Joe Biden

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. BIDEN. That was my assumption all along, to have an up-or-down vote.

Mr. BIDEN. I also find this notion, and it is repeated in different ways but never in a more articulate fashion than just done by my friend from New Jersey, no force on Earth will be able to defend Poland or the Baltics, and he may have mentioned another country, Ukraine, if Russia is not a democracy. One of the secondary reasons why people want to expand NATO is because we fundamentally reject that notion, but fundamentally reject the notion that if things ``go south,'' to use the colloquial expression, in Russia, that someone will be there to never let it happen to Poland again, just like we defended Germany, just like we defended Turkey, just like we defended Norway. Now, I am going to, at a later point, speak at length about this iron ring notion my friend from Virginia and my friend from New York talk about and point out that there has been a border shared between Norway and Russia that is one of the most heavily fortified places in the world, and during the period when the Soviet Union was at its zenith, we made a judgment as a people that we would defend Norway. Now, I know my friend is not suggesting this, but is anyone implying that peace and stability in Europe is any less at issue if Poland, after having received their independence, were now or again to be invaded as compared to Norway? What are we saying here? And the notion, will we use nuclear weapons to defend Warsaw, do you think anybody in our respective constituency is going to say, yes, let's use them to defend Turkey, Ankara? I respectfully suggest that we can use rhetorical devices to make a point, but that they are able to be used in more than one instance. Maybe you are not going to get a consensus to use the requirement, the nuclear protection in NATO, the consultation provision where we are required to go to the mutual defense, I believe article V--and we always used to hear, when the Soviet Union existed, how many Americans are prepared to trade Bonn for Washington, Bonn for New York City. Well, now to say how many people will be prepared to defend Warsaw, I suggest you might get more people to say they are prepared to defend Warsaw than they are prepared to defend Ankara or Oslo. That is my guess, because there are a heck of a lot more Polish Americans than there are Turkish Americans. I don't think it is a useful, in terms of what our national policy should be, particularly useful point to make because it could be made about every capital in Europe, I suspect, if it were put to the American people today. But the real question to be put to the American people is--I think they answer affirmatively on it--is peace and stability in Europe in our national interest, and it is one of those things that we either pay now or pay later, because Americans have good memories. They understand that every time chaos has reigned in Europe, we have been dragged in this century. And so I suggest further that to denigrate the forces of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, who were equally, or better situated than Spain and Portugal were when they came in, in terms of forces, or to suggest the only way to defend Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic is nuclear weapons is simply militarily not accurate. And so I think what we are really debating here--and I will say it again--and I don't think people really want to speak to it directly-- and what this is really about is whether we should have NATO, period-- not whether we should expand it, but whether we should have it now. Because if a test as to whether or not we are going to admit Poland is whether or not we are going to use nuclear weapons--and it is not an option because there is no serious problem about conventional forces overrunning Poland today--none--you could scramble enough jets, bombers, fighters out of Germany to get to the Polish border without having to have them in Poland at all, to withstand any reasonable conventional capability that is available to the Russians or anyone else right now. But the question is: Would we defend Warsaw? If we don't believe that resoundingly the American people would say that, then we should not let Poland in. I think really what you are saying is that you have to ask the honest question to the folks in Salem, New Jersey, across the river from Delaware, and up in Trenton, and further up in Newark: Are you willing to go to war to save Oslo? I would be willing to make my friend a bet, and let my vote depend on it, that if he got more people to say, yes, we are willing to go to war to defend Oslo, then I will vote against admitting Poland. But my guess is, if you ask any capital in any city in any European country--say possibly London--are you willing to go to war to defend Oslo, I am not sure you would get much of a different answer, no matter where you asked. So if that is the question--and the Presiding Officer knows this issue well--aren't we really asking: Do we want NATO, period? If that is the case, why doesn't someone introduce an amendment, straight up, and stop all this foolishness--I take that back. I withdraw that statement. I don't mean that. Stop all the tangential attacks on expansion and get right to what this is about-- introduce an amendment saying that we no longer need NATO. We can save a lot of money. We spend well over $120 billion a year on the deal-- nothing to do with expansion. I yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN. I make a point, I have the floor.

Mr. BIDEN. Let me make a second point.

Mr. BIDEN. Before the Senator from New Jersey leaves the floor, I want to briefly make two points. I find his argument absolutely fascinating that economic dependence or integration with the United States is a prerequisite for NATO membership. I wonder if he could explain to me what that dependence was we had with Norway or that dependence we have with Denmark or Portugal or Spain? As each came in, as each of these nations came in, if there is a notion that there is a prerequisite of an economic dependency--we have more invested in Poland, more in Poland now than we did at the time of these countries coming in.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, from a strictly American foreign policy viewpoint, requiring EU membership first is sheer folly. Why would we want to place such a key element of our national security decisionmaking in the hands of the European Union--an organization to which we do not belong? Already we are seeing the EU members disagreeing over how quickly those invited should be allowed in. To give the EU, in effect, a veto over NATO membership, might encourage the creation of an EU caucus within NATO, limiting the United States' ability to advance our diplomatic and military goals in the committees of the Alliance. Moreover, advocates of this amendment have misunderstood the importance of NATO membership prior to EU membership, both from a policy and historical context. From a policy perspective, NATO membership in advance of EU membership will provide the security these countries need to continue their economic reforms and help to ensure a climate of confidence essential for continued foreign investment and economic integration. From a historical perspective, in all its reports on all three rounds of NATO enlargements that took place from 1952 to 1982, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee cited European economic development and integration as one key benefit of expanding NATO's zone of stability. I would like to briefly quote from these Senate Foreign Relations Committee reports: 1949 Report establishing NATO: The treaty is designed to contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations, to strengthen the free institutions of the parties and promote better understanding of the principles upon which they are founded, to promote conditions of stability and well-being, and to encourage economic collaboration. It should facilitate long-term economic recovery through replacing the sense of insecurity by one of confidence in the future. The Committee believes that the [1949] North Atlantic Pact, by providing the means for cooperation in matters of common security and national defense, creates a favorable climate for further steps toward progressively closer European integration * * * In 1952, Secretary of State Acheson, in his testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee, urged NATO membership for Greece and Turkey first by recalling that these two nations already enjoyed an associate status with NATO's activities in the Eastern Mediterranean. It was in response to Athens' and Ankara's formal request--their belief that associate status was inadequate to their national defense needs-- that they were favorably considered for NATO membership. Acheson emphasized that positive action rested not only on their military contributions to the Alliance, but on their advances in democracy, rule of law, and Western orientation, and the likelihood that NATO membership would deepen this. It should be noted that Greece did not enter the European Union until nearly twenty years after its accession to NATO. Turkish membership in the EU remains a contentious, unresolved issue. Are we supposed to kick Turkey out of NATO because it doesn't belong to the EU? The 1955 Foreign Relations Committee report welcomed West German accession: * * * not only as a major step toward the elimination of intra-European strife but in a broader sense, these agreements provide the foundation for close cooperation and integration among European allies . . . The Committee was impressed in particular with Secretary Dulles' statement on the psychological impact of this association--the increased effectiveness and the sense of unity and cohesion which will be brought about in Western Europe by German participation in NATO and the Western European Union. Of all the examples, the last one--Spanish accession to NATO in 1982--bears the closest resemblance to that of the current applicants. Spain, having returned to democracy only five years earlier, believed that NATO membership would help consolidate Spanish democracy and assist, at lesser cost, a process of military modernization it had to undertake regardless of membership. Aside from its geography, Spain was judged to offer little in the way of military assets useful to the Alliance in 1982 prior to the completion of its modernization. Nevertheless, in favorably reporting Spanish accession to NATO to the full Senate, the Foreign Relations Committee recorded a brief exchange between then-Chairman Charles Percy and then-State Department European Bureau Chief Larry Eagleburger explaining why Spanish accession to NATO was so important to broad U.S. national security interests. Because this exchange is so similar to our situation today, I would like to quote from it. Chairman Percy noted: At a time when NATO's cohesiveness and viability is being critically questioned in the press, I find Spain's NATO membership application a reaffirmation of the fundamental principles of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, a group of sovereign nations sharing common values and aspirations and committed to working together despite differences to guarantee the security, prosperity, and defense of Western democracy. Assistant Secretary Eagleburger replied: * * * in terms of that question of Spanish democracy, it is terribly important that we do everything we can to tie Spain to Western institutions, to have those people be able to deal with Western parliamentarians who also have a commitment to democracy * * * Every tie we can create between Spain and Western Europe and the United States, institutional tie, in fact, I think, strengthens the whole process of democracy in Spain. Spain did not enter the EU until 1986, four years after accession to NATO. Historically, membership in NATO has preceded membership in European common market or economic integration groupings. It is much easier to develop habits of cooperation in common defense as a precursor to the much more complex negotiations leading to economic integration. If we wait for the EU to act, we may be waiting for a long time. For example according to recent polls, the Austrian public opposes EU membership for four of the five recent EU invitees. Finally, recent history has shown that, in European capitals, when presented with a choice between farm policy and foreign policy, farm policy always wins. For all these reasons, Mr. President, I oppose the Moynihan amendment and urge my colleagues to do so.

Mr. BIDEN. I yield to my friend from Texas the remainder of time on this amendment, if I may yield him a total of 5 minutes, whatever that takes off of the Warner amendment--if I am able to do that?

Mr. BIDEN. I beg your pardon?

Mr. BIDEN. I yield myself 30 seconds. Madam President, the Treaty of Rome wasn't until the mid-1950s, and it was unheard of in 1949, as the Schuman Plan was. The only point I am making is, any cooperation in Europe was one of the purposes of NATO; it was to encourage that cooperation. But what they had in mind in May of 1949 may have been only the Schuman Plan and/or something else. The EU wasn't even around until the mid-1950s. That wasn't even thought of either. So the whole notion was that economic cooperation in Europe produced stability, enhanced democracy, and, in turn, allowed for military security. It is still the case. I reserve the remainder of my time.

Mr. BIDEN. But--it is hyperbole that I am engaging in now, it was just pointed out by my friend from New York. But let me tell you what is not hyperbole. There is no historical precedent for this. There is no logical rationale as to why this would, in fact, facilitate NATO membership down the road, because we all know farm policy will prevail over foreign policy. And lastly, I respectfully suggest that it bears no relationship, no relationship whatsoever, to anything anyone in the past has thought was necessary to strengthen NATO--none, zero, none, historically, politically, economically, socially, in any way. It may be a good idea, and I have been battling the Europeans, in my capacity as the chairman of or the ranking member of the European Affairs Subcommittee, for years, to ``do the right thing. Do the right thing. Let your brothers in.'' Let me point out, if tomorrow you went to the Russians and said, ``I have a deal for you; here is what we are going to do: All those European countries or former satellite states will become part of the EU and you will never be a member of the EU; or they will not be members of the EU, but they will be members of NATO, which you may be able to do; you choose''--there is not an economist, there is not a democrat, in Russia who would choose the former over the latter, in my humble opinion, not a one. So the fear--if you are worried about Russia being isolated, then isolate Russia economically from the rest of Europe as a condition before they can enter, anyone can enter, NATO. The Europeans may grow beyond that and show their largess and bring in Russian farmers and all that wheat--all that wheat, as we give them the technological capability and the transportation infrastructure to be able to transport it to Europe. You watch. You watch. I am willing to bet any of you anything you would like, the likelihood of the EU being economically generous, extending any largess to the East, is zero, as distinguished from this defensive military alliance that provides political security for Russia on her border and diminishes the realistic prospect that any demagoguing nationalist will be able to inflame people enough to think that they could, in fact, realize any dead dreams. I reserve the remainder of my time.

Mr. BIDEN. To be able to ensure their economic stability. There is no question it referred to that. And there is no question that Acheson, referring to the relationship in 1952, said so in his testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee when he urged Greek and Turkish membership by first recalling that the two nations already joined us in an associate status with NATO, as do the countries we are talking about now, and Acheson emphasized that ``the positive action rested not on their military contributions to the alliance but on their advances in democracy, rule of law, western orientation and the likelihood that NATO membership would deepen this.'' The only point I am trying to make is the obvious one we keep forgetting. My colleagues who oppose expansion and wish to slow it or change it or alter it come to the floor and argue that this was uniquely a military alliance; its soul purpose was to make sure the Fulda Gap was not wide open for Warsaw Pact units to come pouring through. That was its essential purpose. It is still its essential purpose. But it was not its only purpose in the beginning, in the middle, in the end. And so I would suggest that we tend to intentionally confuse our colleagues and the public when we say that we raise all these questions about the economic stability. The economic stability of the countries in question coming in is relevant in terms of whether they can pay their freight. That is an important question. But this notion of winners and losers, now, I would ask the rhetorical question, if in fact by bringing the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary into NATO, that would in fact seriously disadvantage Romania, Slovenia, and all the other countries in question, does anyone ever stop to ask themselves the question, why is Romania ardently for Hungary's membership? Is it because they like being put at an economic disadvantage? Is it because they think this is a good idea; it will spur the competitive juices of our people? Is that why? If this is going to be so debilitating because there is going to be losers, that this is a zero sum game, why are they all for it? Not for it tepidly, not for it on the margins, but for it with an enthusiasm to the degree they send their Foreign Ministers to this country to importune me and many others. Please. Now, obviously, they want to get in. They want to get in in the future. They have no promise of getting in. They have the hope of getting in. But the idea that we are going to debilitate, we are going to worsen, we are going to put at a serious disadvantage the economy of our other friends seems either to suggest that our other friends are too stupid to know what their own economic interests are--and they clearly are not, in my view--or it is not debilitating to their economies. Madam President, it seems to me if you want to take a further look at this, in 1955, the Foreign Relations Committee report welcomed West Germany as ``not only a major step toward the elimination of intra- European strife but in a broader sense these agreements provide the foundation for close cooperation and integration among European allies. The committee was impressed with particularly Secretary Dulles' statement on the psychological impact of this association, the increased effectiveness of the sense of duty, and the cohesion which will be brought about in Western Europe by Germany's participation in the Western European Union as well as NATO.'' Again, to make the point. Spain, in 1982, bears the closest resemblance to the current applicants. Spain, having returned to democracy only 5 years earlier, believed NATO membership would consolidate Spanish democracy and assist at a lesser cost, as the Poles believe, the process of military modernization it had to undertake regardless of membership. And aside from geography, Spain was judged to offer little in the way of military assets useful to the alliance in 1982 prior to the completion of its modernization. Spain did not enter the EU until 1986, 4 years after, 4 years after NATO. Madam President, historically, the economic component of the impact on the relationship with NATO of a new member state has been considered from 1949 on, and every time since, and it has been viewed consistently as better for the economies of the countries that have been unable to gain these larger economic relationships to join NATO first. That has been a stated purpose of bringing them in as well as the military component. Historically, membership in NATO has preceded membership in the European Common Market, or any economic grouping, in every instance. Reserving the remainder of my time by saying this--when I finish this one comment. Why in the Lord's name would we, unless we just were simply flat against expanding NATO--which I understand. If this is designed as a killer amendment, it is a good strategy, but the logic of it I am lost in trying to comprehend. I find no logic to it, other than it being a killer amendment. You might as well attach an antiabortion amendment to the treaty. That would kill it. I don't want to give anybody any ideas. In this place, it may generate some ideas, but not by any of the Members on the floor.

Mr. BIDEN. It clearly did. But they needed military security----

Mr. BIDEN. It clearly did.

Mr. BIDEN. Yes, it clearly did.

Mr. BIDEN. I would be delighted to yield.

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, it must be that I am a little slow on the uptake here, because it seems to me that my friends are making my case. Let me explain what I mean by that, and they can correct me. First of all, in the Foreign Relations Committee, I recall when we had this vote--and I say it again--in Europe, farm--f-a-r-m--policy always trumps foreign policy. Both have made my point. They acknowledge that. There is no possibility that Europe is going to do the right thing. They have not thus far. The reason, in my view, we must stay as a European power is that they have continued to demonstrate their immaturity over the past, and not much has changed in 50 years in terms of the willingness of anyone to lead. If we acknowledge that farm--f-a-r-m--policy always trumps foreign policy in Europe--I challenge anyone to give me an example where it has not--then I ask you: Is this not a red herring? Join EU first before you can get into NATO. The second point I will make: No one knows the history of this nation and Europe on this floor better than my friend from New York. As I said before, and I mean this sincerely, I am always uncomfortable when I am on the opposite side of an argument with my friend from New York. Let me review very, very briefly the history of NATO and its founding, and the relationship between the economic health of a nation being invited in, and the ability or the willingness of the United States and other NATO members to invite that nation in. From a policy perspective, NATO membership and EU membership--that is what this amendment is about, EU membership first before NATO--it is supposed to, and has been suggested by my two friends who are the sponsors of this amendment, somehow put the cart before the horse, that is, military alliance before economic unity, economic growth, economic security. I quote from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee report of 1949, the document that was brought to the floor of the Senate urging us to sign the Washington treaty. It said: This treaty is designed to contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relationships, to strengthen free institutions of the parties, and promote better understanding of the principles upon which they are founded, to promote the conditions of stability and well-being, and to encourage economic collaboration. It should facilitate long-term economic recovery through replacing the sense of insecurity by one of confidence in the future. That was the original purpose. The original purpose was to promote economic stability. Nobody said then nor has--and I will quote Acheson and a few others in a moment. Nobody has said then or at any moment in our history since that time that, by the way, a condition of joining NATO must be economic integration first, should be economic integration first, must be a demonstration of a strong economy first. No one has ever said that, including George Kennan. George Kennan argued and thought this would promote economic stability as well as military security.

Mr. BIDEN. Good. I thank you.

Mr. BIDEN. Does this mean that Turkey has to get out of NATO now?

Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator yield for a question on my time?

Mr. BIDEN. That is why the Senator should vote against his first amendment and for the second amendment. Mr. SMITH of Oregon addressed the Chair.

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, as the Senator knows, they are routinely dismantling that system under Nunn-Lugar, in the face of expansion of NATO. I find that fascinating, and I also find it fascinating that they overwhelmingly ratified the CWC in the Duma. And as recently as two weeks ago, the number two man in the Kremlin is here telling us--excuse me, the foreign minister is here in the United States saying, by the way, by the end of the summer we are going to ratify START II. I don't fail to share the concerns of my friends about the nuclear hair trigger. My point is, as we are talking about expanding NATO, what they have been doing is exactly the opposite of what is being implied here. They have continued to move forward on arms control agreement, they have continued to destroy their nuclear arsenal, they have continued to go along with the CFE arms agreement and other treaties and destroyed their conventional weapons, saying they will no longer abide by the doctrine of no first use, which occurred in 1992 when they realized that all they had left was their nuclear arsenal. That is my point. It is non sequitur to suggest that the reason why we should be concerned is we are expanding NATO. That has nothing to do with it. There is not a shred of evidence of that. Now, there may very well be a hardening of positions in the domestic political situation in Russia. It may very well be that the browns and the reds get a little more muscle and the nationalists gain some. I don't think so, but I acknowledge that it may be. But their nuclear doctrine is unrelated, put in place 5 years before NATO was a glint in the eye of President Clinton. I yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN. On my own time, if I might say, that is a little bit like my wife deciding that she is no longer going to cook dinner because she is receiving her Ph.D. and is taking too much time in class, and then 6 months later, after having made that decision, when I, in fact, do something she does not like, she says to me, ``I want to formally tell you I haven't been cooking dinner, but I want you to know the reason I am not cooking dinner now is because you were late coming home tonight because you didn't call me from Washington and we missed going to that play.'' That is what it is like. It has nothing to do--she didn't cook me dinner before for reasons unrelated to me coming home late, but if she wants to make a point that I missed a play, she may very well reiterate, bring out of an old bag something that is already being used. That is what the Russians have done, and Mr. Kennan, a revered figure we both know--you know him better than I--believes this is dangerous. Paul Nitze thinks it is dangerous for totally different reasons. Kennan thinks it is dangerous because he thinks it will exacerbate the prospects of any democracy occurring in Russia. Nitze thinks it is dangerous because he is worried that NATO will get fat and flabby now and not be available as a significant military force, were things to go back in Russia. I think it is comparing--with all due respect to my learned friend-- apples and oranges.

Mr. BIDEN. I put that question on my time, and then I will yield.

Mr. BIDEN. I will yield to my colleague, who has somewhere to go, but I want to ask the Senator from New York a question. Is he aware that the point he is making about a hair trigger--that is, that the Russians have moved to a doctrine of not eschewing the doctrine of first use, that they are now saying they may have to rely on the first use of nuclear weapons? Is he aware that that doctrine which was changed in 1992 had nothing to do with the expansion of NATO? In 1992, when the Russian military realized that they, in fact, had imploded when they were incapable of defending their borders, they did exactly what NATO did when we concluded we did not have the conventional force capacity to stop an all-out attack in Europe and indicated that we would use nuclear weapons if, in fact, we were attacked. I ask my friend--I am fascinated by his rendition, and I share his concern about the hair trigger. But is he suggesting the decision in 1992 where Russia declared that it would not any longer abide by its previous policy of no first use of nuclear weapons--is he aware that was long before the contemplation of expansion of NATO?