Joe Biden

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, there is absolutely no evidence today that expanding NATO to include Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary would do anything to exacerbate the problem we all are concerned about--the proliferation of nuclear capability. The truth is, notwithstanding the knowledge on the part of Russia that we are going to expand, they continue to destroy their nuclear weapons under the Nunn-Lugar agreement, they have endorsed and have ratified the CWC agreement, and they have committed to take up the START II agreement. Nothing we have done relative to expansion has any negative impact on the continued cooperation between the United States and Russia to deal with the threat of nuclear warfare. I respectfully suggest that to vote for this amendment turns over the future of what we think the defense architecture of Europe should be to an organization of which we are not a part, and that is the EU. It says that no one can join NATO unless they are first a member of the EU. Why would we turn our fate over to an organization of which we are not a member? I urge my colleagues to vote no on this amendment.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Parliamentary inquiry. The first vote is on the Craig amendment?

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I would like to point out, with regard to the military credibility of NATO raised by my friend from New Jersey, in terms of protecting Poland, I remind him, West Berlin was militarily indefensible but the Warsaw Pact never attacked. Why? Because the Soviet Union knew what would happen. The third point I would make is with regard to the 3-year pause. The clearest reason this amendment is superfluous is in the Resolution of Ratification itself, Section Two, Paragraph Seven. There it clearly states that the U.S. has not consented to invite any state other than the three before us today, and that many subsequent decision to do so would rest on that state's ability to fulfill the obligations of membership, as well as serve the overall political and strategic interests of NATO and the U.S. Further, Article X of the North Atlantic Treaty declares, and as the July 1997 Madrid NATO Summit Declaration repeats, that the door to NATO membership is open to other European states able to further principles of the treaty and to contribute the security of the North Atlantic area. Each applicant country will be judged on its merits. Moreover, in the Resolution of Ratification before us, Section 2, Paragraph 7(A)(iv) requires prior consultation of the Senate by the President before the United States can support the invitation of any new member, and recalls that ratification of any new NATO ally requires the advice and consent of this body. To mandate a pause would tie NATO's hands should an obviously qualified applicant such as Austria applies for membership. For the moment, it appears that the Austrian government has decided against applying for membership, but that could change after elections next year. In fact, Austrian public opinion is already changing. Earlier this month when the Austrian public was informed of NATO's Article 5 guarantees, for the first time in a national poll a majority of Austrians said that Austria should abandon its neutrality and join NATO. So if the Austrian government decides to follow public opinion, would we then want to tell the Austrians, ``Sorry, no applications accepted until the year 2002''? As you know, many, including myself, believe that Solvenia already meets the criteria for NATO membership. I supported its entry in this first wave. There is every indication that Slovenia will be ready to join the Alliance within the next three years. To mandate a pause would take the urgency off the reform efforts that nations such as Bulgaria and Romania have stepped up, at great short- term cost to their standard of living, precisely because they want to make themselves NATO-qualified for the next wave. Even Slovakia, a long-shot applicant because of its poor record on democratization and privatization, may have a dramatic turn-around as a result of national elections this fall. Such a decision would make NATO look like it can't be trusted to judiciously apply its own criteria; namely, that it cannot tell when and whom to invite to become new allies. This is no policy for a great nation like the United States or a great alliance like NATO. Secretary of State Albright told the Foreign Relations Committee on February 24 that just the possibility of joining NATO has inspired declared applicants to accelerate reform, to reach out to their neighbors, and to reject the destructive nationalism of their region's past. As one of many examples of this, Latvia, Lithuania, and Belarus signed in March a border agreement paving the way for a final demarcation of the 500-kilometer Baltic-Belarusian frontier. Given these accomplishments, Secretary Albright warned: A mandated pause would be heard from Tallinn to in the north to Sofia in the south as the sound of an open door slamming shut. It would be seen as a vote of no confidence in the reform-minded governments from the Baltics to the Balkans. It would diminish the incentive nations now have to cooperate with their neighbors and with NATO. It would fracture the consensus NATO itself has reached on the open door. It would be dangerous and utterly unnecessary since the Senate would, in any case, have to approve the admission of any new allies. There are many foreign policy experts who share these views. But let me quote one concerned American who urged me to oppose this amendment. David Harris, Executive Director of the American Jewish Committee, wrote to me on March third, stating: Last June 26, we [the American Jewish Committee] observed that an enlarged NATO will mean greater security and stability and also hasten the political and economic integration of Europe. An expanded NATO means greater stability and security for Central Europe, a region that was the cockpit for the two world wars that brought such horror to the world--and to the Jewish people. For many of the same reasons we supported NATO expansion we now oppose any effort to mandate a pause in initiating procedures for a second round of its enlargement. States throughout Central Europe that hope for eventual membership would feel that the open door enunciated at Madrid had been slammed shut in their face. At a minimum these states would be discouraged, and a pause might lead to instability in the region. Hardliners in the Russian Federation would find vindication. Supporters of this amendment appear to believe that they are stopping a runaway train of immediate NATO membership for every state from Croatia to Kazakhstan. They seem to be unaware that not every European state has declared an intent to join NATO. In particular, Ukraine, at its March 26 meeting with NATO officials, restated its view that while it ``does not rule out'' joining the alliance, such a move is currently unrealistic. Ukraine issued three conditions for joining NATO: (1) decisive public opinion in favor of accession; (2) interoperability of its armed forces with those of NATO members; and (3) a guarantee that its accession would not harm relations with neighboring states, particularly Russia. Recognizing that we already have all the control we need over the speed and choice of future NATO members, I urge my colleagues to vote down this amendment.

Mr. BIDEN. I yield 1 minute to my friend from Massachusetts.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished Senator from West Virginia.

Mr. BIDEN. How much time remains under my control?

Mr. BIDEN. My intention in terms of the now 10 minutes total time I control, I will yield 5 to my senior colleague from Delaware, and then I will yield the remaining 5--and I think that will leave me 1 minute to close--to the distinguished Senator from West Virginia, just so people will know the order. I thank the Chair.

Mr. BIDEN. After consultation with the distinguished Senator from Virginia, in light of the fact several more Senators have asked to speak, I would ask unanimous consent, if the Senator is listening, for 10 additional minutes equally divided.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to my friend from Arizona.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I have 16 minutes remaining in my control. For the benefit of the Senators, so I don't get myself in more trouble in the allocation of time, I am going to yield, in the following order: 5 minutes to the Senator from Virginia, 5 minutes to the Senator from Delaware, and 5 minutes to the Senator from Arizona. That will leave me probably 10 seconds. I now yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Virginia.

Mr. BIDEN. Although I have no objection--I realize we have gotten unanimous consent already with the Senator from Alaska going next--as soon as I did not object, I was informed by my Cloakroom that Senator Conrad, whose amendment is one of those listed as next, objected to it being put aside. I wanted Senator Conrad to know I did not realize he would object to that. I just want the Record to show that I was unaware of that.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, for the benefit of my colleagues, those wishing to speak in opposition to the amendment, that I have been told of, who have not yet spoken, two of them, who are here, are the Senator from Michigan and the Senator from Virginia, Senator Robb, with the possibility of the Senator from Indiana, Senator Lugar, and the Senator from Arizona, Senator McCain, all of whom are against the amendment, I believe all of whom wish to speak against the amendment, two of whom are here. And since I have very limited time left, the two who are here I am very happy to give 5 minutes to, and those who show up next I will give 5 minutes, and then I am out of time. It is my full intention to yield to the Senator from Michigan to speak in opposition.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I am delighted to yield 5 minutes to my friend from Michigan.

Mr. BIDEN. Yes.

Mr. BIDEN. I am delighted to have time to debate it. That is why I think we should just go ahead, have the two amendments, vote. And then the Senator and I and others who wish to debate it from 3 o'clock on, to debate as long as you want. That is fine by me.

Mr. BIDEN. No. I am not trying to be an obstructionist at all. No. 1, I am told by my staff--A, I don't know about the amendment, notwithstanding it has been filed. I have been concentrating on other things. No. 2, I am told by my staff--and they may be incorrect; staff as well as Senators often are--the fact is that I am told that Senator Helms has not signed off on any amendment yet.

Mr. BIDEN. Surely.

Mr. BIDEN. Let me say that, first of all, I do not know what the Stevens amendment is, so I do not want to agree to a time agreement. He is a very formidable adversary on these issues, and I am not about to agree to a time agreement on what I do not know, No. 1.

Mr. BIDEN. I am sure all 7 minutes will be worth yielding.

Mr. BIDEN. I yield 7 minutes to the Senator from Maryland.

Mr. BIDEN. How much time does the Senator need?

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from New Jersey.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for his answer. The Senator from New Jersey raised a point with me. I raised three questions and several rhetorical questions about his comments. He pointed out that because I didn't want to use my time, I did not yield to him, and he did not think he had an opportunity to respond, and he wishes to respond. I am delighted to yield him a couple of minutes on my time at the appropriate time. I don't want to interfere with my friend's comments to respond to the issues I raised.

Mr. BIDEN. If I can ask a question on my time. Does the Senator think--and he is a strong supporter of NATO, and if he thought I was implying that he wasn't, I was not. There are others who believe very strongly that it is no longer as relevant. You and I think it is. Let me ask you, do you think this is a relevant question, a threshold question? Would the American people defend Warsaw? Do you think if that question were not answered in the affirmative, that that should be the test as to whether a nation should come in or not, or whether one should stay in, or we should stay in NATO or not?

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, today I am introducing the New Medicines to Treat Addiction Act of 1998, legislation that builds upon my efforts in previous Congresses to promote research into and development of new medicines to treat the ravages of hard core drug addiction. Since the first call to arms against illegal drugs in 1989, we have learned just how insidious hardcore drug addiction is, even as the ravages of substance abuse--on both the addict and his victims--have become ever more apparent. The frustration in dealing with a seemingly intractable national problem is palpable, most noticeably in the heated rhetoric as politicians blame each other for the failure to find a cure. What gets lost underneath the noise is the recognition that we have not done everything we can to fight this problem and that, like all serious ills, we must take incremental steps one at a time, and refuse to be overwhelmed by the big picture. Throughout my tenure as Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, I called for a multifaceted strategy to combat drug abuse. One of the specific steps I advocated was the creation of incentives to encourage the private sector to develop medicines that treat addiction, an area where promising research has not led--as one would normally expect--to production of medicines. The bill I am introducing today, the New Medicines To Treat Addiction Act of 1998, will hopefully change that. It takes focused aim at one segment of the drug-abusing population-- hardcore addicts, namely users of cocaine and heroin--in part because these addicts are so difficult to treat with traditional methods, and in part because this population commits such a large percentage of drug-related crime. In December, 1989, I commissioned a Judiciary Committee report, ``Pharmacotherapy: A Strategy for the 1990's.'' In that report, I posed the question, ``If drug use is an epidemic, are we doing enough to find a medical `cure' for this disease?'' The report gave the answer ``No.'' Unfortunately, almost a decade later, the answer remains the same. Developing new medicines for the treatment of addiction should be among our highest medical research priorities as a nation. Until we take this modest step, we cannot claim to have done everything reasonable to address the problem, and we should not become so frustrated that we effectively throw up our hands and do nothing. Recent medical advances have increased the possibility of developing medications to treat drug addiction. These advances include a heightened understanding of the physiological and psychological characteristics of drug addition and a greater base of neuroscientific research. One example of this promising research is the recent development of a compound that has been proven to immunize laboratory animals against the effects of cocaine. The compound works like a vaccine by stimulating the immune system to develop an antibody that blocks cocaine from entering the brain. Researchers funded through the National Institute of Drug Abuse believe that this advance may open a whole new avenue for combating addiction. Despite this progress, we still do not have a medication to treat cocaine addiction or drugs to treat many other forms of substance abuse, because the private sector is unsure of the wisdom of making the necessary investment in the production and marketing of such medicines. Private industry has not aggressively developed pharmacotherapies for a variety of reasons, including a small customer base, difficulties distributing medication to the target population, and fear of being associated with substance abusers. We need to create financial incentives to encourage pharmaceutical companies to develop and market these treatments. And we need to develop a new partnership between private industry and the public sector in order to encourage the active marketing and distribution of new medicines so they are accessible to all addicts in need of treatment. While pharmacotherapies alone are not a ``magic bullet'' that will solve our national substance abuse problem, they have the potential to fill a gap in current treatment regimens. The disease of addiction occurs for many reasons, including a variety of personal problems which pharmacotherapy cannot address. Still, by providing a treatment regimen for drug abusers who are not helped by traditional methods, pharmacotherapy holds substantial promise for reducing the crime and health crisis that drug abuse is causing in the United States. The New Medicines to Treat Addiction Act would encourage and support the development of medicines to treat drug addiction in three ways. It reauthorizes and increases funding for the Medications Development Program at the National Institute of Health, which for years has been at the forefront of research into drug addiction. The bill also creates two new incentives for private sector companies to undertake the difficult but important task of developing medicines to treat addiction. First, the bill would provide additional patent protections for companies that develop drugs to treat substance abuse. Under the bill, pharmacotherapies could be designated ``orphan drugs'' and qualify for an exclusive seven-year patent to treat a specific addiction. These extraordinary patent rights would greatly enhance the market value of pharmacotherapies and provide a financial reward for companies that invest in the search to cure drug addiction. This provision was contained in a bill introduced by Senator Kennedy and me in 1990, but was never acted on by Congress. Second, the bill would establish a substantial monetary reward for companies that develop drugs to treat cocaine and heroin addiction but shift the responsibility for marketing and distributing such drugs to the government. This approach would create a financial incentive for drug companies to invest in research and development but enable them to avoid any stigma associated with distributing medicine to substance abusers. The bill would require the National Academy of Sciences to develop strict guidelines for evaluating whether a drug effectively treats cocaine or heroin addiction. If a drug meets these guidelines and is approved by the Food and Drug Administration, then the government must purchase the patent rights for the drug from the company that developed it. The purchase price for the patent rights is established by law: $100 million for a drug to treat cocaine addiction and $50 million for a drug to treat heroin addiction. Once the government has purchased the patent rights, then it is responsible for producing the drug and distributing it to clinics, hospitals, state and local governments, and any other entities qualified to operate drug treatment programs. This joint public/private endeavor will correct the market inefficiencies that have thus far prevented the development of drugs to treat addiction and require the government to take on the responsibilities that industry is unwilling or unable to perform. America's drug problem is reduced each and every time a drug abuser quits his or her habit. Fewer drug addicts mean fewer crimes, fewer hospital admissions, fewer drug-addicted babies and fewer neglected children. The benefits to our country of developing new treatment options such as pharmacotherapies are manifold. Each dollar we spend on advancing options in this area can save us ten or twenty times as much in years to come. The question isn't ``Can we afford to pursue a pharmacotherapy strategy?'' but rather, ``Can we afford not to?'' Congress has long neglected to adopt measures I have proposed to speed the approval of and encourage greater private sector interest in pharmacotherapy. We cannot let another Congress conclude without rectifying our past negligence on this issue. I urge my colleagues to join me in promoting an important, and potentially ground breaking, approach to addressing one of our nation's most serious domestic challenges.