those in S. 589, the Homeland Security Federal Workforce Act, which I introduced and was passed by the Senate last November. The National Intelligence Reform Act mirrors the intent of S. 589 by establishing a program awarding scholarships to students in exchange for government service in the intelligence community. I would like to reiterate that the language in the Governmental Affairs Committee report relating to this provision and urge the DNI to give special consideration to applicants seeking degrees in foreign languages, science, mathematics, or a combination of these subjects. S. 2845 includes other aspects of S. 589, such as an incentivized rotational program for employees in the intelligence community in order to break down cultural and artificial barriers to information sharing, build a cadre of highly knowledgeable professionals, and ensure cooperation among national security agencies. In addition, the conference report includes language offered by Senator Bob Graham and Senator Richard Durbin, and myself requiring the Director of National Intelligence to review existing programs to increase the number of personnel with science, math, and foreign language skills and report to Congress on the proposals to improve the education of such individuals if existing programs are found inadequate. These programs partially address, however, a larger national problem in our educational system that must be tackled, including at the primary and secondary level. I look forward to working with my colleagues in the next Congress to implement additional programs to solve the human capital crisis in our national security community as well as elsewhere in the government. In addition, I am pleased that the legislation includes language creating an Office of Geospatial Management in the Department of Homeland Security, which was added to S. 2845, the Senate version of the bill, through an amendment offered by Senator Allard and myself. This language is identical to S. 1230, the Homeland Security Geographic Information Act. It will help to better coordinate the procurement and management of geospatial information within the Department of Homeland Security and centralize activities within one office. Geospatial information has become a critical component in both assisting our war fighters and in protecting our homeland. However, I would be remiss not to mention areas that are not included in the legislation. I regret that the conference report did not include a Senate amendment I sponsored with Senator Fitzgerald to create a chief financial officer, CFO, within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Our amendment would have placed the NIA under the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990, which requires agencies to submit audited financial statements and requires that CFOs be appointed by the President, confirmed by the Senate, and report directly to an agency's head. This amendment is similar to legislation Senator Fitzgerald and I sponsored now Public Law 108-330--which brings the Department of Homeland Security, DHS, under the CFO Act and ensures a Senate- confirmed CFO who reports directly to the Director of DHS. I plan to introduce legislation that embodies our amendment because I strongly believe that this new entity must have the financial management systems and practices in place to provide meaningful and timely information needed for effective and efficient management decisionmaking. It would be naive to say that this legislation by itself will make America stronger. Americans will make America stronger. What this legislation does offer is a framework within which we can build a more secure nation if we all work together within the limits of our Constitution. In creating a Director of National Intelligence it is critical that the President pledge to make this office accountable to the American people. The DNI must be kept free of political pressures and independent of partisan policy agendas. While employees working under the DNI will have the same rights and protections as those at the CIA, I urge the DNI to make every effort to ensure that whistleblowers are not retaliated against and that their disclosures, which may have a significant impact on the security of this nation, are taken seriously. The DNI must make civil liberties and privacy rights a capstone in the structure of this new agency. Without these basic protections, our freedoms will not be strengthened, our Nation will not be more secure. I pledge to do all I can to exercise my responsibility to oversee this new intelligence agency and ensure it lives up to the trust being placed in it by the Congress today.

Mr. AKAKA

Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I rise to join my colleagues in saying thank you to a great senator, a great American, a wonderful leader, and a dear friend, Senator Tom Daschle of South Dakota. In Hawaiian we say, mahalo nui loa. ``Mahalo'' means thank you; ``nui'' means large; and ``loa'' means wide. It is used to convey profound and deep gratitude. I want to say mahalo nui loa to Tom Daschle for his great service to our country and to the Senate as an institution. During his 26 years in the House and Senate, Tom Daschle has epitomized the ideal that we can disagree without being disagreeable. His prairie optimism and can-do attitude served his constituents well and served our Democratic caucus well. I have always marveled at the fact that despite his responsibilities as majority leader and Democratic Leader, Tom Daschle always kept the needs and interests of South Dakotans as his top priority. He never lost sight of the people back home. Perhaps that is best reflected by his annual ``unscheduled driving'' tour, when he drives across his home state, visiting every county, with no staff and no schedule, just Tom, stopping to visit his constituents and hear what is on their minds. As Senator Daschle has said, these visits remind him of where he came from, and why he came to Washington--to put the priorities of America first. For that, and for so much more, I say mahalo nui loa, Tom Daschle. Godspeed. God bless Tom and his wife Linda. This comes from me and my wife Millie. Aloha.

Mr. AKAKA

Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, today the Transportation Security Administration, TSA, will begin receiving applications from U.S. airports that wish to participate in the Screener Partnership Program. This program will allow airports to hire security screeners employed by private-sector companies to provide baggage and passenger security screening at their facilities for the first time since September 11, 2001. In the aftermath of the attacks of 9/11, security screening at U.S. airports was federalized because commercial airplanes were turned into guided missiles. Those attacks demonstrated that the then current airport security system was not working. Less than two weeks later, the Government Accountability Office, GAO, testified before the Senate Commerce Committee that screeners were deficient at detecting threatening objects and were not given sufficient training by employers and access controls to secure areas in airports were weak. The congressional conferees of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, ATSA, also concluded that ``a fundamental change (is required) in the way (the U.S.) approaches the task of ensuring the safety and security of the civil air transportation system.'' It is the responsibility of the administration and the Congress to ensure that aviation security does not fall back to the pre-9/11 status quo. Congress understood the need to evaluate how well a federalized workforce would compare to a privately employed workforce prior to allowing privatization which is why the ATSA included a 3-year screener pilot program involving five U.S. airports. Despite this pilot program, the Department of Homeland Security Inspector General testified at a House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee hearing on April 22, 2004, that there was not sufficient basis to determine conclusively whether the pilot airport screeners performed at a level equal to or greater than that of the federal screeners. GAO, also testifying at the hearing, said, ``Little performance data is currently available to compare the performance of private screeners and federal screeners in detecting threat objects.'' Before the Nation's airports return to commercially hired and trained screening workforces, we must make sure there has truly been adequate analysis of the performance of private airport screeners prior to allowing privatization. In a November 16, 2004, press release announcing the commencement of its Screener Partnership Program, TSA stated, ``An evaluation earlier this year concluded there was little difference in the performance or cost of the private and federal screening forces.'' TSA is relying on a study that both the DHS IG and GAO found to be inconclusive. Given the high stakes involved in airport security, I am concerned that the decision to begin this program is being made without sufficient data. In addition, I have concerns about TSA's ability to award and administer contracts with private screening companies based on a September 2004 DHS IG report that found TSA mismanaged a contract with Boeing to install Explosive Detection Systems, EDS, and overpaid Boeing by approximately $49 million. According to the IG report, contractor performance was not evaluated for each year of the contract until approximately a full calendar year later. Most troubling is that TSA rejected some of the IG's key criticisms, which makes me question the manner in which it will manage future contracts. Moreover, I believe we must also consider whether contractual mismanagement could lead to lapses in security. Are the right standards and policies in place to ensure that private screeners will provide the same security as federalized screeners, and is TSA equipped to enforce them? As the ranking member of the Financial Management Subcommittee and the Armed Services Readiness Subcommittee, I have long worked on the challenges of Federal acquisitions. I want to make sure that DHS, which is a composite of 22 legacy agencies, has the people and tools needed to solicit and manage the Screener Partnership Program. Just this week I contacted Secretary Ridge to express my concern about the $49 million overrun of the Boeing EDS installation contract. That wasted money could have gone a long way towards helping Honolulu International Airport in my home State of Hawaii install inline EDS machines. My interest is to improve the management of contracts and the collection of timely and accurate information and to stop erroneous and improper payments to contractors. For that reason I was pleased to work with my good friend, Senator Fitzgerald, in passing legislation to bring the Department of Homeland Security under the Chief Financial Officers Act, CFO. The Department runs the risk of becoming a morass of hidden contract costs and poorly managed programs without a strong CFO to ensure accountability and transparency. I would, however, like to commend TSA for honoring a commitment made by Admiral Stone at his confirmation hearing before the Governmental Affairs Committee that Federal screeners at airports which chose to use a private workforce give TSA screeners the right of first refusal for jobs. It is important that the substantial investment made by the Federal Government in the hiring, the training, and the deployment of Federal screeners not go to waste. I plan to monitor very carefully how this plan develops, both in terms of the level of security provided to the traveling public and the level of transparency and accountability of the contracts.

Mr. AKAKA

Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, the World War II war against Japan has been described in John Dower's book ``War Without Mercy'' as the most savage, bitterly fought racial war in history. Caught in between this epic struggle as innocent victims were the Nisei, American citizens of Japanese ancestry, who were neither accepted nor trusted by both America and Japan. The widespread question and doubt as to their loyalty to America extended to grave uncertainty of whether the Nisei would be willing to fight against an enemy of their same ancestry. This calls for the telling of the little-known story that there were over 6,000 Nisei who more than willingly and resolutely fought against the Japanese enemy during World War II as military intelligence linguists serving in the American and Allied forces. Briefly, this is that story. As the probability of war against Japan mounted in the summer of 1941, the U.S. War Department realized its deficiencies in the intelligence operations against Japan. The Military Intelligence Service Language School, MISLS, was hastily authorized and created to train linguists skilled in interpretation, translation and interrogation in the Japanese language, established at the Fourth Army Intelligence School located at Crissey Field, Presidio of San Francisco. With a meager budget of $2,000 and an initial enrollment of 60 students, the first classes commenced their studies of military Japanese on November 1, 1941, a scant 5 weeks before the Pearl Harbor attack by Japan. After a grueling 6 months of training, only 45 of the initial enrollment of 60 students survived to graduate in May 1942, 35 of whom were immediately assigned and deployed out to the Alaskan and Guadalcanal campaigns. From the outset the Army recognized that the American Nisei possessed the best qualifications, competence and potential for Japanese intelligence specialist training, yet harbored grave doubts about the Nisei's loyalty to America. Soon news came back from the field of vast sources of new Japanese intelligence uncovered by a pioneer linguist team lead by Captain John Burden of Hawaii in the battle of Guadalcanal, and field commanders began flooding the MISLS with demands for more Nisei linguists. The need to meet this surging demand for Japanese language linguists led the MISLS in December 1942 to recruit 58 Nisei from the 100th Battalion then training at Camp McCoy, Wisconsin, to secure the transfer of 250 Nisei from the 442nd Regimental Combat Team, RCT, at Camp Shelby, Mississippi, to scour the 10 relocation camps to recruit MIS students from behind their barbed wire enclosures, and to conduct two recruiting trips to Hawaii in June 1943 and February 1944 to enlist over 500 Hawaii Nisei for intelligence training at MISLS. With the forced evacuation of 110,000 Japanese from the West Coast under Executive Order 9066 in the spring of 1942, the MISLS was transferred to Camp Savage, Minnesota where it continued to recruit, train and graduate successive classes of Japanese linguist specialists at roughly six month intervals totaling some 1,600 graduates. The ever- increasing enrollment overtaxed the facilities at Camp Savage forcing the MISLS to move to larger facilities at nearby Fort Snelling in the spring of 1944. Here, classes training WAC students, oral language training and occupation civil affairs administration were added to the curriculum. By V-J Day in August 1945, 10 classes had been trained and graduated from MISLS at Camp Savage and Fort Snelling and another 3,000 students were enrolled and learning Japanese at the Snelling facilities at that time. In all, during its history MISLS trained and graduated 6,000 students for combat and occupational duty against Japan in World War II. In June 1946, MISLS was then moved to the Presidio at Monterey, California and was renamed the Defense Language Institute where it teaches over 25 languages in the military intelligence field. MISLS graduates served in every combat theater and engaged in every major battle fought against Japan during World War II. Nisei linguists were assigned to and served with the United States Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force, as well as with British, Australian, New Zealand, Canadian, Chinese, and Indian combat units fighting on all fronts against the Japanese. Trained for duties as interrogators, interpreters and translators, cave flushers, radio interceptors, radio announcers and propaganda writers, the MIS graduates served as ``the intelligence eyes and ears'' of American and Allied Forces in the war against Japan. The Nisei linguists were sent out to serve in every battle front where war was being waged against the Japanese enemy. South Pacific Command: Commencing in May 1942 Nisei linguist teams were sent out from Admiral Halsey's command headquarters in New Caledonia to participate in the battle for Guadalcanal where Japan suffered its first defeat, in the invasion of New Georgia and Bougainville and in the encirclement and cut off of Rabaul, New Britain to neutralize Japan's main Pacific stronghold. In April 1943, linguist Harold Fudenna intercepted and translated a Japanese radio message which outlined the schedule of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto's inspection trip to Bougainville. American P-38 fighters flown out of Guadalcanal intercepted and shot down Yamamoto's plane over Bougainville. General McArthur described this incident as ``one of the singularly most significant actions of the Pacific War.'' Southwest Pacific Command: In July 1942 General McArthur established the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, ATIS, of his Intelligence Division in Melbourne, Australia to become the largest military intelligence center to wage the tactical war against Japan. Throughout its history over 3,000 Nisei linguists served with ATIS, translating over 350,000 captured Japanese documents and interrogating more than 10,000 Japanese POWs. Nisei language teams were assigned to and participated in the two-year campaign of jungle warfare along the east and northern coast of New Guinea and Borneo, invading and defeating Japanese defenses along the way. The Nisei were part of the invasion of the Philippines in October 1944 where General McArthur made his triumphal ``I have returned'' landing at Leyte. In March 1944, the ``Z'' Plan containing Japan's total defense strategy for the Western Pacific fell into American hands following the fatal crash of Admiral Koga in the Philippines. The document was rushed to ATIS in Australia where two Nisei, Yoshikazu Yamada and George ``Sankey'' Yamashiro, translated the ``Z'' Plan, and copies were distributed to every command in the U.S. Navy. When the invasion of the Marianas Islands began in June 1944, the counterattacking Japanese aircraft were virtually wiped out by U.S. Navy carrier planes in ``The Great Marianas Turkey Shoot'' by virtue of the prior knowledge of Japanese strategy contained in the ``Z'' Plan. Southeast Asia Command. (CBI Theater): Nisei linguists joined British, Indian, Chinese and U.S. forces in the China-Burma-India Theater to drive Japanese invaders out of Burma and to reestablish the Burma Road supply lines to China. They were part of the two ground forces in Burma, the Merrill's Marauders and Mars Task Force, performed guerrilla tactics behind the enemy lines with the OSS Detachment 101, provided radio intercept work for the 10th Army Air force, manned the Southeast Asia Translator & Interrogation Center, SEATIC, in New Delhi, India, made propaganda broadcasts for the Office of War Information, and were leased out to the British forces fighting in southern Burma. In China, Nisei MIS performed intelligence services for the ``Dixie Mission'' to Communist China Headquarters at Yenan and OSS Detachment 202 in Kunming, and fought with Chiang Kai Shek's Forces against the Japanese in southwestern China. Central Pacific Command: Admiral Nimitz organized the ``Joint Intelligence Center Pacific Ocean Area (JICPOA) operating out of Pearl Harbor, staffed by hundreds of Nisei translator/interrogators who were assigned out to serve with the U.S. Army, Navy, Marine and Air Force units waging the Pacific War against Japan. Nisei participated in the amphibious landings and land battles of the Marine Corps to capture Tarawa, Makin, Kwajalein and Eniwetok and were part of Marine and Army attacking units invading and capturing Saipan, Iwo Jima and Okinawa. Nisei radio interceptors flew as crews on U.S. Air Force bombing missions over the Japanese mainland. With their language skills they called into caves at Saipan, Iwo Jima and Okinawa to persuade hundreds of Japanese soldiers and civilian natives to surrender and save their lives without needless mortality. T/Sgt Hoichi Kubo assigned to the U.S. 27th Division entered a cliffside cave alone at Saipan to face 9 armed Japanese soldiers to successfully persuade them not only to release the 120 civilians held captive there but for the soldiers themselves to surrender. Kubo was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, the highest decoration received by any Nisei in the Pacific War. Nisei linguists attached to the front line of American invading forces not only assumed the normal hazards of combat but also faced the additional danger of being mistaken for an enemy Jap and shot at by their own troops, so they were assigned personal bodyguards at their sides at all times! Japan's Surrender and Occupation: With the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan accepted the terms of the Potsdam Declaration and surrendered on August 15, 1945. OSS Nisei like Fumio Kido, Dick Hamada and Ralph Yempuku parachuted down into Japanese POW prison camps at Hankow, Mukden, Peiping and Hainan as interpreters on mercy missions to liberate American and Allied prisoners. Over 5,000 Nisei served as the vital link between General MacArthur's Occupational headquarters and the Japanese people during the seven year occupation of Japan, contributing to the promotion of peaceful and harmonious relationships between occupation forces and Japanese citizens. Nisei were part of military government offices established all over Japan to ensure proper implementation of occupational policies, interpreting the directives and verifying that local governments carried them out. Nisei buttressed U.S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps efforts to detect and prevent subversive activities against Occupation Forces, screened hundreds of thousands of Japanese soldiers repatriating back to Japan against communist influences, helped design the Land Reform Law, and provided vital translator/ interpreter services at the War Crimes Trials against Japanese war criminals. Nisei participated in every major assignment covering military government, disarmament, civil affairs and intelligence and helped to frame the new Japanese Constitution which pledged that Japan would ``forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation.'' A personal assessment of the Nisei's role in the occupation is stated by Harry Fukuhara, a combat veteran of the Southwest Pacific campaign and himself a member of the occupation forces, thusly: ``The role of the Military Intelligence Personnel during the Occupation of Japan also was very important in assisting the rapid recovery that helped Japan to be accepted back into the family of nations. Nisei soldiers, with their language fluency and knowledge of Japanese culture and customs, bridged the gap between U.S. forces and the Japanese government. This was one of the key elements contributing to the recovery of war-torn Japan, its people and economy. Nisei efforts also laid the groundwork for the bilateral relationships that exists today between the United States and Japan.'' Summary: Such in brief is the story of the Nisei MIS linguist, America's little known ``secret weapon'' against Japan during World War II. Their story is little known because their identity and their work was conducted under the strictest security and secrecy and their vital role in waging the successful intelligence war against Japan remained classified for until over 30 years after the War. Their role was considered indispensable because they possessed and employed the most effective weapon knowledge to be able to comprehend and pierce the enemy's complex, difficult language and their services contributed tremendously to the Allied victory. General MacArthur stated that ``Never in military history did any army know so much about the enemy prior to actual engagement.'' On April 1, 2000, the President of the United States bestowed upon the Nisei MIS the Presidential Unit Citation, the highest honor that can be awarded to any military unit. The major part of the citations reads: The key contributions made by the members of the Military Intelligence Service in providing valuable intelligence on military targets helped advance the United States and Allied cause during World War II and undoubtedly saved countless lives and hastened the end of the war. The significant achievements accomplished by the faithful and dedicated service of the linguistic-intelligence specialist graduates of the Military Intelligence Service will never be forgotten by our grateful nation. Their unconquerable sprit and gallant deeds under fire in the face of superior odds, and their self-sacrificing devotion to duty are worthy of the highest emulation. The Nisei served with distinction and honor; not a single case of subversion or disloyalty was ever charged against them. Little is known that nineteen Nisei gave up their lives in the line of duty in the Pacific War. They convincingly proved that Japanese Americans were more than willing and able to fight against an enemy of their own race, and validated the truism ``Americanism is not, and never was, a matter of race or ancestry. Americanism is a matter of the mind and heart.''

Mr. AKAKA

Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I rise today to express my concern over recent news reports detailing turmoil inside the Central Intelligence Agency since the arrival of the new Director, Porter Goss, and former members of his staff in the House of Representatives. As a senior member of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs with oversight responsibility for homeland security and the committee responsible for drafting the legislative reform on intelligence now in conference, I am deeply concerned about the impact the new leadership at the CIA may have on our national security. Since the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, the Congress has been engaged as never before in efforts to reform our intelligence collection capability in terms of our ability to improve the technical means to collect and share critical information in a timely fashion. The key component to that reform is human capital. Time and time again in outside commissions, reports to the Congress, and in hearings, we have been told that our intelligence and law enforcement communities lack sufficient qualified personnel to collect and analyze information. I introduced legislation, S. 589, the Homeland Security Federal Workforce Act, which passed the Senate with bipartisan support last year and is now in the House, to help rectify that problem. Other Members of Congress on both sides of the aisle have also introduced legislation to improve our intelligence and law enforcement workforce. This is why I am so disturbed by the news reports that senior members of the CIA are being forced to resign, are being pressured to fire subordinates, and there are fears that they may even be asked to tailor their analysis to support the administration's policies, according to the November 17, 2004, New York Times. I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in the Record following my remarks.

Mr. AKAKA. Among those who have been forced out or retired recently are the Deputy Director of the CIA, the Deputy Director of Operations, the second ranking member of the clandestine service, and the former head of the CIA bin Laden unit. Other resignations, retirements, or reassignments may follow. Apparently, Director Goss brought with him at least 4 former staffers from the House of Representatives and inserted them into senior positions at the agency where they have begun to force these resignations. This is troubling for two reasons: First, we cannot afford to lose any intelligence personnel, especially seasoned officers, in the midst of the war on terrorism. We have so few people we cannot fully staff the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, TTIC, that the President created to provide a coordinated counterterrorism response to the 9/11 attacks. Secondly, our intelligence staff have been working 24/7 since the war on terrorism and the war in Iraq began. They need morale boosters, not the morale downers that come from the forced resignations of well-respected leaders. So desperate is the personnel situation that the intelligence reform bill, S. 2845, now in conference, authorizes the establishment of a National Intelligence Reserve Corps for the temporary reemployment of former intelligence community employees during periods of emergency. Some would argue that the CIA is a ``damaged agency'' that needs to be reformed through ``hard love.'' Perhaps that is the case. Perhaps the operations directorate needs to be given new direction. I understand that both President Clinton and President Bush, in his first term, were focused on reforming the clandestine operations through the efforts of Director Tenet and that those reforms were yielding results. But if those results are insufficient, more needs to be done. If a ship needs to change course and requires a new crew, the new crew needs to knows both how to pilot a ship and how to plot a course. So far, the current upheaval at the Central Intelligence Agency makes me worry that the current new crew may not measure up to that challenge. I would like to be proved wrong because our national security depends on it. Exhibit 1 [From the New York Times, Nov. 17, 2004] New C.I.A. Chief Tells Workers To Back Administration Policies (By Douglas Jehl) Washington, Nov. 16.--Porter J. Goss, the new intelligence chief, has told Central Intelligence Agency employees that their job is to ``support the administration and its policies in our work,'' a copy of an internal memorandum shows. ``As agency employees we do not identify with, support or champion opposition to the administration or its policies,'' Mr. Goss said in the memorandum, which was circulated late on Monday. He said in the document that he was seeking ``to clarify beyond doubt the rules of the road.'' While his words could be construed as urging analysts to conform with administration policies, Mr. Goss also wrote, ``We provide the intelligence as we see it--and let the facts alone speak to the policymaker.'' The memorandum suggested an effort by Mr. Goss to spell out his thinking as he embarked on what he made clear would be a major overhaul at the agency, with further changes to come. The changes to date, including the ouster of the agency's clandestine service chief, have left current and former intelligence officials angry and unnerved. Some have been outspoken, including those who said Tuesday that they regarded Mr. Goss's warning as part of an effort to suppress dissent within the organization. In recent weeks, White House officials have complained that some C.I.A. officials have sought to undermine President Bush and his policies. At a minimum, Mr. Goss's memorandum appeared to be a swipe against an agency decision under George J. Tenet, his predecessor as director of central intelligence, to permit a senior analyst at the agency, Michael Scheuer, to write a book and grant interviews that were critical of the Bush administration's policies on terrorism. One former intelligence official said he saw nothing inappropriate in Mr. Goss's warning, noting that the C.I.A. had long tried to distance itself and its employees from policy matters. ``Mike exploited a seam in the rules and inappropriately used it to express his own policy views,'' the official said of Mr. Scheuer. ``That did serious damage to the agency, because many people, including some in the White House, thought that he was being urged by the agency to take on the president. I know that was not the case.'' But a second former intelligence official said he was concerned that the memorandum and the changes represented an effort by Mr. Goss to stifle independence. ``If Goss is asking people to color their views and be a team player, that's not what people at C.I.A. signed up for,'' said the former intelligence official. The official and others interviewed in recent days spoke on condition that they not be named, saying they did not want to inflame tensions at the agency. Some of the contents of Mr. Goss's memorandum were first reported by The Washington Post. A complete copy of the document was obtained on Tuesday by The New York Times. Tensions between the agency's new leadership team, which took over in late September, and senior career officials are more intense than at any time since the late 1970's. The most significant changes so far have been the resignations on Monday of Stephen R. Kappes, the deputy director of operations, and his deputy, Michael Sulick, but Mr. Goss told agency employees in the memorandum that he planned further changes ``in the days and weeks ahead of us'' that would involve ``procedures, organization, senior personnel and areas of focus for our action.'' ``I am committed to sharing these changes with you as they occur,'' Mr. Goss said in the memorandum. ``I do understand it is easy to be distracted by both the nature and the pace of change. I am confident, however, that you will remain deeply committed to our mission.'' Mr. Goss's memorandum included a reminder that C.I.A. employees should ``scrupulously honor our secrecy oath'' by allowing the agency's public affairs office and its Congressional relations branch to take the lead in all contacts with the media and with Congress. ``We remain a secret organization,'' he said. Among the moves that Mr. Goss said he was weighing was the selection of a candidate to become the agency's No. 2 official, the deputy director of central intelligence. The name being mentioned most often within the C.I.A. as a candidate, intelligence officials said, is Lt. Gen. Michael V. Hayden of the Air Force, the director of the National Security Agency, which is responsible for intercepting electronic communications worldwide. The naming of a deputy director would be made by the White House, in a nomination subject to Senate confirmation. In interviews this week, members of Congress as well as current and former intelligence officials said one reason the overhaul under way had left them unnerved was that Mr. Goss had not made clear what kind of agency he intended to put in place. But Mr. Goss's memorandum did little to spell out that vision, and it did not make clear why the focus of overhaul efforts to date appeared to be on the operations directorate, which carries out spying and other covert missions around the world. ``It's just very hard to divine what's going on over there,'' said Senator Ron Wyden, Democrat of Oregon, who said he and other members of the Senate intelligence committee would be seeking answers at closed sessions this week. ``But on issue after issue, there's a real question about whether the country and the Congress are going to get an unvarnished picture of our intelligence situation at a critical time.'' Mr. Goss said in the memorandum that he recognized that intelligence officers were operating in an atmosphere of extraordinary pressures, after a series of reports critical of intelligence agencies' performance in the months leading up to the Sept. 11 attacks and the war in Iraq. ``The I.C. and its people have been relentlessly scrutinized and criticized,'' he said, using an abbreviation for intelligence community. ``Intelligence-related issues have become the fodder of partisan food fights and turf-power skirmishes. All the while, the demand for our services and products against a ruthless and unconventional enemy has expanded geometrically and we are expected to deliver-- instantly. We have reason to be proud of our achievements and we need to be smarter about how we do our work in this operational climate.''

Mr. AKAKA

Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I want to express my sincere gratitude to Senator Kyl particularly and also to Senator Domenici for working with us on our Hawaiian bill. Especially I want to express my gratitude for your grace and your commitment for next year. Again, I want to do this, as we say in Hawaii, with much aloha.

Mr. AKAKA

Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I commend the Senator from Iowa for his stalwart stand for the farmers of America. He has been a strong Member of the Senate for our farmers over the years. I commend him for his statement. Mr. President, I rise to express my views on the conference report to accompany H.R. 4520, the Jumpstart Our Business Strength Act, to be on record as to why I voted against cloture. On balance, although the package contains a number of helpful provisions, it ultimately falls short of what we owe to the people of my State and the people of this country. Initially, I would like to thank my colleagues for their hard work on this bill, which contains some good provisions to help American businesses and works toward ending harmful tariffs currently placed on many of our exports. The conference report also contains some much- needed boosts for renewable energy and renewable fuels. It will expand production tax credits to include renewable sources of electricity, such as geothermal and solar energy, landfill gas, trash combustion, and open-loop biomass. It will provide a per-gallon excise tax credit for ethanol blended by refineries and a 50-cent-per-gallon income tax credit for each gallon of biodiesel used or sold as fuel. As a longtime advocate for renewable and alternative energy sources, I believe these incentives are important to help our renewable energy businesses in Hawaii increase the amount of renewable energy used to produce electricity. However, there is much more that the final conference agreement lacks that leaves me no choice but to oppose the measure. For example, I am disappointed that some of the measures in S. 476, the CARE Act, which passed the Senate by an overwhelming vote of 95 to 5, did not make it into the bill. In particular, section 310 of the Senate's CARE Act bill is important for our teaching hospitals. The provision allows support organizations to utilize debt to improve teaching hospitals' real estate endowment. This would assist charitable teaching hospitals in my State of Hawaii and other States as well. Regrettably, this provision was not incorporated into the conference report. I supported another provision in an amendment offered by my colleague from Louisiana, Senator Landrieu, that the Senate accepted by voice vote. This amendment sought to improve the credit for employers of the men and women in the Ready Reserve or National Guard who have been called to active military duty. In light of large deployments underway in my State of Hawaii and other areas of the U.S.--as the Senator from Louisiana said earlier, about 57 percent of Hawaii's Guard and Reserves have been called up--this was a very significant amendment to show that we honor the commitment that the Reserves and Guard have made to our country. I am very disappointed that this amendment was stripped in conference, despite a strong show of support by this body. I understand that there may be efforts to try to rectify this problem, and I hope that we get somewhere, but it should have been remedied during conference on this measure. I am pleased that the bill includes long-awaited provisions to shut down certain abusive tax shelters. However, as meaningful as some of those tax loophole closers are, the Senate had sought a stronger package to further restore faith in corporate America. Although this represents a missed opportunity, I hope that we will revisit the matter in the next Congress. In addition, I am pleased that the conferees heeded calls for fiscal responsibility and used provisions such as those ending tax shelters to fully offset the package. However, depending on whether the leadership of our Nation or this body changes next month, we may face tremendous additional costs years from now when tax cut extensions and expansions in the package are further extended or possibly made permanent. I hope that we are able to stick to fiscal prudence when working on future tax cut measures, given important domestic and international priorities that could continue to suffer from further major decreases in Federal revenues. I also oppose this bill because it represents a missed opportunity related to the U.S. Department of Labor's overtime regulations. Since the Department published its proposed overtime regulations in the Federal Register in March 2003, Members of Congress have been trying to improve the regulations to ensure that all workers are not adversely affected by these changes. However, our concerns have not been heard by this administration. Rather, this administration continues to disregard the wishes of the majority of the Members in this Chamber that believe certain portions of the overtime regulations will take away overtime protections for some workers. On May 4, 2004, the Senate passed an amendment introduced by Senator Harkin that would allow for full implementation of any regulations that expanded or improved overtime coverage, but would prohibit the Department of Labor from implementing any new rules which would take away overtime protections currently guaranteed. And, once again, in conference, the provision was taken away. Finally, an extremely important provision has been omitted from the conference report. By an overwhelming vote of 78 to 15, the Senate approved an amendment offered by my colleagues Senators Kennedy and DeWine to provide the Food and Drug Administration, FDA, with the authority to regulate tobacco products. I appreciate their leadership on this critical issue. For too long, the FDA has not been provided with the necessary authority to regulate a substance that causes so many lives to be lost. The Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids, American Heart Association, American Cancer Society, and American Lung Association sponsored the educational campaign piece behind me. As you can see, it features a young child, likely no older than 8 or 9 years old. Yet, children this age are too often the target audience of cartoon-like tobacco advertising that seeks to exploit them as part of a target market for cigarettes. According to the Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids, smoking is the leading cause of preventable deaths, killing approximately 400,000 people each year. The FDA must be provided with the authority to regulate tobacco products to help prevent children from becoming addicted and to make tobacco products less harmful than they are in their current form. It is estimated that 2,000 children are hooked on tobacco every day. Flavoring cigarettes is one of the tactics used to entice children and teenagers to start smoking. Right here, you can see an example of the marketing that was employed in this campaign. This summer, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company produced flavored cigarettes that used images of my home State of Hawaii and the name of one of our islands in an attempt to make smoking more attractive. One of the cigarettes, which was named Kauai Kolada, is flavored with ``Hawaiian hints of pineapple and coconut.'' I don't know if you can see this, but let me point it out right here. Another lime-flavored cigarette is featured in the same marketing campaign. I am outraged that a manufacturer of such a deadly product would exploit and, therefore, taint images and names from Hawaii in their attempts to lure children into smoking. It presents a false promise of paradise. The DeWine-Kennedy amendment would have prohibited flavored cigarettes, such as the Kauai Kolada, and restricted tobacco advertising. Any buyout for tobacco farmers must include FDA regulation. It is outrageous that this current Congress will fail to take necessary and justifiable steps to help protect our children and improve the public health of our country. It appears that certain tobacco companies want to continue to cultivate another generation of smokers so that they can increase their sale and reap more profits at the expense of the health and well-being of our families. Coming from a State that does not have a large manufacturing base, the bulk of this conference report will not apply. Given that fact, I still find it my duty to help American manufacturers for the good of our country, and I applaud the provisions in this conference report that do so. It is our manufacturers that help us maintain our status as an economic powerhouse in the world. However, as occurs with other large bills, there are enough things wrong with this final package and enough missed opportunities that I am unable to support it. I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. AKAKA

Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I rise to introduce the Taxpayer Abuse Prevention Act. Earned income tax credit (EITC) benefits intended for working families are increasingly being reduced by the growing use of refund anticipation loans, which typically carry triple digit interest rates. According to the Brookings Institution, an estimated $1.9 billion intended to assist low-income families was received by commercial tax preparers and affiliated national banks to pay for tax assistance, electronic filing of returns, and high-cost refund loans in 2002. The interest rates and fees charged on refund anticipation loans (RALs) are not justified for the short length of time that these loans cover and the minimal risk they present. These loans carry little risk because of the Debt Indicator program. The Debt Indicator (DI) is a service provided by the Internal Revenue Service that informs the lender whether or not an applicant owes Federal or State taxes, child support, student loans, or other government obligations, which assists the tax preparer in ascertaining the applicant's ability to obtain their full refund so that the RAL is repaid. The Department of the Treasury should not be facilitating these predatory loans that allow tax preparers to reap outrageous profits by exploiting working families. Unfortunately too many working families are susceptible to predatory lending because they are left out of the financial mainstream. Between 25 and 56 million adults are unbanked, or not using mainstream, insured financial institutions. The unbanked rely on alternative financial service providers to obtain cash from checks, pay bills, send remittances, utilize payday loans, and obtain credit. Many of the unbanked are low- and moderate-income families that can ill afford to have their earnings unnecessarily diminished by their reliance on these high-cost and often predatory financial services. In addition, the unbanked are unable to save securely to prepare for the loss of a job, a family illness, a down payment on a first home, or education expenses. My bill will protect consumers against predatory loans, reduce the involvement of the Department of the Treasury in facilitating the exploitation of taxpayers, and expand access to opportunities for saving and lending at mainstream financial services. My bill prohibits refund anticipation loans that utilize EITC benefits. Other Federal benefits, such as Social Security, have similar restrictions to ensure that the beneficiaries receive the intended benefit. My bill also limits several of the objectionable practices of RAL providers. My legislation will prohibit lenders from using tax refunds to collect outstanding obligations for previous RALs. In addition, mandatory arbitration clauses for RALs that utilize federal tax refunds would be prohibited to ensure that consumers have the ability to take future legal action if necessary in the future. I am deeply troubled that the Department of the Treasury plays such a prominent role in the facilitation and subsequent promotion of refund anticipation loans. In 1995, the use of the DI was suspended because of massive fraud in e-filed returns with RALs. After the program was discontinued, RAL participation declined. The use of the DI was reinstated in 1999, according to H&R Block, to ``assist with screening for electronic filing fraud and is also expected to substantially reduce refund anticipation loan pricing.'' Although RAL prices were expected go down as a result of the reinstatement of the DI, this has not occurred. The Debt Indicator should once again be stopped. The DI is helping tax preparers make excessive profits of low- and moderate- income taxpayers who utilize the service. If the Debt Indicator is removed, then the loans become riskier and the tax preparers may not aggressively market them among EITC filers. The IRS should not be aiding efforts that take the earned benefit away from low-income families and allow unscrupulous preparers to take advantage of low- income taxpayers. My bill terminates the DI program. In addition, my bill removes the incentive to meet Congressionally mandated electronic filing goals by facilitating the exploitation of taxpayers. My bill would prevent any electronically filed tax returns that resulted in tax refunds that were distributed by refund anticipation loans from being counted towards the goal established by the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 that the IRS have at least 80 percent of all returns filed electronically by 2007. My bill also expands access to mainstream financial services. Electronic Transfer Accounts (ETA) are low-cost accounts at banks and credit unions that are intended for recipients of certain Federal benefit payments. Currently, ETAs are provided for recipients of other federal benefits such as Social Security payments. My bill expands the eligibility for ETAs to include EITC benefits. These accounts will allow taxpayers to receive direct deposit refunds into an account without the need for a RAL. Furthermore, my bill would mandate that low- and moderate-income taxpayers be provided opportunities to open low-cost accounts at federally insured banks or credit unions via appropriate tax forms. Providing taxpayers with the option of opening a bank or credit union account through the use of tax forms provides an alternative to RALs and provides immediate access to the opportunities found at banks and credit unions. I want to thank my colleagues, Senator Bingaman and Senator Durbin for cosponsoring the legislation. I also thank Representative Jan Schakowsky for introducing the companion legislation in the other body. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the Taxpayer Abuse Prevention Act be printed following my remarks. I also ask unanimous consent that the text of a support letter from the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now, the Children's Defense Fund, the Consumer Federation of America, Consumers Union, and the National Consumer Law Center, be printed in the Record. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill and a letter be printed in the Record.

Mr. AKAKA

Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I rise to introduce the Taxpayer Abuse Prevention Act. Earned income tax credit (EITC) benefits intended for working families are increasingly being reduced by the growing use of refund anticipation loans, which typically carry triple digit interest rates. According to the Brookings Institution, an estimated $1.9 billion intended to assist low-income families was received by commercial tax preparers and affiliated national banks to pay for tax assistance, electronic filing of returns, and high-cost refund loans in 2002. The interest rates and fees charged on refund anticipation loans (RALs) are not justified for the short length of time that these loans cover and the minimal risk they present. These loans carry little risk because of the Debt Indicator program. The Debt Indicator (DI) is a service provided by the Internal Revenue Service that informs the lender whether or not an applicant owes Federal or State taxes, child support, student loans, or other government obligations, which assists the tax preparer in ascertaining the applicant's ability to obtain their full refund so that the RAL is repaid. The Department of the Treasury should not be facilitating these predatory loans that allow tax preparers to reap outrageous profits by exploiting working families. Unfortunately too many working families are susceptible to predatory lending because they are left out of the financial mainstream. Between 25 and 56 million adults are unbanked, or not using mainstream, insured financial institutions. The unbanked rely on alternative financial service providers to obtain cash from checks, pay bills, send remittances, utilize payday loans, and obtain credit. Many of the unbanked are low- and moderate-income families that can ill afford to have their earnings unnecessarily diminished by their reliance on these high-cost and often predatory financial services. In addition, the unbanked are unable to save securely to prepare for the loss of a job, a family illness, a down payment on a first home, or education expenses. My bill will protect consumers against predatory loans, reduce the involvement of the Department of the Treasury in facilitating the exploitation of taxpayers, and expand access to opportunities for saving and lending at mainstream financial services. My bill prohibits refund anticipation loans that utilize EITC benefits. Other Federal benefits, such as Social Security, have similar restrictions to ensure that the beneficiaries receive the intended benefit. My bill also limits several of the objectionable practices of RAL providers. My legislation will prohibit lenders from using tax refunds to collect outstanding obligations for previous RALs. In addition, mandatory arbitration clauses for RALs that utilize federal tax refunds would be prohibited to ensure that consumers have the ability to take future legal action if necessary in the future. I am deeply troubled that the Department of the Treasury plays such a prominent role in the facilitation and subsequent promotion of refund anticipation loans. In 1995, the use of the DI was suspended because of massive fraud in e-filed returns with RALs. After the program was discontinued, RAL participation declined. The use of the DI was reinstated in 1999, according to H&R Block, to ``assist with screening for electronic filing fraud and is also expected to substantially reduce refund anticipation loan pricing.'' Although RAL prices were expected go down as a result of the reinstatement of the DI, this has not occurred. The Debt Indicator should once again be stopped. The DI is helping tax preparers make excessive profits of low- and moderate- income taxpayers who utilize the service. If the Debt Indicator is removed, then the loans become riskier and the tax preparers may not aggressively market them among EITC filers. The IRS should not be aiding efforts that take the earned benefit away from low-income families and allow unscrupulous preparers to take advantage of low- income taxpayers. My bill terminates the DI program. In addition, my bill removes the incentive to meet Congressionally mandated electronic filing goals by facilitating the exploitation of taxpayers. My bill would prevent any electronically filed tax returns that resulted in tax refunds that were distributed by refund anticipation loans from being counted towards the goal established by the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 that the IRS have at least 80 percent of all returns filed electronically by 2007. My bill also expands access to mainstream financial services. Electronic Transfer Accounts (ETA) are low-cost accounts at banks and credit unions that are intended for recipients of certain Federal benefit payments. Currently, ETAs are provided for recipients of other federal benefits such as Social Security payments. My bill expands the eligibility for ETAs to include EITC benefits. These accounts will allow taxpayers to receive direct deposit refunds into an account without the need for a RAL. Furthermore, my bill would mandate that low- and moderate-income taxpayers be provided opportunities to open low-cost accounts at federally insured banks or credit unions via appropriate tax forms. Providing taxpayers with the option of opening a bank or credit union account through the use of tax forms provides an alternative to RALs and provides immediate access to the opportunities found at banks and credit unions. I want to thank my colleagues, Senator Bingaman and Senator Durbin for cosponsoring the legislation. I also thank Representative Jan Schakowsky for introducing the companion legislation in the other body. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the Taxpayer Abuse Prevention Act be printed following my remarks. I also ask unanimous consent that the text of a support letter from the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now, the Children's Defense Fund, the Consumer Federation of America, Consumers Union, and the National Consumer Law Center, be printed in the Record. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill and a letter be printed in the Record.

Mr. AKAKA

Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I rise today to commend my colleagues on the adoption of amendment No. 3765 to S. 2845, the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, which will create an Office of Geospatial Management within the Department of Homeland Security, DHS. This amendment originated as a stand alone bill, S. 1230, which was introduced by Senator Allard and amended by Senators Collins, Lieberman, and myself in a Governmental Affairs Committee business meeting. I thank Senator Allard, who shares my interest in geospatial information sharing, for offering this amendment, as well as Senators Collins and Lieberman for their continued support on this issue. Much of the discussion that has grown from the 9/11 Commission report has centered around the institutional stovepipes that impede information sharing within the Government, which is why this amendment is so important. While the term ``geospatial'' is foreign to many, the tools it describes are relied upon by all. The 9/11 Commission recommended that the President ``lead a government-wide effort to bring major national security institutions into the information revolution.'' Geospatial coordination is a critical component of that effort. Geospatial technologies, such as satellite imagery and aerial photography, provide data that create the maps and charts that can help prevent a disaster from occurring or lessen the impact of an unforeseeable event by equipping first responders with up-to-date information. In the event of a terrorist chemical attack, knowing which way a contaminated plume will travel can save lives. Similarly, the damage of a natural disaster, such as a wildfire, can be lessened by maps that help predict which areas will be in the path of the blaze. All levels of government are more effective and efficient when employing geospatial technology, especially in the area of homeland security. According to DHS, geospatial information is used for intelligence, law enforcement, first response, disaster recovery, and agency management--virtually every function of the Department. When the Department was created in 2003, it brought together components from 22 separate agencies, each of which managed its geospatial needs independently. In the past year, the Department has encountered significant difficulties integrating personnel, financial systems, and computer systems from the legacy agencies. Geospatial information has been no different. A September 2004 Government Accountability Office, GAO, report entitled ``Maritime Security: Better Planning Needed to Help Ensure Effective Port Security Assessment Program,'' found that the development of a geographic information system, GIS--GIS is often used as a synonym for geospatial to map the Nation's most strategic ports would greatly benefit the Coast Guard as it implements the Port Security Assessment Program. A GIS would integrate all security information pertaining to one port into a single database so that it is easily accessible and can be frequently updated. In addition, it would give the Coast Guard the ability to visually map a port so that it can quickly identify the location and surrounding environment of an at-risk container before deploying a response team, for example. However, GAO also found that: The Coast Guard lacks a strategy that clearly defines how the (GIS) program will be managed, how much it will cost, or what activities will continue over the long term. The legacy agencies that make up DHS had traditionally managed their own geospatial procurement. But many of the homeland and non-homeland security missions of DHS complement each other. Sharing maps and data reduces redundancy, provides savings, and ensures better information for disaster response. Currently, the DHS Chief Information Officer, CIO, is working to break down this geospatial stovepiping within the Department by naming a Geospatial Information Officer. However, there is no single office in DHS officially responsible for geospatial management and, therefore, no corresponding budget. In the present structure, the Geospatial Information Officer does not have the authority to compel the five DHS directorates to cooperate with his efforts. The entire agency should make geospatial coordination a priority. A geospatial management office needs to be created and codified within DHS. A congressionally mandated office would give the Geospatial Information Officer more authority with which to do this job. The Office of Geospatial Management has the potential to significantly increase the quality of the resources homeland security officials rely on by reducing redundancy and improving the quality of geospatial procurement. But in order to do this it needs authority and funding. This office would also serve as a mechanism for coordinating with State and local authorities. Much of the geospatial information available today is created at the State and local levels. Centralizing this information will make it more widely available to first responders and other homeland security officials. In order to facilitate this process, it is also important that local governments initiate their own coordination efforts. In June 2003, the city of Honolulu conducted a pilot program to foster geospatial coordination and collaboration among public and private stakeholders in critical infrastructure protection. Representatives from local and State government, utility companies, and other private organizations came together to identify potential impediments to geospatial information sharing in Honolulu and to develop a plan to circumvent those impediments. I commend the government of the City and County of Honolulu for hosting such an exemplary event. This sort of commitment at a local level is crucial to breaking down the geospatial stovepipes that exist at all levels of government. I hope other cities will follow suit. This amendment will help DHS to better coordinate its activities, and will ultimately make our Nation safer and prevent duplicative spending. I appreciate my colleagues' endorsement of this important issue, and urge that this language be maintained in the final version of the intelligence reorganization bill that is sent to the President.

Mr. AKAKA

Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I rise today to engage in a colloquy concerning language in the Senate version of H.R. 4567, the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, regarding the distribution of the port security grant program. Under current policy, any port designated as a critical national seaport terminal may apply for a port security grant even though the grants are funded through the Urban Area Security Initiative, UASI, grant program. I would like to clarify that it is the intent of Congress that the port security grant program continue to be administered in this manner, and not limited to ports in UASI cities, as such a policy would deprive many American ports of crucial security funding. I would like to ask my distinguished colleague from Mississippi if he agrees that it is the intent of Congress to continue the distribution of port security grants to all national critical seaports as has been done in the past?

Mr. AKAKA

Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I rise today to express my concern that we need to do much more and do it much sooner to address the threat posed by Avian influenza and other infectious diseases. The Avian influenza outbreaks that occurred in late June 2004 indicate that the virus is becoming more pathogenic and more widespread according to World Health Organization, WHO, officials. In addition, this virus has crossed the species barrier, moving from infected chickens or ducks directly into humans in three documented outbreaks since 1997. I am most troubled, however, by a warning from WHO officials that the virus may acquire the ability to spread easily from human to human, and thus, trigger a global influenza pandemic. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, CDC, an influenza pandemic could cause an estimated 89,000 to 207,000 deaths, 314,000 to 733,000 hospitalizations, and cost from $71-$167 billion in the United States alone. We cannot afford to take this threat lightly. The so-called bird flu is deadly to humans. It killed 24 out of 35 people who contracted it from chickens in Thailand and Vietnam earlier this year. In July an additional three were killed in Vietnam. This fatality rate is in the same range as the Ebola virus which is considered one of the most virulent viral diseases known to man. Lack of effective treatment options for Avian flu contribute to its lethality. Creating an effective vaccine for the Avian influenza virus is extremely difficult. The virus is so deadly that a vaccine cannot easily be grown in eggs, the usual method of production. Other vaccine production methods are being studied, but the required extensive safety tests for a new vaccine mean that large scale vaccine distribution is not feasible in the near term. Equally disturbing is that only one drug is currently believed effective to treat Avian flu, an antiviral medicine called Tamiflu which helps only if taken within one to two days of developing symptoms of the disease. The WHO recently decided Tamiflu should be included in regional stockpiles to be distributed at the first sign of a new influenza virus spreading among humans. Unfortunately, if a pandemic of Avian flu were to occur now, the manufacturer of Tamiflu could not produce enough of the drug to meet the huge demand that would occur, and there is no generic substitute. In light of these very limited treatment options, we should heed the WHO's warning and take aggressive steps to prevent a pandemic from occurring while at the same time increasing our preparedness to respond to all public health emergencies by developing a global defense system against the outbreak of diseases, including those resulting from terrorist attacks. On July 31, 2003, I introduced S. Res. 208 to address this concern. The resolution seeks to improve American defenses against the spread of infectious diseases by calling for improvements in global disease surveillance capabilities because the early warning of a disease outbreak is key to its identification, the quick application of countermeasures, and the development a cure. The recent Presidential Directive 10, ``Biodefense for the 21st Century,'' observes that many bioterror attacks could initially mimic naturally occurring diseases and potentially delay recognition of an attack. This is another important reason why I believe that the United States must strengthen its ability to detect diseases before they cross our borders. To pursue this initiative, I along with Senators Bingaman, Dodd, Durbin, Feinstein, Inouye, Leahy, Levin, Lieberman, Murray, and Sarbanes sent a letter to President Bush urging his support for global health issues at the 2004 Group of Eight, G-8, Summit. Our letter underscored the need for better disease surveillance and reporting systems which are inclusive of all public health emergencies of international concern. I am pleased that the G-8 committed to take steps to expand and initiate new biosurveillance capabilities to detect bioterror against humans, animals, and crops; improve bioterrorism prevention and response capabilities; increase protection of the global food supply; and respond to, investigate, and mitigate the effects of alleged uses of biological weapons or suspicious outbreaks of disease. The administration followed the G-8 summit with the August release an updated draft of the 1978 Pandemic Influenza Response and Preparedness Plan for 60 days of public comment. This plan outlines the administration's proposed national strategy for preparing and responding to an influenza pandemic. Developing a strategy is good and the administration is to be commended for its concern, but far better would be committing more resources now to programs that have already been identified as critical to our preparedness. For example, the administration's fiscal year 2005 budget request, which cuts public health preparedness for State and local governments by more than $105 million and hospital preparedness funding at the Health Resources and Services Administration by $39 million, seriously calls into question the administration's commitment to ensuring that U.S. citizens are protected from bioterrorist events and other public health emergencies. I commend the President and the G-8 for expressing support for global health issues, but words and plans are not enough. We need action and we need action now. We must act together to reduce the grave threat that biological weapons and naturally occurring infectious diseases pose to the safety and security of the world. Adoption of S. 427, the Agriculture Security Assistance Act, and S. 430, the Agriculture Security Preparedness Act, which I introduced in 2003 to help protect our Nation from an agroterror attack, would be a good first step for the United States as we strive to live up to the promises made to our G-8 partners. S. 427 would assist states and communities in responding to threats to the agriculture industry by providing funding for biosecurity grants to farmers and community planning activities. S. 430 would enable better interagency coordination within the federal government as it works to plan and respond to a threat to American agriculture. We should also ensure that the National Security Council, and the Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Health and Human Services have the funding and support they need to fully implement the commitments made at the 2004 G-8 summit. CDC's fiscal year 2005 budget request for global disease detection shows an increase of $27.5 million over the fiscal year 2004 budget. However, this funding increase comes at the expense of other important public health initiatives. We should not be robbing Peter to pay Paul when it comes to the health and safety of our Nation. We must take action to increase WHO's global disease surveillance capability, including supporting their effort to revise the International Health Regulations by expanding the scope of required disease reporting to include all public health emergencies of international concern. An April 2004 Government Accountability Office, GAO, report on emerging infectious diseases, ``Asian SARS Outbreak Challenged International and National Responses,'' GAO-04-564, noted that the response by governments in SARS-affected countries was hindered by inadequate disease surveillance systems, poor communication, ineffective leadership, insufficient public health capacity, and limited resources. While the International Health Regulations provide the legal framework for global infectious disease control, WHO's Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network, GOARN, is the primary mechanism by which WHO mobilizes technical resources for the investigation of and response to disease outbreaks of international importance. The SARS outbreak was the first time that the GOARN network was activated on such a large scale for an international outbreak of an unknown emerging infectious disease. During the SARS outbreak, GOARN's human resources were stretched to capacity. GOARN experienced difficulty in sustaining the response to SARS over time and getting the appropriate experts out into the field. These difficulties in responding to and containing the SARS outbreak demonstrate the urgent need to strengthen our ability to respond to global health emergencies. For example, the CDC reported that if the United States had experienced many SARS cases during the global outbreak, CDC might not have been able to make as many of their staff available to assist GOARN. In light of this, the implications of a bioterror event or an influenza pandemic are chilling. The SARS outbreak sickened 8,089 people causing 774 deaths in 2003, and an influenza pandemic is estimated by CDC to affect 10 times as many people. CDC's fiscal year 2005 budget request for global disease detection is $50 million. This figure is not adequate when one considers that the SARS outbreak alone cost Asian economies $11 billion to $18 billion and resulted in losses of 0.5 percent to 2 percent of total output. If we multiply that by 10 for an influenza pandemic, the numbers are staggering. If we act now to increase funding for these programs, we have a chance to help prevent such a tragic situation from happening. By helping the world cope with infectious disease outbreaks we not only increase global public health, but help ensure the health and safety of the American people as well.

Mr. AKAKA

Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, today I congratulate the team of students from Iolani School of Honolulu, HI, for logging a national accomplishment in the National Economics Challenge recently held in New York City. The team traveled over 5,000 miles to represent not only Hawaii, but the western region in the competition, at which they achieved a second-place finish in their category, the David Ricardo division, which is for students enrolled in single-semester economics courses. The National Economics Challenge is sponsored by the National Council on Economic Education, NCEE, and the Goldman Sachs Foundation, which created the Challenge in 2000 to promote student interest in economics, reinforce classroom instruction, advance academics, and reward scholarship. Preliminary rounds began in April with more than 3,600 students on over 700 teams participating in 33 State and 4 regional competitions. I commend the Hawaii Council on Economic Education for sponsoring the State-level competition in my State and, on a constant basis, training teachers and working to improve economic and financial literacy in Hawaii's schools. Student teams in the final round at the national level faced difficult questions on complex economic concepts and theories involving microeconomics, macroeconomics, international economics, and current events. The final round of the competition was held before a crowd of hundreds at the New York High School of Economics and Finance in Manhattan. The Iolani team competed and placed second in their division, for which I congratulate them wholeheartedly. As a former teacher and principal, I am aware of the many hours of work that these students dedicated to develop the necessary knowledge to participate in this national competition. They have surmounted many challenges at the State, regional and national levels, and have emerged with not only a placing finish to show for it, but also the experiences and memories of all they have learned along the way. Economic and financial education are crucial components needed to build our future leaders, and I applaud all students who participate in this competition for their hard work. I am pleased to enter the names of the Iolani team members for the Record: Stephani Le, Kimberlee Collins, Kyle Sombrero, and Brando Inouye. I also take this opportunity to recognize their coach Richie Kibota for his contributions in helping the Iolani team prepare for the national competition. Of particular interest are their classmates and peers who rose to the same challenges, whose names I would also like to enter into the Record. This includes another Iolani School team who competed and placed at both State and regional levels in the Adam Smith division for advanced placement, international baccalaureate, and honors students, with team members Jeffrey Lawi, Brad Kawitaki, Ronald Kwok, Keone Nakoa, and Krystal Ching, and coach Dick Rankin. Also included are other Hawaii State participants: a third team from Iolani School and other teams from Kamehameha Schools, Maryknoll School, Kaimuki High School, and Nanakuli High and Intermediate School. Again, I congratulate the students and the faculty of Iolani School, and I join the people of Hawaii in expressing my pride in their impressive achievements. It is these types of efforts that are supported by the Excellence in Economic Education Act, and these kinds of efforts that will ensure that our students and future leaders have the tools they need to make wise economic and financial decisions.

Mr. AKAKA

Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I rise today to join my colleagues Senators Lieberman and Collins in introducing the Homeland Security Interagency and Interjurisdictional Information Sharing Act of 2004, a piece of legislation critical to improving the communication capabilities of first responders and among all levels of government. One of the most important lessons our Nation learned on September 11 is that information sharing, both between agencies and levels of government and between emergency first responders, is critical to the prevention of and response to a terrorist attack on our homeland. There has been much talk about breaking down stove pipes and fully equipping our heroic first responders in the past 3 years, but this bill points out those goals have not yet been met. The world watched as firefighters perished in the World Trade Center because their radios could not function inside the buildings and they did not have updated information about the imminent collapse of the towers. Ten months later it was reported that officers responding to a shooting at Los Angeles International Airport missed crucial information because they were not using the same radio frequency. Yet almost all cities and counties in the United States still lack an interoperable communications system today and many still lack the infrastructure to provide 100 percent coverage for the radio systems they do have. In my home State of Hawaii, first responders are unable to communicate through radios in 25 percent of the island of Hawaii because of a combination of lack of infrastructure and diverse geography. This problem can be solved, but it will require a commitment of not only funding but planning, communication and cooperation. The current SAFECOM initiative, which is supposed to address the interoperability problem, has failed in most, if not all, of these areas. While this issue clearly cannot be solved by one agency alone, the cross- government nature of SAFECOM crippled the program from the start. SAFECOM is supposed to be funded by multiple agencies meaning that if one agency is not in agreement with the others it can withhold funding and slow or stop activities. This formula has proven ineffective. The Homeland Security Interagency and Interjurisdictional Information Sharing Act will address these issues. The bill creates an Office of Information Sharing within the Department of Homeland Security to develop and implement a national strategy and provide the leadership, outreach, and technical assistance necessary to achieve interoperability. The new office would receive a direct line of funding for its operations as well as to provide grants to States and localities to develop interoperable networks. The bill would also require the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop a Homeland Security Information Sharing Network. The problem of informational stove piping will not be eradicated with ad hoc measures as is the practice today. The administration must institutionalize a system of sharing critical homeland security information among all levels of government. We are no longer in a ``need to know'' world. We must switch to a ``need to share'' mentality. Three years is too long for the lessons of September 11 to not be implemented. I urge my colleagues to support this important piece of legislation and I thank Senators Lieberman and Collins for their work on this issue.

Mr. AKAKA

Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I rise today to join my colleagues Senators Lieberman and Collins in introducing the Homeland Security Interagency and Interjurisdictional Information Sharing Act of 2004, a piece of legislation critical to improving the communication capabilities of first responders and among all levels of government. One of the most important lessons our Nation learned on September 11 is that information sharing, both between agencies and levels of government and between emergency first responders, is critical to the prevention of and response to a terrorist attack on our homeland. There has been much talk about breaking down stove pipes and fully equipping our heroic first responders in the past 3 years, but this bill points out those goals have not yet been met. The world watched as firefighters perished in the World Trade Center because their radios could not function inside the buildings and they did not have updated information about the imminent collapse of the towers. Ten months later it was reported that officers responding to a shooting at Los Angeles International Airport missed crucial information because they were not using the same radio frequency. Yet almost all cities and counties in the United States still lack an interoperable communications system today and many still lack the infrastructure to provide 100 percent coverage for the radio systems they do have. In my home State of Hawaii, first responders are unable to communicate through radios in 25 percent of the island of Hawaii because of a combination of lack of infrastructure and diverse geography. This problem can be solved, but it will require a commitment of not only funding but planning, communication and cooperation. The current SAFECOM initiative, which is supposed to address the interoperability problem, has failed in most, if not all, of these areas. While this issue clearly cannot be solved by one agency alone, the cross- government nature of SAFECOM crippled the program from the start. SAFECOM is supposed to be funded by multiple agencies meaning that if one agency is not in agreement with the others it can withhold funding and slow or stop activities. This formula has proven ineffective. The Homeland Security Interagency and Interjurisdictional Information Sharing Act will address these issues. The bill creates an Office of Information Sharing within the Department of Homeland Security to develop and implement a national strategy and provide the leadership, outreach, and technical assistance necessary to achieve interoperability. The new office would receive a direct line of funding for its operations as well as to provide grants to States and localities to develop interoperable networks. The bill would also require the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop a Homeland Security Information Sharing Network. The problem of informational stove piping will not be eradicated with ad hoc measures as is the practice today. The administration must institutionalize a system of sharing critical homeland security information among all levels of government. We are no longer in a ``need to know'' world. We must switch to a ``need to share'' mentality. Three years is too long for the lessons of September 11 to not be implemented. I urge my colleagues to support this important piece of legislation and I thank Senators Lieberman and Collins for their work on this issue.

Mr. AKAKA

Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, today I rise to introduce the Federal Employee's Protection of Disclosures Act. Last year I introduced similar legislation, S. 1358, to amend employee safeguards for disclosing government waste, fraud, and abuse with the support of Senators Grassley, Levin, Leahy, Durbin, Dayton, Pryor, Johnson, and Lautenberg. Today, I am pleased that we can introduce a strong bipartisan version of this legislation with the additional support of Senators Collins, Lieberman, Fitzgerald, and Voinovich. Thanks to the work of the bill's cosponsors, we have developed legislation that strikes the right balance between the protection of Federal whistleblowers and our national security. As my colleagues know, the events of September 11, 2001, have brought renewed attention to the security lapses at our Nation's airports, nuclear facilities, borders, and law enforcement agencies. However, in many cases, the current whistleblower system fails to protect those who would disclose information that could ensure the safety and welfare of the American people. As of May 2004, Federal whistleblowers have prevailed on the merits of their claims before the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals only once since 1994. This record sends the wrong message. How can we expect civil servants to protect and defend the United States when we permit agencies to retaliate against them for doing their job? I know the Department of Justice (DOJ) has objected to previous legislation concerning this problem. This comes as no surprise as the Department has an institutional conflict of interest with restoring whistleblower rights as it is charged with defending agencies charged with retaliating against the whistleblower. Nonetheless, I have worked with my colleagues on the Governmental Affairs Committee to address some the concerns raised by the Justice Department while still protecting federal employees. One of the most significant changes in the bill relates to the protection of employees who find their security clearances stripped as a means of retaliation for blowing the whistle. Current law does not permit the whistleblower to have his or her case heard by an independent adjudicator when this type of retaliation occurs. Under our bill, the whistleblower would be able to bring a case before the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) on an expedited basis when the employing agency revokes, suspends, denies, or makes another determination in relation to an employee's security clearance or access to classified materials. However, the employing agency need only prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have taken the action against the employee irrespective the whistleblower's disclosure. By lowering the burden of proof for the employing agency from clear and convincing, as is the standard with other whistleblower cases, to preponderance of the evidence, our legislation strikes a balance between having an open and transparent process for whistleblowers and the need to make security clearance or access determinations in the interests of national security. The Department of Justice was also concerned with a provision in the prior bill, S. 1358, which granted independent litigating authority to the Special Counsel. In testimony before the Governmental Affairs Committee last November, the Department claimed that extending this authority to the Special Counsel would usurp DOJ's traditional unifying role as the Executive Branch's representative in court. The Department also claimed that the provision would undermine a number of important policy goals, including the presentation of uniform positions on significant legal issues and the objective litigation of cases by attorneys unaffected by concerns of a single agency that may be inimical to the interests of the Government as a whole. However, many agencies have independent litigating authority, including the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the MSPB, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Federal Labor Relations Authority. Moreover, interagency disputes are not unique. It is inappropriate for the Office of Special Counsel (OSC), the agency charged with protecting the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA), to seek approval from DOJ, the agency charged with protecting agencies alleged to have retaliated against whistleblowers, in order to carry out its mission. Nonetheless, our bill would not provide the Special Counsel with independent litigating authority but rather provide it with independent authority to file amicus briefs with federal courts. This authority will allow the Special Counsel to protect the WPA while addressing concerns raised by the Justice Department. In addition, our compromise measure would still provide protection to whistleblowers subject to retaliatory investigations, but not for routine or non-discretionary investigations of the employee and codify the definition of reasonable belief an employee must have in order to determine when an employee has made a protected disclosure. I am pleased that our new bill, among other things, retains language restoring congressional intent regarding the definition of a protected disclosure, codifying the anti-gag provision that has been in every appropriations law since 1988, and establishing a more reasonable test for determining government mismanagement instead of irrefragable proof. According to the Federal Circuit, in order to determine that the federal government has engaged in gross mismanagement, the whistleblower must have irrefragable proof, meaning proof impossible to refute. The bill also retains language, subject to a five-year sunset, providing whistleblowers the opportunity to have their cases heard by federal courts other than the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. These provisions are necessary to facilitate disclosures of government mismanagement in order for Congress to do its job and make informed decisions when carrying out its legislative, appropriation, and oversight functions for the protection the American people. Our government is responsible for services and programs that touch all Americans. The Federal employees who carry out these responsibilities on behalf of the American people must be able to communicate with Congress without fear of losing their jobs when reporting threats to public health and safety and government mismanagement. We must have a credible and functioning WPA. I urge my colleagues to support this bipartisan bill and ensure real protection for Federal whistleblowers. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. AKAKA

Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, today I rise to introduce the Federal Employee's Protection of Disclosures Act. Last year I introduced similar legislation, S. 1358, to amend employee safeguards for disclosing government waste, fraud, and abuse with the support of Senators Grassley, Levin, Leahy, Durbin, Dayton, Pryor, Johnson, and Lautenberg. Today, I am pleased that we can introduce a strong bipartisan version of this legislation with the additional support of Senators Collins, Lieberman, Fitzgerald, and Voinovich. Thanks to the work of the bill's cosponsors, we have developed legislation that strikes the right balance between the protection of Federal whistleblowers and our national security. As my colleagues know, the events of September 11, 2001, have brought renewed attention to the security lapses at our Nation's airports, nuclear facilities, borders, and law enforcement agencies. However, in many cases, the current whistleblower system fails to protect those who would disclose information that could ensure the safety and welfare of the American people. As of May 2004, Federal whistleblowers have prevailed on the merits of their claims before the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals only once since 1994. This record sends the wrong message. How can we expect civil servants to protect and defend the United States when we permit agencies to retaliate against them for doing their job? I know the Department of Justice (DOJ) has objected to previous legislation concerning this problem. This comes as no surprise as the Department has an institutional conflict of interest with restoring whistleblower rights as it is charged with defending agencies charged with retaliating against the whistleblower. Nonetheless, I have worked with my colleagues on the Governmental Affairs Committee to address some the concerns raised by the Justice Department while still protecting federal employees. One of the most significant changes in the bill relates to the protection of employees who find their security clearances stripped as a means of retaliation for blowing the whistle. Current law does not permit the whistleblower to have his or her case heard by an independent adjudicator when this type of retaliation occurs. Under our bill, the whistleblower would be able to bring a case before the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) on an expedited basis when the employing agency revokes, suspends, denies, or makes another determination in relation to an employee's security clearance or access to classified materials. However, the employing agency need only prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have taken the action against the employee irrespective the whistleblower's disclosure. By lowering the burden of proof for the employing agency from clear and convincing, as is the standard with other whistleblower cases, to preponderance of the evidence, our legislation strikes a balance between having an open and transparent process for whistleblowers and the need to make security clearance or access determinations in the interests of national security. The Department of Justice was also concerned with a provision in the prior bill, S. 1358, which granted independent litigating authority to the Special Counsel. In testimony before the Governmental Affairs Committee last November, the Department claimed that extending this authority to the Special Counsel would usurp DOJ's traditional unifying role as the Executive Branch's representative in court. The Department also claimed that the provision would undermine a number of important policy goals, including the presentation of uniform positions on significant legal issues and the objective litigation of cases by attorneys unaffected by concerns of a single agency that may be inimical to the interests of the Government as a whole. However, many agencies have independent litigating authority, including the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the MSPB, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Federal Labor Relations Authority. Moreover, interagency disputes are not unique. It is inappropriate for the Office of Special Counsel (OSC), the agency charged with protecting the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA), to seek approval from DOJ, the agency charged with protecting agencies alleged to have retaliated against whistleblowers, in order to carry out its mission. Nonetheless, our bill would not provide the Special Counsel with independent litigating authority but rather provide it with independent authority to file amicus briefs with federal courts. This authority will allow the Special Counsel to protect the WPA while addressing concerns raised by the Justice Department. In addition, our compromise measure would still provide protection to whistleblowers subject to retaliatory investigations, but not for routine or non-discretionary investigations of the employee and codify the definition of reasonable belief an employee must have in order to determine when an employee has made a protected disclosure. I am pleased that our new bill, among other things, retains language restoring congressional intent regarding the definition of a protected disclosure, codifying the anti-gag provision that has been in every appropriations law since 1988, and establishing a more reasonable test for determining government mismanagement instead of irrefragable proof. According to the Federal Circuit, in order to determine that the federal government has engaged in gross mismanagement, the whistleblower must have irrefragable proof, meaning proof impossible to refute. The bill also retains language, subject to a five-year sunset, providing whistleblowers the opportunity to have their cases heard by federal courts other than the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. These provisions are necessary to facilitate disclosures of government mismanagement in order for Congress to do its job and make informed decisions when carrying out its legislative, appropriation, and oversight functions for the protection the American people. Our government is responsible for services and programs that touch all Americans. The Federal employees who carry out these responsibilities on behalf of the American people must be able to communicate with Congress without fear of losing their jobs when reporting threats to public health and safety and government mismanagement. We must have a credible and functioning WPA. I urge my colleagues to support this bipartisan bill and ensure real protection for Federal whistleblowers. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. AKAKA

Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I thank you very much for recognizing me. I rise today to express my extreme disappointment, along with the Senator from Idaho, Mr. Craig, with the actions of the majority leader in preventing the consideration of amendments, including amendment No. 3547, the Native Hawaiian Government Reorganization Act of 2004. Senator Inouye and I filed this amendment in an effort to have our legislation considered by the Senate. We have been working to enact this legislation now for the past 5 years. The Senate Committee on Indian Affairs has favorably reported this bill for the past three Congresses. Our legislation enjoys widespread support in Hawaii, and nationally also. We consider this a bipartisan measure. Our Governor supports it, our State legislature supports it, and a majority of our constituents support it. For 5 years we have worked to enact this bill which has effectively been blocked from Senate consideration by a few of our Senators who refuse to acknowledge native Hawaiians as indigenous peoples. We have the votes to pass this legislation. In fact, I am confident that we have the votes to succeed on a motion to proceed to S. 344. I must at this point say that S. 344 has been cosponsored by my colleague who preceded me, my colleague from Utah, who is cosponsoring S. 344 as a freestanding version of my amendment. Because of the kind of support we have here on both sides of the aisle, we are trying to have it considered. This is why we sought to have our legislation considered today--because we knew we could debate it quickly and pass it. I join my other colleagues in expressing my disappointment, again, with the procedural maneuvering that has occurred today. Thank you, Mr. President. I yield back my time.

Mr. AKAKA

Mr. AKAKA. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I ask that I be permitted 15 minutes to speak as in morning business.

Mr. AKAKA

Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I rise today to focus on the challenges facing America's working families. Rising health care costs, increases in gasoline prices, and the lack of affordable housing have contributed to making the lives of working families more difficult as they strain to meet their day-to-day needs. The ability of these families to meet their increasing financial obligations is hampered by their significant debt burdens, particularly credit card debt, and by predatory lending practices such as refund anticipation loans. Mr. President, too many families are becoming overwhelmed by their debts. In 2003, consumer debt increased for the first time to more than $2 trillion, and continued to increase in March, 2004, for the 12th straight month according to the Federal Reserve. A key component of household debt can be attributed to the use of credit cards. Revolving debt, mostly comprised of credit card debt, has more than doubled from $313 billion in January 1994 to $756 billion in March 2004. These debt burdens will increase as interest rates rise. Bankruptcy filings have surged to record levels. In 2003, more than 1.6 million consumers filed for bankruptcy, increasing by 2.8 percent in the 12 months ending on March 30, 2004. Many of these are middle class Americans who continue to work hard to make ends meet. It is imperative that we make consumers more aware of the long-term effects of their financial decisions, particularly in managing their credit card debt. Obtaining credit has become easier. Students are offered credit cards at earlier ages, particularly since credit card companies have been successful with aggressive campaigns targeted towards college students. Universities and alumni associations across the country have entered into marketing agreements with credit card companies. For example, the University of Oklahoma will receive $13 million over 10 years in exchange for the exclusive ability to market credit cards to students, alumni, and employees, and to issue cards with the university's name. In this agreement, the school also receives 0.4 percent of every credit purchase. More than 1,000 universities and colleges have affinity cards which are made as attractive as possible through the opportunity to earn various benefits and discounts. College students make up a very ripe market for such credit and to boot are considered by some very good customers for lenders based on their payment patterns. Nina Prikazsky, Nellie Mae's Vice President of Operations, was quoted in the Chronicles of Higher Education as saying, ``Banks will take risks on young people the way they never would a decade ago, because they've discovered that students have become their best customers because they tend to make the minimum payments.'' Thus, college students, many already burdened with educational loans, are accumulating credit card debt. Forty-five percent of college students carry credit card debt, with the average debt over $3,000. While it is relatively easy to obtain credit, especially on college campuses, not enough is being done to ensure that credit is properly managed. Currently, credit card statements fail to include all of the information necessary to allow individuals to make fully informed financial decisions. Mr. President, I recently introduced S. 2475, the Credit Card Minimum Payment Warning Act, along with Senators Durbin, Leahy, and Schumer. Our legislation will make it very clear what costs consumers incur if they make only the minimum payments on their credit cards. The personalized information consumers will receive for each of their credit card accounts will help them to make informed choices about the payments that they choose to make towards their balance. The bill also requires that credit card companies provide useful information so that people can develop strategies to free themselves of credit card debt and have access to a toll-free number so that consumers can access trustworthy credit counselors. My bill represents sound legislation that aims to protect middle income and other families in this country. Mr. President, the ability of families to survive financially is also hampered by predatory lending. Earned income tax credit, EITC, benefits intended for working families are increasingly being reduced by the growing use of refund anticipation loans, which typically carry triple digit interest rates. According to the Brookings Institution, an estimated $1.9 billion intended to assist low-income families was received by commercial tax preparers and affiliated national banks to pay for tax assistance, electronic filing of returns, and high-cost refund loans in 2002. The interest rates and fees charged on refund anticipation loans are not justified for the short length of time that these loans cover and the minimal risk they present. These loans do not carry much risk because of the Debt Indicator program. The Debt Indicator is a service provided by the Internal Revenue Service that informs the lender whether or not an applicant owes Federal or State taxes, child support, student loans, or other Government obligations, and this assists the tax preparer in ascertaining the applicant's ability to obtain their full refund so that the RAL is repaid. The Department of the Treasury should not be facilitating these predatory loans that allow tax preparers to reap outrageous profits that result from the exploitation of working families. More needs to be done to crack down on abusive refund anticipation loans and to provide additional opportunities for EITC families to access free tax preparation services. I appreciate the efforts of the Senate Finance Committee for incorporating several provisions of S. 685, the Low Income Taxpayer Protection Act, which Senator Bingaman and I introduced, into S. 882, the Tax Administration Good Government Act. One provision of special importance to me is an authorization for a grant program to link tax preparation services with the establishment of a bank or credit union account. Having a bank account allows individuals to receive their tax refund check faster than waiting for a paper check and without the need for using refund anticipation loans or check cashing services. It is important these provisions to provide additional consumer protections and expand opportunities of taxpayer assistance be enacted into law. We must work to provide alternatives to RALs and crack down on these exploitive loans. Mr. President, unfortunately too many working families are susceptible to predatory lending because they are left out of the financial mainstream. Between 25 and 56 million adults are unbanked, or not using mainstream, insured financial institutions. The unbanked rely on alternative financial service providers to obtain cash from checks, pay bills, send remittances, utilize payday loans, and obtain credit. Many of the unbanked are low- and moderate-income families that can ill afford to have their earnings unnecessarily diminished by their reliance on these high-cost and often predatory financial services. In addition, the unbanked are unable to save securely to prepare for the loss of a job, a family illness, or a down payment on a first home or education expenses. Mr. President, a Federal program, the First Accounts program, is intended to increase access for unbanked low- and moderate-income individuals to mainstream financial services. The program helps to offset the costs financial institutions incur in offering low-cost, electronic banking accounts. In addition, the program supports financial institution and nonprofit initiatives to provide financial education and counseling to low-income households. The First Accounts program has the potential for developing research into the financial services needs of low-income individuals and financial products designed to meet these needs. While the need is great, the President proposed in his fiscal year 2005 budget request to rescind the $4 million for the First Accounts program that had been previously appropriated in fiscal year 2002 and fiscal year 2003. I will continue to work with my colleagues to help preserve these funds for their intended purpose and bring people into the financial mainstream. Mr. President, I look forward to continuing to work with my colleagues to help provide additional meaningful disclosure to consumers about their use of credit and expanding access to mainstream financial service opportunities. We owe it to our country's working families and their children.