Joe Biden

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, today I wish to publicly congratulate Ms. Madeleine Cooper Taylor on her recent appointment as a member of the city council of Memphis, TN. Last Tuesday, she was appointed unanimously by the council to serve the remaining term of council member TaJuan Stout Mitchell. Ms. Taylor has worked as a program coordinator for the Memphis branch of the NAACP since 1991 and is a lifelong Memphian. Now, I am not normally in the habit of coming to the Senate floor to congratulate a new city council member, especially one who is not from my home State of Delaware. But this is no normal circumstance. Madeleine Cooper Taylor is the mother of Reagan Taylor, an attorney and presidential management fellow whom I have been fortunate enough to have on my staff for the past 6 months. During her rotation on my Judiciary Committee staff, Reagan has made an invaluable contribution to legal and drug policy for our country. Thanks to her efforts, we have succeeded in reauthorizing the Office of National Drug Control Policy, and our fight against the scourge of methamphetamine has been bolstered. And even though she is scheduled to rotate out of my office at the end of this month, as we speak she is hard at work improving security for our State and local courts and better utilizing DNA as a powerful tool in solving horrendous crimes. While Reagan tirelessly works to make our communities safer through her efforts on the Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs, Councilwoman Taylor stated in one of her first public statements after her appointment that she is concerned about crime in her community. As the old saying goes, the apple does not fall far from the tree. It has been my pleasure to have Reagan Taylor on my staff over these past months, and it is my distinct honor to congratulate Madeleine Cooper Taylor on her new public office. I wish them both the best of luck in their future endeavors.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Homeland Security Trust Fund Act of 2007. I introduced this legislation in the last Congress, and I do so again because it is my sincere belief that in order to better prevent attacks here at home, we must dramatically reorder the priorities of the Federal Government. This legislation says in basic terms that we value the security of all Americans over the tax cuts for our Nation's millionaires. Right now, we under fund homeland security and public safety, and at the same time, we have established extremely large tax cuts for the wealthiest among us. This legislation will re-set our priorities by creating a homeland security trust fund that will set aside $53.3 billion dollars--less than one year of the tax cut for millionaires--for the exclusive purpose of investing in our homeland security. Through this trust fund we will allocate an additional $10 billion per year over the next 5 years to enhance the safety and security of our communities. Everyone in this body knows that we are not yet safe enough. Independent experts, law enforcement personnel, and first responders have warned us that we have not done enough to prevent an attack and we are ill-equipped to respond to one. Hurricane Katrina showed us that little has been done to enhance our preparedness and the devastating consequences of our failure to act responsibly here in Washington. And, just over a year ago, the 9/11 Commission issued their report card on the Administration's and Congresses' progress in implementing their recommendations. The result was a report card riddled with D's and F's. Last November, the American people voted for a change and their decision ushered in a new Democratic Congress. Under new leadership, we have made a decision to implement the 9/11 Recommendations. I have long argued that we need to take these prudent steps, and I look forward to working with my colleagues to see that this is done, but under the proposals currently being circulated we do not put forward any dedicated funding to pay for these security upgrades. I believe that the most important responsibility of our Federal Government is to provide for the safety and security of the American people. And, I also believe that we need to do this in a fiscally responsible way. Secretary Chertoff has argued that one strategy of Al Qaeda is to bankrupt us by forcing us to invest too much in our domestic security. This is an outrageous claim. This is simply a matter of priorities. This year the tax cut for Americans that make over $1 million is nearly $60 billion. Let me repeat that, just one year of the Bush tax cut for Americans making over $1 million dollars is nearly $60 billion. In contrast, we dedicate roughly one-half of that--approximately $34 billion--to fund the operations of the Department of Homeland Security. We have invested twice as much for a tax cut for millionaires--less than 1 percent of the population--than we do for the Department intended to help secure the entire Nation. For a Nation that is repeatedly warned about the grave threats we face, how can this be the right priority? The Homeland Security Trust Fund Act of 2007 would change this by taking less than 1 year of the tax cut for millionaires and invest it in homeland security over the next 5 years. By investing $10 billion per year over the next 5 years, we could implement all the 9/11 Commission recommendations. We could hire 50,000 additional police officers and help local agencies create locally based counter-terrorism units. We could hire an additional 1,000 FBI agents to help ensure that FBI is able to implement critical reforms without abandoning its traditional crime fighting functions. We could also invest in security upgrades within our critical infrastructure, fund efforts to implement 100 percent scanning of cargo containers, fund a grant program to ensure that our first responders can talk in the event of an emergency, and nearly double the funding for state homeland security grants. And, the list goes on. To add to the concerns that we face with respect to homeland security, crime is unquestionably on the rise in the United States. The FBI reported earlier this past fall that violent crime and murders are on the rise after years of decreases. Given all of this, it is hard to argue that we are as safe as we should be. We know that the murder rate is up and that there is an officer shortage in communities throughout the nation. Yet, we provide $0 funding for the COPS hiring program, and we've slashed funding for the Justice Assistance Grant. We know that our first responders can't talk because they don't have enough interoperable equipment and available spectrum. Yet, we have not forced the networks to turn over critical spectrum, and we vote down funding to help local agencies purchase equipment every year. We know that only 5 percent of cargo containers are scanned, yet we do not invest in the personnel and equipment to upgrade our systems. We know that our critical infrastructure is vulnerable. Yet, we allow industry to decide what is best and provide scant resources to harden soft targets. I am hopeful that this will change under the new Democratic Congress, and this legislation will help ensure that we do all this in a fiscally responsible manner. In addition, this legislation will also establish an independent agency whose sole purpose will be to make recommendations to the Department of Homeland Security with respect to distributing homeland security with respect to risk and vulnerabilities, to improve the grant making process to ensure that all spending is made towards the common goal of improving preparedness and response, and to eliminate any waste of our precious homeland security resources. This board will be comprised of experts at the Federal, State and local level, with law enforcement and first responder experience to ensure that all stakeholders' viewpoints are considered in the recommendation process. I will conclude where I started. This is all about setting the right priorities for America. Instead of giving a tax cut to the richest Americans who don't need it, we should take some of it and dedicate it towards the security of all Americans. Our Nations most fortunate are just as patriotic as the middle class. They are just as willing to sacrifice for the good of our Nation. The problem is that no one has asked them to sacrifice. The Homeland Security Trust Fund Act of 2007 will ask them to sacrifice, and I am convinced that they will gladly help us out. And to those who say this won't work, I would remind them that the 1994 Crime Bill established the Violent Crime Reduction Trust Fund, specifically designated for public safety that put more than 100,000 cops on the street, funded prevention programs, and more prison beds to lock up violent offenders. It worked; violent crime went down every year for 8 years from the historic highs to the lowest levels in a generation. Our Nation is at its best when we all pull together and sacrifice. The bottom line is that with this legislation, we make clear what our national priorities should be, we set out how we will pay for them, and we ensure those who are asked to sacrifice that money the government raises for security actually gets spent on security. This legislation is about re-ordering our homeland security priorities. I will push for its prompt passage, and I hope to gain the support of my colleagues in this effort.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Homeland Security Trust Fund Act of 2007. I introduced this legislation in the last Congress, and I do so again because it is my sincere belief that in order to better prevent attacks here at home, we must dramatically reorder the priorities of the Federal Government. This legislation says in basic terms that we value the security of all Americans over the tax cuts for our Nation's millionaires. Right now, we under fund homeland security and public safety, and at the same time, we have established extremely large tax cuts for the wealthiest among us. This legislation will re-set our priorities by creating a homeland security trust fund that will set aside $53.3 billion dollars--less than one year of the tax cut for millionaires--for the exclusive purpose of investing in our homeland security. Through this trust fund we will allocate an additional $10 billion per year over the next 5 years to enhance the safety and security of our communities. Everyone in this body knows that we are not yet safe enough. Independent experts, law enforcement personnel, and first responders have warned us that we have not done enough to prevent an attack and we are ill-equipped to respond to one. Hurricane Katrina showed us that little has been done to enhance our preparedness and the devastating consequences of our failure to act responsibly here in Washington. And, just over a year ago, the 9/11 Commission issued their report card on the Administration's and Congresses' progress in implementing their recommendations. The result was a report card riddled with D's and F's. Last November, the American people voted for a change and their decision ushered in a new Democratic Congress. Under new leadership, we have made a decision to implement the 9/11 Recommendations. I have long argued that we need to take these prudent steps, and I look forward to working with my colleagues to see that this is done, but under the proposals currently being circulated we do not put forward any dedicated funding to pay for these security upgrades. I believe that the most important responsibility of our Federal Government is to provide for the safety and security of the American people. And, I also believe that we need to do this in a fiscally responsible way. Secretary Chertoff has argued that one strategy of Al Qaeda is to bankrupt us by forcing us to invest too much in our domestic security. This is an outrageous claim. This is simply a matter of priorities. This year the tax cut for Americans that make over $1 million is nearly $60 billion. Let me repeat that, just one year of the Bush tax cut for Americans making over $1 million dollars is nearly $60 billion. In contrast, we dedicate roughly one-half of that--approximately $34 billion--to fund the operations of the Department of Homeland Security. We have invested twice as much for a tax cut for millionaires--less than 1 percent of the population--than we do for the Department intended to help secure the entire Nation. For a Nation that is repeatedly warned about the grave threats we face, how can this be the right priority? The Homeland Security Trust Fund Act of 2007 would change this by taking less than 1 year of the tax cut for millionaires and invest it in homeland security over the next 5 years. By investing $10 billion per year over the next 5 years, we could implement all the 9/11 Commission recommendations. We could hire 50,000 additional police officers and help local agencies create locally based counter-terrorism units. We could hire an additional 1,000 FBI agents to help ensure that FBI is able to implement critical reforms without abandoning its traditional crime fighting functions. We could also invest in security upgrades within our critical infrastructure, fund efforts to implement 100 percent scanning of cargo containers, fund a grant program to ensure that our first responders can talk in the event of an emergency, and nearly double the funding for state homeland security grants. And, the list goes on. To add to the concerns that we face with respect to homeland security, crime is unquestionably on the rise in the United States. The FBI reported earlier this past fall that violent crime and murders are on the rise after years of decreases. Given all of this, it is hard to argue that we are as safe as we should be. We know that the murder rate is up and that there is an officer shortage in communities throughout the nation. Yet, we provide $0 funding for the COPS hiring program, and we've slashed funding for the Justice Assistance Grant. We know that our first responders can't talk because they don't have enough interoperable equipment and available spectrum. Yet, we have not forced the networks to turn over critical spectrum, and we vote down funding to help local agencies purchase equipment every year. We know that only 5 percent of cargo containers are scanned, yet we do not invest in the personnel and equipment to upgrade our systems. We know that our critical infrastructure is vulnerable. Yet, we allow industry to decide what is best and provide scant resources to harden soft targets. I am hopeful that this will change under the new Democratic Congress, and this legislation will help ensure that we do all this in a fiscally responsible manner. In addition, this legislation will also establish an independent agency whose sole purpose will be to make recommendations to the Department of Homeland Security with respect to distributing homeland security with respect to risk and vulnerabilities, to improve the grant making process to ensure that all spending is made towards the common goal of improving preparedness and response, and to eliminate any waste of our precious homeland security resources. This board will be comprised of experts at the Federal, State and local level, with law enforcement and first responder experience to ensure that all stakeholders' viewpoints are considered in the recommendation process. I will conclude where I started. This is all about setting the right priorities for America. Instead of giving a tax cut to the richest Americans who don't need it, we should take some of it and dedicate it towards the security of all Americans. Our Nations most fortunate are just as patriotic as the middle class. They are just as willing to sacrifice for the good of our Nation. The problem is that no one has asked them to sacrifice. The Homeland Security Trust Fund Act of 2007 will ask them to sacrifice, and I am convinced that they will gladly help us out. And to those who say this won't work, I would remind them that the 1994 Crime Bill established the Violent Crime Reduction Trust Fund, specifically designated for public safety that put more than 100,000 cops on the street, funded prevention programs, and more prison beds to lock up violent offenders. It worked; violent crime went down every year for 8 years from the historic highs to the lowest levels in a generation. Our Nation is at its best when we all pull together and sacrifice. The bottom line is that with this legislation, we make clear what our national priorities should be, we set out how we will pay for them, and we ensure those who are asked to sacrifice that money the government raises for security actually gets spent on security. This legislation is about re-ordering our homeland security priorities. I will push for its prompt passage, and I hope to gain the support of my colleagues in this effort.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, today, Senator Hagel, Senator Levin, and I are submitting a bipartisan resolution that opposes the President's plan to escalate the war in Iraq. This resolution says what we and many of our colleagues, Democrats and Republicans, are against: deepening America's military involvement in Iraq by escalating our troop presence. Just as important, it says what we and many of our colleagues are for: a strategy that can produce a political settlement in Iraq. That's the only way to stop Shiites and Sunnis from killing each other and allow our troops to leave Iraq without leaving chaos behind. Last week, when Secretary of State Rice presented the President's plan to escalate our troop presence in Iraq to the Foreign Relations Committee, the reaction from Democrats and Republicans alike ranged from profound skepticism to outright opposition. This resolution will give every Senator a chance to say where he or she stands on the President's plan. I believe that when a President goes way off course on something as important as Iraq, the single most effective way to get him to change course is to demonstrate that his policy has waning or no support--from both parties. The more we make Iraq a partisan issue, the more the President is likely to dig in. The more we show that Americans across the board don't want to go down the path of escalation, the better our chance to stop it. Iraq is not a partisan issue. It's a challenge we must meet as Americans. The very first sentence of our resolution says something the three of us believe profoundly: ``U.S. strategy and presence on the ground in Iraq can only be sustained with the support of the American people and the bipartisan support of Congress.'' This resolution will demonstrate that, right now, the support is not there for the President's policy in Iraq. The sooner he recognizes that reality and acts on it, the better off all of us will be.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. President, the climate has changed. It has changed outside these walls: the year just concluded was the warmest on record in the United States. And the climate has changed in the halls of the Senate, where the causes and consequences of global warming--and how we should respond--will be a major concern of this new Congress. Outside, the concentration of greenhouse gases in our atmosphere has grown from 280 parts per million before the Industrial Revolution to 430 parts per million today. We are on a path that could double the pre-industrial levels of greenhouse gases, threatening an increase of as much as 10 degrees in the next century. The physical consequences of global warming are right before our eyes: the shrinking polar ice cap, retreating glaciers, stronger storms driven by warmer ocean waters, changing growing seasons, animal migration, and rainfall patterns. Future consequences if we continue business as usual will include rising sea levels, the spread of diseases, abrupt climate shifts that could shut down the Atlantic cycle that warms Europe, or shrink the Amazon rainforest, which provides twenty percent of the oxygen we breathe. These changes will profoundly alter the assumptions on which the economic, political, and security arrangements of our world have been constructed. Our national borders, our cities, our cultures, are all built around patterns of rainfall, arable land, and coastlines that will be redrawn as global warming proceeds. By one estimate, 200 million people, in the coastal cities of New York, Tokyo, Cairo, and London, in low-lying countries such as Bangladesh, in the islands of the Pacific and Caribbean, could be permanently displaced by climate shifts. Throughout human history, massive population shifts, frustrated expectations, and the collapse of economies, have all led to conflict. Even the richest nations, source of the emissions behind global warming, will face huge costs coping with those catastrophes. The poorest nations, whose economies have contributed little or nothing to the greenhouse gases in our atmosphere, will be hit the worst, and will have the fewest resources with which to respond. This is a recipe for global resource wars, and even greater resentment of our wealth by those less fortunate--a new world disorder. Weare failing in our responsibility to steward the riches we have inherited. We are bequeathing our children not just a ruined landscape, but a world of conflict as well. This is a classic tragedy of the commons. We have treated our atmosphere as a costless dump for the waste gases that are the byproduct of our great wealth. There was a time when we could plead ignorance. That day is past. The science is now clear. There was a time when we might have claimed the cost of changing our ways was too great. That day is past. We now know the costs of inaction are unacceptably high. There was a time when we could claim that our actions, in isolation, would be ineffective. That day is past. It is now clear that our inaction reduces the effectiveness of international efforts to address climate change, and provides an excuse for China, India, Mexico, Brazil, and the other leading emitters of the future to stay with us on the sidelines. Today, I am joining with my friend Senator Dick Lugar to submit this resolution, to put the Senate on record in support of a return of the United States to a leadership role in the international search for solutions to the problem of global warming. Our resolution calls for United States participation in negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change--signed by the first President Bush--that will protect the economic and security interests of the United States, and that will commit all nations--developed and developing--that are major emitters of greenhouse gases to achieve significant long-term reductions in those emissions. The resolution also calls for a bipartisan Senate observer group to monitor talks and ensure that our negotiators bring back agreements that all Americans can support. With the glaring exception of the United States, the major industrial nations of the world are proceeding with their commitments, under the Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention, to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions an average of seven percent below 1990 levels. The period from 2008 through 2012 will test their ability to meet those commitments, which were first negotiated in 1997. It is past time for us to begin the discussions that can lead to the next steps, beyond the Kyoto date of 2012. Those next steps must not only include the United States, the leading historical source of greenhouse gases. They must include those nations who will soon overtake us in that role, those who will be the leading emitters in 2012. The Biden-Lugar Resolution states that the evidence of the human role in global warming is clear, that the environmental, economic, and security effects will be costly, and that the response must be international. The resolution recognizes that there are real economic benefits from both reducing the waste and inefficiencies inherent in greenhouse gas emissions, and from the markets for new, climate- friendly technologies. Most importantly it puts the Senate on record, calling for the United States to resume its role as leader in the international effort to address this global threat. I personally believe that the single most important step we can take to resume a leadership role in international climate change efforts would be to make real progress toward a domestic emissions reduction regime. For too long we have abdicated the responsibility to reduce our own emissions, the largest single source of the problem we face today. We have the world's largest economy, with the highest per capita emissions. Rather than leading by example, we have retreated from international negotiations. In this Congress we will see renewed efforts to pass legislation to create that regime, to reduce our domestic emissions, and to open our many responsible American businesses to both international emissions trading and the new markets for clean technologies in the developing world. Moving toward that goal will be crucial to the effectiveness and credibility of our international efforts. We are all on this planet together. We cannot protect ourselves from the effects of climate change by acting alone--this is a global problem that will require a global solution. To undertake meaningful reductions, countries will need to know that their actions will not be undercut by ``free riders'' who continue business as usual while they commit to change. To build that trust will require commitments by all of the key players, and the institutions to coordinate the actions of independent nations. With this resolution, Senator Lugar and I want to put the Senate on record in support of a new effort to build that trust, to make those commitments, to participate in a coordinated international effort to confront the real threat of climate change.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, today I wish to briefly honor a friend of mine of many years who recently reached a milestone in her golf game that many of us strive a lifetime for without success. Ann F. Trzuskowski celebrated the Thanksgiving weekend by achieving something that neither her husband Fran nor I ever have: a hole in one. The lucky club was a 7 wood, striking the ball the perfect 93 yards into the eighth hole of Ford's Colony Williamsburg's Marsh Hawk Course. Golf is the sort of game that draws you in with promises of grace and then torments you with its difficulty. I congratulate my friend on defying the golf gods with a single shot.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise today with my good friend from Maine, Senator Collins, to submit a Resolution Marking January as National Stalking Awareness Month. I introduce today's measure because I want to renew our Nation's resolve to fight stalking and to promote public awareness about the newest stalking tool, technology. Imagine that you are a young wife--estranged from your husband. A court has ordered him to stay away from you, but he shows up everywhere you go. You see him while driving on the road, in the parking lot at work, at a nearby table in restaurants, and at your friends' homes. Although you haven't spoken to him in months, he always knows exactly where you are. Last year, the Seattle police received such a report from Sherri Peak, whose estranged husband seemed to know her every move. Detectives believed that Robert Peak was stalking his wife, and they brought Sherri's car into the city shop to scan for tracking devices. After several hours of futile searching, one officer popped off the dashboard cover and spotted a global positioning system (GPS) and a cell phone embedded in the car. Then police checked the victim's home computer and found spyware that allowed her husband to hack into her e-mail. Sherri Peak was indeed being stalked--via technology. The Peak case illustrates a disturbing criminal trend and the dark side of technology. The devices we use to surf the Internet, e-mail one another, download music, and find our way in unfamiliar towns have also equipped stalkers with powerful tools. While ``conventional'' stalkers follow a victim from home to work or place countless phone calls to their homes, technology-empowered stalkers use GPS to track victims and computer programs to trace every Web site victims visit and every e- mail they send or receive. Stalkers can harass or threaten their victims (or urge others to do so) via e-mail or Web sites set up to harm the victim. The potential impact of these tactics is staggering. National statistics show that 1 in 12 women and 1 in 45 men will be stalked during their lifetime. The average duration of stalking is 2 years, and more often than not it is accompanied by physical violence. In one study, 3 of 4 women murdered by their intimate partners had been stalked by that partner before they were killed. Although all 50 States and the Federal Government have stalking laws, many were drafted before the widespread use of e-mail, the Internet, chat rooms, Web sites, social networking sites, GPS, cell phones, and tiny hand- held video and digital cameras. Last year Congress tightened the Federal stalking law to take into account these potential stalking tools and techniques. Although some States are following suit, I urge state legislators to continually assess the power of their stalking laws to prohibit and appropriately punish acts of stalking with current or even future technology. January is National Stalking Awareness Month--the perfect opportunity for parents, lawmakers and community leaders to carefully review State and local laws on stalking and insist that laws keep pace with technology and protect our families. Valuable information on stalking can be found at the Stalking Resource Center (www.ncvc.org/src). We are indebted to the Center's expertise and leadership on this issue. For immediate and confidential assistance, I also urge people to contact the National Crime Victim Helpline at 1-800-FYI-CALL. I often watch my grandchildren learn with ever more speed to deftly manipulate technology, everything from making digital movies, downloading music, to surfing the Internet. It is clearly a brave, new world. And one that each of us should embrace, learn and celebrate. But with new rights, always come new responsibilities. Through vigilance, both citizens and officials can combat stalking via technology. Just as parents and teens are starting to learn how to protect their privacy while on-line, we can all learn how to detect high-tech stalking and what to do if it occurs. Before closing, I would like to thank Senator Collins for her commitment to this issue; it is always a pleasure to work with her. S. Res. 24 Whereas an estimated 1,006,970 women and 370,990 men are stalked annually in the United States and, in the majority of such cases, the person is stalked by someone who is not a stranger; Whereas 81 percent of women who are stalked by an intimate partner are also physically assaulted by that partner, and 76 percent of women who are killed by an intimate partner were also stalked by that intimate partner; Whereas 26 percent of stalking victims lose time from work as a result of their victimization, and 7 percent never return to work; Whereas stalking victims are forced to take drastic measures to protect themselves, such as relocating, changing their addresses, changing their identities, changing jobs, and obtaining protection orders; Whereas stalking is a crime that cuts across race, culture, gender, age, sexual orientation, physical and mental ability, and economic status; Whereas stalking is a crime under Federal law and under the laws of all 50 States and the District of Columbia; Whereas rapid advancements in technology have made cyber- surveillance the new frontier in stalking; Whereas there are national organizations, local victim service organizations, prosecutors' offices, and police departments that stand ready to assist stalking victims and who are working diligently to craft competent, thorough, and innovative responses to stalking; and Whereas there is a need to enhance the criminal justice system's response to stalking, including through aggressive investigation and prosecution: Now, therefore, be it Resolved, That-- (1) the Senate designates January 2007 as ``National Stalking Awareness Month''; (2) it is the sense of the Senate that-- (A) National Stalking Awareness Month provides an opportunity to educate the people of the United States about stalking; (B) the people of the United States should applaud the efforts of the many victim service providers, such as police, prosecutors, national and community organizations, and private sector supporters, for their efforts in promoting awareness about stalking; and (C) policymakers, criminal justice officials, victim service and human service agencies, nonprofit organizations, and others should recognize the need to increase awareness of stalking and availability of services for stalking victims; and (3) the Senate urges national and community organizations, businesses, and the media to promote, through observation of National Stalking Awareness Month, awareness of the crime of stalking.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I am pleased to speak today in enthusiastic support of Kent Jordan, a fellow Delawarean, who has been nominated by President Bush to serve on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. If Kent is confirmed by the Senate, he will have completed a meteoric rise to a seat on the Federal court of appeals, and no one is more deserving. But before I talk about Judge Jordan, allow me to say a few words about the Judge whom Judge Jordan is nominated to replace. This spring, Judge Jane Roth informed the President that she would be taking senior status. Judge Roth has been a stellar presence on the Federal bench; she has served her country with dignity, wisdom and distinction. She is dedicated to the rule of law, and her representation of our State on the court of appeals has brought nothing but distinction to Delaware. Like many of you, I have known Judge Roth for several years, and I look forward to her continued brilliant service as a senior judge of the circuit. As I told the Judiciary Committee at his hearing, Kent Jordan has very large shoes to fill, but I am confident that he is up to the task. Judge Jordan began his legal career with a clerkship in the chambers of Judge Latchum, a pillar of the bar in Wimington. He went on to serve as an assistant U.S. attorney, working on some highly publicized cases and bringing some really bad characters to justice. He then became a partner at one of Delaware's top law firms, Morris James Hitchens & Williams, before becoming general counsel to the 102- year-old Corporation Services Company and finally, 4 years ago, being confirmed by this Senate to serve on the bench of the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware. Mr. Chairman, the past 4 years have demonstrated what those of us familiar with Judge Jordan already knew. He possesses the sterling academic and professional skills, as well as the vital judgment and temperament, to be an outstanding Federal district judge. Lawyers who have appeared before Judge Jordan--even those he has ruled against--have described him as openminded and fair. His colleagues on the bench have come to value his intellect, integrity and his friendship. If confirmed, Judge Kent will be an asset to the appellate bench and a model of responsible jurisprudence for years to come. I have full confidence that he will bring to the appellate bench all of the assets he has so clearly demonstrated in the district court. I highly commend Judge Jordan to my colleagues and ask that they vote to confirm his nomination.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, as the people of Serbia approach a critical national election on January 21, 2007, I pay tribute to the journalists and broadcasters who have worked to provide an antidote to forces of extremism in the country. I especially congratulate the Voice of America's Serbian Service and recognize the 10-year anniversary of its first television broadcast. VOA's long-running work in Serbia has played a valuable role in the country's evolution and provided an important source of information during the darkest periods of Serb history. This contribution has been particularly evident as Serbia has undergone profound changes in the last 10 years. Open Studio, VOA's first daily television newscast, was launched on December 11, 1996, in the wake of massive demonstrations to protest the invalidation of election victories by opponents of Slobodan Milosevic. In the face of public outcry, the Milosevic regime worked quickly to silence independent media outlets in Serbia, including a small, vibrant radio station called B92. The student-run station had distinguished itself by broadcasting hard news about the wars in the former Yugoslavia and engaging in relentless criticism of the Government. VOA's Serbian Service responded to the Milosevic regime's attacks on media freedom by expanding its broadcast and providing extensive reports on the international reaction to the protests in Serbia. On the day Serb authorities finally shut down B92, VOA requested permission to help the station reach its audience via VOA radio waves. As a result, VOA Serbian launched a media solidarity project and began broadcasting reports prepared by B92 stringers. The solidarity project received widespread international attention, including press coverage by the New York Times, Washington Post, CNN, and many other respected media outlets. After VOA began providing assistance to B92, the Milosevic Government relented and permitted the station's radio service to resume broadcasting. B92's chief editor, Veran Matic, credited VOA's assistance and international pressure on the Milosevic Government with getting his station back on the air. B92 quickly became a symbol of freedom and resistance to ultranationalism during the balance of the Milosevic era. Today, the station is one of the most respected radio and television broadcasters in Serbia. VOA's Open Studio program has built on its early success and is now carried by 53 television stations in the region; 45 in Serbia and Montenegro, 6 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and 1 each in Kosovo and Macedonia. VOA is the leading international broadcaster in Serbia and Montenegro today, reaching 16 percent of the country's population each week through its radio and television programming. By presenting American values to an audience that was predominantly anti-American, the Voice of America Serbian Service has been an important public diplomacy tool and helped promote United States foreign policy objectives in Southeast Europe. In keeping with the best traditions of the service's 60-year history, VOA has helped guide Serbs toward greater freedom and openness, and encouraged the country to come to terms with the difficult legacy of the Yugoslav wars. VOA's objective, comprehensive reporting and analysis has provided reliable, often indispensable information to the region's Serbian population. Events in Serbia during the last decade provide compelling evidence of how courageous journalism can serve as a catalyst for democratic change. As the region prepares to deal with new challenges, including potential political changes in Belgrade and Kosovo, there is an ongoing need to provide Southeast Europe with reliable information. Along with the important work of B92 and other brave Serb partners, I applaud the efforts of the Voice of America to convey the facts and represent the United States to the people of Serbia. I look forward to the VOA's continued success in its next decade of service.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. The Senate will shortly take a momentous step in U.S.-India relations by passing the conference report on H.R. 5682, the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006. Enactment of this legislation brings us much closer to the day when India will resume peaceful nuclear commerce, despite its status as a state that has nuclear weapons and has never been a state party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It will help bring India into the global nuclear nonproliferation system. It also helps to remove a major irritant in the relations between our two countries. This bill is a tremendous victory for U.S.-India relations. And it increases the prospect for stability and progress in South Asia and the rest of the world. It has become cliche to speak of the U.S.-India relationship as a bond between the world's oldest democracy and the world's largest democracy--but this cliche is also a fact. Shared political values are the foundation for our relationship, a firm belief in the dignity of man and the consent of the governed. Senator Lugar and I yield to no one in our commitment to nuclear nonproliferation. We have taken great care, in this legislation, to protect the role of Congress and of the international institutions that enforce nuclear nonproliferation. This legislation was the result of hard compromises--compromises between our two countries and between Congress and the executive branch. The end result, however, was overwhelming bipartisan support, in both the House and the Senate. That level of broad, solid, bipartisan buy-in was absolutely essential when crafting legislation with such long-term impact on vital American interests. I want to pay special tribute tonight to the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Lugar of Indiana, for his tremendous contribution to securing that broad, bipartisan consensus. The administration originally proposed legislation that would have effectively taken away the power of Congress to review an agreement for nuclear cooperation with India, and Senator Lugar was under great pressure to accept that proposal. He did not do that. Instead, he held four hearings--three open and one closed--that allowed all sides to express their views and that enabled Senators from both parties to raise their concerns with the approval procedure that the administration had proposed. Then he and I worked to craft a Senate bill that passed by a vote of 16-2 in committee and 85-12 on the floor of the Senate. Senator Lugar performed a signal service to our country when he added title II to this legislation, the implementing legislation for the U.S. Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency. It is fitting that this legislation has been combined with the India nuclear bill, since part of the nuclear deal is for India to negotiate its own Additional Protocol with the IAEA. It will also be a notable benefit to U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy when the United States finally ratifies its Additional Protocol, giving our country greater credibility as it presses other countries to allow the IAEA to increase its inspections of their nuclear programs. Ratification of the U.S.- IAEA Additional Protocol was long delayed, and Senator Lugar's leadership on this issue was absolutely vital to this final, successful conclusion. In conference with the House of Representatives, Senator Lugar and I once again worked for a measure that could gain broad support from the Senate. We worked with the House conferees to craft a bill that embodied the best ideas from each house of Congress. At the same time, we worked with the Administration to reach agreement on a wide range of issues, without sacrificing the principles that each house had written into its legislation. We and the other conferees chose substance over rhetoric. The result is a conference report that will command the same broad, bipartisan support today that was demonstrated in the Senate 3 weeks ago. I would like also to acknowledge the staff members who have contributed to the success of this legislation. On the Senate side, the Foreign Relations Committee was most ably served by Ken Myers III, Thomas Moore, Edward Levine and Brian McKeon. Mr. Stephen Rademaker of the majority leader's staff was also an important contributor to our efforts. On the House side, the conferees were most ably served by Douglas Seay, David Fite and David Abramowitz, among others. The U.S.-India agreement is much more than just a nuclear deal. I believe historians will see this as part of a dramatic and positive departure in the U.S.-India relationship that was begun by President Clinton and continued by President Bush. In a time when relationships between states are critically important in shaping the world in which we live, no relationship is more important than the one we're building with India. There is still much to be done in India, as a stable and secure India is very much in America's national interest. We should work to help India increase its energy production, combat terrorism, and guard against epidemics of infectious diseases. We should help both India and Pakistan to ease tensions between their countries and, someday, to walk back from the nuclear precipice. And India should continue its progress toward the front rank of world leaders, and especially of leaders in combating the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Enactment of this bill today helps both countries to keep moving on the path of cooperation for a better world. In conclusion, I would like to turn to an issue raised recently by some experts, whether the legislation before us, by citing a particular IAEA document, might undermine the principle of perpetuity of safeguards in India. My view is that the IAEA document makes a real contribution to our understanding of safeguards perpetuity. The document cited by this legislation appears in section 104(b)(2), the second determination that the President will have to make when submitting a U.S.-India agreement for nuclear cooperation to the Congress. It is an IAEA Board of Governors memo cited as GOV/1621 of 20 August 1973. We have been given permission to publish this document, so I will ask that it be printed in the Record at the end of these remarks. The Board of Governors memo makes clear that safeguards on nuclear material will extend until that material no longer has any possible nuclear weapons use, or until it is exchanged with an equal amount of previously unsafeguarded material, or until it leaves the country--in which case safeguards may continue elsewhere. In other words, if you move some imported fuel or equipment to a new location, that location becomes subject to safeguards. The memo also makes clear that safeguards on ``nuclear material, equipment, facilities or non-nuclear material'' supplied to a nuclear facility will apply as well to fissile material ``produced, processed or used in or in connection with'' a safeguarded facility. In other words, any fissile material produced by a safeguarded facility becomes subject to safeguards even after it leaves that facility. Until that output no longer has any possible nuclear weapons use, safeguards follow it; that is a real example of perpetuity of sanctions. At the same time, perpetuity does not mean that a facility will be subject to safeguards until the end of time. A facility can be decommissioned so that it, too, no longer has any possible nuclear weapons use. Or, if the only reason for safeguards is that the facility has imported equipment or material, removal of all such equipment or material from the facility could render it eligible for removal from safeguards. Thus, India's reprocessing plant is safeguarded when it handles spent fuel from imported uranium, but not when India is using it to reprocess spent fuel made from domestic uranium. That is the way safeguards have worked for years in India. The Government of India has announced that eight more of its existing power reactors will be declared as civil and opened to IAEA inspection. India would gain great credibility if it were to let those reactors be inspected even if they use domestic nuclear fuel. Indian officials have suggested, however, that they may insist upon the right to remove those reactors from safeguards if foreign fuel supplies are cut off, and the safeguards agreement that India negotiates with the IAEA may allow for that. There is precedent for such an arrangement, in states that do not have full-scope safeguards, and it would be up to the IAEA Board of Governors, of which the United States is a member, to decide whether that arrangement was permissible in this case. It would be up to Congress and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, of course, to consider whether that sort of safeguards arrangement was sufficient to warrant authorizing peaceful nuclear commerce with India. And it would be up to the executive branch to determine whether to authorize a particular export to India, in light of the safeguards that would govern the facility for which the export was requested. India has also said that many new power reactors will be put under IAEA safeguards. If those reactors are foreign-built, like the Tarapur reactor, there will be no way that they can be withdrawn from safeguards unless they are decommissioned. If they are domestic designs but use some foreign equipment, there will be no way to withdraw them from safeguards without first removing the foreign equipment. And if foreign equipment should be used in one of the eight domestically built reactors that are put under safeguards, then that equipment, too, would have to be removed before that reactor could be removed from safeguards. As a matter of principle, then, perpetuity in safeguards applies more to material and equipment than it does to a whole facility, unless that facility is foreign-built. In practice, however, the only reactors that India might pull out of its safeguards regime would be the eight newly- safeguarded ones, and I believe that the only time that this might occur would be if India were to come under sanctions because of improper nuclear activities or weapons proliferation. In such a case, the regime for nuclear cooperation with India would likely be collapsing anyway. The material follows.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, at the end of this year, Anthony ``Tony'' Zagami will retire after 40 years of public service, including the last 16 years at the Government Printing Office, which publishes the Congressional Record for all of us every day. I first met Tony when I served in my first term in the Senate. He was working as a legislative assistant in the Democratic cloakroom. He spent 25 years working in the Congress, including general counsel to the Joint Committee on Printing. In 1990, Tony left to become the general counsel at the Government Printing Office. When he retires it will be with the distinction of having been the agency's longest-serving general counsel. As he moves on, I know all my colleagues join me in thanking him for his dedicated service, and wish him the best for the future.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, I think there is a need for a mild correction.

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, today the Senate is engaged in a truly historic process. When we pass this bill--and I expect we will do that--America will take a giant step closer to approving a major shift in United States-India relations. If we are right, this shift will increase the prospects for stability and progress in South Asia and, I would argue, the world at large. The Committee on Foreign Relations has worked to move this project forward, while safeguarding the role of Congress and minimizing any harm to nuclear nonproliferation policies and institutions. There is no one who has been stronger in dealing with the issue of nonproliferation than my colleague, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. I have supported him in those efforts for years. I urge my colleagues to take a real close look at the argument that is being made by some that this is going to promote the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The fact is, I believe it will not. I am going to urge my colleagues at the appropriate time to support this bill. It has been a cliche to speak of the United States-India relationship as a bond between the world's two oldest democracies and the world's two largest democracies, but this cliche is also a fact. Shared political values are the foundation of our relationship and, I would argue, the raison d'etre for taking a chance for those who are doubtful on this treaty. Both the United States and India believe in the dignity of man and the consent of the governed. Both countries are multiethnic and multireligious. Both countries seek economic and social betterment for their people and believe that it is best achieved through peaceful change, both domestically and externally. If that were the whole story, however, it would not have taken us six decades to get to the moment we are now. For much of the last 60 years, the political structures were trumped by geopolitical ones. Democracy in democratic India was often closer to the Soviet Union, while the United States often favored India's rival Pakistan, particularly during the most undemocratic phase of Pakistan's national history. That alignment was an anomaly of the cold war. Today the United States and Pakistan are important allies in the war on terror and, at the same time, today the national interests of the United States and India are in concert, perhaps more than any time in the past. India and the United States are both status quo powers, at least regarding territory. Neither of us has any claim on any neighboring piece of real estate. We face similar challenges from extremists and terrorists; in some cases, from the same terrorist groups and same individuals. We share a common desire for stability and the spread of liberal democracy throughout Asia and, indeed, throughout the world. And we share a concern about the world's need for energy, especially energy that does not increase the speed and risk of global warming. The need for new energy supplies is an important underpinning of the issues before us today, legislation opening the way for civil nuclear cooperation between the United States and India. In time, I hope India's burgeoning energy needs will prove a spur to a wide variety of alternatives to fossil fuels, including solar, wind, and biofuel. On many of these, India has already begun to move, but at present, nuclear power is a vital part of India's energy equation. It is likely to grow in significance in the years to come. Experts note correctly that nuclear power will still provide only a small portion of India's energy consumption even when this passes. But at the margin, the contribution of nuclear power will be greater, and India's leaders across the political spectrum see nuclear power as an important and necessary contributor to their country's economic progress. The Agreement on Nuclear Cooperation negotiated by President Bush and Prime Minister Singh in July of 2005 cannot be implemented unless Congress approves changes in U.S. law. So we in the Senate must now address both the opportunities and the nonproliferation issues raised by that agreement. The administration proposed that we treat the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement as if it met all the requirements of section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act. In fact, it does not. There is no way, of course, that India, with a nuclear weapons program that is outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, could meet these requirements. I compliment my chairman for making it clear to the administration that was a nonstarter. Were Congress to accept the administration's proposal, it would lose any real ability to influence a nuclear agreement with India. The agreement would be sent to Congress, but we would have to enact a motion to disapprove over a likely Presidential veto within 90 days in order to stop any agreement from entering into effect. That would be a gigantic usurpation of our responsibility. The Foreign Relations Committee, under the leadership of the chairman, rejected this approach, as did the House of Representatives. The bill before us today would require, instead, an affirmative vote of Congress before a United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement can enter into effect. Section 3709 provides expedited procedures for the resolution to approve such a United States-India agreement. That resolution would not contain any conditions, and it could not be amended. But if Congress found the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement wanting in some respect, it could either reject the expedited resolution or approval or pass a different resolution that did contain conditions. That is what Congress did with the United States-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement in 1985. So this bill protects congressional powers not for the sake of protecting congressional powers, as if we were interested in turf; it protects the balance of power, the separation of power, which is essential in the formulation of a policy, including foreign policy. At the same time, it offers procedures that will expedite approval of a good agreement. Section 3907 also allows the President to waive section 128 of the Atomic Energy Act, which provides for annual submission of one export license to Congress. That provision has never been used and would be of little benefit to Congress, as a sale could be blocked only if a resolution of disapproval were enacted, again, over the likelihood of a Presidential veto. The administration argued that section 128, while giving Congress little real power, would harm U.S. industry by creating an annual event that would frighten both the customer and the investor from proceeding. We agreed, and this bill includes a section 128 waiver provision that the administration requested. Chairman Lugar and I yield to nobody in our commitment to nonproliferation, and no one has a stronger record on this than Senator Lugar. We believe we have presented to this body a bill that allows civil nuclear cooperation with India to proceed and ends India's nuclear isolation, but it does so without seriously jeopardizing the hard-won nonproliferation gains of nearly the last four decades. Specifically, our aims have been as follows: To preserve the right of Congress to conduct a meaningful review of the peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement that India and the United States are negotiating; secondly, to ensure that such nuclear cooperation is used exclusively in India's civil nuclear program and that India continues to be a ``good citizen'' when it comes to nonproliferation, as it has been; to preserve the role and procedures of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and of the International Atomic Energy Agency; and to do all this without requiring any renegotiation of the United States-India treaty deal. Look, every time we have a treaty presented to us in the Senate, there are those of us, including my friend from North Dakota who is on the Senate floor, who believe we can probably do it better. We believe we could have gotten a better deal. We believe we could have gotten a treaty that was even better than the one that exists. But the old expression is that we cannot let the perfect be the enemy of the good. It wasn't really very easy to do what we set out to do, but I truly believe we have succeeded in the points I have just made. There is a reason this bill was reported out of committee with a 16-to-2 margin; we did really try to address the major nonproliferation concerns legitimately raised by colleagues in the committee. The Foreign Relations Committee did not endorse, for example, the administration's request for broad waiver authority regarding section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act. That section terminates nuclear exports to a country under certain circumstances. The administration did not want that in place. The committee agreed that the President needs the right to waive those portions of section 129 which would end exports because India has a nuclear weapons program or because it has tested nuclear devices in the past. But section 3709 doesn't grant a waiver authority regarding those portions of section 129 which would end nuclear exports if India were to, 1, test a nuclear device in the future; 2, terminate or materially violate the IAEA safeguard; 3, materially violate its agreement with the United States, or engage in nuclear proliferation. Look, if India does any of those things, then the premise upon which we have dealt with a good friend and neighbor was falsely relied upon. I believe India understands the consequence of this bilateral relationship as profoundly as we do. If I am wrong about that and India were to do any or all of the four things I just named, it would clearly violate the spirit of this agreement, part of which, as all agreements ultimately are, is based on some sense of comity and trust. This bill requires that India sign a safeguards agreement with the IAEA and negotiate an additional protocol as well. It requires the President to certify, moreover, that the safeguards agreement is ``in accordance with IAEA standards, principles, and practices.'' The President must certify to that effect. We understand that India, having nuclear weapons, will not accept full-scope safeguards. But the language in this bill makes clear our expectation that the safeguards agreement India works out with the IAEA will guard effectively against diversion of foreign nuclear material and technology to India's military program. Section 3709 also requires the President to certify that the Nuclear Suppliers Group has decided to permit civil nuclear commerce with India and that the NSG, Nuclear Suppliers Group, decision was made by consensus. We do not want to damage the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which has been a vital institution in our fight against nuclear proliferation. So this bill protects the Nuclear Suppliers Group's role in governing peaceful nuclear commerce. The administration has said repeatedly that this is an India nuclear deal, not intended to permit nuclear commerce with Pakistan or Israel-- the only other states that never signed the NPT. The committee's bill incorporates that distinction by requiring the President to certify that the NSG--Nuclear Suppliers Group--decision does not permit nuclear commerce with any other state that does not accept full-scope safeguards. The NSG is not likely to single out India as an exception to its guidelines. Rather, it will create tests that a non-NPT state must meet before nuclear commerce with the country may take place. The committee believes that such a test should be substantial, so that the countries outside the NPT are not all given the same benefits as the nonnuclear weapon states inside the treaty. Thus, the bill before us today is designed to maintain important nonproliferation policies that have served our country well. With regard to sections 106 and 107, two sections of this bill, they have been cited by some Indian officials as causing concern. I will address these sections, as I do not believe such concern is merited. Section 106 in the agreement bars the executive branch from exporting to India ``any equipment, materials, or technology related to the enrichment of uranium, the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, or the production of heavy water.'' That is because these technologies are all used to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. In fact, the administration already has a worldwide policy of not exporting these technologies. Section 106 merely makes that a legal requirement in this case. Because section 106 makes this a legal requirement, we also added two exemptions. One would be for a program such as the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, which is to develop a new generation of proliferation-resistant nuclear facilities. In other words, the second exemption would be for a facility in an IAEA-approved program to provide alternatives to national fuel cycle capability. For example, there might some day be a South Asian regional uranium enrichment facility under IAEA auspices. Some Indian officials are reportedly upset because section 106 singles out India. But they have long known that it is U.S. policy not to sell them these technologies, so this is a matter more of pride than of substance, which I hope they deal with. I would not object to making section 106 apply worldwide, but we believed this was too large a step to take in this bill. I would think it should apply worldwide. Section 107 requires a program to maintain accountability with respect to nuclear materials, equipment, and technology that we sell, lease, export, or reexport to India. This program would include end-use monitoring conditions, as appropriate. A similar program exists for U.S. nuclear exports to China. Such a monitoring program would enhance confidence in India's separation of its civilian and military nuclear programs. It would also further ensure U.S. compliance with article I of the nonproliferation treaty. Indian officials are reportedly upset that American personnel might need to visit India's nuclear sites. It should come as no surprise, however, that we need to ensure that U.S. nuclear materials, equipment, and technology are not diverted to military uses. The purpose of section 107 is not to impose new conditions upon India but, rather, to make sure the executive branch doesn't forget its obligation to guard against diversion. That obligation is already U.S. policy. It also flows from article I of the nonproliferation treaty, which requires nuclear weapon states not to assist nonnuclear weapon states ``in any way'' to manufacture nuclear weapons. And India remains a nonnuclear weapons state under both the NPT and U.S. law, despite the fact that now it does have nuclear weapons. I hope that in conference we can adjust the wording of section 107 to correct any potential misunderstanding of its effect, which is not intended to be onerous. I also hope that Indian officials will understand the U.S. need to embark upon nuclear commerce with India in a manner that maintains our nonproliferation policies and fulfills our international obligation. I believe the bill reported out by the Foreign Relations Committee does that in a most reasonable manner and that it will provide a strong foundation for a new beginning in United States-Indian relations. The United States-Indian agreement is much more than just a nuclear deal, though, Mr. President. I believe historians will see this as a historic step, part of the dramatic and positive departure in United States-Indian relationship that was begun by President Clinton. President Bush is to be commended for continuing and accelerating the journey President Clinton started in our relations with India. If I were asked to name the pillars for security in the 21st century, India and the United States would be two of them. India and the United States, working in cooperation toward the same goal, can provide the beginning of a strong foundation for a stable world. And for the United States, no relationship, in my view, is more important than the United States-India relationship maturing along the lines that have begun. The ultimate success of this agreement will rest on India's willingness and ability to reduce tensions with its nuclear neighbors and achieve nuclear stability. We all hope to see the day when India and Pakistan voluntarily reduce or end their fissile material production, as the recognized NPT nuclear weapons states already have done. I hope especially that India will not use its peaceful nuclear commerce to free up domestic uranium for increased production of nuclear weapons. The United States-India deal doesn't bar India from doing that. But such a nuclear buildup--unless carried out in response to a direct threat from its nuclear-armed neighbors--would be a gross abuse of the world's trust, in my view. It would sour relations between India and the United States, just at a time when both countries hope to build upon a new foundation that has been laid in the past decade and which I respectfully suggest is in the overwhelming self-interest of both countries. India and the world will also benefit if India embraces these critical nonproliferation standards. These include the Proliferation Security Initiative; the guidelines and policies of the Australia Group, which, I add, controls exports that could help countries build chemical or biological weapons; and the guidelines and policies of the Wassenaar Arrangement, which combats the spread of advanced conventional weapons. India is a major world power. India needs to--and will, I believe-- step up to this awesome responsibility. As an important world power, it is important that support for the complete nonproliferation regime would make a gigantic difference in the world. Currently, however, India doesn't stop its companies from exporting dual-use chemicals and equipment to countries such as Iran because those exports are not banned by the Chemical Weapons Convention. Other leading countries have concluded that unrestrained exports of items that could be used to produce chemical or biological weapons and advanced conventional weapons are a real danger to world stability. It is my fervent hope and prayer that India reaches that conclusion as well. It is time for them to adopt, in my opinion, the same approach to the dangers posed by such proliferation. India will not attain the respect and status it seeks and deserves in the world unless it takes a willing and active role in preventing proliferation of all kinds. The nuclear deal we are considering today is a sign, however, of the world's desire to bring India into the fold. I hope India will use this deal as a departure point from which it will branch out to embrace all international nonproliferation activities. It will surely be welcomed if it does. In my view, the bill before us is a victory for United States-India relationships. It is a victory for the quest to move beyond fossil fuels. And it is a victory we have achieved while doing our best to maintain the global effort to end proliferation. I believe, not guaranteed by this agreement, it will be also a point of departure for India to rethink its role in the world with regard to proliferation of all kinds. I sincerely hope it does. I end where I began. I think United States-India relations is two of the pillars upon which we have a chance--we have a chance, a real chance--to build a 21st century that is much more stable than the 20th century and to avoid the carnage of the 20th century. It cannot be done without India's cooperation, and it can be done with India's leadership. I thank my colleagues for listening. I understand my friend from North Dakota may have an amendment or may wish to seek the floor. I yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise to speak to the Dorgan amendment. I appreciate, respect, and share the sentiment and concern of the Senator from North Dakota who has been doggedly supportive of pushing nonproliferation and a nonproliferation regime. And if this were 1998 or 1999, I would support the Senator's amendment. But this is 2006, and a great deal has changed since India and Pakistan both exploded nuclear devices in 1998. The Security Council resolution passed after those tests called for several things: one including for India and Pakistan to immediately stop their nuclear weapons programs and their ballistic missile programs. We wish they would have ceased their nuclear programs. They did not. We wish they had ceased their programs with regard to missiles. Well, they did not. So the fact is, it is not realistic. We wish they would join the nuclear test ban treaty. But do we really think that is possible under this administration that is not supportive of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty? In this legislation, and in the United States-India nuclear agreement, we are making clear that continued cooperation under this nuclear agreement and nuclear exports to India will cease if India, one, tests a nuclear device, terminates or materially violates its IAEA safeguards, materially violates its agreement with the United States, or engages in nuclear proliferation. Further, the bill requires that India sign a safeguards agreement with the IAEA and negotiate an additional protocol. It also requires the President to certify that the safeguards agreement is in accordance with the IAEA standards, principles, and practices. In sum, that is U.S. policy toward India and its nuclear program, and I do not see the purpose of revisiting the old history of 1998. We need to look forward, and that is what we are doing in this legislation. We are using this legislation and the agreement to build a new relationship with India on this issue, and also using it as a means to strengthen the bilateral relationship across the board. And in doing so, we have enshrined important nonproliferation principles into this legislation because we cannot turn back the history of 1998. So at the appropriate time--and I think we are working now on a consent agreement--I would urge the defeat of the Dorgan amendment. I yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will be very brief. As I said, I really admire, respect, and observe the passion of my friend from North Dakota on this issue. But I think the comparisons are not particularly apt. The wing strut the Senator has was able to be held in his hand because two countries--the United States and the Soviet Union--concluded that it was in their mutual interest to cease and desist and/or significantly reduce the threat each posed to the other. And they were the only threats that existed. The only threat to the United States from a nuclear capability of an ICBM or a Backfire bomber resided in the Soviet Union. Now, we tried. I was the author of--and, as a matter of fact, there was a South Dakota Senator named Pressler, along with John Glenn, who early on put in legislation relating to sanctions for India. India obviously violated those sanctions and did not comply with the U.N. resolution. But there is a reason for that--not a justification, a reason. They looked across their borders north and west and saw two nuclear powers--one emerging nuclear power, one existing nuclear power--and they concluded, rightly or wrongly, from their perspective that they had to be a nuclear power. It is clear nonproliferation does not work in a vacuum. Nonproliferation entreatments, requests, proddings to a nation that finds itself in a situation where it believes it is threatened by a nuclear neighbor have not worked particularly well, offering those two examples, for example. It seems to me what we are attempting to do is the only route to get to the point where both India and Pakistan are part of a nonproliferation treaty; that is, we are trying to change the regional situation on the ground. It is not going to happen through a nonproliferation treaty. It is going to happen through a rapprochement between India and Pakistan. The idea that we would be able to, through any legislation, prevent India from moving forward to add additional nuclear weapons, if they so choose to do that--there is no legislation we can pass to do that. What this legislation does is recognize the reality of the geopolitical situation in the region, set up safeguards to deal with the ability for India to use anything we are doing with them to be able to further advance their nuclear capability, give them a new buy-in to an international regime that will have the effect of putting pressure on them to move in the direction we and the Soviets moved on back when that Backfire bomber strut was sawed off a wing, and that is the route we choose. It is not pretty. It is not clear. It is no guarantee. It is not certain to succeed. But I do know one thing: Absent this agreement, there is a likelihood things get worse instead of better, beyond what may already occur. I appreciate the Senator's comparisons, but I think they are not as apt as they might appear to be because, again, India's motivation, in terms of its viewing its need for a nuclear arsenal, is not unlike the motivation that existed with regard to the United States and the Soviet Union. It is going to take a geopolitical settlement of that, not a nuclear arms control agreement imposing a settlement on India and Pakistan at this moment, now that the genie is out of the bottle. I appreciate my friend's point and respect his point of view, but I disagree that it is the best way to move forward.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I want to associate myself with the remarks made by the Senator from Indiana. The amendment requires India to declare as civil reactors all reactors that supply electricity to the civil sector. There is no way that India will accept this. I might wish they would, but they will not. That's because for decades, they have built reactors that can be either civil or military. So India has reserved as military enough reactors to produce more plutonium for nuclear weapons--in case they decide they need to do that. But India will also use those reactors for electric power. If this amendment is enacted, India will have to choose to either make all its power reactors civil, and build new ones to produce plutonium; or waste the electric power capability of its current military reactors. India will not do that. So this is a killer amendment. It's also a killer amendment because it requires India to commit to verifiably reduce its nuclear weapons stockpile. I wish India would do that--but it will not. India fears both Pakistan and China, which also have nuclear weapons. The Dorgan amendment does not require Pakistan and China to reduce their stockpiles, only India. This is a non-starter for India. Finally, the amendment requires India to commit to ``joining a legally-binding, nuclear test moratorium.'' I wish India would do that. I hope the administration will push for that. But for now, there is only one ``legally-binding, nuclear test moratorium.'' It is called the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty. And I do not think this administration will press India to join that treaty. So, I sympathize with all of the concerns raised by this amendment. But I know that it would kill the nuclear deal. That is the bottom line: if we support the deal, we have to reject this amendment.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, if I understand the parliamentary situation properly, and I am not sure I do, I ask unanimous consent that following the offering of the Ensign amendment, the Senate stand in recess subject to the call of the Chair so that it may reconvene pursuant to the previous order. I further ask that the following Senate staff be permitted to attend the closed session, and I send the list to the desk. The list is as follows: Mike Disilvestro; Joel Breitner; Mary Jane McCarthy; Paul Nelson; Richard Verma; Stephen Rademaker; Marcel Lettre; Nancy Erickson; Lynne Halbrooks; Scott O'Malia; Pam Thiessen; Thomas Moore; Lynn Rusten; Ed Corrigan; Rexon Ryu; Ken Myers III; Ken Myers, Jr; Brian McKeon; Ed Levine; Madelyn Creedon; Nancy Stetson; Diane Ohlbaum; Anthony Blinken; Janice O'Connell.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, before the Chair rules, I will remind Senators that those who attend the closed session are not permitted to bring any electronic devices into the Old Senate Chamber. Mr. President, I send to the desk the list of the names of the staff members that could be present.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, how much time remains?

Mr. BIDEN. I wonder if the Chair would give me 3 minutes.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will be very brief. The Senator stated it well. And I don't like to argue with my friend from California; I seldom ever win, and I am very uncomfortable because I consider her one of my best friends in this body. So it is an uncomfortable position to be in. I want to make three points. The first is that right now, if India were to engage in transferring any lethal weaponry to Iran, it would be in violation of our law. It would damage the relationship and fundamentally alter our relationship. It is existing U.S. law. No country can transfer lethal weaponry to Iran and maintain our support. That is No. 1. The second point I would like to make is with the underlying concern--I know it is much broader than this--of my friend from California. I think if I read her correctly--and I may not be--somehow this agreement is going to yield the prospect that India will be in a better position to transfer some kind of technology in this military- to-military relationship to Iran that will help Iran get the nuclear capability. The truth is, as the chairman has pointed out, they have entered into an agreement with us not to do that. But, secondly, they have voted in the IAEA with the Board of Governors to sanction Iran, to take issue with Iran, to report it to the U.N., and they voted with us in the U.N. So they are openly taking on Iran in terms of the thing of greatest concern to us all. I know my friend spoke eloquently about the support of terrorism by Iran. The implication is that any military-to-military assistance goes directly to helping the capability of the Iranians to help support Hezbollah and other organizations that are terrorist organizations around the world. I will make the following observation: She also stated accurately that Indian entities have been sanctioned for transferring materials to Iran. I must point out, so has Germany, so has the Spanish, so have European allies of ours. They also had entities sanctioned. It is not unique to India that an organization would, in fact, provide assistance to Iran in a way that would generate United States sanctions. Spain is the most recent offender. I conclude by saying this is the hardest piece to swallow--not what the Senator said, but what I am about to say is the hardest piece to swallow. Palmerston had the famous expression that countries don't have permanent friends, they have permanent interests. Look where India resides and look where Iran resides. One of the countries they are most concerned about is Pakistan. Now, it is not reasonable to assume that India and Iran would not want to have a military relationship where they shared information and/or concerns relative to Pakistan. So for them to forswear any kind of relationship at all with India that has a military or quasi-military relationship is to essentially suggest to them that they should not deal with a common enemy. Look what we are doing. We are dealing with a country that we sanctioned before, that we have clearly decided is not a democratic country, that clearly has probably the largest percentage of jihadists residing in it, with, arguably, the least significant effort to deal with these jihadists--the country of Pakistan. What are we doing? Because we have permanent interests, and our interests are that we have support in the war against jihadists and al-Qaida and terrorist organizations, we are cooperating with a country we otherwise probably would not cooperate with. How would we feel if a European country or any other country around the world said--or India said--we will not trade with you, the United States of America, as long as you continue to have a military-to- military relationship with Pakistan, a country that is, in fact, exporting--or if they are not exporting, at least cooperating with or turning a blind eye to the terrorist organizations that reside within their country? We would say, Wait a minute. You want to trade with us, trade with us. You want to tell us whether out of our self-interest we can cooperate with Pakistan--which is not what you call a model democracy--then we would say no. The only generic point I want to make, I know of no evidence--it may exist, but I am unaware of it--where India is materially cooperating with Iran in order for Iran to be able to better supply, support, and/ or encourage terrorism. I know of no such interest and no such circumstance. Maybe my friend may know what I do not. She may have gotten a recent briefing with the Intelligence Committee where somebody said that, but I am unaware of any such cooperation that has the net effect of promoting terror. What I do know is we have built into the law now the ability to sanction India if, in fact, India does supply lethal weapons or was in any way cooperating with promoting Iran's nuclear program. Beyond that, it would break the spirit of the entire agreement we have with India. If it came to light that somehow there was evidence that India was in any way cooperating with Iran's nuclear program, this deal is done. This is over. It is finished. It is gone. At the root of this overall agreement, which my colleague, understandably, does not like, the underlying issue here is this agreement between India and the United States. The underlying premise is based upon a notion of a maturing relationship based on trust that they will not only not violate the letter but will not violate the spirit of this agreement. Let me conclude by saying what the spirit of the agreement is. The spirit of the agreement is we are not going to do anything, United States of America, that we would not otherwise be able to do; we will not do anything with what you provide for us that will increase our capacity, our ability, our desire, or our intent to deal with our nuclear program. They have said straightforwardly at the same time, We are keeping our nuclear program. We ain't giving it up. It is a little bit like us saying now--and this will be my last statement--you know, Pakistan violated the law, Pakistan violated our law. It went out and it broke the deal and it did what India did. On top of that, Pakistan was the largest proliferator in the history of the world of nuclear capability through A.Q. Khan. And guess what. We are going to bite our nose off to spite our face. Now that we need Pakistan in dealing with this war on terror, we are going to sanction Pakistan, we are not going to cooperate with Pakistan, we are going to do nothing with Pakistan even though we acknowledge that might give greater sustenance to al-Qaida, bin Laden, the Taliban, et cetera. Countries make hard choices. They are not neat and clean. I suggest if we are going to impose upon India a requirement to cease and desist with any military-to-military relationships notwithstanding they have common enemies and common concerns with Iran, as bad as Iran is, notwithstanding the fact that there is no evidence that they are promoting and/or giving the ability to support terrorism's greater thrust, notwithstanding the fact they have agreed to do everything they can to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power, if we are going to sanction them this way, I ask the rhetorical question: Why wouldn't the rest of the world sanction us for our relationship with Pakistan. And why are we cooperating with Pakistan? If anybody in the deal is not the ideal partner right now, it is Pakistan. But what do we do? To steal a phrase from a former President that I often hear, comments we hear on CNN all the time, his comment always is ``you got to accept life in the world as you find it.'' I am paraphrasing a former President. I think it is close to a quote. We have to accept the world as we find it, make the best out of it, and promote our interest to the greatest extent. Sometimes it means we make less than perfect deals. Had Chairman Lugar been President Lugar, had Senator Boxer been Senator Boxer, had I been their Secretary of State, I believe I could have gotten a better deal than we got. But the fact is, we are where we are, as the old trade expression goes, and I believe the downside of rejecting this treaty is so much further down than any downside that flows from supporting this changed law allowing this to go forward. In that sense, it is not a close call. I suggest to my friend, I think everything she says has merit in the abstract. But we are living in the world we live in now based on the parameters we are looking at. I think this amendment, which would kill the agreement, is not worth the candle because it would do that--not because it doesn't have underlying merit. I yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, let me, in brief response, say I understand the intent of the amendment. But the amendment uses the words, for example, ``India cannot use United States-origin equipment . . . ,'' ``India cannot replicate and subsequently use. . . .'' No one can certify they cannot. It is possible they could. The question is whether we are insisting that they not use it. We are insisting they are not using it, and we have built into this agreement a requirement on the part of the administration to look at whether they are, in fact, doing it. So the question is not whether they can or cannot. Anything can happen. A President cannot certify it is not possible. That is what ``cannot'' says. But he can certify to the best of his knowledge it is not occurring. That is what we require. ``Cannot'' makes this a deal- breaker. No President could certify it. ``Cannot'' translates into ``it is not possible to replicate, it is not possible to . . . ,'' and no one can certify to that. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise today to pay special tribute to the General Federation of Women's Clubs and their recent work to fight domestic violence. The organization is a gem among our midst. Founded in April 1890, it is one of the world's oldest and largest women's volunteer organizations. More than 150,000 women members in 5,000 local and 20 international clubs volunteer over 13 million hours and contribute approximately $35 million through more than 160,000 club projects. I can't underestimate how powerful and influential this corps of volunteers is to the health of our Nation. I am particularly proud that this year the international president, Jacqueline Pierce, has adopted ``Domestic Violence Awareness and Prevention'' as her President's Special Project for 2006-2008. Nannette White, a member from Louisiana, serves as the national chairperson of the President's Special Project, and with the support of a national committee of women, promotes participation in this project. All across the Nation, local women's clubs are adopting battered women's shelters and donating needed goods such as food, linens, health care items, and more. In Nevada, members sponsored a public service campaign on radio stations to promote important messages about violence prevention. In Mississippi, members distributed 2,000 fliers with information on the National Domestic Violence Hotline and helped raise funds for the Mississippi State Coalition Against Domestic Violence. This is just a small sampling of the good works being done. As part of this special project, the General Federation of Women's Clubs forged a historic collaboration with the Family Violence Prevention Fund, the National Domestic Violence Hotline, the National Network to End Domestic Violence and domestic violence organizations in communities throughout the United States. Innovative partnerships between the public and private sector, new relationships between organizations--these are the pathways to solutions to our Nation's most pressing problems. I have spent almost 34 years of my life in Congress and witnessed the transformative impact of powerful Federal legislation. For instance, the Violence Against Women Act improved Federal and State criminal laws and enacted programs that encourage prosecution of abusers, create battered women's shelters and sponsor educational campaigns. Over the past decade, the act's programs have distributed over $4 billion to States, local governments, and nonprofit organizations. Yet despite this extraordinary success, I am convinced that Federal Government action alone cannot end domestic violence. We desperately need the individual attention and dedication of volunteers. Change happens one woman at a time and one volunteer at a time. The volunteer work done by club members fills an invaluable role. As my mother would say, these are the people who do God's work. I commend Madam President Pierce for her leadership and commitment to airing our Nation's ``dirty little secret,'' domestic violence. She has brought a whole new legion of women warriors to help battered women and their children. On behalf of the entire Senate, I thank them for their tireless volunteerism to end domestic violence and giving women what they haven't had before--hope.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, the country of Cyprus has occupied a special place in my heart for many years. My admiration for the island and its people grew in recent months as Cypriots opened their arms to assist the thousands of American citizens who fled from Lebanon during this summer's fighting between Hezbollah and Israel. This exceptional display of Hellenic hospitality has reaffirmed Cyprus's importance as a safe harbor amid the unsettled waters of the eastern Mediterranean and a key partner for the United States. For far too long, however, Cyprus has existed as an island divided. An invasion by Turkey in 1974 needlessly separated the island's ethnically Greek and Turkish citizens--two communities that had successfully coexisted for centuries. A generation has now grown to adulthood on either side of a Green Line that segregates Cypriots from both their peaceful shared history and their promising shared destiny. Mr. President, I believe we must correct this wrong before another generation endures a similar fate. In 2004, United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan presented a plan to reunite the island's two communities. The Annan plan certainly wasn't perfect, but it brought the island closer to reunification than any peace initiative in the past three decades. After the plan failed to gain the support of the Greek Cypriot community in an April 2004 referendum, the drive to unify the island largely stagnated, and the U.N. closed its ``good offices'' mission in Nicosia that had worked to facilitate peace negotiations. Over the summer, I have been encouraged by the first real signs of movement toward a settlement since the Annan plan was rejected. Ibrahim Gambari, the United Nations Under Secretary General for Political Affairs, visited Cyprus in July and presided over a joint meeting between the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Tassos Papadopoulos, and the head of the Turkish Cypriot community, Mehmet Ali Talat. The two leaders reaffirmed their commitment to seek a political settlement in an agreement signed on July 8. They are now poised to begin a new round of technical talks that I hope will move the peace process forward. Mr. President, others have rightly stated that Cypriot problems need Cypriot solutions, but I am convinced that those solutions won't be forthcoming without the forceful support of the international community. For years, the United Nations has played a critical role in Cyprus, maintaining a ceasefire and facilitating a political settlement. Under Secretary Gambari will report to the U.N. Security Council in the beginning of December, and the Security Council and Secretary General will subsequently decide whether to renew the mandate of UNFICYP, the U.N. Peacekeeping mission in Cyprus, and reopen the Secretary General's good offices mission in Nicosia. Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders should take advantage of this window of opportunity and launch the technical talks they committed to as part of the July 8 agreement. Once they do, the international community should be ready to support them. I am convinced that given the right conditions and adequate international backing, a solution in Cyprus is both possible and attainable. I hope that members of the Security Council will reach the same conclusion and act accordingly when the issue is before them, and that the new U.N. Secretary General will build on Secretary General Annan's leadership to facilitate a peaceful resolution of this long-running conflict. When it finally happens, the reunification of Cyprus will have significance far beyond the shores of the Mediterranean. A united Cyprus will stand as an example to the world of how different ethnic groups can overcome past wrongs, bridge differences, and live together as neighbors. At a time when too many countries are beset by demons of ethnic and sectarian hatred, it is more important than ever to find an answer to the Cyprus question. If the United States and other members of the international community are willing to act as catalysts for a political settlement, I am confident that future generations of Cypriots can enjoy the peace they rightly deserve.