Joe Biden

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. BIDEN. Will you be kind enough to add me as a cosponsor?

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, with the end of the Cold War, the terrible threat of nuclear holocaust has been substantially reduced. But the world is far from trouble-free. The threat of the 90's, perhaps to become the threat of the coming decade, is that posed by weapons of mass destruction in the hands of lesser powers--like Iraq or Iran--or even terrorist groups. My esteemed colleague, the senior Senator from Indiana, has written a sobering article in today's issue of The Hill. His conclusion is one to which we should all pay attention: Absent congressional support of a U.S. response to this threat as focused, serious and vigorous as America's Cold War strategy, Americans may have every reason to anticipate domestic or international acts of nuclear, chemical and biological terrorism against American targets before another decade is out. The Nunn-Lugar and related programs that help countries in the former Soviet Union to guard against diversion of material or technology relating to weapons of mass destruction are an important defense against such terrorism. Last year, I was pleased to co-sponsor Senator Lugar's amendment that restored full funding to these programs. This year, we would all be well advised to seek opportunities to expand these programs, as recommended in a study last year by the National Research Council, an arm of the National Academy of Sciences. I commend Senator Lugar's article to my colleagues and ask unanimous consent that its text be printed in the Record.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, one of the most important foreign policy issues with which the Congress must deal in the coming months is continued American involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Last December, President Clinton announced his decision that the United States should maintain ground troops in an international force that will replace SFOR, whose mandate expires in June. Soon, he will ask the Congress for the funding to support this operation. I support the President's decision as being squarely in the national self-interest of the United States. As I have said on many other occasions, the stability of southeastern Europe depends on the ability of the Bosnians, working with the international community, to create a self-sustaining, peaceful, democratic system in their country. Failure to achieve this goal would inevitably restart the violence that produced the worst bloodletting in Europe since World War II, and would almost certainly ignite the ethnic tinderbox that is smoldering in neighboring countries. Other potential Radovan Karadzics cannot be encouraged to believe that they can get away with similar crimes. The devil's work of the mass murderers, ethnic cleansers, and rapists in Bosnia must not be allowed to stand in that country or, worse still, to be repeated there and elsewhere. Moreover, as President Clinton said in his State of the Union address, staying the course in Bosnia is a test of American leadership in Europe in general, and in NATO in particular. It was American military involvement in the fall of 1995 and our diplomatic leadership in crafting the Dayton Accords that ended the carnage in Bosnia. Make no mistake about it: we are the indispensable country in the European security equation, as Bosnia demonstrates. Although our alliance partners are shouldering the lion's share of the economic and military burden in Bosnia, without our participation on the ground and in the air, SFOR and any post-SFOR force would be impossible. The task in Bosnia is complex and will take several more years to complete. President Clinton himself admitted his error in thinking that nearly four years of horrific violence could be remedied in one year, or even two-and-a-half years. But our commitment to assisting the Bosnians, of course, is not open- ended. Rather than tieing our exit to an artificial date, we should-- and will--link it to the completion of clearly defined criteria, such as the establishment of a functioning national government and other national institutions, seated elected local governments, free media, and a free-market economy. I have every confidence that the Administration will spell out these benchmark criteria in detail in its request for U.S. participation in the international force after this June. I had the opportunity to accompany the President to Bosnia before Christmas--my fourth journey in recent years to that troubled land. The trip confirmed the impressions that I gained in a longer trip last summer: we have made significant progress in implementing the military and civilian provisions of the Dayton Accords. I scarcely need to add the caveat that much still remains to be done to put Bosnia back on firm footing. Today I have several concrete policy proposals to further that end. To put them into context, I would like to review in some detail the significant progress that has been made in the last nine months in implementing both the military and civilian provisions of the Dayton Accords. Mr. President, I believe that even the most skeptical observer has to admit that the situation in Bosnia has improved greatly since Dayton, and with an increased tempo in the last nine months. Thanks to our magnificent troops in IFOR and SFOR and those of allied and partner countries, a stable military environment has been created and the warring parties separated. No fewer than three hundred thousand troops from all sides have returned to civilian life. Nearly seven thousand heavy weapons have been destroyed, and an additional two thousand six hundred put into supervised cantonments. A joint Muslim-Croat Federation Defense Force has been created, although below the top command much more integration remains to be accomplished. The American Train and Equip Program to create a defensive Federation capability is in full swing. I visited its headquarters last summer, and was impressed with its trainers and its Muslim and Croat students. Progress has also been made in creating non-political local police forces, both in the Federation and in the Republika Srpska. Integrated police forces are operating in eight major locations around the country, including the pivotal northern town of Brcko, whose future will be determined in March by an international arbitrator. The International Police Task Force or IPTF has had its share of problems, perhaps unavoidable given the fact that no fewer than forty countries are contributing officers to it. Recent reforms, however, in which Americans have played a prominent role, have strengthened its professionalism. A new Federation Police Academy has been opened near Sarajevo to train new recruits from all religious groups. Last fall, I called for our European allies to contribute forces from their paramilitary formations to create a gendarmerie in Bosnia as a vital middle layer--under SFOR control--between the local police and SFOR. Although there was an initial, predictable negative public reaction from Europe, I am told that several of our partners are now actively considering the idea. These European gendarmes could provide the security for newly elected municipal governments, guarantee safety for minority refugee returns, and take over the lead-role in capturing indicted war criminals. In fact, slowly but surely the indicted war criminals are already being rounded up. Nearly one-third of the seventy-nine individuals under open indictment have been taken into custody in the War Crimes Tribunal in the Hague. Last month, for the first time American SFOR troops carried out a capture operation, seizing a notorious Bosnian Serb who as the sadistic commander of a prison camp called himself the ``Serb Adolf'' and reveled in his grisly murder of Muslims. He is one of only a handful of individuals in Bosnia indicted for genocide. NATO Secretary-General Solana has publicly pledged to arrest such war criminals when NATO troops find them, but proceeding with careful preparation so as to avoid undue risk. I welcome his statement and urge an acceleration of the process, to be taken over as soon as possible-- as I just mentioned--by a European gendarmerie. Contrary to popular belief, Mr. President, many refugees and displaced persons have returned home--more than 400,000 in fact. The number of minority returnees represents only a small fraction of the total, but even here there has been notable progress in several cities in the past few months. Mr. President, there are other positive signs emanating from Bosnia. Thanks to pressure from SFOR, the Bosnian media have been restructured. The hate-filled television broadcasts of the Karadzic forces have been put under the oversight of the High Representative, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Equally important, the internationally funded Open Broadcast Network now reaches eighty percent of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The economic life of the Federation is rapidly improving, although a huge amount remains to be rebuilt. GDP grew by 53% in 1996 and 35% last year, and unemployment has been cut in half, from 90% to 44%. A central factor in the economic resuscitation of the Federation has been international assistance, and our USAID is generally acknowledged to have been the most efficient national agency in delivering emergency assistance in a variety of ways. I have personally seen the targeted programs of USAID contractors helping minority refugees to return and rebuild their own houses. Moreover, USAID assistance has created over 11,000 jobs and provided sixty-eight million dollars in loans to one hundred forty medium-sized Bosnian enterprises. From all international sources more than 230 miles of roads have been rebuilt throughout Bosnia and twenty-one key bridges repaired and made functional again. Economic progress in the Republika Srpska has lagged far behind that of the Federation, primarily because the Karadzic-dominated government in Pale obstructed implementation of the civilian parts of the Dayton Accords. I will return shortly to the issue of how best to assist the Republika Srpska to get back onto its feet. Progress has been uneven in fleshing out the institutions of government mandated by Dayton. While all national and entity-level institutions have been created, the joint presidency is a fractious and hamstrung organization, and tax, customs, and banking bodies are still not fully functioning. We clearly must put more pressure on the various parties to make the system work, and recent events give me some confidence that this is beginning to happen. The High Representative for Bosnia, the impressive Spanish diplomat Carlos Westendorp, has been given additional powers by the international community, and he is using them. Last month, fed up with stalemate among the representatives of the three major religious groups, Mr. Westendorp imposed a common currency on the country. When the three groups seemed deadlocked on a common national license plate, he forced the issue, and an agreement was reached. Most recently, when they failed to agree on the design of a national flag, Mr. Westendorp made the choice and imposed it on them. In contrast to the grudging pace of reform at the national level, there has been quite remarkable progress at the entity and local levels of government. Democratic elections have been held with turn-outs averaging more than seventy percent. The trend has been toward marginalizing the ethnic extremists, who have either been voted out of office or removed by the High Representative from positions in towns in both the Federation and the Republika Srpska. Then last month, Mr. President, a stunning and heartening development took place in Bosnia. A non-nationalist Bosnian Serb named Milorad Dodik was elected Prime Minister of the Republika Srpska. I met Mr. Dodik last August in Banja Luka. He seems genuinely to believe in a unified, multi-ethnic Bosnia, and his behavior during the four years of violence was exemplary. In fact, his razor-thin victory in the Republika Srpska parliament was made possible by the support of sixteen Muslim and several Croat deputies. Nominated for his position by Republika Srpska President Plavsic, Prime Minister Dodik has crafted a program that goes beyond that of his patron: He has pledged to implement Dayton fully, including completing the unification of the police forces of the Republika Srpska and of the Federation. He has said he will seek an equitable solution to the refugee problem. He has said that when he is firmly in power he will turn over all Serbs suspected of war crimes to the international tribunal in the Hague. In fact, the tribunal may soon open an office in Banja Luka. He has guaranteed equal rights for all citizens. He has called for the separation of religion and politics. He has come out for independent media, pledging publicly to reorganize Bosnian Serb Radio and Television ``in accordance with the requirements of the Office of the High Representative . . . to develop into a professional, independent, and responsible network, open to everybody.'' Moreover, Prime Minister Dodik--himself a successful businessman--has set as a top priority the privatization and restructuring of the economy of the Republika Srpska. Central to this is his determination to eliminate the widespread corruption that has kept the Karadzic gang in power by eliminating their ability to tax, to impose customs duties--and then to siphon off the money for their personal use. He has already replaced the corrupt Karadzic appointees who ran the state- owned industries. In an immediate measure to exert his control, Dodik is moving the Republika Srpska capital from Pale to Banja Luka, a measure that was officially approved by the Republika Srpska Parliament on January 31st by a wide margin. Moreover, the Republika Sprska Parliament has voted to annul thirty- three laws passed by the Karadzic-dominated parliament after President Plavsic dissolved that body last summer. My colleagues should understand that we must keep a sharp eye on Dodik--if for no other reason the fact that he is also being supported by Yugoslav President Milosevic--but there is no doubt whatsoever that Dodik is a vast improvement over the Pale gang that is actively resisting him. The jury is still out as to who will emerge victorious, but, Mr. President, the very facts of Dodik's record, his parliamentary victory, and his reform program are an eloquent rebuttal to the many superficial and utterly erroneous statements about Bosnian history that we have often heard in this country, even on the floor of this chamber. We have repeatedly heard the refrain of how ``those people in Bosnia have never gotten along,'' how ``they have fought each other for five hundred years,'' and how ``they are incapable of living together.'' I hope that as we go forward in Bosnia, we can finally dispense with these tired cliches, which, in essence, have been an excuse not to deal with the real world. Mr. President, in my twenty-five years in the Senate my colleagues have called me many things, but ``starry-eyed'' is not one of them. In taking note of the progress that has been achieved in Bosnia, I do not for one minute believe that we are on the edge of victory, or even that the final goal of a multi-ethnic, democratic, free-market Bosnia is certain to be achieved. But I do think that a sober, objective reading of the current situation gives cause for some optimism that we have turned the corner. In conclusion, I would like to offer a six-point plan to correct some missteps-steps and to keep up the positive momentum in Bosnia. First, in the very near future we must secure the commitment of several of our allies to contribute troops to create the European paramilitary gendarme force for Bosnia, which I described earlier, to handle a variety of civilian security tasks. This is eminently do-able and would provide a tremendous boost to Dayton implementation. Second, although we will almost certainly reduce the size of the American troop commitment in the post-SFOR force from the current eight thousand five hundred, the President must make clear to the American public that he is prepared to raise that number again if our commander on the ground in Bosnia certifies that the security situation warrants it. Third--and this may not sit well with some of my colleagues--I believe that if a continued American troop presence in Bosnia is an important national interest, as it manifestly is--then I think this priority should be reflected in a supplemental appropriation that does not reprogram other military funding. In other words, we should not sacrifice readiness elsewhere to pay for Bosnia. Both are essential, and we can afford both. Fourth, we should support Republika Srpska Prime Minister Dodik by speedily providing assistance to his central government and to localities that implement Dayton, but not provide it in an indiscriminate way. What do I mean by that? I mean that henceforth in order to receive American USAID assistance, all Bosnian municipalities, both in the Republika Srpska and in the Federation, by a reasonable date-certain would have to join the Open Cities Program to welcome returning minority refugees, seat their municipal councils that were legally elected last September, and deny sanctuary to indicted war criminals. I would also design USAID reconstruction projects that designate for returning minority refugees housing units or jobs in rebuilt factories. Let me underscore, Mr. President--and this is key--my plan means not providing assistance to localities until they comply. The date-certain must be reasonable, but firm. The restrictions I propose are not intended to undercut Prime Minister Dodik, whom I support. But we must be clear: the American policy goal is not just to have a rhetorically friendlier Republika Srpska government, but is rather to help build a multi-ethnic, democratic Bosnia. Fifth, as a specific corollary of this last point, we should force the Bosnian Muslim SDA Party, the senior partner in the Federation government, to welcome returning Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat refugees back to Sarajevo and to enact legislation to enable non- Muslims to reclaim their former apartments in ``socially owned,'' that is, public housing. I have advocated these steps for months. Last week, under pressure from our talented Special Envoy Ambassador Bob Gelbard, Bosnian President Izetbegovic finally agreed to admit twenty thousand Serbs and Croats and to introduce the property legislation. We must now hold him to his word, using assistance as a lever. The Bosnian Muslims, the principal victims of the carnage of the last four years, know that they have no stronger defender in Congress than me. But they must also realize that all groups in Bosnia--Muslims, Croats, Serbs, and others--deserve equal treatment as the country is rebuilt and made healthy again. I cannot stress this point enough. Sixth, in the preparations for the pivotal Bosnian national elections next September we should greatly increase our support for the non- nationalist, multi-ethnic parties in the Federation and the Republika Srpska. Until now, this task in the field has been handled principally by the U.S. National Democratic Institute, which has done superb work. We should now pressure the OSCE to involve the multi-ethnic parties in the work of the Provisional Election Commission, which sets the ground rules. For example, until now, incredible as it may sound, only the nationalist parties have had access to voters' lists! Mr. President, Bosnia has come a long way since the horrifying days only two-and-a-half years ago when daily mortar attacks and snipers terrorized Sarajevo and Mostar, when thousands were brutally murdered in Srebrenica and elsewhere, and when women were degraded in bestial rape camps. Much work remains to be done, but there is light at the end of the tunnel. A peaceful, democratic Bosnia is central to the peace of Europe, and therefore to America's national interest. And American leadership is absolutely essential to the rebuilding of the country. For all these reasons, I am confident that in the coming weeks when the Congress is called upon to support an extension of the American commitment to Bosnia, it will respond affirmatively. I thank the Chair and yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, no one should doubt for a moment the resolve of the United States to respond with force, if necessary, to Iraq's continued flagrant violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions. Vigorous diplomacy has been pursued over the past three months, but, thus far, Saddam Hussein has shown that he has no interest in a peaceful solution on anything other than his own terms. We cannot allow this tyrant to prevail over the will of the international community. Our national security would be seriously compromised by a failure to stand up to the challenge he has confronted us with. Our strategic objective is to contain Saddam Hussein and curtail his ability to produce the most deadly weapons known to mankind--weapons that he has unleashed with chilling alacrity against his own people. Left unchecked, Saddam Hussein would in short order be in a position to threaten and blackmail our regional allies, our troops, and, indeed, our nation. Let me take just a moment to recount how we have come to the point where military force may be employed in the near future. For nearly seven years, Iraq has engaged in a cat and mouse game with the international inspectors that comprise the United Nations Special Commission. It has obstructed UNSCOM from fulfilling its mandate to monitor, investigate, and destroy Iraq's capacity to produce weapons of mass destruction. In spite of Iraq's tenacious efforts at concealment and obstruction, UNSCOM has uncovered and destroyed more weapons of mass destruction than were destroyed during the entire gulf war. UNSCOM has revealed Iraqi lie after Iraqi lie. Last October, Iraq threatened to expel all American members of the special commission. Ambassador Richard Butler, the chairman of UNSCOM, responded appropriately by withdrawing all inspectors rather than having his staff of professionals segregated on the basis of their nationality. The ensuing stand-off led to diplomatic intervention by Russia. Eventually, Iraq relented by allowing UNSCOM back into the country. But the central issue of unconditional and unfettered access by UNSCOM was left unresolved. Ambassador Butler visited Baghdad in December to try to resolve this issue, but to no avail. Then, last month, Iraq refused to cooperate with a team of inspectors investigating Iraq's efforts at concealment. It made preposterous charges that the American head of the team, Scott Ritter, was a spy. During a subsequent visit by Ambassador Butler, Iraq struck a defiant note. It vowed never to open so-called ``presidential and sovereign sites'' to inspection. In a recent speech, Saddam Hussein stated his decision to expel UNSCOM by May 20 if sanctions remain in place. The United Nations Security Council has repeatedly condemned Iraq's non-compliance. Since October of last year, on seven separate occasions, the Security Council has demanded that Iraq fulfill its obligations. But Saddam Hussein has made clear that it is more important to him to retain the capacity to produce weapons of mass destruction than it is to comply with the resolutions that would allow sanctions to be lifted. Once again he has proven what little regard he has for the suffering of his people. The international community has exhibited enormous patience with Iraq. But that patience has reached its limit. Time has run out. If Iraq does not comply immediately and unconditionally with United Nations Security Council resolutions demanding unfettered access for U.N. weapons inspectors, I believe that President Clinton will have no choice but to order the use of air power. Unfortunately, we have learned over the past several years that the Iraqi Government, and more specifically its leader, only seem to understand the blunt language of force. In recent weeks, several questions and criticisms have been raised with respect to President Clinton's policy. I would like to take a moment to respond to some of these comments. Questions have been asked about our objectives. The objectives have been defined precisely. They are to curtail and delay Saddam Hussein's capacity to produce and deliver weapons of mass destruction and his ability to threaten his neighbors. We have been told by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that a military plan has been developed that would fulfill these objectives. In a sense, the international coalition now assembling forces in the Persian Gulf will accomplish through the use of force what UNSCOM would be doing were it allowed to do its job. Secretary Cohen has told us that there is no substitute for having UNSCOM on the ground, but we are left with little choice if UNSCOM is prevented from carrying out its duties. When the objectives have been explained, the next question that arises is what are the next steps. But this question is based upon the flawed premise that the use of force reflects a new policy. In fact, the use of force for the purposes outlined by the President is an integral part of the long-standing policy of containing Iraq. Containment is a very unsatisfying policy at an emotional level. It lacks finality and it requires patience and staying power. But it meets our strategic objective of preventing Iraq from threatening our national security interests. Containment is the best of three bad options available to us. The other two options would be to do nothing, or to send in several hundred thousand ground troops to occupy Iraq. Neither of these policies is viable. Doing nothing would encourage Iraqi defiance and lead to a complete collapse of the constraints that have been placed upon Iraqi behavior since the end of the gulf war. It would be the surest way to rehabilitate Saddam Hussein. Just as unpalatable is the prospect of sending in several hundred thousand ground troops to change the Iraqi regime. I believe that there is little support for such an operation in the Congress or the public. It would also raise a series of questions: Would we be prepared to occupy and rebuild Iraq over a period of several years? Would we be prepared for the real possibility that a march on Baghdad might lead Saddam Hussein to unleash his weapons of mass destruction? Would any other nation support us for an action that is clearly outside the bounds of security council resolutions? To this point those resolutions have provided the basis for all U.S. military action against Iraq since the gulf war. In the end, the only policy that stands up to scrutiny is that of containment, which the Clinton administration has followed and the Bush administration before it followed. Finally, another question that has arisen is whether the President should obtain specific authorization to use force. I believe that the President would be wise to obtain such authorization. The executive branch contends that it already has sufficient legal authority, under Public Law 102-1--the use of force resolution passed by Congress before the gulf war. The argument, as I understand it, may be summarized as follows: In Public Law 102-1, Congress authorized the President to use United States Armed Forces: ``Pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 678. Security Council Resolution 678, passed by the Council in November, 1990, authorized members of the United Nations to ``use all necessary means to uphold and implement Resolution 660 (1990) (The resolution which called for Iraqi forces to leave Kuwait) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the [Persian Gulf] area.'' Following the gulf war, in April, 1991, the Security Council passed Resolution 687, which set the terms of the cease- fire and required Iraq to accept the destruction or removal, under international supervision, of its weapons of mass destruction. By its terms, it reaffirmed Resolution 678, and all prior council resolutions regarding Iraq. Because Security Council Resolution 678 provided broad authority for nations to enforce ``all subsequent relevant resolutions'' and ``to restore peace and security in the area,'' and, because peace and security has not been restored to the Persian Gulf--indeed, Iraq is currently in violation of the cease-fire resolution--then the resolutions from 1990 and 1991, both by the Security Council and Congress, the administration contends, would still have legal force. Moreover, Congress has never modified or repealed Public Law 102-1, so absent further congressional action, and absent the restoration of peace and security to the gulf, the President still has the legal authority to use military action against Iraq. Or so the administration's argument goes. As a strong advocate of Congress exercising its powers under the Constitution in authorizing the use of force, I must admit to some skepticism about this theory. In my own research of the question, I have consulted several eminent constitutional scholars. My conclusion is that the administration's argument may be legally tenable--if barely so--and would probably be sustained in a court of law. But merely because the position may be legally sufficient--and the courts are notoriously deferential to the executive in matters of war and peace (if they agree to consider the case at all)--I do not believe it would be wise precedent, or wise policy, of the President to proceed with renewed military action against Iraq without a clear authorization, newly enacted by this Congress. Indeed, because the question is a close one--and because we have a different President than we did in 1991, and a significant change in the membership of Congress since that time--it would be prudent for President Clinton to seek a new expression of legal authorization from Congress. Mr. President, we should all hope for a genuine diplomatic solution to this stand-off, but no one should doubt our resolve to use force if it becomes necessary. We have little choice in this matter. Important principles and vital national interests are at stake. First and foremost, an Iraq left free to develop weapons of mass destruction would pose a grave threat to our national security. The current regime in Iraq has repeatedly demonstrated its aggressive tendencies toward its neighbors. It has also displayed a callous willingness to use chemical weapons to achieve its aims. Recently, we have heard chilling reports of possible biological weapons experiments on humans. An UNSCOM Inspector has spoken of information that points to a secret biological weapons production facility. And Ambassador Richard Butler has told us that Iraq could well have missile warheads filled with anthrax capable of striking Tel Aviv. An asymmetric capability of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons gives an otherwise weak country the power to intimidate and blackmail. We risk sending a dangerous signal to other would-be proliferators if we do not respond decisively to Iraq's transgressions. Conversely, a firm response would enhance deterrence and go a long way toward protecting our citizens from the pernicious threat of proliferation. Second, a failure to uphold United Nations resolutions would diminish the credibility of the Security Council. As much as we might like to deal with every threat we face on our own, in reality it is impractical and unrealistic. Instinctively, we all know that we are much better off when we have the support of the international community when facing common threats. But in order for the Security Council to respond effectively to threats to international peace and security that might arise in the future, it is important that those who would violate the will of the international community pay a steep price for their actions. Iraq offers an important test case for the Security Council. Capitulating to Iraqi defiance could spell a dismal future for the Security Council in handling the central matters of international peace and security for which it was created. I hope that the Russians, French, and Chinese keep in mind that it is not in their interest to see the authority of the Security Council diminished. It is difficult to overstate the stakes involved. Fateful decisions will be made in the days and weeks ahead. At issue is nothing less than the fundamental question of whether or not we can keep the most lethal weapons known to mankind out of the hands of an unreconstructed tyrant and aggressor who is in the same league as the most brutal dictators of this century. I yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I want to make it absolutely clear: I oppose the cloning of human beings. But, I am voting against cloture on the motion to proceed to the cloning bill because the bill and the issues the bill raises are not that simple. I am voting against cloture because there has not been sufficient discussion; there have not been sufficient hearings; there has not been sufficient consideration of what is a very complicated scientific issue. Legislation is supposed to be the end result of a process; not the beginning of it. This bill, Mr. President, is far too premature. Yes, hearings were held last year after it was announced that Dolly the sheep was a clone. But, those were generic hearings on the issue of cloning. And, the bill before us is not--I repeat, not--a result of those hearings. This was a bill that was introduced a week ago, has never been the subject of a hearing, and has never been considered by a committee. Are the definitions adequate? Or, are they over broad? In the name of preventing the cloning of a human being, are we hindering medical research that might help in the battle against cancer and other diseases? Or, in the name of allowing scientific research, are we opening the door to rogue scientists who will then find it easier to clone a human? These are all very legitimate questions that need answers. In the end, there may be significant differences over what the answers should be. But, the problem here today, Mr. President, is that we are not ready to be debating answers to these policy questions because we have not had a thorough discussion of the questions and the implications. With the pace of scientific advancement--scientific knowledge is now doubling about every five years--more and more of these extremely complicated bioethical issues are likely to come before the Congress in years to come. Let's not set a precedent here today that we will deal with them willy-nilly--by simply taking a position and voting without having given thoughtful consideration to the issues involved. We need to act to ban the cloning of humans. But, before we act, we need more hearings and more discussion on how best to accomplish that. Therefore, I am voting against cloture on the motion to proceed.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I am pleased to report a very historic event that occurred today at the State Department at about 12 noon. The President of the United States, the Secretary of State, the Vice President, and the Foreign Ministers of the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary, were in attendance. At this event, the President signed an amendment to the Washington treaty--the NATO treaty--that has been or will shortly be delivered to the Senate asking that the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland become full members of NATO. This ceremony at the State Department completed the formal transmission from the President to this body for its advice and consent of the protocols of accession of those three countries into NATO. It was pointed out to me by the Vice President, as we were leaving the State Department ceremony, that it was this very day upon which the Yalta Conference ended some 50 years ago. It seems to me incredible that it is happening, but also that it has taken this long for to us rectify a serious historical error. At the ceremony, there were a number of things stated about why this was so important. We are moving very quickly this session to a momentous vote addressing America's security interests in Europe, which will not only affect us, but the next several generations of Americans. I refer to the addition of new allies to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Recognizing that the protocols would be referred to the Foreign Relations Committee for its review, The committee, under Chairman Helms' leadership, has been holding a series of comprehensive hearings since October on the pros and cons of enlarging NATO. Beginning with Secretary of State Albright, we heard testimony from senior Clinton administration and former executive branch officers, retired ambassadors and generals, and distinguished academics and foreign policy experts--most in favor of, but some in opposition to expansion. The Committee also invited public testimony from all citizens concerned with this issue, welcoming veterans groups, scholars, and representatives of the American Baltic, Central and East European, and Jewish communities. Opinion among all witnesses ran four to one in favor of embracing the Poles, Hungarians, and Czechs as NATO allies. With the Protocols now in hand, the Committee will hold one more hearing with Secretary of State Albright, Secretary of Defense Cohen, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Shelton on February 24. The following week, the Committee is expected to markup and vote on the Resolution of Ratification. I anticipate that the Committee will overwhelmingly recommend consideration of the Resolution by the full Senate. The Majority Leader has indicated that consideration should begin in March, after action on campaign finance reform. Mr. President, rather than giving a detailed statement now on the many benefits to America of NATO enlargement, I wish only to enunciate a few central themes upon which I will expand as Senate consideration of these vital protocols approaches. The first thesis is that, as NATO's leader, America must ensure the Alliance moves beyond its Cold War mission. The status quo is tantamount to declaring NATO a non-performing asset. Internally, NATO is already adapting to address different threats to peace, now that a massive military strike from the East is highly unlikely. The Alliance is placing smaller, smarter, more mobile forces under a streamlined command system with a new strategic concept. This will allow rapid action, including beyond the borders of NATO, such as our current mission in Bosnia. Enlargement is part of NATO's external transformation. This transformation is designed to widen the zone of stability, deter new threats of ethnic conflict, eliminate new divisions or ``zones of influence,'' and promote common action against weapons proliferation and transfer, terrorism, and organized crime. NATO's open door to expansion helps provide the confidence and inspiration for continued democratization and economic development in the former Soviet States and in Eastern and Central Europe. Admission of new allies is the most solemn in the spectrum of new security relationships NATO has undertaken throughout Europe and the former Soviet Union, since the admission of Spain, and prior to that, Germany, Greece and Turkey. In addition, NATO has developed unique partnerships with Russia and Ukraine, and has drawn former adversaries into a web of cooperation through what we refer to as the Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. The second thesis that I will be expounding on at a later time is that the costs of enlargement are real but manageable, and represent a bargain for the American people in terms of our security. NATO's own study of the Polish, Hungarian, and Czech contributions to our common defense rates them well worth the ten-year, one-and-a half billion dollar price tag. The U.S. share in this price will be roughly four hundred million dollars over ten years, or about forty million dollars per year. Most importantly, Secretary of State Albright noted in her testimony, that our Allies stated at the last NATO summit that the resources for enlargement will be found and that she will ensure that our allies pay their fair share--a very important requirement to be met in order to gain the support of our colleagues in the Senate. In the long-run, America has always found that common defense is cheaper defense. This is true certainly in financial, but even more so in the far more precious human resources the sixty million people and two hundred thousand troops Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic bring to our common security. This is not a question of whether the U.S. will trade Warsaw for Washington, or Budapest for Buffalo, but rather that the Poles, Czechs, and Hungarians are willing to assume the front line in America's forward defense of its shores. The third thesis is that our relations with Russia remain solid, productive, and cooperative, notwithstanding enlargement. Prophets of backlash have been disproven. Although few Russians are fond of NATO enlargement, policymakers in Moscow have accepted it. Moreover, no Russian with whom I met in Moscow--from Communist leader Zyuganov, to liberal leader Yavlinsky, to the nationalist retired General Lebed--believed that NATO enlargement constitutes a security threat to Russia. We have seem Russia ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention, renew efforts to ratify START II, send troops under overall U.S. command to implement peace in Bosnia, and work smoothly with NATO as an organization in the new Russia-NATO Permanent Joint Council. But ultimately, Russia must understand that it has no veto over NATO actions, nor over the right of former Soviet satellites to freely choose their defense arrangements. I believe their actions demonstrate that they have come to terms--however grudgingly--with this fact. My fourth thesis is a caution. The consequences of a failure to embrace the Poles, Hungarians, and Czechs as new allies would be a disaster. This century has taught us that when Central Europeans are divorced from Western institutions of common defense, they are vulnerable to pressure and control by the great powers around them, and susceptible to insidious suspicions of their neighbors' intentions. This forces them to nationalize their defense policies, creating tension and instability Here, I would like to quote from Dr. Henry Kissinger's testimony to the Foreign Relations Committee on this very point. Dr. Kissinger's testimony to the Foreign Relations Committee on this very point was very, very enlightening, I thought. Kissinger warned: Basing European and Atlantic security on a no man's land between Germany and Russia runs counter to all historical experience, especially that of the interwar period. It would bring about two categories of frontiers in Europe, those that are potentially threatened but not guaranteed, and those that are guaranteed but not threatened. If America were to act to the defend the Oder [between Germany and Poland] but not the Vistula [in Poland], 200 miles to the east, the credibility of all the existing NATO guarantees would be gravely weakened. Madam President, I will close with a fifth and final thesis, and it is a moral one. For 40 years, the United States loudly proclaimed its solidarity with the captive nations of Central and Eastern Europe who were under the heel of communist oppressors. Now that most of them have cast off their shackles, it is our responsibility, in my view, to live up to our pledges to readmit them into the West through NATO and the European Union as they qualify. Just as NATO enlargements embraced Turkey, Greece, and West Germany several years before the European Union's precursors were yet in existence, so we should not hesitate to accept Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic now, even before their accession to the European Union. The habits of cooperation created by NATO membership can only help these nations as they prepare for economic integration into Europe and the West. I thank the Chair for listening and I yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I come to floor today to discuss the new juvenile justice grant program contained in the appropriations bill for the Commerce, Justice, and State Departments. Of course, I would have preferred the appropriators to defer to the Judiciary Committee, which considered juvenile crime legislation for over a month and reported a bill to the Senate floor, so we could have a full debate and develop effective, comprehensive juvenile crime legislation. That said, I am pleased that the conference report addresses one of my primary concerns by relaxing the mandates contained in earlier proposals that would have required States to try more juveniles as adults to qualify for federal funding. Recall that the juvenile crime bill passed by the House of Representatives last spring would have disqualified States from receiving federal funds unless prosecutors had complete discretion to try certain 15-year-olds as adults. Similarly, as originally introduced, the Senate Republican's youth crime bill --S. 10--would have required States to give prosecutors unfettered discretion to try 14-year-olds as adults, even for minor crimes, to qualify for funding. S. 10 as passed by the Committee loosened this restriction substantially, by enabling States to qualify for funding so long as 14- year-olds were eligible to be tried as adults for serious violent crimes, which they already are in almost every State. Similarly, the new program contained in the appropriations bill passed by Congress today does not require States to change their laws on trying juveniles as adults. All a State must do to participate in the new program is to certify that it is ``actively considering'' such changes in policy. So, a State can say, ``we're going to think about it,'' introduce legislation but not enact it, or even reject legislative changes and still qualify for the new federal youth crime fighting funds. I support this relaxation from the earlier proposals because trying more juveniles as adults is likely to be counterproductive. The research shows that juveniles tried in the adult system are more likely to be released on bail, less likely to be convicted, punished more slowly, and incarcerated less frequently than in the juvenile justice system. If we want to get tough on juvenile crime, trying kids as adults is the wrong answer. What is more, placing juveniles in adult jails--where they have exposure to hardened criminals--will only make them more likely to commit crimes once they get out. So despite popular opinion, trying more kids as adults may make our crime problem worse, not better. Instead of imposing unproven, Washington-based solutions on the States, the best thing the federal government can do is provide local law enforcement, prosecutors, juvenile courts, and community based organizations additional funds to develop creative, comprehensive strategies to address juvenile crime. Such strategies are beginning to bear fruit across the country as juvenile crime has fallen significantly in the past two years. The new juvenile crime block grant takes a partial step in the right direction by providing $250 million for juvenile justice system improvements. But this new program is deeply flawed by failing to permit State and localities to use any of these funds for juvenile crime prevention programs. Police chiefs and prosecutors around the country are emphatic that to be effective in combating juvenile crime, we have to combine tough enforcement with effective prevention programs. The new block grant sends the wrong message to our States and localities by requiring that all the funds be spent on enforcement and juvenile justice system improvements. I am also concerned that the new program will not result in sufficient funding for juvenile prosecutors. Past experience has shown that block grants that flow through local governments do not result in very much funding for prosecutors offices. In the Senate youth crime bill, we have established a grant program--albeit an underfunded one-- that would provide federal funding directly to prosecutors specifically for juvenile crime fighting efforts. I will work to fix these and other flaws in the new program when we consider youth violence legislation next year.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, last year the Senate passed the Federal Law Enforcement Dependents Assistance Act. A law which provides for the education of the spouse and dependent children of Federal law enforcement officers who die or are totally disabled in the line of duty. The purpose of the legislation was to remove a significant financial burden from the families of these deceased officers and to allow them to continue on the educational path they would have followed had their parent or spouse not been killed in the line of duty. This fall, several young men and women were able to go to college under this program. Unfortunately, this program is only available to the children of Federal law enforcement officers. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Public Safety Officers Educational Assistance Act of 1998. This legislation will extend these same educational benefits to the dependents of all public safety officers--Federal, State, county, and local law enforcement officers, correctional officers, and fire and rescue personnel--who have given their lives in the line of duty. Under my bill, the Attorney General will administer a program which will provide up to $4,485 per child, per year to attend a 4-year college. This is the same amount of educational assistance the Federal Government provides to veterans. It is critical that we remember the families of those officers who have made the ultimate sacrifice to keep our streets and homes safe. This bill is intended to allow the dependents of public safety officers to continue with their education as they would have been able to do had their parent not been killed or totally disabled in the line of duty. I have long been concerned about the plight of families of public safety officers killed in the line of duty--this summer, I introduced an amendment to the Budget Reconciliation Act which provides for the favorable tax treatment of survivor death benefits paid to the families of fallen officers. In that vein, this legislation offers assurance to those in the public safety profession--and even to those considering service as public safety officers--that their loved ones will be able to attain their educational goals in their absence.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, last year the Senate passed the Federal Law Enforcement Dependents Assistance Act. A law which provides for the education of the spouse and dependent children of Federal law enforcement officers who die or are totally disabled in the line of duty. The purpose of the legislation was to remove a significant financial burden from the families of these deceased officers and to allow them to continue on the educational path they would have followed had their parent or spouse not been killed in the line of duty. This fall, several young men and women were able to go to college under this program. Unfortunately, this program is only available to the children of Federal law enforcement officers. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Public Safety Officers Educational Assistance Act of 1998. This legislation will extend these same educational benefits to the dependents of all public safety officers--Federal, State, county, and local law enforcement officers, correctional officers, and fire and rescue personnel--who have given their lives in the line of duty. Under my bill, the Attorney General will administer a program which will provide up to $4,485 per child, per year to attend a 4-year college. This is the same amount of educational assistance the Federal Government provides to veterans. It is critical that we remember the families of those officers who have made the ultimate sacrifice to keep our streets and homes safe. This bill is intended to allow the dependents of public safety officers to continue with their education as they would have been able to do had their parent not been killed or totally disabled in the line of duty. I have long been concerned about the plight of families of public safety officers killed in the line of duty--this summer, I introduced an amendment to the Budget Reconciliation Act which provides for the favorable tax treatment of survivor death benefits paid to the families of fallen officers. In that vein, this legislation offers assurance to those in the public safety profession--and even to those considering service as public safety officers--that their loved ones will be able to attain their educational goals in their absence.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I am pleased to support this legislation. Included within this appropriations bill is historic legislation, produced on a bipartisan basis in the Foreign Relations Committee, regarding the institutional structure of, and funding for, American foreign policy. This important legislation to reorganize the foreign policy agencies of the U.S. Government and authorize the payment of U.S. arrearages to the United Nations is similar to a bill approved by the Senate last June by a vote of 90-5. Unfortunately, the bill which the Senate overwhelmingly approved has been bogged down in conference with the other body over an issue which has no relevance to this bill. I am therefore grateful to the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Appropriations Committee, Senator Stevens and Senator Byrd, for agreeing to include provisions of our legislation in this bill. I can assure my colleagues that the decision to include the authorization bill in an appropriations bill was not taken lightly. The Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Helms, and I sought to do so after careful consultation with the Senate leadership. But because two major elements of this bill are so critical to American foreign policy, the Chairman and I believed that we could not afford to delay this bill until next year. I hope my colleagues will agree. Specifically, the bill addresses two important issues which were the focus of much heated debate in the last Congress. First, the bill provides for the payment of U.S. back dues to the United Nations, contingent on specific reforms by that body. Second, the bill establishes a framework for the reorganization of the U.S. foreign policy agencies which is consistent with the plan announced by the President last April. Importantly, the bill also contains sufficient funds to restore our diplomatic readiness, which has been severely hampered in recent years by deep reductions in the foreign affairs budget. The funding levels in the bill largely mirror the Fiscal 1998 budget request submitted by the Clinton administration. The wide support in this Congress for providing increased funding for foreign affairs is an important achievement, and reverses a troubling trend of the past few years. Although the cold war has ended, the need for American leadership in world affairs has not. Our diplomats often represent the front line of our national defense; with the downsizing of the U.S. military presence overseas, the maintenance of a robust and effective diplomatic capability has become all the more important. Despite the reduction in our military presence abroad, the increased importance of ``diplomatic readiness'' to our Nation's security has not been reflected in the Federal budget. The increase in foreign affairs funding contained in this bill could not have come too soon. According to a report prepared at my request by the Congressional Research Service earlier this year, foreign policy spending is now at its lowest level in 20 years. Stated in fiscal 1998 dollars, the budget in fiscal 1997 was $18.77 billion, which is 25 percent below the annual average of $25 billion over the past two decades, and 30 percent below the level of 10 years ago, near the end of the Reagan administration. In fiscal 1997, such funding was just 1.1 percent of the Federal budget--the lowest level in the past 20 years and about one-third below the historical average. I should remind my colleagues that the bill is truly a bipartisan product. It began with negotiations involving the Foreign Relations Committee and the Clinton administration early in the year. The Senate subsequently passed that bill overwhelmingly in June, by a vote of 90- 5. Since that time, several changes have been made as a result of the conference deliberations with our House counterparts and negotiations with the Clinton administration. These were also undertaken in a spirit of bipartisanship. Because of these changes, I am confident that the bill will be acceptable to the President. Enactment of this bill will mark another important milestone in reestablishing a bipartisan consensus on foreign policy. Like our predecessors five decades ago, we stand at an important moment in history. After the Second World War, a bipartisan and farsighted group of senators, led by Chairmen of the Foreign Relations Committee such as Thomas Connally and Arthur Vandenberg, worked with the Truman administration to construct a post-war order. The institutions created at that time--the United Nations, the World Bank, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization--are still with us today, but the task of modernizing these institutions to make them relevant to our times is just beginning. For example, the Clinton administration and the Senate are cooperating on the first significant expansion of NATO--an expansion to the east which will encompass three former adversaries in Central Europe. The Foreign Relations Committee, under the leadership of Chairman Helms, has initiated a series of hearings on the proposed enlargement of NATO, setting the stage for what I hope will be successful amendment to the Washington Treaty next spring. Similarly, this legislation now before us calls for significant reforms of the United Nations, an important instrument in American foreign policy which has become crippled both by growing U.S. arrearages and an unwillingness within that body to reform. Enactment of this legislation will be an important step forward in resolving both those problems. Just as we are trying to revise and reenergize international institutions, we must reorganize our own foreign policy institutions. Two years ago, the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee put forward a far-reaching plan to consolidate our major foreign affairs agencies--the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), the United States Information Agency (USIA), and the Agency for International Development--within the Department of State. In the context of an election cycle, it was perhaps inevitable that the Congress and the President would not come to agreement on it. But continued stalemate was not inevitable. With the onset of a new presidential term and the appointment of a new Secretary of State, a window of opportunity to revisit the issue was opened. The Chairman, to his credit, took advantage of this window by urging the new Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, to take a second look at the reorganization issue. And, to her credit, the Secretary did so; the result was the reorganization plan announced by the President in April. Under the proposal, two agencies--ACDA and USIA--will be merged into the State Department. The Agency for International Development will remain an independent agency, but it will be placed under the direct authority of the Secretary of State. The legislation now before the Senate closely reflects the President's proposal. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency will be merged into the State Department no later than October 1, 1998, and the U.S. Information Agency will be merged no later than October 1, 1999. As with the President's plan, the Agency for International Development will remain a separate agency, but it will be placed under the direct authority of the Secretary of State. And, consistent with the President's proposal to seek improved coordination between the regional bureaus in State and AID, the Secretary of State will have the authority to provide overall coordination of assistance policy. The bill puts flesh on the bones of the President's plan with regard to international broadcasting. The President's plan was virtually silent on this question, stating only that the ``distinctiveness and editorial integrity of the Voice of America and the broadcasting agencies would be preserved.'' This bill upholds and protects that principle by maintaining the existing government structure established by Congress in 1994 in consolidating all U.S. government-sponsored broadcasting--the Voice of America, Radio and TV Marti, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia, and Worldnet TV--under the supervision of one oversight board known as the Broadcasting Board of Governors. Importantly, however, the Board and the broadcasters below them will not be merged into the State Department, where their journalistic integrity would be greatly at risk. With regard to the United Nations provision, the bill provides $926 million in arrearage payments to the Union Nations over a period of 3 years contingent upon the U.N. achieving specific reforms. This will allow us to pay all U.S. arrears to the U.N. regular budget, all arrears to the peacekeeping budget, nearly all arrears to the U.N. specialized agencies, and all arrears to other international organizations. It is difficult to exaggerate the significance of this achievement. We are finally in a position to lay to rest the perennial dispute over our unpaid dues that has severely complicated relations between the United Nations and the United States. This bill would give our diplomats the leverage they need to push through meaningful reforms that promise to make the U.N. a more capable institution. Two important changes were made to the legislation that cleared the Senate last June. First, the bill now allows the crediting of $107 million owed to the U.S. by the U.N. against our arrears. Second, it gives the administration added flexibility by allowing the Secretary of State to waive two conditions. The waiver will not apply to the reduction of assessment rates or the establishment of inspectors- general in the specialized agencies. But report language will make a clear commitment that Congress would, if necessary, consider on an expedited basis a waiver on the condition for a 20 percent assessment rate for the U.N. regular budget. Of course, not everyone is happy with the agreements the Chairman, Senator Helms, and I worked out. Some would have preferred to see no conditions at all attached to the payment of our debts. Others are unhappy that the United States is paying any arrears whatsoever. I think it is fair to say that the Chairman and I approached this issue from two very different points of view. I make no excuses for my support of the United Nations. I believe that the U.N. is an indispensable arrow in our foreign policy quiver. The Chairman, I think it is fair to say, has been skeptical of the role of the United Nations. But despite our differing outlooks, over the course of nearly 8 months of negotiation, dialogue, and old-fashioned bargaining, we each gave something and got something to return. The Chairman got several important conditions attached to the payment of arrears. Among other items, these include important managerial reforms, assurances that U.S. sovereignty will be protected, and a lowering of our assessment rate from 25 percent to 20 percent of the U.N. regular budget. For me, it is important that this bill sends a strong signal of bipartisan support for putting our relationship with the United Nations back on track. Restoring our relationship with the United Nations is not a favor to anyone else--it is in our interest. The United Nations allows us to leverage our resources with other countries in the pursuit of common interests, be it eradicating disease, mitigating hunger, caring for refugees, or addressing common environmental problems. And as the unfolding crisis with Iraq demonstrates, the United Nations can be a useful instrument in our diplomacy. The United States has played a leading role in the United Nations since its founding, and I believe that this legislation will secure that leadership. While the purists on either side may not be happy with the agreement before us, I believe that we have produced a responsible piece of legislation that warrants the support of our colleagues. In sum, the bill before the Senate, the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act, is a significant achievement. I want to pay tribute to the Chairman for his continued good faith and cooperation throughout this process. I want to thank the President, the National Security Adviser, and the Secretary of State, for their support and assistance during the negotiations. I also want to thank our colleagues in the other body, particularly the ranking member of the International Relations Committee, Lee Hamilton, who played an important role in pushing for changes to make this proposal more acceptable to the administration. I believe we have produced a good compromise that a large majority will be able to support. I urge its adoption. Amendments to the Prison Litigation Reform Act

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I am pleased that we finally have before us the legislation we need to give Amtrak a new lease on life. In my remarks this afternoon, I will start with the bottom line. When we pass this legislation today, Amtrak will be eligible to receive the $2.3 billion that was provided in last summer's balanced budget plan. This legislation authorizes the continued existence of Amtrak--that authorization expired in 1994--and therefore gives Amtrak access to the capital fund that some of us have worked so many years to establish. Agreement on the terms of Amtrak's reauthorization has not been easy, Mr. President. It has taken several years to accomplish, marked by many long hours and more frustrations than I care to recall, as agreements we thought were done unraveled over and over again. The bill before us this afternoon has required the best efforts of many of my colleagues, who have persevered in the face of those frustrations. We could not have reached this point without the leadership of Senator Hutchison, along with Senator McCain, and of course, their colleague on the Commerce Committee, the distinguished majority leader, to reach agreement on the many difficult issues that this legislation has raised. And I know that without the persistence of Senator John Kerry, along with Senators Hollings and Breaux, we would not have reached this point. And if I may say so, Mr. President, the entire Delaware congressional delegation has been a part of this process from the beginning. My good friend Bill Roth, chair of the Finance Committee, and our Governor, Tom Carper, who is on the Amtrak board of directors, both continued to play their key roles at critical moments in this process. The result is a bipartisan compromise, that required that everyone give up some of what they wanted to get as much as possible of what Amtrak needs. Those of us who followed these negotiations closely can count many moments when it seemed that this legislation was dead. Only the long-suffering perseverance of the key players made this legislation possible. But let's be clear about where we are in the life of Amtrak. As my good friend, Senator McCain, has stressed today, Amtrak is indeed in dire economic trouble. And yes, some of this trouble is indeed due to some of the constraints that we in Congress put on Amtrak's business practices when we created it a quarter of a century ago. That is why the reforms in this legislation are needed. But I believe that much of the problem is due to our failure over the years to provide our nation's passenger rail system with the level of financial support that we give to other elements of our country's transportation system. As Senator Kerry has argued here this afternoon, we here in the United States rank below some of the poorest Nations on the planet in the level of financial support per citizen that we provide our passenger rail system. One result of this has been that during the 25 year life of Amtrak, its employees have seen their wages cut as the cost of living grew while their paychecks stagnated. In my State of Delaware, we have two of the essential maintenance facilities for Amtrak--at the Wilmington and Bear, DE yards. The workers at these facilities are the best in the business, and are carrying on a tradition that reaches back to the turn of the century in which Delaware has provided essential support for passenger rail along the East Coast. The hard work that the men and women of the Delaware yards have put in keeping Amtrak's equipment and tracks safe and dependable has been rewarded with a stagnant standard of living. And our citizens--not just in East Coast urban areas, as we often hear, but in small towns all over the country--have had much less passenger rail service than the citizens of other major industrial nations. By failing to support Amtrak adequately, we have been forced to live with a less efficient transportation system, reducing the effectiveness of the more substantial funds we provide for highways and airports, which are crowded with travelers who might otherwise be able to travel by rail. We all hope that Amtrak will make the best of the management reforms in this bill to put passenger rail on a healthier financial track for the future. But this legislation entails more than operating reforms and access to a new capital fund. As Senator McCain so rightly pointed out, this legislation makes provision for termination of Federal Financial support for Amtrak's operations by the year 2002, something already part of our long-term budget plans. It includes provision for a study of the possibility of Amtrak's bankruptcy and liquidation. For the first time in Federal law, we are contemplating the possibility of shutting down passenger rail in this country. So while those of us who put in the hard work that made this moment possible should rightfully be proud of those efforts, we must not lose sight of the big picture. While we have bought a little more time for Amtrak, we have by no means assured that passenger rail--essential to the efficient operation of every other industrial economy's transportation system--will survive in the United States. Over the next 5 years, there will be more tough choices as we move toward the twin goals of a balanced Federal budget and the end of Federal operating support for our country's passenger rail system. If we fail to provide Amtrak with the resources it needs to modernize, to attract the ridership and revenues that can advance the goal of self- sufficiency, today's accomplishment will be hollow. I am not convinced, Mr. President, that we have chosen the right course for passenger rail in this country. No one argues against reforms that make the best use of taxpayers dollars, reforms that permit Amtrak to make use of the best business practices to attract riders and to expand our country's passenger rail system. But by themselves, those reforms will not relieve us of our responsibility to keep passenger rail alive. Senator Kerry reminded us today that the European Community has committed to major new investments on top of their substantial contributions to their continent's passenger rails system. As the most productive economy in the world, we should face up to the need to make similar commitments here. So many benefits flow from these investments--benefits that can be measured, but not always on the books of any given passenger rail system--that the rest of the developed world is willing to make that kind of commitment. Those benefits include more efficient use of fuel, cleaner air, reduced congestion on our highways and at our airports-- real benefits that add up to real dollars saved that can be put to better use. In today's world--with balanced budgets and increased economic competition--we must make sure that we capture those benefits and save those dollars. That is why the fight for passenger rail in the United States is far from over today.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise to offer some remarks on Drug Director Barry McCaffrey's decision to decertify the Defense Department's proposed antidrug budget for fiscal 1999. At the outset, let me state that I support General McCaffrey's decision to request that the Defense Department increase its budget request by $140 million for the antidrug initiatives the General identifies: $24 million to boost antidrug task forces on the border to help implement the United States-Mexico Declaration signed by Presidents Clinton and Zedillo in May, 1997; $75 million for enfocement and interdiction to reduce the flow of cocaine out of the Andean Region; $30 million for boost National Guard drug efforts on the southern border; and $12 million to target drug trafficking criminal activity in the Caribbean. Even beyond the specifics of this issue, I am greatly heartened by the fact that General McCaffrey has chosen to exercise this important budget-setting authority. I must admit that I have been frustrated that, until General McCaffrey acted, no drug director had ever used this authority--not William Bennett, not Robert Martinez, and not Lee Brown. Let me also be up-front with my colleagues, one of the reasons I so strongly favor this decision is because I wrote this authority into law. For more than a decade, I debated with the Reagan administration and my colleagues to establish the Office of National Drug Control Policy. One of the reasons my legislation was so bitterly opposed for so long was because I put some real teeth into this legislation. And, of all the teeth, it is this budget authority which is the sharpest of all. Let me also explain to my colleagues that this so-called Biden Drug Budget Authority not only gives the Drug Director the authority to decertify the drug budget requests of the drug agencies, but it is crystal clear what must happen next. Just read the law: If the Drug Director exercises this authority, ``the head of the Department or Agency shall comply with such a request.'' It does not get much clearer than that. To make one more point--now before the Senate we have legislation to re-authorize the Drug Director's office. Yesterday, the Judiciary Committee reported the bipartisan Hatch-Biden reauthorization bill. A bill cosponsored by Senators Thurmond, Coverdell, DeWine and Feinstein. It is my hope that not only will the full Senate pass this legislation before we adjourn, but also that the leadership of the House reject the unproductive and partisan approach it adopted a few weeks ago and come onboard the bipartisan Hatch-Biden bill. Nothing puts the need for a Drug Director in starker focus than General McCaffrey's action on the Defense Department drug budget. My colleagues should need no other example--though there are many others-- to recognize the importance of having a Drug Director. I urge my colleagues to support the General's decision on the Defense Department budget, and I urge my colleagues to take the concrete step it is within our power to do--pass the law to keep the Drug Office in place.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I would like to congratulate Senator Thurmond and Senator Levin, the distinguished chairman and ranking minority member of the Armed Services Committee, for their work in conference to produce a defense authorization bill that will help keep America's military strong and well-prepared for today's multiple threats and challenges. The U.S. leadership role has never been more important than it is now as the world reshapes itself to face a new century. In order to lead, America must have strong diplomatic and military tools. As ranking minority member of the Committee on Foreign Relations I have worked this year with the Chairman, Senator Helms, to enhance our country's diplomatic readiness overseas. Our Nation's defense force is the weight behind our diplomatic initiatives. It is the critical strength upon which we rely when other options, unfortunately, may fail. Good diplomacy is always built upon good defenses and this bill enhances our ability to deal with critical foreign policy and security issues. I am pleased that the conferees agreed to fully fund the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program. This program assists Russia and other former Soviet states both to secure and control their nuclear materials and to improve their nuclear safety programs. This bill ensures that the Nunn-Lugar program will continue to protect our national security in a very cost-effective manner. The bill also requires the President and the Secretary of Defense to increase their focus on counterterrorism efforts. The importance of Asia and the Pacific is highlighted by an expression of congressional support for continuing a minimum troop presence to support our security agreements with countries in that region. The bill contains another important provision that expresses the sense of the Congress that any moratorium on the use of antipersonnel landmines by U.S. Armed Forces should not be implemented in a manner that would endanger U.S. personnel or undermine their effectiveness. This is consistent with the provisions of S. 896, the Landmine Elimination Act of 1997, of which I am proud to be a cosponsor, as that act includes a Presidential waiver to protect American forces in Korea. Like the defense appropriations bill, there are sections in this authorization bill dealing with our involvement in Bosnia. As I have said before, I think that it was a mistake to have set a deadline for a complete American troop withdrawal from Bosnia. Months ago, I called for a combined joint task force with European troops making up the overwhelming majority of the ground forces and Americans providing command and control, intelligence, and logistics assistance, air and naval support, and, if necessary, a ready reserve force in the region. So, I agree with the thrust of this bill's recommendation, but I also think a small, residual American ground force in Bosnia may be necessary to maintain America's leadership role in the operation. I am happy to see the commendation for the NATO enlargement process and the sensible reporting requirements contained in this conference report. In separate provisions, by authorizing pay raises and barracks construction, this bill takes important steps to enhance the quality of life for our brave men and women in uniform. This bill also adds two positions to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to include National Guard and Reserve commanders. This change recognizes the unique and increasingly vital role played by our reservists and guard members in our nation's defense. Last, the conferees maintained the U.S. ability to forcefully project power by continuing to fully fund the C-5 aircraft. The C-5 is the military's workhorse plane--carrying heavy weapons like tanks and helicopters all over the world. Its singular value has been shown in conflict after conflict, from Vietnam to Desert Storm. Delawareans are proud to host a significant portion of the Nation's C-5 fleet stationed at the Dover Air Force Base and glad to see that Dover's infrastructure will benefit from the military construction appropriations bill signed by the President and authorized by this bill. I am pleased, therefore, to support the work of my colleagues on the Armed Services Committee and vote to strengthen America's leadership role around the world with a strong, well-equipped military.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, David H. Kraus, assistant chief of the European Division of the Library of Congress, died on October 27 in Lanham, MD. In a career at the Library of Congress that spanned a quarter-century, Mr. Kraus played a pivotal role in developing the library's unparalleled European collections and in advising the Congress in a variety of ways, most recently in the training of parliamentarians and librarians from the newly independent, former Communist States of Europe. A native of Minnesota, Mr. Kraus received his undergraduate education at the University of Wisconsin and did graduate work at Harvard University. A consummate bibliographer and administrator, he was also a remarkable linguist who attained reading fluency in most of the major languages of Eastern and Western Europe. Mr. Kraus was nationally prominent in library circles and ably represented the Congress at scores of professional meetings. David Kraus was a wise and gentleman, possessed with a ready wit to go with his enormous erudition. He served the Congress long and faithfully, and he leaves many friends on Capitol Hill where he will be sorely missed.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I am pleased that the Senate is today acting on the Extradition Treaties Interpretation Act. I appreciate the cooperation of the chairman of the committee, and the cooperation and assistance of the executive branch, in moving this bill forward. The bill is very short, and I will not take the Senate's time to review it at length. In brief, the bill is designed to remedy a disparity in U.S. extradition law and practice. The disparity is this: under certain extradition treaties, the crime of parental abduction-- when one parent takes a child in violation of law or a custody order and against the wishes of the other parent--is not extraditable. That is so for two related reasons. The criminalization of parental abduction is a relatively recent development in U.S. criminal law. Prior to the mid-1970's, parental abduction was generally considered a family law matter not covered by criminal law. In the last two decades or so, U.S. criminal law has evolved significantly. All 50 states make the act a crime, as does the District of Columbia and the Federal Government. As a consequence of this development in the law, a disparity has been created in U.S. extradition law. The disparity occurs in a subset of extradition treaties referred to as ``list'' treaties--so named because they specifically enumerate, or list, the crimes under the treaty that are considered extraditable. Thus, because the act of parental abduction was not a crime when these older list treaties were ratified, it has been the practice of the executive branch to interpret the treaties as excluding parental abduction. This concern does not arise in more modern ``dual criminality'' treaties, which avoid the limiting nature of the list treaties by allowing extradition in any case where both countries make a practice a felony. Seeking to remove this disparity, the Clinton administration has requested authority to adopt a new interpretation of the term ``kidnapping'' in the list treaties so that it encompasses parental abduction. The Foreign Relations Committee strongly supports this request, and voted unanimously last month to report the bill to the Senate. The chairman and I have offered a substitute amendment which makes several changes to the Committee-reported bill which were recommended by the Justice Department after it gave closer review to the legislation. The changes are modest, and mostly technical. I would highlight only one: the committee-reported bill provided, in the operative section of the bill, section 3, that the Congress authorizes the interpretation of the term kidnapping to include international parental kidnapping. The substitute omits the word ``international,'' for an important reason: the crime of international parental abduction, which includes as an element the taking of a child out of the country, is a Federal offense. But the practical reality is that most extradition cases will involve crimes prosecuted at the state level, where the offense does not include the aforementioned element of removing the child from the country. Thus, the substitute ensures that the bill has the broadest possible reach. Mr. President, the abduction of children by their parents is a heartwrenching crime. This bill will ensure that there is no disparity in U.S. extradition law and practice with regard to this crime, and, I hope, will help lead to the extradition of individuals wanted for this crime. I urge my colleagues to support the bill.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, on Tuesday, Americans from around the country gathered here at the Capitol to hold a rally in conjunction with Brain Tumor Awareness Week. I want to add my voice to those calling attention to this debilitating disease and to the calls for continuing to increase our funding for medical research. It sounds wrong to call one debilitating disease more important than another. After all, a life-threatening disease is a life-threatening disease. However, as a society, we often get caught up in the rhetoric and publicity surrounding one of these terrible afflictions and forget that, unfortunately, there are a number of other terminal illnesses. While brain tumors do not receive as much press as other terminal illnesses, their impact on the lives of brain tumor patients and their families is equally devastating. One of those people is a constituent of mine, Ms. Kathy Delledonne- Minutola. She and her husband attended the rally on Tuesday because, four years ago, their son Joseph was diagnosed with a brain stem tumor. The roots of the tumor have wrapped around Joseph's brain stem, a condition which makes removal of the tumor impossible. Mr. President, there are thousands of people across this country who have been diagnosed with brain tumors, just like Joseph. In fact, each year approximately 100,000 people in the United States are diagnosed with a brain tumor. Brain tumors are the second leading cause of cancer death for children and young adults up to age 34, and they are one of the fastest growing causes of cancer death in the elderly. Furthermore, each patient is different, and potential for recovery depends on a number of factors. The type of tumor, its location, the area of the brain involved, and the forms of therapy the patient will receive all contribute to a patient's prognosis. Currently, there is no cure for most malignant brain tumors. Surgery, radiation therapy, and chemotherapy are the three most common treatments. However, because brain tumors are located at the control center for human thought, emotion, and movement, both the tumor and its treatment can have devastating effects on a person's physical and cognitive abilities. Despite often bleak projections for recovery, however, the community of people who have been affected by this disease has refused to give up. Their courage and support for one another in the face of tragedy is truly inspirational. They are proof that the power of the human spirit can triumph over adversity in even the darkest of moments. So, Mr. President, in this, Brain Tumor Awareness Week, I rise today to applaud the tireless commitment that brain tumor patients and their families have made to beating this disease. This is a remarkable group of people. However, they cannot take on the burden of finding a cure on their own. We in Congress need to help, and I look forward to working with my colleagues, as I have in the past, to support medical research funding. While Brain Tumor Awareness Week may only last seven days, our commitment to finding a cure must be a year-round endeavor.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, the reversion of Hong Kong to the People's Republic of China is a historic event, the full impact of which may not be known for years. At midnight on June 30, the world watched as the flag of the United Kingdom came down over Hong Kong, the final chapter of over a century of the British Empire's presence in the Far East. July 1 dawned with the flag of China flying over Victoria Harbor, providing a great moment of pride for the people of China as Beijing recovered a territory lost in humiliating fashion to foreign powers. For the cause of freedom, the reversion is a conundrum. Some observers warn that China intends to trample Hong Kong's freedoms. After a decade in which millions have cast off the yoke of Communist rule of the Soviet Empire, the subjugation of the people of Hong Kong to the control of a dictatorial government in Beijing is surely a sad anomaly. Others predict optimistically that in the end China, not Hong Kong, will be transformed by the new union. They point to the changes already underway in China, and foresee a more prosperous, open, plural, and democratic system for one-fifth of the world's population. I believe the future of Hong Kong, like that of China, is not yet written. The actions of the United States will affect the ability of the people of Hong Kong to preserve their democratic freedoms and overall quality of life. Visiting Washington recently on his first trip abroad as Hong Kong's Chief Executive, Tung Chee-hwa rightly took pride in the former colony's smooth transition to Chinese rule. But he also candidly acknowledged that preserving Hong Kong's economic vitality and expanding the democratic freedoms enjoyed by its 5\1/2\ million residents required not only a steady hand in Hong Kong, but also the sustained interest and support of the international community. It is in this context that we must view the U.S.-Hong Kong extradition agreement. Approval of the treaty is a risk, for it is predicated on a question which cannot be answered in the abstract. The question is this: will the Beijing Government adhere to its pledge to permit Hong Kong a high degree of autonomy for at least 50 years? In other words, will China abide by its promise to maintain ``one country, two systems?'' No one can answer that question definitively today--not the people of Hong Kong, not the British Government, not the Clinton administration, not even the gerontocracy in Beijing, which struggles to chart a course for China's modernization in the post-Deng Xiao Ping era. Of course, there is always the risk that a treaty partner will prove to be unreliable. That risk is particularly acute here, where the treaty partner--the Hong Kong Government--will be overseen by a government in Beijing which has often failed to adhere adequately to commitments made to the United States. Standing opposite that risk are the benefits that flow from having an extradition relationship with Hong Kong. For most of this decade, the relationship has undeniably been in our interests. Since 1991, more than 60 persons have been returned to the United States from Hong Kong pursuant to extradition requests, many of them for serious crimes such as narcotics trafficking. By contrast, we have extradited just seven persons to Hong Kong. Moreover, the extradition treaty is a critical component of our overall law enforcement cooperation with Hong Kong authorities-- cooperation which has proven enormously successful over the years in combating organized crime, drug smuggling, and international terrorism. Finally, this treaty contains extraordinary protections against any attempt by Beijing to meddle with or politicize the extradition process. Indeed, the treaty provides several protections against valid concerns that the PRC may renege on its pledge to permit Hong Kong to retain an independent judiciary. The treaty contains several safeguards; these include: First, a provision allowing the United States broad power to refuse to surrender U.S. nationals in cases relating to ``the defense, foreign affairs, or essential public interest or policy of the United States'' (Article 3); second, a provision permitting the Secretary of State to deny extradition if the request was politically motivated, or the person sought is likely to be denied a fair trial or punished because of his race, religion, nationality, or political opinions (Article 6); and third, a provision barring the retransfer of any fugitive beyond the territory of Hong Kong without U.S. consent (Article 16). The Committee has added included two provisions in the resolution of ratification that provide additional protection. First, understanding No. 1 makes it plain that the United States will not permit the retransfer to the People's Republic of China of any persons surrendered under this agreement, unless the person being surrendered consents to the transfer. Understanding No. 2 makes a strong statement in support of the independence of the Hong Kong judiciary, by stating that any effort to curtail the jurisdiction and power of adjudication of the Hong Kong courts may be considered grounds for withdrawal from the Agreement. In exercising its power to advise and consent, the Senate must balance the risks that China will interfere with the autonomy of Hong Kong against the likely benefits to U.S. law enforcement that will flow from the agreement. In my view, the benefits clearly outweigh the risks. And the safeguards in the treaty, in addition to the provisions in the resolution of ratification, provide strong protection of U.S. interests and of the rights of those persons who may be surrendered under the treaty. By ratifying this treaty, the Senate will send a strong signal to the people of Hong Kong that we have confidence in their ability to make the unique ``one country, two systems'' formula work. We also send a strong message to Beijing that we will not tolerate any efforts to undermine the traditional autonomy and impartiality of Hong Kong's judiciary. I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting ratification of the Hong Kong extradition agreement. Constitution and Convention of the International Telecommunication Union Resolved, (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein), That the Senate advise and consent to the ratification of the Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), with Annexes, signed at Geneva on December 22, 1992, and Amendments to the Constitution and Convention, signed at Kyoto on October 14, 1994, together with Declarations and Reservations by the United States contained in the Final Acts (Treaty Doc. 104-34), subject to declarations and reservations Nos. 68, 73 and 82 of the 1992 Final Acts; declarations and reservations Nos. 84, 92, 97, and 98 of the 994 Final Acts; and the understandings of subsection (a), the declarations of subsection (b), and the proviso of subsection (c). (a) Understandings.--The Senate's advice and consent is subject to the following two understandings, which shall be included in the instrument of ratification, and shall be binding on the President. (1) Broadcasts to cuba.--The United States of America, noting the Statement (No. 40) entered by the delegation of Cuba during the Plenipotentiary Conference of the International Telecommunication Union, in Kyoto Japan, affirms its rights to broadcast to Cuba on appropriate frequencies free of jamming or other wrongful interference and reserves its rights to address existing interference and any future interference, by Cuba with United States broadcasting. Furthermore, the United States of America notes that its presence in Gurantanamo is by virtue of an international agreement presently in force; the United States of America reserves the right to meet its radio communication requirements there as heretofore. (2) Geostationary-satellite orbits.--The United States understands that the reference in Article 44 of the Constitution to the ``geographical situation of particular countries'' does not imply a recognition of claim to any preferential rights to the geostationary-satellite orbit. (b) Declarations.--The Senate's advice and consent is subject to the following two declarations, which shall be binding on the President: (1) Assessed payments to the united nations international telecommunication union.--Payments by the United States to the International Telecommunication Union shall be limited to assessed contributions, appropriated by Congress. This provision does not apply to United States payments voluntarily made for a specific purpose other than the payment of assessed contributions. The United States shall seek to amend Article 33(3) of the ITU Convention to eliminate to ITU's authority to impose interest payments on ITU members. (2) Treaty interpretation.--The Senate affirms the applicability to all treaties of the constitutionally based principles of treaty interpretation set forth in Condition (1) of the resolution of ratification of the INF Treaty, approved by the Senate on May 27, 1998, and Condition (8) of the resolution of ratification of the Document Agreed Among the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, approved by the Senate on May 14, 1997. (c) Proviso.--The Senate's resolution of ratification is subject to the following proviso, which shall be binding on the President: (1) Supremacy of the constitution.--Nothing in the Treaty requires or authorizes legislation or other action by the United States of America that is prohibited by the Constitution of the United States as interpreted by the United States.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. The second hearing today will feature testimony of distinguished experts who are for and against enlargement. Later in the month the committee will hear examinations of cost and burden-sharing, of the qualifications for membership of the three candidate countries-- Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, and of the new relationship between NATO and Russia. The final hearing will be reserved for public testimony from individuals and groups with special interest in the NATO enlargement issue. Through these hearings, the Committee on Foreign Relations hopes to inform not only the entire Senate on this critically important issue, but also the American public. Mr. President, as my colleagues know, I have spoken many times in some detail on this floor about the issue of NATO enlargement. As the Committee on Foreign Relations launches its series of hearings, I would like briefly to recapitulate why I believe NATO enlargement is in the best interest of the United States. Europe remains a vital area of interest for the United States for political, strategic, economic, and cultural reasons. A sizable percentage of the world's democracies are in Europe, and the continent remains a major global economic player and partner of the United States. The European Union, with a combined population a third larger than ours, has a combined gross domestic product that exceeds ours. While the United States has a larger and less balanced trading relationship with Asia than with Europe, we invest far more in Europe. Several new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe have highly educated work forces, already boast rapidly expanding economies, and already attract considerable American investment. Moreover, most Americans trace their ethnic and cultural roots to Europe, and millions retain personal ties to it. Other than North America, no other part of the world can match Europe's combination of political, economic, military, and cultural power. By any geopolitical standard, it would be a catastrophe for U.S. interests if instability would alter the current situation in Europe. Of course no one believes that the Russian Army is poised to pour through the Fulda Gap in Germany--NATO's horror scenario for 45 years. Rather, the threats to stability in Europe have changed, but they are, if anything, even more real than those of the cold war: ethnic and religious hatred as horrifyingly shown in the hundreds of thousands killed, raped, made homeless, or otherwise brutalized in Bosnia, and the well-organized forces of international crime, whose tentacles extend from Moscow and Palermo to New York and Los Angeles. Unfortunately, the history of the 20th century has demonstrated that out of enlightened self-interest the United States must play a leading role in organizing the security of Europe. In two world wars and lately in Bosnia without American leadership the countries of Europe have been unable to resolve their differences peacefully. Translated into 1997 terms it means that we must lead the Europeans to create a new security architecture to guarantee stability to the areas most vulnerable to disruption, namely Central and Eastern Europe, where newly independent states are striving to create and soldify political democracy and free markets. It is a difficult process, which if not put into a larger framework could spin out of control. It is in this context that the enlargement of NATO must be seen. During the cold war, NATO provided the security umbrella under which former enemies like France and Germany were able to cooperate and build highly successful free societies. It was the framework in which former pariahs like Germany, Italy, and Spain could be reintegrated into democratic Europe. And it was NATO that kept the feud between Greece and Turkey from escalating to warfare. The enlargement of NATO can now serve to move the zone of stability eastward to Central Europe and thereby both prevent ethnic conflicts from escalating and forestall a scramble for new bilateral and multilateral pacts along the lines of the 1930's from occurring. In fact, it is already happening. In anticipation of NATO membership, several Central and East European countries have recently settled long- standing disputes. If NATO were not to enlarge, however, the countries between Germany and Russia would inevitably seek other means to protect themselves. The question for today is not, as is often assumed, enlarge NATO or remain the same. The status quo is simply not an option. Finally, there is the moral argument for enlargement. For 40 years the United States loudly proclaimed its solidarity with the captive nations who were under the heel of communist oppressors. Now that most of them have cast off their shackles, it is our responsibility to live up to our pledges to readmit them into the West through NATO and the European Union when they are fully qualified. NATO enlargement, of course, like any venture, is not cost-free. Earlier this year the Pentagon issued a study that estimated the cost to the United States to be around $200 million per year for 10 years. Other estimates by the Congressional Budget Office and by the Rand Corp. have varied considerably, according to risk assumptions. At the July NATO Summit in Madrid, the North Atlantic Council directed the Alliance to come up with a definitive cost estimate for the NATO ministerial meeting in December. Whatever the final, authoritative cost estimate turns out to be, we must be certain that our current allies, and our future allies, pay their fair share of the enlargement costs. Similarly, before we in the Senate vote on whether or not to admit Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to NATO, we must settle what we plan to do in Bosnia after the expiration of the mandate for SFOR in June 1998. That in itself is an immensely complicated topic, for which there is inadequate time to discuss today. After my latest trip to Bosnia at the end of August, I am more convinced than ever that we are making progress and that we must not abandon the international effort to reach a lasting, peaceful, and just solution for that troubled land. But whatever post-SFOR plan we hammer out, it must be done on the basis of sharing the risks and costs with our European allies and with non- NATO contributors to SFOR. NATO enlargement need not adversely affect our relations with Russia. In fact, we must redouble our peaceful engagement with Russia in the hope that its nascent democracy and free market system will mature sufficiently so that some day it may fully join the Western world. The NATO-Russia Founding Act of May 1997 is a significant step in the right direction. Enlargement plans have been accompanied by a redefinition of NATO's mission and force posture. The alliance's primary mission remains the same: treating an attack on one member as an attack on all, and responding through the use of armed force if necessary. NATO's new strategic concept emphasizes rapid and flexible deployment. The three new members, plus other countries like Slovenia and Romania in the near future, will enhance NATO's ability to project power, if necessary, into crisis areas like the Middle East. In addition, in the current post-cold war situation, missions like peacekeeping, sometimes in cooperation with non-NATO powers, have become possible. The SFOR joint effort in Bosnia with Russia and several other non-NATO countries, which I mentioned earlier, is an excellent example. NATO enlargement corresponds to America's security requirements in the 21st century. As long as the costs of enlargement are equitably shared among current and future NATO members, and as long as we have agreed upon a fair and coherent plan for Bosina after SFOR, I believe that my Senate colleagues will vote to ratify NATO enlargement when it comes before us next spring. Exhibit 1 Statement by Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 7, 1997 Chairman Helms, Senator Biden, members of the committee: It is with a sense of appreciation and anticipation that I come before you to urge support for the admission of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to NATO. Each of us today is playing our part in the long unfolding story of America's modern partnership with Europe. That story began not in Madrid, when the President and his fellow NATO leaders invited these three new democracies to join our Alliance, nor eight years ago when the Berlin Wall fell, but half a century ago when your predecessors and mine dedicated our nation to the goal of a secure, united Europe. It was then that we broke with the American aversion to European entanglements, an aversion which served us well in our early days, but poorly when we became a global power. It was then that we sealed a peacetime alliance open not only to the nations which had shared our victory in World War II, but to our former adversaries. It was then that this committee unanimously recommended that the Senate approve the original NATO treaty. The history books will long record that day as among the Senate's finest. On that day, the leaders of this body rose above partisanship and they rose to the challenge of a pivotal moment in the history of the world. Mr. Chairman, I believe you are continuing that tradition today. I thank you for your decision to hold these hearings early, for the bipartisan manner in which you and Senator Biden are conducting them, and for the serious and substantive way in which you have framed our discussion. I am honored to be part of what you have rightly called the beginning of the process of advice and consent. And I am hopeful that with your support, and after the full national debate to which these hearings will contribute, the Senate will embrace the addition of new members to NATO. It would be fitting if this renewal of our commitment to security in Europe could come early next year, as Congress celebrates the 50th anniversary of its approval of the Marshall Plan. As I said, and as you can see, I am very conscious of history today. I hope that you and your colleagues will look back as I have on the deliberations of 1949, for they address so many of the questions I know you have now: How much will a new alliance cost and what are its benefits? Will it bind us to go to war? Will it entangle us in far away quarrels? We should take a moment to remember what was said then about the alliance we are striving to renew and expand today. Senator Vandenberg, Chairman Helms' extraordinary predecessor, predicted that NATO would become ``the greatest war deterrent in history.'' He was right. American forces have never had to fire a shot to defend a NATO ally. This Committee, in its report to the Senate on the NATO treaty, predicted that it would ``free the minds of men in many nations from a haunting sense of insecurity, and enable them to work and plan with that confidence in the future which is essential to economic recovery and progress.'' Your predecessors were right. NATO gave our allies time to rebuild their economies. It helped reconcile their ancient animosities. And it made possible an unprecedented era of unity in Western Europe. President Truman said that the NATO pact ``will be a positive, not a negative, influence for peace, and its influence will be felt not only in the area it specifically covers but throughout the world.'' And he was right, too. NATO gave hope to democratic forces in West Germany that their country would be welcome and secure in our community if they kept making the right choices. Ultimately, it helped bring the former fascist countries into a prosperous and democratic Europe. And it helped free the entire planet from the icy grip of the Cold War. Thanks in no small part to NATO, we live in a different world. Our Soviet adversary has vanished. Freedom's flag has been unfurled from the Baltics to Bulgaria. The threat of nuclear war has sharply diminished. As I speak to you today, our immediate survival is not at risk. Indeed, you may ask if the principle of collective defense at NATO's heart is relevant to the challenges of a wider and freer Europe. You may ask why, in this time of relative peace, are we so focused on security? The answer is, we want the peace to last. We want freedom to endure. And we believe there are still potential threats to our security emanating from European soil. You have asked me, Mr. Chairman, what these threats are. I want to answer as plainly as I can. First, there are the dangers of Europe's past. It is easy to forget this, but for centuries virtually every European nation treated virtually every other as a military threat. That pattern was broken only when NATO was born and only in the half of Europe NATO covered. With NATO, Europe's armies prepared to fight beside their neighbors, not against them; each member's security came to depend on cooperation with others, not competition. That is one reason why NATO remains essential, even though the Cold War is over. It is also one reason why we need a larger NATO, so that the other half of Europe is finally embedded in the same cooperative structure of military planning and preparation. A second set of dangers lies in Europe's present. Because of conflict in the Balkans and the former Soviet Union, Europe has already buried more victims of war since the Berlin Wall fell than in all the years of the Cold War. It is sobering to recall that this violence has its roots in the same problems of shattered states and hatred among ethnic groups that tyrants exploited to start this century's great wars. Finally, Mr. Chairman, and most important, we must consider the dangers of Europe's future. By this I mean direct threats against the soil of NATO members that a collective defense pact is designed to meet. Some are visible on Europe's horizon, such as the threat posed by rogue states with dangerous weapons that might have Europe within their range and in their sights. Others may not seem apparent today, in part because the existence of NATO has helped to deter them. But they are not unthinkable. Within this category lie questions about the future of Russia. We have an interest in seeing Russian democracy endure. We are doing all we can with our Russian partners to see that it does. And we have many reasons to be optimistic. At the same time, one should not dismiss the possibility that Russia could return to the patterns of its past. By engaging Russia and enlarging NATO, we give Russia every incentive to deepen its commitment to democracy and peaceful relations with neighbors, while closing the avenue to more destructive alternatives. We do not know what other dangers may arise 10, 20, or even 50 years from now. We do know enough from history and human experience to believe that a grave threat, if allowed to arise, would arise. We know that whatever the future may hold, it will be in our interest to have a vigorous and larger alliance with those European democracies that share our values and our determination to defend them. We recognize NATO expansion involves a solemn expansion of American responsibilities in Europe. It does not bind us to respond to every violent incident by going to war. But it does oblige us to consider an armed attack against one ally an attack against all and to respond with such action as we deem necessary, including the use of force, to restore the security of the North Atlantic area. As Americans, we take our commitments seriously and we do not extend them lightly. Mr. Chairman, you and I do not agree on everything, but we certainly agree that any major extension of American commitments must serve America's strategic interests. Let me explain why welcoming the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland into NATO meets that test. First, a larger NATO will make us safer by expanding the area in Europe where wars simply do not happen. This is the productive paradox at NATO's heart: By imposing a price on aggression, it deters aggression. By making clear that we will fight, if necessary, to defend our allies, it makes it less likely our troops will ever be called upon to do so. Now, you may say that no part of Europe faces any immediate threat of armed attack today. That is true. And I would say that the purpose of NATO enlargement is to keep it that way. Senator Vandenberg said it in 1949: ``[NATO] is not built to stop a war after it starts, although its potentialities in this regard are infinite. It is built to stop wars before they start.'' It is also fair to ask if it is in our vital interest to prevent conflict in central Europe. There are those who imply it is not. I'm sure you have even heard a few people trot out what I call the ``consonant cluster clause,'' the myth that in times of crisis Americans will make no sacrifice to defend a distant city with an unpronounceable name, that we will protect the freedom of Strasbourg but not Szczecin, Barcelona, but not Brno. Let us not deceive ourselves. The United States is a European power. We have an interest not only in the lands west of the Oder river, but in the fate of the 200 million people who live in the nations between the Baltic and Black Seas. We waged the Cold War in part because these nations were held captive. We fought World War II in part because these nations had been invaded. Now that these nations are free, we want them to succeed and we want them to be safe, whether they are large or small. For if there were a major threat to the security of their region, if we were to wake up one morning to the sight of cities being shelled and borders being overrun, I am certain that we would choose to act, enlargement or no enlargement. Expanding NATO now is simply the surest way to prevent that kind of threat from arising, and thus the need to make that kind of choice. Mr. Chairman, the second reason why enlargement passes the test of national interest is that it will make NATO stronger and more cohesive. The Poles, Hungarians and Czechs are passionately committed to NATO and its principles of shared responsibility. Experience has taught them to believe in a strong American leadership role in Europe. Their forces have risked their lives alongside ours from the Gulf War to Bosnia. Just last month, Czech soldiers joined our British allies in securing a police station from heavily armed Bosnian Serb extremists. Mr. Chairman, I know you have expressed concern that enlargement could dilute NATO by adding too many members and by involving the alliance in too many missions. Let me assure you that we invited only the strongest candidates to join the Alliance. And nothing about enlargement will change NATO's core mission, which is and will remain the collective defense of NATO soil. At the same time, it is important to remember that NATO has always served a political function as well. It binds our allies to us just as it binds us to our allies. So when you consider the candidacy of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, Mr. Chairman, I ask you to consider this: When peace is threatened somewhere in the world and we decide it is in our interest to act, here are three nations we have been able to count on to be with us. In the fight against terror and nuclear proliferation, here are three nations we have been able to count on. In our effort to reform the UN, here are three nations we have been able to count on. When we speak out for human rights around the world, here are three nations we will always be able to count on. Here are three nations that know what it means to lose their freedom and who will do what it takes to defend it. Here are three democracies that are ready to do their dependable part in the common enterprise of our alliance of democracies. Mr. Chairman, the third reason why a larger NATO serves our interests is that the very promise of it gives the nations of central and eastern Europe an incentive to solve their own problems. To align themselves with NATO, aspiring countries have strengthened their democratic institutions. They have made sure that soldiers serve civilians, not the other way around. They have signed 10 major accords that taken together resolve virtually every old ethnic and border dispute in the region, exactly the kind of disputes that might have led to future Bosnias. In fact, the three states we have invited to join NATO have resolved every outstanding dispute of this type. I have been a student of central European history and I have lived some of it myself. When I see Romanians and Hungarians building a genuine friendship after centuries of enmity, when I see Poles, Ukrainians and Lithuanians forming joint military units after years of suspicion, when I see Czechs and Germans overcoming decades of mistrust, when I see central Europeans confident enough to improve their political and economic ties with Russia, I know something remarkable is happening. NATO is doing for Europe's east precisely what it did-- precisely what this Committee predicted it would do--for Europe's west after World War II. It is helping to vanquish old hatreds, to promote integration and to create a secure environment for economic prosperity. This is another reminder that the contingencies we do not want our troops to face, such as ethnic conflict, border skirmishes, and social unrest are far more easily avoided with NATO enlargement than without it. In short, a larger NATO will prevent conflict, strengthen NATO, and protect the gains of stability and freedom in central and eastern Europe. That is the strategic rationale. But I would be disingenuous if I did not tell you that I see a moral imperative as well. For this is a policy that should appeal to our hearts as well as to our heads, to our sense of what is right as well as to our sense of what is smart. NATO defines a community of interest among the free nations of North America and Europe that both preceded and outlasted the Cold War. America has long stood for the proposition that this Atlantic community should not be artificially divided and that its nations should be free to shape their destiny. We have long argued that the nations of central and eastern Europe belong to the same democratic family as our allies in western Europe. We often call them ``former communist countries,'' and that is true in the same sense that America is a ``former British colony.'' Yes, the Czechs, Poles, and Hungarians were on the other side of the Iron Curtain during the Cold War. But we were surely on the same side in the ways that truly count. As Americans, we should be heartened today that so many of Europe's new democracies wish to join the institutions Americans did so much to build. They are our friends and we should be proud to welcome them home. We should also think about what would happen if we were to turn them away. That would mean freezing NATO at its Cold War membership and preserving the old Iron Curtain as its eastern frontier. It would mean locking out a whole group of otherwise qualified democracies simply because they were once, against their will, members of the Warsaw Pact. Why would America choose to be allied with Europe's old democracies forever, but its new democracies never? There is no acceptable, objective answer to that question. Instead, it would probably be said that we blocked the aspirations of our would-be allies because Russia objected. And that, in turn, could cause confidence to crumble in central Europe, leading to a search for security by other means, including costly arms buildups and competition among neighbors. We have chosen a better way. We have chosen to look at the landscape of the new Europe and to ask a simple question: Which of these nations that are so clearly important to our security are ready and able to contribute to our security? The answer to that question is before you today, awaiting your affirmation. I said at the outset, Mr. Chairman, that there are weighty voices on both sides of this debate. There are legitimate concerns with which we have grappled along the way, and that I expect you to consider fully as well. Let me address a few. First, we all want to make sure that the costs of expansion are distributed fairly. Last February, at the behest of Congress and before the Alliance had decided which nations to invite to membership, the Administration made a preliminary estimate of America's share. Now that we have settled on three candidates, we are working with our allies to produce a common estimate by the December meeting of the North Atlantic Council. At this point, the numbers we agree upon as 16 allies are needed prior to any further calculations made in Washington. I know you are holding separate hearings in which my Pentagon colleagues will go into this question in detail. But I will say this: I am convinced that the cost of expansion is real but affordable. I am certain our prospective allies are willing and able to pay their share, because in the long run it will be cheaper for them to upgrade their forces within the alliance than outside it. As Secretary of State, I will insist that our old allies share this burden fairly. That is what NATO is all about. I know there are serious people who estimate that a larger NATO will cost far more than we have anticipated. The key fact about our estimate is that it is premised on the current, favorable security environment in Europe. Obviously, if a grave threat were to arise, the cost of enlargement would rise. But then so would the cost of our entire defense budget. In any case, there are budgetary constraints in all 16 NATO democracies that will prevent costs from ballooning. That is why the main focus of our discussion, Mr. Chairman, and in our consultations with our allies, needs to be on defining the level of military capability we want our old and new allies to have in this favorable environment, and then making sure that they commit to that level. We must spend no more than we must, but no less than we need to keep NATO strong. Another common concern about NATO enlargement is that it might damage our cooperation with a democratic Russia. Russian opposition to NATO enlargement is real. But we should see it for what it is: a product of old misperceptions about NATO and old ways of thinking about its former satellites in central Europe. Instead of changing our policies to accommodate Russia's outdated fears, we need to encourage Russia's more modern aspirations. This means that we should remain Russia's most steadfast champion whenever it seeks to define its greatness by joining international institutions, opening its markets and participating constructively in world affairs. It means we should welcome Russia's decision to build a close partnership with NATO, as we did in the NATO-Russia Founding Act. But when some Russian leaders suggest that a larger NATO is a threat, we owe it candor to say that is false--and to base our policies on what we know to be true. When they imply that central Europe is special, that its nations still are not free to choose their security arrangements, we owe it to candor to say that times have changed, and that no nation can assert its greatness at the expense of its neighbors. We do no favor to Russian democrats and modernizers to suggest otherwise. I believe our approach is sound and producing results. Over the past year, against the backdrop of NATO enlargement, reformers have made remarkable gains in the Russian government. We have agreed to pursue deeper arms reductions. Our troops have built a solid working relationship on the ground in Bosnia. Russia was our full partner at the Summit of the Eight in Denver and it has joined the Paris Club of major international lenders. What is more, last week in New York we signed documents that should pave the way for the Russian Duma to ratify the START II treaty. While this prospect is still by no means certain, it would become far less so if we gave the Duma any reason to think it could hold up NATO enlargement by holding up START II. As you know Mr. Chairman, last week, NATO and Russia held the first ministerial meeting of their Permanent Joint Council. This council gives us an invaluable mechanism for building trust between NATO and Russia through dialogue and transparency. I know that some are concerned NATO's new relationship with Russia will actually go too far. You have asked me for an affirmation, Mr. Chairman, that the North Atlantic Council remains NATO's supreme decision making body. Let me say it clearly: It does and it will. The NATO-Russia Founding Act gives Russia no opportunity to dilute, delay or block NATO decisions. NATO's allies will always meet to agree on every item on their agenda before meeting with Russia. And the relationship between NATO and Russia will grow in importance only to the extent Russia uses it constructively. The Founding Act also does not limit NATO's ultimate authority to deploy troops or nuclear weapons in order to meet its commitments to new and old members. All it does is to restate unilaterally existing NATO policy: that in the current and foreseeable security environment, we have no plan, no need, and no intention to station nuclear weapons in the new member countries, nor do we contemplate permanently stationing substantial combat forces. The only binding limits on conventional forces in Europe will be set as we adapt the CFE treaty, with central European countries and all the other signatories at the table, and we will proceed on the principle of reciprocity. Another important concern is that enlargement may create a new dividing line in Europe between a larger NATO and the countries that will not join in the first round. We have taken a range of steps to ensure this does not happen. President Clinton has pledged that the first new members will not be the last. NATO leaders will consider the next steps in the process of enlargement before the end of the decade. We have strengthened NATO's Partnership for Peace program. We have created a new Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, through which NATO and its democratic partners throughout Europe will shape the missions we undertake together. We have made it clear that the distinction between the nations NATO invited to join in Madrid and those it did not is based purely on objective factors--unlike the arbitrary line that would divide Europe if NATO stood still. Among the countries that still aspire to membership, there is enthusiastic support for the process NATO has begun. Had you seen the crowds that cheered the President in Romania in July, had you been with me when I spoke to the leaders of Lithuania and Slovenia, you would have sensed how eager these nations are to redouble their efforts. They understand a simple fact: With enlargement, no new democracy is permanently excluded; without enlargement, every new democracy would be permanently excluded. The most important thing the Senate can do to reassure them now is to get the ball rolling by ratifying the admission of the first three candidates. Mr. Chairman, a final concern I wish to address has to do with Bosnia. Some have suggested that our debate on NATO enlargement simply cannot be separated from our actions and decisions in that troubled country. I agree with them. Both enlargement and our mission in Bosnia are aimed at building a stable undivided Europe. Both involve NATO and its new partners to the east. It was our experience in Bosnia that proved the fundamental premise of our enlargement strategy: there are still threats to peace and security in Europe that only NATO can meet. It was in Bosnia that our prospective allies proved they are ready to take responsibility for the security of others. It was in Bosnia that we proved NATO and Russian troops can work together. We cannot know today if our mission in Bosnia will achieve all its goals, for that ultimately depends on the choices the Bosnian people will make. But we can say that whatever may happen, NATO's part in achieving the military goals of our mission has been a resounding success. Whatever may happen, our interest in a larger, stronger NATO will endure long after the last foreign soldier has left Bosnia. We can also say that NATO will remain the most powerful instrument we have for building effective military coalitions such as SFOR. At the same time, Bosnia does not by itself define the future of a larger NATO. NATO's fundamental purpose is collective defense against aggression. Its most important aim, if I can paraphrase Arthur Vandenberg, is to prevent wars before they start so it does not have to keep the peace after they stop. These are some of the principal concerns I wanted to address today; I know you have many more questions and I look forward to answering them all. This discussion is just beginning. I am glad that it will also involve other committees of the Senate, the NATO Observers' Group and the House of Representatives. Most important, I am glad it will involve the people of the United States. For the commitment a larger NATO entails will only be meaningful if the American people understand and accept it. When these three new democracies join NATO in 1999, as I trust they will, it will be a victory for us all, Mr. Chairman. And on that day, we will be standing on the shoulders of many. We will be thankful to all those who prosecuted the Cold War, to all those on both sides of the Iron Curtain who believed that the goal of containment was to bring about the day when the enlargement of our democratic community would be possible. We will be grateful to all those who championed the idea of a larger NATO--not just President Clinton, or President Havel, or President Walesa, but members of Congress from both parties who voted for resolutions urging the admission of these three nations. We will owe a debt to the Republican members who made NATO enlargement part of their Contract with America. Today, all of our allies and future allies are watching you for one simple reason. The American Constitution is unique in the power it grants to the legislative branch over foreign policy, especially over treaties. In this matter, Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, you and the American people you represent are truly in the driver's seat. That is as it should be. In fact, I enjoy going to Europe and telling our allies: ``This is what we want to do, but ultimately, it will be up to our Senate and our people to decide.'' I say that with pride because it tells them something about America's faith in the democratic process. But I have to tell you that I say it with confidence as well. I believe we will stand together, Mr. Chairman, when the time comes for the Senate to decide, because I know that the policy we ask you to embrace is a policy that the Administration and Congress shaped together, and because I am certain that it advances the fundamental interests of the United States. Thank you very much.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. Prsident, this week the Committee on Foreign Relations began a comprehensive series of six hearings on NATO enlargement. I commend Chairman Helms for holding these hearings at this busy time. He and I have met at great length to construct the agenda as preparation for the committee's acting expeditiously next year to consider the enlargement amendment to the Washington Treaty. At the committee's first hearing on October 7, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright outlined the adminsitration's strategic rationale for enlargement. Mr. President, I ask permission for the text of Secretary Albright's statement be printed in the Record. Following my remarks.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise very briefly to explain my absence on rollcall vote No. 271. This was a procedural vote to instruct the Sergeant at Arms. I was attending a conference with Ambassador Richard Holbrooke and was involved in a discussion of Bosnia and the enforcement of the Dayton Peace accords. I was unable to return to the Senate for the vote.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, since 1992, when the Senate first voted on the issue of providing private school vouchers, I have consistently voted against spending Federal money to pay for tuition at private schools. I did so again today. But, I rise to let my colleagues know that I am reconsidering my position based on the changed circumstances in American education. I want to give everyone fair notice that in the future, I may vote to allow such a limited experiment. I realize that whenever elected officials change their position on an issue, they are subject to accusations of flip-flopping or being inconsistent or trying to have it both ways. It is for that reason that I want to explain my thinking on this matter today. Unlike some opponents of vouchers, I have never categorically opposed the idea of public money being used under any circumstances for private school education. Rather--and I think I have been forthright about this from the very beginning--my concerns have been very specific. First, I have questions about whether a private school voucher system, when it involves private religious schools, is constitutional. And, second, I have deep reservations about taking money away from underfunded public schools. But, Mr. President, I do not believe that simply because I have always voted a particular way on a particular issue that I should be locked in forever to that position. Circumstances change. Thinking changes. And, I have been giving this issue a lot of thought. I have come to the belief that the constitutional issues involved here are not as clear cut as opponents have argued. While lower courts have ruled that vouchers used in private religious schools violate the first amendment's prohibition on the establishment of religion, the Supreme Court has not yet weighed in on the question. In fact, the Supreme Court has ruled that State tuition tax credits for private religious school tuition are perfectly constitutional, and the Supreme Court has ruled that Pell grants--vouchers for college students--can be used in private religious colleges without violating the Constitution. Granted, Mr. President, the issues that the Court has adjudicated are not exactly parallel to the issue of private school vouchers for elementary and secondary school students. But, the point is, it is an open question. Even some liberal constitutional scholars have noted that vouchers to parents and children may be constitutional. And, as long as it remains an open question, I do not think I can dismiss the issue of vouchers solely on constitutional grounds. With regard to my second concern--that private school vouchers may drain funds away from the public schools--I now think that the issue is more complex. The real issue is not whether money is drained from public schools, but what effect vouchers would have on public schools and the quality of education those students receive. And, yes, I do believe there is a difference. Even if vouchers were to take money away from the public schools--and I should point out that not all voucher proposals do--that does not in and of itself mean that public schools will be harmed. When you have an area of the country--and most often here we are talking about inner cities--where the public schools are abysmal or dysfunctional or not working and where most of the children have no way out, it is legitimate to ask what would happen to the public schools with increased competition from private schools and what would happen to the quality of education for the children who live there. Most of the opponents of private school vouchers argue that with more kids attending private schools, the support for public education will be drained. To date, that assertion has largely gone unchallenged. I am not sure it should any more. Is it not possible that giving poor kids a way out will force the public schools to improve and result in more people coming back? Make no mistake about it. Public education must be our primary focus. And, in considering voting for vouchers in the future, I am not subscribing to the philosophy of many voucher supporters who argue that there should be no Federal role in education or that the Federal Government should not in any way help States fund public education or that we should decrease our commitment to public education. On the contrary, I think we should increase that commitment. But, for those kids who are presently caught in a failed public school, we must start asking--only asking--if public education is still the only answer. I do not know the answer to that or any of the other questions I have raised today. But, I believe the questions need to be asked. And, it may be that the only way that we will find out the answers is to create a limited private school voucher demonstration project. I say ``may,'' Mr. President, because I do not know. And, that really is part of the point here. I will continue to ask these questions, listen to both sides of the debate, and ponder the answers. In so doing, however, I want everyone to understand that I may conclude in the end that the only true way to answer the questions is to try vouchers--in a limited fashion for those who need the most help.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, this evening, the Senate conducted two rollcall votes--on the conference report to the Defense Department Appropriations bill and on the nomination of Katharine Sweeney Hayden to be U.S. District Judge for the District of New Jersey. Unfortunately, I was not present for those votes. Tonight, at my daughter's school in Wilmington is what is called mini roster night. That is what most people know as open house or parents' night--where the parents go around and meet all of the teachers. Because of the Senate voting schedule, I will either have to miss votes or miss mini roster night at my daughter's school. On both matters voted on tonight, my position is already on the record, and my vote is not expected to change the outcome. With regard to the defense bill, I voted for the bill on July 15 when it passed the Senate by the overwhelming margin of 94-4. There have been no substantial changes in the legislation, and I continue to support it. On July 10, the Senate Judiciary Committee reported out the nomination of Katharine Sweeney Hayden to be a New Jersey district judge. I supported her nomination, and I continue to do so. Again, Mr. President, on both matters, my vote is not expected to change the outcome, and therefore, I have decided to attend parents' night at my daughter's school. I appreciate the understanding of my colleagues and my constituents.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. I thank my colleague. With the permission of the Chair and my colleagues, I will take about 12 minutes, if I may. Mr. President, the purpose of this FDA reform bill we are considering today is obviously to streamline the process for approving drugs so that they are available to people who need them more quickly. I support the bill and I look forward to its becoming law. But, Mr. President, I rise today to speak to several amendments and several points that were, quite frankly, made nongermane as a consequence of the cloture vote, so I will pursue this at another date. I rise today to discuss the problem of drugs that do not get to the market, even though we need them desperately, because there are insufficient financial incentives for pharmaceutical companies to develop these drugs that we need to get to the market. In particular, I am speaking about medicines to treat addiction to illegal drugs like cocaine and heroin, so-called pharmacotherapies--that is, drugs that would be able to be developed and used to combat addiction to cocaine and heroin and other scheduled drugs. Since 1989, when I first offered a comprehensive report, which--I don't know whether I am going to burden the Record with it, but I will point it out to my colleagues. It was a report entitled ``Pharmacotherapy: A Strategy for the 1990s.'' Since that time, I have argued that a key component of our national drug strategy should be the development of these pharmacotherapies that would act as antigens or antagonists to the effects of the illegal drugs being purchased on the streets. These medicines are critical for turning around addicts, particularly addicts who are difficult to treat with traditional methods. Getting these addicts off of drugs is one of the most important efforts we can undertake to reduce the harm done to our Nation by the drug epidemic-- because these treatment-resistant addicts commit such a large percentage of the drug- related crime, we would, if we could find some of the answers, significantly impact on and increase the safety of all Americans. In my 1989 report, I posed the question: ``If drug use is an epidemic, are we doing enough to find a medical `cure' for this disease?'' The obvious answer, as the report concludes, is, no, we are not. If, for example, everyone who was victimized by a drug addict who has knocked them on the head or hurt them or robbed them or burglarized their home, and everyone who is addicted to drugs had a rare disease instead of the victims of drug addiction, or of being addicted to drugs, we would have a multibillion dollar national campaign to find a medical cure for it, as we rightfully are attempting to do with AIDS, breast cancer, or cancer generally. But there is precious little going on, although there is a lot of potential in the area of developing medicines, drugs, to combat drug addiction. Based on my report, I offered legislation with Senators Kennedy, Moynihan, and others, enacted into law in 1992, which created the Medications Development Program of the National Institute of Drug Abuse and commissioned a major study by the National Academy of Science on pharmacotherapies. This study highlighted the promise of the medical research that I referred to. In fact, in recent years, there have been a number of promising advances that give hope that effective medicines could be developed if we dedicated a sufficient amount of energy and resources. One example of this promising research is the recent development of a compound that appears to immunize laboratory animals against the effects of cocaine. Let me say that again. There is a compound that has been developed in a laboratory that appears--it hasn't gone through clinical trials--to be able to immunize laboratory animals against the effects of cocaine. The compound works like a vaccine by stimulating the immune system to develop an antibody that blocks cocaine from entering the brain. Now, this is pure conjecture on my part. Let's assume that that was able to be developed and it worked for human beings. What an incredible impact it would have on the United States of America. What an incredible impact it would have not only on the addicts, but on those of us who are victims of the addicts. I want to remind everybody that over 60 percent of all the violent crime committed in America is committed by people who are addicted. At the moment they are committing the crime, they are high, they are on a drug or a substance. Just think what a difference that would make. Now, there are at least eight new medicines with promising potential, beyond the one that I mentioned, to treat drug addictions which are at various stages of research and development. By the way, I commend to my colleagues the report put out by the Institute of Medicine called the ``Development of Medications for the Treatment of Opiate and Cocaine Addiction.'' Now, of the eight promising medicines that are out there, one is LAAM, a treatment for heroin addiction, the first new medicine since methadone was approved in the early 1970's. Others are Naloxone, Naltrexone, Imipramine, Desipramine, Carbamazepine, Burprenorphine, and Diltiazem. These are all medicines identified by the various studies-- in this case, by the Institute of Medicine--that in fact have promising capacity to deal with either blocking the effect of the drug when it is ingested by an addict or someone attempting to use it for the first time, or it has the effect of causing that person to be sick and not wanting to take the drug again. Not a silver bullet that cures everything, but every single drug expert I have spoken with indicates that if these could be developed, they would be significant tools in aiding in the recovery of addiction and preventing addiction. The National Academy of Sciences study also outlined the key steps we have to take to fully realize the promise of pharmacotherapeutic research. Yet, almost a decade after my original report, almost a decade after Senators Kennedy, Moynihan, myself and others moved to change the law in 1992, despite promising research, despite the tremendously important gains that such medicines would mean for our national effort against a drug epidemic, despite the fact that it's clear what steps we have to take to speed and encourage the research in this area, despite all this, we are still not doing enough to encourage the development of medicines to treat drug addiction. That is why I have come to the floor today, Mr. President--to discuss three amendments I had offered to the FDA reform bill. These amendments sought to take three different approaches to addressing our critical need to develop pharmacotherapies to deal with our drug epidemic. First, I believe we should reauthorize the Medications Development Program of the National Institute of Drug Abuse and increase its funding to $100 million by the year 2002. I might add, every time we identify serious and pernicious diseases like breast cancer, prostate cancer, or AIDS, what do we do? We all immediately know that if we spend more money on research, we will attract more brilliant women and men into the field to find the answer because they have funding to do their research, and we increase exponentially the prospects that we will find a cure or find something to mitigate against the ravages of the disease. But not all people instinctively reach that conclusion. Why don't we reach that conclusion about drug addiction when the medical community says there are so many promising avenues we could go down? It would be different if the National Academy of Sciences and researchers and experts said, ``You know, there isn't any promise here, there is nothing we should bother to do, there is nothing we can do. This is like trying to be able to go warp speed in our Challenger.'' Well, that would be one thing. But that is not the case. That is not the case. Currently, the program I have referred to at the National Institute of Drug Abuse receives about $67 million. Increasing that level by 50 percent over the next 5 years is the very least we should be doing in light of the savings in crime reduction, reduction in health care costs, and other expenses that would be eliminated or diminished if we could effectively treat drug addiction with medicine. Yet, despite the progress being made by Government and university researchers, the Federal Government cannot solve this problem by itself, even if the amendment I proposed were not out of order or were accepted. Private industry has not aggressively developed pharmacotherapies for a variety of reasons, including a small customer base, difficulties in distributing medicines to the targeted population, and fear of being associated with the notion of substance abuse. There are two major, major drug companies in my State--Zeneca and Du Pont Merck. They have a number of brilliant researchers. I have visited their laboratories. They say to me what every other drug company says. ``OK. Biden, how many addicted drug people are there in all America?'' I believe the number is estimated at 5.6 million people. Let's say we spend $200 million, $300 million, $500 million, or $700 million developing it. They say, ``Say we go out and spend all this money. And let's say we come up with a cure or a silver bullet. How do we get that to the 5.6 million people who need it? They don't have the money to buy it. Are you going to guarantee us that you will buy it? Are you going to guarantee us they will take it? What are you going to do? Our return on investment is de minimis. We will lose money in all probability, even if we come up with a silver bullet,'' which they are not suggesting they will. Conversely, if they come up with a silver bullet for prostate cancer, or a silver bullet for breast cancer, the world would beat a path to their door to buy it. That is one of the reasons they don't want to get into the game, even though they acknowledge that these are promising opportunities. Second, none of these companies, or anyone I named--Lilly, Squibb, any of them--wants to be known as the company that deals with drug addiction. It is bad public relations. So for these and many other reasons, private industry has not really gotten into the fray. We need to create financial incentives to encourage pharmaceutical companies to develop and market these treatments. And we need to develop a new partnership between private industry and the public sector in order to encourage the active marketing and distribution of new medicines so they are accessible to all addicts who need treatment. My amendments sought to create these incentives in two ways. First, I believe we must provide additional patent protections for companies that develop drugs to treat substances abuse. Under my bill, pharmacotherapies could be designated ``Orphan Drugs'' and qualify for an exclusive 7-year patent. These extraordinary patent rights would increase the market value or pharmacotherapies--providing a financial reward for companies that invest in the search to cure drug addiction. This provision was contained in a bill introduced by Senator Kennedy and me which passed the Senate in 1990, but the provision was dropped in conference. It was also contained in the pharmacotherapy bill I introduced last year and the youth violence bill I introduced this year. In addition, I proposed an amendment which would provide a substantial monetary reward for companies that develop medicines to treat drug addition and shift responsibility for marketing and distributing such drugs to the Government--a ``Biden Bounty'' as some have called it. This approach would create a financial incentive for drug companies to invest in research and development but enable them to avoid any stigma associated with distributing medicine to substance abusers. To qualify for the award, a pharmaceutical company would have to demonstrate that the new medicine meets strict guidelines--developed by the National Academy of Sciences--that the medicine effectively treats cocaine or heroin addition. At a minimum, the guidelines will require the producer of the drug to conduct a controlled, long-term performance test which demonstrates that: Patients--addicts--will actually take the medicine; addicts will continue taking the medicine for as long as it takes to cure the addition; a significant percentage of those who receive treatment refrained from using cocaine or heroin for at least 3 years; and the medicine has a reasonable cost. So, it is real simple--if a medicine meets the National Academy of Science test and it is approved by the Food and Drug Administration, then the Government will purchase the patent rights for the drug from the company that developed it. So this bounty that would be made available to them is literally a reward. A reward, not unlike if I were a billionaire and say, ``I will give any company $100 million if they found the cure for cancer, or for any cancer.'' It is the same notion. The key reason the Government must not only reward companies with a bounty for developing medicines, but also purchase the patent rights is due to the stigma problem identified by the National Academy of Sciences report. This stigma problem is the legitimate concern of companies that they not be identified as the drug addicts company. I would also note, that if a company does want to market and distribute the medicine, they do not have to sell the patent to the Government. But if they don't want to they can sell the patent to Government, and we market it. The purchase price for the patent rights is established by law: $100 million for a drug to treat cocaine addiction and $50 million for a drug to treat heroin addiction, figures recommended by the Tufts University Center on Drug Development. So the way it works. You develop a patent. You don't want to be distributing it because you don't want to be known as that company. The Federal Government would pay you $100 million for the patent after it has demonstrated that it works, and it was effectively done, and we would be the one engaged in the business of doing it. We can pay all of this money to buy cops, we can pay all of this money for prisons, and pay all of these other moneys for other things. It is a reasonable expenditure for taxpayer dollars, in my view, to deal with the problem and scourge of drug addiction. Once the Government has purchased the patent rights, then the Government would contract out the production of the drug and distribute it to the existing clinics, hospitals, State and local governments, and other entities qualified to operate drug treatment programs. This is not a radically different process from how our military procurement works: The Pentagon specifies what they want a fighter plane to be capable of--how fast, its stealth capabilities, what kind of weapons, et cetera; then the powers of the private sector are unleased because the Government will buy the best plane which meets the specifications. If my colleagues doubt that any such medicine could ever be developed, fine. If you are right, the Government will never spend the money. But, if I am right--just imagine the promise--in terms of reduced drug abuse; reduced crime; and reduced health care costs. The bottom line is that--this joint public/private endeavor I seek will harness the most important engine of innovation the world knows-- the private sector. The three pharmacotherapy amendments I offered were directly related to the purpose of the FDA reform bill and I hoped they would be accepted. Nonetheless, I understand that for procedural reasons, my amendments were out of order and could not be offered for a vote. Still, I urge the Labor Committee to hold hearings on the topic and consider this legislation as soon as possible. And, I put my colleagues on notice that I will be back to offer these amendments on the next appropriate legislation. In closing, I would observe that America's drug epidemic is reduced each and every time a drug abuser quits his or her habit. Fewer drug addicts mean fewer crimes, fewer hospital admissions, fewer drug- addicted babies and fewer neglected children. The benefits to our country of developing new treatment options such as pharmacotherapies are manifold. Each dollar we spend on advancing options in this area can save us 10 or 20 times as much in years to come. The question should not be--``can we afford to pursue a pharmacotherapy strategy?'' But rather, ``can we afford not to?'' I urge my colleagues to join me in promoting an important, and potentially ground breaking, approach to addressing one of our Nation's most serious domestic challenges. A lot of the scientific community says that there are great promising medicines out there but which the companies will not move on for the reasons I have stated. We should be doing all that we can for our own safety's sake. I thank my colleagues. I yield the floor. Mr. JEFFORDS addressed the Chair.