Spencer Abraham

Mr. ABRAHAM

Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, I rise today to express my sincere condolences to the families and friends who which took place in Oklahoma City, OK, on April 19, 1995. My prayers are with the victims, with those who lost loved ones, and with those who simply had to suffer through the agony of uncertainty. And, like every Member of this Senate, I am determined to ensure that those terrorists who committed this crime will be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law. Our top priority today and always ought to be the protection and safety of all the citizens of our country. Though we in the Senate will, as we already have, differ about the role of the Federal Government and the scope of Congress' authority, I think we can all agree that the first obligation of the Government is to protect its citizens from harm. We must do everything we rightfully can to prevent future tragedies of this sort and to see to it that the perpetrators of this terrible act are brought to justice. One hope I have is that, in the process of focusing on the tragic incident in Oklahoma City involving one type of crime, we don't lost sight of the rising tide of all violent crime in this country. It did not take the massive destruction of this bombing to make violence a major problem in America. The rate of violent crime is increasing and will continue to do so if we do not put a stop to it now. Thus, it is even more urgent that government at all levels--Federal, State, and local--act accordingly to make sure that all types of criminal violence are prevented, or, that when these acts occur, to see to it that the responsible parties are severely punished for their actions. In my view, there is a continuum in our society, with the rights of criminals on one end, and the rights of both victims of crime and the law-abiding on the other. More rights for criminals ineluctably translates to fewer rights for victims. I believe the pendulum has swung too far, and for too long, toward the right of criminals. It is time for us to shift things in the direction of law-abiding citizens and the victims of crime. Despite our best efforts, we must recognize that, no matter what we do, we will never to able to eradicate crime, nor, though we would like to, eliminate the possibility of a violent fanatic detonating a fertilizer-based bomb. So long as human nature remains imperfect there are going to be murderers, there are going to be rapists, there are going to be violent fanatics. Prevention is critical, and all appropriate tools should be provided to law enforcement officials to aid their preemptory efforts. But what is also important is the response which our criminal justice system is able to muster after the fact. In short, we must ensure that the perpetrators of all criminal acts in this country are--as the President promised in this case--brought to swift and certain justice. Legal reforms that would permit the rapid apprehension, trial, and punishment of the perpetrators of crime--all crimes--would go a long way toward preventing future such crimes and assuring the victims that justice will be done. I believe, with regard to Oklahoma City that what most affects us all is seeing the families of the victims. Like most Americans, I want to see justice for those families prevail. I would like to be able to assure those families that they will not have to suffer through a 9- month trial on TV--including, for example, several weeks devoted to selecting the perfect, dispassionate and adequately uninformed jury. And I would like to be able to tell those families that they will not then have to endure years upon years of repetitive trials and appeals, forcing them to relive over and over the nightmare of the past weeks. But I cannot. Regrettably, our current system is all too often exploited by the guilty--at the expense of the innocent. That is why, as we move ahead with any proposed antiterrorist legislation as well as with the Senate Republican crime bill, S. 3, the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Improvement Act of 1995, I hope we will seek to pass legislation which does put the rights of victims and law-abiding citizens first--where they belong. Mr. President, on another note, I would like to also shed light on an unfortunate incident which took place during the aftermath of the bombing in Oklahoma City. Immediately after the bombing, many so-called experts and news media outlets rushed to the judgment that this attack was most probably the result of, ``Islamic radical fundamentalist terrorists from the Middle East.'' This inaccurate and prematurely reached conclusion did great damage to the millions of loyal Arab- and Moslem-Americans in the United States, producing a wave of anti-Moslem, anti-Arab hysteria in the days after the bombing. The windows of a mosque in Oklahoma City were shattered by bullets in the days after the bombing, and death threats were called in to many mosques across the United States--including several in my home State of Michigan. In addition, many Arab- and Moslem-American students were harassed at their schools and universities. All of these unfortunate incidents could have been avoided had some in the media and their so-called terrorism experts refrained from jumping to such unsubstantiated conclusions. The news media has a clear duty to the American people to report allegations of this type responsibly. The media has received many compliments about its coverage of Oklahoma City, much of it deserved. However, those outlets which failed to show proper restraint or which countenanced wildly speculative finger-pointing should, I believe, extend an apology to the Arab- and Moslem-American communities for the damage done to the hardworking individuals and families that comprise them. The American-Moslem community has donated $22,500 to assist the families of the victims of the bombing in Oklahoma City--a story which I hope the media will also be reporting. That said, I want to reemphasize my comments regarding this horrible tragedy in Oklahoma. Our criminal law enforcement community needs to have the appropriate tools for prevention and punishment. If we, in the Senate, are able to pass the appropriate legislation which will assist the law enforcement officials to effectively combat crime, then perhaps criminals will be deterred from committing another tragic Oklahoma City incident anywhere in the United States. Amidst all the pain, we may have learned a very valuable lesson from this incident--the worst terrorist crime in our Nation's history. The painful lesson learned may be that Oklahoma City is a wake-up call to all Americans that we desperately need to reform our criminal laws.

Mr. ABRAHAM

Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Government Information of the Committee on the Judiciary, be authorized to hold a hearing during the session of the Senate on Thursday, May 4, 1995, to consider ``Counter-Terrorism Legislation.''

Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Subcommittee on Housing Opportunity and Community Development of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Thursday, May 4, 1995, to conduct a hearing on Federal Housing Administration Reform.

Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President I ask unanimous consent that the Subcommittee on Superfund, Waste Control, and Risk Assessment be granted permission to conduct an oversight hearing Thursday, May 4, at 9 a.m., regarding the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act.

Mr. ABRAHAM

Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, the amendment I have offered with the distinguished Senator from Ohio [Mr. DeWine], is extremely important for small business owners across the country. This amendment protects small businesses and other small entities with 25 employees or less from excessive punitive damage awards over $250,000. Individuals, including small businesses organized as sole proprietors, whose net worth does not exceed $500,000 would also be protected. Let me make it clear that small business owners support requiring someone to make restitution when they cause injuries. However, under our current liability structure businesses can be bankrupted by the addition of punitive damage awards that are vastly in excess of the business' ability to pay. The result is fewer small businesses and lost job opportunities. Our amendment will not limit plaintiffs from receiving full compensation for their economic and noneconomic damages. Mr. President, this small business punitive cap amendment will be rated by the National Federation of Independent Business as a key small business vote for the 104th Congress. This amendment is also strongly supported by the 739,000 members of the National Restaurant Association. I ask unanimous consent that letters of endorsement by the NFIB and National Restaurant Association be printed in the Record. I yield the floor.

Mr. ABRAHAM. That would be fine.

Mr. ABRAHAM

Mr. ABRAHAM. Madam President, I just wanted to add a couple more points to my opening remarks on this amendment, because I think they elaborate a little more fully on some of the concerns I raised at that time. As I mentioned in my comments, the need, in my judgment, for expanding the underlying substitute is based on my belief that there is a need to provide the same sort of protections to nonprofit organizations and civic organizations, and so on, that we are trying to provide to product manufacturers. I just wanted to enter into the Record a couple of examples that have been brought to my attention in recent days in the context of this debate. The first is a case of a battered women's shelter in Evanston, IL. A few years ago, the Junior League of Evanston sought to establish such a shelter. An exhaustive search of liability insurance coverage revealed that no insurance company would provide coverage until the shelter operated for 3 years without being sued. No one was willing to serve on the shelter board unless it had liability insurance. So the shelter was never established. That is the kind of, I think, unhappy outcome which the current system with respect to joint and several liability has created. A similar incident involving the Cincinnati Symphony Orchestra illuminates the problem as well. A situation occurred recently where traffic was backed up on the exit ramp leading to the Cincinnati Symphony Orchestra's facility prior to a recent performance. A drunk driver, speeding above posted limits, rear ended a car in the traffic jam injuring the driver of that car. The injured driver filed a lawsuit and made the orchestra a defendant only after learning that the drunk driver was uninsured. The owner of the land on which the facility was situated was also made a defendant. The plaintiff argued that the orchestra and the landowner were negligent in allowing the traffic jam to occur. After litigating the case all the way through trial, the orchestra and landowner were found to be 20 percent at fault between them. However, through the application of joint liability, the orchestra and the landowner were made responsible for all the plaintiff's damages, even though, by any commonsense measure, they had done little or nothing to cause them. This is really the principle that caused me to bring this amendment in to expand the underlying substitute, because I think we have instance after instance where these types of outcomes are produced and, as I said in my opening statement, they happen regardless of the extent to which the defendant may have tried to protect against injury. We know that no situation is without its risks. Nobody who operates a business can operate it risk free. They can and should have as much incentive as possible to minimize the risks that they create. Under a joint/several liability approach, however, there is not as much incentive to limit risk because, as I stated in my earlier comments, no matter how successfully one insulates themselves, even to exclude certain risks and possibilities of liability from happening, they still may be found responsible and pay the entire damages involved in an injury simply because of joint and several liability. I do not think that is the kind of incentive system we want, and I think that set of incentives ought to apply across the board. Therefore, I believe the expansion of the legislation through my amendment from the product area exclusively to other areas, as indicated in the amendment, is a sensible and wise addition to this bill. Madam President, I yield the floor. Mr. HOLLINGS addressed the Chair.

Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, the amendment I have proposed with my esteemed colleague from Kentucky would extend the joint liability reforms of S. 565 to all cases whose subject matter affects interstate commerce. This extension is necessary, in our view, to realize the basic goals of the bill. In its traditional form, the doctrine of joint liability allows the plaintiff to collect the entire amount of a judgment from any defendant found to be at least partially responsible for the plaintiff's damages. Thus, for example, a defendant found to be 1 percent responsible for the plaintiff's damages could be forced to pay 100 percent of the plaintiff's judgment. This example is not merely theoretical. In the case of Walt Disney World versus Wood, the plaintiff sought recovery of damages resulting from a collision between her go-kart and another driven by her fiancee. The jury found the plaintiff 14 percent responsible, and her fiancee 85 percent responsible, for the plaintiff's damages. Thus, between them, the plaintiff and her fiancee were 99 percent responsible for her damages. Unfortunately for Disney, however, the jury found it 1 percent responsible for the plaintiff's damages and, under the doctrine of joint liability, Disney was forced to pay 86 percent of the plaintiff's judgment. The Disney case underscores the fact that unreformed joint liability forces defendants to pay judgments on the basis of their resources, not their responsibility. Thus, a largely blameless defendant can be punished for the actions of a truly culpable defendant simply because the former defendant has greater assets than the latter. This unfairness is aggravated when noneconomic damages are awarded. Noneconomic damages are awarded to compensate plaintiffs for subjective harm, like pain and suffering, emotional distress, and humiliation. Since noneconomic damages are not based on tangible losses, however, there are no objective criteria for calculating their amount. As a result, the size of these awards often depends more on the luck of the draw, in terms of the jury, than on the rule of law. Thus, when defendants are held jointly liable for noneconomic damages--as they are under the unreformed version of joint liability-- they can be forced to pay enormous sums for unverifiable damages they did not cause. Apparently forgotten amid all this is the old idea that the law is supposed to yield predictable, fair, and equitable results. In cases where the doctrine of joint liability is applied, then, we depart from the fundamental concept, rooted in simple justice, that tort law liability should be based on fault. This departure yields a number of undesirable consequences. First, determining liability on a basis other than fault often leaves people with an overwhelming sense of helplessness. No matter how careful they might be, actors are no longer masters of their own fate with regard to the extent of their exposure to liability. For example, one of my cousins operates a baseball batting cage. Patrons of the cage pay money to swing at pitches hurled by a pitching machine. Obviously, a fast-pitched baseball can cause injury, so the small business posted warnings that the cage should only be used by experienced batters, and that only one person should be in the batter's box at a time. On one occasion, however, two patrons squeezed into the batter's box, including one who had never hit a fast-pitched baseball before. The inexperienced batter was struck by the ball and injured. The business was sued for this injury, although the plaintiff and her accomplice were largely responsible for it. Thus, because of joint liability, and despite their best efforts to act responsibly, my cousin's business faced the prospect of paying for all the plaintiff's damages. A second and related point is that basing liability on criteria other than fault erodes incentives for responsible behavior. As Karyn Hicks has explained in a leading law review article, [u]nder joint and several liability, whether the actor is 1 percent responsible or 100 percent responsible for an injury, his actual cost potential for involvement in the activity will always be the same. He will, therefore, have little incentive to expend his resources in accident avoidance behavior, such as equipment maintenance or taking the time to act carefully, if * * * he will still have to pay the same as he would if he had made no expenditure to avoid the accident in the first place. Thus, by reducing or eliminating an actor's reward for acting carefully, we likewise reduce or eliminate the incentive for shouldering the extra costs associated with careful conduct. The result, of course, is more accidents and injuries. In truth, Mr. President, to the extent that joint liability requires parties to provide compensation for harms they did not cause, it acts like an accident insurance system. But this system is remarkably inefficient. Less than half of every dollar paid out in damage awards goes to the injured party--the remainder goes to court costs and attorney fees. Of course, the costs imposed on defendants by unreformed joint liability are not limited to damage awards. In case after case, deep pockets organizations and individuals are made defendants for no reason other than their financial resources. For example, George McGovern operated a country inn that was sued by a man who got into a fistfight in its parking lot. Mr. McGovern had a security man on duty at the time, and he managed to win the case. But he only did so after, in his words, ``the expenditure of a great deal of time, effort and money.'' In another case, a McDonald's restaurant was sued by a driver whose car was struck by a car driven by a drive-in patron of the restaurant. The plaintiff argued that McDonald's had been negligent by failing to warn its patron of the dangers of eating while driving. The case was a patent of the threat of joint liability, but McDonald's prevailed only after 3 years of costly litigation. Although not reflected in any damage award, the costs of these two cases should be attributed to the lure of joint liability because, absent that doctrine, the cases almost certainly would not have been brought. Now, some may ask why we should reform a doctrine that has been around as long as joint liability. That is a fair question, but it has a ready answer. Joint liability was designed for a fundamentally different body of law than that in place today. As Ms. Hicks explains, ``the evolution of joint liability took place at a time when the contributory negligence of the plaintiff was a complete defense to any negligence action.'' But the vast majority of States have now abolished contributory negligence as a complete defense. By failing to reform joint liability as well, we have moved, as Ms. Hicks explains, ``from a situation where a wrongdoer compensated an innocent victim to one in which an actor responsible to a degree as minute as one percent * * * may, in fact, be confronted with paying the entire damage costs to a plaintiff who may have been considerably more responsible and in a far better position of cost avoidance than was he.'' Thus, Mr. President, joint liability reform is necessary to bring the doctrine into alignment with the reforms made to related, background principles of law. S. 565 would reform joint liability in the product liability context by allowing it to be imposed for economic damages only, so that a defendant could be forced to pay for only his proportionate share of noneconomic damages. As a result, plaintiffs would be fully compensated for their out-of-pocket losses, while defendants would be better able to predict and verify the amount of damages they would be forced to pay. This reform thus would address the most pressing concerns of plaintiffs and defendants alike. But this reform needs to be extended beyond the product liability context, because entities other than manufacturers and sellers are among those hardest hit by unreformed joint liability. The impact of our current system on nonprofits and local governments, for example, is well-documented: Individual Little League Baseball leagues have seen their liability insurance premiums soar 1,000 percent over the past 5 years alone; the city of New York now pays out almost $270 million in tort awards each year, which is double the amount of funding for city libraries; and well-grounded fears of liability thwart the recruitment efforts of volunteer organizations. Extending this bill's joint liability reforms beyond the product liability context is also critical to the bill's goals of enhancing economic growth and competitiveness. Small businesses are the engine of that growth, generating 2 of every 3 new net jobs in our economy since the early 1970's. To a significant extent, however, small businesses are forced to direct their resources not to job creation, but to costs associated with lawsuits. Liability insurance premiums paid by American businesses, for example, are now 20 to 50 times higher than those paid by foreign firms. But the bill as currently written fails to pare these costs adequately because many if not most of the lawsuits involving small businesses do not concern product liability. Instead, small businesses are routinely ensnared in suits for slip and fall, misconduct by employees, patrons, and the like. Since a majority of small business owners take home less than $50,000 per year a determination of joint liability in even one such lawsuit can cripple a small business or force it to close its doors. To be serious about enhancing economic growth, we have to address that threat. Mr. President, it is clear that the American people, men and women alike, demand joint liability reform. According to a recent poll conducted by the Luntz Research Co., 71 percent of Americans believe that joint liability reforms should be extended to all lawsuits, not just product liability cases. In summary, Mr. President, we can no longer afford to overlook the heavy burden that unreformed joint liability imposes on our society. I say our society, rather than simply ``defendants,'' because we all know that the costs of our current system are passed on to all of society, rich and poor alike, in the form of lost jobs, higher taxes, reduced community services, and rising prices. Without our amendment, we can address only a small fraction of those costs. With it, we can make a difference in the lives of all Americans. Mr. President, I yield the floor. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. ABRAHAM. I ask unanimous consent further reading be dispensed with.

Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to lay aside the pending Thompson amendment so I may offer an amendment.

Mr. ABRAHAM. Thank you, Madam President. I would like to try to answer several of the questions that were raised by the distinguished Senator from Alabama in his comments a moment ago. I was out of the Chamber for a minute, so I am trying to recapitulate all of his remarks. But I will go to the ones I think I understand. One question that has been raised is the issue of whether the Senate has had an opportunity to consider some of the arguments that are involved in this effort to expand the underlying bill, the substitute bill, through such things as hearings and so on. I would just say that I think there have been several efforts to do that. It is my understanding that in the Commerce Committee the notion of broadening legislation in that regard was discussed at least by one of the witnesses. A Mr. Ted Olson discussed the notion of broadening. Also, obviously the principles of changing from the joint and several system that has preexisted were discussed in the context of the underlying bill itself. We discussed to some degree the same issues in a hearing that was held in the Judiciary Committee on punitive damages as well as in a subcommittee hearing that was conducted yesterday by Senator Grassley on the cost of the legal system. To my knowledge, those are at least several venues in which these discussions have been the subject of hearings. In addition, I guess I would just point out to the Chair that these are certainly not new issues. I believe the notion of reforming the legal system has been, as I understand it, at least before the Senate on previous occasions in various committees. So I think that we have had previous discussions as well. Another point I want to address is the question that was raised as to whether the amendment we are proposing would apply to such things as the Civil Rights Act and so on. This amendment expressly does not alter or supersede Federal law. So in the case of any Federal law, whether it is the Civil Rights Act or others, I guess, that were referenced, I was out of the Chamber at that time, where provision for joint and several liability is provided, this amendment would not supersede. Those provisions would remain in place. Let me just comment a little more broadly on some of the other points that were touched on by the Senator from Alabama in his remarks. As far as noneconomic damages go, he, I think, did a very good job of outlining the broad definition of what constitutes noneconomic damages. And there is no intent on the part of our amendment to change that definition or to confine in any way the types of noneconomic damages which people might be able to recover. The purpose of our amendment is to say that, while you may recover noneconomic damages, you should only recover them from a defendant to the extent the defendant is responsible for those noneconomic damages. And in the sense that so many of the noneconomic damages that were referenced tend to be in areas that are very subjective in terms of calculation, very hard to discern, it strikes me at least to be a fundamental principle of fairness that we not hold defendants who are not responsible for the negligence involved for damages over which it is very difficult, if not impossible, to calculate. As a sense of fairness, I think the type of amendment we are offering is responsive. I would close with one final thought. We heard, I thought, a good point made with respect to some of the people who could conceivably be plaintiffs in actions of this sort; references to the elderly who might be injured and be seeking a form of recovery and not be somehow able to because we assign damages on the basis of responsibility. But it seems to me that it is equally possible that the type of elderly individual referenced by the Senator from Alabama could be a defendant--an elderly individual who has saved his or her entire life for his or her retirement, who has a certain amount of fixed assets unlikely to get greater because of the fact that they have stopped working, who, because of joint and several liability, finds themselves, unhappily, the deep pocket in some type of multiple defendant situation and, consequently, even though they have only participated in a small degree in terms of the responsibility for an injury, end up holding the bag for the entire amount of the injury because the other defendants, even though more blameworthy, are judgment proof. In short, I think you can see it from both perspectives. The notion of our amendment is to try to place responsibility for resolving noneconomic damages on the shoulders of those who are most responsible for the damages in the first place, on the basis of their apportioned share of negligence. So, for those reasons, I think our amendment is a sensible expansion of the underlying legislation. As I said earlier, I strongly hope that Members of the Senate will support it. Madam President, I yield the floor. Mr. HEFLIN addressed the Chair.

Mr. ABRAHAM

Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. ABRAHAM

Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, the distinguished Senator from South Carolina indicated, as we discussed the effect of the modification, it is to correct the transpositional error that took place when we took language from another piece of legislation and created this amendment. My intent was, and remains, to apply the amendment that I offered initially, not just to the clients of plaintiffs' attorneys but to the clients of defense attorneys as well. That is the purpose of the modification, to fundamentally change the word from ``claimant'' to ``party'' so it would apply to all cases. Mr. President, what I would like to do is talk briefly about why this amendment was offered initially and to clarify some ambiguities and some misunderstandings that appeared to exist and comment a little bit about the merits of the amendment. First of all, let me begin by saying that I am an attorney, as is the Senator from South Carolina and many other Members of this body. I respect my colleagues who are lawyers. I respect the attorneys who practice in my State and those who practice in the other States. I believe most lawyers are doing an outstanding job, and I think that consequently the amendment I am offering is not going to really have much effect on the overwhelming percentage of attorneys in America. In fact, the goal of my amendment is essentially to eliminate bad practices undertaken by some attorneys who do not attempt to keep their clients well informed as to the arrangements into which they enter. Often we have, particularly in cases where clients who are less experienced in the legal system, clients who are unsophisticated about the ways in which attorney-client relationships work, we have situations where clients are less informed than they should be about the arrangements they are entering into. Such is the case when I go to have my television or my automobile repaired and inquire ahead of time for some assessment of what the cost will be and what is wrong with the car or the television set. I think many clients of attorneys need similar help to make informed decisions about the types of arrangements that they will enter into. That is basically the purpose of my amendment. People are unhappy in my State and elsewhere with respect to the way the current system of legal fees is entered into. Just to mention a couple of cases in point, I recently received a letter from a Michigan resident who wrote that the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois had just notified him that he was included in a class action case, and the court soon would be holding a hearing whether to give final approval to a settlement with Chrysler Corp. under the proposed settlement. Under the alleged defect in the Chrysler credit leases, each class member was going to be paid between $2 and $2.50. The attorney who brought the case would be paid up to $175,000. Under this agreement, the lawyer would get enough money to buy a big, new house. The victims would get enough to buy a Big Mac. That struck me as hardly the kind of appropriate practice that we should tolerate without the clients having full information as they become engaged in the matter. That is the reason a number of organizations that represent consumers have called for the kind of amendment which I am offering here today. Bill Pride, the executive director of an organization of Americans who are for legal reform--and the only consumer group, I might add, that has publicly stated that it accepts no money from big business, supports disclosure of attorney fees, and the sort of approach I am taking with this amendment--recently testified before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property. He stated that because of its complexity and expense of lawyers, the legal system is inaccessible to more than half the population when they have legal problems. For low-income people, legal help is almost nonexistent except for the most poor, who qualify for legal aid. Millions of middle-income people cannot get any help from lawyers for simple remedies because of the complex and expensive and intimidating procedures established by the legal profession. He went on to indicate the need for reform. One of the reforms that his organization supports is the kind of fee disclosure proposal which I am offering here today because of its potential value to the clients as they enter into legal relationships and negotiate fees. So indeed there are people who are not satisfied with the information they have with regard to entering into legal arrangements and who are not sophisticated enough in dealing with entering into those relations to enter into them in a knowledgeable way, or to even know what their options are. My coming here today is not to argue that fees are too high or too low or wrong or right. I did not come before the Senate with this amendment to affect the fees that are paid. What I came here for was to try to provide a system by which fee arrangements would be knowledgeable basis. The requirements I am suggesting in the amendment I believe are both simple and fundamentally fair. Without going into all of the details again, as I did yesterday, basically the amendment requires attorneys-- and under the modification, this will be for the defense as well as for plaintiffs' counsel--prior to the entering into an arrangement to provide the potential client with information as to an estimated amount of time that would be involved in handling the matter with an explanation of the various options available as far as the nature of the arrangements that would be entered into, whether it would be hourly billing, or a national fee, or a contingent fee, and then an explanation as to the type of fee as well as the specific amounts that would be employed; in other words, the per-hour amount, the contingent percentage, or the national fee. Following completion of the matter, a similar kind of accounting would take place in which the actual hours would be made available to the client, the amount of the fee which was ultimately calculated or charged, and then the computation of what the hourly rate would be. I recognize that for some small law firms, this may be more burdensome than for others. But like the Senator from South Carolina, who I gathered was in a small firm at one time in his career, I began my legal career when I left law school in a small firm in Lansing, MI. We did not have a lot of fancy computer equipment or access to accountants. But we did maintain a pretty good recordkeeping of our own efforts and the hours that we put in on matters, regardless of the nature of those matters because, simply, we thought it was to be able to operate our offices in an efficient fashion, as well as to serve our clients better and to be able to satisfy requests of this sort if they were to come from clients who knew their rights included the ability to make such requests. But I will add a few other points. The amount that I am offering has several options in it. One is a waiver option. Clients may, under the amendment, waive their rights to this information either preliminary to or following the transaction of a legal matter. It does not require, therefore, that in each case the attorney provide this information. Second, I think it is very consistent with a recent formal opinion, formal opinion No. 94-389, addressing attorneys' contingent fees, which was recently entered into by the American Bar Association Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility. That section, at page 7, said that, among other things, regardless of whether the lawyer and the prospective client, or both, are initially inclined toward a contingent fee, the nature and details of the compensation arrangement should be fully discussed by the lawyer and client before any final agreement is reached. It went on to say that among the factors that should be considered and discussed are the following: The likelihood of success, the likely amount of recovery or savings if the case is successful, the possibility of an award exemplary or multiple damages, and on and on. And included in the things that were recommended was the amount of time that is likely to be invested by the lawyer. In other words, the proposal I am making is not the only one that I think many lawyers already follow. It is also something which the American Bar Association, which may be on different sides of other parts of this pending legislation, has in its own recent opinion suggested ought to be followed. Finally, I will just say that we are not in this legislation telling the States what to do. This amendment is limited to actions within the Federal court; in short, within the purview of what I believe is the appropriate purview of this Congress in determining the areas in which we might apply these types of regulations; in short, the matters before our Federal courts. So I would just conclude by saying that when I proposed this and brought it to the floor, I really did it with a belief it essentially was a matter which would give consumers more information, a right to know what the legal fees they were entering would be like, what they should anticipate, what their options were, an accounting for those fees. In no way was it my intention to cast aspersions on the legal profession. Certainly it was not my intention to be critical of the many fine lawyers who are referenced by the speech of the Senator from South Carolina. I hope that was not the case. We are always hearing in the Congress the concerns that virtually all of us have I think about consumers, about the interest of consumers, about the interests of people who are frequently finding themselves in a disadvantaged position with respect to big business, with respect to big Government, with respect to other big institutions. Many of those individuals find themselves from time to time in circumstances where they would like to litigate a concern or defend one. If they are not well informed, it seems to me they are at an even greater disadvantage, and I believe that this amendment provides a chance to help them and at the same time improve the legal system. It is the case that there is a lot of criticism about lawyers and the way the legal system works. One of the reasons this legislation on product liability was generated obviously was because of concerns about the system. I do not want to kill all the lawyers. I wish to improve the legal system. I think by eliminating from the many concerns people have the concern that they are brought into legal arrangements without the full knowledge of their options, without the full accounting of the time and the dollars involved, that it would substantially improve the system and the way it functions. Finally, as I said a little earlier, I think we are asking here lawyers to do nothing more than we ask of many other professionals in many other service parts of the economy. As I mentioned, when I go to the auto shop with a car problem, I am given information as to what is likely to be wrong, what the likely cost of repairs are, and so on, so that I can make an informed decision whether I wish to pursue repair. We are told that it is harder to do that in this context because it is a more complex area, and I agree it is more complex. But I think, because of its complexity, because it is a more difficult area, that is all the more reason why we should try to get the people who come into this often intimidating setting the sort of information that would allow them to make knowledgeable decisions. That is the purpose of my amendment. At this time, Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of whatever time I have remaining.

Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, I so yield.

Mr. ABRAHAM. I yield myself such time as I desire. Mr. President, I just want to reiterate a couple of points I made. The purpose of the amendment which I have offered is not defined to affect legal fees. In fact, it is the second-degree amendment that the Senator from South Carolina has offered which would attempt to put constraints on those fees. Again I express, all I am trying to do is provide information, both before as well as after the entering into of a legal arrangement between clients and their attorneys. I think the descriptions of such an amendment as being overly bureaucratic and so on is really inconsistent with several facts. First, the fact is that whether it is the distinguished Senator from South Carolina or other Members of this Chamber who are attorneys that I have spoken to on this or heard from about it--and I have heard from several--virtually to a person, they indicate that in one way or another they already perform the function of information and transmission that we are talking about. The attorneys in my State who have talked to me prior to the offering of this amendment and since have likewise said that in their current arrangements, they provide similar information. But they all acknowledge, at least the ones in my State, that there are people in the practice of law who do not. And the people who are unfortunate victims in these situations are the less knowledgeable, the people who are less familiar with the legal process and what their rights are when they enter into these kinds of arrangements. They frequently are in a disadvantaged position because they are the victim of an injury or a harm and in a disadvantaged position because they are intimidated entering into the legal process itself. Again, I stress that this is really, in my judgment, a choice between helping consumers or inconveniencing those attorneys who do not follow the various American Bar Association and State bar association guidelines that both the Senator from South Carolina and I have referred to or the practices of most attorneys. It seems to me that to inconvenience those attorneys who do not feel it is their responsibility to at least inform their clients as to the kind of fee arrangements they are going to enter into and the likely amount of time involved, as well as to inform them after the fact of what the costs are and how much time was involved, to worry about inconveniencing them rather than worrying about protecting those consumers of legal services that are at least the victims I am trying to help with this legislation is to have the balance struck the wrong way. So, for that reason, I believe the amendment makes sense. I would also just reference back to the example we used yesterday that was in a letter we sent around regarding the airline matter. It was brought to my attention by an article in the Washington Post. The article was written from the perspective of one of the various people who were part of the class of people that were affected and received these awards. It was not a complimentary position that was taken by that plaintiff. It was a position of somebody who apparently was representative of a lot of other plaintiffs that were not happy. They were unhappy with the outcome. That is often the case. I think it is particularly the case when people have no information as to what the fee structures will be. And for that reason, I think the amendment that I am offering, as I say, will help consumers. It may prove to be an inconvenience for some attorneys, but those attorneys who will be inconvenienced are the ones who are not following the kinds of practices and recommendations of the bar association as are those of the profession who I think are doing an outstanding job. Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.

Mr. ABRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. President. I just will make several comments. One, in the case the Senator from South Carolina and I have been discussing, I just will point out, again, this is a quote from the media, the judge in that case actually later said that he regretted having approved of the fees that were involved for the reasons that he believed they were inappropriate. Again, my point is not to talk about excessive fees or fees that are inadequate. I have not yet encountered any attorney who says they did not earn the fees that they charged, and since they feel that way, my guess is they should not object to the requirements of this amendment, which would simply ask that prior to and following the conclusion of matters, accountings be made and the fees, as well as the hours involved, be tabulated. I would also stress though, as I did earlier, the amendment provides a waiver provision so that those attorneys who feel this is too burdensome and cumbersome can at least seek to have their clients waive this right to have both prior- as well as post-litigation or settlement accounting occur. But basically, again, Mr. President, I think that the thrust, at least of my underlying amendment, is one of disclosure, it is one of providing consumers with the right to know the kind of legal arrangements that they are getting into, and the right to know what has transpired and how the fees that they are paying will be structured. I believe it is pro-consumer. I believe the only people who might find this inconveniencing are those attorneys who are not following the common practice that is outlined by so many legal organizations of calling upon attorneys to provide that sort of information. Mr. President, at this time, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. ABRAHAM. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. Amendment No. 599 to Amendment No. 596

Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I desire. Mr. President, following discussions with my colleague from South Carolina, and the managers, I ask unanimous consent to modify the underlying first-degree amendment. I send the modification to the desk.

Mr. ABRAHAM

Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the Product Liability Fairness Act which I consider to be a very important piece of legislation. I believe it is the principal first step in reforming our increasingly irrational, often unfair and very costly civil justice system. This system is burdening our economy, it is burdening America's consumers and its middle class; ultimately it is weighing down the community institutions and organizations that help us live together as friends and neighbors. By enacting product liability reform, we can begin reinvigorating our economy, giving consumers a choice of products and decreasing the expense and unpredictability of our tort system. This bill makes a number of much-needed reforms. First, it caps punitive damages in product liability suits. This reform does not limit anybody's right to recover in full for any damages suffered. That right remains intact even if the recovery runs into the millions. Rather, it merely limits the punitive damages that can be awarded over and above what is needed to compensate those injured by defective products. These punitive damages are supposed to function as a punishment for the defendant. But because they are awarded to claimants, their potential availability attracts lawsuits whenever somebody thinks he or she might get lucky and hit the jackpot. Capping these damages will place a real limit on windfall profits in product liability lawsuits and thus lead to fewer frivolous claims being filed and less unnecessary extension of lawsuits which could be settled. In addition, the bill would eliminate joint liability for noneconomic damages in product cases, and replace it with proportionate liability. It thus would end the costly and unjust practice of making a company pay for all damages when it is only responsible for, say, 20 percent, just because the other defendants already have gone bankrupt. Instead each defendant would have to pay only for the noneconomic damage he or she actually caused. The bill also establishes important limits to the liability of product sellers, as well as suppliers of raw materials critical to the production of life-saving medical devices. Generally speaking, the bill makes clear that these sellers and suppliers can be held liable only for their own misconduct in connection with the product. If, for example, the purchaser misuses the product, then that purchaser is responsible to the extent he or she is injured on account of his or her own misuse. These provisions go a good way toward restoring individual responsibility as the cornerstone of tort law. They also recognize an important problem with our legal system: Ultimately, in its current form the system is profoundly anticonsumer. The tort tax imposed by our legal system raises prices on many important goods, rendering them unavailable to poor people. And in extreme cases, our legal system can literally bring death or misery; it does so by driving off the market drugs that can cure terrible but rare diseases, or medical devices for which raw materials are unavailable on account of liability risks. Mr. President, this is not mere hyperbole. There are some 5,000 diseases that affect small numbers of Americans. Many of these diseases, such as cystinosis, a fatal kidney disease, and leprosy, are extremely serious. But a number of them go untreated. Pharmaceutical companies cannot afford to market drugs to treat these diseases because the cost of liability insurance is prohibitive. To give just one example: A West German chemical company at one time supplied Americans with botchyoulinum. If properly used this drug, otherwise a paralytic poison, can control a rare but incapacitating disease, characterized by uncontrollable twitching of the eye muscles. Unfortunately the company cut off American supplies to avoid the risk of being held liable should people misuse its product. And this is no isolated instance. A recent Gallup survey found that one out of every five small businesses decides not to introduce a new product, or not to improve an existing one, out of fear of lawsuits. And, according to a Conference Board survey, 47 percent of firms withdraw products from the market, 25 percent discontinue some form of research, and 8 percent lay off employees, all out of fear of lawsuits. Mr. President, this bill takes important steps to address these problems. The reforms I have specifically noted, as well as others in the bill, will help consumers. They will help our economy. And they will help our legal system. I pledge my full support for this well- considered legislation. However, I would also like to take this opportunity to urge my colleagues to go further. And I mean go further in two respects. First, the reforms under consideration apply only to product liability. That is, they affect only suits involving manufacturers' and sellers' liability for defects in manufacturing and handling products. And second, the reforms do not address certain key flaws in our civil justice system. The problems with our current system are deep and pervasive. They are homeowners, accountants, farmers, volunteer groups, charitable organizations, small businesses, State and local governments, architects, engineers, doctors and patients, employers and employees. In short, they affect all of us. We need to repair our system for all Americans. And doing that will require reforms that go beyond the field of products liability. We must replace our litigation lottery with a civil justice system that is less costly, more predictable, and ultimately more fair to everybody. And we must replace the current incentives to sue with incentives to settle disputes before they get into court. This is why in the course of the next few days I intend, along with others, to offer and support amendments that would broaden the legislation currently under consideration. These amendments fall in two classes. The first class takes valuable reforms currently in the current product liability reform bill and applies them to other kinds of cases. Thus I will be leading an effort to broaden application of this bill's joint and several liability reform and supporting an effort to broaden application of this bill's punitive damages reform. The other category of amendment I am supporting would reorient our current system's distorted incentives. Today, Mr. President, our tort system encourages people to spend money on lawyers and litigation rather than on resolving disputes quickly and compensating deserving claimants. The right to know and rapid recovery amendments I have introduced with my colleague from Kentucky will promote speedy compensation for claimants, save attorney's fees, greatly reduce the cost of liability insurance and change our culture of litigation, which brings me to my last point, Mr. President. A broad approach to legal reform will help our communities. Our current system discourages the voluntarism and civic participation that hold our towns and neighborhoods together. A Gallup survey found that 8 percent of nonprofit organizations had volunteers resign over liability concerns; 16 percent reported volunteers withholding their services due to fear of liability, and 49 percent reported seeing fewer volunteers willing to serve in leadership positions. This is disastrous, Mr. President. When almost half our nonprofit organizations are finding it more difficult to get people to serve in leadership positions, we are in trouble. When our citizens are afraid to serve their neighbors out of fear of being sued, we are in danger of losing that sense of common cause and mutual reliance that is at the heart of any community. We have been hearing a good deal lately about the breakdown of our communities. And it is a real problem. This problem arises in part from peoples' understandable fear of local bullies and strangers who prey on them in their streets and homes. But today our law-abiding citizens suffer from another even more debilitating fear: a fear of each other. Too many Americans are afraid to get involved with their local little league or Girl Scouts or volunteer fire department because they seriously believe that if they make an honest mistake they will be sued and lose everything they have merely for trying to help. So long as Americans see one another as potential plaintiffs, they cannot see one another as neighbors. So long as we encourage lawsuits rather than personal responsibility and early dispute resolution our citizens will fear even those they know well--and come to see them as strangers whom they themselves will sue at the slightest provocation. Neighbors no longer trust one another enough to look out for each other, and each others' children. The result is a breakdown of mutual support and pride in the community, leaving it easy prey for other social ills like crime and delinquency. We must break this destructive cycle, Mr. President, for the sake of our families and our children. We must begin to rebuild our communities by restoring the sense that we can count on one another's good will and forgiveness for innocent mistakes. We must restore trust among our citizens, and health and vigor to our economy, by remaking our civil justice system to reward neighborliness rather than stubborn greed. Mr. President, we must reform our tort system so that we encourage people to come together on their own to settle disputes before they end up in court, costing time, money, and bad feelings. The result will be a reinvigorated economy, more jobs and necessary products for us all, and a revival of that civility and common feeling some of us remember with regret from an era not too long ago; an era in which Americans thought of one another not as potential plaintiffs and defendants but as neighbors trying to help each other in making their community a better place. Mr. President, I yield the floor. Mr. BURNS addressed the Chair.

Mr. ABRAHAM

Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, my esteemed colleague from Kentucky and I are proposing here an amendment which would establish a consumer of legal services' right to know how much he or she is paying and for what services. This is a right we recognize in most other markets for goods and services, and one which is no doubt recognized and respected by most reputable attorneys. Nonetheless, Mr. President, there are too many cases in this country in which tort victims and other consumers of legal services have real difficulty determining whether they are getting a fair shake from their attorney. As a result, victims receive less of their rewards than they should, the legal system costs everyone too much, and ever-higher fees are encouraged by a lack of competition. Mr. President, this amendment will give consumers of legal services the means with which to make informed decisions concerning their legal representation. By establishing a consumer's right to know in the legal services market it will encourage competition and fair dealing. It will help make our system more fair to litigants and reduce the total cost of our legal system. The unfairness of our current system is shown by the fact that tort victims receive only 43 cents of every $1 awarded from damages--the other 57 cents going to pay lawyers and court fees and to cover the litigants' lost time. A significant portion of the 57 cents taken by the legal system goes directly to attorneys. Plaintiff's attorneys, in particular, collected from 33 to 40 percent of the average award in a contingency fee case-- that, plus fees for all costs related to the litigation. Now, I am not begrudging the hard-working attorney for his or her hard-won fee. Nor am I proposing that we establish any set fee. But it seems clear to me that something is wrong with a system in which, as was noted by Professor Lester Brickman of the Cardozo School of Law, 25 to 30 percent of all contingency fee cases have no real contingency. In particular, in cases such as those involving airline crashes, fault often is not in doubt as a practical matter. This means that plaintiff's lawyers, who still collect their full 33-to-40 percent fee, may receive the equivalent of $10,000 or even $30,000 per hour. I was struck in particular by a 1989 case Professor Brickman noted out of Alton, TX, in which a school bus was hit by a delivery truck. In this tragic incident 21 children were killed and 60 were injured. Obviously and rightfully there was a large judgment in favor of the plaintiff/children. While there was no doubt about who was at fault, the lawyers still charged their full fees. As a result, according to Professor Brickman, the attorneys received as much as $30,000 an hour for their services-- money for which they did little and which could have done much more to help the victims and their families. Mr. President, victims are losing out, and so are the rest of us, because legal costs are too high. Professor Brickman estimates that contingency fees now run $13 to $15 billion annually. This represents a substantial portion, more than 10 percent, of the $132 billion which Tillinghast research estimates we spend as a nation on our legal system each year. This $132 billion acts as a huge, business-stifling liability tax on consumer goods and services. Now, again, most attorneys recognize their duty to inform clients of how much they will be paying and for what services. Indeed, this is a standard for professions in general. Doctors provide fee schedules to insurers. Architects and even furniture movers provide written, binding estimates upon request. Consumers of legal services, I believe, deserve the same treatment. This is what our reforms would provide: At the initial meeting with the prospective client the attorney would be obligated to inform the client of his or her right to obtain a written fee statement within 30 days. This statement would contain, first, the estimated hours of the attorney's services that will be spent settling or attempting to settle the claim and handling the claim through trial; second, the basis on which the attorney proposes to charge the client--hourly, contingent, or flat fee; and third, the hourly rate, contingent fee, or flat fee the attorney proposes to charge. The attorney would be obligated to give this statement to the client within 30 days unless the client in writing waives the right to receive it or extend the attorney's time within which to provide. Similarly, within 30 days after completion of the litigation either by settlement or trial, the attorney would be obliged to furnish the client a written statement describing, first, the number of hours the attorney expended in connection with the claim; second, the total amount of the fee; and third, the actual fee per hour charged, regardless of how the fee was structured. Again, the client could waive the right to the statement or extend the 30-day deadline. A claimant who does not receive the requisite disclosures has the right to withhold up to 10 percent of the fee charged and to file a civil action for any damages the client incurred as a result of the failure to disclose. Mr. President, we need these reforms to help potential clients make informed decisions concerning legal representation. The legal services market is in particular need of open information because clients may never have dealt with the legal system before. This lack of client experience establishes a significant information and expertise imbalance, one that can lead to a client's receiving less favorable treatment than he or she might obtain with better information. Moreover, this problem is made worse when an attorney is hired to provide services for a single piece of litigation. That lawyer does not have the same incentives to keep the clients happy at the conclusion of the lawsuit as an attorney providing services to a longstanding firm or client on an ongoing basis. The right to know established by this amendment will facilitate an exchange of information concerning the quality of legal services provided, and even single-issue relationships. Thus we can empower clients in their dealings with attorneys while actually increasing the ability of market forces to work in the legal services markets. The result will be increased competition, better service, lower fees, and savings for everyone. I yield the floor.

Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading be dispensed.

Mr. ABRAHAM

Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, if the subcommittee chairman would answer an additional question, I would like to know whether he will continue to support funding to keep the Great Lakes Center open in fiscal year 1995, during the conference on S. 617 and H.R. 1158?

Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, I will vote for this rescission bill because I believe it will greatly benefit the citizens of Michigan by reducing the burden of Government spending and deficits on the economy. Each dollar that Washington does not spend on Government programs means $1 more than Americans can spend for their families. While I did fight to restore funding for a few specific programs slated for rescission because of their critical importance to Michigan--such things as the Low-Income Heating Energy Assistance Program and the Center for Ecology Research and Training slated to be located in Bay City, MI--I do believe that this rescission package is a win for the people of Michigan because it is the first down-payment toward reducing the size and scope of Government. Specifically, this bill will reduce Government spending by $15 billion. That represents a reduction of 1 percent of the entire Federal budget of $1.5 trillion this year--hardly a draconian reduction in Government spending as some special interest groups have claimed. Nonetheless, these spending reductions are crucial to our Nation, and to Michigan in particular. This bill will help my State by reducing the deficit, freeing up economic resources for the economy, and job creation in particular. Moreover, American taxpayers send 25% of their paychecks to Washington. Furthermore, it is clear that we need to take immediate action to reduce Government spending because projected deficits are getting larger, not smaller, under President Clinton's budget policies. Contrary to conventional wisdom, President Clinton's budget policies have had almost nothing to do with the slight improvement in the size of the budget deficit that has occurred in recent years. According to the CATO Institute, almost all of the deficit reduction since 1992 is attributable to three main factors: No. 1, the one-time sale of assets and properties acquired by the Federal Government during the savings and loan bailout of the late 1980's--which alone has accounted for about $75 billion in deficit reduction in recent years; No. 2, reductions in defense spending resulting from the end of the cold war; and No. 3, the cyclical economic recovery that began well before President Clinton took the oath of office. Federal spending continues to spiral out of control. Under President Clinton, the level of Federal spending as a share of the national income is about 23 percent, near historic levels. According to the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office, unless we take action to halt the growth of Government spending, it will automatically rise from $1.531 trillion this year to $2.202 trillion by 2002. Under the President's budget plan, deficit spending would continue to explode. The CBO reports that the annual deficit will rise from $170 billion this year to over $200 billion next year and to almost $300 billion a year over the next 4 years. Under President Clinton's policies, $1.4 trillion dollars will be added to the national debt, thereby increasing interest payments, crowding out private sector investment, and reducing the economic well-being of America's children. I am particularly concerned about the budget crisis occurring in the Housing and Urban Development's subsidized housing program. The CBO projects that the future obligations to renew the expiring section 8 contracts will add $20 billion to the budget by the year 2000. This $15 billion rescission package would partially offset these added budget costs. Mr. President, this rescission package is only a small example of the kind of reductions in the growth rate of Government spending that will be required to balance the budget. According to the CBO projections, if we simply limit annual spending increases to 2.9 percent between now and 2002, we can balance the budget. In other words, achieving a balanced budget requires not absolute cuts in Government spending, but rather reductions in the rate of growth of Government spending. Mr. President, the best thing I can do for the citizens of Michigan is to reduce the burden of Government and let them keep more of what they earn. By reducing the growth rate of Government spending and cutting taxes, we can strengthen America's and Michigan's families, businesses, and voluntary organizations. This rescission bill is an important first step in achieving the electorate's desire for smaller Government. I yield the floor.

Mr. ABRAHAM

Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, I rise to pay tribute to a great man and a great head coach: Jud Heathcote of the Michigan State Spartans. After this season ends, players and fans of college basketball at Michigan State will have to learn to live without the institution that is Jud Heathcote. He will be sorely missed. Jud Heathcote's 340 wins in 19 seasons at MSU make him State's all- time winningest coach. Jud passed the previous mark of 232 in February 1990. His teams hold the first through seventh-highest victory totals on MSU's all-time single-season list. To top it off, Coach Heathcote's Spartans won the NCAA championship in 1979 and won the Big Ten in 1978, 1979, and 1990. As he retires, Jud, his wife Beverly, and their children Jerry, Carla, and Barbara can look back on a long-running, successful career. Jud capped off a very successful tenure as Head Coach at the University of Montana by serving as assistant coach of the U.S. Pan American team in 1975--a team which brought back the Gold Medal. Beginning at MSU in 1976, Coach Heathcote became Big Ten Coach of the Year by the 1977-78 season. He repeated this performance in 1985-85 and went on to become the National Association of Basketball Coaches [NABC] Coach of the Year in 1989-90 and College Sports Magazines's Coach of the Year in 1994-95. Noted for his special expertise in coaching defense, Jud also produced at MSU a team that this year led the Big Ten in field goal percentage, and was ranked seventh nationally. His dedication to the game, his concern with the well-being of the players and the integrity of the MSU program and his personal warmth and decency all make him a coach for all seasons. We will miss Coach Heathcote, but are grateful for his many contributions to basketball, MSU and Michigan, and wish him all the best in his retirement.