Joe Biden

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. I see my friend is rising to speak. Let me respond to the questions directed to me very briefly. I recall my friend from Virginia--I keep referring to my friend from Virginia because he is on the Armed Services Committee. We have been here a long time. We have been back and forth to Brussels zillions of times. So I don't mean that to suggest he agrees with me.

Mr. BIDEN. Yes. I yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN. And I respect that. But what confuses me is, with the Senator's grave concern, why would he even want to give the NAC, or NATO, a possibility of taking away his power to influence those outcomes? He says that he is worried about--and I know him to be--the next strategic doctrine NATO may come out with. Right now the way NATO is constructed organizationally is if they come out with a doctrine that we sign off on, or intend to sign off on, the distinguished Senator from Virginia can come to this floor, pass a resolution and/or an amendment to a piece of legislation instructing the President not to sign on, and he can make that prevail depending on the number of votes available. If this were to be put before NATO, which would, by the way, imply at a minimum that the United States supported it, and the President doesn't, we do not support it. We wouldn't table something we don't support. People do not go around tabling things and asking for consideration that by implication they don't support. This administration does not support that. The last administration, to the best of my knowledge, does not support that. But why would this Senator even put in play the possibility that his influence over whether or not we are involved in a border dispute is rendered null and void? For if this were tabled, and if NATO adopted this, we would be in the position of taking exception to getting involved in a border dispute quite possibly, and if the dispute mechanism resolution requiring binding arbitration were in effect, the Senator would have no, no, no impact over whether or not that occurred, other than passing a resolution suggesting we would throw off from NATO. I don't understand, even though that is not likely to happen, why the Senator would even want to put himself in that possible position. The higher one is concerned with being involved in border disputes seems to me to increase in direct proportion the need for opposition to this amendment. Those who are willing to get involved in every border dispute who think we should be the policeman for all of Europe, central Europe, the former Soviet Union, that we should do whatever our European friends think should be done, they should be for this because it doesn't matter. It may very well be that we have a President who doesn't want to get involved in those disputes. But a majority of the members of NATO do, and they think that is good foreign policy. But I am perplexed. The more one is concerned about border disputes, the less they should be willing to give an absolute veto power that we now have--absolute. There is no need to discuss it. There is no need to do anything. The President of the United States picks up the phone, the Secretary of State picks up the phone and says to our Ambassador to NATO, ``Vote no.'' Done, over, gone, finished, no troops, no NATO. Why would you want to give up that lock? It is beyond me.

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, the Senator doesn't often confuse me. We very often agree, and when we disagree, I usually understand clearly why we disagree. Let me explain my confusion, and if the Senator wishes to respond, I would appreciate it. If not, I understand. The Senator has been the most vocal and articulate opponent of NATO and/or the United States alone getting involved in what he believes to be intractable civil conflicts, border disputes, that have hundreds of years of history that precede them.

Mr. BIDEN. Yes, and I am a quarter French heritage. But my point is this. I think it is dangerous to even introduce this into the NAC. Why would we possibly say to anyone in NATO, now, that we want you to consider us being able to give up our right to dictate the outcome of any decision made by NATO that is in a positive sense? Why would we even want to do that? That would be a question to my friend from Virginia, other than responding to my other colleague. Why would we want to do that?

Mr. BIDEN. You have. Secondly, I was reminded by my staff that our present NATO Ambassador called me personally, and maybe others, asking that he not be put into a position of even having to introduce it, because he thought it was such a serious mistake to even raise that specter. Now, it seems to me that if I were a member of the NAC presently, if I were France, I might like this dispute resolution mechanism. They have been trying very hard to take over your fleet, without supplying a ship. They have been trying very hard to take titular leadership of NATO--I will get a lot of letters on this. I see Senator Roth's senior staff saying: There he goes again with the French.

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I say to my friend that, to be honest with you, initially I was under the impression that this was to provide for this dispute resolution mechanism.

Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator pardon me for a moment to ask my staff a question?

Mr. BIDEN. I am delighted to.

Mr. BIDEN. I find myself once again in an uncomfortable position. I admire and like my friend from Texas. And maybe she is not, but I am looking for something to agree with her on, but this is not the one. She has been, as she always is, persistent and effective in making her case. She and I have been sort of at this dispute about dispute resolutions privately and also in our official capacity of attending the observer group meetings. And so here it is on the floor. I just rise today to strongly oppose the amendment because its prescription, I think, is both unnecessary for NATO as an organization and, quite frankly, harmful--harmful--to continued U.S. leadership to the alliance. Let me explain what I mean by that. And none of this will come as any surprise to my friend. I do not expect to change her mind at all, but I do want to make the case why I think this is a bad idea. It is unnecessary because the North Atlantic Council, which is now known as the NAC, the principal political organ of NATO, is by its very nature already a dispute resolution mechanism. That is the place we make decisions in NATO. All actions in the NAC--all of them--are taken by consensus, which comes, in almost every circumstance, after very lengthy formal and informal discussions among the 16 nations who are members of the NAC. For example, all delegations to NATO are housed in the same headquarters building in Brussels. Every working day there is a wide variety of meetings among delegates and member countries. Some are briefings; some are informal group meetings; and some are one-on-ones. Every Tuesday, NATO ambassadors or so-called perm representatives meet in an informal luncheon, which is strictly an off-the-record luncheon. A lot is resolved there as well. The purpose of these luncheons is to work out tough questions out of the glare of the press and publicity and to be able to be brutally candid with one another. In addition, the North Atlantic Council holds a weekly formal meeting which is on the record. By that time, issues in dispute, in almost every circumstance, have already been settled. As the alliance grew from 12 in 1949 to 16 in 1982, it has expanded its areas of common endeavor rather than retreated due to the inability of each to reach consensus decisions. Even during the divisive Bosnia debate, which has been referenced here, when one ally favored the Serb position and another the Muslim, the alliance still agreed to the largest historic commitment leading to the Dayton peace implementation force. This amendment notes that the North Atlantic Treaty does not provide for a dispute resolution process by which members can resolve differences among themselves. As true as that statement is, it is also equally irrelevant. NATO has a remarkably good track record in resolving disputes among its members, or at least in previewing them and then preventing them from escalating into open conflict. In fact, I think we ought to declare it the sense of the Congress that NATO is to be congratulated for having aided immeasurably in helping two of its members, France and Germany, to resolve their age- old antagonisms that caused two world wars in this century alone. That did not need a formal dispute mechanism. That was a consequence of the way the NATO negotiations take place now among its members. I think it should be the sense of the Congress that NATO is to be congratulated, notwithstanding the comments of my friend from Texas, for having prevented two members, Greece and Turkey, from going to war on more than one occasion. I am told my friend has indicated that that may have been the case in the past, but no longer. The truth of the matter is, NATO is still deeply involved in preventing the disagreement over Cyprus and the Aegean, certain islands, the transfer of weapons. It is the real place where most of the resolution takes place, because those Greek generals and those Turkish generals and the Greek perm representative and the Turk perm representative, they pass each other in the corridor every day. They meet every day. They probably talk every day. More recently, we ought to congratulate NATO for having integrated Germany so well with its neighbors so that the rest of Europe is now comfortable with a larger united Germany. Up until 12 years ago, there were as many people in the West as the East who were concerned about a united Germany. There was as much talk among parliamentarians in the East as the West about a united Germany--not a prospect in 1948, 1955, 1965, 1975, and I would argue even 1985 that anyone was rushing to embrace on the continent. Why did it go off so smoothly? NATO. NATO. More importantly, we ought to congratulate NATO, under American leadership, for having resolved all these disputes while assembling the most awesome defensive military alliance in history, one that no foe has dared to attack for 49 years. The only change to the NAC as a result of the enlargement that is about to take place with the addition of three new countries, the only change will be the addition of their three perm representatives, of their generals, of their people in the same building at the same meetings interfacing on the same questions. Some may worry that they will carry their own hostilities with neighbors into the NAC. I would argue that not only is that not likely to happen, if past is prologue, they have put away those hostilities in order to be able to get into NATO. NATO--just the prospect of membership to NATO has caused each of those countries, in varying degrees with varying degrees of disputes outstanding, to settle those border disputes, to settle those ethnic rivalries. I mentioned half a dozen times on the floor I doubt whether anyone on this floor would have predicted 2 years ago, let alone 20 years ago, that Romania would be accommodating a Hungarian minority or that Poland would have settled all of its border disputes. A President whom I personally admire and politically disagreed with but my friend from Texas, I expect, politically and personally admired, Ronald Reagan, used to say, ``if it ain't broke, don't fix it.'' This ``ain't'' broke. Trying to fix something that ``ain't'' broke is likely to damage it, in my opinion. Each of the three candidate countries has recently concluded a bilateral agreement with its neighbors resolving any outstanding issues that may lead to conflict, Poland with Germany, Poland with Ukraine, Poland with Lithuania, Hungary with Slovakia, Hungary with Slovenia, Hungary with Romania, the Czech Republic with Germany, and now that they will be sitting at the same table, making the same profound decisions, dealing with the same issues, again, if past is prologue, there is little to no possibility that concerns of my friend are likely to come to fruition. Maybe most importantly, in my view, it would be extremely hard for the U.S. leadership of the alliance to create a binding dispute resolution mechanism separate from the NAC, because that would mean relinquishing what I thought was of concern to my friend from Texas, as well as my friend from Virginia and my friend from New Hampshire, and all those who oppose enlargement. What do they keep talking about? We are basically going to get ourselves entangled with more people. We will get involved in a more unwieldy operation. We are going to be in a position where actions are taken. The mere action of bringing them in will negatively impact their relationships with Russia. This is going to cause friction within Europe because now some countries are left out and some countries are left in, and it goes on and on and on. I respect their concerns. But if you have those concerns, why would you now want to change the organization of which we are a member, where we can now veto anything NATO wants to do--anyone, anything. All we have to do in the NAC is say, ``Sorry, no; we vote no, no,'' and it is done, finished, over. We lead the alliance. Now I admit, we lead the alliance as a consequence of the size of our military, the nature of our equipment, our command and control, and our phenomenal economic power. I acknowledge that. But we politically lead the alliance, as well, not only for those reasons but because we have the ability to stop anything we want. Now, I ask my friends in this body, why would we, a noncontinental power who is, in fact, a European power, why do we want now to sign up as we enlarge NATO--and I respectfully predict that we are going to enlarge NATO. The vote will be overwhelming. We will enlarge NATO, in my humble opinion. Now, why are we now going to say, look, we are going to have a new mechanism, a new mechanism, the equivalent of unilaterally giving up our most potent weapon politically; that is, this new mechanism will say, hey, you know, if most of the European countries want to do something we think is foolhardy and against our interests, we have to submit to a binding resolution. And if, in fact, the binding resolution results in a decision different from the one we have taken, then we have one of two choices. We either go along and consider it to be bad policy or we leave NATO--as I understand the resolution. I think this would be the political equivalent to unilateral disarmament, robbing ourselves of the final protection against any mischief, should it arise. I think this would inevitably erode American support for NATO itself as it comes to be perceived as a forum where America does not lead but where America's influence has been self- restrained. Sandy Vershbow, our current U.S. Ambassador to NATO, recognizing this threat, called me from Brussels a couple weeks ago to express his strong opposition and fervent prayer, wanting me to assure him--which I could not do--don't worry, this will not pass. He thinks, our present Ambassador to NATO, any such mechanism would be totally counterproductive to American interests in NATO. In remarks on this floor last month, the Senator from Texas likened her NATO dispute resolution mechanism to the National Labor Relations Board. Mr. President, NATO is not the NLRB. I know she didn't mean it is. She was making a comparison of how the mechanism would function. But NATO is an alliance that has protected the free world for 49 years. It has worked well the way it is presently constructed. The United States is a leader of that alliance, and it would be totally irrational, in my view, to squander that leadership by tampering with the North Atlantic Council. We heard yesterday from Senator Kyl, and from me, mainly from Senator Kyl, about the strategic doctrine of NATO and what it would be in the future and what we were insisting on in this body. We can insist all we want. We can instruct the President to vote any way, tell our NATO Ambassador to vote any way he wanted, and if, in fact, we are outvoted, it wouldn't matter, like it does now. We vote no now, it ends--done, finished, over, no action. But if we submit to binding arbitration, what we say in this floor is diluted. So this also, in my view, dilutes our power, our responsibility as the body that is given the constitutional responsibility to, as was stated by Professor Corwin in another context, to struggle for the right to conduct American foreign policy. I say to my friends who are worried about dispute resolutions and border disputes, right now I see my friend from Virginia is on the floor again. Amazing how we attract one another to the floor these days. My friend from Virginia, who knows a lot about NATO and the Armed Services Committee, has expressed concern about what NATO may get involved in in the future. I think he would be strongly opposed to this because right now if NATO countries decided to get involved in a border dispute in Europe that we did not want to be involved in, under this operation being suggested, we would have to go or leave NATO. We would not be given a choice. If we lose in binding arbitration, we participate in an operation we disagree with or practically leave NATO. That is a practical matter. The Senator knows he can only work by consensus. I realize this is extremely well-intended, but I used to go to a Catholic grade school, as well as a Catholic high school, but the distinction was in the Catholic grade school the nuns taught me. I know this will come as a shock to all my colleagues. Occasionally, I would be kept after school for disciplinary reasons, and it wasn't because I spoke too much then, because I used to stutter very badly so I hardly spoke at all. Maybe that is why I speak as much now. All kidding aside, I used to have to stay after school. I say to my friend from California, if you were a bad boy or a bad girl, in fifth, sixth, seventh, or eighth grade, you would have to write something on the board 500 times. And the one that I used to have to write the most, that Sister Michael Mary would most often choose for me to write--God rest her soul, as my mother would say--particularly because she would say I always had some rational excuses as to why I did what I did, she always used to make me write the following phrase 500 times on the blackboard: ``The road to hell is paved with good intentions.'' Well, this will not take us to hell, but this is a road to disaster that is paved with very good intentions. It is unnecessary, it is counterproductive. One other thing. While I was off the floor temporarily, I am told by staff that the distinguished Senator from Texas said that when we had a meeting with the foreign ministers--``we'' being Senator Roth, Senator Biden, the Senator from Texas, and I don't know how many other Senators attended that meeting right downstairs in the room of the Appropriations Committee, their Capitol meeting room. We met with them at length, all of them that were here. The distinguished Senator asked them whether or not they thought a dispute resolution mechanism was a worthwhile thing. They all said yes, initially. And I said, ``Please, will everybody hold up for just a moment.'' I said, ``Let me explain to you''--and I ask the Senator, if she disagrees with the explanation, to say so--``what my distinguished friend from Texas means. That is a resolution mechanism, different than the NAC, that would be binding arbitration. Do you still agree?'' Every single one of them said, ``No; we do not agree.'' They said that with all of us present.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, the Senator from Idaho and I are going to have a chance to debate this issue later this afternoon. But I would just say to those who heard what he had to say in the introduction, consider the following: This is a treaty. This is not a conference report. This is not a piece of legislation. This is a treaty. And we should not be effectively legislating on a treaty. This treaty is going to go back to every other nation to sign, and we are going to say, by the way, there is a paragraph in here that says, ``The Senate authorization committee,'' and they are going to think they are reading Greek. It has nothing to do with the treaty. I do not in any way belittle his concern; it is worthy of debate, but it should not be on a treaty. I will make that point more forcefully when we get into the debate. I thank my colleague for yielding.

Mr. BIDEN. There is no need for that.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield 1 minute, 60 seconds?

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, the chairman and I have worked very, very hard over the last 9 months to produce this bill. I will not reiterate all that each of us said last week at the end of the day. We have no real disagreement in terms of the substance of the bill. We have a disagreement on not even whether or not we should attach a provision relating to family planning and abortion in the bill. We don't even disagree on that. The chairman had nothing to do with that being in. He is a strong supporter of the family planning limitation that is in this bill, so-called Mexico City, although he did not ask for it to be put in this bill, but it is on the bill. We are faced with the reality, it is on the bill. The question is, What do we do from here? I urge my colleagues, notwithstanding the agreement the Senator and I have in every other aspect of the bill, to vote against this conference report. I do so because, at the insistence of the House, the Mexico City provision, which is not related to the underlying legislation, is in the bill, and stopping the conference report, I hope--and I may be tactically wrong here; this is my objective--I hope we send a signal to the House that we will not yield to what I characterize--not the chairman, ``me''-- characterize, as legislative blackmail on this or other controversial issues. As indicated, it would be inappropriate, if the Democrats took back the House next time out--I have no idea whether that will happen, but if they did--for them to attach to one of the bills an education provision that no one on the Republican side liked and said, ``Take it or leave it.'' I think it is a mistake. The underlying legislation is critically important to American foreign policy. It would pay off our arrearages to the United Nations and bring additional reform to that body and reorganize our foreign policy agency, and it begins to provide the funds, in essence, to restore our diplomatic presence worldwide. I believe the President will sign it promptly, provided we send him one without Mexico City attached. Again, the only thing that the chairman and I disagree on, he believes, and he believed, and I believe he believes it, that what the House sent is at least a compromise on Mexico City. I view it as not a compromise at all on Mexico City. So I urge my colleagues to reject this conference report so we can return to conference and produce a bill that the President can sign. I reserve the balance of the time.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I know my friend from Oklahoma didn't intend to mislead, but there is already a law, the Helms amendment, which says no U.S. money can be used for that purpose --no U.S. money. What the Mexico City language in this bill says is that these nonprofit organizations cannot use their own money, the money they raise, in Mexico, in Argentina, in Italy, in France, in China, they can't use that money to lobby their government. No U.S. taxpayers' dollars are allowed under present law to be used to lobby for abortion, period, bang. That is already law. That is the Helms amendment. What we are talking about is using their money raised from sources other than a contribution from the U.S. taxpayer.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. I thank the Senator.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I realize we only have a minute or two before the unanimous consent order kicks in which ends discussion at 12:45, but let me say for the record that one of the aspects of the amendment that we are considering and will be voting on when we come back from our caucus luncheons, the Harkin amendment, deals with requiring excess military materiel transferred to any NATO country--in this case, the three new members--to be counted against our common budget. I did not have these numbers before, but I want to put them in the Record now. The Senator from Iowa has contended that we provide aid only to the less well off countries in NATO, and he implied they are the only ones we have given this excess military equipment to. Most people don't know what we are talking about here, so let me make it clear. Here are the facts. In fiscal year 1996, we provided excess defense articles to the following countries: Denmark, Germany, Greece, Portugal, and Turkey, for a total value of $55 million. In fiscal year 1997, these excess articles went to the United Kingdom, Norway, Spain, and Turkey; value: $113 million. And my friend from Iowa, if his amendment passes, would say we can continue to spend taxpayers' money for what we believe is in our national interest to give excess items to other NATO countries, not part of our NATO requirement but our individual judgment, but we could not do the same for Poland, the Czech Republic, or Hungary. I think that would a serious mistake. If he wishes to do that and ``save the taxpayers' money,'' why not have his amendment say no excess military arms could go to any NATO country? Why single out for this second-class treatment the three new countries? I yield the floor. Mr. McCAIN addressed the Chair.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. BIDEN. The Senator from Iowa forthrightly responded, as he always does, that if we wanted to sell Poland, like we sell Greece or Germany or anyone else, a piece of American-made military equipment, as long as we did not subsidize more than 25 percent of what that was, then we could sell it. I wonder, why in God's name would the French Government agree to come up with money for Poland to allow them to buy an American jet instead of a French jet? Why would they possibly do that? And does this not give a veto, a veto on the part of other NATO nations, over American foreign military sales? Because unless they come up with 75 percent of what any subsidy would be, why would they possibly do that? Is it not true--the Senator is on the Armed Services Committee--is it not true that one of the core debates in NATO beyond burdensharing has been who gets to sell NATO the equipment, whether they fly Mirages-- whether NATO planes are Mirages or whether they are American made aircraft? Every other European country in NATO has been saying, ``You Americans get too much of an advantage.'' Every time we talk about burdensharing, don't they come back and say, ``Yes, but you don't get it; you get to make all that money and get all those jobs because you are supplying the equipment that all the NATO uses''? So why in the Lord's name would we give a veto power over the ability of American manufacturers and American employees to keep their jobs to the French and the Germans and the Brits?

Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. BIDEN. If the categories all come out of the State Department budget, then let's say let's freeze the State Department budget. Nothing can go up in the State Department budget, period. Freeze it, just like we are going to freeze it here. Why not do that? And if an emergency comes along, we can change our mind. It is not a way to do business, I respectfully suggest. Mr. HARKIN addressed the Chair.

Mr. BIDEN. If the Senator will yield, let's set the State Department budget then, freeze that.

Mr. BIDEN. Let's set the State Department budget.

Mr. BIDEN. If the Senator will yield. If in fact this logic makes sense, I don't know why we would produce an amendment that says right now we spend--I don't know the exact national budget. My friend from Virginia may know how much we spend on defense right now in the United States of America on our total defense budget. I will make up a number. Let's say it is $300 billion. Why don't we attach an amendment right now and say that we will not spend more than $300 billion on defense, period? Why don't we do that? It is the same logic. Let's tell the American taxpayers now we are limiting what they are going to spend on defense. We will do it now. We will limit it to that number, not just in Europe but all over the world. Tell them that right now. If there is an emergency, we can come back. This is the same man, whom I respect enormously, who argued strenuously, and he argued on the same issue of a constitutional amendment to balance the budget. Why not set a number? Defense spending cannot increase at all. We can pass it now, unless we come along and by a two-thirds vote in this body agree to spend more money on defense. That is what we are doing here relative to these three countries. That is what we are doing for Europe. Why don't we do it for the all of the national defense budget? If it doesn't make sense for the whole national defense budget, I respectfully suggest it makes zero sense to do it in Europe for these three countries.

Mr. BIDEN. This in no way limits our ability to give aid or assistance to any other country in NATO. So we are going to say that you three guys can come in, but we are going to promise that we are never going to give you assistance, but we will maybe give assistance to Greece, Turkey, Germany, France and England.