Doug Bereuter

Mr. BEREUTER

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I certainly do agree. I would say to the gentleman, as a matter of jurisdiction, that those particular high officials of our government were not mentioned.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I am not in opposition, but I ask unanimous consent to claim the time in opposition.

Mr. BEREUTER. For purposes of a parliamentary inquiry, I yield to the gentleman from Connecticut.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman yield?

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Connecticut for his support, and I yield 1 minute to the distinguished gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman), chairman of the Committee on International Relations. (Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BEREUTER

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 45 seconds to the distinguished gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. Meek). (Mrs. MEEK of Florida asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson), the ranking minority member of the Committee on International Relations.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss). (Mr. GOSS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the gentleman's amendment. Although this Member shares his colleague's interest in reducing wasteful spending, the institutions targeted by his amendment certainly do not fall in that category. On the contrary, on closer examination, the Asia Foundation, the East-West Center, the Dante B. Fascell North-South Center, and other successful programs will confirm their cost effective contributions to American interests around the world. Indeed, our modest investment in these institutions is money well spent. As chairman of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, this Member would like to focus briefly on just one of the affected institutions: the Asia Foundation. The foundation has a 45-year proven track record. Programs and investments in reform-minded individuals in Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines directly supported the incredible democratic and economic transformations there. The Asia Foundation remains on the front lines doing the same today in Asia's new, emerging democracies like Indonesia and Bangladesh and helping lay the foundation for positive change in authoritarian countries like China and Vietnam. Fundamental changes are happening in Asia as a result of the recent economic crisis. Now is the time to take advantage of this climate of change and expand programs advancing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, economic reform and sustainable recovery. That is why the International Relations Committee restored full funding for the Asia Foundation. Over \1/2\ of the world's population is within the Asia Foundation's operating area. The Sanford amendment would cut the foundation back to its FY1998 appropriated level--a level $7 million or 46 percent below this authorization and also below last year's appropriation. The authorization in the pending bill merely returns the Asia Foundation to its FY1995 funding level. Helping Asia develop into a stable, market-oriented and democratic region is an important American national security objective. The programs of the Asia Foundation and others like the East-West Center support this national security objective. The Sanford amendment would severely cut these NGOs' programs and further restrict our ability to influence positive change. The long term cost of this amendment to U.S. feign policy objectives certainly outweighs any short-term savings it may have. For example, the developing countries in Asia are in desperate need of legal reforms. American commerce and local human rights are early beneficiaries of such Rule of Law programming. By defeating the Sanford amendment, we are supporting new legal reform initiatives for Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, and China. All three institutions targeted by the Sanford amendment are small, very cost effective private institutions that play very important complementary roles in advancing U.S. foreign policy interests around the world. We need their effort. This Member urges his colleagues to support the authorization levels reported by the International Relations Committee and oppose the Sanford amendment. Oppose the Sanford Amendment Asia Foundation, East-West Center and Dante Fascell North- South Center are small, but cost effective private organizations that play very important complementary roles in advancing US foeign policy interests around the world. We need this effort. Asia Foundation: 45-year proven track record. Over \1/2\ of the world's population is within its programming jurisdiction. Following on its previous successes in Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines, the Asia Foundation is now focusing on emerging democracies like Indonesia and Bangladesh and promoting reform in China and Vietnam. International Relations Committee authorized $15 million (the Administration-requested level of funding). This restores Asia Foundation funding to its FY'95 (and pre-FY'95) funding levels. The Sanford Amendment would ``freeze'' the Asia Foundation at the FY'98 appropriation level of $8 million. This is a $7 million or 46 percent cut and even a reduction from the FY'99 level ($8.5 million). Fundamental changes are happening in Asia as a result of the economic crisis. Now, is the time to take advantage of this climate of change and expand programs advancing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, economic reform and sustainable recovery. The Sanford Amendment would severely hamper Asia Foundation efforts supporting these U.S. national security objectives. Now programming supporting much-need legal reform in Indonesia would be jeopardized by the Sanford Amendment cuts. With the ouster of Suharto and the recent elections, Indonesia is in a very precarious transition. Asia Foundation programs supporting democracy, human rights, rule of law and economic restructuring will help steer this transition in the right direction. This is new programming that would be lost if the Sanford Amendment is adopted. The long term costs of the Sanford Amendment to U.S. foreign policy objectives certainly outweigh any purported short-term savings. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Shaw). (Mr. SHAW asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. (Mr. BEREUTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I urge strong opposition to the amendment. I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from Hawaii (Mr. Abercrombie).

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 45 seconds to the gentleman from American Samoa (Mr. Faleomavaega). (Mr. Faleomavaega asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BEREUTER

Mr. BEREUTER. Yes, Mr. Chairman. It is my intention to attempt to amend the Budget Act to permit for lease-purchasing by the State Department for embassies and consulates and related facilities, but I do reluctantly, with great regret, acknowledge that a point of order does pertain against the amendment under the rule.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume to simply state that the previous act I mentioned, PL 103-236, made it very clear that the Congress intended that we were going to overrule the Budget Act that will be cited here in a few seconds, and the President's signing statement simply flew in the face of that clear legislative intent. So I urge my colleagues to support the amendment. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. Ms. McKINNEY. Although I am not in opposition to this amendment, Mr. Chairman, I would like to claim the time in opposition.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 4 minutes. Mr. Chairman, this Member offers this amendment for one simple reason, a glitch in the current interpretation, or the misinterpretation, of the Budget Act has resulted in a situation where Americans overseas are needlessly being placed at risk. There is no question that many of America's diplomatic facilities are at risk from terrorist attack. Recommendations were made in 1985 by the Inman Commission to significantly upgrade security and replace outdated facilities. But a decade and a half later, only 15 percent of the U.S. embassies meet Inman standards. The reason is that it takes decades to go through the labyrinth of bureaucracy associated with the U.S. government constructing a new embassy. The addition to the Moscow embassy took almost two decades. The State Department has been considering additions to the terribly outdated Beijing chancery for almost a decade, and construction has yet to begin. There are many, many facilities that do not receive much-needed attention because the few contractors the State Department relies upon are overwhelmed. In desperation, our U.S. ambassadors are taking it upon themselves to cut through the red tape, contacting private engineering firms to develop plans for necessary embassy upgrades. The notion is that private firms are able to construct diplomatic facilities that meet the Inman standards, and then lease the facilities to the United States. Such lease-purchase arrangements for facilities built by the private sector would eliminate the likely delays caused by the tortuous, slow State Department bureaucracy, where decisions on embassy construction literally require decades. According to the Assistant Secretary of State for Administration, ``The bottom line is I can get more embassies built faster if the private sector was doing the construction with its own money.'' This Member's amendment would permit budgetary scoring of leased properties on an annual basis. This amendment permits the speedy construction of more secure diplomatic facilities. I would tell my colleagues this has, in fact, long been the intent of this body. Section 134 of the Foreign Relations Act for fiscal years 1994 and 1995 spoke directly to this problem. According to that legislation, ``Whenever the Department of State enters into lease- purchase agreements involving property in foreign countries, the Department shall account for such transactions in accordance with fiscal year obligations.'' Regrettably, the administration has written an opinion stating that this provision of law does not alter Office of Management and Budget scoring rules. OMB is steadfastly opposed to lease-purchase scoring on an annual basis. Rather, they insist the entire value of the lease be scored on the first year of the lease. As a result, there is no incentive to engage in lease-purchases and we lose a highly creative approach to addressing our security concerns. This Member's amendment simply would permit scoring of lease-purchase properties on an annual basis. If this amendment is offered, we will have secure embassy facilities years earlier. Thus, the security of U.S. diplomatic personnel overseas will be dramatically increased. The bottom line is this: The current OMB interpretation of lease- purchase scoring regulations needlessly endangers American lives overseas. This Member would ask his colleagues to work to address this situation by allowing lease-purchase scoring on an annual basis. And I urge my colleagues to support the Bereuter amendment on embassy construction. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith), the chairman of the subcommittee.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

Mr. BEREUTER

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, following the public release of the Final Report of the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/ Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China, more commonly referred to as the Cox Committee report, there have been attempts to discredit the work of the select committee. As one of the nine members of the select committee, this Member would like to reemphasize the truly bipartisan nature of the select committee and underscore that every finding made by the Cox committee in its report is fully corroborated with evidence detailed either in the public report itself or in the classified version. The Cox committee report is not and has never claimed to be a comprehensive report, nor was it ever meant to be one. When rumors first arose that sensitive military technology was being illegally transferred to the People's Republic of China, the House of Representatives created a select committee to investigate such allegations with emphasis on the launch failure investigations of the failures of two Chinese rockets carrying commercial satellites produced by American companies and an investigation of the sale of high performance computers to China. In the course of our investigation, far more disturbing information came to light that took us into unanticipated directions. Even as we were trying to close the select committee's operations, new revelations kept being brought to our attention by whistleblowers. It became clear that a very deep institutional problem had existed for some time in some of our Federal agencies and particularly the Department of Energy and its national laboratories, there at least since the late 1970s. I believe that these lapses of security at the DOE weapons laboratories taken together resulted in the most serious espionage loss and counterintelligence failure in American history. Moreover, these lapses facilitated the most serious theft ever of sensitive U.S. technology and information. Clearly, what the select committee revealed is very disturbing. Americans should be angry that their own government's lax security, indifference, naivete and incompetence resulted in such serious damage to our national security. The loss of sensitive nuclear weapons information to China is a national embarrassment and an incredibly important loss. The bipartisan Cox committee report should be used as the starting point in our efforts to fix the serious problems the select committee identified. Rather, some have focused on discrediting the report by improperly interpreting the very clear language we used and questioning the construction of the report. Instead, they should just focus their attention on the actual meaning of straightforward, plain English meanings of the words we used. We were very careful in what we said and how we said it. The most recent distortion circulated in Washington and in the national media is a document written by Dr. James Gordon Prather entitled ``A Technical Reassessment of the Conclusions and Implications of the Cox Committee Report.'' It was released personally by the Honorable Jack Kemp after Empower America, the organization to which Mr. Kemp belongs and which sponsored Dr. Prather's research, refused to endorse the final document. The Prather document was also the subject of a Wall Street Journal article and one of Robert Novak's columns last week. Dr. Prather claims that our select committee erred in finding that Chinese espionage penetrated U.S. weapons labs. Indeed he claims there was no evidence of Chinese espionage, that the real culprit is the Clinton administration's policy of unilateral nuclear disarmament and opening up the Nation's nuclear secrets to the world. That is pure nonsense. Of course there was espionage. After careful review of the Prather document, this Member concludes that it was written with an underlying political agenda in mind; that is, to focus attention and blame on the Clinton administration, particularly its policy of engagement with China and its declassification of nuclear secrets. There is plenty of blame that might be headed that direction, but that should not discredit the Cox Committee Report. If partisan politics is the purpose of the report, then we should recognize it as such, but it is a disservice to the Nation to discredit the work of the Cox committee if the result is that their recommendations are not implemented. The cover letter to the Prather document clearly states, quote, ``the White House is using the espionage angle to mask the real security risk which comes not from foreign spies, but rather from the Clinton administration's own ill-conceived strategy,'' end of quote. Of course the United States is a target of foreign espionage, including Chinese espionage. To ignore or fail to act on such evidence is an embarrassment to the Clinton administration, and it is dangerous. Without the Cox Committee, we would still not know of this massive failure or be seeing corrective action. There is a significant difference between analyzing the motive behind whatever partisan spin and public relations angle the White House has given to the Cox Committee Report and the Prather analysis of the contents and conclusions of the report itself. It appears to this Member that the Prather document mixes up these distinctions for its partisan purposes. In order to better support and prove its conclusions, the Clinton administration policy alone, and not any Chinese espionage, is responsible for American national security losses. The Prather analysis necessarily had to redefine the Cox committee report in a critical way. Unfortunately the overall credibility of the Prather document is suspect, given its numerous flaws and its noticeable selective cherry picking of the Cox committee report. For example, the Prather document essentially dismisses the charge that China stole design information for the neutron bomb with the help of Taiwan-born Peter Lee. This dismissal is based on a deliberately selective reading of our report, faulty assumptions and a disregard for other information which is still classified. The Prather document called this theft charge (quote) ``ridiculous'' (unquote) and opined that the Cox Committee, in its zeal to be bipartisan, claimed the Chinese stole neutron bomb information (quote), ``because the alleged spying happened on Reagan's watch, not Clinton's watch.'' (unquote). Notwithstanding Dr. Prather's interpretations, Peter Lee pled guilty to willfully passing classified U.S. defense information to PRC scientists and to providing false statements to a U.S. government agency. The Prather document also introduces the case of Wen Ho Lee, another scientist at Los Alamos. In fairness, the Prather document states that ``Wen Ho Lee is not mentioned by name in the Cox Report . . .'' He is not. However, aside from the caveat, Prather treats the Wen Ho Lee case as if it was the lynchpin of our investigation. It was not and furthermore the allegations against Wen Ho Lee are, at this time, still just that--allegations. This Member does not disagree with Dr. Prather that through our open system, smart people can gather significant amounts of information other countries would consider very sensitive. Mr. Speaker, our colleagues may recall the publicity that was given to the book ``Mushroom'' which was written back in 1978 by John Phillips, then an undergraduate student at Princeton University. Mr. Phillips wrote about how he was able to design an atomic bomb using only the open-source information available in the university's library. Experts confirmed the design was valid. This Member is sure that the Chinese and others have similarly used our open system, as Dr. Prather states. However, the detailed design plans and other extremely sensitive information relating to the neutron bomb and other thermonuclear warheads have not been declassified and are not in Princeton's library or on the Los Alamos public website. There are numerous other instances in the Prather document of inaccurate interpretations and distortions of the Cox Committee Report for which there is not enough time this evening to detail. However, given the apparent political objectives of the Prather document and the questionable selectivity of its analysis, it should be seen for what it really is: a partisan attack or a partisan counterattack to a Clinton Administration selective leak and spin operation against the findings of the Cox Committee, and it therefore does not warrant any further attention. Mr. Speaker, the Congress has just begun the job of implementing many of the 38 recommendations made in the Cox Committee Report. Most can be implemented by the executive branch without legislation. Some recommendations, such as increasing the penalties for export control violations, are relatively easy to legislate. Others such as reauthorizing the Export Administration Act, are not so simple and will take time and effort. This Member strongly urges his colleagues to concentrate on implementing these recommendations and not be distracted and dissuaded from this duty by those critics like the author of the Prather Report who all too apparently has a different agenda.

Mr. BEREUTER

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman would yield further, I understand the point of the gentleman. I understand this amendment will be en bloc and it is my only opportunity for debate.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding. I join him in that request as the chairman of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for his statement. I wanted to engage the gentleman in a colloquy on the amendment that the gentleman is lead sponsor on, amendment No. 9, related to satellite export activities. I want to ensure that my reading of the amendment of the gentleman is correct; and if it is, I certainly understand it, as a member of the Cox committee. It is my understanding that the gentleman is attempting to provide for expedited approvals for NATO countries, non-NATO allies, and other friendly countries, but that he is specifically suggesting not that there would be no exports licenses for satellites but that there would be no expedited licenses for exports to the People's Republic of China. Is my understanding correct?

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strongest possible support for H.R. 2415, the Embassy Security Act of 1999. It was slightly less than 1 year ago, on August 7, 1998, when terrorists successfully attacked U.S. embassies in Narobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Over 220 people were killed, including 12 Americans and 40 local hires. While all in this body would like to believe this could never happen again, tragically, unless we can act to prevent it, such acts of terrorism are more likely a prelude of things to come. There are too many evil or badly misguided people looking to make their mark, and American assets are just too vulnerable. Indeed, recall the attempted rocket attack in Moscow just this April against our embassy that failed only because the perpetrators did not know how to operate the launcher. A rocket launch against our embassy in Athens also failed for technical reasons. There were explosions in Uzbekistan in February that, while apparently not directed at the United States, blew out windows in a U.S. embassy annex. In fact, as this body debates H.R. 2415, a number of U.S. embassies in Africa have recently been closed because of credible threats of terrorist attack of quite a high degree of sophistication. Admiral William Crowe was tasked with chairing the Accountability Review Boards for the two embassy bombings. Admiral Crowe, while praising the efforts of the embassy personnel in Kenya and Tanzania, made it clear that U.S. facilities overseas were largely unequipped for the threats that have emerged. The Crowe report urged a total of $1.4 billion per year over the next 10 years to address the security for the U.S. personnel living abroad. Such recommendations are not new. Fourteen years ago, there was the Inman report, which pointed out the glaring inadequacies of our embassy security at the time and our need for serious upgrades. But only 15 percent of our embassies and consulates meet Inman standards. This Member congratulates the distinguished gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith) for working to address Crowe Commission recommendations. Working with this Member, the Committee on International Relations agreed to authorize the full $1.4 billion recommended by the Crowe Commission for embassy security funding for fiscal year 2000. Obviously, this is a lot of money. But this Member would tell my colleagues on this committee and this body that we have a responsibility to address the safety and security of State Department employees. If we do not address this issue, we will share in the responsibility and the blame when the next disaster occurs. Mr. Chairman, the men and women who serve in the United States overseas are not looking for absolute guarantees that they will be safe. But they have a right to expect that all reasonable precautions will be taken to ensure their security. In good conscience, this body can do no less. For this and no other important reasons, this Member urges support for H.R. 2415, the Embassy Security Act of 1999.

Mr. BEREUTER

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.