Joe Biden

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Just those three?

Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. BIDEN. Where you don't go back 50 years--for example, if the Senator's amendment had been in place, we probably could not have amended the conventional forces in Europe. In 1991, it became clear-- the wall came down in 1989--we had to amend the conventional forces amendment. We renegotiated that agreement. The flank agreement in the Senate was an amendment. It was passed in Russia in the Duma as well. What we said was that we had to give up a number of pieces of equipment, thousands of pieces of equipment, but because Greece and Turkey were on the southern flank of NATO and because we still were concerned about instability in the region, we still wanted force structure there, we had to call for a cascading down. We took all of the equipment that we were giving up, thousands of pieces, and we just gave them to the Greeks and the Turks. It was in our national interest to do so. Had the Senator's amendment been in place, the cost of all of those pieces of equipment would have to have been computed and added up, and then reduced from the 25 percent ceiling that was allowed to be spent by the United States on the common budget of the NATO. That had nothing to do with the cold war; it had to do with reality. It had to do with the arms control agreement. That arms control agreement would have done one of two things. It would not be able to have been negotiated and signed by us because we would not have been able to have that force structure on the southern flank, or we would have had to go in arrears to our commitment of saying 25 percent of the common budget of NATO. That is a contemporary example. That went on from 1991 to 1996. It is a further example of how well-intended but dangerous this amendment is. I thank the Senator for yielding.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield on that point?

Mr. BIDEN. The Senator is correct. I apologize.

Mr. BIDEN. Moral obligations--

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, with all due respect, I did not say it is going to increase. It would be up to the Senate and the Appropriations Committee.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, it clearly does. It says that if we want to ``take a tank off the shelf,'' as they say, which comes right now out of the Defense Department budget, and we want to give that tank to Turkey, or to Greece, or to Germany, it says that tank can't be given if in fact we have already met our obligation of 25 percent under the common budget because it would exceed 25 percent. So he is limiting-- limiting in perpetuity--the amount of money we can spend out of our national budget. Look, this is apples and oranges again. We say with NATO, here is the deal: We are going to pay 25 percent of all the moneys that directly relate to NATO. We do not say we are only going to keep 25 percent of the total amount of money we spent at 25 percent if, in addition, we decide we want to help, as we have over the last 30 years, Greece. If this had been the law in the last 20 years, the military aid that we have given to Greece and Turkey would have eaten up our share of what we agreed to do in the common budget. So in Aviano, Italy, the national budget of the country of Italy pays for that Air Force base. But if we are going to build a runway to land NATO planes on, or Italy comes back and says, wait a minute, even though that is on an Italian air base for which we pay for all the infrastructure, if you want to lengthen the runway to accommodate NATO planes, the other 15 members of NATO have to kick in to pay for it. If it costs $10 to extend the runway, we take out $2.50 and pay the 25 percent. But if we have already given $2.50 off the shelf to Greece, we don't have any money, we are prohibited by law from being able to do this. This is hamstringing our national defense budget, unrelated to NATO. It is a little like my saying that we are not going to spend anymore money on education than what we now spend on title VII. So if we want to pass, as I do, and did, the subsidy for IRAs for private schools, that would have to come out of the ceiling for all title VII, which was a billion dollars. We would have to find $300 million out of that billion dollars, which means you don't have enough money to meet the obligation you have agreed to, separate and apart for decisions independent of NATO considerations. You know, the rest of NATO has not wanted to support Greece. We stepped in and said, OK, notwithstanding that NATO doesn't want to support Greece beyond the NATO common budget, we are going to step in and give them the following subsidies, or the following military equipment off our shelf, out of our national budget, out of our pocket. Now, if we deal with any NATO nation, and we conclude that we want to engage in foreign military sales with them, unrelated to NATO, if we want to convince the French--which we never could--to stop flying Mirage aircraft in their national air force and fly F-15s, we could not do that. And so this is a profound change in national defense policy that, with all due respect, has nothing to do with NATO. If you want to cap all U.S. spending as it relates from the Euros to the Atlantic at 25 percent, fine, do it; but understand that you are making a profound foreign policy judgment that has nothing to do with whether or not Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary are members of NATO. I yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN. Is that not out of our national budget? Is that not out of our national defense budget?

Mr. BIDEN. I have read it in detail.

Mr. BIDEN. If the Senator will yield. He wants written into law in the passage of the amendment to the Washington treaty a commitment that the United States national budget will now and forever not exceed 25 percent of all the money we decide to spend in the European theater. I can't imagine the Senator from Virginia supporting that.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I say to my friend, one of the things the Armed Services Committee has been very jealous of, rightfully so, even though foreign military sales fall within the Foreign Relations Committee purview, when we argued in the Foreign Relations Committee, some of us, against some foreign military sales, the Armed Services Committee members and staff have often come to us and said, ``Joe, do you know what you are doing?'' If you don't let Lockheed or Marietta Martin sell that particular item subsidized to the Germans or to the Greeks or to the Spaniards or to whomever, do you know what you are doing? You are just subsidizing the French because they will sell them a Mirage; they will sell this, they will sell that. When we make these judgments on foreign military sales, they are judgments that are not only made in terms of what we believe to be our security interest, but when we fail to participate in that, we find that we lose part of our infrastructure because we find that, as a lecture I received many times on the floor from Armed Services Committee members, we lose the competitive advantage to those foreign military sales merchants in France, in England, wherever else. So what we are talking about is the independent judgment of whether or not we may, in the future conclude, as we have in the past, that in addition to our contribution to the common military budget, in order to keep peace in the Aegean, we have supplied in addition to that common NATO budget, we have supplied additional moneys or subsidies to Greece or to Turkey or Denmark. We have done it for almost all of the 15 members. What the amendment of my friend here would do is something revolutionary. It would say that we will redefine what NATO's common budget is as it relates to the United States. We now would have to include as part of the economic budget any of the following: foreign military financing under the Arms Control Export Act, transfers of excess defense articles, emergency drawdowns or no-cost leases of U.S. equipment or subsidies or loan guarantees, which would in effect give veto power over our interests with the other 15 NATO nations. The reason we give a veto power is because if we draw down, if we have to draw down from a 25 percent foreign military sales, we can't then pay our common budget that is owed to NATO because we have agreed. If we don't do that, then NATO says ``Woe, woe, you are not engaging in cost sharing.'' And that, in turn, means that they can veto whether or not as a practical matter we decide it is in our national interest to sell Cobra helicopters to the Greeks. My time is up.

Mr. BIDEN. On my time, if I may respond, if I can take 3 minutes--and I guess it is not just my time but the time controlled by the majority here--if I can have 3 minutes to respond.

Mr. BIDEN. We are so accustomed to other committees stealing our jurisdiction that it was a slip of the tongue.

Mr. BIDEN. That is correct.

Mr. BIDEN. If the Senator will yield, the answer is I am saying there is no obligation we undertake. The Senator sits on the Appropriations Committee. The Senator will have to make an individual judgment as each of the items come before him whether he wishes to do it. For example, we are going to have, and right now the President has sent up within the last 3 months a request for additional equipment for Turkey, additional military equipment for Greece. Now, they have nothing to do with our common budget in NATO, zero. Now, the Senator sits on the Appropriations Committee. He can come to the floor, and on foreign military sales of those countries, he can say no, we don't want to do that, and we can vote against it. It is irrelevant. It has nothing to do with whether or not Poland is a member of NATO or the Czech Republic is a member of NATO. What the Defense Department means, I respectfully suggest, is the following; that with NATO, with the additional three countries in NATO, we may conclude that our defenses would be further enhanced, bilaterally enhanced, U.S. interests enhanced if we gave more money, more for military sales to Romania or to the Baltics or somewhere else. But it has nothing to do--nothing to do, zero--with whether or not we expand NATO. Zero, nothing. The Senator from Virginia is on the floor, a strong opponent of expansion. He knows that the Armed Services Committee has no obligation to send foreign military sales which we subsidize to Greece or Turkey, yet he votes for it. But it has nothing to do with NATO, zero. Nothing to do with NATO, zero. It is not part of NATO's common budget, common budget. The only thing, I respectfully suggest to my colleague, that we are committing ourselves to with the expansion of NATO is that we will continue to participate roughly 25 percent of the cost of the common budget of NATO. The things that the DOD referenced and what my friend from Iowa is talking about have zero to do with the common budget. There is a chart here, ``budget cost-sharing formula, in percentage of total NATO common budget.'' I will later in the day go into great detail, because I think one of the great misnomers here is how the NATO is funded. I am not speaking to my friend from Iowa, who knows this area very well because he serves on the Appropriations Committee. But many of us who do not serve on the Appropriations Committee or Armed Services Committee don't necessarily understand the details of how the NATO budget is constructed. There are three common budgets. I will not go into it now. But they are the things that all 16 NATO nations reach into their pockets and pay for. They are not the national budgets. The national budget, my friend on the authorizing committee--both my friends stand here on the Armed Services Committee--in the national budget we decide whether or not out of our military budget we are going to help Greece beyond the common budget, whether we are going to help Turkey beyond the common budget, whether we are going to help Chile beyond the common budget, whether we will spend money in Korea beyond, and it has nothing to do with the common budget of NATO. So what happens here is we are taking great big apples and putting them in baskets of small oranges. We talk about mixing apples and oranges. The reason why the numbers, which I will go into in great detail later, range from $125 billion to $1.5 billion is that we are counting the wrong things. So the issue here, and we will get a chance to talk about this in detail, what is NATO's--and I know my friend from Virginia knows this well--what is the common budget of NATO? And what are we committing ourselves to spend in addition to what we are now spending on the common budget of NATO because these three countries are going to be added--if they are added, if we prevail? So, that is the issue. With all due respect, my friend is mixing apples and oranges here when he refers to the DOD saying we might in the future decide to spend more money. It has nothing to do with any obligation we are taking on as a consequence of expanding NATO. I thank my colleague. I yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I am not one for shilling for books, but for those of you who are interested in this subject and the religious and ethnic conflicts that have erupted after the mailed fist of communism has been lifted in Central and Eastern Europe, I strongly recommend--and I mean this sincerely--Senator Moynihan's book entitled ``Pandaemonium.'' It is worth, as they say, the read, and is incredibly instructive. I mean it sincerely. It is incredibly insightful, and those of you who have an interest should take a look at it. I yield the floor and yield the time, and I am ready to vote.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, if I may respond, since I am not the author but only the cosponsor, I do not want to take the liberty of suggesting what the Senator from Arizona meant, but that is my understanding. It is my understanding that the words as drafted now in paragraph 5--and I apologize. I am searching for the language--say each of the threats are self-evidently covered by present NATO doctrine: ``Re-emergence of hegemonic power confronting Europe,'' i.e., Russia. That is part of our existing doctrine today. ``Rogue states and non-state actors possessing nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons and the means to deliver these weapons by ballistic or cruise missiles,'' et cetera. That, as I read paragraph 10, is contemplated within the ``serious economic, social and political difficulties.'' It says, ``including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes'' but not limited to those two items. No. 3, ``Threats of a wider nature, including the disruption of the flow of vital resources'' obviously would affect the economic security and the stability of the NATO nations. No. 4, ``Conflict in the North Atlantic stemming from ethnic and religious enmity.'' That is covered. So as I said----

Mr. BIDEN. On my time, let my take a crack at that, if I may. I am a cosponsor, although I cannot take credit for the drafting. It is totally a product of my friend from Arizona, and it is an admirable job. The Senator from Oregon and I were just talking about what a good amendment this is. I am glad to cosponsor it. But let me maybe help. I have in my hand the alliance's Strategic Concept of 1991, the last one that occurred. It is the present operating doctrine for NATO. My friend from Virginia pointed out that the North Atlantic Assembly committee gets together and they decide whether this should be updated periodically, what it should say, and what article V of the Washington treaty means. Article V of the Washington treaty, the NATO treaty, was read earlier by my friend from Virginia. It starts off, the parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all, consequently, and it goes on from there. Let me read from the strategic concept, the alliance's strategic concept, which is the operating strategy of NATO, as we speak, the one that was, in effect, redone in 1991 to respond to the changed circumstances, meaning no longer the Soviet Union, the Berlin Wall is down, and all these nations. We are talking about independent republics and nations themselves. OK. That is the concept in which the strategic document came about. On page 4, under ``Security Challenges and Risks,'' paragraph 10, the present strategic doctrine of NATO reads as follows: Risks to allied security are less likely to result from calibrated aggression against the territories of the allies, but rather from adverse consequences of instability that may arise from serious economic, social, or political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes . . . --border disputes, and ethnic rivalries. Excuse me. Let me be clear that I don't want to misquote. Go back to the quote: . . . political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries, and territorial disputes. Parenthetically inserted by me was border disputes, and what is going on in Bosnia now. Back to the quote: . . . which are faced by many countries in Central and Eastern Europe . . . Not members of NATO. . . . the tensions which may result, as long as they remain limited, should not directly threaten the security and territorial integrity of members of the alliance. They could however lead to a crisis inimical to European stability and even to armed conflicts which would involve outside powers, or spill over into NATO countries having a direct effect on the security of the alliance. Nothing to do with the expansion of NATO--zero, zero to do with expansion. Presently, NATO interprets article V to represent--is interpreted and laid out tactically in the alliance's strategic concept as interpreted by the 16 NATO nations. It authorizes and allows, and they in advance acknowledge that NATO will deem, under article V, instability as a consequence of ethnic rivalries, or boundary and territorial integrity. They will interpret that. They may interpret that to be a threat to the security of any of the member nations; ergo, you are then allowed under NATO strategic doctrine, if all NATO countries agree, as they do in this doctrine, to use force. What is happening in this debate, unintentionally, as I said to my friend from Virginia yesterday, and what we are really debating in the biggest debate that has occurred is what the greatest differences have been over NATO strategy as it now exists. That is really what people are arguing about. They are really arguing not about what these three additional countries will do to impact on strategy. They are basically arguing, as they should, as they should, whether or not this outfit we put together almost 40-some years ago still is relevant today, whether we should still have it. But the strategic doctrine today put in place in 1991 says, and I will repeat, ``Risks to allied securities are less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territory of the allies but, rather, from adverse consequences of instability that may arise from serious economic, social and political difficulties including ethnic rivalries, territorial disputes which are faced by many countries in Central and Eastern Europe.'' Now, my friend from New York, who is opposing the expansion, is probably the single most qualified man in the Congress, having written about and predicting the kind of chaos that would come from the male fist of communism being lifted off of the sectarian rivalries that have been subsumed under that heavy hand in the Communist rule--he predicted in a book he published several years ago, that I recommend to everyone, that there would be crisis in Europe. It would not be Soviet armies invading. So my friends who keep saying: Look, we ought to reflect reality, NATO should reflect the real world, as Senator Smith from New Hampshire kept saying yesterday, NATO did just that in their strategic doctrine of 1991. They said the risk--paraphrasing--is not from Soviet divisions; it is from ethnic rivalries, economic, social, and political instability. That is where our risks lie and we must respond to those risks. So nothing new is being stated by my friend from Arizona. He is not breaking new ground. He is reiterating a basic principle of the strategic doctrine that exists now. And if we vote down these three countries, it will still exist. To the extent you have a fight, an argument with that section of his amendment, which I cosponsor, you do not have a fight about expansion. You have a fight about why don't you introduce an amendment that says the strategic doctrine of NATO should not be what my friend states it should be and, in fact, is. So, again, we tend to----

Mr. BIDEN. I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Virginia.

Mr. BIDEN. How much time do I control?

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, it is true the Delaware which touches New Jersey is owned by Delaware, but I am from Delaware. I would be proud to be from New Jersey, but I am prouder to be from Delaware. Mr. President, I understand we are going to go to the Kyl amendment very shortly and I cosponsor and agree with the Kyl amendment. I think the manager supports the Kyl amendment, too. But while we wait for Senator Kyl to make his opening statement in support of his amendment, I would like to reiterate a point I made yesterday with Senator Smith, in the few minutes while we are waiting for Senator Kyl to come to the floor. Yesterday there was a good deal of talk here about whether or not this expansion of NATO was good, bad or indifferent. The distinguished Senator from New York, Senator Moynihan, the distinguished Senator from Virginia, Senator Warner and others, were taking issue with the expansion of NATO. I referenced why I thought the Poles thought this was in their interest because the comments were basically made that the Poles--Senator Smith of New Hampshire said we support the Poles anyway. I made the point that that kind of promise had been made to Poland before. In 1939, France was considered to have Europe's strongest army. It had built the massive defensive fortification called the Maginot Line which was widely thought to be impregnable. Hitler's generals warned against an attack on France. In late August of 1939, of course, came the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany which--difficult though it may be to understand today--astonished the world then. Little more than a week later, on September 1, 1939, Hitler's forces launched a surprise attack on Poland. Here we come to two critical points. First, Great Britain and France had cobbled together an alliance with Poland earlier that year after Germany had annexed the rest of Czechoslovakia. But that last-minute alliance, of course, can in no way be compared to today's powerful integrated military command of NATO. France and Britain had no capability to project forces eastward to defend the Poles. Furthermore, Poland was then ruled by authoritarian colonels, while Britain and France were democracies. Therefore, appeasers could and did proclaim that they would not ``die for Danzig.'' Hitler saw all this and correctly anticipated that France and Britain would not actively oppose his attack on Poland. And they didn't. Secondly, Hitler's generals needed the attack on Poland to perfect their new tactic which was dubbed the ``Blitzkrieg'' or ``lightning war.'' The panzer attack on the Polish cavalry, as was pointed out yesterday, an incredible undertaking where Poles on horses were taking on armored divisions of the German Army, which the Senator from Virginia recalled earlier in the debate, was a metaphor for the effectiveness of the German's new kind of rapid, mobile warfare. I said yesterday that France and Britain, after formally declaring war on Germany September 3, 1939, did nothing. In fact, Mr. President, for more than 8 months nothing happened on the Franco-German frontier. Commentators labeled this the ``phony war,'' a term which students of history will call and readily recall. Meanwhile, after carving up Poland with Stalin, the Germans were freed to redeploy offensive combat units for use in the West. On May 10, 1940, Hitler invaded France and the Low Countries using the Blitzkrieg tactics perfected against the Poles, now against France. Going through Belgium and Holland, the Germans simply bypassed the vaunted Maginot Line, and soon they were in Paris. So I repeat, Hitler's road to France went through Poland. We should ask ourselves what lessons can be learned from this sad tale and acknowledge Poland is east of Germany. How did it get to France? Had they not gone into Poland first they would not, in all probability, have been nearly as successful as they were in 1940. The road to France was through Poland. First, the lesson we should learn from this sad tale is the alliance only means something if it has a deeper purpose. Today, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are democracies with Western values--not as Poland was then, a very different country. By the way, only extreme isolationists, I submit, would repeat a ``I won't die for Danzig'' slogan in 1998. Second, the alliance must have military muscle to back up a paper agreement. NATO clearly has the military structure in force to make collective defense credible. The third lesson, is NATO, through its Partnership for Peace Program, is actively cooperating with non-NATO countries, including Russia, to lessen tensions and make future conflicts highly unlikely. So for all these reasons, Mr. President, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, passionately want to become members of NATO. All three countries have successfully completed a demanding set of reforms in order to qualify. History need not repeat itself, Mr. President. But history is always instructive. That is why I mention the connection between Poland and France in 1939 and 1940. I hope this explanation is helpful to my colleagues. I hope we keep it in mind. I yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN. Obviously that is the Senator's right. I do not challenge it. I just am reminded, I remember one time when I first got here--and I know he has been here a long time. I went up to Russell Long, the Chairman of the Finance Committee, and indicated to him I wanted help on an amendment to a Finance Committee bill. Senator Long, the senior Senator and Chairman of the Finance Committee, said, ``Fine.'' He accepted it. Then I thought later it would be good to have a recorded vote. I stood up and said, ``I have decided I want a recorded vote.'' He said, ``In that case, I am against it.'' We had the recorded vote and he beat me. So I learned, from my perspective anyway, that when someone accepts an amendment, I am always happy to do it. But I understand the Senator's motivation. I will not change my position, but maybe he would reconsider whether we need the vote. But that is his judgment. I yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN. My uncle. My mother was one of five children. It was her brother and her soul mate. It is amazing how, like I said, she is 80 years old, God love her, and it is still there. The only reason I bothered to mention it--I never mentioned it before on the floor in all the debates we had about POWs and MIAs. I compliment my colleagues in their diligence to continue to pursue accounting for POWs and MIAs, and I didn't want them to think that, because I slightly disagree with their assertion of what these three countries have done--I agree with my friend from Oregon. I think they are clearly interested in helping. If there are any countries that are fully aware, as my friend from Oregon said, it is the Hungarians and the Czechs and the Poles, who have had people dragged off to those gulags, never to be heard from again. These democratically elected officials, now--I would be dumbfounded if they did not fully cooperate. But I understand the motivation. That is my point, to my two colleagues. I am happy, from our side, to accept the amendment, as well as my friend has indicated he is willing to accept it. Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire addressed the Chair.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, to respond, that is exactly what this amendment says. The amendment says, as my friend from Arizona has drafted it, it is a decision self-evident. In this amendment, it is a decision for the NAC to make whether or not it is an armed conflict that will spill over. There have been a number of ethnic conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe which we had concluded not to get involved in because the NAC concluded they were not directly threatened, they did not directly threaten the security of those countries. They did conclude that the ethnic rivalries and the war in Bosnia did--did-- threaten their security. They made that judgment internally within the NAC, within that governing body of NATO. So I reserve the remainder of my time. I have 2 minutes, I am told. Mr. SMITH of Oregon addressed the Chair.