Doug Bereuter

Mr. BEREUTER

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman). (Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, in constitutional monarchies the monarchs are never elected, but Morocco has an important, improving elected legislative body. Just last year they added a second Chamber, which is directly elected. So like Britain, like Denmark, like Norway, they are a constitutional monarchy, but of course those bodies and Morocco has an elected legislative body.

Mr. BEREUTER. If the gentleman will continue to yield once more, so our colleagues are not confused, this relates to one country only, not all of North Africa. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. BEREUTER. I thank the distinguished chairman, and I reserve the balance of my time, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will continue to yield, I cannot be any more supportive of this legislation. I am an original cosponsor. I think it is the most important foreign policy initiative the United States has even ever taken in post-colonial days with respect to Africa. It deserves to be broadened. If the gentleman would like to add Tunisia by unanimous consent, I would be happy to receive it.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Chairman, I would say to my distinguished colleague with whom I serve with on the Committee on International Relations, he is at a bit of a disadvantage. We had modified this, and he was not aware of it, earlier. I would also say that we do not want to change the criteria for Morocco. They have to meet the same qualifications. The President must actually make a certification that they meet them, and then it must come to the Congress, unlike all of the other sub-Saharan African countries that are named in the bill. There is another step we have added. I would also say to the gentleman this: This legislation, which is, I think, the outstanding foreign policy legislation this Congress will see, is not a zero sum game. If, in fact, Morocco is deemed eligible by the President and the Congress then agrees, it is not at the loss of sub-Saharan countries. It should be open to all who meet the qualifications, because we benefit from it, and it is not a zero sum game for African countries. Beyond that, it is important to consider this. It is a delicate matter, but I think it is important that we not give the impression that race or religion has anything to do with respect to this legislation. Many of the border nations have people of several races, ethnic groups, and religions, so they are already incorporated. I understand that this legislation was careful and sensitive in that respect. But I did want the gentleman to know that all of these protections are there. In fact, there is an additional set of protections before Morocco could come in, but to close off that part of Africa, I think, is the wrong message. So I hope the gentleman might reconsider when he understands the additional steps we have taken to make sure it is not overextended or there is no free ride. I thank the gentleman for listening. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding for a clarification. I wanted the gentleman to know that the modification that I made restricted the amendment to Morocco. It does not include Egypt or other North African countries.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BEREUTER

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, this Member comes before the body to alert his colleagues to a troubling situation in the Southeast Asian country of Laos. While the Laotian Constitution guarantees religious freedom for its citizens, in reality the government restricts freedom of religion, especially for Christian denominations. Recently, 40 Laos citizens and 5 foreigners, 3 of whom were Americans, were arrested and imprisoned. The official reason given for their arrest was ``illegal assembly;'' however, the real cause was related to their practice of the Christian faith. The record of Laos in this regard is troubling. According to the State Department's Country Reports on Human Rights for 1997, the Lao government has harassed, arrested and jailed clergy members. Members of the Lao Christian community are often looked upon with distrust by their government as having connections to ``foreign influences.'' There are also unconfirmed reports that Christians have been barred from joining the Lao People's Revolutionary Party or from securing government employment. As chairman of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, this Member sincerely hopes that the United States and Laos can develop warm and cordial relations. The potential is there. However, Mr. Speaker, this Member, through this forum, now urges the government of Laos to stop the growing trend of religious persecution within their borders.

Mr. BEREUTER

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, the following is the second quarterly report of the Task Force on the Hong Kong Transition. It follows the first report dated October 1, 1997, and it was prepared and compiled by those Members of Congress (Representative Doug Bereuter, Representative Alcee Hastings, and Representative Donald Manzullo) who traveled to Hong Kong, Macau, Shenzhen, and Beijing from December 13-20 as part of their responsibilities as Members of the Task Force. The report reflects the observations of the Task Force during the trip but also includes other information compiled before and after the trip up to December 31, 1997. Summary of Second Report In the first report of the Speaker's Task Force on the Hong Kong Transition, Hong Kong's reversion to China was characterized as ``so far, so good.'' Six months after the official reversion that characterization still applies. However, nearly all observers agree it is ``too early to tell'' whether Hong Kong will be greatly affected by the transition and/or whether the United States' significant interests in Hong Kong will be adversely affected. From all perspectives both within and outside of Hong Kong, the very negative scenarios for Hong Kong, which many had predicted thus far, have not occurred. Undoubtedly, this is due in part to a determined effort by officials from the People's Republic of China (PRC) to respect Hong Kong's autonomy under the ``one-country, two-systems'' formula. Despite the fact that the fundamental underlying reasons for China's stance remain the same, there is no assurance that the outcome from those objectives will still prevail. To date, the Hong Kong people seem to enjoy the same basic liberties and rights they enjoyed prior to the reversion. However, this is tempered by the abolition of the Legislative Council and its replacement by a provisional legislature which was ``selected,'' but not elected, by the people of Hong Kong. Most observers agree that Hong Kong and Beijing officials responsible for implementing the ``one-country, two-systems'' framework are ``on their best behavior.'' Yet, one overriding concern remains: Are Hong Kong officials subtly anticipating what Beijing desires and not in all instances vigorously pursuing the autonomy they have out of fear they will upset Beijing? At least with regard to routine matters, Hong Kong government officials seem quick to assert their own autonomy. There also is some evidence that Hong Kong officials may be seeking to influence policies on the ``mainland.'' But on more sensitive issues such as President Jiang's interaction with protesters, Hong Kong officials may be attempting to put on a good face for Beijing. If such attempts to ``out royal the queen'' are really occurring in Hong Kong, a subtle and seemingly invisible erosion of Hong Kong's autonomy could be happening without being fully discernible. Beijing: Honoring Its Commitments Chinese officials in Beijing and Hong Kong who are responsible for implementing the ``one-country, two-systems'' legal framework are clearly bending over backwards to demonstrate a policy of non-interference in the areas of Hong Kong's autonomy (every aspect of governance except, as specified, foreign affairs and defense). In meeting after meeting, officials of Hong Kong and China reiterated the ``one-country, two-systems'' framework and provided anecdotes of decisions with which Beijing or its representatives in Hong Kong were not involved--like Hong Kong's defense of its own currency during the monetary crisis. In one instance, a Chinese official recounted that he was informally approached by a Hong Kong official about an issue falling in the monetary policy arena. That official recounted declining to offer an opinion because it was in Hong Kong's own autonomy. Another example of deference occurred when PRC officials reportedly approached Hong Kong officials regarding South Africa's mission to Hong Kong (a matter all parties agree lies within Beijing's sole authority for foreign affairs). One good test of the non-interference of PRC officials is Hong Kong's self-reporting under two key international covenants on human rights. When pressed on the issue, Ma Yuzhen, PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Commissioner, stated that his office intends to function only as a ``conveyor belt'' transferring the reports from Hong Kong to the United Nations in New York without suggested changes or even recommendations. One example of Hong Kong's continued autonomy involves the decision to let British expatriates in the Hong Kong government join the official PRC delegation to such international organizations as the World Intellectual Property Organization. Moreover, Hong Kong officials demonstrated their autonomy at the last Working Group meeting in Geneva on China's accession to the World Trade Organization by submitting seventeen questions in China's new services offer. But the question remains as to whether Hong Kong officials are altering their actions so as to please Beijing on certain matters. One Hong Kong journalist termed this practice the new ``political correctness.'' This practice could greatly influence how the Hong Kong government handles the requirement in Article 23 of the Basic Law that it enact laws prohibiting acts of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central Government, and theft of state secrets. However, while many people accuse Hong Kong officials of this ``political correctness'' toward Beijing, the only evidence of such actions occurring involves the Hong Kong government's alleged movement of protesters away from a site where President Jiang Zemin was to be during his visit to Hong Kong, the removal of Taiwan flags from a public bridge during that Taiwan's national day, and also an alleged informal request from the PRC for an opinion by a Hong Kong official on an international monetary policy issue. Many other controversial issues are labeled by various government opposition groups as falling within this category of ``political correctness'' on the part of Hong Kong officials, but it is often impossible to discern the motives behind the policy. For example, the Hong Kong government's decision to require more than three hundred schools to comply with a directive to use Cantonese as the medium of instruction in secondary schools (while allowing more than one hundred schools to continue to teach English) could either be a ``practical'' decision to improve understanding and instruction in the schools or a ``patriotic'' move. Similarly, opposition politicians in Hong Kong have vigorously criticized the Hong Kong government for its handling of the Avian flu crisis, arguing that an embargo was not placed on birds from China for fear of angering Chinese officials. However, the Hong Kong government quickly consulted and cooperated with international health official in an attempt to contain the flu. They also eventually and completely banned the importation of chickens from China, thereby placing significant economic hardship on local producers in China, and slaughtered and discarded all chickens in Hong Kong. Political and Legislative Activity One real caveat to the ``so far, so good'' characterization of the Hong Kong transition is the roll back of democratic reforms in Hong Kong. Though Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa argues that the number of directly elected seats of the Legislative Council (Legco) will increase to thirty by the year 2004, he bluntly admits that democratic reform in Hong Kong is ``not a priority at this moment.'' He says that he will do ``what is right for Hong Kong'' and that, he makes clear, is to let democracy mature slowly. The Task Force's initial report characterized the changes in Hong Kong's elections laws as a ``remaining concern.'' While it appears that all major political parties in Hong Kong are active in preparing for the May 1998 Legco elections, the number of votes cast will diminish because of changes to Hong Kong's Electoral Law which abolished mass- membership functional constituencies and restricted the numbers of Hong Kongers eligible to vote in the thirty functional seat contests. Unlike the September 1995 Legislative elections, when more than two million Hong Kongers had votes in functional constituencies in addition to their votes in the districts where they lived, in 1998 only 200,000 voters will be eligible to pick the 30 legislators representing functional constituencies. (News reports show registration of functional constituencies to be very low but it is difficult to determine whether general apathy or apathy created by electoral law changes have caused this low registration turnout.) Moreover, while it is impossible to prove the motive for the election law changes, it is clear that the Democratic Party will lose representation in the newly constituted Legco because of the aforementioned changes and because of the additional election law changes requiring use of a ``proportional representation'' system to determine election winners. Martin Lee, Democratic Party Chairman, predicts that the representation of ``Democratic Party and friends'' will fall from twenty-six in the abolished legislature to fifteen in the newly elected legislature in May of 1998. Most political observers in Hong Kong have welcomed the Provisional Legislature's adoption of a doctrine of `essentiality,'' i.e., only considering and approving legislation that is absolutely essential during its transition period until an elected legislature is put into place. However, it is unclear whether the Hong Kong government's decision to postpone consideration of a bill prohibiting acts of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central Government, and theft of state secrets means that the legislation will be more or less restrictive of the Hong Kong peoples' basic rights. Clearly, this issue will be one of the first important tests of the newly elected Hong Kong legislature and current government. Future benchmarks include the government's responsiveness to Hong Kong public opinion when formulating legislation (as it appeared to do in the formulation of the societies ordinance) and whether the Hong Kong government strictly enforces the legislation, once enacted. hong kong's customs autonomy: a promising start but too early to judge Indicators suggest that Hong Kong is fully exercising its autonomy as a separate customs territory within China. Law enforcement cooperation between Hong Kong police and Customs and U.S. Customs remains ``much the same'' and, according to U.S. officials, there appears to be ``no change in the working relationship.'' Nevertheless, it is ``too early to judge'' whether long-term U.S. trade, security, and law enforcement interests in Hong Kong ultimately will be affected by the transition. To prevent smuggling through its port, Hong Kong Customs employs four hundred people but is only able to examine approximately 1300 of the 13.5 million containers per year which move throughout the entrepot territory. In addition, the border between Hong Kong and Shenzhen currently handles 14,000 vehicles per day, and that number is increasing daily. ``Without good intelligence,'' U.S. officials say, Hong Kong custom's task in finding smuggling is like ``looking for a needle in the haystack.'' American officials acknowledge, however, that their Hong Kong counterparts ``do as good a job as anyone.'' In November, the U.S. Foreign Commercial Service performed thirty post-shipment verifications on export licenses and found only one or two questionable situations. Moreover, those questions were resolved upon further inspection. A U.S. interagency team on export controls traveled to Hong Kong on January 12, 1998, as part of a bilateral cooperation agreement between Secretary of Commerce William Daley and Hong Kong Trade and Industry Secretary Denise Yue. The conclusions of that meeting were not available for this report. Hong Kong's customs service has demonstrated continued diligence and quick response on two potentially serious diversions from North Korea of unmilled tank barrels and rocket fuel. The customs service now has legislation to catch ``middle men'' in Hong Kong who facilitate diversions not actually involving the Hong Kong port. In this respect it is similar to the United States and a leader in the world. One continuing complaint by U.S. law enforcement officials involves Hong Kong's laissez faire approach to money being personally carried in and out of Hong Kong. There is no reporting requirement for travelers doing this, and Hong Kong is therefore an ideal place for laundering money. Note: This situation existed in Hong Kong prior to the transition and therefore is not a resulting problem. Nevertheless, it would seem desirable for the U.S. Government to recommend that the Hong Kong government mirror U.S. reporting requirements in order to stem the flow of money laundering. U.S. officials give Hong Kong Customs high marks for recent stepped-up efforts on textile transhipments, but lower marks for their enforcement of intellectual property rights violations. Hong Kong Customs claims difficulty in ``going after the kingpins'' and, instead, arrests the sellers at the retail level of pirated material. More blatantly, some well- known arcades certainly do rather openly market pirated software and compact discs. Some Hong Kong officials complain that the reason that pirated products remain on sale in legitimate retail stores is that ``there is no deterrent''-- judges are too lenient. However, recent increases in jail terms along with expanded enforcement powers for Customs officers may have a positive effect in reducing piracy. Also, the government has introduced legislation that should help enable Customs to control illicit production. Economic Conditions in Hong Kong If one were only to examine the Heritage Foundation's annual Index of Economic Freedom or the American Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong's annual confidence survey, one might wrongly conclude that Hong Kong's economic outlook remains unchanged from last year. However, regional economic woes beginning in the summer of 1997 have had a significant impact on Hong Kong. Drawing on large international currency reserves and a strong determination to defend the HK$-US$ peg, Hong Kong was able to weather an initial attack on its currency caused by the financial turmoil throughout Asia. This led, however, to a sharp rise in interest rates as well as large drops in the stock and property markets. After rising to a new high in August, the stock market fell almost 40% during the last week of October. Since bottoming out in November of 1997, however, the Hang Seng index has battled back to levels recorded in April of 1997. (Information compiled after January 1, 1998) The real estate market is important to Hong Kong's economic viability and stability, and it certainly has an important effect on U.S. firms and citizens residing there. Residential property prices have been trimmed by 20%-30% in recent months. Tourism in Hong Kong also has noticeably declined and it is difficult to predict how significantly the region-wide financial crisis will further affect this key industry. An additional issue of concern is the fact that the Peregrine Investment Corporation, Hong Kong's largest investment firm, declared bankruptcy on January 12, 1998. (Information compiled after January 1, 1998) Despite recent difficulties, short-term confidence in the Hong Kong dollar seems strong, and policy makers express a continuing determination to defend the peg. (There are, however, a growing number of dissenters who maintain that Hong Kong will not be able to maintain the peg in the long term, principally because they predict China will eventually devalue the renminbi.) Hong Kong's banking sector and its regulatory regime are strong. Monetary figures show no sign of capital flight or panic. Hong Kong's foreign exchange reserves reached U.S. $96.5 billion in November 1997. Macau Macau will revert to China on December 20, 1999, and become yet another Special Administrative Region. Like the British, Portugal negotiated a Joint Declaration with the PRC government that establishes a ``one-country, two systems'' formula for Macau. Although there are many similarities between the imminent Macau reversion to China and that of Hong Kong, there are several key differences. If for no reason other than size, Macau has only a modest effect upon U.S. vital interests. Macau buys only one percent of the total exports which the U.S. sends to Hong Kong, and it houses only 1% of the number of Americans as reside in Hong Kong. Nevertheless, there are legitimate U.S. concerns in the areas of drug smuggling and intellectual property rights violations. For example, it is believed that a considerable portion of the region's illicit compact disc and videotape production lines may have moved to Macau. Estimates suggest that a hundred million or more illegal compact discs and movies per annum may now be produced in Macau. Exacerbating the illicit production problems in Macau are contradictory actions taken by the local courts concerning the government's seizure of equipment used in the illegal production lines. Organized gang warfare is also a matter of legitimate concern. Early in 1997, Macau was featured in the news by reports about gang fighting or turf wars. Macau officials argue that the overall crime rate in Macau has been exaggerated by the sensational nature of the stories. Macau's reversion to China presents several other key differences from Hong Kong's reversion to China. For example, Macau has a ``through train'' for its Legislative Assembly and therefore will not have to cope with the provisional legislature scenario currently existing in Hong Kong. This body currently has twenty-three assembly members of which two-thirds are elected. It also has an ambitious legislative agenda for 1998 that includes localization of the major Portuguese codes and human rights initiatives. Of concern is the fact that the Macau Legislative Assembly was unable in 1997 to pass several human rights initiatives. Other key issues for Macau which pose difficult transition issues include localization of the civil service and nationality issues. With the approval of the Speaker for an expanded area of responsibility because of Macau's relevance to the Hong Kong transition and its proximity, the Task Force would propose to similarly observe and report on the Macau transition. Additional Note Although there have been many economic developments in Hong Kong after December 31, 1997, this report generally reflects those developments occurring before that date. There are limited exceptions where the report comments on events occurring after December 31, 1997, and they are indicated appropriately.

Mr. BEREUTER

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, last March, Speaker Gingrich visited Asia. In the course of his visit to Hong Kong, he determined it would be appropriate to create a House task force to observe and report on the Hong Kong transition as it moved from colonial rule of the United Kingdom to become a separate but integral part of the People's Republic of China. He mandated that I chair that task force. We created a bipartisan task force of equal numbers from the membership of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the House Committee on International Relations, eight members total. The Speaker mandated that we visit Hong Kong and Beijing a minimum of every 6 months and provide a quarterly report to the Congress on the transition, to let the People's Republic of China know that we are watching that transition and to thereby try to protect the freedoms that existed in Hong Kong before the transition. Interestingly, the Australian Parliament has a similar effort underway. In the first report of the Speaker's Task Force on the Hong Kong Transition, dated October 1, 1997, we reported that Hong Kong's reversion to China was characterized as ``so far, so good.'' Six months after the official reversion, that characterization still applies. Two other members of the Task Force and I visited Hong Kong, Beijing, Shenzhen and Macau between December 13 and December 20 of last year, and our report is effective through December 31 of 1997. However, nearly all observers agree it is yet ``too early to tell'' whether Hong Kong will be greatly affected by the transition and/or whether the United States' significant interests in Hong Kong will be adversely affected. From all the perspectives both within and outside of Hong Kong, the very negative scenarios for Hong Kong which many had predicted thus far have not occurred. Undoubtedly, this is in part due to a determined effort by officials from the People's Republic of China to respect Hong Kong's autonomy under the ``one-country, two-systems'' formula. Despite the fact that the underlying reasons for China's stance remain the same, there is no assurance that the outcome from those objectives will still prevail. To date, the Hong Kong people seem to enjoy the same basic liberties and rights they enjoyed prior to the reversion. However, this is tempered by the abolition of the Legislative Council and its replacement by a provisional legislature which was ``selected,'' but not elected, by the people of Hong Kong. Most observers agree that Hong Kong and Beijing officials responsible for implementing the ``one-country, two-systems'' framework are on their best behavior. Yet one overriding concern remains, and I put that in the form of a question: Are Hong Kong officials subtly anticipating what Beijing desires and not in all instances vigorously pursuing the autonomy that they now have out of a fear that they will upset Beijing? That is the question. At least with regard to routine matters, Hong Kong governmental officials seem quick to assert their own autonomy. There is also some evidence that Hong Kong officials may be seeking to influence policies on the mainland. But on more sensitive issues such as President Jiang's interaction with protesters in Hong Kong not too long ago, Hong Kong officials may be attempting to put on a good face for Beijing. If such attempts to ``outroyal the queen'' are really occurring in Hong Kong, a subtle and seemingly invisible erosion of Hong Kong's economy could be happening without being fully discernible. That is a summary of what we concluded. Mr. Speaker, I would like to focus briefly on one other aspect of the Hong Kong transition which is of particular importance to America and being watched by this House, and I will say to my colleagues, the full report of this task force, our second quarterly report, will be found in the Extensions of Remarks for today, but that area is Hong Kong's customs autonomy. Mr. Speaker, I would say it is a promising start but too early to judge. Indicators suggest that Hong Kong is fully exercising its autonomy as a separate customs territory inside China. Law enforcement cooperation between Hong Kong police and Customs and U.S. Customs remains ``much the same,'' and, according to U.S. officials, there appears to be no change in the working relationship. Nevertheless, it is ``too early to judge'' whether long-term U.S. trade, security, and law enforcement interests in Hong Kong ultimately will be affected by the transition. In November, the U.S. Foreign Commercial Service performed 30 postshipment verifications on export licenses and found only one or two questionable situations. Moreover, those questions were resolved with further inspection. A U.S. interagency team on export controls traveled to Hong Kong on January 12, 1998, as part of a bilateral cooperation agreement between Secretary of Commerce William Daley and Hong Kong Trade and Industry Secretary Denise Yue. Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to look at our entire report. We are going to more fully examine the customs and export control issue, among others, when we present our third and fourth quarterly reports to the Congress of the United States. Again, our colleagues will find our second quarterly report fully presented in the Extensions of Remarks for today.

Mr. BEREUTER

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding the time to me. I want to rise in strong support of H.R. 2631. I want to give my colleagues one good example why it is appropriate to do that. On the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, I became familiar with a proposal of a particular construction project in Fort Derussey, Hawaii. It is to relocate the Asian Pacific Center for Security Studies to a building that is existent. It is used as a reserve center. This center today is renting very high-cost space. That building is waiting to be renovated. All parties concur that this was an appropriate and agreed decision and appropriation item. Its inclusion on the veto list was an inexplicable error that ought to be corrected by our override on the veto. Undoubtedly there are other such cases in the hastily prepared and inadequately vetted veto list, but this is one that saves the taxpayer money. Everybody agrees it should have been done. It was inexplicable error. It is another reason why we should vote to override the veto. I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time. Mr. Speaker, this Member rises in strong support of H.R. 2631, legislation to override the President's veto of military construction programs. Certainly, the President has the authority to exercise the line-item veto on occasion when fiscal responsibility demands. No one disputes that prerogative; however, this authority must be exercised very judiciously. This Member would tell his colleagues that there are many meritorious programs that the President targeted for elimination without careful consideration of the consequences. In particular this Member would point to one particular construction project, that of Fort Derussey, Hawaii. This is to become the future home of the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies which was established in September 1995. Relocating the Asia-Pacific Center from its current location to Fort Derussey will eliminate a very major rental cost now being borne by the Center and the American taxpayer. It makes sense to use the existing U.S. government facility after renovations rather than continue to pay the high rental costs. All parties concur that this is the proper and agreed decision and appropriations item. Its inclusion on the veto list was an inexplicable error that ought to be corrected by our override vote of the veto. Undoubtedly, there are other such cases in the hastily prepared and inadequately vetted veto list. The Asia-Pacific Center's mission is to serve as a focal point where national officials, decision makers, and military officers of the United States and other Asia-Pacific nations gather to explore pressing issues and achieve a greater understanding of the challenges that face the Asia-Pacific region. This center can help foster early rapport among the leaders of tomorrow and promote U.S. interests throughout the region. Mr. Speaker, this Member urges support for H.R. 2631.

Mr. BEREUTER

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, this Member highly commends this January 12, 1998, Omaha World-Herald editorial on President Clinton's child care proposal to his colleagues. Big Government Era Lives On in Clinton's Child Care Proposal Bill Clinton is playing Daddy President again. The same president who announced the end of the era of big government in 1996 is now advocating a major new government benefit: subsidized child care. Clinton has proposed a five-year combination of spending increases and tax incentives that would cost the Treasury almost $22 billion. Of that, he would spend $14.3 billion on child care subsidies for low-income families, increased funding of Head Start for preschoolers and a new federal program to promote training and safety at child care centers. The plan would let families with incomes of up to $30,000 take a tax credit for 50 percent of child care expenses up to a limit of $2,400 for one child, $4,800 for two or more. Families above $30,000 in annual income could also claim credits on a sliding scale as income rises. At $60,000, their maximum credit would be 20 percent of child care costs. The current credit is 20 percent--30 percent if family income is $28,000 or less. The plan has shocking implications. It would eliminate federal income taxes for a family of four with an annual income of up to $35,000 a year. So long as the family used the maximum credit, life would be tax-free as far as the Internal Revenue Service was concerned. Reducing the tax burden on the poor is one thing. A family that earns $35,000 a year is not poor. Accompanied by a dozen children for the announcement, Clinton called the plan ``the single largest national commitment to child care in the history of the United States.'' His plan would in fact be an unprecedented foray by the federal government into the way American children are raised. And what of the families who have planned and sacrificed to allow one parent to stay home with the children? Many families with a stay-at-home mom or dad are not wealthy. The Clinton proposal ignored them. Indeed, the Clinton plan could encourage more families to send both parents to work outside the home. Federal income and payroll taxes eat up so much family income that some families decide that both parents must work full time. Clinton would best serve families by reducing government and reforming Medicare and Social Security, thereby making it possible to further reduce the tax burden on families. Instead, he seeks to expand government, further complicate the tax code and encourage the funneling of children into day care. Certainly the government might properly help provide temporary child care assistance for families in emergency circumstances, or while a single parent prepares for a job. That does not change the general concept that people should not have children unless they can care for them or can afford to pay someone else to care for them. However, Clinton's proposal to turn federally subsidized child care into what amounts to a middle-class handout is bad policy. It undermines the fundamental notion that parents-- not the Daddy President--should be primarily responsible for the care of their children.

Mr. BEREUTER

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, this Member would ask his colleagues to consider carefully the following editorial from the December 4, 1997, edition of the Omaha World-Herald, entitled ``Probe of Fund-Raising Scandal Snuffed on Narrowest Grounds.'' Probe of Fund-Raising Scandal Snuffed on Narrowest Grounds Attorney General Janet Reno used astonishingly narrow grounds to excuse her decision not to seek an independent counsel in the White House fund-raising scandal. Even Louis Freeh, a former federal judge who is Ms. Reno's FBI director, urged the attorney general in effect to take off her political blinders and acknowledge the appearance of wrongdoing. Ms. Reno chose to focus on campaign fund-raising phone calls that President Clinton and Vice President Gore made from the White House. She said the money raised by those calls did not go directly to the Clinton-Gore 1996 re- election campaign. Her tortured reasoning is that the money went to the Democratic National Committee for general political use and, therefore, was not covered by the law prohibiting candidates from raising campaign funds on federal property. What about DNC documents indicating that significant chunks of the money Gore raised were transferred to his campaign? Never mind, says Ms. Reno; the vice president didn't know about that. Even on the narrow grounds that Ms. Reno used as a basis for her decision, her judgment is suspect. An independent counsel--not a Clinton appointee--ought to determine what the vice president knew. By limiting her attention to the narrow issue of the White House telephones, Ms. Reno ignored Clinton's role in coffees, sleepovers and the vast web of donors set up by John Haung, Charlie Trie and other operatives with ties to the Lippo group and the government of China. She ignored the videotape on which Clinton explained to donors how they could get around limitations on direct contributions by giving unlimited amounts to the DNC. Ms. Reno may be the only person in the nation who still believes that the Clinton-Gore campaign kept its required legal distance from the DNC. Ms. Reno also ignored serious allegations of wrongdoing involving the White House China connection. There are indications that the Chinese government had a purpose in using Huang, among others, to make illegal campaign contributions to the Clinton-Gore re-election campaign. Someone needs to find out what the Chinese expected in return. Chinese intelligence agents boasted about ``thwarting'' a Senate investigation headed by Tennessee Republican Fred Thompson, who had set out to expose Chinese involvement in the '96 campaign. Lack of cooperation by the White House, the FBI and the Justice Department foiled the Thompson committee's inquiry. Yet Ms. Reno sees no need for independent review--no need, apparently, to look at other serious allegations, including: Whether the DNC arranged illegal foreign donations to then- Teamsters President Ron Carey in return for the Teamsters' financial and political support of Clinton-Gore '96. Whether the White House shook down Indian tribes in Oklahoma seeking the return of tribal lands and overturned Interior Department approval of an Indian casino project along the Wisconsin-Minnesota border because tribes that already operated casinos in the area gave the DNC $300,000. Whether the DNC funneled $32 million to state parties with orders to spend it on the Clinton-Gore campaign, thereby exceeding federal campaign spending limits. Whether Energy Secretary Hazel O'Leary met with a delegation of Chinese businessmen in return for a $25,000 contribution to the charity of her choice. Until The Washington Post wrote about it, Ms. Reno's staff did not know that money raised from the vice president's office had been spent directly on the vice president's campaign. Yet Ms. Reno focused only on the telephones. Her unfortunate decision left the American people with no confidence that the fund-raising scandal will ever be subjected to the scrutiny it deserves.

Mr. BEREUTER

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks on H. Con. Res. 172, now under consideration.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, H. Con. Res. 172 was introduced on October 22 by the distinguished gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Porter] together with the distinguished gentleman from California [Mr. Dreier], and a second distinguished gentleman from California [Mr. Lantos]. This resolution commends the people of Mongolia for the remarkable progress that country has made since 1990, and as chairman of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, I was pleased to expedite this resolution. This Member also authorized a congratulatory resolution on Mongolia which was approved by the previous Congress. Mongolia has indeed made great strides from a one-party Communist country with a command economy to a multiparty, free market democracy. In the last 7 years Mongolia has also freed itself from Soviet domination. Within a year from the fall of the Berlin Wall, the popularly elected Mongolia legislature, whose election we are commemorating in this resolution, enacted a new constitution which declared Mongolia an independent, sovereign republic with guaranteed civil rights and freedoms. These changes were not only dramatic in scope and speed, they were also accomplished without firing a shot and with little concrete support from the outside world. Mongolia's accomplishments are worthy of congressional commendation, and that is the major thrust of H. Con. Res. 172. The Committee on International Relations, to which this resolution was referred, unanimously approved this resolution on October 31. The committee did make a number of minor alterations to the resolution, the most notable being language supporting Mongolia's membership in NATO's Partnership for Peace, which the Department of Defense indicates is not feasible. Mr. Speaker, while the State Department does not make a habit of formally taking a position on noncontroversial resolutions such as the one before the body at this time, we have been assured that this resolution fully conforms with U.S. policy and has the administration's support. Mr. Speaker, again I congratulate these gentlemen for bringing this to our attention. We need to take time to recognize particular successes among our friends and allies and not just focus on negative things. This Member would urge approval of this congratulatory resolution for a Nation that has taken extraordinary strides. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I urge support of the resolution, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and agree to the concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 172) expressing the sense of Congress in support of efforts to foster friendship and cooperation between the United States and Mongolia, and for other purposes, as amended.

Mr. BEREUTER

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I do rise as a cosponsor in strong support of H. Res. 282, a resolution congratulating ASEAN on the occasion of its 30th anniversary of creation. I would, however, like to take a few minutes here or a part of a minute or so to speak extemporaneously on what took place on this floor just a minute or two ago when we were debating an Iraqi resolution. I would have requested time if I had known what was going to be said in some of the closing comments of that debate. What we say and what we do on this floor on international relations does matter, and we ought to be careful with what we say to make sure it is accurate. Now it was said a few minutes ago, in some hyperbole no doubt, that the U.S. taxpayer stands behind tens of billions of dollars of assistance to Indonesia. That is not factual. There is a standby allocation to assist with the financial problems and the currency exchange rates in Indonesia. The U.S. is willing to be a backup to the IMF, but it is nothing approaching that amount, and perhaps that backup will not be used. We also heard a lot of rhetoric here about evenhandedness when it comes to Turkey and the Kurds and Iraq. Well, we also might have said we need evenhandedness when it comes to terrorist organizations like the PKK, and I think it is inappropriate for us to demonize countries unless the facts are on our side. Now one of the gentleman here misunderstands the situation in East Timor. There are problems in East Timor, alleged human rights violations, and certainly there are human rights violations, and there has been violence on both sides on that issue. This has been a major source of contention and conflict since the Portuguese walked away from that colony of East Timor and the Indonesians came in. But the problem is not that people cannot practice their religion in Indonesia. That is not the problem, as was suggested out here. So it is important that we not demonize countries for things that are not true. We should not be demonizing countries at all, and when we have a legitimate reason for criticism, we should exercise that criticism. Now back to the ASEAN resolution. This Member would congratulate the distinguished chairman of the Committee on International Relations, the gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman], for his leadership demonstrated on recognizing the increasing significance of this important multilateral organization. Through his authorship of the resolution as the chairman of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, I was pleased to expedite consideration of this resolution. Over the last three decades, ASEAN has emerged into a critically important security institution in Southeast Asia. Originally created as a means to respond to the threat of Vietnamese expansionism, it is now an umbrella organization where all of Southeast Asia, including Vietnam, can eventually work together to promote their common interests, and most of the countries now are members in Southeast Asia. Cambodia is not yet because of what happened there in what can only be called legitimately a coup. ASEAN has had an important role in promoting a peaceful resolution to the Spratly Islands crisis and has brought significant pressure to bear regarding the ongoing crisis in Cambodia. This Member would also note that the United States, Russia, the People's Republic of China, and other countries interested in Asian security, and I could have mentioned Japan, have been able to work constructively through the ASEAN Regional Forum, or the ARF. While ASEAN certainly has a significant challenge as authoritarian governments are brought into that organization, we can also hope and push for the Vietnamese, the Laotians, the Burmese. Their association with the ASEAN will have a democratizing effect on these one-party states. While the State Department does not, as a rule, take a position on such nonbinding resolutions like this one, this Member would note the gentleman from New York worked very closely with the State Department and the minority to ensure unanimous support for H. Res. 282. His success in this effort has been demonstrated by the fact that the distinguished ranking Democrat on the Committee on International Relations, the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton], and the distinguished ranking Democrat on the Subcommittee on the Asian Pacific, the gentleman from California [Mr. Berman], are cosponsors of this resolution, and it was unanimously approved by the Committee on International Relations on October 31, 1997. This Member is also pleased to be a cosponsor. Mr. Speaker, this Member once again congratulates the gentleman from New York and urges adoption of H. Res. 282. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from California [Mr. Rohrabacher].

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from California for his timely and cogent remarks. I urge support for House Resolution 282. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. BEREUTER

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I do rise in strong support of H. Res. 231. I will be brief. I want to congratulate the gentleman from California [Mr. Rohrabacher] for his exceptional and dogged pursuit of human rights and economic freedom in Vietnam, and I am pleased to help expedite his resolution here. The resolution correctly notes that several provinces in Vietnam have experienced anticorruption protests in recent months, a phenomenon that is quite remarkable for Vietnam. This Member would suggest that these protests should be considered to be a good sign by Americans, for it is clear that a great many Vietnamese people have had enough of corrupt local bureaucrats siphoning off the wealth of the nation. This Member has also been informed that the protests have been sufficient to force the national government to deal with some of those corrupt officials. Certainly it will make it easier for U.S. businessmen to operate in Vietnam, and that is important, for this Member has heard several reports of numerous horror stories from U.S. business leaders about corruption in that country. The resolution of the gentleman from California [Mr. Rohrabacher] rightly reaffirms U.S. support for political, religious and economic freedom in Vietnam and calls upon the government to permit free and fair elections where competing political parties are allowed to participate. These are basic freedoms that we can all support and we do support. Mr. Speaker, I urge adoption of H. Res. 231.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman is understandably proud of the past performance and the current performance of our former colleague, the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Peterson, as our Ambassador, and I understand the Floridian pride in him, but I would like to also mention he received his elementary and high school education in Omaha, Nebraska.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?