Wayne Allard

Mr. ALLARD

Mr. ALLARD. I thank the Chair. I yield the floor. The sponsor of that amendment wishes to make a few comments, and I wish to follow with a few comments.

Mr. ALLARD. I rise today in opposition to the Kennedy-Feinstein amendment that would strip the authorization for funding for the robust nuclear earth penetrator and the advanced concepts. Again, we have heard the argument of how somehow or another we would have further world peace if we just weakened America, and I could not disagree more with that. I believe we do have peace through strength, and what we have in this particular legislation is a study to study where the strengths are of our adversaries and where the proper response to those strengths would be. I do not think anybody has any preconceived notion of how this study should come out; we just think we need to know some vital information to make sure America remains strong. I am disappointed once again by the efforts of those on the other side of the aisle to eliminate altogether this administration's effort to study options for modernizing our nuclear deterrent. To me, it seems that sponsors of this amendment may not fully understand how important it is for the United States to maintain a credible deterrent, or how a modernized deterrent could result in a substantial reduction in our nuclear stockpile. Over the last several years, the Department of Defense closely examined our nuclear weapons posture. It became apparent that the cold- war paradigm of mutually assured destruction was no longer an appropriate response for the United States. Increasingly, irrational rogue nations and nonstate actors have emerged as a greater threat to U.S. security than historical adversaries. As part of this examination, it was discovered that many of our adversaries are building increasingly hardened and more deeply buried facilities in order to protect high-value targets such as command and control nodes, ballistic missiles, and, in some cases, the actual development of facilities for weapons of mass destruction. Many of these buried targets are immune to our conventional weapons. Therefore, our ability to deter such undesired activities is greatly eroded. The need to hold these targets at risk became so apparent that in 1994 U.S. Strategic Command and Air Combat Command issued a mission needs statement for a capability to defeat hardened and deeply buried targets. In 1997, the Department conducted an analysis of alternatives to address intelligence and strike capabilities related to defeating hardened and deeply buried targets. To almost everyone's surprise, the analysis of alternatives found that not all hardened and deeply buried targets could be defeated by current or conceptual conventional weapons. Then, in 1999, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff requested that a capstone requirements document for hardened and deeply buried targets be developed. Again, this document provided additional justification for a requirement for both conventional and nuclear weapons capable of defeating these targets. Meanwhile, during these military studies and analyses, the Clinton administration was already building and deploying an interim nuclear earth penetrator. I have noticed that the advocates of the Kennedy-Feinstein amendment have tried to place the blame on the Bush administration. But here we are--the Clinton administration building and deploying an interim nuclear earth penetrator. Even he recognized the need and the changing environment in which we must act in order to maintain a strong America. The modified nuclear weapon was designated the B61-11 and entered service in April 1997. While this weapon provided a limited capability, it does not have capability to defeat all types of hard and deeply buried targets. With this history in mind, it surprises me that once again we are here to debate whether we should go forward with a feasibility study on a modified nuclear weapon and whether our scientists can explore nuclear weapon concepts. Let me take a moment to respond to clear up some misconceptions that have been suggested by the supporters of Kennedy amendment. First, opponents of RNEP argue that conventionally armed ``bunker buster'' weapons are sufficiently effective to destroy hardened and deeply buried targets. Clearly, advanced conventional earth penetrators are the weapon of choice for most hardened and deeply buried facilities, but according to the Department of Defense, they are not effective against a growing class of hardened and deeply buried targets. Moreover, the precise location of surface support facilities are not always known, and at best, we can only hope to disrupt the operation of a hardened or deeply buried target for a few hours or days at most. The second argument used by opponents of RNEP is that any modifications to the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal will encourage other nations to develop new nuclear weapons. This argument suggests that there is a direct correlation between our activities and those of other nations. I could not disagree more with this notion. Over the last 10 years, we have conducted very little work on new nuclear weapons. Yet Pakistan and India have conducted nuclear tests. Russia and China continue to develop nuclear weapons. And, countries such as Iran and North Korea are secretly working to build new nuclear weapons. All of this activity has taken place without the U.S. taking any action with regard to our nuclear stockpile. In response to our mini-nukes, first, ``battlefield nuclear weapons'' would be tactical, not strategic. Second, President George H.W. Bush's Presidential Nuclear Initiative, announced September 27, 1991, did away with all U.S. battlefield nuclear weapons. In fact the Pantex plant in Amarillo, TX, dismantled the last battlefield nuclear weapon, the W-79 artillery shell in 2003. The administration has no plans to change that decision. Nor are there plans by the Department of Defense or Department of Energy to research or develop ``battlefield nuclear weapons.'' The administration believes that nuclear weapons are strategic weapons of last resort. In fact, if the United States does not show that it is serious about ensuring the viability of our entire military capability, including our weapons of last resort, we might not be able to dissuade potential adversaries from developing weapons of mass destruction and deter those adversaries from using those weapons they already have. The third argument used by opponents of RNEP is that the administration has already decided to develop, build, and test a new robust nuclear earth penetrator. They point to a Congressional Research Service report that seems to suggest that the RNEP is not merely a study because the budget projections over the next 5 years are nearly $500 million for the program. To be clear, it was Congress that directed the Department of Energy to prepare 5-year budget profiles. The nearly $500 million outlined in the latest profile is only a projection of what the costs might be if the results of the feasibility study are reasonable, the administration opts to proceed, and the Congress approves the development of such a weapon. We must keep in mind that the administration cannot begin the development, much less build or test, a new robust nuclear earth penetrator without the expressed approval from Congress. Section 3117 of the Fiscal Year 2004 National Defense Authorization bill makes this clear. It specifically states that ``the Secretary of Energy may not commence the engineering development phase of the nuclear weapons development process, or any subsequent process, of a Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator weapons unless specifically authorized by Congress.'' The fourth argument used by opponents of RNEP, and perhaps the most egregious, is that the RNEP will lower the nuclear threshold. Crossing the nuclear threshold represents a momentous decision for any President. A nuclear weapon's size or purpose does not alter the gravity of the decision for using a nuclear weapon. No President would use a nuclear weapon unless it was the option of last resort. Therefore, to suggest that simply modernizing a nuclear weapon automatically lowers the rigor and deliberation in deciding to employ that weapon is unfounded. The success of our goal of assuring our allies and dissuading potential adversaries is dependent upon a modern, effective nuclear detterent that can counter today's threats. We must keep in mind that the current U.S. stockpile was developed for very different purposes than the threats that exist today. It was developed for a massive nuclear exchange with one nation. Today, these weapons are too powerful and may result in greater damage than necessary to neutralize a target. Moreover, these weapons continue to age, making it increasingly more difficult to predict their reliability. We depend upon their reliability, as do our allies and our troops in the field. We must also recognize that a modernized nuclear stockpile will result in significant reductions in our stockpile. If we have specific weapons that can hold certain targets at risk, it will not be necessary to have a vast inventory of strategic nuclear warheads. This path forward would yield substantial cost savings and, more importantly, demonstrate our country's commitment to reducing nuclear stockpiles around the world. For over 50 years, we, as a Congress, and every President have agreed that nuclear weapons are a critical element of our national security strategy. They remain so today. I believe a modernized detterent will help ensure that our adversaries are deterred tomorrow. Therefore, I will oppose this amendment and urge my colleagues to oppose it as well. I yield the floor.

Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, to suggest that somehow or the other this particular President does not want to be a leader in reducing nuclear threats is absurd. I call to the attention of the Members of the Senate the Moscow Treaty which was put together at the first of this administration. He brought down some 8,000 warheads to 1,700 to 2,200 active warheads. The result from our potential adversaries is to produce more nuclear warheads. Our adversaries are not necessarily responding to what we do in the United States. Take India and Afghanistan. They are more interested in how each other's country is responding to that issue. They are not that concerned about what is happening here. Despite that, they continue to be proliferating. And there is always the potential they could be proliferating warheads that could have an impact on us. We know our adversaries are building hard bunkers, deeply buried. This particular piece of legislation is not putting in place the engineering or development of nuclear warheads. I have just shared that language with my colleagues. But what we are looking at is a study. I think it is foolhardy and irresponsible to not even look at the facts, to not call for a study to see where we are in relation to the rest of the world. We know other countries, other than just Afghanistan, such as North Korea--I don't see a real stepdown as far as Russia and other countries around the world. We know Iran, admittedly, is looking at a nuclear weapons program. So this is an important step in making sure that America remains secure. I think it is a responsible step because we are saying that in order to maintain peace in this world we need to have a strong America. If we want to have some response to terrorism and that flexible threat we have out there, we have to have a more flexible defense posture. We need to look at alternatives. And, yes, I believe terrorists throughout the world have the potential of being a real threat to this country, although the main threat that is recognized today is from many of those countries that I cited. But that is why it is important to have a study. I think those people in the know--whether they are in the Bush administration or were in the Clinton administration--agree we need to stay on top of this issue. I think the irresponsibility would be for us to bury our heads in the sand and ignore the fact that the world is changing. The fact is, the world is changing, the threat is changing, and for us to deal with those potential threats, we need to look at modernizing our ability to deal with those changing threats. That is what the provision in this particular bill is all about. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. ALLARD

Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I request 10 minutes in morning business.

Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I rise today to pay tribute to a distinguished American. Lieutenant General Ronald T. Kadish, United States Air Force, will soon be retiring from the U.S. military after 34 years of exceptional service to our Nation. Many of my colleagues have come to know and respect General Kadish. Over the past 5 years, he has served as the Pentagon's Director of the Missile Defense Agency and the Program Manager for the Ballistic Missile Defense System. General Kadish's performance as Director has been nothing short of superb. Throughout his unprecedented 5-year tour of duty, General Kadish applied his unparalleled experience and knowledge of public and private industry in the pursuit of effective defenses against enemy ballistic missiles. He succeeded in motivating and aligning our political, scientific, and engineering communities to tackle the challenges of evolving a layered, mulitnational missile defense capability. And, he succeeded in transforming and focusing a large defense bureaucracy into a true joint planning, joint operating system acquisition and business activity. Today, because of his singular and tireless efforts, we stand on the threshold of eliminating our Nation's long-standing vulnerability to the very real threat of ballistic missile attack. General Kadish was commissioned into the Air Force in 1970 after completing the Reserve Officers Training Corps program at St. Joseph's University in Philadelphia, PA. He went on to earn his master's of business administration at the University of Utah, and continued his professional military education at the Air University, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and the Defense Systems Management College. In the early 1970s and 1980s, he was a pilot and instructor for the C-130 aircraft and served in tactical airlift squadrons in the United States and Germany. Over his career, he flew more than 2,500 hours in aircraft that form the airlift and fighter backbone of our Air Force-- the C-130s and C-17s, and the F-15s and F-16s, respectively. As a young acquisition professional, he participated in the Education-with-Industry program in Dallas with the Vought Corporation, and then got 3 years of hands-on management experience in the F-16 development program. A few years later, he was appointed the director of manufacturing and quality assurance for the B-1B bomber, one of the most technologically complex production efforts ever undertaken by our Nation up to that time. The Air Force later called upon his managerial talents to serve in three successive high visibility, high pressure, and high impact positions as program director for the F-15 fighter, the F-16 fighter, and the C-17 military transport acquisition programs. Some of my colleagues will remember the developmental difficulties the C-17 program faced. It was General Kadish's expertise that straightened out this troubled program. Our troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, and indeed in all points of the globe, remain the beneficiaries of his managerial accomplishment. As the current Bush administration came into office, Secretary Rumsfeld looked to General Kadish to lead a major transformation of the Ballistic Missile Defense program. The daunting task of realigning a multi-billion-dollar, cutting-edge defense technology program into a streamlined, capability-focused effort did not deter General Kadish. His charge was to produce reliable defenses that will protect our citizens and friends across the globe from the growing threat posed by ballistic missiles. We are on the threshold of providing that capability as I speak. Armed with his 20-plus years of military acquisition experience, it was clear to General Kadish that enhanced authorities and improved techniques were needed to accomplish the mission. General Kadish was never satisfied with business as usual when a better way could be found. Bureaucratic change is tough enough to execute under any circumstance. It is doubly so in a culture reinforced by longstanding legal requirements and administrative procedures. Add to that a measure of healthy and vocal skepticism from critics, and his missile defense transformation achievements stand out in stark relief. Defense acquisition has historically been an activity carried out by the individual military services. General Kadish has broadened that vision by pioneering a joint acquisition strategy for the Department of Defense. This approach has been more responsive to the needs of our troops, more effective for the funds under his charge, and more attuned to the complexities of missile defense, than traditionally could have been possible. He leaves an important legacy of example and accomplishment for those who follow, inspiring a new generation of program managers for the joint arena. In so doing, General Kadish earned the trust and respect of his associates in the Pentagon and my colleagues here in the Senate. We could always count on him to be clear in his goals, demanding in his standards, and forthright in acknowledging issues. He never promised more than he could deliver. Indeed, one of my distinguished colleagues in this body, a declared skeptic of the missile defense program, has called him ``a class act.'' I, personally, am privileged to be able to call him a friend, and to have him as a thoughtful and experienced advisor. We will miss his leadership and his counsel as he moves on to a most well-earned retirement from the Air Force. We owe him a profound debt of gratitude and deep thanks for his extraordinary contributions to our Nation and our Nation's security over a lifetime of selfless service. I am sure I speak for all of us in this body in saying we wish him and his family health and happiness in the years ahead. I yield the floor, and I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. ALLARD

Mr. ALLARD. Now, I think Senator Levin has to be recognized to move the modification forward.

Mr. ALLARD. That is correct.

Mr. ALLARD. I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. ALLARD. What is our order of business?

Mr. ALLARD. I ask unanimous consent that we lay aside the Kennedy amendment so I can send an amendment to the desk.

Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I call up amendment No. 3322.

Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. ALLARD. I rise today to offer this amendment in order to draw attention to the importance of encouraging missile defense international cooperation. My amendment accomplishes the following: First, it requires the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, to establish an expedited process for considering the transfer of missile defense-related agreements and licenses within 30 days. The Secretary of State may use more time if he determines the proposed transfer necessitates a careful review to prevent the proliferation of U.S. ballistic missile technology. Second, the amendment requires the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, to conduct a study on major project authorizations for missile defense. The purpose of this study would be to examine the feasibility of providing major project authorizations for projects related to missile defense. Third, the amendment requires the Secretary of Defense to prescribe procedures to increase the efficiency and transparency of the practices used by the Department of Defense to review applications for technical assistance agreements and licenses related to missile defense. These provisions are limited in scope and have been refined considerably over the last month. They are specifically designed to provide a mechanism for increasing our cooperation on missile defense with our closest allies. Why is this amendment important? Why should we work with our closest allies on missile defense? Let me take a moment to explain why. Widespread proliferation of ballistic missiles and illegal weapons technology is a major threat to the United States as we enter the 21st century. Today, unfortunately, the United States remains defenseless against a ballistic missile attack. President Bush, who is committed to eliminating this vulnerability, has taken extraordinary measures to remove obstacles to developing a missile defense capability. The technology has been proven. The timing is right. As a result, the President's vision for a national missile defense system will likely become a reality this fall. Yet we must acknowledge this complex system could become even more complicated without the assistance of other nations. We need early warning and tracking sensors in other countries in order to predict and intercept an incoming ballistic missile. We also need intelligence other countries may have on the activities of those who may threaten our Nation. Without this information, it could become extremely difficult for us to defeat a ballistic missile attack. A prudent step on our part would then be to recognize the value of this assistance and exhibit a willingness to help those who have been so willing to help us. We cannot forget that while the United States may have a legitimate missile defense capability, most of our allies do not. For example, Japan, Australia, and South Korea are perhaps more vulnerable than the United States due to their close proximity to the North Korean ballistic missile threat. Yet these three close allies are defenseless against most ballistic missile attacks. Our NATO allies in Europe are also vulnerable to a similar threat from the Middle East. We also cannot forget hundreds of thousands of U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are deployed in many tough regions around the world, and many of these regions have rogue states that have substantial offensive ballistic missile capability. We cannot ignore this looming threat to our troops overseas. Having allies with missile defenses would greatly reduce the threat offensive ballistic missiles could pose against our troops overseas. Some might suggest cooperation on missile defense could lead to the proliferation of ballistic missile technologies. This is a legitimate concern, and I certainly agree we must do everything we can to protect our most sensitive technologies. That is why I included in my amendment an exception that authorizes the Secretary of State to conduct an extended review of a proposed transfer if there is a concern about the transfer of ballistic missile technologies. None of us want to see ballistic missile technologies fall into the wrong hands. We must recognize, though, that international cooperation on missile defense can greatly reduce the proliferation of ballistic missiles. It does so by directly devaluing the ballistic missile as an offensive weapon of terror. With missile defenses deployed, as in Operation Iraqi Freedom, an enemy can no longer be assured of success when considering a missile attack. It thus acts as a counterproliferation tool that forces our adversaries to think twice about investing billions of their scarce resources into ballistic missiles. I commend President Bush for already taking the lead on international cooperation on missile defense. At his direction, the Pentagon is planning wide-ranging cooperative missile defense activities with the United Kingdom, Australia, Japan, Germany, Italy, other NATO allies, and friends. The Pentagon is also looking into other opportunities with Russia in the wake of the decision to cancel the Russian-American Observation Satellite, or what we refer to as the RAMOS Program. Yet our Government has only limited experience with large-scale missile defense cooperation abroad. This limited experience has drawn out inefficiencies and problems that could limit cooperative missile defense programs. Here are two recent examples that have troubled me. First, it took almost 6 months to execute the United States-Japanese cooperative program on the Aegis-based Standard Missile-3. This holdup was despite Japan's sterling nonproliferation reputation, a detailed United States and Japan memorandum of understanding, and a United States-Japanese exchange of diplomatic notes underpinning the MOU. Similarly, for our joint operations centers in NORAD, where we conduct missile defense operator training and exercises, we require numerous special authorizations, taking months to review, to permit our industry experts to work with Canadian military operators already in place behind the computer terminals providing missile defense early warning in Colorado Springs. I believe we should be thinking beyond our own borders and begin looking at ways to assist our friends and allies. My amendment takes a small step forward in this direction. It still provides for a case-by- case review and permits a careful and close review of a transfer that might be of vital importance to our Nation. Perhaps most importantly, it upholds the virtue of our nonproliferation regimes and helps develop another counterproliferation tool for the President's use in the future. I urge my colleagues to support this amendment. I yield the floor.

Mr. ALLARD. I will yield to the Senator from Oklahoma.

Mr. ALLARD. I yield to the Senator from Oklahoma for a question.

Mr. ALLARD. Well, the 30-day mandate is to emphasize the importance of considering these agreements and licenses for international cooperation on missile defense in a timely manner, not being dragged out forever and ever. Too often, applications for technical assistance programs and licenses for missile defense are held up for months at a time, causing our allies needless frustrations, in my view. The process is so cumbersome for missile defense agreements and licenses that it takes weeks to get an application approval for something as simple as permitting the British Ministry of Defense officials to attend the Missile Defense Agency's annual conference we have here in DC. We are trying to bring a stroke of common sense in our cooperation with our allies. There are cases, obviously, when more time is needed. So the judgment can be applied by the Secretary of Defense, as well as the Secretary of State, to use more time to determine the feasibility of extending licensing agreements to our allies. What we are trying to reach is a proper balance. There are times when it is not necessary to delay this for extended times. Sometimes we may take longer because of the type of technology we are dealing with. We are trying to have a proper balance so we can adequately protect our technical systems, defense systems, as well as to have a format out here so we can work in an effective manner with our friends and allies.

Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I haven't had an opportunity to review this particular amendment that I understand has just been laid down to my amendment, and I need a little time to review that. I did have another amendment that we are sharing with the other side, expecting them to introduce another amendment. I am going to have to take some time here and look at this particular amendment because I have not seen this amendment.

Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I have an amendment that we have laid aside. I guess the proper thing is we need to call it up for consideration. The reason I am calling it up is because our staffs have worked this out. There is a second-degree amendment that was offered by Senator Reid on behalf of Senator Levin. We have worked out an agreement, I understand, between the staffs, and I know the chairman would like to expedite and move forward and not leave these amendments hanging out there. So I call up that amendment.

Mr. ALLARD. Yes, I request the regular order on that amendment, please.

Mr. ALLARD. Yes. Madam President, if I could be recognized briefly, we did have some exceptions in that to be sensitive to your concerns about the 30-day portion. In the judgment of the Secretary of State, they could extend that if they believe that is necessary. There is also a paragraph in here that was adopted on policy to address some of your concerns about proliferation and whatnot. Hopefully, we met those concerns. I think this is a good compromise. I thank the Senator from Michigan for working with me and our staff over here and for your staff working together with us. I think now that we have resolved this matter we can move forward on the amendment. Now, Madam President, have we adopted the modification?

Mr. ALLARD

Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, some people have the capacity to change your life. For me, Ronald Reagan was one of those people. Ronald Reagan's message of strengthening individual liberties, maintaining a strong national defense, cutting through the thicket of Government regulations and lowering taxes inspired me to run for public office in the 1980s. He made me believe it is possible to bring about change for the better. I first ran for the Colorado State senate in 1982, the second year of Reagan's Presidency, and fought to pass resolutions there supporting the policies that the President advocated, such as the balanced budget amendment. I was a small businessman. I operated a private veterinary practice. So Ronald Reagan's vision of strengthening America's small businesses, because they are the backbone of our economy and way of life, had a great deal of appeal. His belief in small Government and cutting taxes to allow people to decide how best to spend their own money have been two of my guiding principles since I was first elected to public office. I believe him to be the father of the modern Republican Party. My wife Joan and I never had the opportunity to meet Ronald Reagan until he came to Colorado in 1988. Talking to him one on one was an emotional high point of my life. We smiled all the way back home to Loveland, CO. I have kept his picture hanging in my office, first in the U.S. House of Representatives and now in the Senate, ever since. It is hard to describe to the young people who live in our vibrant economy and confident culture just how unsure and discouraged Americans were in the late 1970s. Everything that could go wrong had. America seemed to be shrinking before our eyes. Those in charge of our Government had apparently given up on winning the cold war. The Soviet Union loomed dangerous and, we were told, invincible. We were being admonished to get used to a dysfunctional economy that combined high inflation with low growth, a demoralized military, an ever more intrusive and intruding Government, a depressed and depressing spiritual malaise that left many in doubt about our fundamental values. No one offered a way out. Ronald Reagan's fresh voice of optimism was like manna to our hungry spirits. He talked about how our idling economy could regain its formidable power. He talked about how great our country was and how much greater it could be. He talked about facing down our foes and our fears. He talked about restoring American pride and patriotism. He, more than any other individual in the second half of the 20th century, brought America back from the brink of self-imposed defeat and despair. He made us proud once again. Ronald Reagan was a monumentally gifted man, and a man of many gifts. To those in doubt, he brought the gift of optimism. To his supporters and allies, he brought the gift of confidence and assurance. To an audience, he brought a magnificent gift of humor. To his opponents, he brought the gift of disagreeing without being disagreeable. His gift to the world was even more significant. He brought about the end of a cold war that had cast a 50-year shadow of fear over all the people on the planet. Ronald Reagan never doubted his country's need to defend itself from all foes. ``Of the four wars in my lifetime,'' President Reagan said, ``none came about because the United States was too strong.'' It is of paramount importance for us to remember, during this period of threat and conflict, the wisdom of one of his favorite phrases: ``Peace through strength.'' Among his greatest achievements was to rearm us, to reinvigorate the American military, and to let our adversaries know, beyond any doubt, that they were in a race they were not going to win. In the past 15 years or so, the United States has decisively fought and won two significant wars. The keys to those victories were highly motivated and skilled combat personnel fighting with unmatched military equipment and employing unprecedented tactics. How did this renewed and reinvigorated American military might come about? Let's look back to Ronald Reagan's acceptance speech at the 1980 Republican nominating convention. As only the Great Communicator could, he laid out his vision for us with not only clarity, but with a conviction that rings true and is still good counsel today. He said: We are awed--and rightly so--by the forces of destruction at loose in the world in this nuclear era. But neither can we be naive or foolish. . . . We know only too well that war comes not when the forces of freedom are strong, but when they are weak. It is then tyrants are tempted. He added: Let our friends and those who may wish us ill take note: the United States has an obligation to its citizens and to the people of the world never to let those who would destroy freedom dictate the future course of human life on this planet. . . . This nation will once again be strong enough to do that. He was, of course, as good as his word. Once assuming office, President Reagan launched a military renaissance that not only led to the demise of the Soviet Union, Soviet communism, and the cold war, but also set the course for our military leadership that continues to this day ensuring our safety. President Reagan's initiative was threefold: upgrade our military equipment; improve the training and morale of our service men and women to improve recruitment and retention; and restore national pride in-- and global respect of--the United States' military. A major accomplishment of President Reagan's was the development of a credible, modern strategic deterrent. He reinvested in our strategic ballistic missile weapons inventories, modernized a complement of land, sea, and aircraft-based platforms to project our strategic force. This display of offensive force proved to be an effective deterrent, but President Reagan envisioned a world with far fewer of these destructive weapons, and pressed throughout his Presidency for significant reductions of nuclear weapons. In 1983, President Reagan launched the Strategic Defense Initiative in the hopes of one day rendering all such ballistic missiles ``impotent and obsolete.'' Today we are building on his legacy by deploying strategic missile defenses and aggressively eliminating excessive nuclear stockpiles. President Reagan's legacy to us, of a safer world, is one we must constantly guard and honor. There is no doubt that President Reagan was one of the greatest Presidents of the modern era. A man of huge confidence and unwavering principle, he revived the American spirit, revitalized our economy and engineered the fall of communism. He changed the world for the better. We share his family's grief, and keep them in our prayers. In his memory, let us recommit ourselves to President Reagan's goal of ensuring that America always remains the ``bright, shining city on the hill.'' Mr. President, I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. ALLARD

Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Patricia Kimpan, a fellow in Senator Bunning's office, be given the privilege of the floor during consideration of the Department of Defense authorization bill.

Mr. ALLARD

Mr. ALLARD. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. ALLARD. We did have a committee hearing on February 25, 2004. We had the committee hearing and Mr. Roberson testified in front of that committee. On March 23, 2004, there was a committee hearing on the very same issue. Those two previous committees were within my subcommittee on Armed Services. On March 31, 2004, Senator Domenici in his committee had this debate. It has been going on in the Environment and Public Works Committee back to 2000. We have testimony from there. There has already been a lot of discussion about this subject and the proper way of disposing it. This is the same kind of procedure we have used in Colorado to clean up Rocky Flats where we have had an expedited procedure. The people of Colorado are delighted because now we have closure and we have it ahead of time and under budget, so far. Hopefully, we can get this to apply to other areas.