Spencer Bachus

Mr. BACHUS

Mr. BACHUS. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

Mr. BACHUS. Well, as I said a few minutes ago to the chairman, with all respect to the chairman, we have 19 days. We've talked about the importance, particularly on that side of the aisle, and many Members on our side, the importance, if we are going to have a bill, let's have a bill. If the program is important, let's have the program. Let's not let it expire. If terrorist risk insurance will shut down New York, if in the absence of this bill you can't build a hotdog stand in New York, why would we let a bill expire that will, quote, shut down the economy of New York? We have an alternative. The alternative is to pass a bill that passed unanimously in the Senate. Executive Summary The Terrorism Risk Insurance Extension Act of 2005 requires the President's Working Group on Financial Markets (PWG) to perform an analysis regarding the long-term availability and affordability of insurance for terrorism risk, including group life coverage; and coverage for chemical, nuclear, biological, and radiological events; and to submit a report of its findings to Congress by September 30, 2006. In conducting this analysis, the PWG was assisted by staff of the member agencies who reviewed academic and industry studies on terrorism risk insurance, and sought additional information and consultation through a Request for Comment published in the Federal Register. Staff also met with insurance regulators, policyholder groups, insurers, reinsurers, modelers, and other governmental agencies to gather further information. The key findings of the PWG's analysis are set forth below. The findings are presented under three main areas: the general availability and affordability of terrorism risk insurance; coverage for group life insurance; and coverage for chemical, nuclear, biological, and radiological events. Further detail on each finding is provided in the body of the report. Key Findings Long-Term Overall Availability and Affordability of Terrorism Risk Insurance The availability and affordability of terrorism risk insurance have improved since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Despite increases in risk retentions under TRIA, insurers have allocated additional capacity to terrorism risk, prices have declined, and take-up (purchase) rates have increased. The take-up rate--or the percentage of companies buying terrorism coverage--has reportedly increased from 27 percent in 2003 to 58 percent in 2005, while the cost of coverage has generally fallen to roughly 3 to 5 percent of total property insurance costs. These improvements have transpired in a marketplace that has had access to a Federal backstop that has gradually contracted through the life of the temporary TRIA Program. Insurers' retention of risk has steadily increased under the TRIA Program: deductibles have increased from 7 percent of direct earned premium in 2003 to 17.5 percent in 2006, and other changes made to TRIA in 2005 have also increased insurer retentions. The general trend observed in the market has been that as insurer retentions have increased under TRIA and policyholder surpluses have risen, prices for terrorism risk have fallen and take-up rates have increased. The improvement in the terrorism risk insurance market is due to several important factors, including better risk measurement and management, improved modeling of terrorism risk, greater reinsurance capacity, and a recovery in the financial health of property and casualty insurers. State regulation does not appear to have had a significant impact on capacity, and a significant number of policyholders are still not purchasing terrorism coverage. How these factors continue to evolve will importantly affect further developments in the long-term availability and price of terrorism risk insurance. Insurers have made great strides in measuring and managing their risk accumulations. The amount of capital an individual insurance company is willing to allocate to a particular risk in a given location depends on its understanding of its maximum loss under different scenarios. Since September 11, insurers have made greater use of sophisticated models that allow them to identify and manage concentrations of risk in order to avoid accumulating too much risk in any given location. This improvement in risk accumulation management has allowed insurers to better diversify and control their terrorism risk exposures, which has enhanced their ability to underwrite terrorism risk. A significant effort has been made by the insurance industry in modeling the potential frequency and severity of terrorist attacks, which helps insurers to assess their potential loss exposures. An understanding of the potential frequency and severity of terrorist attacks is important for insurers to properly evaluate their risk exposures. Improvements in probability modeling of terrorist attacks have likely had a positive impact on insurers' willingness to provide coverage for terrorism risk following the re- evaluation of terrorism risk that took place after September 11. However, unlike other catastrophic exposures (e.g., natural disasters) where there are more refined methods of modeling frequency, modeling terrorism risk frequency relies largely on analysis of terrorist behavior. Given the uncertainty of terrorism in general and, in particular, the uncertainty associated with these modeling efforts, insurers appear to have limited confidence in these models for evaluating their risk exposures. The quantity of terrorism risk reinsurance capacity has increased since the period following September 11. Reinsurance for terrorism risk all but vanished after September 11 as reinsurers withdrew from the market. The market has since improved and reinsurers have gradually allocated more capital to terrorism risk. The key determinants in the capital allocation decisions of reinsurers include pricing, which is influenced largely by demand, loss experience, underwriting performance, and probability of loss for a given risk at a given location. These determinants also factor into the willingness of other capital providers (e.g., through catastrophe bonds or other mechanisms) to allocate capital to terrorism risk. The presence of subsidized Federal reinsurance through TRIA appears to negatively affect the emergence of private reinsurance capacity because it dilutes demand for private sector reinsurance. The financial health and capacity of insurers has recovered since September 11. There has been improvement in the financial health of the insurance industry, which plays a role in how much capacity an insurer is willing to expose to terrorism risk. Since September 11, policyholder surpluses in the property and casualty industry have risen, as the industry has remained profitable (even with the 2005 hurricane season losses) and has benefited from increased rates of return on assets. As a result, insurers have more available capital to allocate, and they apparently have chosen to allocate additional capacity to terrorism risk as demonstrated by the increased provision of terrorism risk insurance coverage over the past few years. States require that some types of terrorism risk insurance be provided and otherwise regulate aspects of the terrorism risk insurance market. However, it is unclear whether these requirements have reduced capacity significantly. State laws and regulations govern various aspects of the insurance marketplace (e.g., mandating certain types of coverage, approving forms and rates, and monitoring financial solvency), and the provision of terrorism risk insurance falls within this general structure. In terms of pricing, although states regulate commercial insurance rates to various degrees (to a larger extent with workers' compensation insurance), commercial terrorism risk insurance for large property risks may be exempt from state price regulation or not subject to state price regulation (or other state mandates) when purchased from non-admitted surplus lines insurers. In addition, some insurers do not even charge for the terrorism coverage that is included in their policies. In lines of insurance with the greatest amount of price regulation and coverage mandates (such as workers' compensation insurance), insurers have generally remained in the market, even as their TRIA retentions have increased, despite not having the flexibility to fully price for terrorism risk. Therefore, while state regulations have the potential to significantly interfere with the operation of the insurance markets, it does not appear that such restrictions have had a significant impact in the market for terrorism risk insurance in the post-TRIA environment. While take-up rates have increased as prices have fallen, a significant number of policyholders are still not purchasing coverage. The willingness of consumers to pay for terrorism risk insurance is a determinant of how much capital insurers will allocate. It is unclear why approximately 40 percent of all policyholders do not purchase coverage, although the Treasury's 2005 study and others have found that the primary reasons were price and assessment of their individual risk to terrorist attack. Individual perceptions of low risk are likely related to the lack of a successful terrorist attack within the U.S. since 2001, and perhaps to some degree an expectation that Federal aid might be available if a significant attack occurs. Further improvements in insurers' ability to model and manage terrorism risk will likely contribute to the long-term development of the terrorism risk insurance market. However, the high level of uncertainty currently associated with predicting the frequency of terrorist attacks, along with what appears to be a general unwillingness of some insurance policyholders to purchase insurance coverage, makes any prediction of the potential degree of long-term development of the terrorism risk insurance market somewhat difficult. The post-September 11 terrorism insurance market has developed in the presence of a Federal backstop (albeit a progressively less generous one over time), which creates inherent difficulties in evaluating the long-term development of the terrorism risk insurance market. Group Life Insurance Coverage for terrorism risk insurance in group life insurance policies has remained generally available and prices have declined, even though group life insurance is not part of TRIA. Given these market signals, there is no reason to expect negative developments in the group life insurance market. Group life insurance is generally sold to employers as part of employee benefit packages along with other benefits, such as medical, dental, vision, and disability. In some cases group life insurers partner with other providers of employee benefit services. The group life insurance market is highly competitive and insurers appear to be unwilling in the face of such competition to raise prices (states do not regulate group life insurance rates), or to decline to provide terrorism coverage. Even though group life insurance has not had access to the Federal backstop under TRIA, private market forces (high competitiveness and extreme price sensitivity) have ensured the continued availability and affordability of group life insurance to employers and their participating employees. As in the market for property and casualty reinsurance, there have also been improvements in the availability of catastrophic life reinsurance, and there is the potential for continued market development. Just as with the property and casualty reinsurance, catastrophic life reinsurance all but disappeared after September 11, even though by most industry metrics, September 11 was not a catastrophe in terms of either individual or group life insurance losses. Still, the lack or limited availability of catastrophic life reinsurance following September 11 had no disruptive effect on the availability and affordability of group life insurance to consumers largely due to competitive market forces. Since then, some catastrophic life reinsurance has again become available in the marketplace, albeit at higher cost when compared to pre-September 11 pricing. Today, group life insurers are deciding whether to purchase reinsurance, or to forgo and retain most of the risk--a decision that has not had any impact on the availability and cost of group life insurance to consumers. Similar to the situation with property and casualty insurers, group life insurers have developed an increased ability to measure and manage their accumulation of terrorism exposure through the use of modeling, and there appears to be potential for additional improvements. While group life insurers face aggregation exposure (the risk of multiple losses from a terrorist-related mass casualty event due to concentrations of insured lives), they are capable of managing this risk to some degree by managing risk accumulations. Property and casualty insurers have made great strides in modeling techniques, but it is unclear to what extent group life insurers have made use of these tools. The highly competitive environment in the group life market, the general wider dispersion of overall life insurance risks (for companies that sell both group and individual life), and some institutional arrangements regarding how policies are sold, may all influence how group life insurers view their need and ability to manage accumulation risk. Chemical, Nuclear, Biological and Radiological (``CNBR'') Coverage Historically, insurance coverage for losses associated with chemical, nuclear, biological, and radiological risks has generally not been widely available unless it was mandated. Insurers generally did not provide CNBR coverage even before September 11, and for the most part they do not provide such terrorism coverage even with a Federal backstop in place. Given the general reluctance of insurance companies to provide coverage for these types of risks, there may be little potential for future market development. The factors determining the availability and affordability of CNBR coverage in the marketplace have more to do with the nature, scale, and uncertainty of the damage and losses from CNBR events--however caused--and less to do with terrorism specifically. What coverage exists today is mostly tied to state mandates, most prominently workers' compensation insurance, as well as some aspects of fire insurance through the Standard Fire Policy. In addition, a Federal mandate requires some nuclear coverage for reactor operators and some specialty coverage exists. There is virtually no CNBR reinsurance available, and the modeling issues both for exposure and probability become even more complicated for

Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Speaker, I yield to myself such time as I may consume. It's all come down to this. We can continue to debate the Senate, we can continue to try to change this bill, or we can pass a bill, send it to the President, which extends this vitally important program as so many speakers on the majority side have said. Let's be honest with ourselves. We know that this bill should have passed 6 months ago. We know it probably should have passed 9 months ago. We know that it will not pass in time for new coverage to be written January 1. We know that. So here we are, arguing differences with the Senate, but I think the first thing we ought to acknowledge is the Senate unanimously passed this bill. Now, the chairman says that two people got together, agreed on everything and the other 98 waved good-bye. Well, let me say this. We, the majority of this body, almost all the Members on your side, if not all, and a good number of the Members on our side have said we need to extend this program and we needed to do it 6 months ago. It's time for us to pass the Senate language, send this bill to the President. You know, there comes a time when if what the Senate did is wave this bill good-bye, it's time for us to wave this bill good-bye. We have engaged in a debate. The Senate has been unfair to us. Quite frankly, policyholders don't care whether the Senate's unfair to the House. They don't care whether the House didn't get its way and the Senate did. The bill the Senate passed, I'm not supporting it because it's not only the only thing available today, although it is. Let me again read to you what the statement of the administration is. The administration continues to believe that any TRIA reauthorization should satisfy these three key elements: The program should be temporary and short-term, there should be no expansion of the program, and private sector retention should be increased. That was the original policies and the original bill we passed. However, the administration will not oppose the version of H.R. 2761 passed by the Senate on November 16, but the administration strongly opposes any amendments to the Senate-passed version of the bill away from the administration's key elements. And the only thing underlined in this statement to us is, accordingly, if H.R. 2761 passes, that's the bill before us, if it's presented to the President to be considered, his senior advisers will recommend him veto the bill. A very important program. It's already too late for insurance companies and policyholders to adopt the provisions as of January 1. State regulators don't have time to print the forms. It's time for us to pass the bill. It's time for us to say, Okay, we didn't settle all our differences with the Senate, and we can do that. And, quite frankly, I am very happy that it is the Senate bill we'll be passing, because the Senate bill is very, very close to what we Republicans some year ago proposed. And we've gone through a year. Provisions, the House has not gotten its way on certain provisions. It's time to act. It's past time to act, and we're going to have that opportunity today. We're going to have the opportunity to extend what you say is a vital program, what some of us say, well, actually we're not getting what we want because we believe that this program continues to be a free Federal backstop for private insurers and developers, and that's okay. We want development, just like you do. We don't believe, as the Treasury does, many of us, that the program has served its purpose and it is actually impeding the private market, but we don't have to get there. We have compromised our beliefs and are willing to vote for a 7- year extension. The Senate unanimously came together and compromised their various differences and voted unanimously for a version the President has said he will sign. The only thing that remains is on this side, the House side, that some in the majority have not gotten their way on certain provisions. And listen, I'm all for advocating a House position, but we've done that, and in the interests of the American people, in the interests of getting legislation, in the interests of closure, let's vote for the Senate version.

Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to recommit.

Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Speaker, I yield to myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, TRIA, provides a free Federal backstop to private insurers to protect them against acts of terrorism in the United States so they can have insurance. It was enacted, as all of us recall, right after 9/11 for 3 years as a very temporary measure. It was intended to give the insurance industry developers a 3-year period of transition to a private market, allow them to stabilize, to price terrorism insurance, and the third goal was to rebuild capacity. Now, in 2005, Republicans agreed. We came together bipartisanly and extended it for 2 years. However, that same year, the Treasury did a study on TRIA, and here's what they said. They said, by 2005, 2 years ago, the program had achieved all its purposes. The insurance market had stabilized. They were pricing terrorism insurance, and they were rebuilding capacity. I will submit for the Record the Treasury Department study that they found had achieved all its goals. Now, let me read from the Treasury study of 2 years ago: ``The availability and affordability of terrorism risk insurance has improved since the terrorist attacks of September 11. Despite increases in risk retentions under TRIA, insurers have allocated additional capacity to terrorism risk, prices have declined, and take-up (purchase) rates have increased.'' But we extended it. And then we passed the legislation that the chairman has talked about today, and it went over to the Senate. And the Senate, unanimously, passed a TRIA bill. One hundred Republicans and Democrats came together and passed that legislation, and the President said he would sign it. Now, there are things about this bill that some of my colleagues on this side support. The gentlelady from Florida has a provision that I think would be beneficial. But it deals with group life. I'm sure she's going to talk about that provision in a minute. But let me say this. The Senate has said they're not going to include group life. So why put a provision in about group life when the Senate has already said they're not going to include group life?

Mr. BACHUS. In its current form, I am.

Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Speaker, the chairman of the Financial Services Committee, whom I have great respect for, indicated several times that we are here today because of the Senate's inaction and intransigence. Now, I'm not going to argue that point. The Senate, what they didn't do is they didn't take action on our bill, but what they did do is they came together and they unanimously passed legislation, and that legislation is very close to what House Republicans advocated from day one. They did take action. They passed legislation. The President said he'll sign it. It's legislation that Treasury said is consistent with the original declarations of the TRIA bill. I share the chairman's frustration on the predicament we find ourselves in. I wish the Senate had been willing to engage in a conference to allow Members the opportunity to work out their differences on the extension of this program. However, I will tell the chairman this: The House Republicans, many of us on that conference committee, would have voted to adopt the Senate language. So the Senate bill, in my opinion, had we conferenced, we would have still passed the Senate bill. Now, the chairman has expressed his frustration with the Senate that they are holding a gun to our head. I'm not going to characterize it in that regard. Whether it is or isn't, I wish it wasn't so. But the clock has run out on this Congress and the opportunity to get anything done on TRIA has, as a practical matter, gone by. But if it is so important, and most Members of this body believe it is, it's important to pass legislation today, and that's the Senate legislation. The motion to recommit removes additions in the bill offered by the majority and returns the TRIA language to that passed by the Senate last month by unanimous consent. The Senate bill reflects a bipartisan compromise with the administration. It extends the TRIA program for 7 years, the same amount of time that we advocated in a bipartisan bill in the House. We didn't get a bipartisan bill in the House. It wasn't a bad bill. It wasn't a bad bill. But that bill when it passed and the bill today, the bill that was just offered, is not going to become law. The Senate bill includes coverage for domestic terrorism. Many in this body felt like it ought to include that. It imposes a liability cap for the marketplace. That's good. I think it's a responsible, measured approach to extending a vital program, as many have characterized it. Not all on this side agree. But the majority on this side will come together, the majority of the minority, and pass what you say is a vital program and we'll do it today. The administration has said they will veto the House bill. Both sides of the aisle and the Senate have indicated that the Senate is unwilling to consider it. We have a gripe against the Senate, but let's take that up with the Senate. A large number of Members in the House may continue to oppose the Senate bill. You have an opportunity to vote on it in just a minute. The only TRIA extension that can get enacted is the Senate compromise. Many say I wish it wasn't so. It is. The only responsible course for this House to take is to accept the Senate bill and move on. My motion is the Senate compromise. We have 19 days until TRIA expires. Let me say it again. That's not a practical time left for the industry to comply with legislation. In a reasoned society, a deliberative body would never pass a bill and ask the American people to adopt all that in 5 days. Mr. Speaker, we cannot risk TRIA's expiration. We need to get the job done now. A vote for this motion to recommit is a vote to promote economic vitality in this country.

Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Members of the body, first let me address the practicalities of where we are. I am going to talk about the policies in a few minutes after others have had an opportunity to speak, but let's just talk about where we are. The chairman has talked about the Senate this, the House this. But the truth is that the present legislation expires December 31. That is in 19 days. Businesses across the country are trying to arrange their insurance coverages for next year, and they have no certainty as to whether or how much there will be a Federal safety net in place. Nineteen days. Even if Congress were to act today, there is hardly time enough for insurance companies to develop new policy forms, to obtain approval from 50 State regulators, to get them in the marketplace for review by the brokers, and to finish negotiating coverage with their policyholders. There is just not time. Now, it can be the Senate problem. The House passed a bill earlier this year. That is all true, but that doesn't change the facts. Nineteen days. Nineteen days. Each additional day that we fail to get a bill on the President's desk means less ability in the marketplace to adjust and to respond to the new mandates in this program, or the Senate program, particularly the mandates on domestic terrorism. Policies are going to have to be rewritten. And both the House and the Senate bill does that, so it doesn't really matter which bill ultimately passes. Mr. Speaker, I share Chairman Frank's frustration with the Senate. He described this ping pong, back and forth. A House-Senate conference would have been nice to work out our differences, although in a minute I will say why I personally believe the Senate bill is more in keeping with our original intention. The chairman of the full committee and I were two of the authors of the original legislation. And it says in that legislation it was intended as a very temporary Federal backstop until the private market could fill in, and I will talk about that and why I support the Senate bill later. But as a practical matter, whether I supported the Senate or the House bill, there is only one bill that is going to pass. I think the chairman knows that, I know that, Members of this body know that. That's the Senate bill. The administration has indicated they are going to veto anything but the Senate bill. If we pass this bill, they will veto it. The Senate has agreed unanimously to their bill. They came together unanimously. I regret we weren't able to do that. But it was, at that time, a 15-year permanent bill. So we didn't come together. But we have got to put this behind us and adopt legislation that has a realistic possibility of becoming law, and to do it right now. We need to do that on the alternate minimum tax. It is staring us in the face. I don't think the American people, the taxpayers, I don't think the accounting industry care whether or not the Senate did this to the House or the House did this to the Senate. On terrorist insurance, I don't think the insurance companies, the developers, the policyholders, I am not sure they care about all the internal fights between this body and that body. They are caught in the middle, and you do have a bill available. It's a Senate bill that will go to the President to be signed and take away this uncertainty. The Senate has made it clear that they are not going to pass the legislation that the chairman is offering. It is not me; that is the Senate. The White House has issued a Statement of Administrative Policy indicating that if presented with the bill we are going to vote on today, the President will veto it. That's with less. The Senate is not going to take it up, so it won't ever get to the President. So that is just theoretical because the Senate said they are not going to pass it. And we have got 3 weeks left before the program expires. Now, some of our Members think that the private market, that the TRIA 5 years after 9/11, a 3-year bill and a 2-year extension, that TRIA has served its purpose. And in a few minutes I am going to talk about the Treasury and that they believe that it has fulfilled its purpose and from now on it just retards the private market. But we can vote this bill down, we can bring up the Senate bill, and we can put a bipartisan TRIA extension on the President's desk. We can do it this week. The time for further deliberation or argument has passed. Time has run out on us. With all due respect to the chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, I recommend we vote down this legislation, we bring up the Senate legislation, we do it in a motion to recommit, we do it in a unanimous consent, we do it in a suspension. We move it, we pass it over to the Senate, and we end the uncertainty. If it is such a vital program that many Members think it is, why don't we need it in place? Why would we wait until a week or two or even after it expires to reauthorize it? Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Speaker, we have 19 days till this program expires. Now, if, as you have said, this is such an essential program, we need to pass a bill today. The industry needed 6 months. They've only got 19 days. Policies have to be written. We can continue to talk about not letting the Senate run over the House. We can continue to say we're going to stand up for our version of the bill, but ask yourself this question: How could 100 Senators, both Republicans and Democrats, come up with a unanimous bill, which many of us in this bill support, and the President said he will take it up and sign it, why are we here today delaying the extension of what many of you have argued on the floor today is a very important bill? I'm going to say it again. Even if Congress were to act today, there's not enough time for insurance companies to develop new policy forms. There's not enough time for 50 State regulators to approve those forms. There's not time to get the finished product to the marketplace. There's not time to negotiate with policyholders. So this idea that we don't have to pass it today, no, we don't have to pass it today. No, we don't have to pass it tomorrow. We should have passed it 6 months ago. We did. The Senate passed a different version, and we are arguing at the end of this session, 19 days before this program expires, as to differences between the Senate and the House version. And quite frankly, as I have said, the Senate version, which is the version the Treasury Department urged on the House, the version the President has said he will sign, the insurance industry's happy with. It extends the TRIA program. Why are we here delaying? As I said, we're delaying this. We're putting this program at jeopardy. We're postponing a decision on AMT. The IRS is not going to have time to react to that, and here we are as if we have all the time in the world. The American people are not interested in differences between the House and the Senate bill. I believe the American people, you know, if a bill can pass unanimously out of the Senate, which it did, and the President take it up, why does this House continue to debate long after the time to act and pass legislation? It should have happened 6 months ago. It can happen today. It should happen today. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. BACHUS

Mr. BACHUS. May I inquire as to how much time is remaining?

Mr. BACHUS. Madam Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Hensarling).

Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition, although I am not opposed to the amendment.

Mr. BACHUS. I want to compliment the gentleman from New York (Mr. Meeks) for offering this amendment. I know it clarifies the role of the Conference of State Bank Supervisors and the approval process for State license mortgage practitioners and originators. I compliment the gentleman. I know that the Conference has worked with the industry in crafting this amendment. I urge support for it.

Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to claim the time in opposition.

Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Chairman, the gentlewoman from Ohio obviously points out a significant problem with foreclosures in Cleveland. It is actually a heart-breaking experience that the people of Cleveland are going through when one out of every five or six houses are undergoing foreclosures. You hear some pretty devastating figures. I know, I used to be an attorney for the FOP, Fraternal Order of Police, in Birmingham; and there is absolutely nothing more problematic in a community than a vacant house from a crime standpoint as well as from a property value standpoint. The notice she requires, I think some of that is addressed by Mr. Green and Mr. McHenry, but it is at an earlier time. I would say this, I personally am not going to ask for a roll call on this. Going forward, I think parts of this amendment are very good. I think stating what the new interest rate will be, giving somebody a notice. The Federal Reserve said some folks sort of, you know, this is something that they don't always see or focus on. But explaining what the new interest rate is going to be and how it is going to be determined, that could be somewhat problematic, but it could be worked in a range as long as the regulators are given some discretion. Offering the borrower the best estimate of what the new monthly payment will be could also, as long as there was some range or discretion in there. The last two things I think are very good, offering alternatives that the consumer could pursue. That might be very valuable, as would providing information on HUD-approved house counseling. I think that would be very valuable. I personally am not going to ask for a roll call on this. Other Members might. Mr. Chairman, at this time I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from Florida because, as you know, on this side, as with this whole body, we come with different perspectives.

Mr. BACHUS. Madam Chairman, I rise to claim the time in opposition.

Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Chairman, I compliment the author, Mr. Green, for this amendment. I would anticipate and hope that with the passage of this amendment that mortgage originators would receive instructions on these subjects. So I very much am in support of the amendment. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. BACHUS

Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the bipartisan manager's amendment. It makes both technical and substantive changes in the legislation, and I think significant contributions. For example, the amendment incorporates language authored by the gentleman from California (Mr. Gary G. Miller). His amendment clarifies the bill's anti-steering provisions to ensure that consumers retain the ability to finance points and fees in connection with a mortgage transaction. It also corrects certain problems in the provisions dealing with renters and foreclosed properties that Mr. Marchant from Texas raised during the markup. And it addresses some of those problems. The amendment also includes provisions drafted by the gentlelady from Ohio (Ms. Pryce) that will give consumers regular updates on the term of their mortgages and advance notice of any impending interest rate adjustments. Now, these are important improvements in the bill. And I again thank Chairman Frank and the other members who contributed to the manager's amendment, and urge support for the manager's amendment. I would yield the remaining time that I have to the gentleman from California (Mr. Campbell).

Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Ohio (Ms. Pryce).

Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Miller) to speak in support of the bill.

Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Roskam) to speak in opposition to the bill.

Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Chairman, at this time I recognize the gentlewoman from West Virginia (Mrs. Capito) for 3 minutes.

Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. McHenry) to speak in opposition to the bill.

Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire as to the remaining time.