Doug Bereuter

Mr. BEREUTER

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, despite a number of highly contentious foreign policy issues that have been debated in this body in recent months, this Member continues to believe that American interests are best served by a bipartisan foreign policy. When the executive and legislative branches, furthermore, speak with one voice, the Nation is more likely to enjoy success in preserving its vital interests. As chairman of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on International Relations, this Member has had the opportunity to focus closely on the Clinton administration's policy toward this important region. Frankly, the administration deserves credit on several fronts in its overall policy there, including its active support for democracy in Indonesia and a peaceful resolution to the festering situation that is East Timor, the successful renegotiation of the U.S.-Japan Security Guidelines, its commitment with Congress to maintain 100,000 U.S. military personnel in the Asian region, and the judgment to elevate the import of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum. Genuine bipartisanship in Congress complementary to formulating a foreign policy, however, requires that Members of the Congress speak out when serious foreign policy failings by this or any other administration are detected. It is in this context that this Member expresses deepening concerns over the Clinton administration's continued lack of a coherent, comprehensive strategy towards Pyongyang, toward North Korea. This situation presents a grave challenge to vital U.S. national security interests. In recent weeks, two important U.S. missions have traveled to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, that is, North Korea. The first mission was that of former Secretary of Defense William Perry who has been tasked by the President to complete a congressionally mandated, comprehensive review of U.S. policy regarding the problems of the Korean Peninsula. Dr. Perry is an outstanding public servant, extraordinarily well qualified to undertake this important assignment. In large part because of his reputation, his qualifications and the high bipartisan respect he has here on Capitol Hill, expectations are very high that he will be successful in engaging Pyongyang and presenting them with a clear choice of another track for its relationship with the United States, the Republic of Korea--that is South Korea--and our allies in the region. The second mission involved the inspection of the suspected underground nuclear facility at Kumchang-ni, North Korea. That country, my colleagues will remember, agreed to abandon its nuclear aspirations in return for the construction of two light-water reactors for power generation through the U.S.-led international consortium called the Korean Energy Development Organization, or KEDO. If it is learned that the DPRK has a secret nuclear program, this, of course, would completely undermine the credibility of the Clinton administration's policy of constructive engagement and would end KEDO. If these missions proved satisfactory in their results, it was hoped that the Clinton administration would begin to lay a solid foundation for eliminating or at least dramatically reducing hostilities and ultimately for wholly transforming the relationship between North Korea and the United States and our regional allies. Working towards this objective certainly is a laudable and desirable goal if North Korea truly does wish to break from its history of brinksmanship and blackmail. Regrettably, this Member does not find the results of the administration's missions to be wholly reassuring, particularly when viewed against the backdrop of North Korean provocations. Of course, despite the completion of the Kumchang-ni inspection to determine if Pyongyang is covertly continuing its nuclear development program at other locations in violation of the agreed framework, we really do not have evidence that they have stopped. Certainly, former Secretary Perry effectively delivered a strong message to the upper echelons of North Korean leadership, and the American inspection team performed its mission very well. While applauding these efforts, this body nevertheless must urge careful scrutiny of both the results and the administration's impending policy proposal. There is an old adage that says ``actions speak louder than words.'' With Pyongyang, actions shout louder than words. So, indeed, this Member is troubled by the provocative language and the actions of the North Korean leadership both during and after the Kumchang-ni inspection and Secretary Perry's visit. Not much time has passed since Dr. Perry's visit but Pyongyang's behavior thus far shows no real evidence of an interest in confidence-building measures or tension reduction. Rather, its behavior rings of persistent hostility, and appears to be inconsistent with defusing tensions, advancing regional security, and improving relations. Here are just a few examples. First, the media has been reporting widely that Pyongyang will test fire the Taepo Dong II ballistic missile in July or August. If these reports are accurate, the growing capability of North Korea's missile development program, including an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of reaching the continental United States, cannot be overstated. North Korea, perhaps the most volatile and unstable regime on earth, is fast acquiring the ability to strike the continental United States with weapons of mass destruction. Press reports indicate that talks between North Korean officials and Dr. Perry on halting the ballistic missile program and sales, a key requirement outlined by Dr. Perry as he prepared for his visit, apparently ended with the same North Korean attempts at extortion that the U.S. has received at earlier meetings. The North demanded a large direct cash payment to terminate the program. True to form, the DPRK behaves as the modern equivalent of the Barbary pirates, extorting tribute in return for barely tolerable behavior. It is also important to note that during Dr. Perry's visit, the North Korean press condemned the U.S. with the most contemptuous invective-- and also vitriolically denounced South Korea and Japan--on issues ranging from a supposed U.S. master attack plan, an alleged U.S. dress rehearsal for an attack on the DPRK being staged in the Balkans, and a condemnation of Western economic policies that must be prevented from so-called poisoning their society. Pyongyang further lambasted Seoul's ``sunshine policy''--South Korean President Kim Dae Jung's policy of engagement with the North--as a blatant attempt to absorb North Korea. Mr. Speaker, this Member also would note that the mid-June, North Korea-South Korea naval stand-off in the Yellow Sea escalated to an armed confrontation, reportedly provoked by North Korean ships that violated the demarcation line. Pyongyang subsequently threatened to cancel long-postponed talks with the South, and agreed to sit down only after a final shipment of humanitarian aid arrived in North Korea. This was the last shipment of $50 million in fertilizer aid that Seoul had agreed to provide in exchange for these talks. The potential challenges for the U.S. and the Asia-Pacific region posed by recent North Korean activities highlight the need to remain very wary of the North's intentions and actions, despite the initial results of the Kumchang-ni expeditious withdraw and its Perry missions. In some ways, the results of these missions raise more questions and concerns than they answered. For example, it is no real surprise that the inspection team found no evidence linking the underground site at Kumchang-ni to North Korea's nuclear weapons program. If this evidence had existed, it is obvious that the United States never would have been permitted to inspect that facility. In addition, this Member's concern about the possibility of a covert North Korean nuclear development program are exacerbated by press reports that the North is not cooperating sufficiently with the IAEA regarding reactor parts that are missing from Yongbyon, a subject which is covered by the Framework Agreement. More worrisome, however, are reports that Pyongyang has been trying to obtain items related to uranium enrichment. This material would help North Korea develop nuclear weapons without violating the Framework Agreement. Lastly, accentuating this list of concerns is the genuine difficulty we have in monitoring North Korean activities in that, the most closed society on earth. Mr. Speaker, North Korea's continuing provocations demonstrate how important it is for the administration to clearly and, I emphasize, expeditiously lay out for Congress its policy proposal for North Korea. North Korea's behavior certainly seems to reflect a leadership that still has little intention of working constructively with the U.S. and our regional allies. North Korea's leadership appears to remain committed to its policy of orchestrating crises as a means of extorting financial and humanitarian assistance. If this is the case, forthcoming Clinton administration policy proposals that derive principally from the perceptions of the inspection team and Dr. Perry in may leave unanswered the particularly thorny policy question of how to deal with a truculent, mercurial, and menacing North Korea--one that continues to use posturing and threats to extract resources and other concessions while offering nothing meaningful in return. Mr. Speaker, relations with North Korea are highly problematic and precarious. A policy failure on our part for the Korean Peninsula would put tens of thousands of American troops and the South Korean people at risk. Misjudging our adversary could result in virtually any Americans on the continent being vulnerable to North Korean ballistic missile attack. The administration has a responsibility to extensively and routinely consult with Congress, particularly on a threat of this magnitude, and this body has both the responsibility and right to act as a partner in the formulation of North Korean policy. This body should have further dialog with, and a road map from, the Clinton administration that clearly outlines the benefits that would be extended to Pyongyang for working in earnest with the United States, the conditions that the North must meet to obtain these benefits, and the potential consequences of remaining intractable. We also should work to ensure that any administration plan is backed by both United States willingness and capability to undertake the tough measures to bolster our national security that North Korea appears to understand. Pyongyang subsequently threatened to cancel the long postponed talks with the south. That is not a good start to a more constructive path. I urge my colleagues to watch this issue very carefully and to work with the administration, demanding a full report on progress on the Dr. Perry mission.

Mr. BEREUTER

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, this Member highly commends this June 11, 1999 editorial from the Norfolk Daily News regarding President Clinton's plan for including prescription drug coverage under Medicare. Drug Coverage Means Extra Cost President has a plan for including prescriptions under Medicare program President Clinton believes he has a plan for including prescription drugs under Medicare coverage that is superior to the one suggested by the co-chairmen of his 17-member advisory commission. The latter plan advanced by Sen. John Breaux, D-La., and Rep. Bill Thomas, R-Calif., would provide the elderly participants under Medicare with a fixed amount for purchasing either a public or private health plan, which could include expenses for prescription drugs. That had the advantage of simplicity, but a political disadvantage of not providing opportunity for presidents and members of Congress to get credit for periodic improvement of all kinds of health care benefits. The Clinton plan, promised to be presented in detail later this month, proposes drug coverage for Medicare beneficiaries through the payment of an extra premium. It was predicted as being as low as $10 a month and certainly less than $25 a month. In either event, it would be relatively cheap coverage, and appealing to those now covered by this government program whereby Social Security beneficiaries pay a $45.50 premium for health insurance. Inclusion of drugs in the program will boost costs, though White House advisers claim they will be offset by reducing hospital admissions and nursing homes, and reduce the need for home health care. The question is: Who will pay? Today's wage-earners should not be saddled with extra payroll taxes to provide this new coverage; neither should employers who are partners in paying the payroll taxes. The problems with future solvency for the systems that provide Social Security retirement and Medicare arise from a political inability to fix benefit limits. Any expansion of benefits--especially for prescription drugs--must be accompanied by a sound program by which those who are served share the extra expense. Using a federal surplus--which accumulates because Americans are already taxed too heavily--to expand government benefits is a politically devious way to resolve solvency problems of a program already destined for insolvency on its present path. Better coverage will cost more; and those costs ought to be paid largely through realistic premiums for those who wish and can afford the extras.

Mr. BEREUTER

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, on rollcall No. 226, the Goodling amendment, I inadvertently pushed the ``no'' button on the voting box; it was my intention to vote ``aye'' and I want the Record to reflect my intent.

Mr. BEREUTER

Mr. BEREUTER. Madam Speaker, this Member rises to oppose any kind of accommodationist approach regarding Russian military forces in Kosovo. Russia's gambit at the Pristina airport clearly caught NATO and the Clinton administration off guard. It looks too much like the kind of territorial grab the Soviet Army made at the end of World War II. Moscow declared and demanded that its soldiers have a separate sector to patrol outside NATO's command. Madam Speaker, Americans must not be deceived by the administration to accept euphemistic rhetoric which will mask the placement of Russian forces in a separate geographic area in Kosovo under a separate command. President Clinton must not budge. No separate sector under Russian control. The administration and NATO absolutely must not compromise on this issue. Congress and the American people will be watching. The world will be watching. There must be only one answer to the Russians. No, no, no. Nyet, nyet, nyet.

Mr. BEREUTER

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, this Member commends to his colleagues this June 9, 1999, Omaha World Herald editorial that cautions NATO not to underestimate the ambitions of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) after the Serbian forces withdrawal from Kosovo. The Kosovo Liberation Army: A Naive View of Rebel Force NATO told Yugoslavia it would stop the air war if Serbian forces were pulled out of the province of Kosovo in one week. It's easy to understand why Yugoslavian President Slobodan Milosevic found that idea hard to swallow. He does not want to surrender Kosovo to the Kosovo Liberation Army. Milosevic sent Serbian soldiers and police into Kosovo to put down a rebellion led by the KLA. The ethnic-Albanian KLA wants independence for Kosovo, whose majority population is ethnic Albanian. Or at least it was before Milosevic, a Serb who obtained political power by exploiting ethnic hatred, managed to kill thousands and expel hundreds of thousands of ethnic-Albanian Kosovars. News reports say Milosevic nearly succeeded in wiping out the KLA, but the rebels have regrouped. Fueled by recruits from the roughly one million Kosovar refugees Milosevic has created, the KLA reportedly is regaining ground in Kosovo. Some reports indicated that the KLA is helping NATO target Serbian forces in Kosovo. The KLA and Milosevic's Serbian forces are engaged in the latest round of an ethnic blood feud that is centuries old. Yet here's what NATO spokesman Jamie Shea had to say about a settlement: ``As the Serb forces pull out and the NATO forces move into Kosovo, we expect the Kosovo Liberation Army . . . not to try to take advantage of the situation.'' Shea must be dreaming. The KLA, in its view, is fighting to liberate its homeland. ``The KLA will be the sole force in Kosovo creating institutions,'' said a KLA spokesman Sunday. ``It will be the strongest force influencing the future of Kosovo.'' The KLA is planning to build a nation of ethnic Albanians in what is now Yugoslavian territory. Of a proposed NATO peacekeeping force, Shea said, ``NATO forces will be operating under strict rules of engagement and, of course, they will not tolerate any hindrance to their mission. More specifically, we hope the (KLA) will renounce violence.'' Imagine France announcing in the early 1780s that, upon cessation of the war between England and the American colonies, the colonies would become an autonomous zone within the British empire and would be occupied by a European peacekeeping force. Oh, and the American freedom fighters, it is assumed, would ``renounce violence.'' NATO's next adversary in Kosovo might be the KLA.

Mr. BEREUTER

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, this Member rises in strong support of H.R. 1000, the AIR 21 legislation. This legislation is clearly needed to preserve the integrity of the Aviation Trust Fund and to provide adequate funding for our nation's airports. This Member would like to begin by commending the distinguished gentleman from Pennsylvania, [Mr. Shuster], the Chairman of the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, the distinguished gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. Oberstar], the ranking member of the Transportation Committee, the distinguished gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. Duncan], the Chairman of the Aviation Subcommittee, and the distinguished gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Lipinski], the ranking member of the Subcommittee, for their extraordinary work in developing this bill and bringing it to the Floor. This Member appreciates their diligence, persistence, and hard work. This is an important bill for this Member's district, for the State of Nebraska, and for the nation. It addresses the country's growing aviation needs in a fiscally responsible manner. Quite simply, the bill recognizes the need to spend aviation taxes on the aviation system. During the 105th Congress we restored the trust with American drivers by ensuring that gas taxes will be spent on highway construction and maintenance. It is now time to ensure that this trust is restored with the flying public. No longer should the Aviation Trust Fund be misused and diverted. This bill will properly take the Aviation Trust Fund off-budget and ensure that it is used for aviation. it will result in reduced flight delays, improved air safety and greater competition. The American people deserve this legislation. They deserve it because they've already paid for it. Let's look past the distortions and misleading rhetoric and instead focus on the facts. This legislation will not jeopardize funding for other government programs. That's because the funding increases for aviation will come from the Aviation Trust Fund which has accumulated a large surplus. This Member is concerned about growing needs at our nation's airports. While more people are flying, airport improvements are simply not keeping pace. That's because the money that passengers are paying each time they fly are accumulating in the trust fund rather than being put to use at the airports. Unless we act now, the problems will only get worse. It is now anticipated that air travel will increase by more than 40 percent over the next ten years. This surge will place increased demands on an already overburdened aviation system. According to the General Accounting Office, we are underfunding airport infrastructure by at least $3 billion each year. Currently, the needs of smaller airports are twice as great as their funding sources. Fortunately, we have the ability to act now. We can improve the system without raising taxes or threatening the funding for other government programs or services. We must unlock the money in the Aviation Trust Fund and spend it for what it was intended. Airports across the country and the passengers who use them will all benefit from passage of this legislation. Large airports as well as small airports will be able to modernize and expand once the Trust Fund money is released. The increases in funding will be substantial and passengers will notice the results if we make these investments now. As an example, the Lincoln Municipal Airport in Nebraska currently receives an entitlement of about $1 million per year. Under H.R. 1000, this will increase to more than $3 million annually. Such an increase would greatly assist the airport with its planned $5 million runway project, which would replace the surface, comply with new safety requirements and provide new lighting. General aviation airports in Nebraska, in communities such as Beatrice, Falls City, Blair, Fremont, Norfolk, York, and Nebraska City, will also receive annual entitlements which will assist them with necessary projects. Mr. Chairman, this Member urges his colleagues to support H.R. 1000. It will provide the American people with the aviation system that they have paid for the deserve.

Mr. BEREUTER

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, this Member commends to his colleagues an excellent editorial pointing out the need for realistic premiums to cover the additional cost that would result from including prescription drugs under Medicare coverage which appeared in the Norfolk (Nebraska) Daily News, on June 11, 1999. [From the Norfolk Daily News, June 11, 1999] Drug Coverage Means Extra Cost President has a plan for including prescriptions under Medicare program President Clinton believes he has a plan for including prescription drugs under Medicare coverage that is superior to the one suggested by the co-chairmen of his 17-member advisory commission. The latter plan advanced by Sen. John Breux, D-La., and Rep. Bill Thomas, R-Calif., would provide the elderly participants under Medicare with a fixed amount for purchasing either a public or private health plan, which could include expenses for prescription drugs. That had the advantage of simplicity, but a political disadvantage of not providing opportunity for presidents and members of Congress to get credit for periodic improvement of all kinds of health care benefits. The Clinton plan, promised to be presented in detail later this month, proposes drug coverage for Medicare beneficiaries through the payment of an extra premium. It was predicted as being as low as $10 a month and certainly less than $25 a month. In either event, it would be relatively cheap coverage, and appealing to those now covered by this government program whereby Social Security beneficiaries pay a $45.50 premium for health insurance. Inclusion of drugs in the program will boost costs, though White House advisers claim they will be offset by reducing hospital admissions and nursing homes, and reduce the need for home health care. The question is: Who will pay? Today's wage-earners should not be saddled with extra payroll taxes to provide this new coverage; neither should employers who are partners in paying the payroll taxes. The problems with future solvency for the systems that provide Social Security retirement and Medicare arise from a political inability to fix benefit limits. Any expansion of benefits--especially for prescription drugs--must be accompanied by a sound program by which those who are served share the extra expense. Using a federal surplus--which accumulates because Americans are already taxed too heavily--to expand government benefits is a politically devious way to resolve solvency problems of a program already destined for insolvency on its present path. Better coverage will cost more; and those costs ought to be paid largely through realistic premiums for those who wish and can afford the extras.

Mr. BEREUTER

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, this Member would like to commend to his colleagues the following editorial from the June 8, 1999, Norfolk (Nebraska) Daily News. The editorial expresses support for the AIR 21 legislation and emphasizes the need to preserve the Aviation Trust Fund for its intended purposes. [From the Norfolk (Nebraska) Daily News, June 8, 1999] Air Trust Funds Need Protection--Aviation Investment Act Would Preserve Sanctity of Taxes Paid by Passengers Battles have been waged at the state and federal levels over whether gasoline tax receipts going into highway trust funds should be preserved exclusively for road construction and maintenance work. Some politicians would prefer that the funds be available, when necessary, to pay for other needed projects. The sanctity of the highway trust funds has always been promoted in this space. Now, the same must be true for the federal aviation trust fund. Although they may not realize it, every time a person buys a plane ticket, he also pays a tax. The money received goes into the federal aviation trust fund, which is a pot of money earmarked to fix airports, runways and other essential parts of aviation infrastructure. This year, according to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the trust fund is expected to collect about $11 billion. Left untouched, it would increase to about $63 billion in a few years. But there are those who don't want to leave it untouched. That's why the Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century has been introduced and likely will be voted on in Congress sometime in the next few weeks. If passed and signed into law, it would preserve the trust fund for aviation infrastructure purposes only. No diverting of funds would be allowed. The U.S. Chamber is right when it says that passage of the act is not only the fair thing to do, but also the right thing to do. It's fair because it would be a breach of faith to use those airline tax funds for other purposes. It's right because aviation infrastructure in the United States is deteriorating because of high usage. Neglecting to meet the current and future needs of the aviation system will only result in increased airline delays and compromised safety. Domestic air travel has grown by 27 percent to 655 million passengers annually in the past five years. Within the next 10 years, the number of passengers served is expected to surpass 1 billion annually. The nation's runways will require rehabilitation to keep up with that demand. There also is a need to improve air traffic control systems. Congress should do the right and fair thing and pass the Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century. Leave those aviation trust funds alone.

Mr. BEREUTER

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, as the Vice Chairman of the Committee on International Relations and an original cosponsor of the bill, this Member rises in strong support of H.R. 17, the Selective Agricultural Embargoes Act of 1999. This Member also wants to commend the distinguished gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Ewing, for his initiative and his persistence in bringing this important legislation to the Floor as expeditiously as possible. As has been noted, H.R. 17 is identical to H.R. 4647, legislation which passed the House by voice vote under suspension of the rules in the final days of the previous 105th Congress. Unfortunately, since the other body did not consider the measure before adjournment, it is necessary for us to again pass this bill. House Resolution 17 takes the first step towards rationalizing our sanctions policy by requiring the President to report to Congress on any selective embargo on agriculture commodities. The bill provides a termination date for any embargo and requires Congress to approve the embargo for it to extend beyond 100 days. House Resolution 17 also provides greater assurances for contract sanctity. Unilateral embargoes of U.S. food exports do not hurt or effect any real change on the targeted country. All American farmers have a right to be angry that they are being used by both the executive and legislative branches to carry out symbolic acts so foreign policymakers can appear to be doing something about our toughest foreign policy problems. Given the fact that in relative terms U.S. commodity and livestock prices are at the lowest level seen in years and that many American farmers are facing financial ruin, our agricultural sector can no longer bear this unfair discriminatory burden for our country. There are three types of embargoes: Short supply embargoes, foreign policy embargoes, and national security embargoes. Unfortunately, the imposition of any these types of embargoes ends up hurting America's farmers and other Americans working in the agricultural sector of our economy while having little or no impact on the targeted country. Indeed, the people who the authors of these embargoes might intend to harm least, namely American farmers, are harmed the most. For example, last year the United States nearly lost a 350,000 metric ton wheat sale to Pakistan because of our unilateral non-proliferation sanctions on that country. Seeing that unintended and futile effort a number of us in Congress rushed to reverse that sanction just hours before the bids for the wheat sale were received. Because of this quick action, American exporters and our farmers sold our wheat, but just in the nick of time. Had we not acted then, surely the Australian, Canadian or French wheat farmers would have gladly become Pakistan's new primary supplier of wheat. Mr. Speaker, this Member also believes it is important to state what this legislation does not do in order to reinforce the balanced nature of the bill. House Resolution 17 does not alter any current sanctions because it would only affect embargoes that apply selectively to agriculture products like President Carter's ill-fated and totally ineffective unilateral grain embargo on the Soviet Union in 1980 or President Ford's unilateral, anti-farmer short-supply soybean embargo. The former embargo benefitted European grain farmers while having no impact on the Soviet Union or its invasion of Afghanistan. The latter short-supply soybean embargo devastated American soybean farmers while creating our major soybean export competition in Brazil. House Resolution 17 does not restrict the President's ability to impose cross-sector embargoes or apply to multilateral embargoes in which all of our agricultural competitors agree to the same export prohibitions we have imposed on our agricutlural sector against the targeted country. This legislation reinforces the approach contemplated by this Member, that is that future export sanctions should be across the board and, whenever possible, multilateral, so that our competitor countries are also affected. And, if there is any room for any exception to that kind of embargo, it should be for food and medical exports. Food should not be used as tool of foreign policy. Mr. Speaker, in addition to thanking our colleague from Illinois for his outstanding work on this measure, this Member would also like to thank the Chairmen and Ranking Members of the International Relations and Agriculture Committees, Messrs. Gilman, Gejdenson, Combest and Stenholm, respectively, as well as International Relations Subcommittee Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen and Ranking Member Menendez for considering this legislation expeditiously. In the view of this Member, H.R. 17 is one of the more important steps the 106th Congress is taking on behalf of farmers and agricultural trade. Mr. Speaker, the Selective Agriculture Embargoes Act is a measured and responsible bill that protects the American farmer and the American agricultural sector from unnecessary and unwarranted harm while at the same time preserving an important foreign policy tool. This Member, therefore, urges his colleagues to vote for H.R. 17.

Mr. BEREUTER

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, this Member rises in strong support of H.R. 973, the Security Assistance Act of 1999. This Member congratulates the Chairman of the Committee on International Relations, the distinguished gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman] for his action in bringing this legislation before this body. There are many important elements to the legislation before this body today. This Member will draw attention only to two key elements. Representing the great state of Nebraska, this Member is keenly aware of the crisis that continues to affect the American farmer. As was made clear in the discussion of H.R. 17, food commodities are the lowest they have been in many years. Our farmers need markets to sell their grain and other produce. Thus, the loss of the Indian and Pakistani agricultural markets--which occurred following the imposition of the mandatory sanctions that resulted from the May 1998 testing of nuclear devices in South Asia--was particularly devastating for American farmers. A one-year legislative waiver was granted last year, and this waiver permitted the sale of several hundred thousand tons of wheat to Pakistan. H.R. 973 extends that waiver on agricultural sanctions to India and Pakistan for an additional year, permitting this important market to remain open. This Member would thank the distinguished gentleman from North Dakota [Mr. Pomeroy] for his important work on this issue, and would thank the Chairman for incorporating this matter into his legislation. Other issues in H.R. 973 are also significant. The legislation transfers certain forward-based but outdated defensive stockpiles to South Korea and Thailand. While these items were no longer of use to the United States, they are of great significance to the recipient countries. This is particularly true of South Korea, which faces a volatile neighbor to the North. Indeed, in an unfortunate coincidence just yesterday North and South Korea wages a dangerous naval gun-battle as the North attempted to seize control of what appear to be South Korean territorial waters. Certainly, South Korea rightly hopes that its ``sunshine policy'' towards the North will bring better relations. Until better relations are achieved, however, South Korea must be prepared to defend itself. House Resolution 973 assists in that effort. Mr. Speaker, this Member urges strong support for H.R. 973.

Mr. BEREUTER

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, our colleague from Washington has it right, this is a drastic proposal. We have seen some burden-sharing amendments here in the past, but this is draconian. I am shocked by it. As a matter of fact, I chair the delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, and so I follow NATO issues carefully, as do many of my colleagues who are here involved in this debate. I think this proposed reduction over 3 fiscal years is simply bad national security policy. The U.S., as mentioned, is not in Europe to protect European interests, but to defend American national interests. Our borders are more secure because we kept the threat far from American shores through our worldwide forward-based military presence. The real threat to our interests is broad, such as the potential conflict in Korea or southwest Asia where U.S. vital interests lie. The U.S. recently completed a reduction in Europe of our troops from the 320,000 to 100,000 level. I would ask the question, is this really sufficient to protect American interests there? It probably is. But if you reduce it systematically to 25,000, the practical effect is we cannot have even one combat division in Europe under those numbers. Our vital security interests in Europe and globally have not been delineated since the end of the Cold War, but I think it is incumbent on us to understand what our interests are before we begin additionally modifying our force posture in Europe or anywhere else. Remember the core of U.S. forces in the Gulf War. They were deployed from Europe. Many more months and much more capital would have been required to deploy to the Gulf without those forward-based forces. Today we are using airfields in Turkey for operations in northern Iraq. Forward deployment based out of Europe enhances U.S. readiness to respond expeditiously, which can increase our potential for success. Even making a decision to reduce U.S. forces in Europe at this point, I think, would be premature. DOD is in the early stages of its European Posture Review. In it, DOD is evaluating options to reduce stress on U.S. forces in Europe. The impact of these changes in force numbers, types and equipment, I am told is quite seriously being examined. Included will be review of U.S. commitments to Kosovo. It is prudent to wait for the completion of this study, which will be grounded in empirical data and be subject to careful examination. Completion is expected in the next several months. In addition, over time, the European Union's new ESDI, European Security and Defense Initiative, has, I think, great potential to contribute meaningfully to Europe's defense and to allied burden- sharing. But, let us face it, the gap in weapons technology is growing between our European and Canadian partners in NATO, rather than shrinking. At this point our force commitment is really needed in Europe. I urge defeat for this amendment.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from South Carolina for yielding to me. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the en bloc amendments, and I want to speak specifically to amendment No. 32 briefly. The purpose of this amendment is to permanently authorize that the Asia Pacific Center for Security studies the waiver authority for some attendance costs that were granted to it in the fiscal year 1999 Defense Authorization Act and to enact new, permanent legislation for the Center that expands its ability to fund its crucial work in the region. Specifically, the provisions in this amendment will permit the Asia Pacific Center, a component of Pacific Command, to accomplish two important objectives: First, the provisions will permit the Center to waive reimbursement for certain costs of conferences, seminars, and courses of instruction for participants of foreign countries when the Secretary of Defense determines that such participation is in the national security interests. This Member strongly concurs with both Admiral Prueher, the previous Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command, and Admiral Blair, who recently assumed this position, that this waiver of charges is critical to the Center's ability to attract participants from developing and developed countries in the region. The Center complements the Command's strategy of maintaining positive security relationships with all nations in the region. It enhances cooperation and builds relationships through mutual understanding and study of the range of security issues among military and civilian representatives of the U.S. and other Asia-Pacific nations. Second, the provisions will permit the acceptance of foreign gifts and donations. No such authority currently exists for the Center, and such is key to providing an alternate source of income to defray costs or to enhance operations. It will permit the acceptance of donations in the form of funds, materials, property, or services from foreign sources, within ethical guidelines to be developed by the Secretary of Defense. Amending H.R. 1401 to permanently authorize the waiver of reimbursement and the acceptance of foreign gifts and donations will mirror legislative authority previously granted to the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. In addition, significantly, enactment of these provisions will impose no increase in DoD budgetary requirements. Secondly, for amendment No. 33, the purpose of this amendment is to direct the Secretary of Defense to evaluate and report to Congress the U.S. armed forces' ability to successfully prosecute a conflict on the Korean Peninsula or a 2-major-theater-war strategy over the next 5 years while simultaneously engaged in continued operations in the Balkans. Anyone who has been watching our combat strength erode over the last decade or the juggling of equipment and forces to meet Kosovo requirements will understand why this is a vitally important national security issue. U.S. military operations in the Balkans, in this Member's view, will include Kosovo for the foreseeable future. U.S. efforts there clearly are stretching the already ample divide between our global security obligations and military capabilities. The argument that we have heard for years--that with the Cold War over, we can spend less on our Armed Forces--would be true only if we expected less of our military. However, this has not been the case--indeed, our forces have been asked to do more and more with less and less. According to the Congressional Research Service, President Reagan used the military abroad 17 times; President Bush, 14 times, including the Persian Gulf conflict. President Clinton, however, has called on the military over 45 times, including the ongoing Kosovo operations. Such extensive use is unprecedented; moreover, it has been presided over by an Administration that not only has trimmed the fat in our Armed Forces--to its credit--but has, in the view of many senior military officials with whom this Member agrees, cut considerably into its ``muscle'' as well. The dramatic increase in ``operations tempo'' has taken a significant toll on an already substantially downsized, underfunded, and inadequately equipped force. Moreover, the results of the Quadrennial Defense Review, recently concluded by the DoD, projects an increasing number of military commitments into the next century. This is a dangerous situation, in this Member's opinion, and calls into serious question U.S. capabilities to successfully prosecute one or more major contingencies over at least the next several years--major contingencies, such as on the Korean Peninsula or in Southwest Asia, that are in this nation's vital interests. We in Congress first must be fully informed as to our Armed Force's capabilities and limitations. Then, we must be willing to address the challenges they face if we expect them to continue to meet our global challenges. This amendment, requiring the Secretary of Defense to report on the U.S. Armed Forces capability to respond to other regional contingencies while remaining engaged in the Balkans, will provide the baseline analysis we need to ``right-size'' and ``right-equip'' our forces in the future.

Mr. BEREUTER

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, this Member would ask his colleagues to consider carefully the following editorial from the June 2, 1999, edition of the Omaha World-Herald, entitled ``A Price For Lost Secrets.'' It speaks to the need to establish accountability for the intolerable security which has prevailed at Department of Energy weapons laboratory facilities. [From Omaha World-Herald, June 2, 1999] A Price For Lost Secrets Clinton administration official Bill Richardson said recently it was time to stop ``looking for heads to roll'' in response to the administration's failure to combat Chinese spying at U.S. nuclear facilities. He is wrong. For too long, the administration has been hiding behind the bromide that it's petty, mean-spirited and counterproductive to assess blame for the illegal distribution of FBI files, the reception of illegal foreign campaign donations, and other mess-ups in this administration. Richardson is secretary of the Energy Department which supervises nuclear research laboratories. Several years ago a career Energy intelligence officer began warning his Clinton- appointed supervisors that tax security, especially at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico, was allowing China to steal nuclear secrets. The warning, initially dismissed by the Clintonites as alarmist nonsense, eventually was conveyed up the chain of command to key Cabinet members and the president. Still there was no meaningful response. The Justice Department rejected the FBI's request for permission to conduct electronic surveillance of a scientist who now stands accused of transferring to China more than 1,000 classified files of nuclear secrets. Attorney General Janet Reno now is pointing fingers at subordinates, saying she was given bad advice. It's good to see that pressure is building to the point that the attorney general is compelled to do the sort of scapegoating that Richardson wants to squelch. Reno ought to feel severe heat. If deputies did blow it and made Reno look bad, then they, too, ought to be seared in the crucible of public scrutiny. The campaign for accountability ought to be applied across party lines. The current intelligence director at Energy said recently that Republican Richard Shelby, chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, never responded to the FBI's 1997 proposal for $12.5 billion worth of changes to fight nuclear spying. Shelby said that the committee already had begun working on counterintelligence measures in 1996 but that Energy ignored the Committee's recommendations. Let debate continue on that and all other arguments about Chinese nuclear spying on American soil. This administration has bungled the most important duty of government-- safeguarding the security of the nation. The people responsible ought to be exposed. The Clinton administration, through the Democratic National Committee, received millions of illegal campaign dollars from Chinese sources while refusing to act on information that China was raiding the nuclear store. Corporations, that were major donors to the DNC were allowed to share prohibited technology with Chinese businesses as part of lucrative deals. And then there was Reno's thwarting of the FBI's pursuit of the suspected mole at Los Alamos. When will the president offer an explanation to rebut the evidence that something caused his administration to go out of its way to accommodate China? Bring out the political guillotine.

Mr. BEREUTER

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished gentleman from Connecticut for yielding as this Member needs to start a classified briefing with Dr. Perry on his North Korea visit. I wanted to say that I understand the gentleman's concern, for example, about the potential loss of jurisdiction for the House International Relations Committee. I had those jurisdiction concerns myself, and still do to some extent, although part of yesterday was spent in discussing and negotiating, in effect, on this amendment's language with the gentleman from California (Mr. Cox) and indirectly with the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks). Also, I am a member of the select committee that has done the work leading to this amendment by the gentleman from California, and I thank the gentleman from California for his kind remarks. Sections 1401 through 1411 are, for the most part, with International Relations jurisdiction. We have seen changes in this amendment, but also I think it is incumbent on us to recognize that we need to look at the language of this amendment very closely, clearly before conference is conducted, to see if, in fact, the amendment might have unintended consequences that are not visible now. But I also think, as Chairman Cox suggested that our International Relations Committee needs to conduct oversight, as several other committees do as we proceed to the implementation of the recommendations in the Cox Committee's recommendations. I do understand the desire of the gentleman from California (Mr. Cox) to have action on his amendment now, and I think he has made great accommodations to our jurisdictional consensus. As my colleagues know, the recommendations, the 38, were unanimously approved by the Cox select committee. Now comes the difficult task of writing appropriate legislation. So I do understand the concerns of the distinguished gentleman from Connecticut heard here today relating to jurisdiction. I think we on the International Relations Committee ought to commit ourselves to trying to move quickly on oversight but also to refine the language of this amendment as necessary in the next several weeks.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BEREUTER

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, this Member rises today to submit the Sixth Report of the Speaker's Task Force on the Hong Kong Transition. It has been almost two years since Hong Kong reverted to Chinese sovereignty on July 1, 1997. Prior to that historic event, at the request of Speaker Gingrich, this Member formed the House Task Force on Hong Kong's Transition. In addition to myself as Chairman, the bipartisan Task Force includes Representatives Howard Berman (D-CA), Sherrod Brown (D-OH), Eni Faleomavaega (D-AS), Alcee Hastings (D-FL), Don Manzullo (R-IL), and Matt Salmon (R-AZ). To date, the Task Force has prepared six quarterly reports assessing how the reversion has affected Hong Kong. The sixth report, which I submit today, covers the period of October through March 31, 1999, during which time this Member, as Task Force Chairman, visited Hong Kong in January 1999. Mr. Speaker, this Member submits the following Task Force report for the Record. The Speaker's Task Force on the Hong Kong Transition, Sixth Report This is the sixth report of the Task Force on the Hong Kong Transition. It follows the first report dated October 1, 1997, the second reported dated February 25, 1998, the third report dated May 22, 1998, the fourth report dated July 23, 1998, and the fifth report dated February 2, 1999. This report focuses on events and development relevant to United States interests in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) between October 1, 1998, and March 31, 1999, and incorporates findings drawn from the Task Force Chairman's visit to Hong Kong in January, 1999. Hong Kong's ongoing economic recession marked the six months covered by this report as the consequences of the Asian Financial Crisis continued to be felt. Hong Kong's gross domestic product (GDP) declined by 5.1 percent in real terms in 1998, its first annual contraction on record. Unemployment and trade figures were correspondingly negative. Despite the difficulties. Hong Kong authorities operated independently in all areas of economic decision making, and there was no evidence of any attempt to intervene by Beijing. Opinion on the Hong Kong government's controversial August 1998 intervention in the currency, stock and futures markets turned increasingly positive as equities regained much of their lost value and the currency exchange rate held steady. In the legal-political realm, Chinese officials' public expressions of unhappiness over a controversial decision by Hong Kong's Court of Final Appeal raised concern about the future independence of the Hong Kong judiciary. Discussions between Hong Kong and Beijing authorities, combined with a ``clarification'' issued by the court, appeared to have succeeded in settling the matter, at least temporarily, without serious damage to the ``one country, two systems'' concept. The practical consequences of the court decision, which could permit a large number of persons now in China to claim the right to reside in Hong Kong, had not yet been dealt with at the end of March. The Hong Kong Government's obvious displeasure with the ruling, combined with public fears of the consequences of renewed mass immigration, led to fears that the Government would seek Beijing's assistance in rolling back the decision in a manner that would undermine Hong Kong's judicial independence and the rule of law. Economic Developments Hong Kong continued to suffer the negative effects of the Asian Financial Crisis, posting its fourth consecutive quarter of negative growth, as its first recession in thirteen years showed no sign of coming to a quick end. Preliminary estimates showed GDP dropped 5.7 percent in real terms in the fourth quarter of 1998 following a decline of 6.9 percent in the third quarter. For 1998 as a whole, Hong Kong's GDP fell by 5.1 percent, the first annual economic contraction in Hong Kong since such statistics have been calculated. Spending for private consumption continued to fall steeply, declining 9.3 percent in the fourth quarter of 1998, as consumer confidence remained affected by rising unemployment and stagnating personal income. Weak demand and dropping asset values brought about significant deflation, with consumer prices declining for four consecutive months beginning in November. In February, the consumer price index dropped by 1.7 percent. Unemployment reached 6.2 percent in the first quarter of 1999, the highest level recorded in twenty-five years. An early economic turnaround continued to appear unlikely, with most analysts predicting an upturn no earlier than the last quarter of 1999. Many view the official Hong Kong government's forecast of 0.5 percent GDP growth in 1999 as too optimistic, with some private analysts predicting a decline of as much as 3 percent. The government's budget for the 1999-2000 fiscal year that began April 1, 1999, projects a budget deficit of HK $36.3 billion (US $4.7 billion). This comes on top of an estimated deficit of HK $32 billion (US $4.1 billion) in fiscal year 1998-1999. The government anticipates running a deficit for the next two years before returning to a balanced budget in fiscal 2001-2002, but maintains this is a prudent and modest use of Hong Kong's sizable reserves during difficult economic times. While the general consensus among analysts is that a modest deficit is justifiable in view of the current recession, some have voiced concern about the impact three consecutive years in the red would have on Hong Kong's reputation for fiscal prudence. Some also attribute the fiscal deficit in part to Hong Kong's continued reliance on an excessively narrow, property-focused revenue base. There was some positive economic news during the reporting period. The tourism market continued to cover, with January 1999 visitor arrivals up nearly 11 percent over the previous year. The liquidity crunch in the banking sector showed signs of easing, and interest rates began to move downward, although real interest rates remain high by historical standards. Improved international investor confidence helped the stock market to recover much of the ground it had lost since the onset of the financial crisis, and the Hang Seng index stood above 11,000 at the end of March. The renewed buoyancy in the equity markets turned the government's August 1998, market intervention into an extremely profitable venture, with shares acquired by the government appreciating by 20 percent or more. The real estate market also showed signs of bottoming out. The government announced it would resume land sales in April, ending the suspension it imposed in June 1998 to reduce downward pressure on property values. Hong Kong's hard currency reserves also remained substantial. By the end of March, however, these encouraging signs had yet to translate into improvements in Hong Kong's real economy. Concerns remained about Hong Kong's continued dependence on entrepot trade and the relative lack of growth in sectors with high value-added, such as the high-tech industry. The government sought to address the latter problem by announcing an ambitious ``Cyperport'' project aimed at attracting world class information technology companies, but opinions varied as to the commercial viability of the proposal. An increasing percentage of Hong Kong's visitors for tourism are coming from China (27 percent in 1998 versus 22 percent the previous year and 19 percent in 1993). Chinese visitors are believed to spend substantially less than tourists from more affluent countries such as Japan and the U.S., whose numbers have stagnated or declined over the same period. In the short term, Hong Kong's exports (both domestic and transhipments) will probably remain depressed due to the weakened economies of some of its key trading partners and its higher cost of production relative to competitors that have devalued their currencies. The problems of certain mainland companies and financial institutions, highlighted by the insolvency of the Guangdong International Trust and Investment Corporation, also have the potential to negatively affect Hong Kong. With a return to growth apparently still some time off and credit still extremely tight for small and medium sized businesses, more pay cuts and layoffs are likely in the months ahead. Although pressure has clearly eased since the August intervention, the Hong Kong dollar remains vulnerable to speculative attacks. Renewed instability in regional financial markets could seriously set back Hong Kong's prospects for recovery. Revisiting the August 1998 Market Intervention One of the key events described in the Fifth Task Force report was the Hong Kong government's massive intervention in the stock, currency and futures markets on August 14, 1998. On that Friday afternoon, Financial Secretary Donald Tsang invested the equivalent of an estimated US $15 billion of Hong Kong's reserves in the market in what proved to be a successful effort to defend against outside speculators betting against Hong Kong's ability to sustain its currency's peg to the U.S. dollar. Although controversial at the time, over the subsequent months the intervention has increasingly come to be viewed as a regrettable but necessary action, even by many who questioned it initially. During the Task Force Chairman's visit to Hong Kong in January, it was evident that even the sharpest critics of the intervention had changed their opinion and believed the government made the right decision. Direct discussions with those involved also made it abundantly clear that the Hong Kong authorities acted entirely independently in undertaking the intervention. While they informed their interlocutors in Beijing of their actions, they did not consult them beforehand or seek their agreement before proceeding. As noted above, the equities purchased by the government have appreciated significantly in value during the recent recovery in the Hong Kong stock market. To allay fears that this sizable portfolio will be manipulated for political purposes or will come to influence government decision making, the authorities have placed the equities in the hands of an independent appointed board of senior figures. The problem of how to liquidate the holdings remains to be resolved. It appears likely that it will have to be done gradually, and a residual may be retained, with appropriate safeguards, to support the government pension plan. Political Developments As described in previous Task Force reports, the Basic Law that effectively serves as the Hong Kong Special Autonomous Region's constitution provides for a gradual increase in the number of members of the Legislative Council (LegCo) chosen by direct election. Twenty of the 60 members of the Council that took office in July 1998 were directly elected from geographic constituencies, with the remainder coming from ``functional constituencies'' with limited voter pools. Under the Basic Law, the number of directly elected members will increase to 24 in the year 2000 and 30 in 2004. In 2008, the Basic Law allows for (but does not require) the remaining 30 functional constituency seats to be converted to directly elected positions. Similarly, it would also permit, but not mandate, the direct election of the Chief Executive beginning in 2008. Heartened by their strong showing in last year's election, political parties favoring more rapid movement toward elections by universal suffrage continue to call for the immediate amendment of the Basic Law to provide for direct election of the full LegCo and the Chief Executive at the end of their present terms of office (2000 and 2002 respectively). Chief Executive C.H. Tung and the Hong Kong government oppose such proposals, arguing that public consultations on the pace and scope of democratization should wait until after the 2000 LegCo election. Advocates of a faster move to direct elections across the board have not renewed their attempt to put the LegCo on the record in favor of their position since the defeat of an earlier motion last July. Another point of contention is the relative power of the LegCo vis-a-vis the Chief Executive and government. Reformers argue that the Basic Law unduly restricts the LegCo's clout by barring it from introducing many types of legislation and by requiring concurrent majorities of directly and functionally elected members to pass certain bills. Defenders of the current arrangement cite Hong Kong's long tradition of ``executive-led'' colonial governance in which legislative authority was strictly limited. Senior civil servants, in particular, take a dim view of efforts to increase the LegCo's clout, claiming that the legislature simultaneously demands greater power while fleeing the responsibility that such power entails. Within the constraints under which it currently operates, the LegCo has successfully brought its influence to bear on the government's policies and actions, for example, by carrying out an independent inquiry into the chaotic opening of the new Chep Lap Kok airport. Unhappiness over the Government's handling of several legal and judicial matters also prompted the LegCo to mount a no confidence motion against the Secretary for Justice, Elsie Leung. The Government ultimately blocked the motion, but only after an intense lobbying campaign. In combination with Hong Kong's lively and free press, the LegCo's willingness to criticize and challenge government actions clearly has served to further public debate and increase transparency. Opinion surveys suggest, however, that the ongoing recession is taking a toll on the popularity of the Chief Executive, the Civil Service and the legislature, while the increasingly adversarial relationship between the Government and the LegCo remains a subject of widespread concern. The Government also continued to receive for criticism for moving to reduce the opportunity for Hong Kong residents to choose their own representatives at lower public administration levels. Following its earlier decision to abolish the two largely elected Municipal Councils at the end of 1999, the Government in December announced plans to increase the percentage of appointed (versus elected) positions on Hong Kong's 18 District Boards (to be renamed District Councils) beginning in the year 2000. In March, the Government proposed to transfer the Municipal Council's responsibilities for arts and cultural services to a government appointed commission and a newly created department, leading to complaints that this would be a step toward centralized control of cultural affairs and the discouragement of non-mainstream views. Rule of Law and Judicial Independence A fair and independent judicial system is a critical element of international confidence in Hong Kong. The Basic Law provides for judicial independence and grants Hong Kong's courts jurisdiction over all cases except those involving ``acts of state,'' such as defense and foreign affairs. A Court of Final Appeal, consisting of five justices, was created on July 1, 1997, to replace the United Kingdom's Privy Council as Hong Kong's highest court. Since the reversion to Chinese sovereignty, Hong Kong's judiciary generally has continued to operate independently and without taint of political interference. The response by officials in Hong Kong and Beijing to a controversial January 29, 1999, decision by the Court of Final Appeal (CFA), however, for the first time raised substantial doubts about the Hong Kong judicial system's future independence. The case concerned the ``right of abode,'' that is, the right of children of legal Hong Kong residents to join their parents in Hong Kong. The CFA decided upon a generous interpretation of the provisions of the Basic Law concerning the right of abode, granting the right to reside in Hong Kong to all children of legal Hong Kong residents, regardless of whether the children are legitimate or illegitimate or whether they were born before or after their parents attained legal resident status. In making this ruling, the Court clearly opened the door to the legal influx of a large number of persons now residing in China, where it is assumed many Hong Kong residents have children born inside or outside of wedlock. Just how many persons could qualify to reside in Hong Kong under the terms of the CFA decision, both now and in the future, remains a subject of considerable controversy. Critics charged the Government with needless alarmism about the numbers involved, questioning both the methodology of the estimates and the Government's assumption that the new residents will make heavy demands on welfare and other public services. Much of the initial reaction to the CFA decision, however, focused not on the practical concern of a massive influx of new residents but on the question of the Court's authority vis-a-vis that of China's National People's Congress. The CFA sparked this furor by the somewhat gratuitous inclusion of language in its decision which asserted its right to rule on actions by China's National People's Congress that affected Hong Kong if such actions breach provisions of the Basic Law. In apparent response to this portion of the decision, four Chinese legal experts who had participated in the drafting of the Basic Law, together with an official from China's State Council, labeled the CFA ruling an attack on the authority of the National People's Congress and a serious breach of the ``one country, two systems'' principle. The Hong Kong Government, in turn, reacted to the expressions of Chinese displeasure by dispatching the Justice Secretary to Beijing for urgent consultations. Subsequently, on February 24, the Government made an unprecedented request to the CFA for a ``clarification'' of the portion of the ruling which touched upon the CFA's authority to review acts of the National People's Congress (NPC) and its Standing Committee. Two days later, on February 26, the CFA complied, issuing a short statement of clarification in light of what it called ``an exceptional situation.'' The clarification did not address the substance of the original January 29 ruling, but merely asserted that nothing in the decision questioned the authority of the NPC Standing Committee to make an interpretation of the Basic Law binding upon the Hong Kong courts. In its concluding sentence, the clarification stated ``the court accepts that it cannot question the authority of the NPC or the Standing Committee to do any act which is in accordance with the provisions of the Basic Law and the procedure therein.'' The Hong Kong Government's decision to request the clarification caused considerable criticism from some legal experts and from opposition party leaders, who charged that it served to undermine the autonomy of the Hong Kong's judicial system. The Chief Executive, on the other hand, defended the action as entirely in keeping with the ``one country, two systems'' concept, citing other legal scholars who argued the CFA's initial decision had made overreaching claims regarding the court's own authority. In general, the consensus appeared to be that the CFA's ``clarification'' had succeeded in defusing the initial controversy in a way that did little or no harm to the underlying principle of rule of law in Hong Kong. With that question disposed of, however, attention increasingly turned to the practical dimension of the CFA decision. By the end of March, the Government's increasingly dire warnings about the potential consequence of large scale immigration and its refusal to draft procedures to implement the decision were drawing criticism from opponents who argued that it reflected disrespect for the authority of the courts. Opinion surveys consistently showed strong public opposition to the admission of large numbers of new residents under the ruling, but the question of whether or how to go about seeking to overturn or modify the terms of the CFA decision remained deeply controversial. The options under discussion included asking the CFA to review the substance of its original decision, requesting that the NPC amend the Basic Law, or seeking an interpretation of the existing Basic Law provisions by the NPC Standing Committee. While there are provisions for the latter two options in the Basic Law, critics charge it would be improper for the Hong Kong Government, rather than the courts, to request the Standing Committee to interpret the Basic Law, since that would amount to executive branch intervention to overturn a judicial decision. It is important to note that Chinese officials have shown no inclination to intervene unilaterally in the controversy over the practical aspects of the court decision, and have consistently expressed the hope that Hong Kong would find a way to solve the matter internally without involving Beijing. Another emerging area of concern is that of the prosecution of individuals in China for crimes committed in Hong Kong. The subject rose to public attention with the conviction and execution in China of two persons, one a Hong Kong resident and the other a Chinese national. The Hong Kong resident was a notorious gangster who was convicted by the Chinese court of a number of crimes, committed both in Hong Kong and in China. The Chinese national was convicted of crimes committed while visiting Hong Kong. Chinese law permits the prosecution of Chinese citizens for crimes committed outside of its jurisdiction, and both individuals had traveled to China voluntarily prior to being apprehended. Hong Kong authorities are admittedly reluctant to request the return of criminal suspects from China for fear of having to reciprocate when China makes similar requests. As a matter of policy, the Hong Kong government does not return suspected criminals wanted in China, largely due to public concern about China's application of the death penalty. (There is no death penalty in Hong Kong.) In contrast, Chinese officials have unilaterally returned persons wanted for crimes committed in Hong Kong, as long as they were not subject to criminal proceedings in China. Negotiations on a formal agreement on the rendition of criminal suspects between China and Hong Kong are said to be underway, but prospects for a successful conclusion are not clear. Individual Liberties Elsewhere in the legal and judicial area, the people of Hong Kong continued to enjoy broad freedom of speech. Hong Kong's media airs a wide range of views and opinions, including those critical of the Hong Kong and Chinese governments, without overt interference from the authorities in Hong Kong or Beijing. Concerns regarding self-censorship appear to have eased somewhat since Hong Kong's July 1997 reversion. In its 1998 annual report, the Hong Kong Journalists Association concluded that ``self-censorship may even have abated a little from its evident proliferation in the period leading up to the hand-over.'' The Government has yet to introduce proposed laws on treason, secession, sedition, and subversion, all of which are required under the Basic Law. In a legal case with implications for individual liberties, on March 23 Hong Kong's Court of Appeal threw out convictions under laws forbidding the burning or defacing of the Chinese and HKSAR flags, ruling that the laws unconstitutionally breached the Basic Law's protections of freedom of expression. The Hong Kong Government announced plans to appeal the case to the Court of Final Appeal. Also in March, a number of well known exiled Chinese dissidents applied for Hong Kong visas to attend an NGO organized conference in May on the future of democracy in China. Although several of the dissidents had visited Hong Kong prior to the reversion, it was unclear if the Government would approve the applications. (The Immigration Department subsequently announced the denial of the visas on April 21.) Trade and Export Control Issues Final 1998 trade statistics showed across the board drops in Hong Kong's imports (-11.5 percent), domestic exports (-10.9 percent), and re-exports (-6.9 percent). While much of this is a result of the Asian Financial Crisis, domestic exports are subject to a longer-term downward trend, having now fallen for three straight years and for five years out of the last six. The broader regional crisis has thus served to underscore Hong Kong's continuing dependence on entrepot trade between China and other nations, particularly the U.S. This makes Hong Kong highly vulnerable to disruptions in the U.S.-China trading relationship, and helps explain the nervousness with which Hong Kong officials view political or economic tensions between Beijing and Washington. The continued widespread availability of pirated movie, audio, and software compact discs and trademark goods remains the most serious bilateral trade issue between the United States and Hong Kong. In January, the Department of Trade and Industry informed the Task Force Chairman that the number of customs officers monitoring Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) enforcement had doubled since June 1997. A significant increase in raids, seizures and prosecutions at all levels, combined with the passage of new, more effective Prevention of Copyright Piracy ordinance, led the U.S. Trade Representative to remove Hong Kong from the Special 301 Watch List after an out-of-cycle review in February 1999. Despite this positive step, much more remains to be done to crack down on the trade in pirated products. Hong Kong's domestic recording and film industries have also begun to demand stricter enforcment, reflecting their growing awareness of the impact of priacy on their own profitability. This domestic support for tougher enforcement is likely to provide impetus for further improvements. To combat money laundering, U.S. Government agencies continue to urge the Hong Kong Government to adopt mandatory financial transaction and foreign exchange reporting requirements and to explore options for discovering the illicit use of non-bank remittance centers. In early 1999, the Hong Kong Government began the legislative process to bring these centers under regulatory oversight, complete with mandatory reporting requirements. U.S. Government agencies also are urging that Hong Kong establish a mandatory minimum value currency entry and exit reporting requirement and penalties for illicit cross-border currency movements and bank deposits. At the time of this report, there appeared to be no significant problems between Hong Kong and the United States Government in the area of export controls. Hong Kong continues to vigorously enforce what is widely viewed as a highly regarded trade control regime. The U.S. Government reports no evidence of Chinese interference in Hong Kong's export control decisions. Chinese officials have explicitly recognized that export control matters fall within the trade, rather than the foreign policy, ambit, thereby placing export controls within the Hong Kong Government's exclusive purview. Hong Kong's trade control regime is uniquely strict in a number of its features, including the requirement for import licenses as well as the more common export licenses. This enables Hong Kong authorities to track controlled commodities entering, as well as leaving the HKSAR. Hong Kong also refuses to issue re-export licenses for products unless it is sure that the original exporting country, including, of course, the United States, would export the product to the relevant end-user. In one 1998 case, U.S. Commerce Department agents notified Hong Kong Customs of the re-export of a high performance U.S. computer from Hong Kong to the Changsha Institute in China. Hong Kong Customs undertook an investigation, uncovering a total of eleven shipments by the same Hong Kong company that appeared to violate Hong Kong, if not U.S., export control laws. In February, 1999, Hong Kong officials advised a U.S. interagency export control delegation that it intended to prosecute the case on four counts of violating export control laws. United States Department of Commerce officials continue to conduct regular pre-license and post-shipment inspections as part of the dual-use licensing process. In addition, U.S. Department of State and U.S. Customs officials carry out pre- license and post-shipment checks of munitions items under the ``Blue Lantern'' program. In all such cases, Hong Kong officials are neither informed of such checks nor are they involved in making them. Hong Kong's Customs and Excise Department conducts routine checks at entry and exit points and searches of vehicles and vessels to ensure that all strategic trade shipments have the required government approval. One concern that has been raised regarding Hong Kong's export control regime has been the lack of customs inspection of Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) vehicles when they cross the border between Hong Kong and China. While this poses a potential vulnerability, U.S. Government agencies have no indication that the PLA is using this process to divert U.S. technology to China. The Task Force Chairman raised this as an area of concern with Hong Kong officials during his visit in January, 1999, and U.S. Government officials have raised it as well. Macau Preparations continue for the reversion of Macau to Chinese sovereignty on December 20, 1999, after 442 years as a colony of Portugal. Like the much larger Hong Kong, Macau with its 414,000 residents, will become a Special Administrative Region under the ``one country, two systems'' formula for the next 50 years. As we noted in our previous quarterly report, the pace of preparation for the transition has been uneven and a number of key elements have yet to be resolved. One factor impeding progress appears to be Portugal's unhappiness with China's unilateral announcement in September 1998 that it planned to station PLA troops in Macau following the reversion. The Portuguese maintain that there is no room for such a garrison in cramped Macau, and that in previous negotiations on the joint declaration concerning Macau the Chinese had agreed no PLA presence was necessary. On March 19, Portuguese President Jorge Sampaio met in Macau with Chinese Vice Premier Qian Qichen, but indicated that the troop question would be addressed in bilateral talks later in the year. Sampaio indicated it was possible negotiations could be prolonged up until the moment of the hand-over, and warned he might not attend the ceremony itself if a satisfactory agreement was not reached. Among other important matters still to be settled are the structure of Macau's court of final appeal; the eligibility of certain ethnically Chinese Macau residents to retain Portuguese nationality; legislation implementing Macau's accession to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Convention on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights; and whether Portuguese will enjoy equal status with Chinese as Macau's official languages. In March, the initial steps were taken toward the nomination of the 200 person selection committee empowered to select Macau's first post-reversion Chief Executive before the end of May. (Subsequent to the date of this report, the selection committee was named during the April meeting of the Preparatory Committee of the Macau Special Administrative Region. On May 15, Edmund Ho, a 44 year-old banker and son of a well-known Macau community leader was selected to be the Chief Executive. He will take office on the date of Macau's reversion to Chinese sovereignty on December 20, 1999.) While U.S. trade volume with Macau is relatively small, 40 percent of Macau's exports go to the United States. Eighty percent of Macau's total exports consist of textiles, and the U.S. Government has long been concerned about the potential that textiles produced elsewhere are being transhipped through Macau. U.S. Customs officials have visited Macau on a number of occasions to verify local production capacity, and continue to work with the Government of Macus to prevent such transhipment. Intellectual Property Right (IPR) piracy is another key concern, and Macau has been on USTR's Priority Watch List for IPR since April 1998. In response to U.S. suggestions that it intensify and raise the profile of its IPR enforcement actions, the Government of Macau conducted a public destruction of seized pirated goods in March 1999. Other inadequacies in Macau's laws related to trade include a lack of effective legislation and enforcement mechanisms in the areas of money laundering and export controls. These are particularly troubling in view of widespread reports that North Korean operatives currently use Macau as a transit point for shipments of counterfeit U.S. currency. Finally, problems remain with the overall climate of law and order. Gangland killings and drive-by shootings continue to negatively affect Macau's image and its tourism industry. Responsibility for the high levels of criminal activity have at times been a point of contention between China and Portugal. A failure to bring about improvements in this area could tempt more overt action by Beijing following Macau's reversion, with potentially harmful consequences to the autonomy of the Government of Macau. Conclusion--Still so far, so good, with some new concerns In the months prior to Hong Kong's reversion to Chinese sovereignty in July 1997 many voiced concern that Beijing would rapidly move to undermine the relatively open political system and the free market economy of Hong Kong. There was great suspicion that the Chinese-appointed Provisional Legislature would undermine all of the democratic principles that Hong Kong had embraced. It was argued that, among other things, press freedom and freedom of assembly would be radically curtailed, and that the People's Liberation Army garrison would rapidly interject itself into Hong Kong affairs. Critics also warned that mainland financial interests would rapidly move to manipulate and control the then vibrant Hong Kong economy. More than twenty months after the reversion, these fears have proven to be unfounded, up to this point. Hong Kong residents have retained the basic freedoms that they enjoyed under British rule. Although buffeted by the Asian Financial Crisis, the business community and the Government, appear united in their desire to keep Hong Kong's market as free as possible. The PLA troops have kept to their barracks, and Beijing has repeatedly displayed a disinclination to involve itself in Hong Kong's internal affairs. Although sharp differences have arisen within Hong Kong, particularly between the Government and opposition legislators to date informed observers see no evidence of any intent by China to violate the tenets of the Basic Law and the ``one country, two systems'' concept. This is not to say that there is no cause for further concern. As we have noted in this report, the current crisis over the Court of Final Appeal.s's decision on the right of abode has the potential to undermine confidence in Hong Kong's future judicial autonomy and the rule of law. Cautious consideration of the long range implications of any action aimed at addressing the practical implications of the ruling is clearly appropriate. It would appear that improved communication between the Government and the Legislative Council could make a significant contribution to the achievement of a solution, as well as facilitating public consensus on Hong Kong's future political development. Trade related issues, including IPR piracy and money laundering, also deserve continued attention. Hong Kong's excellent export control system is intact, but attention to the potential loophole afforded by cross-border PLA vehicle movements is also needed. Congress should continue its practice of monitoring developments in these and other areas.

Mr. BEREUTER

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, in April, during Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji's visit to Washington, and after thirteen years of off-and-on again negotiations, China finally agreed to the kind of comprehensive trade concessions necessary to gain U.S. support for Beijing's entry into the World Trade Organization. For what this Member believes were political reasons, President Clinton did not accept Premier Zhu's offer despite the offer appearing to meet the commercially-viable standard we set for acceptance. That was a mistake. China's accession to the WTO in the context of a commercially-viable agreement is in the short, medium and long-term national interest of the United States. Since Premier Zhu returned home to Beijing, Sino-American relations have worsened, particularly following our accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. China should be careful, though, and temper its growing overreaction to this unfortunate incident as overplaying its hand could jeopardize China's WTO accession and China's relations with the foreign investors it needs to attract for further economic growth. Such developments would certainly not be in the national interests of either China or the United States. Mr. Speaker, it is in this context that this Member recommends to his colleagues the following editorial from the May 24, 1999, edition of Business Week. Beijing Is Playing a Perilous Game China's anti-U.S. rage over the accidental bombing of its embassy in Belgrade should be a sobering moment for the American business community. Despite decades of economic and social change, China is still governed by an authoritarian regime fully capable of wielding all the tools of a dictatorship. The markets may be more open and people may be freer to travel, but Beijing is still able to control the media and cynically manipulate the truth to whip people into a nationalistic anti-American frenzy. By treating the U.S. as an enemy, China's leaders run the risk of turning America into just that. This kind of brinkmanship was last seen when China lobbed missiles over Taiwan to protest its president's visit to the U.S. A pattern of repeated quick-to-anger behavior could begin to raise the political risk factor for foreign corporations investing in China. It may already have put China's entry into the World Trade Organization in jeopardy. Washington's own blunders haven't helped. After years of boasting about smart bombs, the U.S. must now explain how it accidentally bombed China's clearly marked embassy. This disaster follows hard on the heels of President Clinton's humiliation of reform-minded Premier Zhu Rongji. Clinton made a huge mistake when he rejected a generous offer to U.S. business in exchange for Beijing's entry into the WTO. Zhu went over the heads of conservatives in state companies, the bureaucracy, and the military to make the deal. But Clinton sent him home empty-handed. The organized demonstrations are part of an effort by these conservatives to roll back Zhu's economic concessions. They might also reflect Zhu's own anger at Clinton. Unfortunately, the intense wave of anti-Americanism may change China's investment climate for years to come. U.S. and European corporations must now include in their financial calculations the possibility of Beijing lashing out against foreigners whenever international disputes arise. This higher political risk compounds a basic business problem: Most investments in China have yet to turn a profit. For Americans who believe that China was quickly moving toward a market-driven democracy, recent events should signal a new caution. Clearly, the seeds of a civil society run according to law have been planted in China. The country is far more open today than 20 years ago. But it took Taiwan and Korea nearly 50 years to evolve into democracies. It may take China that long as well. Or China could become a far more threatening country. The point is, no one knows. The long-term goal of U.S. policy should continue to be the peaceful integration of China into the global economy. If Zhu can still deliver on the WTO deal, Washington should sign it. And certainly, Washington owes China a full and detailed explanation of the bombing error. It is also incumbent upon the U.S. to clarify its policy of humanitarian interventionism. Is the U.S. the defender of last resort for every minority anywhere in the world? Is it willing to sacrifice good relations with Russia and China, both of whom have restive minorities, for a foreign policy of unfettered global moralism? China, for its part, should realize that virulent nationalism can only lead down a historic dead end of isolation and international conflict. Its willingness to go to the brink time and again with the U.S. rules out the very kind of normal relations with other nations that it claims to seek.

Mr. BEREUTER

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, this Member rises in support of H.R. 1906, the Agriculture Appropriations bill for fiscal year 2000. This Member would like to commend the distinguished gentleman from New Mexico (Mr. Skeen), the Chairman of the Agriculture Appropriations Subcommittee, and the distinguished gentlewoman from Ohio (Ms. Kaptur), the ranking member of the Subcommittee for their hard work in bringing this bill to the Floor. Mr. Chairman, this Member certainly recognizes the severe budget constraints under which the full Appropriations Committee and the Agriculture Appropriations Subcommittee operated. In light of these constraints, this Member is grateful and pleased that this legislation includes funding for several important projects of interest to the State of Nebraska. First, this Member is pleased that H.R. 1906 provides $423,000 for the Midwest Advanced Food Manufacturing Alliance. The Alliance is an association of twelve leading research universities and corporate partners. Its purpose is to develop and facilitate the transfer of new food manufacturing and processing technologies. The Alliance awards grants for research projects on a peer review basis. These awards must be supported by an industry partner willing to provide matching funds. During its fifth year of competition, the Alliance received 23 proposals requesting $892,374 but it was limited to funding 9 proposals for a total of $350,000. Matching funds from industry partners totaled $475,549 with an additional $82,000 from in- kind contributions. These figures convincingly demonstrate how successful the Alliance has been in leveraging support from the food manufacturing and processing industries. Mr. Chairman, the future viability and competitiveness of the U.S. agricultural industry depends on its ability to adapt to increasing world-wide demands for U.S. exports of intermediate and consumer good exports. In order to meet these changing world-wide demands, agricultural research must also adapt to provide more emphasis on adding value to our basic farm commodities. The Midwest Advanced Food Manufacturing Alliance can provide the necessary cooperative link between universities and industries for the development of competitive food manufacturing and processing technologies. This will, in turn, ensure that the United States agricultural industry remains competitive in a increasingly competitive global economy. This Member is also pleased that this bill includes $200,000 to fund a drought mitigation project at the Agricultural Meteorology Department at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. This level of funding will greatly assist in the further development of a national drought mitigation center. Such a center is important to Nebraska and all arid and semi-arid states. Although drought is one of the most complex and least understood of all natural disasters, no centralized source of information currently exists on drought assessment, mitigation, response, and planning efforts. A national drought mitigation center would develop a comprehensive program designed to reduce vulnerability to drought by promoting the development and implementation of appropriate mitigation technologies. Another important project funded by this bill is the Alliance for Food Protection, a joint project between the University of Nebraska and the University of Georgia. The mission of this Alliance is to assist the development and modification of food processing and preservation technologies. This technology will help ensure that Americans continue to receive the safest and highest quality food possible. This Member is also pleased that the legislation has agreed to fund the following ongoing Cooperative State Research, Education, and Extension Service (CSREES) projects at the University of Nebraska- Lincoln: Food Processing Center..........................................$42,000 Non-food agricultural products...................................64,000 Sustainable agricultural systems.................................59,000 Rural Policy Research Institute (RUPRI) (a joint effort with Iowa State University and the University of Missouri)..............644,000 Also, this Member is pleased that H.R. 1906 includes $100 million for the Section 538, the rural rental multi-family housing loan guarantee program. The program provides a Federal guarantee on loans made to eligible persons by private lenders. Developers will bring ten percent of the cost of the project to the table, and private lenders will make loans for the balance. The lenders will be given a 100% Federal guarantee on the loans they make. Unlike the current Section 515 direct loan Program, where the full costs are borne by the Federal Government, the only costs to the Federal Government under the 538 Guarantee Program will be for administrative costs and potential defaults. Mr. Chairman, this Member appreciates the Subcommittee's support for the Department of Agriculture's 502 Unsubsidized Loan Guarantee Program. The program has been very effective in rural communities by guaranteeing loans made by approved lenders to eligible income households in small communities of up to 20,000 residents in non- metropolitan areas and in rural areas. The program provides guarantees for 30-year fixed-rate mortgages for the purchase of an existing home or the construction of a new home. Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, this Member supports H.R. 1906 and urges his colleagues to approve it.

Mr. BEREUTER

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, following the death of Mao and the end of the chaotic Cultural Revolution in 1976, China embarked down the path of significant economic and political reform, comparatively speaking. With Deng Xiaoping's Reform and Opening Policy, trade and foreign investment expanded and rigid communist economic policies were relaxed. As a result, the Chinese people were exposed to new standards of living, access to information and commercial freedoms never before realized. These progressive economic reforms stimulated the desire for increased political freedom and democratization, especially among students in China. Unfortunately, while the Chinese Communist Party leadership acknowledged that economic reform was necessary and encouraged it, these leaders fearfully viewed even modest political liberalization as a serious threat to the Communist Party's monopoly on power. Thus, when Chinese students peacefully demonstrated for democratic change, hard- line Communist leaders responded with tanks, bullets and mass arrests. The most visible and brutal incidents occurred on June 3rd and 4th in Tiananmen Square. Many people were killed by the People's Liberation Army and other security forces. A great many more were wounded. It is reported at over 20,000 people nationwide suspected of taking part in the democracy movement were arrested and sentenced without trial to prison or labor camps. Hundreds of these individuals remain incarcerated today. As the Chairman of the House International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, this Member follows developments in China as closely as possible and believes that it is certainly in America's national security interests to integrate China into the international community. Yet, it is clear that Sino-American relations are complex and comprehensive, and have become increasingly problematic. Our concerns continue to multiply in scope and seriousness: espionage, illegal campaign contributions, weapons proliferation, abortion, Tibet, Taiwan, unfair trade and human rights. Each of these issues needs to be addressed by the appropriate means in the appropriate fora. In some cases we will find ourselves in concert with the views or policies of China. For example, we have a shared interest in supporting a sustainable recovery from the Asian financial crisis. In other matters, such as to what constitutes a respect and proper actions on matters relating to human rights, we strongly disagree. Responsible engagement does not equate to appeasement. It is a comprehensive approach focusing on both areas of agreement and disagreement. Freedom and democracy are the very foundation of the United States and are principles the American people cherish. Americans were outraged watching Chinese students whose only apparent crime was asking for more political freedom being crushed by PLA tanks and shot in the back as they tried to flee Tiananmen Square. Our consciences will not allow us to quietly ignore this tragic misconduct of a government towards its people. While Tiananmen Square may have been cleared of protesters ten years ago, the aftermath of that violence remains. Over the past decade since the tragic incident in Tiananmen Square, the human rights situation in China gradually began to improve, relatively speaking. Unfortunately, that encouraging progress was reversed six months ago when hundreds of prodemocracy activists, journalists, labor union leaders, religious believers, and others labeled by the Communist Party as dissidents began to be exiled, imprisoned or harassed. Therefore, as part of our policy of responsible engagement, this Member supports H. Res. 178, the resolution before the House concerning the tenth anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre of June 4, 1989, in the People's Republic of China. This is an appropriate and measured way to send a message to the Communist leadership in Beijing and to the Chinese people at large that Americans are understandably and as a matter of principle and conscience very much concerned about human rights and democratic reform in China. If China is to be integrated and welcomed into the international community as a responsible member and positive force, China ultimately must respect the rule of law. H. Res. 178 serves as a strong reminder that, in the opinion of the House of Representatives, very significant actions still need to be taken by Beijing to achieve that standard. Mr. Speaker, with the 10th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre just a week away, this Member urges his colleagues to join him in supporting H. Res. 178.

Mr. BEREUTER

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, this Member commends to his colleagues an excellent article which appeared in the Los Angeles Times on May 10, 1999, calling for NATO to halt the bombing of Yugoslavia and to declare a cease-fire, lest NATO become its own nemesis. [From the Los Angeles Times, May 10, 1999] The View From Romania Bombing by NATO, an alliance in which we have so much faith, ensures wrong results while abandoning fundamental precepts (By Adrian Nastase) Romanians have a message for NATO--one that is decidedly pro-NATO, but also may be unpleasant. It is a message of ``tough love.'' Halt the bombing of Yugoslavia and declare a cease-fire. Negotiations must be relaunched without any prior conditions on either side, taking into account the tragic evolution of events that has already occurred on the ground. As an applicant for NATO membership and member of the Partnership for Peace, Romania has opened its air space to alliance aircraft. We are fully supportive of an embargo that pressures Belgrade to cease its actions in Kosovo. We are adamant that Kosovar Albanians should be allowed to return to their homes with their rights guaranteed. War crimes should be investigated and prosecuted. But, most Romanians now think that the use of force, including the long-term continuation of airstrikes or any forcible ground intervention, will lose everything NATO seeks. Kosovo will be destroyed; Slobodan Milosevic will remain in power as a wartime leader reinforced by a siege mentality; Macedonia and Albania will be destabilized by refugees and foreign military presence, and anti-Americanism will rise to fever proportions in Greece, Italy and elsewhere. We want NATO to win politically and morally. We want peace to be ensured by a great alliance and its strongest members. We want dictators to be removed by popular action, and minority rights preserved by diplomacy, incentives and law. Romanians dream about becoming part of NATO. Our dream has been to enter an alliance that occupies a moral high ground, not one that, by mistake, kills refugees and civilians. We believe that the alliance's principles have mattered. For years during the communist period, Romania rejected intervention in sovereign states and distanced itself from the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact. Now, an alliance in which we have put so much faith has erred by acting in a manner that ensures all the wrong consequences while abandoning fundamental precepts. It seems as if NATO now believes that, after destroying Serbian infrastructure, and waiting until all Albanians are expelled from Kosovo, it can recreate order and peace from nothing. Winning militarily from 5,000 meters is being confused tragically with political success. Romanians have learned important lessons from our own contributions to peacekeeping missions in Angola, Albania and Bosnia. Among these are that preventing conflict is far easier than stopping it and that recreating a status quo is a Gordian knot. We fear, however, that these lessons are being ignored. NATO's potential to keep the peace and to prevent ethnic cleansing before resorting to war, was belated and half-hearted. We hope for more, and have watched with increasing anxiety as air power is unleashed; destroying without solving anything. Regional capacities to reduce the potential for or intensity of conflict have been ignored. Romania's participation in two costly U.N. embargoes against Iraq and Yugoslavia, plus peacekeeping missions in Angola, Somalia, Albania and Bosnia exhibit Romania's awareness of its role and willingness to sacrifice for principles in which it believes. Those qualities, however, elicited little interest in Brussels or Washington, where resorting to force seemed preordained. NATO appears to have changed into an organization prone to use bombs in lieu of diplomats. And, instead of using expansion to address security needs in Europe's most insecure regions--the Balkans and the Baltics, for example--NATO told such countries to wait for security guarantees until war was at our doorstep. We think that many opportunities for mediating roles have been lot. As the only country bordering on the former Yugoslavia without antagonistic relations with Belgrade, Romanian NATO membership could have increased the probability of successful negotiations with the Serbs. The denouement of Europe's most recent Balkan was has yet to be scripted. From the neighborhood, however, we can foresee a very discomfiting future: a broken but unrepentant Serbian nationalism, a heavily armed Albanian nation seeking retribution, an embittered Russia harboring imperial memories now convinced of NATO's antipathy, and ample instability. To say we don't look forward to such a 21st-century environment is far too mild. We are deeply troubled. We thought we were at the gates of an alliance that would preserve peace in our corner of Europe. And, we never, never imagined that negotiations and peacekeeping efforts would be jettisoned to inaugurate a war of such duration and intensity. But, a way out exists. NATO can declare that it has inflicted sufficient punishment, and is prepared to contribute, but not necessarily command, a peacekeeping force in part of Kosovo to which Albanian refugees are returned and from which Serb army and police units are evacuated. Establishing the size and location of the two zones, and the nature of the international force must be negotiated, but such diplomacy, not cruise missiles, are the path away from disaster. Romanians are prepared to fulfill useful roles along such a path. But, we must begin to travel down it soon lest NATO becomes its own nemesis.

Mr. BEREUTER

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, this Member would like to commend to his colleagues the following editorial from the May 11, 1999, Journal of Commerce. This editorial provides a thoughtful look at the issues surrounding the European Union's ban on hormone-treated beef. As the editorial emphasizes, since the ban is not based on science, the EU should give consumers the choice of purchasing American beef. The United States and the European Union, twin champions of a rules- based global trading system, are heading toward another senseless trade showdown, this one over hormone-treated beef. Like the banana dispute that preceded it--and on which the United States is now collecting trade penalties from EU exporters--the current fight over beef hormones stems from European intransigence. In the banana case, the EU insisted that its political ties with former colonies took precedence over its duty to deal fairly with other nations' banana producers. In the current fight over hormone-treated beef, the EU insists that its trading obligations must take a back seat to exaggerated public fears over tampering with nature. This is an untenable stance for a major trading power; the EU should abandon it before doing any more damage to the global trading system. The dispute has dragged on since the EU first banned hormone-treated beef in 1988. The issue picked up steam in 1995, when the World Trade Organization's agreement on Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary measures forbade the use of bogus health and safety regulations as de facto trade barriers. Acting on a U.S. complaint, the WTO ultimately ruled that the EU ban of imports of hormone-treated beef is not based on sound science, and told the EU to make a change by May 13. To Washington, this meant the ban must be lifted by Thursday. But Brussels decided the ruling means that more risk assessment is needed, and it ordered up 17 scientific studies. It also said it would announce its intentions this week on how to respond to the WTO order. Then, last week, EU Consumer Affairs Commissioner Emma Bonino dropped a bombshell into the hubbub of predictions and expectations. Citing the interim results of the first of the 17 studies, the chain-smoking Ms. Bonino said hormone-treated beef is so unsafe that it must continue to be banned from the EU market. ``There can no longer be any question of lifting the ban,'' she said. U.S. officials were flabbergasted, and rightly so. The announcement pre-empted the so-called scientific studies the EU had launched. It even jumped the gun on the final results of the study it purported to be based upon. And it raised a curious question: Why should the EU plow ahead with 17 expensive studies when it knows the outcome from the beginning? Moreover, the announcement left major questions unanswered about the scientific basis of the EU's policy. The data behind the interim study results were not immediately available. At the same time, there is substantial evidence the product is safe: Americans and Canadians have been eating hormone-treated beef for decades with no evidence of harm. Study after study has shown there is no difference in the effects of synthetic and natural hormones. And the United Nations agency responsible for food safety issues, Codex Alimentarius, has given a clean bill of health to the substances the EU cites as most dangerous. But none of that deterred Ms. Bonino, who says the danger is so great that even warning labels will not offer enough protection. Her declaration appeared to close off a promising compromise involving labeling; if a product is banned, the question of how to label it becomes academic. U.S. trade negotiators, who initially opposed the idea of labeling beef as hormone-treated, now are warming to the idea. To be sure, it would add costs to U.S. and Canadian beef products. But faced with the option of no access at all to the EU market, producers are relenting. Given the chance, some might even make a virtue of necessity, marketing their products as ``New, Improved, Hormone-Treated!'' It remains for the EU to back down from its Nanny stance and let consumers decide for themselves--just as they do with cigarettes, alcohol, and other products that pose much greater safety risks than beef growth hormones. No government can guarantee its citizens zero risk, and no public agency should presume to try. The best it can do is base its policies on sound science, and respect its citizens' rights to make an informed choice.

Mr. BEREUTER

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, this Member commends to his colleagues an excellent editorial calling for an end to the European Union's irrational and improper beef ban which appeared in the Omaha World- Herald, on May 12, 1999. [From the Omaha World-Herald, May 12, 1999] Let Them Eat Beef A showdown between the United States and the European Union over beef exports ought to be unnecessary. The United States has science and the World Trade Organization at its side. European controls on U.S. beef exports have little relationship with provable concerns. For more than a decade, the European Union has banned the import of beef from animals that have been fed growth hormones. Such hormones are used in raising more than 90 percent of beef cattle in the United States. Their use is an effective way to make cattle grow faster and bigger. The Food and Drug Administration has determined the substances safe. The World Trade Organization rule in 1997 that the European ban violated international trading agreements. The WTO said the ban was neither supported by science nor justified by any risk assessment. The WTO last year ordered the EU to abandon its policy by May 13, tomorrow. A trade war looms unless the EU complies. U.S. officials have threatened to retaliate against European products if the ban, which keeps most American beef out of EU countries, is not lifted. Officials said they would impose 100 percent tariffs on more than $900 million worth of European products, possibly including items such as mineral water, Belgian chocolates and Roquefort cheese. That could effectively price those products out of the U.S. market. Trade policy-makers at the European Union have kept U.S. officials going around in circles for a decade. The coalition has made superficial changes designed to give the appearance of compliance with the WTO order. That has staved off trade sanctions in the past. But a free market in U.S. beef has not materialized. The U.S. cattle industry estimated that growers have lost export sales of about $500 million annually since 1989, when America began exporting only hormone-free beef to Europe. American cattle producers have suggested that the real problem is protectionism. European countries want to insulate their beef producers from U.S. competition. There is also the possibility of scientific ignorance--observers have noted a general European hysteria over mad cow disease and genetically engineered foods such as Monsanto soybeans. Too often, fear has been allowed to trump science. American farmers and ranchers are especially efficient. They have invested in research and technology to keep themselves competitive. If the beef trade barrier is allowed to stand, despite science and the WTO, this nation's ability to sell its agricultural products overseas will become more vulnerable to illegal trade barriers, and its export position could be severely damaged. The European Union's beef ban is irrational and improper. It risks a trade war that would harm people on both sides of the Atlantic. European consumers should have the chance to decide for themselves the worth and safety of the beef grown by America's farmers and ranchers. They will never get that chance unless their leaders bow to the WTO and lift the beef ban.

Mr. BEREUTER

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, this Member rises in support of the rule for H.R. 1555, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000. The distinguished gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] Chairman and the distinguished gentleman from California [Mr. Dixon] Ranking member of the House Intelligence Committee are to be commended for their leadership and fine work on this bill. Intelligence, Mr. Chairman, is an enabler of policy. On occasion, where its sources and methods take us where diplomacy cannot go, intelligence is the sole enabler of policy. Let me give you an example. Some time ago, in what used to be called the Third World, a large rebel force invaded and occupied almost a third of a country with whom we enjoyed good relations. From way back here, in Washington, it looked as if a rogue state had precipitated that invasion. Some back here, in fact, were so convinced that the invasion was the doing of that rogue state that they decried the lack of proof as an ``intelligence failure'' on the part of CIA. Only later, after looking at the Agency's reporting, did Washington realize that the facts in the field did not fit the preconception here at home: The invasion was fundamentally indigenous in cause and in makeup. This affected our actions against the rogue state and shaped our policy toward the friendly nation. The better the intelligence, the better the policy. Our ambassadors around the world, especially those in unstable or underdeveloped countries, understand that and urge our help in obtaining or retaining an intelligence presence in their countries. In those countries, particularly, intelligence can reach beyond the bounds of diplomacy and provide the ambassador and the Department of State with the understanding they must have to make sound policy. Secretary Albright recently visited the CIA at the Bush Center for Intelligence to give the rank-and-file there this same message. As an alumnus of the Intelligence Committee and the Vice Chairman and subcommittee chairman in the International Relations Committee, this Member well knows how important intelligence can be to the formation of policy. H.R. 1555 will help put more intelligence officers out in the field to collect the intelligence that policymakers must have. The bill will help hone the skills of the analysts who interpret and asses that intelligence for our policymakers. In short, H.R. 1555 will continue the process of rebuilding the capability of our intelligence community to support the policymaking process. This bill, and the hours of care and guidance from the Chairman and Ranking Member that produced it in its present form, deserve your support. Finally, after hearing much in recent days about what went wrong over Belgrade last week, this Member would like to end his remarks with a recent quote from President Bush during the dedication of the Bush Center for Intelligence at Langley: ``Some people think, `what do we need intelligence for?' My answer to that is we have plenty of enemies. Plenty of enemies abound. Unpredictable leaders willing to export instability or to commit crimes against humanity. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, narco-trafficking, people killing each other, fundamentalists killing each other in the name of God. These and more. Many more. As your analysts know, as our collectors know--these are our enemies. To combat them, we need more intelligence, not less. * * * * * ``And when it comes to the mission of CIA and the Intelligence Community, Director George Tenet has it exactly right. Give the President and the policymakers the best possible intelligence product and stay out of the policymaking or policy implementation except as specifically decreed in the law.'' President Bush then closed with this: ``It has been said that `patriotism is not a frenzied burst of emotion, but rather the quiet and steady dedication of a lifetime.' To me, this sums up CIA--Duty, Honor, Country. This timeless creative service motivates those who serve at Langley and in intelligence across the world. ``It is an honor to stand here and be counted among you.'' Mr. Chairman, this Member agrees with those words and urges support for the rule for H.R. 1555.

Mr. BEREUTER

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, on May 6, 1999, I was absent on official business and missed rollcall votes 119 (the Istook amendment to H.R. 1664) and 120 (final passage on H.R. 1664, the Kosovo and Southwest Asia Supplemental Appropriations Act). Had I been present I would have voted ``aye'' on both votes.

Mr. BEREUTER

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, this Member rises today to express his support for H.R. 833, the Bankruptcy Reform Act, of which he is an original cosponsor. First, this Member would thank the distinguished gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Gekas], Chairman of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law, for introducing this bill. This Member would also like to express his appreciation to the distinguished gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde], the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, for his efforts in getting this measure to the House Floor for consideration. This Member supports the Bankruptcy Reform Act for numerous reasons; however, the most important reasons include the following: First, and of preeminent importance to the nation's agriculture sector, this Member supports the provision in H.R. 833 which permanently extends Chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code for family farmers. Chapter 12 bankruptcy allows family farmers to reorganize their debts as compared to liquidating their assets. Chapter 12 bankruptcy has been a viable option for family farmers nationwide. It has allowed family farmers to reorganize their assets in a manner which balances the interests of creditors and the future success of the involved farmer. If Chapter 12 bankruptcy provisions are not permanently extended for family farmers, this will have a drastic impact on an agricultural sector already reeling from low commodity prices. Not only will many family farmers have to end their operations, but also land values will likely plunge downward. Such a decrease in land values will affect both the ability of family farmers to earn a living and the manner in which banks, making agricultural loans, conduct their lending activities. This Member has received many contacts from his constituents regarding the extension of Chapter 12 bankruptcy because of the situation now being faced by our nation's farm families--although the U.S. economy is generally healthy, it is clear that agricultural sector is hurting. Second, this Member supports the provision in H.R. 833 which provides for a means testing (needs-based) formula when determining whether an individual should file for Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 bankruptcy. The vast majority of bankruptcy filers--approximately 70%--choose Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, which erases all debts. Some Chapter 7 filers actually have the capacity to repay some of what they owe, but they choose Chapter 7 bankruptcy and are able to walk away from these debts. For example, the stories in which an individual filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and then goes out takes a nice vacation and/or buys a new car are too common. Moreover, the status quo is costing the average American individual and family in increased costs for consumer goods and credit because of the amount of debt which is never repaid to creditors. As a response to these concerns, the means test of H.R. 833 will help ensure that high income filers, who could repay some of what they owe, are required to file Chapter 13 bankruptcy as compared to Chapter 7. This needs-based system takes a debtor's income, expenses, obligations and any special circumstances into account when determining whether he or she has the capacity to repay a portion of their debts. However, this bill still preserves the right to file bankruptcy, for an individual or family who legitimately need a ``fresh start'', which was the original intent behind bankruptcy legislation. Third, this Member also supports the positive steps that H.R. 833 takes in ensuring that those who owe child support and alimony payments are not allowed to evade this vital, familial responsibility by filing bankruptcy. The bill moves child support payments and alimony into the highest payment priority. In closing, this Member would encourage his colleagues to support H.R. 833, the Bankruptcy Reform Act.