Wayne Allard

Mr. ALLARD

Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I yield myself 3 minutes.

Mr. ALLARD. My colleague said all we have to have is mutually assured deterrence. That is a policy out of the cold war: Blow me up and I am going to blow you up. We are past that in this day and age. We are dealing with leaders in other countries who do not care, and that is where our threat is coming from, it is coming from countries such as Iran and North Korea. We need to figure out a new system, and we need to get it in place as quickly as we possibly can to make sure we can continue to provide the security to this country that the American people expect. The missile defense system is the answer. We are talking about a test bed that is overlapping with an operational capability, and anything we do to delay the operational capability, we delay testing. When testing is delayed, the cost of the program is run up and the program is delayed out. Then pretty soon there are cost overruns and then the opposition says, well, we cannot move forward because of all of these delays and cost overruns. The fact is, we are on schedule. We expect to get these missiles in the ground this fall, and we are going to begin to have a system in place where we can defend this country from an unexpected missile attack that may occur out of North Korea or Iran. Mr. Christie, who I had quoted earlier, in simple terms, was our chief tester, and he states that the test bed is necessary for evolution improvement to the ballistic missile defense system, and that the challenge is to do testing in a manner that will improve the system while supporting an operational system. Stating something Mr. Christie said from his recent testimony to the full committee, he says that fielding the test bed provides an opportunity to gather operational data on system performance, safety, survivability, availability, and maintainability. We should expect these data to drive system enhancements. The challenge will be in achieving a defensive posture that is flexible enough to accommodate the necessary changes to hardware, software, and processes that will be necessary to maintain a highly available ballistic missile defense system, while supporting a comprehensive testing program that is designed to mature, improve, and demonstrate mission capabilities through continued development. Mr. Christie believes the Missile Defense Agency test program is a strong one, and that it is working. Unnecessary delays are unnecessary. We simply cannot tolerate those. This issue is too important to the security of this country. So I am asking that my colleagues join me in opposing the Boxer amendment. This is a devastating amendment. It is creating all sorts of problems as far as the defense of this country is concerned, and it is going to severely hinder what we are trying to do with ballistic missile defense. I yield the floor.

Mr. ALLARD. Would you repeat your request?

Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I would like to call on the Senator from Mississippi and yield him 3 minutes to comment on the Boxer amendment. I want to recognize, in a public way, that he is the one who carried the initial amendments on the missile defense system that said we move forward when technologically feasible and he has been a real leader in the defense of this country.

Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I would like to know what time remains on the Boxer amendment.

Mr. ALLARD. On our side. How about the other side?

Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I would like to yield myself 2 minutes. I would like to make a couple of summary comments. First, technologically we are ready to move ahead. The various components of this missile defense system have been shown to be functional and scientifically can happen. What needs to be established is all the communications systems that run from California to Alaska to Colorado, to some of our space satellites, to some of our ships at sea, to the Hawaiian Islands, to the Kwajalein Islands, over thousands and thousands of miles, that they can communicate with one another. There is only one way to do that. You have to put together a large test bed. This test bed happens to also be the same thing we would use to operationally defend ourselves. To not continue on a dual pathway does not make any sense at all. That is why it is so very important that we defeat this Boxer amendment. Mr. Christie, who is the tester, is the one who has been following this. It has been stated time and time again that he is satisfied with the progress, the way we are moving forward. He is the expert. He says: You are doing a good job. Keep it up. I am satisfied. I am responsible and accountable for how this program has gone ahead. He has been before the committee and made that statement. It is very important that we defeat this Boxer amendment. I ask my colleagues to join me. I think the chairman has a concern or two he wants to raise. I yield the floor.

Mr. ALLARD. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the Reed amendment that was before us prior to the amendment from Senator Warner, and I want to talk about that briefly. Then I want to talk about the second- degree amendment by Senator Warner. With respect to the Reed amendment, from my standpoint and the standpoint of the Missile Defense Agency and the Pentagon's office of Test and Evaluation and Formal Operation, tests at this juncture simply would not be helpful. According to a letter I received on May 17, 2004--and I think this is the most current position--the letter from the Pentagon's Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, Mr. Tom Christie, in response to several questions I asked him, Mr. Christie writes--he is the chief tester we referred to, and he is responsible for overseeing much of the testing that goes on at the Department of Defense and obviously has a deep interest in what is happening as far as accountability in the missile defense system. Mr. Christie writes, and this is important: The Ground-based Midcourse Defense element is currently at a maturity level that requires continued developmental testing with oversight and assistance from operational test personnel. I would add at this point that the Missile Defense Agency is currently stressing the system is involved in every developmental test to ensure that they are as realistic as possible. Mr. Christie continues in his letter: Conducting realistic operational testing in the near-term for the GMD element would be premature and not beneficial to the program. I ask unanimous consent that his letter of May 17, 2004, be printed in the Record.

Mr. ALLARD. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Mr. Christie expressed his support for the approach the Missile Defense Agency is taking to incorporate operational realism in the developmental test and is conducting, in his words, continuous operational assessments of the ballistic missile defense system. We must consider that missile defense is a capabilities-based spiral development evolutionary acquisition program--this is a mouthful--and under this approach the missile defense programs are designed to focus on developing capabilities to meet a range of possible threats. These programs are developed incrementally in blocks with the recognition that full capability would not be reached in the first block. Missile defense does not have a final architecture that is defined in the first block but will continue to evolve over time. Therefore, testing of the system should occur as we continue to develop it. We should also consider rethinking how we do formal tests and evaluation. Formal operational testing carries with it certain requirements. There can be no developmental goals because of that. Contractors cannot be involved. The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation must approve the operational test plans. Even the current Director of Operational Test and Evaluation recognizes the need to adopt a new acquisition paradigm for tests and evaluation. Here is what Mr. Christie said about that in his speech just 2 months ago: The concept of milestone driven operational test and evaluation appears to be becoming a process of the past. Either we change our way of doing business, adapt to the new acquisition paradigms and the realities of the war on terrorism, or we will find ourselves becoming irrelevant with dire consequences for our operational forces. . . . Users need up to the minute, continuous test and evaluation to keep them informed of system capabilities and limitations. Even after fielding, the acquisition community needs continuous evaluation to feed spiral development and other evolutionary acquisition concepts. I ask unanimous consent that a copy of Mr. Christie's speech be printed in the Record.

Mr. ALLARD. This quote that I just shared describes exactly what he is doing with testing and the Missile Defense Program. Heavy involvement in the developmental test program, with the intent to achieve operational test goals during development, continued test evaluation assessments to keep the warfighter informed of system capabilities and limitations, and continuous evaluation after fielding to feed spiral development. That is the role the Director of the OT&E describes for himself, and that is the role he is playing in missile defense testing. Everyone on both sides of the aisle, and I would add everyone in the Pentagon, supports operational realistic testing of the ballistic missile defense system, and that is why we are building a missile defense test bed today. That is why the Director of OT&E has over 100 operational test agents influencing and providing input for the GMD. That is why military operators are being used in the tests. Perhaps more importantly, that is why operational test goals are incorporated into each developmental test. Now, make no mistake, the threat drives this program. We are building missile defenses to meet that threat. The test bed is needed to perform operationally realistic tests of the ballistic missile defense system and testing will proceed, becoming progressively more realistic, and will improve the system. Yet it is these same test bed capabilities that would afford us an early operational capability. We cannot forget that we have no defense against long-range missiles. The Armed Services Committee has seen intelligence information which illustrates, more than ever, that the ballistic missile threat is real and growing. We are vulnerable and it is time to change that vulnerability. We need a missile defense capability in the field as soon as possible. For that reason, I will oppose the Reed amendment as it was introduced, and I urge my colleagues to oppose those efforts that would tie up our system in a way that adds delays and adds to our inability to defend ourselves from emerging threats in other parts of the world. With the Warner second-degree amendment, my view of this amendment of Senator Reed changes; that is, if we adopt the Warner amendment. This is why I think we need to support Senator Warner's amendment. The intent is to assure that the Department of Defense conducts operational realistic testing of the BMD system and to support Senator Warner's second-degree amendment because I believe we will achieve our common goal of operational, realistic testing while avoiding some of the potential pitfalls. Everyone on both sides supports operational realistic testing, as I mentioned earlier, on the ballistic missile system. I certainly support the Senator's intent to make sure the BMD system is tested. The question is how best to test effectively while improving system capabilities and fielding capabilities as quickly as we can. Formal operation and testing carries with it certain requirements where there can be no developmental goals. Contractors cannot be involved and the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation approves of the operational test plan. I think the Warner amendment improves on what was proposed by the Senator from Rhode Island. This is operational testing. Again, as I said earlier, we are looking at a two-way path here. While we are doing testing, we want to get something in place that is operational. The more we tie this down in a step-by-step process, which happens with the Reed amendment, with accountability on every little finite step in development, the more you delay the process and the more you add to the cost of the program. That is why I am supporting the Warner amendment.

Mr. ALLARD. I ask for an additional 1 minute.

Mr. ALLARD. What happens with the step-by-step process in the Reed amendment which leads to delays and additional costs, the Warner amendment refines that down so it is more streamlined and becomes palatable to us who would like to see rapid deployment of some kind of missile defense system for this country. It is not going to be perfect. That is why we have spiral development. We are going to develop it and improve upon it with time. This is a process we have used before. It works and it is something that is going to assure us that we will have security rapidly deployed for this country where we have emerging threats in Iran and North Korea.

Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I support the Warner amendment to the Reed amendment because it adds flexibility with accountability. The second- degree amendment will allow the Missile Defense Program to field capabilities expeditiously and to improve those capabilities rapidly and avoids the disadvantages I see in Senator Reed's approach, which requires realistic testing broken off into blocks. Specifically, Senator Warner's second-degree amendment will require the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director of OT&E, to set forth formal criteria to define operationally realistic testing for the ballistic missile defense system as a spiral development program. It will require operationally realistic testing consistent with those criteria during the fiscal year 2005, and it will require operationally realistic testing of each block or spiral of the ballistic missile defense system. The Warner second-degree amendment provides the flexibility needed to incorporate both operational test goals and developmental test goals in missile defense tests--flexibility that is denied in the Reed amendment. Thus, it avoids the substantial replanning, delay, and additional costs that would result if the Reed amendment is adopted. But the second-degree amendment also helps ensure that the testing of the missile defense system is realistic and will result in a well- tested system that will be capable of defending our Nation. It requires a formal and appropriate role for the Director of OT&E, and it requires this realistic testing to be conducted during fiscal year 2005--almost certainly sooner than the formal OT&E required in Senator Reed's amendment, perhaps even sooner. I urge my colleagues to support the Warner second-degree amendment. I yield the floor.

Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, on this side, most Members have said whatever they want to say. I, again, state we have a number of amendments we dealt with last year and this year which, in effect, add delays because of an excess reevaluation of the program. What we are striving for is a commonsense approach to accountability in the missile defense program without so much evaluation that we delay it. Each delay adds more and more costs to the program. Then those people who oppose the missile defense program will use that as a reason to defeat the program. The fact is, right now we are in the process of putting those missiles in the ground. This fall we expect them to be operational. In order to have the proper developmental process in place, we have to have a test bed. While we are putting the test bed in place, it requires such a wide area we might as well make it operationally functional at the same time. That is what we are trying to do. The Warner amendment provides the flexibility but still the accountability that we need. I am happy with what he has laid out in that amendment. Dr. Thomas Christie has indicated time and time again that he is satisfied with his current role and the role his office plays in ballistic missile defense testing. He has testified. He states in his recent letter to me--and maybe I need to read the substance of this letter just to give my colleague an opportunity to hear clearly what his position is--the following: The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is building a BMDS test bed that is essential to support realistic testing, and is absolutely essential for conducting adequate operational testing in the future. The test bed is also key to developing operational concepts, techniques, and procedures, while allowing my office to exploit and characterize its inherent defense capability. The Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) element is currently at a maturity level that requires continued developmental testing with oversight and assistance from operational test personnel. Conducting realistic operational testing in the near-term for the GMD element would be premature and not beneficial to the program. My office has unprecedented access to GMD, and I am satisfied with the cooperation between the program office and the test community. I will continue to advise the Secretary of Defense and the Director, MDA, on the BMDS test program. I will also provide my characterization of system capabilities, and my assessment of test program adequacy annually, as required by Congress. This is the chief accountability officer. He is responsible to make sure everything is ready to move forward. He is satisfied. There is no doubt that he is satisfied with the way things are going. In order to meet some of Senator Reed's concerns, the Warner amendment allows that. We address some of his concerns. Now we need to adopt the Warner amendment so we can still have the flexibility we need to deal with changing technology and perhaps some unexpected events as we move forward. I don't think anyone who has watched the development of military systems ever figures we have it right the first time. We come awfully close. With each passing year, new technology evolves and new ideas evolve and there are things we can do to improve the system. That is what spiral development is all about. Again, Dr. Christie indicates that he is satisfied with his role and the role his office plays in the Missile Defense Program. He states that his office has ``unprecedented access'' to the ground-based midcourse effort and that cooperation is very good between the program office and his office. He testified that he makes recommendations related to the developmental test program and his office has the ability to bring input into and influence the GMD test program. Again, to quote Dr. Christie: My staff and I remain involved on a daily basis with the Missile Defense System and the BMDS element program offices in order to ensure that operational tests are addressed in their testing. We have over 100 operational test agents involved in the missile defense test program. A considerable amount of resources are being put forward to make sure we have accountability. He goes on and indicates again that he is clearly satisfied with emphasis on operational test goals in the BMD system test plan. I will quote directly: The GMD [Ground-based Midcourse] program combined test force effectively integrated the operational testers into the program development activities and the test design and planning efforts. He approved the operational test goals for the last three integrated flight tests. He recently testified as follows: While I am very encouraged by the improved testing environment and capability that the BMDS test bed will provide, I am even more pleased with the increased emphasis on system integration and user involvement that I have seen over the past year. We go on and on about his testimony as to how he has testified. The fact is, it is working. We are ready to put it in the ground this fall. We all recognize there are going to be improvements as we move along, but we are in a position to make those improvements. I think the commonsense approach is to support the Warner amendment. I support it and encourage my colleagues to support it. I yield the floor.

Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I yield myself 1 minute. I want to make a very brief comment, and that is this: The key argument is that the Pentagon's chief tester says the operational test is premature. The Warner second-degree amendment requires the definition of ``realistic testing,'' and it requires a test according to these criteria next year. That means we will get realistic testing years sooner than with the Reed amendment. The Warner second-degree amendment provides a formal and appropriate role for the Director of the Office of Test and Evaluation in a developmental program. That is an unusual step and actually enhances his role in the ballistic missile test program. It does all this without incurring the cost and delay of the Reed amendment. Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time and ask my colleagues to vote in support of the Warner amendment. Mr. President, I have a unanimous consent request that I need to propound. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that following the vote in relation to the pending Warner second-degree amendment, the Senate proceed to executive session and consecutive votes on the confirmation of the following nominations: James L. Robart, Roger Benitez, and Jane Boyle. I further ask unanimous consent that prior to each of the judge votes there be 4 minutes equally divided for debate on the nominations; provided further, that following the votes, the President be notified of the Senate's action, and the Senate then resume legislative session.

Mr. ALLARD. I agree to modify the request to 10-minute votes on the two following the initial vote--or does the Senator want all three of them?

Mr. ALLARD. On all three of them.

Mr. ALLARD. Missile defense is OK.

Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I understand we may need to ask for the yeas and nays.

Mr. ALLARD. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. Amendment No. 3354

Mr. ALLARD

Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Colin Woodall, a member of Senator Cornyn's staff, be granted the privilege of the floor during the course of the debate on the Defense authorization bill, S. 2400.

Mr. ALLARD

Mr. ALLARD. I would like to be recognized to speak against the amendment.

Mr. ALLARD. I join my colleague from Virginia and my colleague from Alabama in opposing the Dodd amendment. I will take one part of our interrogating process and look at Guantanamo Bay. We have 140 translators, of which 105 are contractors; 60 analysts there, of which 35 are contractors; and 45 interrogators, of which 20 are contractors. If we pass this amendment, we shut off the interrogation process and we lose the opportunity to gather vital information that could be valuable to what we are doing in Iraq. We would lose 50 percent of intelligence. Generally, these individuals are well qualified, and they have been carefully vetted as contractors. I join my colleagues in opposing the Dodd amendment.

Mr. ALLARD

Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I understand we now have the Defense authorization bill before us and an amendment to that bill, which is the Kennedy-Feinstein amendment; is that the regular order?