Joe Biden

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. BIDEN. Let me state my opposition and why I oppose the Craig amendment. I find this debate over the last several weeks to be, in a sense, fascinating--fascinating in this regard. The Members of the Senate who express the greatest concern about the ability of Russia to veto any action NATO takes, the Senators who--with the exception of the Presiding Officer now, who expressed that concern himself--the Senators who have been most vocal about a NATO-Russian accord are now on the floor being the most vocal about their concern about how Russia is going to greet our expanding NATO or voting to expand NATO. So that is one thing I find somewhat anomalous. Yesterday, I found it somewhat strange that those who did not want us entangled in border wars in Europe, as they phrased it, or ethnic conflicts in Europe, were the very people who wanted to give up our veto power to be involved in those. That is, right now, under the organizational structure of NATO, if all 15 NATO nations say we should go in and settle this dispute here in Europe and we say no, that is it, we don't go. I found it somewhat anomalous that they were, yesterday, prepared to say: Look, let's have this new dispute resolution mechanism which forced us, whatever iteration it would have come out in, to give up our veto power over that. Now, today, Senator Craig, who has been one of the most outspoken opponents, to his credit, to the former Soviet Union, concerned about Russian interference in American affairs--I may be mistaken, but I think he has a very healthy skepticism about any aid to Russia--is now on the floor. He, I think--I know unintentionally, at least in my view--is on the floor unintentionally giving Russia another veto power. Mr. President, to reiterate, the amendment of Senator Craig would delay U.S. approval of the accession of Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic to NATO until Congress passes specific authorization for the continued deployment of U.S. forces in Bosnia. This amendment should be rejected because it mixes two vital questions of national security that deserve to be debated and decided, each on its own merits. On Bosnia, the U.S. has led successful IFOR and SFOR missions there composed primarily, but by no means exclusively, of NATO forces. The Senate will continue to address the question of whether and how we should continue our participation in the Bosnia mission just as we did during the emergency supplemental budget appropriation adopted prior to the Spring Recess. Today, we face an entirely different question: should we vote to bring three worthy countries into NATO as new allies? If we are using contributions to the Bosnia mission as a criterion for NATO membership, then all three of the applicants before us are highly qualified. Hungary provided a 400-500 troop engineer battalion to IFOR, and a 200-250 troop group to SFOR, as well as a staging area for some 80,000 American troops on rotation through Bosnia at one of its air bases. The Czech Republic has been one of the largest per capita contributors with an 870-person mechanized battalion for IFOR, and a 620-person battalion for SFOR. Poland, with troops already deployed in half a dozen U.N. peacekeeping missions, contributed a 400-troop airborne infantry battalion to SFOR. All three nations provided these assets well before they were formally invited to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty, demonstrating early their willingness to share this burden with us. The Senate should reject this amendment. Let us decide these two important questions as they should be--separately, with due consideration for the merits of each case.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I just turned to my staff and I said, ``I'm going to wait to deliver my statement until Senator Craig is on the floor,'' not realizing Senator Craig was presiding. I am delighted he is here. (Mr. SMITH of Oregon assumed the Chair.)

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will make a geographic point. The Polish border, I am guessing, is about 200 miles from the Russian border, if you do not count Kaliningrad where there are not Russian divisions, et cetera. If you were to take a look--my friend says that if in fact this threat, any threat, to Poland from Russia, a NATO commitment to defend would not be credible because of three American divisions. The fact of the matter is Poland is on the Russian border. From the Russian border to the far border of Poland to Belarus is essentially the same distance from the main body of Russia to Poland. The number of American NATO and other divisions that sit in Germany are by a factor of 25 more credible than any force Russia now or in the near term could use to threaten Poland. So the idea we do not have the physical capability, which I understand is the point being made, the physical capability of defending Poland once the pledge is made is in fact, I think, inaccurate. I yield the floor. I reserve the remainder of my time. Mr. LIEBERMAN addressed the Chair.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, the best time to target a new drug with uncompromising enforcement pressure is before abuse of that drug has overwhelmed our communities. That is why I introduced legislation last Congress to place tight federal controls on the date rape drug Rohpynol--also known as Roofies--which was becoming known as the Quaalude of the Nineties as its popularity spread throughout the United States. My bill would have shifted Rohpynol to schedule 1 of the Federal Controlled Substances Act. Rescheduling is important for three simple reasons: First, Federal re-scheduling triggers increases in State drug law penalties, and since we all know that more than 95 percent of all drug cases are prosecuted at the State level, not by the Federal Government, it is vitally important that we re-schedule. Second, Federal re-scheduling to schedule 1 triggers the toughest Federal penalties--up to a year in prison and at least a $1,000 fine for a first offense of simple possession. And, third, re-scheduling has proven to work. In 1984, I worked to reschedule Quaaludes, Congress passed the law, and the Quaalude epidemic was greatly reduced. And, in 1990, I worked to re-schedule steroids, Congress passed the law, and again a drug epidemic that had been on the rise was reversed. Despite evidence of a growing Rohpynol epidemic, some argued that my efforts to re-schedule the drug by legislation were premature. Accordingly, I agreed to hold off on legislative action and wait for a Drug Enforcement Administration decision on whether to schedule the drug through the lengthy and cumbersome administrative process. As I predicted, the DEA report on Rohpynol--handed down in November-- correctly concludes that despite the rapid spread of Rohpynol throughout the country, DEA cannot re-schedule Rohpynol by rulemaking at this time. The report notes, however, that Congress is not bound by the bureaucratic re-scheduling process the DEA must follow. Congress can-- and in my view should--pass legislation to reschedule Rohpynol. Specifically the report states: ``This inability to reschedule [Rohpynol] administratively . . . does not affect Congress' ability to place [the drug] in schedule 1 through the legislative process''--as we did with Quaaludes in 1984 and Anabolic Steroids in 1990. Let me also note that the DEA report confirmed a number of facts about the extent of the Rohpynol problem: DEA found more than 4,000 documented cases--in 36 States--of sale or possession of the drug, which is not marketed in the United States and must be smuggled in. ``In spite of DEA's inability to reschedule [Rohypnol] through administrative proceedings, DEA remains very concerned about the abuse'' of the drug. ``Middle and high school students have been known to use [Rohypnol] as an alternative to alcohol to achieve an intoxicated state during school hours. [The drug] is much more difficult to detect than alcohol, which produces a characteristic odor.'' ``DEA is extremely concerned about the use of [Rohypnol] in the commission of sexual assaults.'' ``The number of sexual assaults in which [Rohypnol] is used may be underreported''--because the drug's effects often cause rape victims to be unable to remember details of their assaults and because rape crisis centers, hospitals, and law enforcement have only recently become aware that Rohypnol can be used to facilitate sex crimes. Nonetheless, ``DEA is aware of at least 5 individuals who have been convicted of rape in which the evidence suggests that [the Rohypnol drug] was used to incapacitate the victim.'' ``The actual number of sexual assault cases involving [the drug] is not known. It is difficult to obtain evidence that [the Rohypnol drug] was used in an assault.'' I would also note that my efforts to re-schedule this drug have already had beneficial results: The manufacturer of Rohypnol recently announced that it had developed a new formula to minimize the potential for abuse of the drug in sexual assaults. This is an important step. But pills produced under the old Rohypnol formula are still in circulation, and pills made by other manufacturers can still be smuggled in. Furthermore, the new formula will not prevent kids from continuing to ingest this dangerous drug voluntarily for a cheap high. In short, stricter, Federal controls remain necessary; and DEA is powerless to respond to Rohypnol abuse until the problem gets even worse. Therefore, I am reintroducing my bill to re-schedule Rohypnol in schedule 1 of the Controlled Substances Act. I urge my colleagues to support this effort to take action against this dangerous drug now, rather than waiting for the problem to develop into an epidemic. My bill also places ``Special K''--ketamine hydrochloride--a dangerous hallucinogen very similar to PCP, on schedule III of the Controlled Substances Act. Despite Special K's rising popularity as a ``club drug'' of choice among kids, the drug is not even illegal in most States. This has crippled State authorities' ability to fight ketamine abuse. For example, in February 1997, two men accused of stealing ketamine from a Ville Platte, Louisiana veterinary clinic and cooking the drug into a powder could not be prosecuted under State drug control laws because ketamine is not listed as a Federal controlled substance. Similarly, a New Jersey youth recently found to be with possessing and distributing ketamine could be charged with only a disorderly persons offense. Prosecutors are trying to combat increased Ketamine use by seeking lengthy prison terms for possession of the drugs--like marijuana--that users mix with Ketamine, but if it is just Special K, there's nothing they can do about it. I am convinced that scheduling Ketamine will help our effort to fight the spread of this dangerous drug by triggering increases in State drug law penalties. Without Federal scheduling, many States will not be able to address the Ketamine problem until it is too late and Special K has already infiltrated their communities. Medical professionals who use Ketamine--including the American Veterinary Medical Association and the American Association of Nurse Anesthetists--support scheduling, having determined that it will accomplish our goal of ``preventing the diversion and unauthorized use of Ketamine'' while allowing ``continued, responsible use'' of the drug for legitimate purposes. [Letter from Mary Beth Leininger, D.V.M., President of the American Veterinary Medical Association] And the largest manufacturer of Ketamine has concluded that ``moving the product to schedule III classification is in the best interest of the veterinary industry and the public.'' [Letter from E. Thomas Corcoran, President of Fort Dodge Animal Health, a Division of American Home Products Corporation]. Scheduling Ketamine will give State authorities the tools they desperately need to fight its abuse by young people--and end the legal anomaly that leaves those who sell Ketamine to our children beyond the reach of the law--even when they are caught ``red-handed''. I urge my colleagues to support this legislation. In addition to raising controls on Rohypnol and Ketamine, the legislation I am introducing today would increase the ability of the Attorney General to respond to new drug emergencies in the future. Our Federal drug control laws currently allow the Attorney General limited authority to respond to certain new drugs on an emergency basis--by temporarily subjecting them the strictest Federal control while the extensive administrative procedure for permanent scheduling proceeds. But the Attorney General has not been able to use this authority to respond to the Rohypnol and Special K emergencies--because she does not have authority to--move drugs from one schedule to another, or to schedule drugs that the Food and Drug Administration has allowed companies to research but not to sell. This amendment would grant the administration this important authority by--authorizing the Attorney General to move a scheduled drug--like Rohypnol--to schedule I in an Emergency; by applying emergency rescheduling authority to ``investigational new drugs''--like Special K--that the Food and Drug Administration has approved for research purposes only, but not for marketing. And by providing that a rescheduling drug remains on the temporary schedule until the administrative proceedings reach a final conclusion on whether to schedule. This legislation would give the Attorney General the necessary tools to respond quickly when evidence appears that a drug is being abused. I urge my colleagues to support the bill.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, today I am introducing the New Medicines to Treat Addiction Act of 1998, legislation that builds upon my efforts in previous Congresses to promote research into and development of new medicines to treat the ravages of hard core drug addiction. Since the first call to arms against illegal drugs in 1989, we have learned just how insidious hardcore drug addiction is, even as the ravages of substance abuse--on both the addict and his victims--have become ever more apparent. The frustration in dealing with a seemingly intractable national problem is palpable, most noticeably in the heated rhetoric as politicians blame each other for the failure to find a cure. What gets lost underneath the noise is the recognition that we have not done everything we can to fight this problem and that, like all serious ills, we must take incremental steps one at a time, and refuse to be overwhelmed by the big picture. Throughout my tenure as Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, I called for a multifaceted strategy to combat drug abuse. One of the specific steps I advocated was the creation of incentives to encourage the private sector to develop medicines that treat addiction, an area where promising research has not led--as one would normally expect--to production of medicines. The bill I am introducing today, the New Medicines To Treat Addiction Act of 1998, will hopefully change that. It takes focused aim at one segment of the drug-abusing population-- hardcore addicts, namely users of cocaine and heroin--in part because these addicts are so difficult to treat with traditional methods, and in part because this population commits such a large percentage of drug-related crime. In December, 1989, I commissioned a Judiciary Committee report, ``Pharmacotherapy: A Strategy for the 1990's.'' In that report, I posed the question, ``If drug use is an epidemic, are we doing enough to find a medical `cure' for this disease?'' The report gave the answer ``No.'' Unfortunately, almost a decade later, the answer remains the same. Developing new medicines for the treatment of addiction should be among our highest medical research priorities as a nation. Until we take this modest step, we cannot claim to have done everything reasonable to address the problem, and we should not become so frustrated that we effectively throw up our hands and do nothing. Recent medical advances have increased the possibility of developing medications to treat drug addiction. These advances include a heightened understanding of the physiological and psychological characteristics of drug addition and a greater base of neuroscientific research. One example of this promising research is the recent development of a compound that has been proven to immunize laboratory animals against the effects of cocaine. The compound works like a vaccine by stimulating the immune system to develop an antibody that blocks cocaine from entering the brain. Researchers funded through the National Institute of Drug Abuse believe that this advance may open a whole new avenue for combating addiction. Despite this progress, we still do not have a medication to treat cocaine addiction or drugs to treat many other forms of substance abuse, because the private sector is unsure of the wisdom of making the necessary investment in the production and marketing of such medicines. Private industry has not aggressively developed pharmacotherapies for a variety of reasons, including a small customer base, difficulties distributing medication to the target population, and fear of being associated with substance abusers. We need to create financial incentives to encourage pharmaceutical companies to develop and market these treatments. And we need to develop a new partnership between private industry and the public sector in order to encourage the active marketing and distribution of new medicines so they are accessible to all addicts in need of treatment. While pharmacotherapies alone are not a ``magic bullet'' that will solve our national substance abuse problem, they have the potential to fill a gap in current treatment regimens. The disease of addiction occurs for many reasons, including a variety of personal problems which pharmacotherapy cannot address. Still, by providing a treatment regimen for drug abusers who are not helped by traditional methods, pharmacotherapy holds substantial promise for reducing the crime and health crisis that drug abuse is causing in the United States. The New Medicines to Treat Addiction Act would encourage and support the development of medicines to treat drug addiction in three ways. It reauthorizes and increases funding for the Medications Development Program at the National Institute of Health, which for years has been at the forefront of research into drug addiction. The bill also creates two new incentives for private sector companies to undertake the difficult but important task of developing medicines to treat addiction. First, the bill would provide additional patent protections for companies that develop drugs to treat substance abuse. Under the bill, pharmacotherapies could be designated ``orphan drugs'' and qualify for an exclusive seven-year patent to treat a specific addiction. These extraordinary patent rights would greatly enhance the market value of pharmacotherapies and provide a financial reward for companies that invest in the search to cure drug addiction. This provision was contained in a bill introduced by Senator Kennedy and me in 1990, but was never acted on by Congress. Second, the bill would establish a substantial monetary reward for companies that develop drugs to treat cocaine and heroin addiction but shift the responsibility for marketing and distributing such drugs to the government. This approach would create a financial incentive for drug companies to invest in research and development but enable them to avoid any stigma associated with distributing medicine to substance abusers. The bill would require the National Academy of Sciences to develop strict guidelines for evaluating whether a drug effectively treats cocaine or heroin addiction. If a drug meets these guidelines and is approved by the Food and Drug Administration, then the government must purchase the patent rights for the drug from the company that developed it. The purchase price for the patent rights is established by law: $100 million for a drug to treat cocaine addiction and $50 million for a drug to treat heroin addiction. Once the government has purchased the patent rights, then it is responsible for producing the drug and distributing it to clinics, hospitals, state and local governments, and any other entities qualified to operate drug treatment programs. This joint public/private endeavor will correct the market inefficiencies that have thus far prevented the development of drugs to treat addiction and require the government to take on the responsibilities that industry is unwilling or unable to perform. America's drug problem is reduced each and every time a drug abuser quits his or her habit. Fewer drug addicts mean fewer crimes, fewer hospital admissions, fewer drug-addicted babies and fewer neglected children. The benefits to our country of developing new treatment options such as pharmacotherapies are manifold. Each dollar we spend on advancing options in this area can save us ten or twenty times as much in years to come. The question isn't ``Can we afford to pursue a pharmacotherapy strategy?'' but rather, ``Can we afford not to?'' Congress has long neglected to adopt measures I have proposed to speed the approval of and encourage greater private sector interest in pharmacotherapy. We cannot let another Congress conclude without rectifying our past negligence on this issue. I urge my colleagues to join me in promoting an important, and potentially ground breaking, approach to addressing one of our nation's most serious domestic challenges.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, the best time to target a new drug with uncompromising enforcement pressure is before abuse of that drug has overwhelmed our communities. That is why I introduced legislation last Congress to place tight federal controls on the date rape drug Rohpynol--also known as Roofies--which was becoming known as the Quaalude of the Nineties as its popularity spread throughout the United States. My bill would have shifted Rohpynol to schedule 1 of the Federal Controlled Substances Act. Rescheduling is important for three simple reasons: First, Federal re-scheduling triggers increases in State drug law penalties, and since we all know that more than 95 percent of all drug cases are prosecuted at the State level, not by the Federal Government, it is vitally important that we re-schedule. Second, Federal re-scheduling to schedule 1 triggers the toughest Federal penalties--up to a year in prison and at least a $1,000 fine for a first offense of simple possession. And, third, re-scheduling has proven to work. In 1984, I worked to reschedule Quaaludes, Congress passed the law, and the Quaalude epidemic was greatly reduced. And, in 1990, I worked to re-schedule steroids, Congress passed the law, and again a drug epidemic that had been on the rise was reversed. Despite evidence of a growing Rohpynol epidemic, some argued that my efforts to re-schedule the drug by legislation were premature. Accordingly, I agreed to hold off on legislative action and wait for a Drug Enforcement Administration decision on whether to schedule the drug through the lengthy and cumbersome administrative process. As I predicted, the DEA report on Rohpynol--handed down in November-- correctly concludes that despite the rapid spread of Rohpynol throughout the country, DEA cannot re-schedule Rohpynol by rulemaking at this time. The report notes, however, that Congress is not bound by the bureaucratic re-scheduling process the DEA must follow. Congress can-- and in my view should--pass legislation to reschedule Rohpynol. Specifically the report states: ``This inability to reschedule [Rohpynol] administratively . . . does not affect Congress' ability to place [the drug] in schedule 1 through the legislative process''--as we did with Quaaludes in 1984 and Anabolic Steroids in 1990. Let me also note that the DEA report confirmed a number of facts about the extent of the Rohpynol problem: DEA found more than 4,000 documented cases--in 36 States--of sale or possession of the drug, which is not marketed in the United States and must be smuggled in. ``In spite of DEA's inability to reschedule [Rohypnol] through administrative proceedings, DEA remains very concerned about the abuse'' of the drug. ``Middle and high school students have been known to use [Rohypnol] as an alternative to alcohol to achieve an intoxicated state during school hours. [The drug] is much more difficult to detect than alcohol, which produces a characteristic odor.'' ``DEA is extremely concerned about the use of [Rohypnol] in the commission of sexual assaults.'' ``The number of sexual assaults in which [Rohypnol] is used may be underreported''--because the drug's effects often cause rape victims to be unable to remember details of their assaults and because rape crisis centers, hospitals, and law enforcement have only recently become aware that Rohypnol can be used to facilitate sex crimes. Nonetheless, ``DEA is aware of at least 5 individuals who have been convicted of rape in which the evidence suggests that [the Rohypnol drug] was used to incapacitate the victim.'' ``The actual number of sexual assault cases involving [the drug] is not known. It is difficult to obtain evidence that [the Rohypnol drug] was used in an assault.'' I would also note that my efforts to re-schedule this drug have already had beneficial results: The manufacturer of Rohypnol recently announced that it had developed a new formula to minimize the potential for abuse of the drug in sexual assaults. This is an important step. But pills produced under the old Rohypnol formula are still in circulation, and pills made by other manufacturers can still be smuggled in. Furthermore, the new formula will not prevent kids from continuing to ingest this dangerous drug voluntarily for a cheap high. In short, stricter, Federal controls remain necessary; and DEA is powerless to respond to Rohypnol abuse until the problem gets even worse. Therefore, I am reintroducing my bill to re-schedule Rohypnol in schedule 1 of the Controlled Substances Act. I urge my colleagues to support this effort to take action against this dangerous drug now, rather than waiting for the problem to develop into an epidemic. My bill also places ``Special K''--ketamine hydrochloride--a dangerous hallucinogen very similar to PCP, on schedule III of the Controlled Substances Act. Despite Special K's rising popularity as a ``club drug'' of choice among kids, the drug is not even illegal in most States. This has crippled State authorities' ability to fight ketamine abuse. For example, in February 1997, two men accused of stealing ketamine from a Ville Platte, Louisiana veterinary clinic and cooking the drug into a powder could not be prosecuted under State drug control laws because ketamine is not listed as a Federal controlled substance. Similarly, a New Jersey youth recently found to be with possessing and distributing ketamine could be charged with only a disorderly persons offense. Prosecutors are trying to combat increased Ketamine use by seeking lengthy prison terms for possession of the drugs--like marijuana--that users mix with Ketamine, but if it is just Special K, there's nothing they can do about it. I am convinced that scheduling Ketamine will help our effort to fight the spread of this dangerous drug by triggering increases in State drug law penalties. Without Federal scheduling, many States will not be able to address the Ketamine problem until it is too late and Special K has already infiltrated their communities. Medical professionals who use Ketamine--including the American Veterinary Medical Association and the American Association of Nurse Anesthetists--support scheduling, having determined that it will accomplish our goal of ``preventing the diversion and unauthorized use of Ketamine'' while allowing ``continued, responsible use'' of the drug for legitimate purposes. [Letter from Mary Beth Leininger, D.V.M., President of the American Veterinary Medical Association] And the largest manufacturer of Ketamine has concluded that ``moving the product to schedule III classification is in the best interest of the veterinary industry and the public.'' [Letter from E. Thomas Corcoran, President of Fort Dodge Animal Health, a Division of American Home Products Corporation]. Scheduling Ketamine will give State authorities the tools they desperately need to fight its abuse by young people--and end the legal anomaly that leaves those who sell Ketamine to our children beyond the reach of the law--even when they are caught ``red-handed''. I urge my colleagues to support this legislation. In addition to raising controls on Rohypnol and Ketamine, the legislation I am introducing today would increase the ability of the Attorney General to respond to new drug emergencies in the future. Our Federal drug control laws currently allow the Attorney General limited authority to respond to certain new drugs on an emergency basis--by temporarily subjecting them the strictest Federal control while the extensive administrative procedure for permanent scheduling proceeds. But the Attorney General has not been able to use this authority to respond to the Rohypnol and Special K emergencies--because she does not have authority to--move drugs from one schedule to another, or to schedule drugs that the Food and Drug Administration has allowed companies to research but not to sell. This amendment would grant the administration this important authority by--authorizing the Attorney General to move a scheduled drug--like Rohypnol--to schedule I in an Emergency; by applying emergency rescheduling authority to ``investigational new drugs''--like Special K--that the Food and Drug Administration has approved for research purposes only, but not for marketing. And by providing that a rescheduling drug remains on the temporary schedule until the administrative proceedings reach a final conclusion on whether to schedule. This legislation would give the Attorney General the necessary tools to respond quickly when evidence appears that a drug is being abused. I urge my colleagues to support the bill.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I would like to take a brief moment to thank some of the incredibly qualified staff we have here. I don't know whether the public realizes, but some of the young, and in the case of some of my staff not so young, women and men are incredible assets to this country. There are more Rhodes scholars, Marshall scholars, Ph.D.s, professors, former professors, and incredibly talented people who sit here in these seats, not only on treaties, but on every major thing we do and advise us. On Chairman Helms' staff, as always, Admiral Bud Nance, a retired Admiral in the U.S. Navy, and close friend of the chairman's and a close advisor, did a terrific job in directing the entire staff and working closely with our staff, as did a man who was kind enough to stay with me, a man who is a significant and capable lawyer, as well as a staff director for the minority, Ed Hall. These two guys run that operation in a way, I say to the leader sitting here, that was almost like the bipartisan days, the old days, in large part because they get along so well and they trust each other so much. Bud Nance is a gentleman who has already given decades of service to his country in the U.S. Navy, and continues to serve the chairman in his role as staff director. Additionally, I thank Steve Biegun, Beth Wilson, and Alex Rodriguez, as well as Marshall Billingslea, of the majority staff, who did a first-rate job in pulling together our hearings last fall and in helping draft the resolution of ratification. On my staff, I will start with this man. I worry about these guys who have one doctorate, but this guy has two. He came to me from a distinguished career as a professor, as well as working in the Library of Congress, Dr. Mike Haltzel. He is the minority staff member for European affairs. He traveled with me throughout the European capitals and to Russia in preparation for the hearings, and he wrote the major portions of the remarks given and rebuttals during this debate. It was a pleasure to have him at my side. During this process, he has been ably assisted by Mark Tauber, a Pearson Fellow from the State Department; Ed Levine, the committee's arms control expert; and Erin Logan, a Javits Fellow who has honored the memory of our former colleague by her service to the committee. In addition, Marnie Davidson, Ursula McManus, Dawn Ratliff, Mike Schmidt, and Marc Mellinger provided considerable assistance behind the scenes. Finally, I thank my counsel on the committee, a young man who came to me out of Auburn, NY, 20 years ago to stay for a ``few days'' and stayed on, and while with me, he graduated from law school, clerked, and then came back and is the legal director for the committee, Brian McKeon. Thanking Art Rynearson Lastly, I thank Art Rynearson, who is a senior legislative counsel and has served the Senate and the Foreign Relations Committee for over two decades. I know him as Art. I have known him all these years as Art. He is one of those guys behind the scenes, the legislative counsel here, who we take so much for granted, and who did an incredible job. In the 105th Congress, the committee has placed a lot of demands on Art, starting with the Chemical Weapons Convention, the CFE Flank Document, and then on the State Department authorization bill. On NATO enlargement, he was enormously helpful, as he always is, in helping us draft the resolution of ratification. Over the past few months--indeed over the past 15 months --Art has worked tirelessly in assisting the Foreign Relations Committee with its busy agenda. I would like to thank him for his competent professionalism and for always being there to help the committee staff. Lastly, let me thank my colleagues. I believe it is not a presumption to say that the level of debate and the competence that they demonstrated was impressive. I have great respect for those who voted negatively on this because they thought about it long and hard. I also find, I say to the President, in my 25 years here that when the very big, important issues are before us, almost everyone steps up to the ball, no matter what side they come out on, on those big issues. It is always a consequence of very thoughtful consideration and very engaging debate. It was an honor to be associated with the staff of the majority and the minority. I thank, lastly, the minority leader for doing what he has been kind enough to do with me since he has been leader--entrusting to me the tactics, if not the strategy, of how to proceed on a major piece of legislation. I thank him for that. I thank him for his confidence. I yield the floor. Mr. DASCHLE addressed the Chair.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will be very brief. A century ago, our predecessors in the U.S. Senate took a very bold step in ratifying the North Atlantic Treaty. It is easy for us today to forget what a break with the past that vote represented. For the first time, this country committed itself, in peacetime, to the defense of democratic Europe. The Senate recognized by its far- sighted action that our future--indeed our own freedom--is inextricably bound to Europe. The success of the fledgling NATO was by no means certain. Western Europe was made up of a jumble of nations, several of which had only recently been at each others' throats. Germany and France alone had fought each other three times in 74 years. The three western zones of Germany, which were not the Federal Republic and, in fact, were not invited to join NATO. The countries of Western Europe were economically weak, not yet having recovered nearly fully from the devastation of World War II. Several European NATO members had strong Communist parties whose loyalty and commitment to democracy were suspect. Mr. President, our predecessors took a gamble. Fortunately for us and our children--and I hope for our grandchildren--NATO succeeded beyond the Senate s fondest expectations. As we all know, for 40 years, it kept Soviet imperialism at bay, thereby providing the security umbrella under which democratic Western Europe could recover socially and economically, and thrive. In the process, NATO expanded its membership three times to welcome Greece and Turkey, West Germany, and Spain. With each expansion the Alliance was strengthened. Largely thanks to NATO's persistence, communism in most of Europe crumbled, including in the Soviet Union. Now, nearly 50 years after our predecessors met the challenge of their time, we are called upon, once again, to take up the torch. Three highly qualified democracies that chafed under the Communist yoke for four decades are now candidates for membership in NATO. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have already rejoined the West politically and socially. Tonight we can vote to readmit them to the West's security framework. In a larger sense we will be righting a historical injustice forced upon the Poles, Czechs, and Hungarians by Joseph Stalin. Mr. President, NATO enlargement is squarely in America's national interest. It is in Europe's interest. And yes--by stabilizing a historic crucible of violence in East-Central Europe--it is in Russia s interest. I am proud to be able to play a small part in this historic occasion. I will cast my vote with conviction to ratify the Resolution of Ratification, and I urge my colleagues to join me. I yield the floor. Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. BIDEN. The hour is late. It has not improved the substance of the Smith amendment--the time. It is essentially, as the Senator from New Hampshire indicated, similar to the Craig amendment; very little difference. I urge my colleagues to recall how they voted on the Craig amendment, and the same rationale applies with regard to the Smith amendment. I hope when we get to the vote--which I hope is very shortly--that we will vote no on the Smith amendment. I yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will take only 2 minutes.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, there is no more complex issue than the financial cost of NATO enlargement. Over the past two years there have been several studies by private and by governmental organizations, which have yielded widely differing estimates. The highest figure reached one hundred twenty-five billion dollars over ten years, with over thirty billion of that accruing to the United States. The most recent--and I believe the best--estimate is NATO's own cost study, which estimates only one-and-a- half billion dollars in direct costs over ten years. According to the latest estimate, the expected U.S. contribution to the direct costs of enlargement are estimated to average forty million dollars per year for ten years. There are good reasons for the vast disparities in the estimates-- basically there was a lot of ``apples and oranges'' mixing going on. Explaining all this requires a fair amount of effort, which, I regret, some of the critics of enlargement either were unwilling to give, or which they eschewed for the easier route of utilizing unexplained, raw data for partisan purposes. Mr. President, at this time I would like to examine the cost issue. The 16 NATO nations collectively spent about $455 billion on defense in 1997. Of that total approximately $1.6 billion goes to the NATO common budget. What does the NATO common budget pay for? Let's take the airbase at Aviano, Italy, as an example. The host country, Italy, maintains an airbase that has been designated for NATO use. Italy pays for all costs related to the base except new construction and improvements that benefit the United States Air Force units stationed there. These improvements, above and beyond the national needs of Italy, comprising some $260 million, are paid for by NATO's common budget. One of NATO's founding principles was (and remains) equitable cost sharing--that is, nations make financial contributions to offset costs based on their ability to pay. In the 1950's, the U.S. paid almost 50% of NATO's operating costs. In the 1960's, however, our European allies assumed about half of the original U.S. contribution in recognition of our worldwide security commitments. Since then, our overall national contribution to NATO's three common budgets has been reduced to about one-quarter. Our allies account for the other three quarters of NATO operating costs. We participate in NATO at a reduced rate, but we receive security benefits that far outweigh our financial contributions. Let's take a closer look at where our annual contributions to NATO's budget go. NATO has three budgets, each supporting a distinct aspect of NATO operations. NATO's Civil Budget pays for the operating costs of NATO's modest, 1960's-vintage headquarters building plus associated staff in Brussels. Additionally, there are numerous public information, political, and scientific activity programs supported by this budget, including civilian elements of NATO-sponsored Partnership for Peace activities. The annual U.S. contribution is provided by the State Department. NATO's Military Budget provides support for NATO's military headquarter (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium, and other elements of the integrated command structure. This budget also supports operations of several key NATO military agencies, like the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency, the NATO C3 Agency, for example, and the costs of running the NATO AWACS fleet. Annual contributions are paid from Department of Defense Operations and Maintenance funds. NATO's Security Investment Program pays for construction of the facilities and installations NATO uses to support alliance military activities, such as command structure C3 support, force mobility projects, and training facilities--in other words, infrastructure. It is also used to support common-user procurements to meet priority military requirements set by SACEUR and SACLANT, like integrated air defense and interoperable communications systems. U.S. contributions to this budget are obtained from Department of Defense Military Construction funds. As I said, the U.S. pays approximately one-quarter of the overall NATO common budget. If there were no enlargement in 1999, we would still expect to pay about $458 million. Now let's turn to the costs of enlargement. NATO has estimated that over 10 years, the cost to the NATO common-funded budgets will be about $1.5 billion. While the amount may not be distributed evenly over 10 years, let's accept for the sake of discussion that it will. This means that the U.S. quarter-share will be about $400 million over 10 years, or about $40 million a year. This represents only a 9% increase in our total contribution to the NATO common-funded budgets. Bearing in mind that the U.S. share of NATO's common-funded budgets represents only one-tenth of one percent of the current defense budget, I believe that enlargement expenditures are a pretty good deal. The key questions for us should be: Is the $1.5 billion figure accurate? What is the U.S. share? and Is the U.S. share a fair share? Anyone who has looked at this issue would, I believe, agree that it is extremely confusing. There are lots of numbers out there on enlargement costs in addition to the $1.5 billion. You will recall that the Administration told us in February 1997 that the total cost of enlargement would be about $27 to 35 billion. Let's look at those numbers. First, as the General Accounting Office (GAO) has pointed out, the Administration's estimate included two categories of costs that are not direct enlargement costs. The first was costs to current NATO members--$8 to 10 billion. These are the national costs the current allies needed to spend to meet their commitments under the revised 1991 Strategic Concept to improve their mobility, reinforcement, and power projection capabilities. They would incur these costs even if NATO did not enlarge. That's why GAO said the Administration made a mistake in including them in the February 1997 estimate. The U.S. has already met its power projection requirements, so we would not have additional costs in this area. The second figure in the February 1997 estimate, which is not counted in the final NATO study, represented the costs to new members to restructure and modernize their militaries--$10 to 13 billion. They would incur these costs even if they did not join NATO. Once again, this is why GAO said the Administration goofed in including these costs in their February 1997 estimate. This leaves us with $9 to 12 billion in direct enlargement costs. Of this $9 to 12 billion, the Administration said in February 1997 that about 60% would be eligible for NATO common funding. The rest of these direct enlargement costs would be picked up by the new members. For example, there is the procurement of something called Identification of Friend or Foe (IFF) gear--you need to have it if you're in the Alliance--but NATO common funding won't pay for it. 60% of $9 to 12 billion is about $5.5 to 7 billion. This is the number we should start with when comparing the NATO estimate of common-funded costs of $1.5 billion. What accounts for the difference? $5.5 to 7 billion versus $1.5 billion? I just talked about the top half of this chart * * * above the dash line. Let's focus on why the Administration's $5.5 to 7 billion estimate and NATO's $1.5 billion estimate are different. First, there is the matter of four versus three new members. The Administration did its estimate several months before the decision in Madrid. The extra member counts for about $1.1 billion. That brings us down to $4.9 to 6.2 billion. The February 1997 estimate did not have the benefit of detailed responses by the three to NATO's Defense Planning Questionnaire (DPQ) or the benefit of site visits to the three countries' facilities conducted by SHAPE military experts. The infrastructure turned out to be much better than expected. This is a key point. In February 1997, we thought we had a lot of work to do to bring airfields up to NATO standards. The reality is that a number of the Polish, Czech and Hungarian airfields are in very good shape. The earlier Administration assumptions about the capacity of the airfields to host NATO aircraft were incorrect. For example, during Partnership for Peace exercises, a Hungarian airbase successfully hosted a Dutch F-16 squadron, that is, the Dutch F-16s landed, were serviced and refueled, and took off again. With regard to funding eligibility: The Administration assumed NATO would pay for some works that NATO later determined were national responsibilities. There were also some pricing differences. The U.S. used generalized cost factors and pricing, while NATO used by-item, historical cost data from their files. While there were some military requirements differences between the U.S. and NATO studies, these were modest and not operationally significant. What are we getting for $1.5 billion? Is it the right set of requirements? The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff says it is. What are those categories? C31 Requirements include: Cross border connections, transmission media, terminal and security equipment; Upgrades to military headquarters interface equipment; C2 info systems, including the NATO- specialized functional area sub-system; and a NATO satellite communications (SATCOM) terminal for Hungary. Air Defense Requirements include: Air Sovereignty Operations Center communication links to airfields; NATO air defense ground environment C2 sites; Interface to the NATO Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS); Installation of Combined Air Operations Centers in Hungary and Poland; Upgraded air defense radars; and Air Command and Control System acquisition. Necessary reinforcement improvements (land, air & maritime facility upgrades) include: Tactical fighter airfields; An AWACS and air- refueling forward operating base; Rail and storage facilities for land reinforcement; Petroleum, oil and lubricant facilities; and Maritime facilities. Training and exercise improvements include: Upgrades to air and ground communications, Tank and vehicle wash facilities, Movement costs for new allies' exercise participation, and Costs for minor construction and administrative travel. Now I would pose the question: are these the right requirements. I have confidence in the positive assessment of these requirements given by General Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Department of Defense has assured us that the scenarios which these requirements have been planned against include robust assumptions. These assumptions have changed from the Cold War assumptions of about 40 to 60 divisions coming across the border with less than 24 hours' warning, to scenarios of 10 to 20 divisions with 60 to 90 days' warning. We can discuss the specifics in a classified setting. But I am satisfied that the requirements are based on reasonable assumptions, and that they include sound, worst-case analyses, given the current security environment. To sum up, the most recent NATO estimate of the direct costs of enlargement appears to be sound. The annual costs of NATO enlargement to the United States are real, but they are affordable, constituting only a tiny fraction of our annual defense expenditures. For them, we gain three loyal allies with a quarter-million troops. The costs are, in short, a bargain. I thank the Chair and yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN. I agree.

Mr. BIDEN. I agree.

Mr. BIDEN. I agree.

Mr. BIDEN. I agree with the Senator from Michigan that this is an important matter that raises fundamental issues for the United States and our Allies. I believe that this is a matter that merits careful consideration within NATO councils. It would certainly be preferable for NATO to discuss this in a careful and measured way now, rather than to be faced with the issue at some future time when an emergency situation exists. I want to commend the Senator from Michigan for raising this matter. I also commend him for not seeking to amend the resolution of ratification, for, as he has correctly noted, this issue is not related to Poland, Hungary or the Czech Republic.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, the Senator from New York has asserted several times that NATO's enlargement to include Poland would for the first time bring NATO up to Russia's borders. This is because Poland shares a small border with the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad. As I mentioned in our floor debate last month, the Senator's assertion is factually incorrect. Ever since the founding of NATO in 1949, Russia--first as the Russian Republic in the Soviet Union, then since 1991 as the Russian Federation--has shared a border with Norway, a charter member of NATO. Norway's relations with Russia have remained excellent throughout. In fact, Norway gives Russia foreign aid, as do many other NATO members, the United States included. The Senator from New York responded by minimizing both the size and importance of the Russian-Norwegian border. Here again, he was incorrect. First, in regard to length, the Russian-Norwegian border is nearly as long as Poland's border with the Kaliningrad exclave--104 miles versus 128 miles, to be exact. Second, militarily speaking the Russian-Norwegian border is much more important than the Polish-Kaliningrad border. Norway abuts Russia's Kola Peninsula, one of the most heavily militarized regions on earth. Among the Kola Peninsula's armaments are nuclear weapons. In spite of the strategically sensitive nature of the NATO-Russian border, for nearly half-a-century relations have remained very good. One might ask why. Aside from the tact and diplomacy of the Norwegians, another reason may be that NATO has not permanently stationed in Norway troops from other Alliance countries. Mr. President, this is precisely what NATO declared on March 14, 1997 as the Alliance's policy for the prospective new members. So let's dispose of this bogey-man: Russia will not have to worry about large numbers of permanently stationed non-Polish NATO troops facing Kaliningrad. I would like to return to geography for a few minutes, since the Senator from New York and the Senator from Virginia have brought this topic up several times. I think that they would agree that in the bad, old Soviet Union the non-Russian Republics were wholly-owned subsidiaries of Moscow. Ethnic Russians who took their orders directly from the Kremlin filled the key positions in the Republics' political, economic, and military structures. In that context, it is important to note that since Turkey entered NATO in 1952, the Alliance had a common border with Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia--at that time Russian-ruled parts of the old Soviet Union. For the record, that border was considerably longer than either the Russian-Norwegian or the Polish-Kaliningrad borders--328 miles long, to be exact. So for nearly forty years, NATO had a lengthy border with the strategically vital southwestern flank of the Russian-ruled Soviet Union. In fact, Mr. President, even today there are Russian troops stationed in the independent states of Armenia and Georgia. So, once again, let's finally put to rest the nonsensical argument that Poland's joining NATO would constitute a new geographic move by NATO up to Russia's borders. It just isn't true. alleged aggressive posture of nato toward russia Moreover, the opponents of enlargement, the Senator from New York included, have asserted that by enlarging to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, NATO will be assuming a militarily aggressive posture toward Russia. Mr. President, nothing could be further from the truth. NATO simply does not threaten Russia. Never did--never will. Critics often characterize NATO's enlargement as if it were a massive deployment toward Russia. In reality, NATO's entire evolution since the end of the Cold War has been in the other direction, a fact which is patently clear to Moscow. Since 1991, NATO countries have greatly substantially reduced their military forces, as measured by total spending, spending as a proportion of GDP, and by overall force levels. American troop levels in Europe have declined by over two-thirds, down from a peak of over 300,000 to about 100,000 today. NATO's forces during this period have moved away from Moscow, not toward it, as the Alliance abandoned its Cold War doctrine of forward, stationary defenses and relied instead on rapid reaction. These changes have made NATO's posture unambiguously less threatening to Russia. The Alliance's enlargement does not appreciably change this fact. Those who characterize NATO's enlargement as a movement of NATO power into Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are simply wrong, and they do the public a grave disservice by suggesting this is the case. The record has been clear for well over a year that this is not what enlargement means. In December 1996, the Alliance declared that it had ``no intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members,'' and has clarified that this statement subsumes nuclear weapon storage sites. I have already cited the March 1997 statement regarding no need to move combat troops into the territory of the new members. Moreover, the willingness of all Allies to negotiate adaptations to the Treaty on Conventional Force in Europe (CFE) is a clear signal to Moscow that NATO seeks a post-Cold War arms build-down, not a build up. nato's reaching out to moscow NATO enlargement to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, in the real world--not the rhetorical world--will not trigger an adverse Russian reaction. Why? Because the U.S. and our allies have taken so many steps to reach out to Russia since the end of the Cold War. As I mentioned in my opening statement on Monday, the critics of enlargement are guilty of what might be called the ``Weimar Fallacy.'' They suggest that Russians will see NATO enlargement as post-Cold War punishment, which will trigger a nationalist backlash in the same way that the Treaty of Versailles helped to trigger the rise of National Socialism in Germany. But the supposed parallel is utterly specious. The Treaty of Versailles forced Germany to pay billions in reparation to the victors of World War I. by contrast, we and our allies imposed no reparations on Moscow after the Cold War. On the contrary, reparations went in the other direction. We and our allies have provided Moscow with over $100 billion since 1991 to aid its political and economic reform. One of the most important forms of aid has been through the Cooperative Threat Reduction program--known popularly as the Nunn-Lugar Program--which has provided $2.3 billion to Russia and other former Soviet states since 1992, with $442 million requested for FY99. Today, this program is supporting the annual elimination of over 20 Russian SS-18s and 10 SSBNs. The Russians have proposed using the program to support processing of missile materials from dismantled Russian warheads for storage at the Mayak facility. Through this program, we are helping to finance efforts that make both our countries safer--not punishing the Russians at their own expense. The spurious comparison to Weimar Germany is also a fallacy because we and our allies have sought to integrate Russia into the transatlantic community, not isolate it. In 1991, we made Russia and the other former Soviet states part of NATO's North Atlantic Cooperation Council, and part of the Euro- Atlantic Partnership Council, the successor to the NACC, in 1997. In 1994, we made Russia and the other newly independent states part of the Partnership for Peace program. After the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords, NATO invited Russia to participate in the coalition in Bosnia, and today Russia has an airborne brigade of approximately 1,400 troops servicing in northern Bosnia under NATO command alongside American and other NATO forces. In May 1997, President Yeltsin joined President Clinton and the other NATO leaders in signing the NATO-Russia Founding Act. The Permanent Joint Council has met several times at the ministerial level since then, and proved a useful forum for discussions with Russia on security issues of mutual concern. Our efforts to reach out to Russia go well beyond NATO. In March 1997, at their summit in Helsinki, President Clinton told President Yeltsin that the U.S. would support Russia efforts to join the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). In May 1997, President Yeltsin joined G-7 leaders in Denver to inaugurate the ``summit of the Eight.'' The ``Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission'' continued to meet during the very period that NATO was pursuing its enlargement, and American cooperation with Russia continues on a wide range of cultural, scientific, technological, and environmental efforts, such as our continuing efforts in space.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. I know it hasn't been introduced yet. Colleagues are saying: What is the deal? What is the schedule? I think we can facilitate rapidly a very important amendment which could have had a long debate in just a moment here. And then, as I understand it, the Senator from New Hampshire has an amendment and the junior Senator from Oklahoma has an amendment. To the best of my knowledge, they are the only remaining matters relating to this treaty, other than final passage. I yield the floor. Mr. NICKLES addressed the Chair.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I want everybody to know I am not usurping the prerogative of the chairman. He has asked me to do this. So I understand the distinguished Senator from Oklahoma has an amendment, which I believe, after some negotiation with the ranking member of the Armed Services Committee, we are likely to be able to accept. Is that correct, I say to my friend?

Mr. BIDEN. I will say this much to the Senator. I will inquire formally whether or not MEMCOMS have ever been released to the committee. If they were, I would be happy to talk with the Senator about how to get this released. It would be worthwhile knowing.

Mr. BIDEN. It is ex post facto now. I would be happy to talk with the Senator about it. The Senator doesn't need me to ask. You are standing next to a chairman of a powerful committee. I am a mere ranking member of a Foreign Relations Committee. So I am sure if you get him to do it, he may be able to get others to do it. I have learned, even when I was a chairman, there was not much consequence to what I did and how I was viewed. Now, as a ranking member--we all know that ranking members are people who have no power. So I would find a Republican to help you out. You have a very fine one standing next to you.

Mr. BIDEN. I will not ask for it because we have never asked for a release for those purposes, other than affecting the outcome of a significant debate or an issue of national consequence.

Mr. BIDEN. The President, the State Department. My understanding is that they are never released. I would be happy to have them released.