Spencer Abraham

Mr. ABRAHAM

Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, a few weeks ago I sat through a hearing of the House and Senate Budget Committees on the issue of dynamic and static revenue estimating. At this hearing, the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation presented a statement that seemed particularly concerned about an article that Bruce Bartlett of the Alexis de Tocqueville Institution had published in the Wall Street Journal a few weeks ago. Since I know Mr. Bartlett personally, I was especially interested in what he had to say. Apparently what the Joint Committee staff is most concerned about was Mr. Bartlett's discussion of an exchange Senator Packwood, the chairman of the Finance Committee, had had with the Joint Tax Committee regarding the revenue effect of raising the top tax rate to 100 percent on those earning more than $200,000. According to Senator Packwood, the Joint Committee had predicted some $200 billion per year in additional revenues from this tax change. Senator Packwood rightly characterized this estimate as questionable. Now, according to the Joint Committee staff, there was nothing wrong with this estimate because it included a caveat that it did not take into account any behavioral response. They then included in an appendix to the statement a complete set of correspondence between Senator Packwood and the Joint Tax Committee on this matter. Apparently, the Senator from Oregon has had a long time interest in this issue and has periodically asked the Joint Committee to update its estimates. I do not believe that simply appending a caveat is at all adequate. The fact is that a 100-percent tax rate would raise zero revenue and everyone knows it. If this were merely an academic discussion, it would not concern me. But under the budget laws and established practice, we are required to treat these estimates from the Joint Committee as if they are scientific truth. And we all know that these estimates carry enormous weight when it comes to legislating changes in the Tax Code. If the Joint Committee says a tax cut will lose $101 million and there is only room in the budget for a $100 million tax cut, then you are out of luck. A point of order will prevail and your tax proposal is out the window. Now, I had always assumed that the whole point of having revenue estimates on tax bills was so that we could project the actual effect of tax changes on the Government's aggregate revenues as accurately as possible. Yet here we have clear evidence that the Joint Committee has produced estimates for the chairman of the Finance Committee that do not fully account for behavioral changes. I am very concerned about this because the Joint Committee on Taxation probably produces hundreds of estimates during the course of a year that effectively have the force of law. Even the Treasury Department's estimates do not have the same weight as those produced by the Joint Committee, because the Congress will always defer to its own staff in a dispute with the administration. It makes me wonder what other caveats are buried in these estimates that have not gotten any attention in the past. In any case, the sensible thing would seem to be for the Joint Committee to produce estimates that it actually believes are as correct as possible, in terms of the actual effect on the Government's revenues of any changes in tax policy. Apparently, this matter of improving the quality of revenue estimates has become a political issue, with those opposed to certain tax proposals standing firm against any dynamic scoring. This is apparent from the article I read in the Wall Street Journal, in which the chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, Laura D'Andrea Tyson, also attacks my friend Bruce Bartlett for noting several instances in which the Joint Committee's estimates for tax increases were far too high. Ms. Tyson states that Mr. Bartlett ignored the many times their estimates were too low, as though this constitutes a defense of the Joint Committee's methodology. However, it seems to me that being too low is just as bad as being too high. Ms. Tyson further notes that the Joint Committee's estimates were somethings wrong because of unforeseen events. She implies that the collapse of oil prices in the early 1980's was such an unforeseen event that made the Joint Committee's estimate of the windfall profits tax be far too high. In fact, as I recall, there were a number of economists at that time who were arguing that decontrol of the price of oil was very likely to reduce the price of oil by encouraging additional drilling and exploration. In fact, I believe that this is exactly what did happen. Lastly, Ms. Tyson indicates that the reason why corporate tax revenues fell after the Tax Reform Act of 1986, rather than rise in accordance with Joint Committee estimates, is because corporations ceased doing business as corporations and began operating as partnerships or subchapter S corporations. Thus the revenue that was lost on the corporate side was made back on the individual side. The point here is that the 1986 act lowered the top individual income tax rate below the top corporate rate. I think most tax lawyers could have easily predicted that this would lead people to take advantage of this differential by reorganizing their businesses so as to be taxed at the individual rate rather than the corporate rate. While it may be true, as Ms. Tyson says, that the Treasury did not actually suffer that much of a net revenue loss, it still does not explain the Joint Committee's apparent estimating errors. Personally, as a legislator, I want the best possible information before I make a decision. I think the Joint Committee and the Congressional Budget Office should at least explore the possibility of preparing dynamic revenue estimates. Their revenue estimating models should be improved and updated to account more fully for changes in behavior and economic growth. Perhaps a commission comprised of public and private sector experts could be established to recommend reforms in the revenue estimating process. I would suggest we keep the current static revenue scoring, but require the Joint Committee to provide a range of possible dynamic revenue estimates for major tax bills for illustrative purposes only. After a period of time, we could compare the static and dynamic estimates to see which ones came closer to reality. As a member of the Senate Budget Committee this is a matter I intend to follow closely as time goes by. My only interest, as I said, is to get the best, most accurate, information possible. I yield the floor.

Mr. ABRAHAM

Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, as Congress prepares to take up a balanced budget amendment, I would like to offer to my Senate colleagues the perspective of a new freshman Senator who ran on an aggressive platform to reform Congress and limit the size of Government. In my view, the balanced budget amendment to the Constitution embodies the spirit of the electorate that voted for a Republican Congress for the first time in 40 years last November. We in the Senate should not let them down. The Founding Fathers recognized that persistent Government deficits and the growth of Government has consequences for the long-term stability of our democracy and implications for our individual freedoms. The reason why the Founding Fathers did not include a balanced budget requirement in the Constitution is because they felt it would be superfluous. was considered a high priority of the early administrations. Consider the following comments by some of our Nation's early leaders: Thomas Jefferson: ``The public debt is the greatest of dangers to be feared by a republican government.'' John Quincy Adams: ``Stewards of the public money should never suffer without urgent necessity to be transcended the maxim of keeping the expenditures of the year within the limits of its receipts.'' James Monroe: ``After the elimination of the public debt, the Government would be left at liberty to apply such portions of the revenue as may not be necessary for current expenses to such other objects as may be most conducive to the public security and welfare.'' From 1879 until about 1933 the Federal Government operated under an implicit balanced budget requirement. Spending remained low--and rarely exceeded revenues. To the greatest extent possible, the existing debt was reduced. As a consequence, Federal spending as a share of GNP never rose above 10 percent. In the mid-1930's, the rise of Keynesian economics gave politicians the economic rationale to increase Government spending to solve the Nation's economic problems. As a consequence, the balanced budget discipline was abandoned--and Federal spending exploded. Today, Federal spending as a share of our national income stands at 22-23 percent--near historic levels. In effect, deficit spending has become the norm. Because there are no limits to the availability of deficit spending, Members of Congress find it extraordinarily difficult to resist such spending. On the one hand, every dollar of deficit spending creates some measure of political advantage by pleasing parts of a Member's constituency; on the other hand, there is no need for Members to incur equivalent political disadvantage by having to raise anyone's taxes. All the balanced budget amendment does is eliminate from our system this built-in bias toward spending caused by the unlimited access to deficit spending. Critics of the amendment charge that it is a hollow gimmick, a substitute for making real choices about how to balance the budget. Perhaps the best way to respond to this charge is to examine how balanced budget constraints have worked on the State level. Every State except Vermont has some sort of statutory or constitutional requirement to balance its budget. According to economist Bruce Bartlett, in 1933 total Federal spending was $3.9 billion and total State and local spending was $7 billion; 60 years later, however, the situation was almost reversed. By 1993, Federal spending had risen to $1.5 trillion, while total State and local spending had risen to $865 billion. The fact that State governments were required to make real choices and balance their budgets, while the Federal Government did not, was the major reason why Federal spending has dramatically outraced State and local spending. Without a balanced budget amendment, this Nation could be looking at Federal deficits in the trillions of dollars within 15 years. I was sent here by people who will not accept such a fate. The proposed amendment does not read into the Constitution any particular level of spending or taxation, or mandate particular economic policy outcomes. It only restores the historical relationship between levels of public spending and available public resources. National solvency is not--nor should it be--a partisan political principle. It should be a fundamental principle of our Government. Mr. President, I yield the floor. Balanced Budget Amendment

Mr. ABRAHAM

Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President I also rise in support of the amendment. As I think has already been articulated, the small businesses, and the private sector more generally, of this country are heavily inundated with burdens imposed by government and direct kinds of taxes and costs. They are actually, I think, burdened by regulations that impose mandates on them. So I believe the amendment is well in order and should be supported. Mr. President, I rise in support of S. 1, which, of course, addresses the problem of unfunded Federal mandates. S. 1 would significantly limit the Federal Government's ability to require State or comply with Federal standards unless the Federal Government was also prepared to reimburse the costs of such activities or compliance. As with direct Federal expenditures, the financial burdens of such mandates fall squarely upon the middle-class taxpayer. I strongly commend Senator Kempthorne for continuing leadership on this issue and for his sponsorship of S. 1. Perhaps nothing better reflects contemporary trends in government than the enormous growth in the level of unfunded Federal mandates over the past two decades. An unfunded mandate arises when the Federal Government imposes some responsibility or obligation upon a State or local government to implement a program or carry out an action without, at the same time, providing the State or local government with the necessary funding. Several recent illustrations of unfunded mandates include obligations imposed on States and localities to establish minimum voter registration procedures in the Motor Vehicle Voter Registration Act; obligations imposed on States and localities to conduct automobile emissions testing programs under the Clean Air Act; and obligations imposed on States and localities to monitor water systems for contaminants under the Safe Drinking Water Act. These examples, however, are only the smallest tip of the iceberg. While there is virtually no area of public activity in which Federal mandates are absent, such mandates are most visible in the area of environmental legislation. Of the 12 most costly mandates identified by the National Association of Counties in a 1993 survey, 7 of them involve environmental programs such as the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the Endangered Species Act, the Safe Drinking Water Act, and the Superfund Act. The negative effects of unfunded Federal mandates are at least fivefold: First, such mandates camouflage the full extent of Federal Government spending by placing an increasingly significant share of that spending off-budget, in the form of costs imposed upon other levels of government. While it is extraordinarily difficult to assess the dollar costs of unfunded mandates, a sense of their magnitude is evidenced by a 3-month study done earlier this year by the State of Maryland, in which they concluded that approximately 24 percent of their total budget was committed to meeting legal requirements mandated by Congress. Assuming the rough accuracy of this estimation, and assuming that Maryland is not subject to extraordinary levels of mandates, this would amount to approximately $80 to $85 billion imposed nationally upon all State governments. This figure does not include mandates imposed upon local governments. To calculate the true burden of Federal spending, the costs of these mandates must be added to an already bloated Federal budget. The Federal Government consumes the limited resources of the people every bit as much when it compels State or local governments to do something as when it directly does something itself. Second, the impact of the unfunded Federal mandate is to distort the cost-benefit analysis that Congress undertakes in assessing individual pieces of legislation. The costs imposed by the Congress upon States and localities are rarely considered, much less estimated with any accuracy. As a result, the presumed benefits of legislative measures are not viewed in the full context of their costs. Legislative benefits tend consistently to be overestimated and legislative costs tend consistently to be underestimated. Third, unfunded Federal mandates burden State and local governments with spending obligations for programs which they have never chosen to incur while requiring them to reduce spending obligations for programs which they have chosen to incur. For the options are clear when mandates are imposed by Washington: Either State and local governments must raise taxes--since they do not have the same access to deficit spending as the Federal Government--or they must reorder their budget by reducing or terminating programs which had already been determined to merit public resources. With State balanced budget requirements and with taxpayers already burdened to the hilt by government demands for a share of their income, State and local governments are forced into a zero-sum analysis by unfunded mandates; every new Federal mandate must be compensated for directly by a reduction in another area of State or local spending. Further, every Federal mandate must effectively be treated as the number one spending priority by State and local governments, notwithstanding the sense of their community and the judgment of their elected officials. Such governments must first budget whatever is necessary to pay for the mandates and only afterwards evaluate the level of resources remaining for other spending measures. Which leads to the fourth impact of the unfunded Federal mandate. An increasing proportion of State and local budgets is devoted to spending measures deemed to be important not by the elected representatives in those jurisdictions, but rather by decisionmakers in Washington. In 1993, for example, compliance with Federal Medicaid mandates cost the State of Michigan $95.3 million, which exceeded by $7 million the combined expenses of the Michigan Departments of State, Civil Rights, Civil Services, Attorney General, and Agriculture. Although the Supreme Court in recent years has reduced the 10th amendment to effective insignificance, I believe nevertheless that there are constitutional implications to this trend. It is lamentable enough that the Federal budget has grown at the pace that we have witnessed over the past generation; for Washington additionally to be determining the budgetary priorities of Michigan and Texas and Pennsylvania is for it to trespass upon the proper constitutional prerogatives of the States. To the extent that the States are straitjacketed in their ability to determine the composition of their own budgets, their sovereignty has been undermined. Indeed, the Constitution aside, it is difficult to understand how a reasoned assessment of the efficacy of Federal Government programs over the past several decades would encourage anyone in the notion that Washington had any business instructing other governments how best to carry out their responsibilities. Finally, unfunded Federal mandates erode the accountability of government generally. The average citizen now finds that his State and local representatives disavow responsibility for spending measures resulting from Federal mandates, while his Washington representatives also claim not to be responsible. Lines of accountability are simply too indirect and too convoluted where Federal mandates are involved. The result is that the citizenry come to feel that no one is clearly responsible for what government is doing, and that they have little ability to influence its course. I am particularly supportive of S. 1 because I believe that it will result in governments at all levels thinking more seriously about the proper scope of government. In truth, unfunded mandates are but one symptom of the more fundamental problem that the Federal Government has lost sight of the proper scope of its functions. While there are some mandates that are reasonable, Congress should be prepared to reimburse the States for the costs attendant to such mandates. In cases where the wisdom of mandates is more dubious, S. 1 would force upon Congress a more balanced and a sober decisionmaking process. Instead of neglecting the hidden pass-the-buck costs entailed in unfunded mandates, Congress instead would be forced to make hard-headed decisions about the costs and benefits of new programs. In at least some of these cases, I am confident that the legislative balance will be drawn differently than that we have consistently seen over recent decades. I am confident that the virtues of federalism will be recognized more readily when new programs are no longer free but must be explicitly accounted for in the Federal budget. The one-size-fits-all mentality which tends to underlie most Federal mandates may also be reconsidered in the process. At the same time, State and local officials will also have to make difficult decisions. With Congress likely to curtail or terminate altogether some mandates when confronted with the requirement that they have to pay for them, State and local governments will such programs on their own. No longer will they be able to enjoy the benefits of such programs while being able to divert responsibility for their costs to the Federal Government. Rather, they will have to make equally hard decisions as those that will have to be made by Washington lawmakers about the relative merits of public programs. Perhaps the greatest long-term benefit of the present legislation is that it will force more open and honest decisionmaking and budgeting upon all levels of government. When greater governmental accountability is achieved, the public will be better positioned to punish and reward public officials for actions. As a result, government will be more responsive to the electorate in its spending decisions. Government, in short, will be made more representative by this legislation. Further, Federal bureaucracies themselves will have to be more respectful of the costs that they impose upon State and local governments. Currently, these bureaucracies give little or no consideration to such costs because none of those costs are borne by the agencies themselves. When the real costs of Federal regulation are attributed to the agency responsible for such regulation, agencies will gain an extraordinarily useful perspective on the burdens that they are imposing on other levels of government. Going beyond the present measure, I would hope that we will be able to address several related matters in the near future. First, I do not believe that the bar on unfunded mandates should be limited to future initiatives. Given the burdens currently being borne by State and local governments, I favor in certain instances the retroactive application of the commonsense principle incorporated in this legislation. Second, I favor legislation that addresses the problem of conditional mandates. Conditional mandates arise when the Federal Government provides grants- in-aid to the States with strings or conditions attached. While these conditions may be reasonable and designed to ensure that money dispensed is being utilized effectively, other conditions may be far more tangentially related to the grants. I do not believe that Federal grant programs should be used to circumvent the present legislation's bar on direct Federal mandates. Therefore, I would support legislation such as that offered by Senator Hatch, which would prohibit conditional mandates unless they were directly and substantially related to the specific subject matter of the Federal grants-in-aid. Mr. President, by changing the rules of the legislative process and forcing upon Congress more accountable decisionmaking, the present legislation will, in my judgment, contribute greatly to a more responsible and balanced legislative product. This measure is not antienvironment, anti consumer safety, or antiregulation, as its opponents have suggested. Rather, it is pro open and honest government decisionmaking. If a majority of the Congress continues to support a particular mandate, that majority has the unfettered discretion to promulgate the mandate; they are constrained only in their ability to hide the costs of the mandate and to obscure where governmental responsibility lies for the mandate. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record several resolutions and letters I have received from governmental bodies in Michigan in support of this legislation. In view of the strong support for this measure from the National Conference of State Legislators, the National Association of Counties, and the National League of Cities, as well as on the basis of my own conversations over the past year, I am convinced that these writings reflect the overwhelming sentiment of Michigan communities, as well as communities across the United States.

Mr. ABRAHAM

Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, I must rise in opposition to the amendment offered by the Senator from New Jersey. It is true that I strongly support the idea that mandate costs should not be forced upon subordinate units of government, and that the constitution of my home State of Michigan prohibits the imposition of unfunded mandates upon local units of government. My inability to support the amendment accordingly does not arise from any disagreement with the principle it expresses. Rather, my opposition is grounded in larger principles of federalism. A core principle of that doctrine is that certain matters simply are beyond the ken of the Federal Government. To my mind, the proper allocation of mandate costs between State and local governments is one such matter. Thus, while I agree with the general principle expressed in the Senator's amendment, I think we overstep our proper bounds when we tell State and local governments how to structure their relationship. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. ABRAHAM

Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, I introduce S. 183, the Congressional Fiscal Responsibility Incentive Act, which provides that the salary of Members of Congress be reduced by 10 percent whenever the Federal Government is unable to balance the budget at the close of a fiscal year. If further provides that such a reduced salary level remain in effect until the Government is successful in achieving a balanced budget. The bill's requirements would ``sunset,'' however, upon passage of a balanced budget constitutional amendment by both Houses of the Congress. It is a fundamental responsibility of Government to live within its means. When it fails to do so, damaging economic consequences result-- either in terms of increased levels of inflation, higher interest rates, or diminished levels of capital for private investment. The principal reason for the Federal Government failing to balance its budget is that Members of Congress find it difficult to resist temptations to spend more money than they are willing to raise from taxpayers. There is strong political incentive for Members to engage in deficit spending. On the one hand, they reap the benefits of such spending by pleasing individuals who are its beneficiaries. On the other hand, they do not have to displease other individuals who would otherwise have to pay higher taxes to support the spending. This political incentive structure encourages deficit spending and the negative economic consequences which flow from such spending. In part, I support the balanced budget constitutional amendment because I believe that it would alter these incentives. However, until such time as the balanced budget amendment is passed by both Houses of the Congress I would propose a more limited restructuring of incentives. The proposed legislation would hold Members collectively responsible for year-end deficits by reducing their pay. Such a pay reduction is premised upon the fact that the Congress has failed in an essential responsibility when it has failed to legislate a balanced budget. By demonstrating an inability to contain its appetite for spending, the Congress has acted irresponsibly by imposing upon the present and future generations of the American people the burdens of deficit spending. As a result, the long-term fiscal stability of the country which Members of Congress have been selected to govern is eroded. The disincentive toward deficit spending contained in S. 183, while admittedly an imprecise counterweight to the political incentives which operate in favor of deficit spending, at least balances to some degree the calculus of forces confronting Members who are tempted by the lure of deficit spending. Section 1 of S. 183 sets forth in short title, the Congressional Fiscal Responsibility Incentive Act. Section 2(a) defines the essential procedures by which a determination is made at the end of each fiscal year whether or not a balanced budget has been achieved. If it has not been achieved, the 10 percent pay cut takes effect immediately. Such a reduction in pay is maintained until it is determined, by the same procedures, that a balanced budget has been achieved for a subsequent fiscal year. Section 2(b) sets forth procedures designed to ensure that the objectives of this legislation are not undermined in various ways. It would require that measures to increase congressional pay not be combined in bills laden with other subjects and it would require that a explicit rollcall vote be cast on pay increases. Finally, section 3 would have the proposed legislation take effect in connection with the first fiscal year beginning after its enactment. It would also ``sunset'' the legislation upon the passage of a balanced budget constitutional amendment by both Houses of the Congress. Under this amendment, a balanced budget would become the norm and further deficit spending would require the express support of a three-fifths super majority of each House of the Congress. Mr. President, S. 183 is not a panacea for our current fiscal problems. However, until such time as a balanced budget amendment is placed into the Constitution, it would effect a small but potentially important step toward more responsible Government.

Mr. ABRAHAM

Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, I introduce S. 183, the Congressional Fiscal Responsibility Incentive Act, which provides that the salary of Members of Congress be reduced by 10 percent whenever the Federal Government is unable to balance the budget at the close of a fiscal year. If further provides that such a reduced salary level remain in effect until the Government is successful in achieving a balanced budget. The bill's requirements would ``sunset,'' however, upon passage of a balanced budget constitutional amendment by both Houses of the Congress. It is a fundamental responsibility of Government to live within its means. When it fails to do so, damaging economic consequences result-- either in terms of increased levels of inflation, higher interest rates, or diminished levels of capital for private investment. The principal reason for the Federal Government failing to balance its budget is that Members of Congress find it difficult to resist temptations to spend more money than they are willing to raise from taxpayers. There is strong political incentive for Members to engage in deficit spending. On the one hand, they reap the benefits of such spending by pleasing individuals who are its beneficiaries. On the other hand, they do not have to displease other individuals who would otherwise have to pay higher taxes to support the spending. This political incentive structure encourages deficit spending and the negative economic consequences which flow from such spending. In part, I support the balanced budget constitutional amendment because I believe that it would alter these incentives. However, until such time as the balanced budget amendment is passed by both Houses of the Congress I would propose a more limited restructuring of incentives. The proposed legislation would hold Members collectively responsible for year-end deficits by reducing their pay. Such a pay reduction is premised upon the fact that the Congress has failed in an essential responsibility when it has failed to legislate a balanced budget. By demonstrating an inability to contain its appetite for spending, the Congress has acted irresponsibly by imposing upon the present and future generations of the American people the burdens of deficit spending. As a result, the long-term fiscal stability of the country which Members of Congress have been selected to govern is eroded. The disincentive toward deficit spending contained in S. 183, while admittedly an imprecise counterweight to the political incentives which operate in favor of deficit spending, at least balances to some degree the calculus of forces confronting Members who are tempted by the lure of deficit spending. Section 1 of S. 183 sets forth in short title, the Congressional Fiscal Responsibility Incentive Act. Section 2(a) defines the essential procedures by which a determination is made at the end of each fiscal year whether or not a balanced budget has been achieved. If it has not been achieved, the 10 percent pay cut takes effect immediately. Such a reduction in pay is maintained until it is determined, by the same procedures, that a balanced budget has been achieved for a subsequent fiscal year. Section 2(b) sets forth procedures designed to ensure that the objectives of this legislation are not undermined in various ways. It would require that measures to increase congressional pay not be combined in bills laden with other subjects and it would require that a explicit rollcall vote be cast on pay increases. Finally, section 3 would have the proposed legislation take effect in connection with the first fiscal year beginning after its enactment. It would also ``sunset'' the legislation upon the passage of a balanced budget constitutional amendment by both Houses of the Congress. Under this amendment, a balanced budget would become the norm and further deficit spending would require the express support of a three-fifths super majority of each House of the Congress. Mr. President, S. 183 is not a panacea for our current fiscal problems. However, until such time as a balanced budget amendment is placed into the Constitution, it would effect a small but potentially important step toward more responsible Government.

Mr. ABRAHAM

Mr. ABRAHAM. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. ABRAHAM. Madam President, I rise in strong support of the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995. This legislation would apply to the Congress the same regulatory laws that apply to the rest of society. The Senator from Iowa [Mr. Grassley] deserves extraordinary credit for his long-term commitment to the principles incorporated in this legislation. During the most recent campaign in which I was engaged, I discovered a sense of public outrage across the entire State of Michigan that we in the Congress were not required to abide by the same laws as the rest of the country. This outrage was based upon the perception that this was a double standard, a hypocritical policy by which those who enacted the laws of the land exempted themselves and only themselves from the burdens of these laws. The purpose of the present legislation is to bring the Congress in closer touch with the American people by making them subject to a common set of laws. There are two principles that lie at the heart of this legislation: first, there is the principle of equity. To the extent that the Congress has made the judgment that employees in the private sector are entitled to minimal standards and terms of employment, it is difficult for me to understand why employees of the Congress should not be subject to the same standards. While the Congress is a distinctive institution in its role in our public life, I am unable to see how that distinctiveness relates to the proper standards and terms for treating its employees. Although the Congress clearly has the authority to exempt itself from the employment rules which it applies to other institutions, I believe that the integrity of the lawmaking branch of the National Government is diminished when it seeks to treat itself in a different manner than it treats the rest of society. If anything, we should hold ourselves to higher standards than are applied to other institutions which do not make the rules. Second, the Congressional Accountability Act incorporates the principle that sound legislation is better promoted when legislators must abide by the rules set forth in their legislation. When I hear opponents of this measure arguing that Members of Congress should not be subject to frivolous litigation or that reputations may suffer when individuals are wrongfully sued, I am sympathetic but only to a point. Private employers should not be subject to frivolous litigation or liable to damage to their reputations any more than Members of Congress. If these concerns are legitimate, then they are legitimate for all Americans not merely for those of us who toil on Capitol Hill. If these concerns are legitimate, fashion these laws. I am simply convinced that Members of Congress who are confronted with the reality of having to comply with the same legal structure as other Americans are likely to be: first, more careful in their craftsmanship in drafting laws; second, more attentive to detail in saying precisely what is meant by the law; third, more concerned about resolving legal issues and definitions within the text of the legislation rather than effectively delegating these decisions to unelected and unaccountable Federal judges; and fourth, more conscientious in carefully balancing the costs and benefits of their legislative product. To have separate classes of Americans, some subject to the law and others exempt from it, is to have a fundamentally inequitable situation, particularly when that line of division is drawn along the lines of legislators and legislatees. Also, the incentives in the legislative process are skewed in the wrong direction when those who draft the laws do not have to live with the consequences of those laws. Although I recognize that constitutional considerations--separation of powers considerations--come into play whenever relationships are created between the Congress and enforcement agencies of the executive branch, I do not understand there to be anything in the Constitution which would stand in the way of the immediate legislation. The Congressional Accountability Act attempts to address the concerns about separation of powers by enacting a specific enforcement mechanism unique to this act. Although I do not believe that such a precaution is constitutionally necessary, and would prefer that this special mechanism not have been included, ultimately I do not believe that it undermines the critically important thrust of this legislation. Madam President, it is imperative that this institution restore to the American people a sense of trust and confidence. Rightly or wrongly, too many Americans have viewed the Congress as increasingly arrogant in their toleration of double standards of public policy. Passage of this legislation should be revived as a necessary step in reestablishing the proper relationship between our Government and its citizens. If we are going to ask the American people to make sacrifices as we attempt to restructure our bloated Federal Government, the Congress will need credibility. This legislation can contribute to that credibility. In a Congress that promises to be as active and aggressive as the 104th in reforming the way that government does business, there may be no more important legislation than this measure. By restoring public trust, S. 12 would enable us to do a better job in all of the rest of the areas of our public responsibility. Because this legislation represents sound public policy, and because its enactment would signal a new sense of relationship between Washington and the rest of the country, I urge its enactment. Madam President, I yield the floor, and I suggest the absence of a quorum.