John Ashcroft

Mr. ASHCROFT

Mr. ASHCROFT. All that said, encryption and digital signatures do not and should not be joined in the same legislation. The opportunity we have before us is to bring the encryption debate into the open and to pass legislation that adequately addresses the concerns of law enforcement, national security, privacy, and system security.

Mr. ASHCROFT

Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, I rise today in strong support of S. Con. Res. 107. This resolution is intended to repair the damage done by President Clinton's ill-considered comments on Taiwan during the recent U.S.-China summit. The Senate needs to make a clear statement in support of Taiwan. A failure to do so would be a greater disservice to the people of Taiwan and the credibility of the United States in East Asia. Mr. President, let us be clear, the President's statements undercut Taiwan in a way that past U.S. policy explicitly avoided. The Administration has tried to portray the President's regurgitation of Beijing's ``three noes'' as merely a restatement of U.S. policy. If this was merely a restatement of U.S. policy, however, why did the President have to make the comments at all? Far from being a restatement of U.S. policy, Bill Clinton's remarks were the first by a U.S. president formally opposing Taiwanese independence. In addition, the President's stated opposition to Taiwan's membership in international organizations directly undercuts Taiwan's efforts to share abroad its vision for a democratic, unified China. It is Taiwan's vision of China's future--a future of democratic pluralism and civil liberty--that the Administration should be supporting, not legitimizing the Chinese Communist Party with CNN summitry. As hard as the Administration might try to sanitize the President's comments, his statements already are being used by Beijing to pressure Taiwan on reunification. This morning's Washington Post reports that Beijing is telling Taiwan to ``face reality'' after the President's statement and agree to talks on reunification. One of Beijing's top negotiators with Taiwan said that the President's remarks strengthened China's hand and ``* * * provided favorable conditions for the development of cross-strait relations.'' This Administration seems to have forgotten that China has conducted missile exercises off of Taiwan's major ports in two of the last four years. ``Favorable conditions'' for China mean one thing: more latitude from the United States to intimidate Taiwan. The Chinese military continues to acquire weapons systems to facilitate an invasion of the island, yet the Administration tries to distance itself from American obligations in the Taiwan Relations Act to help Taiwan ``maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.'' Incredibly, the Administration parroted the ``three noes'' policy for Beijing without even obtaining assurances from China that it will not use force to reunify with Taiwan. Adopting Beijing's formulation on Taiwan was an ill-advised move by the President that has the potential of doing great harm to the 21 million Taiwanese who have built a vibrant democracy and free market. The Administration's position on Taiwan is not reassuring our democratic allies in East Asia. It is time for this Administration to choose which side it will support in the continuing struggle for civil liberty and democratic reform in East Asia. Blind engagement with Beijing's oppressive regime is not the way to ensure that democracy is preserved on Taiwan or advanced in China. It is time for the United States to stand again for freedom in East Asia and around the world.

Mr. ASHCROFT

Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, I would like to take this opportunity to speak about a provision that has been included in the managers' amendment of the higher education legislation that we are considering. Specifically, I have some reservations about a provision, offered by Senator Craig of Idaho, which expresses a sense of Congress regarding the protection of student speech and association rights. I value highly the protections guaranteed to our nation's citizens under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Freedom of speech and association are cherished rights. They are foundational rights, in that the ability to speak freely and criticize the government are necessary to ensure that other constitutional rights are guaranteed and that the system of government erected in the Constitution functions well. However, it must be remembered that the First Amendment was targeted against government oppression and designed to protect against censorship by the government--not by private individuals or institutions. The Bill of Rights was adopted to address the concern that the new federal government would not accord sufficient respect for the rights of individual citizens. It protects the citizens from the government, not from other citizens. As Thomas Jefferson wrote in a December 20, 1787 letter to James Madison, ``a bill of rights is what the people are entitled to against every government on earth.'' The protections of the Bill of Rights were designed to check specific abuses that can flow from government power; they were neither designed nor intended to be a general code of conduct applicable to all citizens. Indeed, a wholesale application of the Bill of Rights to all private citizens would turn these key protections on their head-- provisions designed to safeguard individual liberty would become the instrument for limiting individual liberty. The United States Supreme Court has long recognized the unique role of the Bill of Rights as a limitation on government action through the state action doctrine. With the exception of limited circumstances in which some heavily regulated quasi-private entities are deemed state actors for limited purposes, the Supreme Court has refused to treat private entities as state actors to which the Bill of Rights apply. Two cases, Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks from 1978, and Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., from 1974, articulate the Court's position in this area. The notion that the Bill of Rights is directed exclusively at government action is implicit in the First Amendment itself. The First Amendment protects citizens not only from government regulation of speech, but also limits the government's ability to interfere with the right of individuals to join together to form private associations and organizations, including private educational institutions. A private college or university may choose to remain private in nature so that it can maintain control over its educational mission and policies. Wholesale application of the First Amendment protections to private institutions does not vindicate the First Amendment right to speech, but rather ends up restricting the First Amendment freedom of association. None of this is meant to suggest that the federal government should never impose conditions on private institutions that receive federal funds. Although there has been an excessive tendency toward applying such mandatory conditions, there are situations in which Congress can properly insist that organizations receiving federal funds maintain certain minimum standards or not use the funds for questionable purposes. Even in the specific context of federal funds directed to private institutions of higher learning, it may be appropriate for Congress to insist that beneficiaries afford some rights to their students. My concern is not that the Craig provision favors imposing some conditions on these institutions, but that it imports wholesale the limitations and restrictions developed over two centuries of cases interpreting the First Amendment. There is no reason to think that liberties designed to protect private individuals and entities from the government will strike the appropriate balance in the very different relationship between a student and a private college or university. Fortunately, the measure before the Senate today is not legislation that would impose the First Amendment directly on private educational institutions, but rather a sense of the Congress resolution that these constitutional limitations should apply to private institutions. I do not share that sense, and if the measure before the Senate were binding legislation, I would exercise my rights in an effort to change the legislation. However, in light of the non-binding nature of the Craig provision, I am content to note my views and concerns for the record.

Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, I rise today along with my friend and colleague, Senator Moynihan, to address the faculty retirement incentive provisions contained in the House-passed version of the Reauthorization of the Higher Education Act. This provision amends the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) to allow the use of age-based incentives for the voluntary retirement of faculty at colleges and universities. In the House, Congressman Fawell worked to include this provision in the Higher Education Act, and we thank him for his leadership on this issue. Here in the Senate, Senator Moynihan and I have introduced an similar provision in the last two Congresses. I am please that Congress and the President will have an opportunity this year to pass this important legislation. This legislation, called the Faculty Retirement Incentive Act, will clarify that institutions may establish plans that give faculty who wish to retire early financial assistance in doing so. Further it would help to ensure that academic institutions will be able to make necessary new hires, particularly in expanding disciplines and new fields. For those who are concerned about potential recrimination if a faculty member would choose not to retire early, the double protections of the ADEA and the tenure system provide effective safeguards against coercion. It is also important to note that current law expressly permits the type of age-based benefit for employees participating in defined-benefit plans. Most colleges and universities, however, maintain defined-contribution retirement plans for tenured faculty. In January, the bipartisan National Commission on the Cost of Higher Education included this legislation initiative in its recommendations to check the skyrocketing cost of a college education. The Commission recommended that ``Congress enact a clarification to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act to ensure that institutions offering defined contribution retirement programs are able to offer early retirement incentives to tenured faculty members.'' The Faculty Retirement Incentive Act has the active support of a number of organizations, including the American Association of University Professors, the American Council on Education, the American Association of Community Colleges, the American Association of State Colleges and Universities, the Association of American Universities, the Association of Catholic Colleges and Universities, the Association of Community College Trustees, the Association of Jesuit Colleges and Universities, the University Personnel Association, the Council of Independent Colleges, the National Association of Independent Colleges and Universities, the National Association of State Universities and Land Grant Colleges, and the National Association of Student Personnel Administrators. I feel it is important that Congress enact this important legislation and I know my colleague from New York shares this same belief.

Mr. ASHCROFT

Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, the real issue in the debate on NATO expansion is the very character of the alliance in the future. NATO has been successful in the past because its mission has been focused. Now, the Senate is being asked to give its stamp of approval to a mission-expanded NATO. Passing this resolution of ratification without the Ashcroft amendment will be ratifying a NATO to serve as a ``force for peace from the Middle East to Central Africa,'' to use the words of Secretary Albright. There have been misconceptions about my amendment in the Senate and in the press. Allow me to address some of those. First, let me emphasize that this amendment is based on the language of the North Atlantic Treaty itself. For the Administration, which is opposing this amendment, I have one question: what do you have in mind for NATO that is not contained within the treaty itself? All my amendment does is restate the language of the treaty, specifically article 4. My amendment will not restrict NATO's ability to respond to collective defense threats from outside NATO territory. My amendment will not restrict NATO from responding to the new threats of post-Cold War world like weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism. The very purpose of NATO has been to prepare for collective defense threats emanating from outside the North Atlantic area. Any threat from outside the treaty area which posed the threat of an attack on NATO territory would be covered by the treaty and allowable under this amendment. This Administration, however, has something much different than collective defense in mind. NATO is in danger of changing, but the transformation is from Administration officials pushing for a global NATO. The United States Constitution has provisions for altering treaties, and it is called obtaining the Senate's advice and consent. If we want a global NATO, the treaty should be resubmitted for the Senate's consideration. For those of us who are concerned that NATO will get into far-flung operations, former officials Bill Perry and Warren Christopher write that the unanimous consent required among NATO members will guard against reckless deployments (New York Times, Oct. 21, 1997). For Mr. Perry and Mr. Christopher, the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate is replaced by the NATO bureaucracy. Thank you, but I like the United States Constitution just fine. Secretary Acheson had it right in 1949--the treaty would be altered by constitutional processes. Acheson stated: ``. . . the impossibility of foretelling what the international situation will be in the distant future makes rigidity for too long a term undesirable. It is believed that indefinite duration, with the possibility that any party may withdraw from the treaty after 20 years and that the treaty as a whole might be reviewed at any time after it has been in effect for 10 years, provides the best solution'' (Letter transmitting the treaty to the President, April 7, 1949). Acheson recognized that the world would change. His answer for how NATO would respond--countries can withdraw from the treaty or the treaty could be reviewed. Notice Acheson did not mention a review of NATO's Strategic Concept, on which the Senate has no vote, but a review of the treaty, with any modifications subject to Senate advice and consent. If this treaty was so elastic as to be stretched to cover any conceivable military operation, why would Acheson even talk about reviewing the treaty? Acheson did have a view of an alliance established for a specific purpose, with a limited scope. In the letter transmitting the treaty to President Truman, Secretary Acheson acknowledged the parameters of the treaty and stated flatly that the North Atlantic Council will have ``. . . no powers other than to consider matters within the purview of the treaty . . .'' (Letter to President Truman transmitting the NATO treaty, April 7, 1949). If Acheson viewed the treaty as limitless in scope, why did he testify about the careful limits of the various articles? Why did he explicitly state that NATO could not consider matters outside the purview of the treaty? The Foreign Relations Committee, in its report on the treaty, took pains to show NATO was not an ``old fashioned military alliance.'' The report states: ``. . . in both intent and language, it is purely defensive in nature. It comes into operation only against a nation which, by its own action, has proved itself an international criminal by. . .attacking a party to the treaty . . . If it can be called an alliance, it is an alliance only against war itself'' (SFRC Report, June 6, 1949). The Ashcroft amendment is designed to advance U.S. interests by keeping NATO focused on this historical mission of collective defense. Without the Ashcroft amendment, the Senate is setting NATO--the most successful military alliance in history--on the course of becoming a mini-UN with a standing army. My amendment will preserve the historical strength and effectiveness of NATO by keeping the alliance focused on the mission of the treaty itself. The Ashcroft amendment will only preclude the global policing operations outside the scope of the treaty. Drift in NATO is already underway. Frederick Bonnart writes of the Madrid summit in July 1997 where expansion was endorsed: `` . . . behind the euphoria, a hollowness has appeared that had not been evident before. The leaders seem unclear about the purpose of the organization, and therefore about the political and military shape it is to take. Worst of all, strains have shown up in the alliance that indicate weaknesses in its most vital asset: its cohesion'' (Intl. Herald Tribune, July 25, 1997). Cohesion means something in a military alliance. If you want to turn NATO into the bureaucratic free-for-all of the UN, then oppose the Ashcroft amendment. If you want to keep NATO on a successful course, vote for this amendment. The Administration and some of my colleagues are arguing that NATO has no parameters, that's its mission can evolve, and that the Senate has no role to play in this evolution. Some of the Senators who are criticizing this amendment were championing the Senate's constitutional prerogatives during the ``reinterpretation'' debate over the ABM treaty in the 1980's. This Administration is setting NATO on a crash course to policing the brushfires of Europe and beyond. The lives of American soldiers are at stake if NATO is transformed into a mini-UN with a standing army. The first Somalia experience you have with NATO, and the alliance's credibility will be undermined. The historical setting for the establishment of NATO, the Senate record surrounding ratification, and the treaty language itself make it clear that collective defense was the clear mission of the alliance. Treaties are not formed in a vacuum. Two world wars were not enough for the United States to abandon a 149-year tradition of no peacetime military alliances. It took Soviet aggression in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland; a civil war in Greece which threatened to install a communist government; the coup in Czechoslovakia in February, 1948; the threat of communist victory in Italian elections in April, 1948; a tightening blockade of Berlin, and threatening moves by the Soviet Union to subjugate Norway to a non-aggression pact to bring the United States to the point of making a peacetime alliance with Europe. When analyzing the Treaty itself, you see a document that commits the U.S. to carefully defined military contingencies. NATO is given the flexibility to consult on an array of issues, it is charged with coordinating mutually constructive economic policies, it is allowed to invite new members to join when doing so would advance the security of the North Atlantic area. But when it comes to the use of military force, careful limits are placed on NATO's scope. Careful parameters are seen clearly in article 5, the heart of the Treaty: ``The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.'' This article establishes the principal of collective defense. The use of armed force in this article and in other parts of the treaty is discussed only within this framework of collective defense: (1) The preamble of the treaty states that NATO allies ``are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security;'' (2) Article 3 states that ``In order to more effectively achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack;'' (3) Article 9 establishes a council for the alliance, now called the North Atlantic Council, which is charged with establishing ``immediately a defence committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5,'' the two articles which outline the collective defense mission. Article 5 excluded NATO's involvement in civil wars in general. The Committee Report states ``. . . purely internal disorders or revolutions would not be considered `armed attacks' within the meaning of article 5.'' Article 5 applied only when a NATO member had an internal civil war aided by an outside power or when a civil war outside NATO threatened an attack on a member. NATO's geographical scope was defined carefully in article 6. Article 6 goes on to define ``armed attack'' and the territorial parameters in which the armed attack must occur for Article 5 to be invoked to include the territory of any NATO member, the islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer, the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer. As is clear in articles 5 and 6, when the deployment of U.S. troops was possible, the U.S. drafters of the Treaty took extra precaution to define parameters. Article 4, the article the Administration would use to create a global NATO, reinforces the alliance's collective defense mission. Article 4 states ``The parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.'' This language is not the basis for a global NATO engaged in flashpoints from the Middle East to Central Africa. Article 4 reinforces NATO's collective defense mission. Words like ``security'' and ``political independence'' were taken seriously in 1949. The world had lived through two world wars and the Cold War was beginning. Security was not given the casual, domino-theory definition of today. Take, for example, comments by Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott: ``If there were to be instability and conflict of any kind, whatever the origin of it, in Central or Eastern Europe, it would be a threat to the Continent as a whole'' (Voice of America Interview, April 10, 1997). As Lawrence Kaplan, perhaps the dean of NATO historians, writes: The alliance's preoccupation with expansion seemingly prevents an exploration of the problems `out of area' issues raise. The Rome Summit [1991 NATO summit at which the Strategic Concept was adopted] did mention Article 4, which calls for consultation whenever any member believes that its territorial integrity, political independence or security is threatened. But this article is too vague, compared with Article 5 to serve as a guide for the future. (Lawrence Kaplan. NATO & Out of Area Issue. March 13, 1998). The Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report on the NATO Treaty in 1949 reinforces the careful limits of the Treaty language itself. The first paragraph of the Report, entitled ``Main Purpose of the Treaty,'' states: The basic objective of the treaty is to [make] clear the determination of the members of the North Atlantic community to safeguard their common heritage of freedom by exercising collectively their inherent right of self-defense in the event of an armed attack upon any of them . . .'' (U.S. Congress. SFRC. North Atlantic Treaty Report, June 6, 1949. Pg. 1) With regard to article 3, the Report states, Questions have also been raised as to whether the United States, under article 3, would be obligated to assist the other parties to develop the capacity of their overseas territories to resist armed attack. The objective of the treaty is to maintain the peace and security of the North Atlantic area. During the negotiations there were no suggestions that this article should be interpreted as applying to any other area. The United States is under no obligation to assist the other parties . . . in resisting armed attack outside the area defined in article 6 (U.S. Congress. SFRC. North Atlantic Treaty Report, June 6, 1949. Pg. 11) With regard to article 4, in testimony on NATO in 1949, Senator Vandenberg stated that he wanted to make it clear in the Committee Report on the treaty that article 4 ``was as limited as the balance of the pact'' (Testimony before the SFRC, May 4, 1949). It is no surprise, then, that the SFRC Report carefully ties the use of article 4 to the collective defense mission of the alliance. The Report states that A situation arising anywhere might be cause for consultation, provided that it constituted a threat to one or more of the parties and might involve obligations under the treaty. The committee underlines the fact that consultation could be requested only when the element of threat is present and expresses the opinion that this limitation should be strictly interpreted. The Report goes on to state that Article 4 carries no obligation other than that of consultation. (U.S. Congress. SFRC. North Atlantic Treaty Report, June 6, 1949. Pg. 12) In discussing the obligation to consult, the Committee Report states that consultation takes place when a threat ``might involve obligations under the treaty.'' It is important what those obligations were. Referring to the Committee report: 1. To maintain and develop, separately and jointly and by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, the individual and collective capacity of the parties to resist armed attack (art. 3); 2. To consult whenever, in the opinion of any of the parties, the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of any of them is threatened (art. 4); 3. To consider an armed attack upon any of the parties in the North Atlantic area an attack against them all (art. 5); and 4. In the event of such an attack, to take forthwith, individually and in concert with the other parties, such action as the United States deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area (art. 5). The obligation to consult is linked to other obligations in the treaty, all of which pertain to some aspect of collective defense. As Secretary Acheson said, article 4 was broader in scope than article 5 and gave NATO flexibility to respond to out-of-area threats related to collective defense. Almost without fail, article 4 was discussed within the context of responding to aggression less than armed attack-- political aggression by a hostile power. Secretary Acheson himself linked article 4 to NATO's collective defense mission, stating that any action taken after consultation should be ``in the spirit of the treaty'' (Letter transmitting the treaty to the President, April 7, 1949). Floor statements by key Senators in 1949 make the limits of article 4 clear. Comments by both Senators Connally and Vandenberg, the Chairman and ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee in 1949, reveal an understanding of article 4 in the light of NATO's collective defense mission. Senator Connally stated in his opening remarks on July 5, 1949 that I think that article 4 goes a long way to emphasize that the period of dividing and conquering has come to an end. The consultation provided for in that article addresses itself to the threatening of the territorial integrity, the political independence, or the security of any of the parties. Consultation is not an unnecessary luxury; it is a logical requirement to gain the objectives of the treaty. For one thing, article 4 . . . rightly faces up to the brutal fact that peaceful peoples have become more and more conscious of a sinister kind of danger--indirect aggression. Let us not forget that no bombs were dropped by the Soviet Union on Bulgaria, Hungary, or Czechoslovakia. (Congressional Record, July 5, 1949, Pg. 8814) Senator Vandenberg stated in his opening remarks the following day that: The question arises whether articles IV and V of the pact cover armed aggression against colonial or dependent or otherwise related areas of the signatories outside the area of the North Atlantic community as geographically defined in article VI. My own understanding is clear and unequivocal. The answer is ``No.'' There can be no other logical answer. The doubts seem to have arisen because article IV, relating solely to consultations, is unlimited in the circumference of these consultations. But there is not a word of obligation in it except to talk things over.'' (Congressional Record, July 6, 1949, Pg. 8896) Senator Vandenberg again: The obligations are spelled out in articles III and V. It is significant, in this connection, that when article IX establishes a council to implement the treaty, it directs the council's attention specifically to articles III and V. It omits article IV in this connection. This is as it should be. It is by significant design. Our pledge of action under the United Nations Charter is general . . . But out pledge of action under the North Atlantic Pact is limited and specific. It applies only to armed aggression in the area clearly defined in article VI which is the North Atlantic community, set up by metes and bounds. (Congressional Record, July 6, 1949, Pg. 8896) Moving to article 5, the Committee Report identifies Article 5 as the ``heart of the treaty,'' and goes on to define what constitutes an armed attack. The Report states that ``article 5 would come into operation only when a nation had committed an international crime by launching an armed attack against a party to the treaty.'' (U.S. Congress. SFRC. North Atlantic Treaty Report, June 6, 1949. Pg. 13) The Committee Report's discussion of article 6 further reinforced the territorial basis of the Treaty, stating that ``Article 6 specifies the area within which an armed attack would bring the provisions of article 5 into operation. Thus, the obligations under article 5 are strictly limited to the area described.'' (U.S. Congress. SFRC. North Atlantic Treaty Report, June 6, 1949. Pg. 15) The Foreign Relations Committee obtained a commitment from the President in 1949 that the Senate would be able to give its advice and consent for new NATO members. New members are important, but new missions are just as critical. The mission of NATO is changing radically, and the Senate has not engaged in the debate. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO planners scrambled to find new missions for the alliance: countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, advancing the political ``interests'' of NATO members, NATO as a police force and crisis manager. The catch-phrase that defined this effort was that NATO must go ``out-of-area or out of business.'' After the Cold War, NATO began evolving into an organization to pursue new missions. The Strategic Concept of 1991 pushed the traditional functions of NATO--to provide for collective defense and serve as a strategic balance in Europe--to the bottom of the list of the alliance s fundamental security tasks. The security task that rose to the top was for NATO to be ``one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security environment in Europe . . . in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any European nation or to impose hegemony through the threat or use of force.'' (1991 Strategic Concept in NATO Handbook, p. 239) This is an amazing expansion of mission. No longer is collective defense the singular mission of the alliance, but NATO has the impossible task of stopping intimidation and coercion throughout NATO and non-NATO Europe alike. In NATO's Strategic Concepts of the past, collective defense was paramount. The State Department has provided my office with the three NATO Strategic Concepts that preceded the 1991 version: the Strategic Concepts of 1950 (with a revised version in 1952), 1957, and 1967. The contrast between the first three Strategic Concepts and the 1991 version is striking. The mission of collective defense permeates the first three Strategic Concepts. Collective defense is carefully defined as the North Atlantic area described in article 6 of the Treaty. When potential out of area security developments are discussed, they are mentioned in the context of NATO members having the capacity to maintain their commitments to NATO while individually addressing the out of area threats that may affect their interests. NATO's Strategic Concept of 1957 explicitly states that ``NATO defense planning is limited to the defense of the Treaty area. . .'' and that ``NATO military authorities have no responsibilities or authority except with respect to incidents which are covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty'' (1957 Strategic Concept of NATO, p. 12). Throughout NATO's Strategic Concepts, the means of collective defense changed, from ``massive retaliation'' in the 1950's to ``forward defense and flexible response'' in the 1960's, but the mission itself remained the same. NATO has an uncertain course for the future, however. The New Strategic Concept of 1991 presented the first significant shift in NATO away from its traditional military mission. The Strategic Concept says that the ``. . . clear preparedness to act collectively in the common defense remains central to the Alliance's security objectives.'' The reliability of this assertion is belied by NATO s activity since 1991, however. Stan Sloan, one of the senior NATO analysts at CRS, states that since the formation of the New Strategic Concept in 1991, ``. . . most of NATO's military activities have been focused on `non-Article 5' requirements, most significantly in Bosnia.'' (Stanley Sloan. NATO's Evolving Role & Missions. CRS rpt.97-708F. Mar. 4, 1998, Pg. 4) No longer is collective defense the singular mission of the alliance, but NATO is committing to the impossible task of stopping intimidation and coercion throughout NATO and non-NATO Europe alike. Nelson Drew writes of this development: While the word ``peacekeeping'' did not appear in either the new Strategic Concept or the Rome Declaration, it was difficult to envision a means by which NATO or the NACC [North Atlantic Cooperation Council] could make good on their commitment to stability and peace throughout the trans- Atlantic community without consideration of an Alliance role in peacekeeping activities.'' (Nelson Drew. NATO Confronts `Test Case from Hell.' INSS: McNair Paper 35) NATO was not created to douse regional brushfires in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. When the deployment of NATO forces was considered, it was for collective defense. NATO's institutional development has followed the alliance's expanded mandate: NATO's goals as a police force and crisis manager have resulted in new institutional capacities. NATO has agreed to make its resources available, on a case by case basis, for brushfire operations under the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the United Nations, and the European Union (NATO Handbook, p. 332-34). In the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the Partnership for Peace, and the Combined Joint Task Force Concept, NATO has taken many positive steps to promote cooperation with other countries, but also has signaled that international policing actions will be an important part of NATO's activity in the future. This institutional transformation signals little strategic thinking. NATO signals its intention to be an international police force and crisis manager by its internal transformation. The Administration refuses to establish parameters for how far NATO expansion will proceed. Where are the limits on NATO's mission and membership? Alliance cohesion is at risk. The Administration views the Partnership for Peace as the ``path to [NATO] membership for countries wanting to join'' (U.S. Security Strategy for Europe and NATO, DOD, June, 1995). NATO makes brushfire troubleshooting an important part of the PFP and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). The Administration launches the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept to make it easier for NATO to engage in crisis management. The question must be asked as to how far NATO will expand its mission and membership. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was quoted in the Washington Post as saying that NATO should become a ``force for peace from the Middle East to Central Africa'' (Washington Post, Feb. 22, 1998). President Clinton, in his recent trip to Africa, spoke of the need for some type of ``multi-national force'' for responding to African crises (White House Bulletin, March 27, 1998). Is this really the kind of mission the Administration wants NATO to have? Other countries take NATO signals seriously. For example, allow me to quote from the latest issue of Defense News: ``Kosovo Fray Forces NATO s Hand.'' ``The violent uprising in the Yugoslav province of Kosovo may force NATO to extend its military influence across the Balkan region. . .'' (Defense News, March 22, 1998). A U.S. official quoted in the article said ```Macedonia is a Partnership for Peace country potentially in trouble from external sources. It needs help. It is not out of the realm of possibility . . . that a NATO-led mission in cooperation with PFP countries could take over when the UN deployment withdraws on August 31.'' On March 11, Albania called the first emergency consultation within the framework of the PFP. NATO diplomats responded with a plan for ``a robust Partnership for Peace program for rapid implementation in Albania.'' (Defense News, March 22, 1998). This PFP program reportedly will include military training and steps to secure Albania s northern border. If we want to send American soldiers into these cauldrons of ethnic unrest, then let's have that debate. Nothing in this amendment would preclude the U.S. from deploying its forces anywhere. This amendment has to do with preserving the integrity of NATO. Just don't use the banner of a successful military alliance to entangle U.S. troops in Europe's brushfires. Comments by both former and present senior Administration officials indicate a radical shift in the scope of NATO. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry and former Secretary of State Warren Christopher stated in a New York Times editorial: ``Shifting the alliance s emphasis from defense of members territory to defense of common interests is the strategic imperative'' (New York Times, Oct. 21, 1997). Secretary of State Albright has confirmed NATO's shift to defense of interests. I questioned her on two separate occasions before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Secretary Albright confirmed that advancing out-of-area interests would be the modus operandi for NATO, but gave no realistic limits. In other forums, Secretary Albright has been quoted as saying that NATO should evolve into ``a force for peace from the Middle East to Central Africa'' (WP, William Drozdiak. Feb. 22, 1998). Strobe Talbott, one of the senior officials at the State Department, stated that geopolitical and military considerations can be put aside and ``other nonmilitary goals shape the new NATO" (Jesse Helms, Wall Street Journal, March 23, 1998). Talbott reportedly looks favorably on Russia joining NATO. Inconsistency in the Administration's policies is creating more confusion in the alliance, however, and hurting U.S. leadership in NATO. Take, for example, Administration policy to combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The U.S. almost goes to war against Iraq in February over the threat of WMD. The U.S. maintains a sizeable force in the Persian Gulf to deter Iraqi aggression. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright states that fighting WMD should become the new ``unifying threat" that binds NATO allies together (Washington Post, Feb. 22, 1998). The Administration's actions speak louder than words, however. In spite of the rhetoric and the object lesson of Saddam Hussein, the Clinton Administration has entered into nuclear cooperation with China, the world's worst proliferator of weapons of mass destruction technology (CIA report, June 1997). The President refused to halt nuclear cooperation even as China was caught trying to send Iran hundreds of tons of anhydrous hydrogen fluoride. This material is used to enrich uranium to weapons grade and was being sent to Iran's Isfahan Nuclear Research Center--the principal Iranian site to manufacture the explosive core of an atomic device (Washington Post, March 13, 1998). Clinton allows sensitive missile technology to be exported to China, undermining a Justice Department investigation of similar possible transfers by Loral Space and Hughes Electronics (New York Times, April 4, 1998). The missile technology possibly transferred by Loral and Hughes could be used on Chinese nuclear ICBM's (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles) to reach the United States. Just so happens that Bernard Schwartz, CEO of Loral, is the DNC's largest personal contributor. With policies like that, U.S. has no credibility in tasking NATO with new mission to fight the proliferation of WMD. European comments on NATO's future mission are just as troubling. President Chirac, at the NATO/Russia Founding Act, stated: ``NATO, initially conceived to face a clear-cut and massive threat, is now a lighter, more flexible organization adapted to its new crisis management and peacekeeping missions.'' In a telling statement about the current evolution of the alliance, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana stated ``NATO was born when Europe was divided, and now it has become a leading instrument in the reconstruction of the continent. This is an incredibly dynamic process. If this pace continues, it is hard to predict what NATO will be like just three years from now.'' (Washington Post, July 6, 1997) Crisis management and brushfire engagements are the kinds of missions and the kinds of problems NATO was never intended to address. As Mark Esper writes in the Washington Times: ``NATO was designed for collective defense of its member states, not for suppressing civil wars in peacekeeping missions that jeopardize the alliance's core purpose.'' (Washington Times, Feb. 15, 1998) From the defense of territory to the defense of ``common interests'' is a quantum leap. Charging NATO to defend nebulously defined interests would have been unacceptable to the Senate in 1949 and it should be unacceptable for the Senate today. Resting on fifty years of NATO's success is not the way to ensure that U.S. interests are preserved and NATO remains a viable alliance in the future. ``Just trust us'' is essentially what the Administration is saying, as they transform NATO into a mini-United Nations with a standing army for ill-defined brushfire operations. Beware the Administration strong on NATO expansion but weak on defense. The U.S. is making a collective defense commitment to new NATO members while slashing defense. Those countries comprise 301,000 square miles of new territory and 2,612 miles of new NATO frontier to which the collective defense commitment is extended. Here are some of the statistics for U.S. defense cuts (in real 1999 dollars) between 1990 and 1998: Military Personnel funding: fell by 28% (from $102 bn in 1990 to $71.7 bn in 1998); Procurement: fell by 53% (from $98 bn in 1990 to $45.5 bn in 1998); Total National Defense Spending: fell by 27% over last eight years (from $375 bn in 1990 to $273 bn in 1998); Army divisions reduced from 26 in 1991 to 18 in 1998; Active Air Force tactical wings reduced from 35 in 1991 to 20 in 1998. The Clinton Administration is finding more things to do with a downsized force. Outside normal training and alliance commitments, the Army conducted 10 ``operational events'' between 1960-91 and 26 since 1991. The Marine Corps conducted 15 ``contingency operations'' between 1982-89 and 62 since the fall of the Berlin Wall. According to the Army Chief of Staff Dennis Reimer, the Army reduced manpower by 36% while increasing the number of deployed operations by 300% (CRS). Officers from deployable Army units now spend 180-190 days away from home annually. Shortly after announcing that U.S. troops would stay in Bosnia indefinitely, Clinton increased funding by 20% to expand U.S. influence overseas--not funding for military personnel, though, but money for the Peace Corps (National Review, Feb. 9, 1998). President Reagan's deputy undersecretary of defense, Dov Zakheim states: ``. . .like Gulliver's enfeeblement by the Lilliputians, [the U.S.] will be tied down in so many parts of the world for so long that it will be hard-pressed to respond to major threats against which only overwhelming force would prove effective'' (Defense News, April 12, 1998). Over-extension is hurting readiness. Misguided deployments harm readiness, inhibit weapons modernization, and undermine morale. The Army just completed its worst recruiting year since 1979. Just one third of the Army's women and just over half of the men believe that to fight and win in combat is the Army's principal mission (National Review, Feb. 9, 1998). The ``two major regional conflict'' strategy of this Administration is becoming increasingly unrealistic. The U.S. would be hard pressed to even replicate the Desert Storm operation. Hillen writes in the National Review: ``In 1998, almost all the active Army's heavy-tank and armored-cavalry units outside of Korea and Bosnia would have to go to the Persian Gulf in order to equal the fighting power of America's VII Corps in 1991. And VII Corps was only one of three American corps engaged in Desert Storm'' (National Review, Feb. 9, 1998). Inconsistent foreign policy is the root of the problem. Effective and credible diplomacy addresses potential crises before the deployment of U.S. troops is needed. This Administration's foreign policy inconsistency is almost reflexively compensated by the deployment of American armed forces. The National Defense Panel created by Congress in 1996 said of the Administration: ``. . .the current approach to addressing national security engages the Department of Defense and services too often and too quickly in situations that should have been resolved by nonmilitary means'' (Defense News, April 12, 1998). The Saddam Hussein's of the world that threaten the U.S. need to be dealt with, but the complacent policy of this Administration over the last six years has left U.S. troops dangling in the Persian Gulf. Our troops serving in Southwest Asia and Bosnia deserve better leadership from this Administration. The Administration's ``assertive multilateralism is a fig leaf for lack of leadership. This Administration has an instinct to strike for the capillaries, to use the phrase of Jonathan Clarke. Policy drift with no finality in addressing national security threats, coupled with the brush fire mentality of this Administration, is squandering U.S. national defense resources. The Administration wants to apply its foreign policy muddle to NATO, to hollow out the clear mission of the alliance just as the U.S. military is being stretched thin and to use NATO as another tool for a globalist agenda with little application to real U.S. national security interests. When U.S. armed forces are struggling, reliable cost estimates for NATO expansion become more important. There have been a wide range of cost estimates for NATO expansion. The Administration's initial estimate (Feb, 1997) was $27-35 billion, with a U.S. share $100-150 m per year for ten years. This initial Administration's estimate, not surprisingly, was revised downward last December: the U.S. now only has to pay $40 million per year over ten years. The estimate of Congressional Budget Office (March, 1996) was a bit different. Different scenarios ranging from minimal reinforcement of four new members ($60.6 bn total) to NATO stationing a limited number of forces forward in new member countries ($124.7 bn total) The wide range of cost estimates is more confusing than helpful, but one thing is clear: the cost estimates rise precipitously when NATO take steps to provide a limited defense to these new members. The Senate should not accept the lowball estimates. We should consider the ends of our actions in expanding NATO--the real costs of actually defending these countries. If U.S. resources are stretched too thin, will Europe take up the slack? Not some of our European NATO allies. NATO allies have agreed only to pay for the cheapest expansion estimate yet: the $1.5 billion price tag from the NATO cost study accepted by the North Atlantic Council in December, 1997. Beyond the paltry $1.5 bn estimate, French President Jacques Chirac has stated bluntly that ``France does not intend to raise its contribution to NATO because of the cost of enlargement'' (Washington Post, July 24, 1998). Not the new NATO members. These countries are still throwing off the vestiges of a command economy and don't want to commit the resources to a full scale modernization effort. Dale Herspring, an expert on the region, writes: ``. . .the East Europeans have done little to prepare themselves to meet NATO's military standards. Hungary and the Czech Republic in particular are trying to join NATO `on the cheap'. . .In fact, the military situation of all three countries is disastrous. Planes are crashing, morale is plummeting, and equipment is outdated. Unless the parliaments of these countries get serious or the West. . .decides to foot the bill, the Czech Republic and Hungary will never meet NATO standards.'' The U.S. and other NATO allies are riding the bandwagon of ``extending the borders of freedom in Europe'' and failing to see the reconstruction effort these countries face. What if a crisis comes, and we have to defend these countries with limited interoperability and even less effective command and control cooperation? The Washington Post reported on March 18 that all three countries would struggle to find a few hundred officers who speak English to NATO standards. Mr. President, before I conclude, I would like to respond to several arguments I have heard during this debate against my amendment. First, there has been a document circulated outlining Secretary of State Dean Acheson's comments during a press conference on March 18, 1949. I am familiar with the document. Let me begin by saying that if you are basing your argument for a global NATO on a press interview transcribed in the second person, your argument is on shaky ground indeed. A careful review of the record of this press interview with Secretary Acheson on March 18, 1949 reveals that his comments did not imply a global NATO beyond the careful scope of the treaty. Acheson states that Article 4 is broader than Article 5, which it is. Article 4 gives NATO the flexibility to respond to threats related to collective defense, but which may not be precipitated by an armed attack. When asked if there ``was no provision [in the treaty] which looked toward these Parties acting as a unit in regard to some matter not covered by the Treaty,'' Secretary Acheson, as paraphrased, said, and rightly so, that the allies ``might act as a unit or they might not, but that there was nothing in the Treaty which required them to do so.'' Secretary Acheson reiterated in this very interview what he had said in his letter to the President transmitting the NATO treaty: that NATO only had authority to deal with matters under the purview of the treaty. This is essentially what I have said all along. The countries that make up NATO can act together on any security matter they desire. But NATO itself is designed for a specific mission. When asked if ``there was no provision for anything except consultation, except actual armed attack on one of the signatories, the Secretary replied that there were Articles one, two, three, and four.'' These articles certainly identified some of the political and economic goals of NATO's collective defense mission. After looking at the careful language of articles 5 and 6 of the Treaty, however, it is preposterous to argue that NATO can turn itself into a global policeman based on the general language of article 1. When Secretary Acheson says that there is no limiting clause, the transcript seems to indicate he is referring to article 4, which is not necessarily limited by geography. Acheson did not mean that the treaty had no limits. In the letter transmitting the treaty to President Truman, Acheson stated flatly that the North Atlantic Council will have ``. . .no powers other than to consider matters within the purview of the treaty. . .'' (Letter to President Truman transmitting the NATO treaty, April 7, 1949). The articles of the treaty speak for themselves and don't imply in the slightest a military mission unrelated to collective defense. Second, some would try to portray a vote on this amendment as a vote on Bosnia. Let me state clearly that this amendment is not intended to be another vote on the Bosnia mission. The NATO mission in Bosnia is related to the out of area debate we are having today, but this vote is more about avoiding the Somalia's of NATO's future than rehashing the debate over Bosnia. The amendment I am offering explicitly refers to future NATO military missions. Making this another vote on Bosnia would miss the purpose: to keep NATO on a sound course for the future. One could argue that if you supported the Bosnia mission, you would not offer this amendment. I disagree. You may support Bosnia, but you may support NATO more and recognize the threats a Somalia experience poses to NATO. I doubt there is anyone in the Senate who has not grown more concerned with each missed deadline for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Bosnia. There is nothing in this amendment that stops the U.S., unilaterally or with other countries, from engaging in ethnic conflicts like Bosnia. If we want to send our soldiers to the flashpoints of Europe and Asia, then let's have that debate. Don't cloak these missions in the banner of a successful military alliance not intended for such purposes. Don't entangle the U.S. in the brushfires of Europe, Asia, and Africa through NATO. Third, and on a somewhat related note, some would argue this amendment constrains the President as commander in chief. My amendment has nothing to do with the President's authority as Commander in Chief. Nothing in this amendment limits the President's ability to deploy U.S. forces unilaterally and in concert with other nations to defend the United States. This amendment has to do with the question of what the President can do through the North Atlantic Treaty. In that treaty, to which the Senate gave its advice and consent based on a shared understanding borne out by 40 years of alliance practice, the U.S. was making a security commitment limited by the mission of collective defense within a carefully defined geographical area. The Senate should give its advice and consent if NATO is to expand its mission. To conclude, these and other issues deserve extensive debate. The risks of an ill-defined NATO are real. The Senate should not allow this alliance to shift from collective defense to fitful multilateralism. This Administration is stretching NATO's scope to cover the globe. The Ashcroft amendment is the right answer to ``Treaty Creep.'' The statements and policies of Administration officials belie a failure to grasp the purpose of a military alliance. There is no long- term vision of where the expansion process will stop. The U.S. is slashing defense while increasing security obligations abroad. Beware the Administration strong on NATO expansion, but weak on defense. The resistance of Administration officials to define where the expansion of NATO's mission and membership will stop indicates how far Article 5 has diminished in importance. Secretary Albright has stated that ``. . .no European democracy will be excluded because of where it sits on the map.'' The Administration's dismissal of the logistical and strategic constraints of war may work for Foggy Bottom. In the real world, real soldiers die in defense of real borders. Treaty creep will cost American lives, harm U.S. interests, and undermine NATO. The drift in this Administration's foreign policy is threatening the future of a focused NATO which serves American interests. The Senate should not be complacent with fifty years of NATO success. This body has a role to play in the scope of U.S. treaty commitments. Changing NATO into a mini-UN with a standing army is not something the American people will support. We have been lucky in Bosnia. The first time NATO has a Somalia experience in pursuit of an expanded mission, U.S. support for the alliance will be undermined. Voting for the Ashcroft amendment is the best way to be clear about NATO's mission--the territorial defense of Western Europe. This amendment is the best way to advance U.S. interests through NATO.

Mr. ASHCROFT

Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, families are the cornerstone of America. The data are undeniable: Individuals from strong families contribute to the society. In an era when nearly half of all couples married today will see their union dissolve into divorce, I believe it is both instructive and important to honor those who have taken the commitment of ``till death us do part" seriously, demonstrating successfully the timeless principles of love, honor, and fidelity. These characteristics make our country strong. For these important reasons, I rise today along with the senior Senator from Missouri, Senator Bond, to honor Kathy and John Phillips, Alma and Larry Swon, and Kathy and Mike Yount of Mexico, Missouri, who on July 3, 1998, will celebrate their 30th wedding anniversaries. Many things have changed in the 30 years these couples have been married, but the values, principles, and commitment these marriages demonstrate are timeless. My wife, Janet, and I had the privilege of celebrating our 30th wedding anniversary just one year ago. I can attest, like these fine couples, to the remarkable love and appreciation that has grown out of my own marriage. As these couples gather together in Mexico on July 3, surrounded by friends and family, it will be apparent that the lasting legacy of these marriages will be the time, energy, and resources invested in their children, church, and community. The Phillips, Swons, and Younts exemplify the highest commitment to relentless dedication and sacrifice. Their commitment to the principles and values of their marriages deserve to be saluted and recognized.

Mr. ASHCROFT

Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, today I introduce the Taxpayer's Defense Act. Quite simply, this bill prohibits any agency from establishing a tax on the American people. Mr. President. As we all know, the United States was founded on one simple and fundamental principle--no taxation without representation. ``In the Second Treatise of Government,'' John Locke said, ``if anyone shall claim a power to lay and levy taxes on the people . . . without . . . consent of the people, he thereby . . . subverts the end of government.'' According to Locke, consent required agreement by a majority of the people, ``either by themselves or their representatives chosen by them.'' The Declaration of Independence listed, among the despotic acts of King George, his ``imposing taxes on us without our consent.'' The Boston Tea Party remains the symbol of Americans' opposition to taxation without representation. The Constitutional authority--given only to Congress--to establish federal taxes is clear. Its reasoning also is clear. It is the Congress that represents the people. Only Congress considers and weighs every issue that rises to national importance. While Federal agencies consider their own priorities to be paramount, only Congress can determine which goals merit a tax on the American people. The modern era of restricted federal budgets, however, threatens to erode the essential principle of ``no taxation without representation.'' In many subtle and often hidden ways, federal agencies are receiving from Congress the power to tax. They tax by adding unnecessary charges to legitimate government user fees. They tax through federal mandates. These taxes pass the cost of government on to the American people--without their knowledge. The worst example of administrative taxation is the Federal Communications Commission's Universal Service Tax. ``Universal service'' is the idea that everyone should have access to affordable telecommunications services. It originated at the beginning of the century when the first national telecommunications service was still being created. This idea was expanded in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which allowed the FCC to extend universal service funds to provide ``discount telecommunications services'' to schools, libraries, and rural health care facilities. Most importantly, the Act gave the FCC the power to decide the level of ``contributions''--taxes--that telecommunications companies would have to pay to support universal service. The FCC now determines how much must be collected in taxes that subsidize a variety of `universal service' spending programs. Long distance providers pass the costs on to consumers in the form of higher telephone bills. In the first half of 1998, the tax was $625 million, and the Clinton Administration's budget projects it will rise to $10 billion per year. This administrative tax is already out of control. This is possible because Congress delegated its authority to tax. The FCC is able to collect taxpayer dollars at levels it sets--without approval from Congress or the people. The FCC can defy Congress and the people because it has the power to levy taxes. Mr. President, some people thought the tax and spend liberals had left Washington. Not so. Washington interest groups who want to feed at this new federal trough already are geared up to accuse the Republican Congress of cutting funding for education and health care if any attempt is made to rein in the FCC. They will frame the issue as a matter of federal entitlements for sympathetic causes and groups. The most sympathetic group is the American taxpayer, whose money is being taken, laundered through the Washington bureaucracy, and returned for purposes set by unelected Washington Bureaucrats. This is why the FCC must be required to get the approval of Congress before setting future tax rates. Should tax dollars be used for federal universal service programs and what amounts or should Americans spend what they earn on their own, real, local priorities? Requiring Congress to review any administrative taxes would answer this question. My bill would create a new section to the Congressional Review Act for mandatory review of certain agency rules. Any rule that establishes or raises a tax would have to be submitted to and receive the approval of Congress before taking effect. In essence, the Act would disable agencies from setting taxes, but would allow them to formulate proposals under existing rulemaking procedures. Once submitted to Congress, a taxing regulation would be introduced in both the House and Senate by the Majority Leader. The rule would then be subject to expedited procedures, allowing a prompt decision on whether or not to approve a rule. The rule would have to be approved by both Houses and signed by the President. Congress must not allow a federal agency--unelected and unaccountable federal bureaucrats--to determine the amount of taxes hardworking Americans must pay. The Taxpayer's Defense Act will require Congress to stand up and face the American people when it decides to tax. The cry of ``no taxation without representation'' has gone up in the land before, and today we are hearing it again. It is time that we respond.

Mr. ASHCROFT

Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, I rise today to express my disappointment that the conference report which accompanies H.R. 2646, the Education Savings and School Excellency Act, does not contain the provisions banning Federal funding for the President's federalized, individualized testing proposal. This provision, which I authored, has been removed in conference because of the clearly communicated concern that the President would veto the legislation based on this issue. The Senate and House have repeatedly given the administration a failing grade on respecting the role of parents, on local control of what is taught and how it is taught. The President has insisted on trying to promote federalized control of education. Federal testing would lead to a Federal curriculum. This administration has a lamentable record of harming the interests of American schoolchildren. For example, on school choice, the President wants to incarcerate America's most disadvantaged youngsters in dangerous, dysfunctional schools, rather than give them a choice of schools. On block grants, he wants to keep plowing taxpayer money into the bureaucracy, instead of investing more in our classrooms. Now, on school testing, he wants to cut the rug out from under the role of parents and communities--the most important factors in how well children do in schools. The more Members of this body have learned about the President's national testing proposal, the less they have liked it. Over the past year, the number of Senators opposing national testing has grown to a majority. When we first visited this issue last fall during debate on the Labor, HHS and educational appropriations bill, only 13 Senators voted against allowing the President's national testing proposal. Only one month later, 36 other Senators joined with me to threaten to filibuster the Labor, HHS, and Education appropriations bill unless there was a ban on FY 1998 federal funding for the President's national testing proposal. In April of this year, when I offered my testing ban as an amendment to the Coverdell A+ bill, the Senate passed the provision by a vote of 52-47. Over in the House, Congressman Bill Goodling, Chairman of the House Education and the Workforce Committee, has continued to provide leadership in the fight against national testing. His bill to prohibit funds for national testing passed by a vote of 242-174 in February of this year. So it is clear that both Chambers of this Congress agree that national testing should be rejected. And the President of the United States wants to promote national testing, and does so, I believe, in an effort that would begin to nationalize the school system. Local control of schools is fundamentally important and should be protected. It is reflected in the understanding of the House and the Senate. The Senate Majority Leader and the Speaker of the House have provided to Chairman Goodling and me a written commitment that they will ensure that the text of the Labor/HHS/Education appropriations bill for 1999, and any supplemental or any other such legislation, will not leave Congress without a testing provision that Chairman Goodling and I find to be satisfactory. That, of course, would be a provision allowing no funds to develop national tests. If the appropriations bill does not make it to the President's desk, they say, then every effort will be made to include this in a continuing resolution or any other must-pass legislation. I appreciate this assurance from our leadership in both the House and Senate, and my colleagues can be sure that I will do everything in my power to hold them to their commitment. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the letter from the Major Leader and the Speaker to Chairman Goodling and me containing these assurances be printed in the Record after my remarks.

Mr. ASHCROFT. Why am I opposed to national testing? Mr. President, we must remember that any movement toward national control of education savages principles that we as Americans hold dear: parental authority and control, teachers who are free to teach core subject matter and school boards that are responsive to their communities, not held captive by distant bureaucrats. President Clinton's proposal for national testing of our children is an example of such an attempt at a federal power grab. The President wants to move power out of the hands of parents and school boards and into the hands of Washington bureaucrats. America resists that for a number of important reasons, and these are the reasons to oppose federalized national tests. Parental involvement is the most important factor in a child's educational success, and national tests would undermine the ability of parents to play a meaningful role in the educational decisions of their children. During my time as Governor of Missouri, and through my work with the Education Commission of the States, learned that the single most operative condition in student educational achievement is the involvement of parents. Study after study has proven the significance of parental involvement in their child's education. We should not disengage parents with a federalized national testing system. Experience has shown that local control is a key factor in educational success. Experience has shown that local control is a key factor in educational success. As a former Governor who made education a top policy priority, I learned first-hand that local control is needed to create educational programs that respond to the needs of local communities and that stimulate success. National tests will lead to a national curriculum. There is wide consensus among teachers, administrators, and education experts that ``what gets tested is what gets taught.'' So, if you determine a test, you determine the curriculum. A national curriculum is detrimental because it eliminates the participation of parents and local schools--the key elements of success. It would do so inevitably. As a result, they key elements of success--parents, schoolteachers, and local decision-making--would be missing in our educational systems throughout the country. Lynne Cheney, former Chairperson of the National Endowment for the Humanities, reminds us that previous attempts at federal standards have been disastrous. She points to the politically correct federal history standards which were unanimously rejected in the Senate. Cheney also points to the English/language arts standards, which were such an ill-considered muddle that even the Clinton Department of Education cut off funding for them after having invested more than $1 million. The final exam on the Clinton plan for federally controlled testing will come on the Labor/OHS/Education appropriations bill. This Congress--and more importantly, the American people--will be watching very carefully to see how the Administration performs on this issue that affects the future of our children. I will do everything in my power to protect the ability of parents, teachers, and local schools to be involved in the education of their children by participating in the development of school curriculum, standards, and testing. So I commend this bill to the President. This is an important bill. It would advance substantially the interests of our students. I thank the sponsors for their outstanding work. I look forward to sending to the President an appropriations bill which would curtail the potential of any money being wasted at the Federal level by imposing inappropriate federalized tests upon local school districts. These tests would curtail the ability of local officials to make the kinds of decisions that are necessary for us to have the kind of school quality that we need in order to survive in the next century. With that in mind, I thank the sponsor of this legislation and commend him for the outstanding work he has done by stepping forward for America's schoolchildren, and I look forward to the opportunity of working together again to make sure that as we protect the options of parents and local officials to educate their children, we best serve this great land and future generations. I thank the Chair. Exhibit 1 Congress of the United States, Washington, DC, June 5, 1998. Hon. Bill Goodling, Chairman, Committee on Education and the Workforce, House of Representatives, Washington, DC. Hon. John Ashcroft, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC. Gentlemen: We are grateful to the two of you for taking the lead on requiring that testing of students remain at the state and local level. The administration's proposal to control student testing at the federal level necessarily would result in government control of the curriculum. Stopping this central government control of student testing is a very important part of our Republican plan to return our schools to the control of the parents and teachers at the local level. We have worked with you and voted with you to pass a federal testing prohibition bill in the House and to add an amendment to H.R. 2646, the Education Savings Act for Public and Private Schools. Obviously, since this bill is under the threat of a veto by the administration and a filibuster by Senate Democrats, it does not serve our interests to pursue the ban on federal testing in this bill. Therefore, in order to ensure that Congress will pass and send to the President a ban on federal testing, you have our commitment to support inclusion of your testing prohibition language (H.R. 2846/Amendment 2300 to H.R. 2646) in the base test of the FY 1999 Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education Appropriations bill. This language will be maintained through floor action and the conference committee process. You have our commitment that this bill will not leave the Congress without a testing provision that you find to be satisfactory. If for some reason the Labor/HHS/Education Appropriations bill does not make it to the President's desk, then we will support efforts to include this provision in any Continuing Resolution(s), or other ``must pass'' legislation in both bodies. We appreciate your leadership over the past months on this most important issue and look forward to continuing to work closely with you. Sincerely, Trent Lott. Newt Gingrich. Mr. COVERDELL addressed the Chair.

Mr. ASHCROFT

Mr. ASHCROFT. The Chinese have intimated that they can't control coercive abortion activity in remote regions. I think the testimony we have heard belies that, but the Chinese officials say this is in remote areas. Would the Senator say that China also is unable to control political discussion and political dissent, or are they pretty good at controlling political dissent and just not very good at controlling coerced abortions?

Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, I have been asked to propound a unanimous consent, and I believe it has been agreed to by both sides. Prior to the Senator leaving the Chamber, I will do that.

Mr. ASHCROFT. Yes.

Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, I commend the Senator from Arkansas for his outstanding work in this respect. I believe this is an item upon which the Senate must vote, ought to vote, should vote. I am distressed that the minority leader has indicated that votes on these issues would be inappropriate. It seems like they are an embarrassment, potentially, to the President. I think the policy which we have pursued is an embarrassment to the United States of America, and I think we need to change our policy to make clear that we reject the kind of activity which has been spoken of by the Senator from Arkansas. With that particular thought in mind, and understanding the merit of this particular division, which would deny visas to those who have been actively involved and for whom credible evidence has been developed in the coerced abortion area, I move to table the first division of Senator Hutchinson's amendment.

Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at the conclusion of the vote being taken on the tabling motion for Senator Hutchison, I have 10 minutes to address a matter as if in morning business.

Mr. ASHCROFT. I am happy to.

Mr. ASHCROFT. Is the Senator telling me that if the person was jailed and fined and the fines somehow didn't deter the individuals, their homes were destroyed?

Mr. ASHCROFT. May I ask another question?

Mr. ASHCROFT. Will the Senator from Arkansas yield for another question?

Mr. ASHCROFT. Does the Senator from Arkansas feel that the way China treats its own citizens--its willingness to coerce them into having forced abortions--reflects the way they feel about human rights and the way they feel about the rights of citizens around the world? And would he care to comment on how that might reflect the rather callous view of the Chinese who are targeting American citizens with what they call city-buster nuclear weapons on their ICBMs? Does the Senator think there is a relationship between this disregard for life that is expressed in coerced abortion policy and the willingness to target peace-loving people in the United States with city-buster nuclear weapons on long-range ICBMs?

Mr. ASHCROFT. So the Senator's amendment is not to deny a visa to someone who had an abortion or someone who has participated in an abortion clinic that wasn't a coerced abortion. You are just focused on this situation where people were intimidated, coerced, sometimes jailed, sometimes fined, sometimes actually had their homes demolished to force them to destroy an unborn child. Your amendment focuses on persons who are involved in that kind of coercive behavior to force individuals--who want to preserve the life of the child--to destroy the child. Those individuals are the ones that would be denied a visa to enter the United States by this amendment.

Mr. ASHCROFT. Beyond that, they would take the resources, by fining her, that she might otherwise use to support her family.

Mr. ASHCROFT. This is the testimony of an individual who was involved in the practice. Is this some American reporter who has testimony or an individual who was part of this operation?

Mr. ASHCROFT. There was incarceration. I am asking the Senator: If the woman refused to get an abortion, she would be hauled off to jail?

Mr. ASHCROFT

Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate proceeds to the consideration of the conference report to accompany H.R. 2646, the Coverdell A+ education bill, it be considered as having been read, and there be 4 hours for debate divided in the following manner: Two hours under the control of the minority leader, or his designee, with part of their 2 hours divided as follows: Senator Kennedy, 15 minutes; Senator Graham, 20 minutes; Senator Kerry of Massachusetts, 10 minutes; Senator Torricelli, 15 minutes; Senator Coverdell, or his designee, 2 hours. I further ask consent that following the expiration or yielding back of time, the Senate proceed to vote on adoption of the conference report, all without any intervening action or debate.

Mr. ASHCROFT

Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, I want to take a few moments to address the situation regarding the policy of the United States and the way in which we relate to the nation of China. The President of the United States is making a trip to the People's Republic of China, and there has been significant debate about this trip, which provides us an opportunity to ask ourselves what kind of policy should we have toward the world's most populous nation. There have been a number of us who have questioned whether or not the President should go to Tiananmen Square, for example, to celebrate, in some way, his arrival with those who pulled the triggers at the square to crush dissent in 1989. There are a wide variety of pluses and minuses about the Presidential trip. I want to try to put this trip and our policy toward China into a broader perspective in terms of the way foreign policy perhaps ought to be conducted. First of all, the President has suggested that we either have to do it his way--to support the Presidential visit, welcomed by leaders at the site of a tremendous violation of human rights--or else we have no engagement with China at all. I think this is a false choice. It is not necessary, in order to have a relationship with countries, that we automatically have to have a summit. As a matter of fact, we engage in relationships with very important countries--countries far more influential in some respects than China--and we don't have summits with them on a regular basis. This is the second summit in less than a year with the nation of China. So the first thing I would like to say is that it is not necessarily essential, in order to pursue a productive policy for a long-term constructive relationship with China, that you have a summit. As a matter of fact, it might be counterproductive. It might impair the development of the kind of healthy, long-term relationship we need if we send the President unduly, or prematurely, to negotiate with or otherwise concede to individuals whose conduct doesn't merit the President's dignifying presence--whose participation in world events is not of a quality that should be legitimized by a visit from the President of the United States. There has been a false dichotomy presented to the American people, and it has been the choice between either supporting the President's trip to China or being labeled isolationists. That is simply an inappropriate framework to force upon the American people. Most Americans understand that our objectives ought not to be involvement or isolation per se, but that the United States--the greatest Nation of the world--would relate constructively with the People's Republic of China on the basis of sound policy that leads to a constructive and mature relationship. I believe that we have to have a policy toward China. While I question what the policies the President is pursuing, my reservations in no way suggest that I don't seek good relations with China. As a matter of fact, I think the road to good relations would be paved with better policy and fewer summits. Allow me to explain. Whether we are talking about the relationships between individuals, or businesses, or institutions, or countries, there are principles that undergird and provide the foundation for good relations. Integrity is one. Relationships have to be based on integrity. People have to be able to trust one another. They have to know that when one says something, it can be trusted. Another component of a good relationship is responsibility. Individuals have to act responsibly. They can't threaten or otherwise endanger the other party if there are going to be sound relationships. Third, there has to be accountability. If we want long-term relationships, if we want a productive relationship, if we want something that can be relied upon and built upon, we have to have the foundation of integrity, responsibility, and accountability. I suggest that our relationship with China is no different, an must include these kinds of building blocks. We have to have a relationship of integrity, responsibility, and accountability with China. If we don't have it, the future of U.S.-China relations is not bright. I have some real problems with the way the Chinese have dealt with us. It is a way that does not reflect integrity. It does not reflect responsibility. It does not reflect accountability. Take, for example, integrity. China last year, after almost 20 years of assuring the world that it doesn't proliferate weapons of mass destruction, was labeled by our own CIA as the world's worst proliferater of weapons of mass destruction. In spite of that, the President said, ``We will invite them over for a summit.'' And the Chinese were invited to the United States in October. As a matter of fact, there were nonproliferation assurances at that summit similar to the assurances that have been made over the past two decades. China pledged that it did not proliferate weapons of mass destruction. We don't involve ourselves in that. Frankly, just a few short months later, our intelligence resources intercepted negotiations between China and Iran for China to provide anhydrous hydrogen fluoride, a material used to upgrade industrial- strength uranium to weapons-grade uranium. The material was destined for Isfahan, one of Iran's principal sites for manufacturing the explosive core of an atomic device. It is pretty clear that the absence of integrity in the conduct of the Chinese is dramatic. It is an absence of integrity prior to the last summit, and it is an absence of integrity that followed on the heels of that summit. They will tell you one thing, and they do something else. That is not the basis of integrity that provides the foundation for a sound relationship. Responsibility is the second key ingredient. I think most Americans were shocked--I was shocked; I was stunned--when it was revealed by our own intelligence sources that the nation of China had as many as 13 intercontinental ballistic missiles targeted on American cities, armed with massive nuclear warheads, termed ``city busters.'' Every city in the United States of America north of southern Florida is within range of these missiles, and they are targeted on the United States of America. I don't think that is the foundation for summitry. I don't think that is the foundation for a good relationship. We never appeased the Soviet Union while it was targeting nuclear warheads on American cities. Ronald Reagan had a sense of principle. He had a sense of determination that you don't stand as a target, while at the same time offering privileges to your adversary. That is not the kind of policy America has pursued in the past. A policy which sells out America's long-term security interests might facilitate a particular sale, it might obtain a particular favor, but it is not in the long-term best interests of the United States to stand as a target offering concessions to a country pointing nuclear weapons at our cities. I think it is, of all things, terribly irresponsible of the Chinese to have 13 American cities targeted with their ``city buster'' nuclear weapons on intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of reaching virtually every city in the United States. The third important element is accountability. Where do the Chinese stand on accountability? The trade barriers that China has toward the United States are incredible. In recent years, China's tariff levels have been about six times as high on our goods as our tariffs are on Chinese products. Not only that, China imposes nontariff barriers that make it impossible for our companies to penetrate the Chinese market. China treats American companies differently, so that U.S. firms don't have the protection of law in Chinese courts commensurate with the protection the United States extends to foreign investors in our market. The absence of integrity, the absence of responsibility, the absence of accountability--the absence of these cornerstones of what ought to be U.S. policy means that the house of cards being constructed in summitry with China is in danger of collapse. I think if we are really interested in China policy over the long term, we ought to build the U.S.-China relationship on a foundation that demands integrity, responsibility, and accountability. When the President's presence implicitly accepts atrocities in China, and when the Administration continues to pursue a bankrupt policy of engaging the Chinese at any cost, the interests of the American people are not served and the United States is not served at its highest and best. It is no wonder that individuals on both sides of the aisle have protested this trip. It is no wonder that this is not a partisan issue. Sure, there may be more Republicans who are willing to stand and talk about this now. But in our news conferences together, we have brought these concerns to the President, saying, you are making a mistake with the kind of things that you are intending with this summit. The President will likely try to come home with some transaction, or some deal, to say that it was an achievement of the summit. But let us not forget that the real purpose of summits ought to be the development of sound structural relations, the kind of underpinning and foundation that will result in the potential for long-term, beneficial, constructive relationships between countries. As long as we ignore the absence of integrity, we ignore the absence of responsibility, we ignore the absence of accountability, it seems to me that we are not building the kind of relationship based on mutual respect. I would say this: As a minimum, this summit must end with the President returning to the United States with an assurance that United States cities are not targeted by Chinese ICBMs--with some kind of verification to ensure China's detargeting of American cities is genuine. The Chinese know that they have not acted with the requisite integrity. They know that they have not acted with the requisite responsibility. I think they understand that they have not acted with the kind of appropriate accountability that would provide the basis for the right foundation for a sound U.S.-China relationship. China, in some ways, may not expect to get the kind of relationship that mature nations dealing with one another on the basis of these values would have. Maybe that is why the Chinese have attempted to influence elections in America with donations to buy the kind of respect they have not earned with good will. Of all the things I would expect us to demand at the upcoming summit, one is that illegal contributions from subsidiaries of the Chinese Army not come to contaminate the political process in the United States of America. I want to say with clarity that an important challenge for the United States is to develop sound long-term relationships with important nations around the world. We cannot develop those relationships, however, without the fundamentals of integrity, responsibility, and accountability. We have in China today a regime whose brutal repression at home betrays its intentions abroad. America should be sounding liberty's bell, not toasting the tyrants who sent tanks to Tiananmen Square and pulled the triggers there. I believe we need to find a way to make sure that integrity, responsibility, and accountability are the fundamental components upon which our China policy rests. To legitimize Chinese conduct absent those values, those principles, is likely to result in a long-term U.S.-China relationship with more risk than reward, with more difficulty than cooperation. Mr. President, I thank you for this opportunity. I thank you for the time you have spent in the Chair. I yield the floor.