Rob Andrews

Mr. ANDREWS

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the minority whip for yielding this time to me. Mr. Speaker, on behalf of my family and on behalf of the people of the First Congressional District of New Jersey, I rise to offer my condolences and thanks to the families of Officer Chestnut and Detective Gibson. They have given us many gifts in their lives, a gift of courage, a gift of discipline, ultimately the gift of their very lives. Let me also suggest that I believe they have given us a gift in death. I have had the privilege of standing in this Chamber for eight years, and I have never once felt the feeling that I feel here this evening of a truly collective broken heart of those of us who stand on this floor and those who serve their country and us around these environs. Their deaths have served to remind us that we are not Republican and Democrat, or liberal and conservative, or northerner or southerner; we are men and women, people bonded by the human spirit. Today that spirit is bruised and broken, but as they have given to us in their lives, I believe they will give to us in their deaths and hereafter a spirit of unity and cooperation. May God bless their families, and we thank them for their contribution.

Mr. ANDREWS

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend from Ohio for yielding this time to me. I oppose this rule, Mr. Speaker, because of its outrageous assault on the consumers of this country. For 24 years it was a law of this country that when a shopper went into a store and thought about buying clothing for an infant, if the clothing was not treated in such a way that it would not burn, if it was not treated for flammability, we knew it, because there was a label on it, and we knew enough not to put a 3- month-old or a 4-month-old down for the night in a crib with clothing that might catch on fire and burn the child to death. For 24 years emergency room nurses and arson experts and firefighters across this country said it worked. In 1996, for reasons that are beyond any of us that have any common sense, the Consumer Product Safety Committee changed that rule. It was a rule change that was opposed by the fire community, by the medical community, by the children's advocates of this country. This Congress decided to do something to fix it. The gentlewoman from Connecticut (Ms. DeLauro), the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon) and I introduced legislation to put the old law back to where it was. Thanks to the efforts of the gentleman from California (Mr. Lewis) and the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Stokes) and the members of this committee, we are moving forward that law. We thought today that we would have a chance to talk about it on this floor and vote on it, but for reasons that are mysterious and unbeknownst to me, we are not going to get that chance because later on, Mr. Speaker, here is what is going to happen. We get to the point of this bill where this consumer protection standard is presented. One Member, one, will have the chance to stand up and object to it, and it will be stripped out of the bill with no vote. Mr. Speaker, if there are Members who disagree with this law, and I understand in good faith that there could be, let them come to this floor, let them take this well, and let them argue their point, and let us put it up for a vote. The fair and reasonable thing to have done would have been to permit an amendment that would have stripped this provision from the bill and put it up for a vote. But the people who oppose this provision do not want their fingerprints on the opposition to this provision because they could not go home, they could not look their constituents in the eye and say, ``I just voted to weaken consumer standards for your children.'' If my colleagues believe that is the right thing to do, then vote on it. My colleagues should have the courage to come to this floor and put their name on it. Mr. Speaker, this is wrong, and I believe the Republican leadership of this House, failing the defeat of this rule, which I urge, ought to have the courage to bring to the floor this bill on a stand-alone vote so all 435 of us can go on the record and explain to our constituents where we stand. If my colleagues ever wanted an argument as to why we need campaign finance reform, this is it.

Mr. ANDREWS

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts for yielding me this time. I wish to thank the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Coble) of the subcommittee, and the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde) of the full committee, as well as the ranking members, the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers) and the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Frank) for their help in bringing this legislation to the floor. Most American grandparents would believe that after a hard fought, very difficult, painful and expensive process of winning the right to visit their grandchildren in State court that they have won that right permanently, or at least until some negative circumstance occurs. Many of them have been shocked and chagrined to find out that that is not the case. Very often, when the child moves to another State, the rights of the grandparents evaporate. This legislation, which is based upon legislation I authored last year, will solve that problem. It will say that if grandparents have rights to visit their grandchild in New Jersey or North Carolina or Massachusetts, then they have those rights irrespective of where the child lives. If the child moves to Arizona or Pennsylvania or to another State, the rights move with the child. I want to commend all my colleagues for their involvement in this and spend a minute in telling my colleagues how I got involved in it. A constituent of mine from Cherry Hill, New Jersey, by the name of Josephine D'Antonio, brought this problem to my attention about 3 or 4 years ago, and it was through learning of her story, as the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Coble) has learned from many stories in his district, that we were able to work together as Republicans and Democrats to bring this bill to the floor today. So I want to thank Mrs. D'Antonio, Mr. Speaker, for her role in making this happen. I also want to thank Maureen Doherty from my office, who has worked tirelessly on this legislation throughout her tenure here. She is leaving us to go to law school in a couple of weeks. There are not many people who help to write a law before they become a lawyer or a law student, and I commend her for that. I also want to say that I have learned of the importance of the bond between grandparents and grandchildren in my own heart and in my own life. I also want to say the important lessons many of us parental learned have been in that way, and on behalf of my children I wanted to thank their surviving grandparents, Mrs. Phyllis Wolf, Mr. Ernest Spinello and Mrs. Florence Spinello for the lessons they have taught us about that very important bond. Mr. Speaker, I am glad today we are coming together so that grandparents all across this country will be able to walk into any courthouse in any State, if they have received a court order, and know that their right to participate in the nurturing and love of their grandchildren will continue across State lines. I urge support of the bill and thank its movers to the floor.

Mr. ANDREWS

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Pennsylvania for yielding, and I thank the ranking member for his cooperation in this matter. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the bill, and I would like to thank my coauthor, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Fawell) for his diligence in preparing this piece of legislation. I share with my ranking member opposition to a plan that would replace cash with comp time. I share his sympathies for an increase in the minimum wage. I would oppose a bill that would divest 1.5 million American workers from the right to receive overtime. That is not the bill before us tonight. The bill before us tonight is not a bill that divests people of overtime. I believe it is a bill that appropriately invests a carefully selected number of people with an opportunity to better themselves. It is not a partisan bill. Five Democratic members of this committee, including myself, are sponsors of this bill. We believe that this is a bill that opens up opportunity for people. It is important, first, to talk about what the bill is not and whom it does not cover. If you drive a truck and deliver goods along a route, this bill does not cover you because you are not an inside sales person. If you are a phone solicitor, someone that makes cold calls to people you have never spoken to before and tries to sell them a credit card or a magazine subscription or some other good, this does not apply to you because you are not dealing with an established customer base. If you stand on your feet in an appliance store or a department store or furniture store and wait for the customers to come in, this does not apply to you because you are not dealing with a sophisticated product and existing customer base; and the law, simply by its terms, does not apply. This bill applies to a carefully selected group of people who are engaged in the process of doing better by working more. Tomorrow morning, one of the beneficiaries of this bill is going to go to work, and she is going to go to work at a food distribution company. Her assigned clientele will be a group of restaurants or food stores. Her job will be to work with that existing customer base to try to make the best deals and the best connections she can with that existing customer base. She has the opportunity, provided that she is primarily engaged in sales, provided that she needs specialized consultive knowledge, provided that she can exercise discretion in the relationship with the client or customer, and provided that she is dealing with primarily an existing customer base, she has the opportunity to move ahead and make more and increase her income. This is not a situation where people who are involved in a cold call selling situation can be compelled to work more hours. This is a situation where people who are engaged in what former Secretary of Labor Reich has described as the new sales force in the economy will be given an opportunity to advance the cause in the income of that particular individual. It is very important to understand that this is a carefully tailored piece of legislation, designed not to cover people who could be easily exploited by an unscrupulous employer, but rather to open the doors of opportunity for an employee who wishes to improve her situation or his situation by working at hours and times where the customer base and the clientele is more likely to respond. To understand why this law is needed, my colleagues need to understand how it would be different if my hypothetical individual who is a food sales person were working as an outside sales person. If this same sales person got in her car or her van and drove from customer to customer instead of sitting at her desk and communicating with those customers on the telephone or via the fax machine or via the computer or the Internet, under the present law, if she sits behind the wheel of a car or a van and drives from place to place, she is not subject to the provisions of the 40-hour workweek. But if she sits behind a desk under what I would assume would be more productive and beneficial circumstances and works her customer relations with a phone and a fax machine and a computer, she is covered by the law. This proposal, with bipartisan support, carefully drawn after due consideration of objections, and made in good faith by both sides of the aisle, this plan is resolved to address that anomaly and treat that person the same if she is sitting in the office making the sales as she would be if she is driving out on the road and making the sales. In support of H.R. 2888, the ``Sales Incentive Compensation Act,'' I believe the following points should be made. The bill sets out important criteria for those employees to be exempted. First, employees must be highly skilled. The exemption is directed at professional employees functioning in a similar capacity as ``outside sales'' employees. In this regard, these employees must have highly specialized and technical knowledge about both the products or services they offer as well as the clients with whom they deal. These ``highly specialized'' professionals typically receive extensive training to prepare them to sell a variety of products and/or services and they receive frequent follow-up training or related educational instruction. Second, employees must exercise independent judgment and discretion. It is fundamental that these employees are required, by the nature of their work, to exercise independent judgment and discretion in making these sales. These are not telemarketers or semi-skilled sales staff. Rather, the bill is designed to identify salespeople who act in a professional capacity utilizing substantial discretion in their work. Third, employees must have continuing and regular contact with customers. These employees can only gain the extensive knowledge of their clients needs envisioned by the law through regular and repeated contact with these customers. One-time calls, whether made by the sales person or the customer, cannot serve as the basis for the type of specialized knowledge of the customers' needs which would permit the employee to act in the consultative or advisory capacity necessitated by the bill. This means in practical terms that the employee must have a continuing relationship with a vast majority of customers to whom he or she makes sales. In addition to the duties criteria, there are several requirements related to compensation. First, the employee must receive a guaranteed salary. The bill requires receipt of compensation which is not affected by the actual number of hours the employee may work in a given period. As a result, the employee cannot earn an hourly wage, but must be given a predetermined and guaranteed salary regardless of the number of hours actually worked. This is reflective of the professional status the employee must possess. The second major component is that the compensation earned as incentive pay must serve as an inducement and reward for individual effort. In this regard, the incentive pay should be in the form of individual commissions based on each sale generated by the employee. Such a requirement does not prohibit incentives based on reaching individual or group sales quotas, etc., but these methods must be constructed in such a way as to make individual sale commissions readily identifiable. Third, employees must be rewarded with at least as high a level of incentive compensation (formula or rate) in hours above forty per week as they received in hours below forty per week. As a result, if quotas or other incentive plans are used which do not explicitly reward employees for each sale generated, the manner and rate of incentive pays must make it perfectly clear that the employee is earning at least as much for sales generated in overtime hours as he or she would earn for same sales in non-overtime hours. This is carefully drawn. It is narrowly tailored. I very much appreciate the support of my four Democrat colleagues on the committee for this bill, and I appreciate the diligence and persistence of my coauthor, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Fawell). Mr. Chairman, I too would urge the adoption of the bill and the defeat of amendments that have been proposed.

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, I want to join the gentleman in respectful opposition to this amendment. I think the point he is making is very important, that the amendment opens an awful lot of questions about how the consent would be expressed, to whom, whether it could be altered, whether someone could be exempt for a week and then go back to nonexempt the next week, whether or not the requests would have to be oral or in writing. And I believe what it would do would be to unduly complicate matters, and for that reason I would join the gentleman in his opposition to the amendment.

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman yield?

Mr. ANDREWS. Under current law, when collective bargaining reaches an impasse, employers have a perverse incentive to bargain to impasse and then compel a union to acquiesce in conditions mandated by the employer. From a related point of view, it is not the intent of the Sales Incentive Compensation Act to create a new defense for an unfair labor practice perpetrated by an employer or to create an exemption excusing what would otherwise be an unfair labor practice. The Sales Incentive Compensation Act does not create a right or authority for an employer to implement unilaterally the exemption provided by the legislation in a circumstance where an employer is engaged in collective bargaining negotiations with a labor organization and the negotiating parties have reached an impasse. As an author of H.R. 2888, I want to make clear that the bill should not be used as an instrument, if an impasse occurs, to secure an outcome that would never result from the normal ebb and flow of the free collective bargaining process. Under current law, when collective bargaining reaches an impasse, employers have a perverse incentive to bargain to impasse and then compel a union to acquiesce in conditions mandated by the employer. From a related standpoint, it is not the intent of the Sales Incentive Compensation Act to create a new defense for an unfair labor practice perpetrated by an employer.

Mr. ANDREWS. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time. I want to engage my colleague in a colloquy. The Sales Incentive Compensation Act does not change the law of impasse in any way. The bill does not create a new right or authority for an employer to implement unilaterally the exemption provided by the legislation in a circumstance where an employer is engaged in collective bargaining negotiations with a labor organization and the negotiating parties have reached an impasse. As a coauthor of H.R. 2888, I want to make it clear that the bill may not be used as an instrument, if an impasse occurs, to secure an outcome that would never result from the normal ebb and flow of the free collective bargaining process. Am I correct that it is the understanding of my coauthor of the bill that it does not create a new right to impose unilaterally a settlement during an impasse?

Mr. ANDREWS. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. ANDREWS. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois, my coauthor.

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, I offer this amendment to conform the bill to a provision that was proposed by the gentleman from New York (Mr. Owens) in committee so that the rest of the bill can conform to that so that the reference would be to the employee's position and the employee. This makes it very clear that the position and the employer are both covered. This conforms the bill that we adopted in committee to the suggestion of Mr. Owens that was adopted in committee. I would urge its adoption.

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

Mr. ANDREWS

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Moakley), the ranking member, for yielding me this time. Mr. Speaker, here we do go again. After 30 years of partisanship and 30 years of red ink, I thought we learned something in 1997. When the parties work together, they can balance the budget, and we should all be proud that we did that in 1997. There is a proposal that would build on that tradition. It was put forward by the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Minge) and the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Stenholm). It deserves a hearing on this floor. It is not perfect. It may not even win majority support. I would support it, as I intend to support the budget offered by the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt), but it deserves a hearing because it builds a bridge between the two parties, and it builds a bridge between this House and the other body. We should reject this rule because this rule rejects our right to fully and fairly debate all of the alternatives before the American people. Reject this rule. Give us a chance to debate all the alternatives.

Mr. ANDREWS

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, I thank my friend and classmate, the gentleman from Indiana, for yielding. I rise in support of the Roemer amendment. Tomorrow, my 5-year-old daughter Jacqueline is going to enroll for kindergarten, and when my wife and I look at the cost of paying for an education, we really have our fingers crossed that some day she will earn an athletic scholarship to play lacrosse or soccer or field hockey or some other sport. We are going to need it. The day that her mother started college, there were far fewer opportunities for women to play intercollegiate sports. When her grandmother was growing up, very few women went to college at all. There has been a lot of progress in opportunities for women over the years, and I believe that we should do nothing to turn back the clock on that progress. It is very important that we reaffirm our support for title IX, as I believe this amendment does. I also believe that no one on the other side of this question wants to downgrade women's sports, and I understand that. I believe that we have gotten in an unfortunate box where, somehow or another, we believe that we are choosing between men and women in intercollegiate sports opportunities, and we should not. I happen to believe that the record does show, particularly in the case of some sports like men's wrestling, that there have been some unjustifiable decisions made that have hurt student athletes. And I, for one, am looking for a tool to try and remedy those injustices. With all due respect to its author, who I know is very well-advised and well-intentioned, I do not believe this is the right tool because of the expanded time window that is in it. I do share his conviction, however, that there ought to be some guarantee that before an institution chooses to terminate a sport that it ought to say exactly how much money it is going to save, justify those numbers so that the dynamic of the campus-based, decision-making community can look at that argument and see whether it is true or false. So I will support the Roemer amendment tonight, but I will offer my willingness to cooperate in trying to find a way to resolve this very serious problem.

Mr. ANDREWS. I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time. Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to defeat the Riggs amendment. I want to talk for a moment about some truths and some myths, because here is the truth. When the door of opportunity is opened to students who are called special admits or affirmative action, they perform equally well to the other students. They perform equally well. The Chronicle of Higher Education recently published a study which compared the graduation rates of special admit medical students with non-special admit medical students. Ninety-eight percent of the non-special admit students graduated. Ninety-four percent of the special admit students graduated, an insignificant statistical difference. Once you open the door, everyone who is willing and able can walk through it equally. This amendment slams the door. Let us talk about the myth of merit. Let us perfect this amendment to make sure it does not perpetuate that myth. Let us have merit. Let us have a Federal law that says if your mother or father is on the board of trustees of the university, you do not get special treatment. Let us have merit. Let us say if your aunt or your uncle or your grandparents gave a lot of money to the school, you do not deserve special admission. Let us have merit. Let us say if you are the son or daughter of the member of the State legislature or the mayor or a Member of the United States Congress, you do not deserve special admission. Let us have merit. Let us say that if you are not someone from a special geographic region of the country or state of the world you do not deserve special treatment. Let us have merit. Let us say that if you are not someone from a different ethnic group that is not fully represented, you do not deserve special admission or special treatment. Merit is a concept that lives only in mythology. It does not live in the admissions offices. This amendment should be defeated for that reason.

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman. I would like to just clarify that we are exempting Native American colleges out of a unanimous consent request to modify the amendment to also exempt historically black colleges and universities and Hispanic institutions. I ask unanimous consent to do so.

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to ask the sponsor of the amendment to offer this modification.

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Clay) for yielding me this time. Mr. Chairman, I too rise in opposition to this amendment. I would point out to our colleagues, I believe this is essentially the same issue we just defeated on the last vote and I would encourage them to do the same on this vote. I also oppose this because I believe it is a breeder of litigation. I believe that this amendment will not breed equality; I believe it will breed litigation. To understand why, imagine the case of a student who applies for a job under a Federal Work Study program, which is a program authorized under the act, and the student alleges that he or she has been denied the job on the basis of race. This amendment does not answer the following questions: One, must the student prove that there was discriminatory effect or discriminatory intent? Secondly, who has the burden of proof under this amendment? Does the student have to prove that he or she has been the victim of discrimination or is the burden on the institution to show that the student was not the victim of discrimination? And finally, what is the quantum of proof? Does the person carrying the burden have to prove this to a preponderance of the evidence? To a substantial degree? Beyond a reasonable doubt? Those are all questions that I believe are not satisfactorily answered in the amendment. I believe it captures the same spirit of the amendment we just defeated, but I also believe it breeds litigation and would cause considerable chaos in higher education programs. Mr. Chairman, I urge its defeat on that basis.

Mr. ANDREWS

Mr. ANDREWS. Does the gentleman mean the chairman of the Committee on Rules?

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, this Congress, working with President Clinton and Vice-President Gore and Secretary Riley and the Department of Education, I think has built a laudable record of achievement in higher education. The Hope Scholarship tax credits that were enacted last year are a matter that is benefiting millions of families across the country. Virtually every family in my district has the opportunity to benefit from it in one way or the other. Working with this committee and this Congress, Pell grants are at their highest level ever. More students are benefiting from Pell grants, and those students who benefit are benefiting at a higher level. We have been able to enact and improve work-study programs and national service and many, many other areas. The administration and the Congress, I believe, have an exemplary record also in the area of student loans. Loan default costs have fallen precipitously. I think Members of both parties and this committee deserve a lot of credit for that, working with the Department of Education. It is with that context in mind that I think the administration's proposal on the interest rate issue merits some consideration. I realize that the gentleman from California (Mr. McKeon) and the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Kildee) and the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Goodling) and other leaders of this committee have worked to construct a very delicate balance on this compromise. For that reason, it is not my intention to press this matter for a vote at this time. It is, in fact, my intention to ask for unanimous consent to withdraw the amendment at the conclusion of these remarks. But I do believe, and I think that belief is shared by many others in this body, that the administration's proposal of the subsidy number, which is the 91-day T-bill rate plus 1.7 percent for in-school interest and 2.3 percent for out-of-school interest, is a better number. That truly represents the level at which this program could operate efficiently for the lenders, profitably for the lenders, at a lower cost for the students, and perhaps most importantly, at a lower cost for the taxpayer. I would repeat an admonition that the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt) made earlier this evening, that some of us have also embraced, that there is a lingering question as to how this compromise would be paid for. I fully respect and appreciate the long-standing effort that the leadership of this committee has made to construct this compromise. It is not my desire to upset it or to be unduly critical of it. I do wish to go on record, though, that I believe the administration position is the right one. As we proceed in negotiations with the other body and the administration, I would hope that we continue to have an open mind about this. With the intention of withdrawing the amendment, I would yield to either the full or subcommittee chairman at this point.

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, I ask unanimous consent to withdraw my amendment.

Mr. ANDREWS. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, this is the second amendment I am offering on the issue of income-contingent or income-sensitive loans. Let me say at the outset, and pursuant to my discussion with the subcommittee staff of the gentleman from California (Mr. McKeon), I intend to simply explain the concept and ask for unanimous consent to withdraw it, based upon the assumption we can continue talking about this basic idea. First, I wish to reiterate my appreciation for the acceptance of the first amendment on this subject. I think it gives us an excellent base on which to build. The purpose of this second amendment is to build on that base by specifying two things. One is that I believe that loans under the FFEL program should also have the income-contingent loan feature without consolidation, as this bill would now call for. And second, I believe in a different structure of income-sensitive repayment. I think there should be a specific gradation where the student's income is then tied to a percentage repayment. My proposal calls for students making a taxable income of $20,000 or less to pay 3 percent of their income as their repayment. Students making $40,000 or less and down to $20,000, to pay 5 percent, and have similar gradations beyond that. I believe that when this issue is fully scored by the Congressional Budget Office, it will show a very, very nominal cost, and yet have a great benefit for students as it will permit them to repay their loans in rising payments as their incomes rise. I believe another benefit of this proposal will be a substantial reduction in loan defaults. This is because the obligation of the student to pay will be more closely tied to the ability of the student to pay. Mr. Chairman, I am aware of the fact that there are jurisdictional and budgetary issues that need to be discussed. I also know there are some substantive disagreements, but I did want to get on the record my adherence to this principle. Again, I express my appreciation for the adoption of the basic idea and amendment in No. 16.