Joe Biden

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. I respectfully suggest the answer is yes.

Mr. BIDEN. Wouldn't the Senator acknowledge the example he just gave has nothing to do with any commitment that is being undertaken by the expansion of NATO now? It is unrelated. We may or may not through the program which the opponents of expansion constantly point to--the Partnership for Peace, as what we should have stuck with--we may or may not do that. But passage of the expansion of NATO for these three countries in no way affects the point of whether or not we give assistance to Romania or we give assistance to any other country questioned. Is that not correct?

Mr. BIDEN. Would the Senator yield?

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the Harkin amendment. Everyone should understand one thing. This has nothing to do with the expansion of NATO. Under the resolution we are passing, we say we are not going to do anything beyond what we now do to contribute to the common budget of NATO, which, on average, is 25 percent. There are three common budgets. My friend from Iowa comes along and says: Look, we are not going to allow you to do what you were allowed to do now for Greece, Turkey, Germany. For example, when we passed the CFE agreement, we agreed we would get rid of a lot of materiel. That materiel was worth the sum total of about $185 million. We gave it to Turkey, Portugal, Germany, et cetera. Under this amendment, we would not be able to do that kind of thing for any of the new countries if they come in. In addition to that, we would be limited to be engaged in any foreign military sales to these countries. Nothing to do with common budgets. I urge you to vote no.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. I will be very brief. Speaking for myself and my side and I think Senator Smith of Oregon, who will say the same thing, we are prepared to accept the amendment. Let me just make a few very brief comments. I think that the applicants for NATO accession have provided cooperation, as was indicated in the U.S. efforts to locate American POWs and MIAs in the cold war. In July of 1987, the U.S.-Russian Joint Commission on POW/MIAs visited Poland; the Department of Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office visited in December of 1997. Resulting from these visits, senior Polish officials pledged to search their archives thoroughly and open all relevant information to the United States. U.S. officials met with the Polish National Security Bureau, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Intelligence Services, the Office of Central Security, Central Archives. All, in the minds at the Pentagon, are fully cooperating. I can say the same relative to the Czech Republic and with regard to Hungary. So although I, quite frankly, do not think it is necessary, I have no objection to the amendment. And let me say to my friend from New Hampshire, all you have to be is the brother, sister, mother, father, son, daughter, nephew, or niece of an MIA to understand everything the Senator says. My mother lost her closest brother in World War II, shot down in New Guinea. They never found his body. To this day, my mother--and that was 1944--wakes up after dreaming that he has been found. To this day, he is a constant--``constant'' would be an exaggeration--he is a regular source of painful memories for my mother. The idea that there is no closure, the idea that there has never been the ability to say his name was Ambrose J. Finnegan, God love him--his nickname was Bozy to everybody in my mom's family. My mother, when I was a kid, literally would wake up at night screaming from a nightmare. She would scare the hell out of us, dreaming that her brother was in the most extreme circumstance. I do not mean in any way to suggest this is not important by saying we will accept it and that I do not think it is necessary, because it is being done, because it is true, the pain lasts. My mother just turned 80 years old. It is like yesterday for my mother. So I appreciate what my friend from Texas and my colleague from New Hampshire are doing. Again, I do not think it is necessary, because I anticipate they will fully cooperate. But I see no problem in accepting the amendment. Mr. SMITH of Oregon addressed the Chair.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. I ask unanimous consent for 60 seconds.

Mr. BIDEN. Does the Senator from Delaware have any time left?

Mr. BIDEN. I ask for the yeas and nays.

Mr. BIDEN. I yield to my colleague from Massachusetts.

Mr. BIDEN. I see the Senator from Texas is standing. After he speaks, I am delighted to yield my 2 minutes in closing to my friend from Massachusetts.

Mr. BIDEN. How much time remains?

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. BIDEN. Maybe we could all try to work out a time through our offices if they are listening, although I'm not sure when I speak my office listens, but if they are listening, maybe the other offices might see if we can coordinate a time on the floor tomorrow where we could enlighten one another and enlighten the country about the cost of the matter. Mr. President, as the Senate begins reconsideration of the resolution of ratification for enlargement--and I and others who are for or against expansion all agree on one thing: I strongly believe it was a mistake, for whatever scheduling reasons, to have brought this up, then delayed it, put other things before it, and then brought it back up. So my hope is--and those who support expansion and those who oppose it have all communicated to their respective leaders that we hope nothing will intervene during the consideration of this debate so that we can give it the time and attention and detail that the public is entitled to. The truth of the matter is, all those folks sitting back behind the bar, back there on both sides, they, along with me and a number of others, have already devoted hundreds of hours to this. This is not a new deal. This is not something that all of a sudden we woke up one morning and said, you know, I feel like expansion today, let's expand, and here we go, let's go through it. This has been a long, serious debate, which has taken place within NATO among the military types and the political types. It has taken place within the national governments of each of the other NATO nations. It has taken place within this country, within the administration. There was a NATO observers group that, in my 25 years in the Senate, was granted unprecedented access to the decisionmaking process. There were 28 of us, the bulk of whom participated, while the decision to invite, if to invite, and who to invite, to join NATO was being made. We went to Europe on several occasions. I bet there were at least a half dozen trips of the NATO advisers to Europe to meet with the military in each of the existing NATO countries and all of the aspirant countries. I myself spent time with my colleague, Dr. Haltzel, next to me here at the moment. We went to Russia, we went to Poland, we went to the Czech Republic, and to Hungary, and to Slovenia, and we met with all of the relevant parties--every leader of every major faction within the political spectrum in Russia today. We had long, private, and sometimes contentious, but always frank meetings. We met with military personnel. We met with the Polish Chief of Staff of the military. We met with the Defense Minister, the Prime Minister, and every major player. We did the same in each of the countries in question. We have hosted the NAC. I was at a meeting with Senator Roth--I am the cochair and he is the chair of the NATO observer group--where there was so much brass in the room, I thought the floor was going to crack. If I am not mistaken--and I may be mistaken--I think the person comparable to our chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was present for every one of the nations in question, every one of them. I am serious. We debated and we argued and we discussed. It was open and frank. There is nothing new about this, and there is nothing quick about it. The wall went down almost 9 years ago. The Soviet Union crumbled. It ended its existence. That was not yesterday, but a long while ago, in political terms. No one rushed out to judgment. The other thing I should point out is that we, under Secretary Perry, the predecessor to Senator Nunn, sent out a group of what he called the Perry principles, the requirements that each--I said Senator Nunn, who was our colleague who I wish was still here; he has a different view from me on this. Senator Cohen is the Secretary of Defense. I know it, Bill, if you are listening, I know it is Senator Cohen. But the truth of the matter is that Secretary Perry set out some criteria that were minimum requirements for any aspirant country to have to meet. By the way, just setting out criteria has fundamentally changed the dynamic and the picture in Central and Eastern Europe, without even joining NATO. If I told my colleagues in 1992 that I believed by the year 1998 that we would have a circumstance where there was an accommodation to the Hungarian minority in Romania or that any border disputes or claims were settled by Eastern European countries--and I could name them--and a whole range of other things, that there would be total civilian control of the military in Poland, et cetera, I think they would have thought that probably wasn't going to happen. But because we said to all nations who wish to be part of NATO, hey, look, there are certain basic drop-dead requirements to even be considered, democracies who lack imperial designs, abide by certain rules, and here are the minimum rules even to get in the game, and we laid them out--I might note, parenthetically, that I attended a conference with some leading Chinese Government folks--not dissidents--and we get the same kind of arguments with regard to China. If you want China to continue its market programs and market economies, you have to go easy on them. You have to back up and you have to slow up. The question I raised there was, hey, wait a minute, if in fact you want to be part of the civilized world and seek civilized behavior and civilized treatment, when you sign an agreement and make a deal, should we not hold you to that deal? There are certain minimum requirements to be able to establish your bona fides as even an aspirant democracy or a market economy. In the case of Russia, can anybody in Russia say now, next year, or could they say yesterday that the minimum requirement for a peaceful democracy is, by the way, my neighbor has a right to choose, assuming it is nonthreatening to me, whatever alliance they wish. It is called their national sovereignty. We relinquish any claim to hegemony. It seems to me to be a minimum nonstarter if you fail to do that, a minimum requirement, a nonstarter, if you fail to do that. How have we threatened Russia? I am the author of the act that became the Freedom Support Act under President Bush. What have we done to threaten Russia? The irony is how the tables are turned here. In the early 1970's, some of my conservative colleagues would look at me as if I were an apologist for the Soviet Union. And here I am now saying expand NATO to include these three nations, assuming they meet the criteria, and extend beyond what we already have, a hand of friendship and help to Russia. They are not inconsistent. As a matter of fact, in my humble opinion, if you would like to diminish the drive toward democratization in Russia, if you would like to diminish the prospects of an emerging market economy in Russia, let the browns and the reds, let the nationalists within Russia crow about how their unsatisfactory response to expansion in NATO was the reason why the United States did not go along and vote to expand NATO. If you want to give antidemocratic forces in Russia a boost, that is a good one. That is the one to do. That is not the intention of any of my colleagues. This is a legitimate, honest, and open debate. I am not questioning the motives of any man or woman in this body. Not a one of us desire anything other than security in Europe and a democratic Russia. That is a universe that all of us can agree on in this body. I think we kind of have it backwards, because, as I said earlier, I think what is strung throughout this, as Senator Warner and Senator Smith of New Hampshire--I do not want to put words in their mouths. So I will say they did not take strong exception to my saying what this is really about is whether or not there should be a NATO; not whether or not to expand NATO but whether or not there should be a NATO. That is a legitimate debate. We have not addressed that in 50 years. For 50 years, we have said this is a good thing. The world has changed, as they point out. It is legitimate to debate whether or not we should even have NATO. But let's not confuse expanding to include these three countries with whether or not there should even be a NATO. If it is about NATO and its existence, let's debate it. Because, as I said, I constantly hear, What is the threat? My response is, If you don't think there is any threat now or in the future, why NATO? Why not save a lot more money? Why not bring all 100,000 folks home? Let's do that. Some would say, yes, let's do that. But I think it is real important we get our facts straight. After a tremendous amount of study and discussion by more than 70 Senators and 4 different committees, and the Senate NATO observer group, before we began the debate, we began on the floor last month to focus attention on whether we were going to vote up or down for or against expansion. So I welcome this climactic debate. As with many momentous decisions, there are legitimate questions to be asked, and it is always easier to criticize than create. But, Mr. President, I urge my colleagues not to fall into the trap of failing to see the forest for the trees. Let's step back a little bit and take a look at the big picture. By enlarging NATO membership to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, we will merely be catching up with reality. For centuries, these three countries have been part of the West. Four decades of Communist oppression and isolation was the historical aberration that has been all but corrected culturally and economically. Prague, Budapest, and Warsaw are now every bit as European as Madrid, Paris, and Berlin. It would be, in my view, indeed, perverse to recreate Stalin's immoral and artificial dividing line through the heart of Europe. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic belong in NATO, and in the European Union. They will soon join these organizations. I would parenthetically note, if you were a Russian and you had the choice of having other European nations near you join NATO, or join the EU, I suspect they would view their economic interests as the most negatively impacted upon by the EU being enlarged and them not being a part of it. What are we talking about? We talk about how we are offending the Europeans or expanding the EU. We are offending Russia to expand the European Union. Great. Great. You are sitting in Russia. Hey, good idea. I now have bilateral relationships that work pretty well with Poland and with Hungary and with these other countries. But I will tell you, they are now going to join the EU, and we don't get a piece of the action. Look, you cannot have it both ways. If this is about Russian pride, Russians feeling they are not part of the West, Russians not being involved in a way that they see their future in the West, then how does isolating them economically in the same way it is isolating them militarily, how does that convince any Russian leader? ``They won't let me sell my widgets in Paris. But they say I am part of the West. They are welcoming me. I need to sell my widgets so I can employ my people.'' The same polls we hear bandied about--the last poll I recall being conducted in Russia, the Russian people didn't even raise NATO on the scale of concern. Zero. Literally zero, of little or no concern to them. So it would be perverse if we were to say that, ``Hey, by the way, you can't join NATO until you are part of the EU.'' As if Russian is going to say, ``Oh, that's a good idea. I really want Poland in the EU and a member of NATO. That will make me feel a lot better.'' It is kind of hard to get a handle on this. But let me just read this poll: 53 percent say Poland--this is in Russia, a Gallup poll, March 14 of this year--53 percent say Poland should be allowed to join NATO. Did you hear what I just said? Fifty-three percent say Poland should be allowed to join NATO; 57 percent say the Czech Republic should be allowed to join NATO; 54 percent say Hungary should be allowed to join NATO, and 25 percent had no view on the matter. Threat? That is one of the reasons I think, by the way, that the Russian people think that, No. 1. This is conjecture on my part; no poll says this. I cannot cite any evidence of this. But I think they are like the American people. They are pretty smart, intuitively pretty smart. They know if Poland is part of NATO that any of the harebrained schemes any of their leaders may have in the future about sending their boys to Poland will be eliminated. I think they are pretty smart. They kind of have us figured out. If, in fact, national Poland is a part of NATO, they realize their political leadership in the future, as well as what is already done now, will have to finally shed 500 years, from czar through commissar, of a notion that somehow in American terms there is a manifest destiny for Russia to control Poland or any other place west of their boundaries. Don't you kind of find it fascinating that a majority of the Russian people say these countries should be able to join? We talk about this like it is a vacuum, where we are operating in a vacuum. How about all those European countries, our allies? I am not suggesting we should take a different kind of poll; that is, the more nations that agree, the better it is. But in counter to the argument that you know the best way to bring Russia around permanently is not to have NATO expanded. But the countries who are most threatened by Russia over the years, don't you kind of find it fascinating they think expansion is a good idea? We hardly agree with the French on anything. We can't even agree with them on Coca-Cola. We hardly have similar values. We hardly agree on any foreign policy national matter, except NATO. They think it is a good idea. The Brits think it is a good idea. The Danes and Spaniards think it is a good idea. The Italians and Greeks think it is a good idea. It is the only thing the Greeks and Turks agree on. Those who argue for expansion sometimes exaggerate the benefits that flow from this picture. I assure you that those who argue against expansion vastly exaggerate it and the potential damage that can be done to the emergence of a democracy in Russia. I ask my colleagues: What are we worried about? Are we worried about Russia? Of course, in public most Russian politicians will grouse about NATO enlargement. Public pronouncements cost them nothing. But from my many conversations with Russian politicians, both here and in Moscow, I can tell you that not one--not one, I repeat, not one--think that the entry of Poland and Hungary and the Czech Republic into NATO will constitute a military threat to Russia, including a long private luncheon with Chernomyrdin not too long ago--2 weeks, 3 weeks ago, whenever he was here last. Now, it would be my opponents, the opponents of enlargement in this country, who will cite a range of issues on which Russia and the United States have different policies and then point the wagging finger at NATO enlargement as the universal culprit. One size fits all. Secretary Albright used an apt metaphor when she labeled NATO enlargement as the opponents' ``El Nino.'' They blame it for everything wrong in the United States-Russian relationship. But even a superficial familiarity with the recent history of our relationship gives the lie to such illogic. Russian Communists and ultranationalists were against ratifying START II before NATO enlargement was even a gleam in the eyes of Lech Walesa and Havel, let alone U.S. policy. Why were Russian Communists and ultranationalists against it? I'll tell you why. Because American arms control negotiators did a heck of a job, and Russia knew it. That does not mean that ratifying START II isn't in Russia's self- interest. It is. But it will take some hard swallowing for them to take that step. It's all part of Russia coming to terms with the end of an empire. And this difficult psychological adjustment lies at the root of the Russian rhetoric against NATO enlargement. But I repeat, when you get down to brass tacks in discussions with Russian leaders, absolutely none of them think that their country's security will be threatened by Polish, Czech, or Hungarian troops being part of NATO--none. Why should they worry? Do my colleagues really believe NATO is anything but a defensive alliance? Surely they don't want to validate crude Russian cold war stereotypes of NATO as a rapacious aggressor just waiting to invade Mother Russia. We all know that NATO never had a plan to invade Russia. Do you know what? The Russians know it, too. How do I know that? They know it because thanks to the NATO-Russia Founding Act, which was signed in Paris last May, Russians have a permanent physical presence at NATO headquarters in Brussels and at SHAPE headquarters in Mons, Belgium. They take part in all discussions with NATO members, and they see for themselves that NATO has no hostile intentions. If they don't believe my analysis, let me quote from an article by the Defense Minister of the Russian Federation in the spring of 1999 edition of the NATO Review. The very fact that the Russian Defense Minister is now contributing, I might add, to the NATO Review, I believe says something in itself, as does the title of his article: ``We Are Not Adversaries, We Are Partners.'' Although the Russian Defense Minister repeats the obligatory negative attitude toward NATO expansion, the vast majority of his article stresses the positive. In particular, he declares: Today it is an established fact that Russia and NATO no longer regard each other as adversaries. * * * Moreover, a partnership in maintaining peace and security on the continent has begun to take shape in our relations. The NATO- Russia Founding Act is an example of this. It doesn't sound to me like a guy who thinks that expansion jeopardizes the security interest of his country. So let's give the Russians a little credit for being intelligent, thinking people who are not captives of outdated, ideological propaganda. From the Gallup Poll I read you, clearly the Russian people are not. And, obviously, the Russian military is not either. If some of my colleagues still don't believe me, I direct their attention to the balance sheet of recent Russian international behavior. On the negative side, from America's point of view, is their unwillingness to follow our lead on inspections of suspected Iraqi military sites, weapons sites. Does anyone really think this had anything whatsoever to do with NATO enlargement? Russia has two centuries worth of involvement in the Middle East, has had Iraq as a major client for decades, has a foreign minister who specializes in that area and has had a lengthy personal friendship with Saddam Hussein. It is nothing to do with NATO. I may be wrong, but I doubt that when Mr. Primakov and Saddam Hussein get together, they talk about the evils of the enlargement of NATO. And, I might add parenthetically, if the reason why the Russians didn't go along with our plan--someone explain to me, my ancestors, the French, how did they arrive at that? Was their decision to side with Russia relative to inspectors because of NATO enlargement? I think it was. I think it was. It is bizarre--I am only joking. I don't think it was. So, you can't have it both ways. It is often cited: You know, they were with us in the gulf war. France was with us in the gulf war. It was a different circumstance. A country had been invaded. They are not with us now, nor is France with us this time. How about Iran, another irritant in our relationship with Russia? Russia's involvement with Persia is even older than that with the Arab world. We certainly must and do oppose Russian investment in Iran and arms shipments and technology transfers to that country. But, again, their policies are grounded on historic geopolitics on their southern flank, economic distress, and lax controls--not on NATO expansion. Or let me frame the issue another way. I ask the critics of NATO enlargement, if NATO rejects enlargement, rebuffs Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, who have met NATO's rigid membership qualifications, is anyone going to be prepared to come to the floor here--the staffs of the opponents are listening here--is anyone going to come to the floor and say, if we reject NATO expansion, and we do it on the floor in the next week or so, that out of heartfelt gratitude you are going to see Russia break off relations with Iran, break off relations with Iraq--which is what we wish them to do--and immediately ratify the START agreement? What do you think? If Senator Roth and I lose on this one, I'm willing to bet you a year's salary, and that is all I have is my salary. It's plenty, but that's all I have. I am willing to bet you a year's salary--that's a joke. I'm not allowed to bet on the floor. I don't really mean it. I'll get letters saying Biden is gambling with his salary. But I will bet you anything that I'm allowed to bet that circumstances, in terms of the ties with Iran and Iraq, will increase, not diminish; that there will be less prospect for future arms control because the nationalists will have prevailed and they will triumph, and they will trumpet their triumph. So, look, if NATO expansion is the reason these bad things are happening to the extent they are happening, then obviously, if it's defeated, a lot of good things are going to happen. Don't hold your breath. Let's turn to the other side of the ledger and go back for a minute to arms control. What is Russia's recent record? I keep hearing from my friend from Virginia: You know it's going to be the end of arms control. Everything is going to come to a screeching halt because this occurred, because we voted to expand --so on and so forth. Let's look at the record. Much as opponents of NATO enlargement would like to forget, the facts are that within the past year the state Duma and Federation Council have ratified two critically important international treaties. One is the Flank Document to the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe. As the Presiding Officer and all my colleagues know, that is the treaty that talks about how much materiel, armored personnel carriers, et cetera, weapons, heavy weapons that each side could have and where they could have them. We just modified that agreement. They ratified it--an arms control agreement. With regard to the Chemical Weapons Convention, I was told once we passed it here, that would be the end of it in the Duma. If I am not mistaken, it was almost the very day we were in either Paris or Spain where the President and the 15 other NATO heads of state were inviting--inviting--these three additional countries to join that by an overwhelming vote, their version of our Senate and House, the Duma, went ahead and overwhelmingly ratified a very controversial arms control agreement requiring them to destroy thousands of tons of chemical weapons. Even now, the Yeltsin government has pledged to push for ratification of START II. Russia is well ahead of schedule in its destruction obligations under START I, and the Russians continue to work with us in implementing the vitally important Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. That doesn't sound like a country that is so blinded by hatred for NATO enlargement that it is opting out of international arms control agreements. How about cooperation in conventional weapons? I might add, Chernomyrdin, when he met with us here, predicted by the end of summer, he was confident that they would ratify the START II treaty. But how about conventional weapons? Russia and the United States and 28 other countries signed the CFE Treaty and, as a consequence, destroyed more than 53,000 pieces of heavy equipment in this decade. And the process continues. Does that sound like a country that is opting out, figuring there is a threat and they are going to stop and start to rebuild? Not only not rebuild it, they are continuing to meet their obligations under the CFE Treaty and destroying military equipment. Let me say that again. More than 53,000 tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery pieces and helicopters, and guess what, NATO enlargement hasn't stopped this remarkable process on multilateral disarmament, and it won't stop it after Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic finally join the alliance. Finally, NATO enlargement has not prevented Russian forces from serving side by side with U.S. forces under NATO command in Bosnia. In my last of several trips to Bosnia, I was standing at what we call Camp McGovern. I was standing out in the field talking to an American one- star general. A Russian colonel who looked every bit like the guy who fought Sylvester Stallone in Rocky IV, whatever that was, ramrod straight, 6 foot 3, wearing a Russian uniform, comes up, seeks to interrupt, salutes the American general and asks what his orders are. I don't know. For all this lack of cooperation we are talking about, how much the Russians hate expansion, how much they view it as a threat, how it is going to bring to a crashing end any cooperation on military matters, on arms control, conventional and strategic, I don't see it. I see no evidence to suggest that. For someone like me of the cold war generation, this was mind- boggling to watch this Russian colonel salute an American general. In spite of the policy differences between Moscow and Washington with regard to Bosnian Serbs, cooperation on the ground is exemplary. I heard the same thing from the Russian Ambassador who is deputy to the American civilian administrator in Brcko when I was in Bosnia. I scarcely need to say that neither the Russian colonel nor the Russian Ambassador had even one word to say about NATO enlargement. It was a nonissue to them. In fairness, there was no way I brought it up. It wasn't like they raised it and I responded. Nobody said anything to me. The salient point which the naysayers would like to obscure is that NATO enlargement is simply a matter of catching up with reality. It would be nothing less than grotesque, in my view, for the U.S. Senate, out of a totally misplaced fear of offending Russian sensibilities, to consign the thoroughly Western Poles, Czechs and Hungarians either to Moscow's sphere of influence or to a ``gray zone'' in Central Europe. Imposed spheres of influence have no place in Europe in the 21st century. Every country must have the right to choose its own political system, its own economic system, its own cultural direction and its own security arrangements, including whether or not to join the alliance. If we would reject the Poles, the Czechs and Hungarians for fear of antagonizing the Russians, the only people we would be helping would be the Russian ultranationalists and Communists by validating their outdated, vicious portrait of the United States, a view not shared by the democrats. The worst you hear, by the way, in Russia from Russian democrats, the worst you hear is not that ``we think expansion is a threat, we think expansion will be a problem to us.'' We know it is not. The worst you hear is ``this expansion will or might give fodder to the ultranationalists and the Communists in our battle to establish democracy.'' That is the worst you hear--the worst you hear. The only people, in my view, we would be helping if we rejected expansion would be the ultranationalists and Communists by, again, validating their outdated and vicious portrait of the West and their outdated and dangerous notion of what they are entitled to do in terms of influencing their neighbors. That rather obvious conclusion brings up a more basic point, which is regularly glossed over by the opponents of NATO enlargement. The choice is not between enlarging or maintaining the status quo; the harsh reality is that the status quo is not an option. It is myopic, in my view, to believe that three booming, vigorous Central European countries, all of whom have bitter historical memories of Russian domination, if rebuffed by NATO would sit idly by and trust good fortune to protect them. It should be obvious that they will not. They didn't do it in the interwar period earlier in this century, and they wouldn't do it now. The renationalization of security policy would take place, undoing all the stability that has been painstakingly created since the fall of communism. It would allow the poisonous forces of ethnic and religious hatred and international crime to regain a foothold in that volatile region. Nearly 60 million highly educated, talented Central Europeans are ready and willing to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area. All three candidate countries have carried out rigorous reforms to conform to NATO's political and military standards. All three have already contributed to NATO-led missions in the gulf war and in Bosnia. They will be an invaluable asset in controlling the forces of chaos and destruction that are now the real threats in Central and Eastern Europe. Indeed, this is the basic rationale for NATO enlargement--to extend the zone of peace and stability in Europe. It is a zone within which democracies do not fight with each other and which other countries, Russia included, need not fear. Obviously, there are certain risks associated with NATO enlargement, as there are with any policy initiative. But the risk of not enlarging NATO, of not catching up with history, in my view, are far greater. One other word about history. In the frantic flurry of last-minute attempts to derail ratification of NATO enlargement, I have even heard the accusation that we would be undermining the young Russian democracy, of helping to create a so-called ``Weimar Russia.'' Well, that charge wins the prize for historic illiteracy. After World War I, the victorious allies imposed punitive reparations upon Weimar Germany and kept it out of the League of Nations until 1926. After the cold war, on the contrary, the victorious West has done exactly the opposite with Russia. The United States and Western Europe have pumped more than $100 billion in aid and investment into Russia and have brought Russia into the international bodies where it was formerly not represented. They have even brought Russia into a working relationship with the inner councils of NATO itself. So please, in this round of Senate debate, let us spare ourselves hearing about ``Weimar Russias'' and ``Iron Rings'' and other ridiculous historic constructions. We are building a partnership with Russia which can continue to grow. Later in this session, Senators will have the opportunity to strengthen this process by voting resoundingly for the administration's enhanced funding request for assistance to Russia and the Nunn-Lugar program. I want to see all those who are opposed to expansion of NATO on the grounds of, it is going to offend Russia, to step up to the ball and do what they say they really are concerned about. Let us see them vote for enhanced funding for assistance to Russia and the Nunn-Lugar program. Another canard of the opponents of enlargement is that we will saddle the American taxpayer with mountainous new costs. Although I would invite my colleagues who wish to debate this to set a time tomorrow to do that, and do it in a coherent way, let me very briefly speak to that. Fortunately, we now have indisputable facts to refute this element of the basic scare tactic which is being engaged in: Is it going to cost $250 billion? $125 billion? and so on. NATO officials estimate that the total common cost of enlargement is $1.5 billion over 10 years. Of this, the share of the United States will be approximately $400 million, or an average of about $40 million per year over 10 years. And that is based upon our accepting the same proportion of responsibility for enlargement as we have for NATO thus far--burdensharing as we have been engaged in it for the past 20 years. As I said, later in the floor debate I hope to have an opportunity to explain this official cost estimate in some vivid detail. For now, however, I refer the doubters to the analysis of two U.S. Government agencies, the General Accounting Office and the Congressional Budget Office. The GAO concluded last month that NATO's approach to determining the $1.5 billion estimate over 10 years is reasonable. The CBO, which traditionally uses worst-case analysis as a hedge against any surprises in the future, set the common cost at $2.5 billion over the next 10 years. The worst estimate is one-tenth of what the worst estimate suggested by our colleagues is. Even the CBO figure, however, would yield an annual American contribution that amounts to only .15 percent of our total defense budget--.15 percent--almost only one-tenth of 1 percent. One final word is in order. No resolution, or even final legislation, is perfect. And there may be a few areas in the resolution of ratification that could be improved upon. Senator Helms and I plan to offer an en bloc managers' amendment that includes several of the amendments proposed to date. I anticipate that in these coming days several other amendments to the resolution of ratification will be offered and we will have ample time to discuss them. So I will not go into detail now. But, Mr. President, I see my senior colleague from Delaware is on the floor, so let me wrap up what I am about to say and what I have been saying in order to give him a chance to speak. Mr. President, it is important to note that the resolution of ratification is thoroughly a bipartisan product, as you will soon hear from my colleague from Delaware, a product in the committee crafted by the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Helms and myself, with significant input from other members of the committee and our respective staffs. It was voted out of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by a vote of 16-2 after hundreds and hundreds of pages of recorded testimony for and against expansion. I urge my colleagues to reread the resolution before offering amendments, for upon careful scrutiny, some of them prove to be superfluous, others harmful, and some both. An example of this is the amendment introduced by my friend and distinguished senior Senator from Virginia which would mandate a 3-year pause for additional countries before they could be invited to join the alliance, if they were to be invited. This would tie our hands diplomatically, Mr. President, if, for example, a clearly qualified country like Austria should apply for membership, and will put an arbitrary hold on Slovenia's case for membership which I believe is already convincing. Other amendments offered by my friend, the distinguished senior Senator from New York, for whom I have no higher regard, would require new NATO members to first join the European Union. This, in my view, equates apples and oranges, forgetting that the criteria to qualify for those two organizations are dramatically different. Moreover, his amendment would turn the institutional history of the last 50 years on its head. Traditionally, NATO membership has preceded EU membership. And I would further add that he chooses, as we are trying to come up with a new architect for the security of Europe, a requirement to go forward first by a group of which we are not a member and in which we have no say. We are not a member of the EU. To suggest that, before we could consider membership in NATO, it has to be decided by the EU whether or not they can join essentially takes us out of the game. And every time we have been taken out of the game in Europe--I might note parenthetically, this is not a direct analogy--but every time we have been taken out of the game or taken ourselves out, there has been real trouble in Europe. We are still a European power. We must remain a European power. We must continue to have a major say in the structures of Europe, because we have found, when we do not, nothing good usually happens. Still other amendments proposed by the junior Senator from Texas and the junior Senator from Missouri would use the enlargement ratification process as a vehicle to alter the very fundamentals of the NATO treaty that exists today, either by changing the rules of the North Atlantic Council or by putting severe restrictions on non-article V missions--an issue that is being debated right now within NATO. I want to put my colleagues on notice that I will oppose any amendments that will undermine the most successful military alliance in history. Mr. President, nearly 50 years ago, NATO was founded to counter a Soviet threat in Western Europe and to establish stability in the rest of Europe. Today, the new threat is instability itself arising out of ethnic and religious conflicts. And this is, at a minimum, a hedge against any future wrongheaded decisions by Russia. Enlarging NATO to include Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary is a unique opportunity to expand the zone of stability in the continent. It serves America's interest, Europe's interest, and the world's interest. I am absolutely confident, if we do this, history will record, as well, it serves Russian interests. I thank the Chair, and I now am happy to yield the floor to my colleague from Delaware, Senator Roth. Mr. ROTH addressed the Chair.

Mr. BIDEN. It will arrive in the form of the Senator from Delaware. We do have a formal estimate of the cost, and the chairman of the full committee was, I think, being his usual diplomatic self in saying that. Maybe it is best that we debate this in a coherent way and a very specific way. So that is why he asked the Senator to submit in writing, if I am not mistaken--Senator Warner submit in writing; I was not here at the time--his questions and the basis of his analysis of the cost and he would come back with a formal response.

Mr. BIDEN. I am delighted to yield.

Mr. BIDEN. Before the Senator leaves the floor, let me thank him again for allowing me to engage and be engaged while he spoke. Before he leaves the floor, I indicated to Senator Warner, and at least in an informal way I invite the Senator--it requires no invitation--I invite the Senator from New Hampshire, maybe we can work out a time tomorrow where those interested in the cost issue would be here to debate. The cost of $250 billion for expansion of NATO is bizarre, in my humble opinion. I will lay it out in detail why it is tomorrow. All of NATO combined, including our national budget now, doesn't cost but half that, less than half of that. How adding three nations would more than increase over 200 percent over the cost--I guess I assume the Senator is talking over a 10-year period--but essentially increase by 50 percent the costs of NATO is beyond me. I think it may be orderly and useful to our colleagues and to the public if those of us who, as the Senator from New Hampshire does, have spent a lot of time researching the detail related to the cost in trying to decipher and explain the reasons for the inconsistent numbers. The inconsistent numbers relate to what we talk about as the unified budget, the national budget, and so on, what we allocate as part of our--for example, we spend a lot of money, $300 billion a year, roughly, for defense. Is that all accountable to NATO? Do we say that the United States is spending $300 billion a year on NATO? What portion of that is the consequence of us belonging to NATO? When we build a runway and so on, is it because of NATO? The NATO budget and the cost relating to expansion I think are very, very important and warrant a very focused and coherent presentation by each of us. I will be here tomorrow prepared to do my best to outline in detail why we are talking more on the order of $40 million a year rather than $200 billion, and I will lay out my reasons. Hopefully, Senator Warner and Senator Smith and others will come and lay out in detail why they believe rather than picking an estimate that has been set out by someone, explain how they arrive at those numbers. I must say, if you tell my constituency to keep NATO--forget expanding, if you told them to keep NATO--it was going to cost them $250 billion, I imagine the referendum in my State would go through like a hot knife through butter. They would say get out. Obviously, if you set a number where the costs could be from $40 million to $150 billion, as I think the Princeton Survey was, although I may have heard it incorrectly, that came hot off the press, obviously a majority of the people would say, ``I am not for that. You mean to tell me I'm signing on for 150 billion bucks?'' I will be here tomorrow, and it might be useful to pick a time when we can be here, all of us interested in the cost, to debate it in some detail. In the meantime, I will take this opportunity to make a broader statement and I will respond to some of the things said today.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I think again we should focus on what my colleague from New Hampshire said about the real world. I think that is a legitimate point to make. The real world several years ago was, we had 338,000 American troops in Europe. Today we have 100,000. That should make it awfully clear to Russia that ours is not an aggressive posture. The expansion of NATO is not for purposes of encircling and/or crushing Russia. The real world is, all indicia out there that are available for the Russians to look at--I understand the psychology, but the real world is, there is no threat, this is a defensive alliance. With regard to drawing lines--I do not suggest in any way, in mentioning what I am about to say, that my friend from New Hampshire in any way wishes to ratify Yalta, but the practical fact of the matter is, Yalta was a deal made out of at the time, viewed by that President at the time, a necessary requirement to basically say, ``Hey, look. Hey, look, you've got this sphere of influence. This is the line drawn in Europe.'' At the time, there was not this anticipation there was going to be this carnage that would result, there would be this overwhelming suppression that would result. ``But here is the deal. Here is the line we are going to draw you. You have this buffer zone.'' That is what it was all about. To say now that these nations cannot come in is to ratify in a different way but the same line. Why? ``You can't come in because the successor to the Soviet Union--Russia--does not want you in.'' So when I say ``redrawing the lines,'' I say, to say they cannot come in ratifies the old line drawn after World War II. And when you erase that line, it is, in my view--and I respect the Senator from New Hampshire and all those who oppose expansion, but I argue it does not send a line closer to the Soviet Union for purposes of encircling; it says that there is no automatic line either of us, East or West--Russia-the United States, Russia-Germany, Russia-anyone else--is going to say, ipso facto, that no nation can make its own choice as to wherein they wish to have their alliance reside. That is what it says. That is what it says. So, therefore, when I say ``redrawing a line''--excuse me, ``erasing a line,'' the line I am talking about erasing is Yalta. And separate and apart from the physical occupation of those countries, at its root it was an admission and an acknowledgment of a sphere of influence of one country over--over--the fate of other countries in Central and Eastern Europe on the grounds that to do otherwise would put them in jeopardy, they had a right to at least indirectly control the national decisions of those nations relative to where they viewed their security to lie, in what alliance, if any. So to not extend, in fact, in my view, is a bold confirmation that that sphere of influence still remains. And that is a tragic historic mistake, in my view.

Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator yield on the point of 100,000 troops?

Mr. BIDEN. I see. I am trying to define--I mean, I am trying to get a clearer picture of what the Senator means by ``urgent.'' He is not suggesting it requires there be a Russian division breathing down the throat, making threats to come across the line, merely that there was this power, this entity, that existed that, if it chose to exercise its military strength, was a real threat.

Mr. BIDEN. A Soviet Union, but there was no specific threat that I am aware--specific change.

Mr. BIDEN. No more urgent than now.

Mr. BIDEN. I ask, would the Senator not acknowledge when we expanded to bring in Greece and Turkey, expanded to bring in Spain, there was also no emergency?

Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator yield for one point?

Mr. BIDEN. Let me respond, if I may, to the question of urgency and the process to clarify the issue of going to Poland's defense. My point about going to Poland's defense did not relate to whether Americans were courageous, were good, were bad, or kept or didn't keep a commitment. It was a statement of fact. My friend talks about the real world. The real world, that was 1939. We got in the war on December 7, 1941. In the meantime, nothing happened. We were a major power. My colleague points out that we weren't militarily prepared. By our own choice, we weren't militarily prepared. But other nations that were allegedly militarily prepared were powers on the continent. They also did nothing, and they watched. All I am pointing out to you is, from a Pole's standpoint, it is of little consequence to tell them, ``Don't worry, if you're ever threatened, we'll be there, we'll be there.'' That would be like saying to most Poles, ``The check's in the mail.'' They look at history, like other nations have looked at history, and they know what has happened to them, and they know the powers who had power did not respond when power was available and they were in trouble. I think it is unrealistic to think that we should expect the Poles to assume that, especially with some of the comments made by my colleagues on the floor in this debate over the last couple weeks about whether or not it is in our vital interest that Poland be free. That question was raised on the floor, and it is raised constantly in the minds of those who deal with the issue of European security. So, from the Polish standpoint, there is a clear, clear reason for them to know and understand that there is a big difference between being part of an alliance where the sacred word and trust of a nation is committed in advance and being left to the vagaries of rationalization on the part of a country after the fact to justify why they did or did not go to the aid of a country in question. It is a big difference. If it is not a big difference, then why do we have any treaties at all? With regard to the real world--let's look at the real world. The real world is, as my friend from Virginia has pointed out, that we have committed over $2 billion dealing with arms control agreements and providing American dollars to allow them to keep a commitment that they made with regard to arms control treaties. All of the Western European nations, the United States included, have contributed over $100 billion to Russia since the wall has come down and the empire has broken up. We, along with our other NATO allies, have taken the unprecedented step, accused by many on the right of having yielded our sovereignty to Russia by doing the NATO-Russian accords where they have full transparency within NATO. We have and continue to seek ways in which to restore--``restore'' is the wrong word; there never was a democracy--seek to provide the circumstances where democracy can flourish in a market economy with American tax dollars and German tax dollars and French tax dollars. So there is no reason--no reason--whatsoever for the Russians--no real world reason for the Russians to conclude that they are viewed as the enemy, the enemy by us. Any indirect comparison to the Weimar Republic is bizarre. We were exacting reparations from them; we are sending dollars, we are sending deutsche marks, we are sending francs, we are sending pounds to Russia, maybe not as much as we should, in the minds of some of us, but we are. With regard to the urgency, the worst time in the world to have to enlarge an alliance is at the moment of threat, because then it leads the other country in question to conclude that if they do not act out what we fear they will do before the alliance is reached, they will be in a weaker position. I respectfully suggest that urgency isn't the question. The question relates to, Is this the time and the moment, 9 years after the wall has come down--almost 9 years now after the wall has come down--to end once and for all the artificial boundaries and the ability of any nation, including Russia, to suggest that individual nations within Central and Eastern Europe do not have the ability to choose their own natural and national alliances? That is the urgency. The urgency is, the opportunity is here. It is the cheapest way to do it. It did not come as a consequence of any fad. It was debated and reflected among the NATO nations, not a decision made alone by the United States of America. Fifteen other European nations thought it was in their interest and the interest of the West, did not feel that it would increase their jeopardy and offend the Russians to do this, and unanimously all voted to take in these three nations. The only debate related to whether we should take in three or five. That was the debate among our NATO allies. So let me conclude--and I thank my colleague again for yielding this time--the urgency is that this is the most propitious time to end--to end--the artificial division of Europe and the implicit recognition that any country in Europe, including Russia, has the right to some buffer zone or has the right to impact upon the national decisions of a neighbor in that neighbor's determination to enter into a defensive alliance they view in their national interest--and I emphasize the word ``defensive.'' I yield the floor and thank my colleague.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I support the confirmation of the nomination of Greg Sleet to be the 22d Federal district court judge in Delaware. One of the most important duties of any U.S. Senator is the duty of advice and consent to the President's judicial appointments. I have worked hard throughout my career to ensure that the Senate provides the Federal courts with a steady supply of judges to enforce our Federal laws. But, after serving on the Judiciary Committee for the last 20 years, and after serving as U.S. Senator from Delaware for the last 25 years, this is my first opportunity to recommend a Federal district court judge for Delaware. I took this responsibility very seriously. And I have no doubt that Greg Sleet is the most qualified and experienced person for this position. This is the second time President Clinton has put Greg's name through the rigors of Senate confirmation. But this is no surprise--he enjoys a reputation for impeccable integrity in the Delaware legal community. In 1993, when I recommended Greg as U.S. attorney for Delaware, President Clinton was wise to follow my advice--he could not have nominated a more qualified, well-rounded, experienced Delawarean. Greg was confirmed unanimously and flawlessly, and for the past 4 years has exceeded even my highest expectations. And it is not only his distinguished service for Delaware, but also the breadth of Greg's experience that has impressed Delawareans, and convinced me that he will make a distinguished Federal judge. Greg is a graduate of Rutgers University School of Law and completed his undergraduate work at Hampton University in Virginia. He began his legal career in 1976 by serving for 7 years as a Philadelphia public defender--arguing before juries and representing indigent defendants at all stages of the criminal process--from pre- trial through the appellate courts. He than gained experience in civil litigation, civil rights, estates, and criminal defense as an associate in private firms--most recently as a sole practitioner for his own firm. I know how tough--and rewarding-- running your own firm can be. In 1990, Greg began his service as deputy attorney general for the State of Delaware, where he gained experience prosecuting a variety of criminal cases at the State level. He has practiced corporate and commercial law as well--working as an attorney in the legal department for Hercules Inc., where he helped manage corporate operations and litigation, and provided advice on acquisitions and antitrust matters. Since Greg became U.S. attorney, he has demonstrated strong leadership as my State's chief Federal law enforcement officer-- He has developed a solid reputation by prosecuting many significant criminal cases, including numerous Federal drug and gun cases. He has prosecuted hate crimes and fraud cases more aggressively than ever before. And, in addition to his accomplishments in the criminal court at the Federal level, he has made it a priority to strengthen the civil division in Delaware's U.S. attorney's office. Mr. President, I will not take up any more time--other than to repeat my ``bottom line'' from Greg's Judiciary Committee hearing: Greg Sleet's record speaks for itself--the Federal bench needs judges like him. His background makes him exceptionally qualified to service on the Federal bench, and his record shows that he is tough--as we need our Federal judges to be--with the practical abilities and experience to do the job. I am deeply proud to be associated with Greg's service as Delaware's U.S. attorney, and look forward to his service as a U.S. district court judge. I commend my colleagues for taking the time to review Greg's record and thank them for their support for the candidacy of this fine nominee.