Joe Biden

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, parliamentary inquiry. Was there a unanimous consent for a time to vote? If not, I would like to speak for 3 minutes on this amendment.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I say to the chairman of the full committee I will summarize my statement here, and when anyone is ready to go with an amendment, I will cease. But I will speak on the overall supplemental, if I may. I rise in strong support of the supplemental appropriation for troops in the Persian Gulf and for our troops in Bosnia. I want to say a few words about our policy in the Persian Gulf and then turn to a more detailed discussion, if I have time, of our SFOR mission in Bosnia. Passing this supplemental appropriations sends an unequivocal message to Saddam Hussein that the United States is committed to thwarting his intent to threaten our national interest. Diplomacy backed by the credible threat of force has put the international inspectors back in business, and for the first time in 7 years these inspectors, Mr. President, are doing their work without hindrance. Maintaining our military force in the gulf is as important as anything else in keeping Saddam Hussein honest, although it is expensive and it is costly in many ways. I know that some of my colleagues, including the senior Senator from Alaska, have expressed concerns about the willingness of our allies in the gulf to share the financial burden of our current deployment. Many of these concerns are valid. We should expect our allies to support us militarily and otherwise, especially when our actions safeguard their interests. But I think it is equally important to recognize that we are in the Persian Gulf, first and foremost, to protect our own vital interests. But I think it is equally important to recognize that we are in the Persian Gulf first and foremost to protect our own vital interests. First, we ignore at our peril the chemical and biological weapons programs of a leader with a demonstrated proclivity for using weapons of mass destruction. Second, whether we like it or not, sixty-five percent of the world's proven oil reserves are in Saddam Hussein's backyard. None of us wants to hand over our energy security to the whims of a maniacal tyrant. But that is exactly what we would be doing if we withdrew our forces from the Persian Gulf. Failure to approve this supplemental would lead Saddam to conclude that the United States is losing its resolve. He would resume his defiance in short order, and before long he would menace the region once again with chemical and biological weapons. Now, Mr. President I want to discuss the mission in Bosnia. By now the importance of the American-led SFOR mission in Bosnia should be manifest. The Dayton Accords of November 1995 ended three- and-a-half years of carnage and gave Bosnia and Herzegovina a roadmap for rebuilding a peaceful, civil society. No one can dispute that it is the overall security environment created by the international community through SFOR that makes civilian progress possible. Mr. President, several Members have already spoken this morning on the Bosnia amendment offered, and then withdrawn, by the junior Senator from Texas. Had the Senator not withdrawn her amendment, I would have opposed it. If she offers it again on the Defense Appropriations bill, I will speak against it. For now, however, I would make only two brief comments on the amendment before I turn to a more detailed discussion on our strategy in Bosnia. First, mention was made of ``shifting goalposts.'' I quite agree, but the shifting has been done by the opponents of our involvement in Bosnia, not by President Clinton. In an effort to prevent, then shorten, our Bosnia mission, the opponents complained that the Administration had not spelled out clear benchmarks, which, if met, would enable our troops to withdraw from Bosnia. Now, my friends, he has given us these benchmarks. And what do the opponents of our Bosnia policy say? They say that he has shifted the goalposts by giving specifics. Give me a break! Second, I understand that the Senator from Texas said that she didn't find the benchmarks to be very concrete. After having examined the conditions and benchmarks, I find her confusion rather puzzling. Therefore, I will now go into detail about them. I have spoken frequently about the enormous progress that has been achieved in Bosnia since the cessation of hostilities and about the difficult tasks remaining ahead. Today I will concentrate on showing that in voting to fund a continuation of the SFOR mission, we are not voting for an open-ended commitment. Rather, the Administration has drawn up clear benchmarks, which, when met, will allow our troops to come home. But, Mr. President, part and parcel of these benchmarks is interpreting them, and in this connection I will insist that the Senate is part of the process. Mr. President, ten key conditions have been identified, each containing objectives and concrete benchmarks, which constitute our ``game plan'' in Bosnia. These ten conditions are: 1. Military Stability; 2. Police and Judicial Reform; 3. Functioning National Institutions; 4. Reformed Mass Media; 5. Democratization and a Functioning Electoral Process; 6. Economic Reconstruction and Recovery; 7. Refugee Returns; 8. A Settlement for Brcko; 9. Resolution of War Crimes; and 10. International Organizations Able to Function without Military Support. I would like to turn to the benchmarks for each of these conditions. The precondition for all progress, of course, is the creation of military stability. The benchmarks of this first of the ten conditions include the maintenance of the ceasefire, weapons secure in their cantonment sites, and the arms control limits set since Dayton adhered to. The special police forces must be disbanded or restructured and inter-entity arms control and confidence and security building measures adopted. In addition, the American-run Train and Equip Program must be successfully completed, with a traditional support and sustainment arrangement with the Federation Army in place. Second, the benchmarks for police and judicial reform require that all local police forces are restructured and ethnically integrated. Basic skills and human rights training must be completed so that the police can deal effectively and fairly with civil disturbances. Police academies with professional leadership must be functioning. The intelligence services and the secret police must be stripped of all police functions, and an effective judicial reform program must be in place. Benchmarks for attaining the third condition for troop withdrawal are in the governmental area. They include all outlawed pre-Dayton institutions having been dissolved. Foremost among these are the remnants of the Bosnian Croat so-called ``Herceg-Bosna.'' A functioning customs service and control over state revenues must be established, including transparency in budgets and disbursements. Funds must be flowing to national, not entity, institutions, which have permanent staffs and facilities in place. The fourth condition for the withdrawal of our troops concerns the mass media. Its benchmarks begin with political parties being divested of their control of the broadcast networks. Entity and national-level media policy and regulatory structures must be in place. A new election law must guarantee that opposition parties have access to the airwaves. Independent media, already in existence, should be generally available throughout the country. Benchmarks for the fifth condition, democratization and the electoral process, are particularly important. Local, entity, and national governments must be beginning to function transparently. Political parties will have to accept binding arbitration for the implementation of the results of contested local elections. Bosnian electoral laws must be modified to meet the standards of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The September 1998 elections must be conducted in a free and fair manner, with the need for OSCE supervision reduced. The sixth condition for withdrawal of American troops involves economic reconstruction and recovery. As benchmarks, agreement must be reached on a permanent national currency. Privatization laws must be drawn in line with Dayton. Major infrastructure including transportation, power grids, and telecommunications must be repaired and functioning. The program of the International Monetary Fund must be in place with traditional lending programs begun. The fundamental and emotional issue of refugee returns comprises the seventh condition. The property laws of both entities in Bosnia must comply with the Dayton Accords. Property commissions must be fully functioning. Both the Federation and the Republika Srpska must be participating in phased and orderly cross-ethnic returns. The key cities of Sarajevo, Banja Luka, and Mostar must have accepted substantial returns of refugees and displaced persons, and the local police throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina must protect returnees, whatever their religion or ethnicity. The thorny subject of Brcko comprises the eighth condition needed to be met before all troops can be withdrawn. An arbitration award must have been implemented without violence. As we know, Mr. President, in mid-March the arbitration award on Brcko was postponed for the third time. Specific benchmarks for Brcko include local elections having been implemented, an integrated police force functioning, two-way refugee returns and ethnic reintegration continuing to progress, and job creation underway. The ninth condition involves war crimes. All parties to the Dayton Accords, including entity justice authorities, must be cooperating with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Local authorities must facilitate the apprehension of indictees. The tenth and final condition necessary for withdrawal of American troops, Mr. President, concerns the relationship of Bosnia with international organizations. One benchmark is certification that local authorities and the entity armies are capable of assuming responsibility for demining operations. Another is that the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia (OHR) demonstratres its authority to enforce inter-entity agreements without military back-up. A third, more general, benchmark is that the OSCE, NATO, and the European Union develop more traditional relationships with Bosnia and Herzegovina. Mr. President, I believe that these detailed conditions and benchmarks show conclusively that the Administration is not asking for an open-ended commitment. It has the exit strategy that critics have long been demanding. One or two of the ten conditions, and several more of the individual benchmarks have already been met. Many others are well on their way to fulfillment. Many others are only just beginning to be implemented. And, Mr. President, I would repeat my cautionary word that the fulfillment of such a detailed formulation leaves much open to interpretation. If the Senate approves this supplemental appropriation for our troops in Bosnia--as I strongly believe it should--we have the right to insist that the Congress be consulted on an ongoing basis on how the implementation of these civil-military benchmarks is going and also that our NATO and other SFOR partners are continuing to shoulder their responsibilities. The SFOR mission is of high national security importance for the United States. We have every right to be pleased with the quite striking progress that has been achieved in Bosnia over the past year. Much remains to be done, and with the game-plan--the ``exit strategy'' if you will--that the Administration has provided, closer cooperation with Congress is possible. I urge passage of this supplemental appropriation for both Iraq and Bosnia. I think that it is vital that the Senate and House pass this supplemental as soon as possible. The more expeditiously we act, the less our military readiness will suffer. The brave men and women serving in Bosnia and Iraq deserve to know that their missions are adequately funded by a proud Congress and not by cannibalizing important core military accounts. For that, they should thank the Senator from Alaska, because he has been absolutely, positively--how can I say it politely--consistent in insisting that we undertake these missions without cannibalizing our core accounts. Both of these missions further America's national security interests. They have achieved real results and what the Chairman of the full committe is suggesting is the way to go. I compliment the chairman in being able to fend off the amendments put forward so far today. I wish him luck for the remainder of the process here. I yield the floor. Mr. STEVENS addressed the Chair.

Mr. BIDEN. I thank the chairman of the committee for accommodating one of my concerns that I expressed through staff on this amendment that he changed. I agree fully, as the Senator knows from our many discussions on the United Nations and some disagreements relative to the United Nations, that I, like he, believe we do not get sufficient credit. He may remember the debate we had in the committee where I found myself at odds with some of my colleagues who share my view that we, in fact, owe a good deal of money and should pay it. I take issue, for the record, with my friend from Minnesota about his characterization of what a terrible job the administration has done. I do not believe that is the case. I believe that Secretary Albright, when she was at the United Nations, and others have never failed to point out the extent of our involvement. I do not think we should confuse apples and oranges here. The truth of the matter is there are certain things that are U.N. sanctioned and there are other things that are U.N. administered. When folks wear blue helmets, everybody gets repaid. When they are not wearing blue helmets, they do not get repaid unless it is a chapter 7 undertaking administered by the U.N. I will not bore my colleagues with the details that relates to, but let me say we are not the only country who has acted unilaterally under the cover of or with the sanction of a U.N. resolution. There are other countries who have done so and have not been reimbursed for their contributions, from France to Germany to Great Britain. For example, in 1994 voluntary expenditures by France amounted to $747.5 million, for which they did not seek reimbursement; Italy, $347.7 million, et cetera. We by far and away are the biggest of the contributing noncredit-given countries in the United Nations, I acknowledge that. And I think we should be doing what the Senator from North Carolina is saying: We should make it clear, in part to our folks as well as the rest of the world, that we do a great deal more than we get credit for. I further say that we could amend--and I am not going to --we could amend this resolution to ask the world body to understand that there are other tens of billions, hundreds of billions, we spend that are not under any U.N. auspices, that are done for the good of the world, that we get no credit for. It is true we do not get sufficient credit. But I respectfully suggest that it should not be confused with whether or not we owe or do not owe what we agreed to under the deal we signed up to when we joined the United Nations. I make a distinction here. No state receives credit against assessments for unilateral activities in support of U.N. security council resolutions which represent a majority of the U.S. cost incurred during the period my friend from Minnesota is talking about. Again, I will ask unanimous consent a written statement be printed in the Record to explain in more detail the points I know my colleagues understand but maybe the public at large, listening to the truncated debate on my part, may not understand. For example, let me conclude with this. Italy just spent a lot of money on Albania under a U.N.-sanctioned resolution. Now, Italy did it because if Albania goes bad, Italy is in trouble. Italy has a real problem, a serious problem. It was in their overwhelming interest to see to it that things did not deteriorate more than they did in Albania. So the rest of the world did what they always do with us--they kind of stood by a little bit, and we held Italy's coat, in effect, and we said, ``OK, you go ahead, you go ahead and spend that money. We know basically it is in your interest. You would want to do it even if there were no U.N. resolution authorizing you to do that. You would still want to do it, because it is in your overwhelming interest and it is in the world's interest.'' The no-fly zone in Iraq. We have used an attenuated rationale--which I think we should have--to enforce the no-fly zone. We are paying for the bulk of that, the United States of America. It is not because the rest of the world is saying, go in and enforce the no-fly zone. Half the United Nations might say, don't enforce the no-fly zone. The reason they do not want to pay, the reason it is not a blue helmet operation, they could not get the United Nations to go along. Here is a case where we believe it is in our overwhelming naked self- interest to enforce the no-fly zone, because oil in that region of the world is as big a deal to us as it is to the rest of the world. Granted, it benefits the whole world, but we are big boys. We have to grow up. We have to understand there are certain times when we do things and expend money that incidentally benefits other people but we would do even if the United Nations was not around. So the technical distinction that is made in reimbursement is between--to overstate it in the interest of time--a blue helmet being worn and us going in and doing it with the sanction of the United Nations, saying, ``OK, we have a resolution that says it is OK to do that.'' There are two different deals. So we should do what is being proposed. I am voting with my leader on this issue. He is correct. But let's not get carried away, as I respectfully suggest my friend from Minnesota maybe has in terms of how, (a), the administration has done nothing to make clear our contributions, and (b), that somehow this is the same as what is owed by us and we are trading apples for apples. They are apples and oranges. Maybe we should change the way the charter reads. Maybe we should change it to say, ``Anything done under the guise of''--or ``under the umbrella of a U.N.-sanctioned operation should be given credit for.'' Maybe we should say that. I am not sure we want to say that, because we may find a lot of folks involved in things we do not want to have to contribute to but maybe we should. But it does not say that now. That is not the way it works now. Mr. President, I compliment my friend, and I do not disagree with the underlying thrust of what my friend from Minnesota is saying, that we do not get enough credit. We do not get enough credit. If we do not get up there and beat our chest a little bit about what we are doing, sure in the heck, no one else will give us credit for it. I think it should at least be done now in part, quite frankly, and you might consider this typically--my friend from North Carolina would be too polite to say this--kind of a typically Biden view of this thing in the following respect: I think it is important to do this now, because we haven't paid. In other words, I am so upset about us not having met our obligations that we signed on to, coupled with the damage I think it is doing to our ability to get other things that are in our naked self-interest done in the United Nations, that at least this might, by advertising what we have done, sort of take the stinger out of the rhetoric that is going around up in the United Nations that we do not do anything, that we are the bad guys, we are the pariah, we are the total deadbeat. That is one of the reasons why I am glad we are doing it. I do not think we should confuse what we have done in other areas, and I will list for the Record what they are. I am sure my colleagues already know how we get to the $2,972,938,000. They are: Former Yugoslavia and Iraq operations, including Able Sentry, Deny Flight, IFOR/SFOR operations, Southern Watch, Sentinel, and Provide Comfort. They basically relate to what was cited here, the former Yugoslavia and Iraq, and with the exception of Able Sentry, I think we would find that each of the things we have done in there that have not been compensated for are things we pushed to have done. There is resistance at the United Nations and in NATO to do --we brought them around through, in effect, sanctioning us to do this. I end by saying I think my colleagues would probably be apoplectic if everything we did in order to get reimbursed we had Americans with blue helmets on. I think you would all be up here going bananas if that were the case. Be careful what you wish for; you may get it. In this case, I think it is worth making the case, I think you overstate the criticism of the administration. I thank the chairman of the full committee for allowing me, and I thank my friend from North Carolina for allowing me to be part of this amendment. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the written material that I referred to earlier be printed in the Record.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. I will yield in just 2 seconds.

Mr. BIDEN. As calmly as I can say it, I guess the point I am trying to make is, it seems to me we should compare apples and apples and oranges and oranges. Does the Senator believe there is any more or less support on the part of the American people to defend Dresden than there is Warsaw? To defend Budapest than there is Florence? To defend any one of the countries that we are talking about, their cities, than any other European city? It seems to me that is the question. If we would not go, if we cannot get American staying power to defend Poland, then I respectfully suggest we cannot get American staying power to defend Germany. I would think, in America, if you ask for a show of hands, so to speak, on a question of whether we should defend anybody--but the reasonable comparison was these NATO nations that are seeking admission versus NATO nations that are already in. To compare this to Iraq, with all due respect, is comparing very different things. By the way, five votes were a close call. But in my father's generation it was one vote that allowed the draft. The British had already been pushed into the English Channel, all of Europe had already been conquered, Jews were already being slaughtered, and there were not a lot of people walking off this floor, or any other floor in this generation or any other generation, raising their hands to join. It was only after Pearl Harbor. I don't say that critically; I say that as an observation, a statement of history, historical fact. So, this notion that the staying power in Somalia or even in the gulf should be equated to the staying power that would or would not exist in Poland, the Czech Republic or Hungary, I think is comparing two different things. I think the most appropriate comparison would be--and you may be right, Senator, that there is no staying power--but the staying power we would have to defend Germany, the staying power that we would have to defend Turkey, I will lay you out 8 to 5, you take the bet, if you took a poll in the United States of America and said you must send your son or daughter to defend one of the two following countries, Poland or Turkey, I will bet my colleague a year's salary they will say ``Poland.'' I will bet you a year's salary, and that is all I have. I have no stocks, bonds, debentures, outside income. I will bet you my whole year's salary. You know I am right. As Barry Goldwater would say, ``you know in your heart I'm right.'' So, if there is no staying power for Poland there sure in heck is none for Turkey.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I find this absolutely astounding. Are my friends suggesting that the Russians were justified in marching into Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania and annexing them in the name of preventing a ring from surrounding them? What in Lord's name are we talking about? No. 1. No. 2. I have the map, and I am looking at the map. I am trying to figure where the ring is. But let's assume it is a ring. It seems to me, if it is a ring, it is a ring of freedom, a ring of freedom that tolls out and says anybody who wants to have it put on their finger can join and work it out, including Russia. And Kaliningrad is a port, but if you look at the Kola Peninsula at the top of that map, which is considerably more armed, including with nukes, than Kaliningrad is, it happens to have shared for the last 40 years a border with a NATO country called Norway, about the same length of mileage. Now, look, this is a bit of a red herring, as we used to say when you practiced law or in law school. What is this ring? We are not talking about Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia or Belarus or Ukraine or Romania now. That is not part of the debate today. Now, if my friends are saying anyone who votes for expanding NATO to include Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary are tying this noose around the Russian neck, this iron ring, well, then, I don't quite get it. But if they are saying that if you vote for these three you must be saying you are going to vote for all 12 or 15 or whatever, well, then, that is not how it works. That is a fight for another day. But I find this notion that Kaliningrad, which was awarded, if you will, to Russia after World War II, that subsequent to that the Russians were justified--they didn't say this; I am saying this--that the Russians were justified to assure that they could have access to this piece which was separated from their otherwise--we call them the contiguous 48--separated from their historic border, that they were justified in taking the freedom of the Lithuanians so they could have access, the Lithuanians are somehow out of line because they will, based on some notion of, apparently, religion or some just international pique of some kind, not allow Russian troops to march through their country and that makes them bad guys--the same troops that subjugated them for the last four decades. I don't find that a religious concern. I do not understand how that somehow makes the Lithuanians a little bit shaky. These are the people who for 40 years subjugated them, took away their national identity. And now just 7 or 8 short years after the wall is down they are somehow the bad guys because they will not allow Russian divisions to march from Kaliningrad to Moscow. Oh, my goodness. And the other argument I am finding fascinating, the solemn commitment--it is a solemn commitment--we make if, in fact, we find ourselves saying that another member can join, we make a solemn commitment to them just as we did Germany, and the comparison is made between Poland and Somalia. We had no staying power in Vietnam and Somalia. I would respectfully submit that Vietnam and Somalia are not Central Europe; they are not Poland; they are not Hungary. Implicit in the statement is if, in fact, tomorrow or the next day or the next year or the next decade someone invaded Poland again, we would, like the French, stand there with our thumbs in our ears and not respond, then I say we really have lost the meaning of what it means to be an American. That is what Europe did. They refused to make a solemn commitment to Poland. Then when they did make it, they broke it. What I find an incredible leap here is, what commitment are we making in NATO that I hope every Senator on this floor would not make absent Poland being part of NATO? Is someone suggesting to me tomorrow--and this is not a possibility realistically, but if Russia decided to put 40 divisions back in Poland and the Senator from Oregon, presiding, stood up and said, ``We should respond,'' what do you think would happen on this floor? Well, I hope to God what would happen on this floor would not be what happened in the British Parliament, what happened in the French legislature, what happened in the other capitals of Europe. I hope we would not say, ``Oh, my goodness, no; maybe they have a historic right. Oh, my goodness, let's think about it. We will be making a commitment that is awful. Oh, my goodness, this is a dilemma.'' What is the dilemma? What is the dilemma? Or Hungary. By the way, I happened to notice on the map, I don't know that anybody is talking about Ukraine, including Ukraine. I don't know that anybody is talking about Belarus, including Belarus. I don't know that anybody is talking about Slovakia, including Slovakia as being members of NATO now or in the near term. It seems to me they somehow sit between that iron ring and that noble emerging democracy of Russia. Look, I guess the thing that sort of got my goat a little bit here is that Americans do not have staying power. What they are really talking about is the Senator's generation and mine, Mr. President, that we do not have staying power. I will tell you about the staying power. The staying power of my friend's generation was real, but it was enviable because they didn't have to doubt whether or not what they were doing was saving the world. They didn't have to doubt whether or not what they were doing was, in fact, literally preserving the freedom of their wives and children back home in the old U.S.A. They didn't have to doubt that they were out there fighting one of the most miserable SOBs in the history of mankind. But my generation went full of doubt and still went--and still went-- never once having the solace of knowing the malarkey we were being fed about Vietnam approached the truth of what their generation was fed about Nazi Germany and fascism in Europe. But they went. I don't doubt the staying power of the American people. I doubt the wisdom of our leadership in the places we have asked them to stay. But if this implies that if there were--and there is no realistic prospect of this--but if there were an invasion of Poland or Hungary or the Czech Republic, not a border dispute, an invasion, that we would not respond, that we would have to think about it, that there is any substantive difference today----

Mr. BIDEN. I am finished. It seems to me this iron ring is no ring at all, the notion that Kaliningrad is somehow going to be isolated relating to expansion. It is already isolated because of the place called Lithuania. The only answer to the lack of isolation is Lithuania limiting their sovereignty. That is the only answer. There is none other. Nobody can get from Kaliningrad to Russia through Poland. They are not trying to get there that way. This is about Lithuania when you talk about Kaliningrad. And the commitment being made to Poland and the Czech Republic and to Hungary, I hope we would make whether or not there was a NATO to which they would join. Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.

Mr. BIDEN. I know the Senator from Connecticut wishes to speak. I will just take 2 minutes here. One, I want to make it clear, when I was making a case to my friends from Virginia and New York about the comparison of Turkey and Poland, it did not relate to whether there was merit in defending Turkey. There is. Not only merit, there is an obligation. I was making the larger point which goes to the serious issue the Senator from Virginia has raised honestly--and the only one who has done it forthrightly so far-- and that is, is there a consensus in America to defend any European country? Whatever commitment we make, we must keep. And he is right in raising the issue: Are the American people--do you all understand, all America, that if we expand, we are committing our sacred honor to defend Poland as we have Germany, to defend the Czech Republic as we have England, to defend the country of Hungary as we have Denmark? Are we prepared to do that? That should be discussed, and it should be discussed forthrightly. And I thank him for raising that issue. There is much more to say, but I will have plenty of chance to say it, so I yield to my friend from Connecticut.

Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator yield for a short question?

Mr. BIDEN. I yield then. I am sorry. I thought the Senator yielded.

Mr. BIDEN. It just confuses me.

Mr. BIDEN. Between the invasion of Warsaw and the invasion of a former East German city, Dresden, what is the substantive difference?

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I want to take a few minutes this afternoon to address the urgent need for IMF funds, to restore confidence to a fragile international financial system and to maintain a leadership role in the world economy. I am pleased to see that the Appropriations Committee has moved quickly this week to provide funding for continued U.S. participation in the IMF--both for the new arrangements to borrow that represent the emergency reserves of the fund, and for the quota increase to restore the IMF's ability to meet potential new demands on its resources. The current news from Asia--declining U.S. exports, the threat of increased imports, a more fragile international banking system--has brought home to us the importance of international cooperation to prevent the outbreak and spread of financial crises. It also reinforces the need to move quickly to restore the IMF's ability to contain the current crisis and to maintain the IMF's ability to respond to future problems. That is why I am concerned about some of the conditions put on the IMF funds in the Appropriations Committee on Tuesday. Treasury Secretary Rubin, who, along with Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan has repeatedly reminded Senators of the need for quick action on these funds, has called those conditions--and I quote: ``Impractical to the point of being unworkable.'' This is no way to treat funds that are needed to restore the equilibrium of the international financial system, and to no way maintain the leadership of the United States in the world economy. The International Monetary Fund was created by us at the end of World War II to maintain the stability of the international financial system. Today, its task as the lender of last resort in the kinds of meltdowns we have seen in Asia is by no means simple. With the rise of market economies among the developing nations of the world, and with the expansion of the international financial system-- both developments that promote the long-term interests of the United States--the task of the IMF has become increasingly difficult. I am not here today, Mr. President, to argue that the IMF is a perfect institution; in fact, our own Treasury, under the leadership of Secretary Rubin, has used its substantial influence to push for important reforms, to open the IMF to greater public understanding and trust. Secretary Rubin is also working with his counterparts around the world to reform the workings of the international banking system to reduce the risk of crises such as one we watch today in Asia with great concern. As the leader in the world's economy--indeed as the model economy which the rest of the world aspires to emulate--we in the United States have a special role to play in helping to sustain the health of the international economy. By maintaining our position in the IMF--by paying our dues and maintaining our dominant position there--we will remove lingering doubts in financial markets that make recovery and reform in Asia harder to achieve. And, as the most open economy in the world, we have the greatest stake in maintaining the stability of international trade and finance. The longer we leave the issue of our IMF commitment in doubt, the more our own farmers, workers, and manufacturers will lose overseas sales. I want to remind my colleagues that our contributions to the IMF don't cost American taxpayers a dime. Like deposits in a credit union of our own making, our contributions are matched by interest-bearing assets, and we can call for the return of those contributions if we choose. For those reasons, those contributions have no impact on our Federal deficit--or the surplus we now enjoy. With the outcome of the Asian crisis still to be determined, with the world looking to us for the leadership that will restore confidence to private sector investors, we must act quickly and decisively to maintain the strength of the IMF--and to maintain our own dominant voice within the IMF. We should not make demands of the IMF that could delay indefinitely the day when private financial markets regain the confidence that will mark the turning point in the current financial crisis. That is why I am pleased that my friend and colleague on the Foreign Relations Committee--chairman of the International Economic Policy Subcommittee--Senator Hagel, has taken the lead in introducing legislation authorizing funds for the IMF with workable, sensible reforms. Together with Senator Grams on our committee, and Senators Roberts, Chafee, and Domenici, Senator Hagel has provided us with an important point of reference when we consider IMF funding here on the Senate floor. And I hope that will happen soon. Right now, there is no guarantee that we will take up the urgent issue of IMF funding at any time this year. Failure to act, and to act soon, would be irresponsible. It would expose the United States as vacillating, indecisive, and unable to lead in a time when what is needed most is leadership and commitment to restore confidence and stability to a shaken financial system. Similarly, it would be irresponsible to add unrelated, highly charged issues to the consideration of what are clearly urgently needed funds for the IMF. Mr. President, I am confident that in the end, the United States Senate will respond to the current challenge with both the decisiveness and good judgment that must characterize the actions of a great Nation in time of crisis. I look forward to working with all of my colleagues to make that faith a reality.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, if I may, I will be brief.

Mr. BIDEN. The Senator is of the view it shouldn't be on anything, so I hope when he settles this he can settle that too so we can fund the United Nations and have the IMF moneys, too.

Mr. BIDEN. I understand his desire but I don't understand his right. I understand the desire not to deal with all those amendments but I never thought that was a right--although it would be nice if it were a right--and while he is doing this, if he succeeds, if he could also clear the Helms-Biden foreign relations material of abortion amendments and declare them out of order as well. That is somehow stopped up.

Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. BIDEN. I, too, applaud the majority leader for this new offer. I am one who supports the Coverdell amendment. I am one of those folks who voted against vouchers, although I am entertaining whether or not I vote for a test project, as I view it, in the District. I have not made up my mind on that yet. But I clearly support the approach of my friend from Georgia. As a matter of fact, we had a little bit of a disagreement in our caucus over that issue on the substance. But there is one thing there is not any disagreement in our caucus about, and that is whether or not--and I suspect there would not be if the roles were reversed for the majority leader--whether or not we would sign on to--even those who support the Coverdell legislation--whether or not we would sign on to a position that would effectively require us to give up our rights to offer amendments, because although I am for this bill, it may be there would be a crime bill on the floor or there would be a foreign policy initiative on the floor that, once I agreed to give up that right procedurally, I would have put myself in the permanent minority and not being able to exercise the rights I have under the rules of the Senate. And I am absolutely confident the Senator from Mississippi would take the same position were he on the opposite side of the numbers at this time, the numbers being in the minority. But I, for one, believe that we should try to work out an overall arrangement relative to making sure we deal with education-related issues. I would--and far be it from me; I am not capable of being the leader of either one of the parties on this floor. But I would suggest that while the minority leader, the Democratic leader, is considering this, that the majority leader, the Republican leader, consider whether or not there is any benefit in trying to put a time limit on this now. Suggesting time limits on amendments is like waving red flags. I can name 10 Senators on your side, if I said that we are going to give their State an additional $70 billion but there will be a time limit on debate, they would automatically disagree. So I think there are sort of red flags. And far be it from me to get in the middle of this negotiation, but I compliment the Republican leader on what seems to be at least a slight change of approach in terms of what I think is an equitable way in which to deal on this floor. But people like me, who strongly support the Coverdell bill, absent something worked out like this--I must say to my friend from Georgia, I am with you, but I ain't with you when I have to give up my rights on everything else that comes down the pike-- as strongly as I support this. So I compliment, again, the Republican leader. I hope he and the Democratic leader can work this out, because I would like very much to get to this debate and get to voting on it. And, to be very selfish about it, I would also like to clear it out of the way so we can focus on NATO in a coherent way. I see the Presiding Officer shaking his head. He has a great interest in the NATO issue as well, I know. There are a number of Members who do. It would be nice to have a coherent, consistent debate on that issue, because it is of such consequence. I thank both leaders for allowing me to get into what is not usually something I speak to, and I appreciate their efforts.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask that the resolution on Kosovo be reported.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. BIDEN. The Senator does not owe the Senator from Delaware any apology at all. I think the case he makes is the correct case. I am particularly concerned that the most important foreign policy debate we have had maybe in the 25 years that I have been here is being used as a filler. That bothers me. It bothers me in the sense it lends an air of credibility to the unfair criticism that we have not adequately and fully and seriously taken into consideration the pros and cons relating to expansion. It just reinforces, in my view, that false argument. I happen to support the position of Senator Coverdell on the procedural aspects of the issue. There is no question the Senator from North Dakota, in my view, is correct. I have been here 25 years. We have just begun, in the last couple of years, deciding new and innovative ways to avoid the opportunity for people to be able to get a vote on issues on this floor. For the first 23 years I was here, I don't ever recall us being in a circumstance where the minority was presented with the proposition that you put up your package, we will put up our package, we each get one vote, and that is it. That is not the way the rules were intended to work, in my view. I am not suggesting that the majority leader is violating the letter of the Senate rules, but I think the spirit is being violated. I have a secondary problem that is almost as bothersome to me. I have, along with the Republican manager of this bill and the chairman of the full committee, Senator Helms, and others, devoted hundreds and hundreds of hours to this issue of NATO expansion, taken the issue very seriously, and now it is kind of like, well, yesterday we had extra hours so, boom, let's go ahead and throw in NATO. By the way, we don't know what else to do. Today we hit a logjam, the Democrats wouldn't swallow the, in my view, heavy-handed tactics employed here on the education bill; so, what do we get? There must be something out there-- grab NATO. So it will reinforce the notion that somehow we are not taking this incredibly important foreign policy consideration seriously. This should be set aside to have one solid, continuous debate, whether it takes 2 hours or 2 weeks--and it is closer to 2 weeks, and appropriate, than 2 hours--in order for the public to be educated about what we are doing. I believe no foreign policy can be sustained or should be sustained without the informed consent of the American people. This a gigantic issue which, understandably, and historically, they are not interested in, in the day-to-day sense, in that they are more concerned about the classroom the Senator described in his own State or whether or not their company is downsizing and they will lose their job or whether or not they will be able to get their child to college. I am not critical of the American people. The only time we have an opportunity to get their attention--and when we do, they pay attention, they understand, they fully grasp what we are about--is if we say, ``And now we are about to debate a major foreign policy issue. Basically, tune in, and we will have a coherent debate.'' This place is capable of coherent and intelligent debate. This, in a sense, demeans the process and demeans the issue. The Senator owes me no apology. Now that we are on NATO, I hope we don't get off NATO; I hope we continue. Let's pick a course here. If we are going to debate this issue, debate it fully and resolve it and put everything else aside until we do it. I really hope the majority leader will refrain from using NATO as sort of a filler here, because it is so much more important, and we all know that the way in which the process treats an issue reflects, at least in the mind of the press and the public at large, what value we place on the issue, how important we think it is. I don't mean to be personally critical of the leader. I think he grabbed whatever was available procedurally to be able to be brought up and this was here. I am really sorry that we have gotten to this point. Again, let me conclude my comments relative to this by saying to the Senator from North Dakota, he owes me no apology. He is protecting not only his rights but he is protecting the rights of the Senator from Delaware, majority and minority Members. I have been here long enough to realize that there is no such thing as a permanent majority. I have been in the majority, I was then in the minority, I was back in the majority, and I am now in the minority, and I look forward to being in the majority again. This kind of precedence sets a tone that puts the majority--whichever party that may be--into the position of ratcheting up the way in which they attempt to have their way on the floor. I think it is not prudent.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, it is signed by the President and the heads of state of Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia in mid-January, as a commitment to a Europe that is whole and free, based upon Western values and Baltic integration into interlocking European and transatlantic security institutions. The key language on NATO membership states: The United States of America welcomes the aspirations and supports the efforts of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to join NATO. It affirms its view that NATO's partners can become members as each aspirant proves itself able and willing to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and as NATO determines that inclusion of these nations would serve European stability and the strategic interests of the Alliance. We said the same thing to the Russians and to every other country. I might add, by the way, when I say the President made the same commitment for theoretic membership of Russia in the alliance, people say, ``Oh, my God, how can you say that?'' I would like to take us back 40 years when NATO was contemplating debate on this floor. If someone would have said, ``if the admission of Germany would enhance stability, we would invite them,'' they would have been looked at like they were crazy. Our goal is European stability, territorial integrity. I don't think the President's actions in fact----

Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator yield for 60 seconds? I point out to my friend from New York that the border with Norway has been there for 50 years. And Norway is now providing aid and assistance to Russia. They seem to be getting on very well. It seems not to have caused all that big a problem.

Mr. BIDEN. A distinction.