Joe Biden

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, at the end of October President Clinton will sit down with Chinese President Jiang Zemin to try to put the United States-China relationship on a sounder footing. After 8 years of tension in the relationship, it should go without saying that there is plenty of work to be done by both Presidents. With over a billion people and a burgeoning economy undergoing a dramatic transformation from doctrinaire communism to market-driven capitalism, China undeniably is an emerging great power. How we deal with China will be one of the great foreign policy challenges of the next century. The forthcoming meeting with President Jiang Zemin is one of a series of important opportunities to advance our relations that will occur over the next several months. Today I want to outline some of the objectives that I think the United States should pursue during Jiang's visit, particularly in regard to one of the central issues in our relationship. The issues on the agenda are familiar. We have deep concerns about China's human rights record, its trade practices, and most important, from the perspective of international security, its lackluster record of adherence to nonproliferation agreements. It is unrealistic to assume that we will resolve all our differences next month, next year, or even over the next several years. I am convinced, however, that it is possible to build a mutually beneficial relationship with China. A rising China need not threaten United States interests. In fact, China cannot achieve the economic growth, international respect, and regional stability it seeks without a workable relationship with the United States and close, constructive, integration with global economic, political, and security regimes. The Containment-versus-Engagement Debate Just as China is engaged in a great internal debate about its future direction, the United States is undertaking a great debate about the future direction of its policy toward China. The choice is often framed, simplistically, as one between two mutually exclusive paths: containment or engagement. But the relationship between these two great nations is far more complicated than that. It demands a more sophisticated strategy. Containment--the central organizing principle of the West during the cold war--is not a realistic policy option for China. Economically, China is already a powerhouse, the third largest market in the world and our fastest growing export market. Unlike the former Soviet Union, China has a vibrant economy, enjoys normal relations with all of its neighbors, and is attracting vast amounts of foreign investment. If we try to smother China by denying it access to our markets, the effect on China would be less severe than commonly expected. Exports to the United States represent only about 2 to 3 percent of China's gross domestic product, and the injury would be borne not only by China, but also by our many allies in the region. This is because 70 to 80 percent of the value of China's exports to the United States represent products originally imported by China from the United States and other countries and then processed for export. Militarily, a containment strategy for China would be a terrible act of folly worthy of a Barbara Tuchman history volume. For the last 25 years our alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines have helped to foster peace and stability in the Pacific--all without vilifying China. While it is essential that we adapt our regional alliances to post-cold war realities, we should not cast China as an adversary. Our allies support the integration of China into the region's economic and political structure, including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations regional forum. None would support a policy of containment premised, as it would have to be, on the notion of an expansionist China bent on regional hegemony. If containment fails to advance our interests, what about engagement? Engagement, a term frequently used to describe the Clinton administration's policy, is, by itself, virtually without substance. ``Engagement'' could run the gamut from normal diplomatic relations, to a zealous mercantilist approach that runs the risk of placing profits over principle. Or to paraphrase George Will in another context from years ago, he said, ``Some of my friends love capitalism more than they hate communism.'' Engagement is not a policy. It is a means to an end. It is the content of the engagement that matters. We should not be passive in our relationship with China. We can influence what kind of great power China becomes. Encouraging China's transition from a poor, isolated Communist state to a more prosperous, open, and democratic partner, however, will take more than a bland policy of engagement. It requires patience and purpose in the pursuit of clearly articulated U.S. interests. U.S. Interests American interests in China are clear. We seek a free, prosperous, and secure China, at peace with its neighbors. We want China to respect international norms--particularly, nonproliferation, human rights, trade, and the environment. The Summit's Measure of Success Next month, Chinese President Jiang Zemin will visit Washington, the first such visit since the Tiananmen Square massacre. I am prepared to support this diplomatic step, provided that it yields meaningful progress on issues of concern to us. Early reports about China's priorities at this summit call into question whether such progress can be achieved. According to press reports, China is obsessed with ensuring that President Jiang receives the red carpet treatment, similar to the celebrated visit of Deng Xiao- Ping in 1979. Let me state it plainly: this visit must be about more than ceremony. In the area of international security, we should not hesitate to criticize China for conduct which calls into question Beijing's commitment to nonproliferation and invites U.S. sanctions. However, we should also be prepared to lay out plainly the benefits that might accrue to China if it takes decisive steps to join with the United States to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Nonproliferation Concerns As my colleagues know, I have for several years been critical, along with Senator Helms, of China's behavior in the area of nonproliferation. Their consistent flouting of international norms warrant skepticism that China is willing to engage us honestly on our proliferation concerns. Nonetheless, I agree with this objective: we must strive to transform nonproliferation from an issue that has become emblematic of the difficulties in Sino-United States relations to an example of cooperation and trust. Toward that end, China deserves some credit for development of its official policy on nonproliferation. For example, since 1992, Beijing has promised to abide by the Missile Technology Control Regime, acceded to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT], signed and ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention, developed regulations governing exports limited by the Chemical Weapons Convention, and issued its first public defense white paper, which focused on arms control and disarmament. On May 11, 1996, following what the Chinese maintain was an unauthorized sale of ring magnets used in uranium enrichment to Pakistan in violation of China's Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] commitments and United States law, China pledged not to provide assistance to any nuclear facilities not under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. Last year, China began a moratorium on nuclear testing and signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Finally, just last month China promulgated a list of controlled nuclear technologies which are prohibited from export. Perhaps even more significantly, in recent months we have observed for the first time a Chinese willingness to forego exports of nuclear technology to Iran in response to United States concerns. Hopefully, this is the dawning on the part of the Chinese of not only a recognition of the commitments they made, but what their self- interest is. It is not in their self-interest, in my humble opinion-- although I never tell another man or woman their politics or lecture another country about what is their interest--but on the surface it clearly is not in their interest to continue to engage in the activities they have engaged in during the decades of the 1980's and the 1990's. So I am not making any prophecy about what this portends, I am just stating a fact, that there has been a change--not sufficient change, but a change. Again, hopefully, it is a recognition of their self-interest in addition to their international obligations. The China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation reportedly has canceled an agreement to sell Iran a facility to convert uranium ore into uranium hexaflouride gas, which could be enriched to weapons-grade material. I hope that is correct. China has also suspended an agreement to sell nuclear reactors to Iran. Again, if true, if they keep on that path, that is a very positive change. I hope that these developments are evidence that Chinese leaders now fully accept that China's own national security would be threatened by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them. I also hope that China understands that great powers go beyond their minimum treaty obligations in the interest of peace and security. If they wish to be a great power, they will be required to do the same. China wants to be accepted as a great power. I welcome that desire and understand it. A great power bears an obligation not to sell dual- use equipment to a country that is known to have a program to develop long-range missiles. A great power bears an obligation not to sell chemical weapons precursors or technology to firms or institutes that are fronts for military programs. A great power agrees to work with other countries to ensure that the burdens of nonproliferation are shared equitably. China must step up to that obligation. China's Next Steps There are several steps China could take to shoulder their share of the nonproliferation burden and to increase the world's confidence in their stance on nuclear nonproliferation. Specifically, in my humble opinion, China should do the following: Expand its pledge not to assist unsafeguarded facilities to include unsafeguarded programs; clarify its recent commitment not to assist Iran's nuclear program and put it in writing; make its nuclear export control list available to Chinese and foreign firms and expand controls to include dual-use nuclear technology; establish a comprehensive export controls enforcement mechanism, and demonstrate its effectiveness through the arrest and prosecution of violators within China; stop all contact between Chinese nuclear engineers and those Pakistani experts with ties to Pakistan's nuclear weapons program; and last, I believe China should agree to join multilateral bodies committed to nuclear nonproliferation, including the Zanger Committee. If China took these steps, we would be well on our way to transforming nuclear nonproliferation from a sore point in Sino-United States relations to a genuine success story. Activating the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement United States concerns about Chinese proliferation are not restricted to nuclear technology. China's export of chemicals and equipment destined for Iran's chemical weapons factories and its sale of cruise and ballistic missile technology to Iran, Pakistan, and other countries remain of serious concern to the United States and must be addressed. But progress in the area of nuclear nonproliferation could serve as an example for these other areas of our bilateral relationships. Moreover, there are benefits that could flow to both the United States and China once we became convinced by China's actions of the sincerity of its commitment to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction. For example, if recent progress in the area of nuclear nonproliferation continues, the President could choose to implement the 1985 Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with China. That early agreement permits the export of United States nuclear energy technology to China. We have suspended it because of our doubts about China's intentions. If China continued on the path that they have begun of late, the President, or the next President, could in fact reengage that agreement. The Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreement was suspended in 1986 in response to Congressional concerns about Chinese assistance to Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. I was one of those expressing concern at that time. I think we made the right decision. For the past decade, China's nonproliferation track record has effectively, in my view, precluded resumption of nuclear cooperation with the United States. I have been one of the people on this floor calling for the rare secret sessions that we occasionally have here to discuss China's activities over the last decade in this area. During the intervening years, China has pursued a ``Noah's Ark'' approach to nuclear energy, purchasing two Russian reactors, two French reactors, and two Canadian reactors. Now they are close to reaching a decision on a standard configuration for their nuclear industry, and they would like to purchase two American reactors. The Chinese rightly believe that United States reactors are the safest, most efficient, and reliable on the planet--which they are. For the United States, reactivation of the nuclear cooperation agreement could mean billions of dollars' worth of exports to help balance our trade with China, additional high-paying jobs for Americans, and a beneficial change in the relationship. There would also be an environmental benefit: reducing China's consumption of high- sulfur coal, which fouls the air over China's cities and contributes to global warming. So, there could be a great benefit. But China must first, must first demonstrate to us that their recent adumbrations with regard to nuclear nonproliferation, are real, and that is why I was presumptuous enough to suggest the things that I think China could and should do, and should be discussed in the impending visit. The world system has never been adept at accommodating the aspirations of rising powers. As a student of history, and although it has been 100 years since I was in undergraduate school, my love and my avocation still, as a student of history--I know, and you know and all our colleagues know, that the world has never been adept at accommodating the aspirations of rising powers. To deny that China is a rising power is to deny reality. China's rise is not likely to be an exception in the way in which the world responds. Increasingly, China not only wants a seat at the table, it expects its interests to be taken seriously and balks at being held accountable to rules it had no role in shaping when the great powers shaped them, before they had a seat at the table. China is an ancient country with a rich history and a proud list of cultural and technological accomplishments which will forever distinguish it from our western, Judeo-Christian traditions. In light of this, one can understand why they might feel that it could be unreasonable for us to try to mold them in our image. But we do China no favors by failing to communicate our concerns, or by jettisoning our principles or our strategic interests in pursuit of an ill-defined policy of engagement. To suggest that international norms that all the world are willing to accept, or should be willing to accept, are an imposition of our system on China, is in fact, I think, an incorrect way of looking at it. We are not trying to make China in our own image. But there are certain basic international norms to which they must conform. We are not being unreasonable when we expect China to accept international norms of behavior in the area of nonproliferation, human rights, and trade. We are not being unreasonable when we expect China to adhere to the terms of its international agreements--period. Since the introduction of Deng Xiaoping's reforms 20 years ago, China has opened to the world, seeking even greater integration into global trade and security regimes. And during that process, as an observer, it seems to me, like all change, like all transitions, they have begun to learn. They have begun to learn where their interests lie. My hope is their learning curve continues. Some China watchers discount this trend as mere tactics. I believe that these China watchers are mistaken. Only in a Chinese historical context of dynasties and centuries could the consistent policy of two decades be dismissed as tactics. China's opening is the single greatest force for economic modernization and political reform that the Middle Kingdom has ever known. We should reinforce this strategic opening. How ironic and tragic it would be if we attempted to contain China just at the moment in history when China becomes convinced that it no longer needed a great wall to protect it from the barbarian hordes and foreign influences. Rather than throwing up the ramparts, we should be seeking to expand the areas of cooperation. China must do its part by adhering to international norms of behavior and following through on its commitments, and we must do our part standing ready to welcome China as it strives to become a truly great power. Our interests with China are too vital--the consequences of failing to build a constructive relationship with China too profound--to do otherwise. Mr. President, how much time do I have left in my request?

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise this evening to comment on the tragic news from Bosnia. Earlier today, a U.N. helicopter carrying several international officials crashed 40 miles northwest of Sarajevo. Twelve people are reported dead and four injured. The latest reports indicate that on board were four or five Americans, still unidentified, who were working for the International Police Task Force and the Office of the High Representative for Bosnia. Among the dead was Gerd Wagner, the Senior Deputy High Representative for Bosnia. Ambassador Wagner was well known to many of us in the Congress, since before he took up his post this past summer he was the political counselor at the German Embassy in Washington. A Balkan expert who learned Serbo-Croatian while serving in Belgrade earlier in his career, Ambassador Wagner answered the call to take up the challenging and dangerous post as Senior Deputy to High Representative Carlos Westendorp. I had dinner with the Ambassador 3 weeks ago in Sarajevo. In the presence of a diverse group of Bosnian Muslims, Croats, and other international officials, he spoke out forcefully in favor of the difficult task of making the Federation work. Much of the credit for refugee resettlement and for fleshing out the political institutions mandated by the Dayton accords belongs to Gerd Wagner. Mr. President, this terrible helicopter crash follows just 2 years after the accident on Mount Igman that took the lives of three dedicated American diplomats--Joe Kruzel, Bob Frasure, and Nelson Drew. In neither the Mount Igman accident in 1995 nor today's helicopter crash was any foul play suspected. As a matter of fact, the early reports are reminiscent--Dr. Haltzel, of the Foreign Relations Committee staff, and I were talking about it today--of our own helicopter travel in Bosnia 3 weeks ago. We were in a similar situation. Reportedly the reason Ambassador Wagner's delegation crashed was heavy fog. We also took off from Sarajevo in a peasoup fog, and the pilot of our American Blackhawk helicopter expressed concern about the fog and the mountains. Obviously, in our case it turned out not to be a problem. Tragically in this case for Ambassador Wagner's Czech-made helicopter, it ended up being a fatal problem. As I mentioned, apparently the crash was not the consequence of any foul play. The accident occurred while Ambassador Wagner's party was on a regular peacekeeping mission. The sacrifices of these brave individuals point out the dangers that international peacekeepers, mediators, diplomats, USAID workers, and others face in Bosnia every day, even if they may not be the direct victims of the ethnic fighting. If the cause of stabilizing the fragile peace in Bosnia and putting that country back on the road to political and economic recovery is important to the United States and its allies, as I firmly believe it is, then we must take the risks to achieve our goals. Our diplomats in Bosnia understand that simple truth, our volunteer professional soldiers in SFOR understand that simple truth, our USAID workers in Bosnia understand it, and our volunteers working for the International Police Task Force in Bosnia understand it. And Gerd Wagner understood it. Mr. President, our hearts go out to the families of all the victims, the relatives of the as yet unnamed Americans on board, and Ambassador Wagner's wife, Mrs. Sandra Wagner, their two sons, and their daughter, who has been studying at the University of California at Berkeley. Gerd Wagner was a fine German diplomat, a dedicated international civil servant, and a good friend of the United States of America. He will be sorely missed. Mr. President, I thank my colleague from Iowa for allowing me to speak ahead of him, and I yield the floor. Mr. HARKIN addressed the Chair.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to be able to proceed in morning business for up to 5 minutes.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I would like now to speak very briefly, 8 minutes, to the issue of Bosnia. Last weekend, the people of Bosnia- Herzegovina went to the polls to elect their various municipal governments. I know the President has recently been to Bosnia, as I have. These local elections had been postponed from last year because of tampering with registration, chiefly by the Bosnian Serbs. But I am happy to report, and we have all observed, that this year's municipal elections were a success. Despite dire threats of violence against refugees and displaced persons who wanted to cross over to their former homes to vote, over 2 days, not one single incident of violence occurred in the entire country. Why? For a simple reason, I believe, Mr. President. Because of the presence of SFOR, the NATO-sponsored troops on the ground led by recently reinforced American troops. SFOR made clear to all parties that violence would not be tolerated and force would be met with force. Every single time over the past several years when the West has been forceful in its behavior, the ultranationalists in Bosnia, primarily the Serbs but all ultranationalists, have backed down--every single time. The elections were carried out by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the so-called OSCE, in which the United States is an active member, but only one of many. The OSCE observers deserve a great deal of credit for their successful labors. The results of the election will not be known for another couple of days. Already, however, some encouraging signs are emerging. In Tuzla, a place I have visited on more than one occasion, the Muslim Party for Democratic Action, the SDA, conceded defeat by Mayor Selim Beslagic, who represented not just the Muslim party but the multiethnic joint group that was running. I met the mayor last month. I met with him last month in Bosnia in Sarajevo. When I met with him, he indicated that he represents not just Muslims, but he represents this multiethnic slate and he represents just the kind, in my view, of democratic, tolerant, pragmatic politician that is going to be needed to rebuild Bosnia. But the point is, the controlling party in the area lost. The election was free. Until now, three ethnically based parties that profess to represent the interests of the Muslims, Serbs, and Croats have been dominating the airwaves and the patronage system. Tuzla, and perhaps other cities in both the federation and the Republika Srpska, show that if SFOR and the international community guarantee equal access, the monopoly of these parties on power can be broken. Moreover, Mr. President, I would argue it represents what I believe to be the majority view of Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims, who, I might add, lived together in peace for decades and decades prior to this and the majority of whom wish to do that again. But it shows that the monopoly of the parties that are representing purely the xenophobic notions of their particular interests are not necessarily the views of the people of Bosnia. Moreover, it is likely that, thanks to the absentee voting and the protection offered by SFOR for returning refugees, the election may reverse the vile ethnic cleansing of the war. For example, in the town of Drvar in western Herzegovina, it was 97 percent Serb until the town's inhabitants were driven out in the fall of 1995 by Croats. Last weekend, the Croats who displaced the Serbs did their best to harass returning Serb voters. International election officials from the OSCE, however, insisted the Serbs be allowed to vote, and it looks like there may be a turnaround in that community as well. Several other towns, like Jajce and Srebrenica, site of the largest civilian massacre in Europe since World War II, may see their former inhabitants, in these two cases Muslims, forming the governments in those two cities. The international community is now faced with the next--and this is an incremental thing, Mr. President--they are faced with the next stark question of whether now we will enforce the election results, whether we will now be part of that. I realize that is a dicey deal, but I continue to argue that when we demonstrated force, and given the power of the people in those communities, we, the Western community, have prevailed. So now the question is, will we enforce the results of the election by guaranteeing that the newly elected councils not remain governments in exile? Enforcing the election results, of course, means that the right of refugees and displaced persons to return must be honored, which Dayton calls for. In most cases, that would be able to be accomplished only by the international community being present and the presence of SFOR. Mr. President, I believe we have no choice in this matter. Both for moral and practical reasons, it seems to me we must move rapidly to enforce the resettlement of refugees as the results of the election will dictate. This will be a difficult task, and the time is short before the onset of the Balkan winter. Most likely we will have to begin with highly visible demonstration returns in one or two selected towns. But, Mr. President, we must keep the democratic momentum going. Rebuilding shattered Bosnia is an immense undertaking, and now, for the first time in years, there has been a string of successes. The United States has been the prime mover in these, although not the prime player in terms of numbers. We must continue to exert our leadership on the European Community, and we must continue the valuable and honorable work we have undertaken, for, Mr. President, to do otherwise, I will predict, the result will be disastrous for Europe, disastrous for our interests. I will end with a rhetorical question. How can we expect stability in Europe if the ethnic cleansing is able to be justified, and partitioning takes place? How do we then explain that to the other parts of the former Soviet Union who have equally deep divisions that exist? Mr. President, there are 5 million ethnic Russians in the Ukraine. There are 5 million of them. There are millions of people who have ethnic differences living throughout that area. How do we deal with Rumania and Hungary? If we say that this vile ethnic cleansing will be rewarded by us backing out and letting it return to the status quo, you know European leadership will not step up to the ball. Again, I want to make it clear, we play the smallest part relative to the rest of the world in this, in the sense that we are only a small portion of the overall effort, but the overall effort is occurring because of our leadership. So, Mr. President, I acknowledge that this is a dicey deal. I acknowledge that it is going to be difficult, but I would suggest that those who have a different view from me acknowledge that there have been recent successes that at least lend hope to the possibility that we can continue down this path. I thank the Chair, and I thank my colleague. I yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, first of all, I have two statements I wish to make, but if any of my colleagues come in and wish to begin on the amendments, I will cease at that point and not ask for all 30 minutes. Second, Mr. President, I apologize to you and others for my gravelly voice; I have a cold, and I understand sitting in the chair can be a task. It is hard enough sometimes to listen to me, and it is even harder sometimes when I am in this condition.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be able to proceed as if in morning business for up to 30 minutes.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Last weekend the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina went to the polls to elect municipal governments. These local elections had been postponed from last year because of tampering with registrations, chiefly by the Bosnian Serbs. I am happy to report, Mr. President, that this year's municipal elections were a success. Despite dire threats of violence against refugees and displaced persons who wanted to cross over to their former homes to vote, over 2 days not one single incident of serious violence occurred in the entire country. Why? Because SFOR, led by recently reinforced American troops, made clear to all parties that violence would not be tolerated. Every single time over the past several years when the West has been forceful in its behavior, the ultra-nationalists in Bosnia have backed down. The elections were carried out by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE], in which the United States is an active member. The OSCE deserves a great deal of credit for its successful labors. The results of the elections will not be known for several days. Already, however, some encouraging signs are emerging. In Tuzla, the Muslim Party for Democratic Action [SDA] conceded defeat by Mayor Selim Beslagic's multi-ethnic joint list. I met Mayor Beslagic last month. He represents just the kind of democratic, tolerant, pragmatic politician that can rebuild Bosnia. Until now the three ethnically based parties that profess to represent the interests of the Muslims, Serbs, and Croats have dominated the airwaves and the patronage system. Tuzla--and perhaps other cities in both the federation and the Republika Srprska--show that if SFOR and the international community guarantee equal access, their monopoly on power can be broken. Moreover, it is likely that thanks to absentee voting and to the protection offered by SFOR to returning refugees, the election may reverse the vile ethnic cleansing of the war. For example, the town of Drvar in western Herzegovina was 97 percent Serb until the town's inhabitants were driven out in the fall of 1995. Last weekend the Croats who displaced the Serbs did their best to harass returning Serb voters. International election officials from the OSCE, however, insisted that the Serbs be allowed to vote. Several other towns like Jajce and Srebrenica, site of the largest civilian massacre in Europe since World War II, may see their former inhabitants, in these two cases Muslims, forming the governments. The international community is now faced with the stark question of whether it will enforce the results of the elections by guaranteeing that the newly elected councils not remain governments in exile. Enforcing the election results, of course, means that the right of refugees and displaced persons to return must be honored. In most cases that would be able to be accomplished only by the international community under the protection of SFOR. Mr. President, I believe we have no choice in this matter. Both for moral and practical reasons we must move rapidly to enforce resettlement of refugees. This will be a difficult task, and time is short before the onset of the Balkan winter. Most likely we will have to begin with highly visible demonstration returns in one to two selected towns. But we must keep the democratic momentum going. Rebuilding shattered Bosnia is an immense undertaking. Now for the first time in years, there has been a string of successes. The United States has been the prime mover in these, and we must continue our valuable and honorable work. I thank the Chair and yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise today to bring to light recent events in Sierra Leone. This has been a challenging year for democracy on the African Continent, and no where has it been more seriously challenged than in this West African nation. On May 25, 1997, mutinous soldiers overthrew the democratically-elected government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. Lawlessness reigns throughout the country, as jail doors throughout Sierra Leone have been thrown wide, and judges and lawyers who once worked to ensure the rule of law have been forced to flee the country for their lives. Ironically, it was only a year and a half ago that Sierra Leone held its first multiparty elections in 30 years, resulting in the transfer of power from the military to the civilian government of President Kabbah. With the conclusion of Sierra Leone's 5-year civil war last November, Sierra Leone was hailed by many in Africa and the West as a model for other African nations. The bloody military coup d'etat that ousted President Kabbah almost 4 months ago is not only an affront to the expressed will of the people of Sierra Leone, but is a direct challenge to the cause of democracy in Africa. I strongly condemn this deplorable action, and call upon the military to return power to the democratically-elected government. Now, as a result of the spring coup, the Sierra Leone is largely isolated from the world. Foreign embassies have closed their doors. Foreign aid has been suspended. There is virtually no humanitarian assistance to speak of left in Sierra Leone. Every day that the military junta remains in power more men, women and children needlessly fall victim to senseless violence. Meanwhile, the military junta continues its rapacious looting of the country, oblivious to the dire consequences of its actions. Freetown, the capital city, without electricity, sits in darkness. Schools are closed. Most doctors have fled the country and hospitals have been looted. Those who have not already fled the country face both a dwindling food supply and the military leaders' seemingly abject disregard for human life. Mr. President, Sierra Leone's West African neighbors have courageously taken the lead in responding to this humanitarian crisis. Upon the outbreak of the coup, regional leaders quickly condemned the coup and imposed regional sanctions. At a recent meeting of West African heads of state those who called for the use of force to end the standoff were resisted, and it was resolved to strengthen the sanctions regime already in place. I strongly commend this decision. Although attempts at negotiation with the junta in July were unsuccessful, I strongly believe that the successful road to peace and stability in Sierra Leone leads to the negotiating table instead of the battlefield. Sanctions must be given more time to pressure the military junta to give up its quixotic lust for power. While the United States was among the first to condemn the coup, I urge our Government to continue to seek every opportunity to publicly support democracy in Sierra Leone. Those who would subvert the will of the people in Sierra Leone should have no illusion about the United States position. The United Nations has already added its voice to international condemnation of the military junta in Freetown. Moreover, the Secretary-General has just appointed a special envoy to Sierra Leone in an attempt to resolve the crisis. I applaud these efforts. I urge the administration to use its influence at the United Nations to initiate a multilateral effort to severely restrict the military junta's ability to purchase arms and fuel. At the same time, I believe it is necessary to try to find a way to address the humanitarian needs of the innocent. Mr. President, these are very troubled days for democracy in Africa. Although democracy is beginning to blossom in other parts of the world since the end of the cold war, it has yet to firmly take root in the fertile soil of many African nations. Mr. President, as the rest of the world moves toward integration into the global economy, embracing democracy and liberal economic principles, we must not leave Africa behind. It is imperative that we who have fought for our own freedom, and who enjoy the fruits that democracy offer, continue to support others in their fight for the same. I thank the chair and yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be able to proceed for 15 minutes as if in morning business.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, a generation ago, President John F. Kennedy called for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. President Kennedy's visionary appeal met with modest but important success: the treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater. One year ago today, the world community took a major step toward fulfilling President Kennedy's vision. With the United States once again in the lead, the U.N. General Assembly voted 158 to 3, with 5 abstentions, to endorse the so-called CTBT, drafted by the U.N. Conference On Disarmament. Two weeks later, all the declared nuclear powers signed that treaty. Soon this treaty will be submitted to the U.S. Senate for our advice and our consent to ratification. Much work is needed to educate this body and to assure us that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty will be effectively verifiable and will not undermine nuclear deterrence. But it is time to begin that effort, and I welcome the administration's commitment to do so. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty will not enter into force for some time. This is because all nuclear-capable States must ratify this treaty before it can enter into force, at least during the next 3 years, and India has refused to do that--although I am given to understand that the President will be traveling there, to try to change that view on the part of the Indian Government. Timely U.S. ratification is still needed, however, to prevent the CTBT from becoming a dead letter and to maintain the pressure on all states not to test a nuclear device. The 144 states that signed the CTBT are largely bound not to undermine it, even before it enters into force. But nonnuclear states will feel little obligation to ratify or obey a test ban if the powers with admitted nuclear weapons programs fail to ratify it themselves. A comprehensive ban on nuclear testing is no minor matter. This is not your father's arms control agreement, Mr. President. You remember that old commercial--I know, the old automobile man that my father was--``this isn't your father's Oldsmobile.'' This is not your standard arms control agreement, merely codifying actions already planned by the two superpowers, which most of our arms control agreements were. This treaty will pinch, it will hurt; but the CTBT will pinch other countries far more than it pinches us, and the world will be a safer place for that. There is always a risk, of course, that a State Party--a fancy foreign policy phrase for another country--will violate this test ban treaty rather than do without nuclear testing. Last month's so-called-- it's amazing the phrases we use--``seismic event'' at or near the Russian nuclear test site of Novaya Zemlya is a timely reminder that arms control compliance can be assured only through effective verification. Article 4 of the test ban treaty and the treaty's accompanying protocol do include, in fact, some very welcome verification provisions. An international monitoring system will combine seismic, radionuclide, hydroacoustic and infrasound monitoring. This monitoring system will provide States Parties with both raw and processed data, as well as with analyses of those data. Article 4 requires prompt clarification by States Parties in ``any matter which may cause concern about possible noncompliance with the basic obligations of the treaty.'' In addition, the United States, if supported by 29 of the 50 other members of the Organization's Executive Council, will be able to force a truly extensive onsite inspection by the CTBT Organization's Technical Secretariat. We would be in a much stronger position to investigate last month's possible Russian explosion if the CTBT were in effect and Russia were required, as a consequence of that, to accept onsite inspections. Verification of this treaty will not be cheap, and the United States will be expected to help other countries participate in seismic monitoring, in particular. We have provided such assistance for many years, for a simple reason: not out of our generosity and our charitable instinct, but because it is in our naked self-interest, it is in our national interest, both to monitor nuclear tests by other countries and to obtain timely and accurate data on earthquakes. It is important to keep up this effort, whether we eventually ratify the CTBT or not, and I urge my colleagues, as an afterthought here, to support full funding of the international monitoring systems that I am talking about. How will this treaty really pinch--I mentioned that at the outset-- assuming that the verification provisions deter any violations? For the five countries with a history of nuclear testing, among which we are one, the CTBT will mean an end to that testing. We, and other declared nuclear powers, will need to use other means in order to ensure that our nuclear weapons are safe and are in working order, or to modify those weapons in any way. Let me explain the meaning of that. Most people say, ``Why don't you have to worry about testing anymore? A nation like ours wouldn't want to test in any circumstance.'' To raise a legitimate point raised by others who don't support this treaty, however, in order to ensure that our nuclear arsenal is accurate and working and functioning, you occasionally have to test it, you occasionally have to know what you have. You can't just let it sit there and let the components of it sit there for 20, 30, 40, 50 years and not test it, and still have confidence in its deterrent capacity. That is the reason why even nations like ours that do not have any desire to increase their nuclear capacity, that want to reduce nuclear weapons, might still want to be able to test. In our country, the Department of Energy plans to use tests that do not actually cause a nuclear explosion, known as subcritical experiments, as well as computer analyses and simulations to assure the safety, reliability, and effectiveness of U.S. nuclear weapons. Ground was broken just last month for a billion-dollar National Ignition Facility at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California to do some of that very work. One hoped-for side benefit is further progress toward controlled fusion, an important potential power source for the next century. Many of my colleagues question whether this Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program, as it is referred to, will suffice in the absence of nuclear testing. The Energy Department, where the scientists and experts are, says ``yes,'' while opponents of arms control say ``no.'' I say nobody knows for sure. We can't guarantee that stockpile stewardship will work because this is a new scientific frontier. But the executive branch must take stockpile stewardship--that is, those tests other than actually exploding nuclear devices--seriously, and we must--we must--fund it appropriately, in my view. Senator Domenici has warned that the current funding plan is insufficient for that job. I hope and expect that the administration will take that concern to heart and not just blow smoke at it. Mr. President, even if we were not going to sign a test ban treaty, it should be very much in America's interest for us not to test nuclear weapons if we have an alternative that can guarantee the safety, stability, security, and usability of our nuclear stockpile. So, for whatever the reasons, even unrelated to this treaty, it makes sense to follow the admonition of Senator Domenici and give the Energy Department the resources it needs to maximize the chances that the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program will suffice in the absence of nuclear testing. Stockpile stewardship, Mr. President, is an opportunity, however, not just a challenge. It is precisely this sort of high-technology activity at which the United States excels. Recent press stories on our improved earth-penetrating nuclear bomb make clear that the United States is capable of maintaining nuclear capabilities, even without nuclear testing, that other countries can only dream of. The truth is that we may well extend our nuclear advantage in a test-free world. So let me be clear about this. I do not think we are seeking any greater advantage in nuclear weapons, over other countries in the world, but if we, in fact, move all the acknowledged nations and those we think have nuclear capacity and nuclear weapons to enter into this treaty, then there will be no more testing. You hear opponents say, ``Well, that will put us at a competitive disadvantage in terms of our nuclear capacity.'' My argument would be if the verification is real, which it is in this treaty, we are potentially at a competitive advantage because we would be able to continue to develop and assure the capacity of our nuclear stockpiles and capabilities--thanks to our testing capacity, our ability to measure their utility absent an actual nuclear explosion. So this is an argument that I know we will engage in, but I would just like to lay a marker down now. I think our security is enhanced and our capability can be enhanced with this treaty in place. But we will not be so likely to develop a whole new generation of nuclear weapons, and that is important. Why? Because there is a deal here between the nuclear weapons ``haves'' and the nuclear weapons ``have-not'' states. For the vast majority of countries, those that have never tested nuclear weapons, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty will greatly impede any efforts on their part to develop nuclear weapons, but it will also reassure those countries that the nuclear powers will be much more limited in their development of still newer weapon designs. Mr. President, think about it. If you are a developing country and you are late into the game of nuclear weapons, you are asked to say, ``OK, these other guys got theirs, we don't have ours yet, but let's make sure no one can test any more so that we, in fact, can never develop nuclear weapons.'' Well, you sit there and say, ``Wait a minute, the other guys have these things, they have these weapons and the only way they developed them is they tested them. Now you are telling us we can never test them, which is synonymous to saying we can never have them.'' OK, in order for them to give up that, because they then are locked into this inferior status in terms of nuclear capability, we have to give something to them. What they get in return for this is that, although we will maintain that capacity and be able to maintain it without testing, none of the nations of the world will be able to move to whole new generations of those nuclear weapons, which is some reassurance to a nation that knows the argument that I made to such countries and their leaders, which is, ``Look, you can never catch up, you can never get ahead of the curve; you may get nuclear weapons, but you're never going to get to the point in your lifetime or the lifetime of your children where you are going to be able to match the capacity of the nuclear powers. So isn't it better for us to freeze or to builddown, in effect, to use an expression that Bill Cohen used to push years ago during the arms control debates of the late seventies and early eighties?'' How will this test ban impede other countries' nuclear weapons programs? We hope to maintain our nuclear weapons without further testing and non-nuclear powers might hope similarly to develop or obtain nuclear weapons without ever testing them. But developing a new weapon without testing is risky, especially for a country with no experience in nuclear weapons; after all, even the advanced nuclear powers have test failures. Military leaders are hardly eager to go into battle with untested weapons, Mr. President. In fact, they get downright cranky about that, and once they start questioning the reliability of their weapons, they begin to think more about the dangers that come with war than about the glory of it all. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty thus may limit the progress that we and other nuclear powers can make in further developments of nuclear weapons, but its greatest benefit will be in nonproliferation by foreclosing nuclear weapons from many countries and making it difficult for new entrants even to approach the sophistication of our existing nuclear weapons. The power of the CTBT as a nonproliferation tool explains why Pakistan was unwilling to sign the CTBT if it could enter into force without India's ratification. If their nuclear weapons program is going to be hobbled, they want India to be hobbled as well. And the CTBT's likely effectiveness is probably also a real reason why India has been unwilling to sign the treaty at all. Both of those countries have rudimentary nuclear weapons capabilities, but they know that a ban on testing, which may eventually come into force despite India's objections, will severely hamper their ability to develop those devices into a stable of weapons that they can count on in a real war. Just as India and Pakistan appreciate CTBT's power to hamper the development of nuclear weapons, so should we. We rightly value the stability that mutual deterrence has brought us over the last 50 years. That is why we want reassurance that ``stockpile stewardship'' will be adequately funded and that the experts expect it to succeed. But the gravest threat to security of our Nation, Mr. President, may not be from Russian or Chinese missiles, but rather from nuclear weapons in the hands of others--Iraq, Iran, Libya, or North Korea, just to name a few, or even terrorist groups that a rogue state might befriend. The biggest risk of nuclear weapons actually being used may not be against us, against Russia or even against Taiwan, but rather by India and Pakistan against innocent civilians in the teeming cities which are within range of each country's bombers or shorter range missiles. With U.S. leadership in ratifying this treaty, the CTBT will gain near unanimous international support and keep pressure on India and any like-minded countries to ratify it--or at least to refrain from testing. A comprehensive test ban, once in force, will reduce substantially the threats of regional nuclear wars or terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons. And that is reason enough, Mr. President, in my view, to support ratification. But, Mr. President, as I have said, serious observers are sincerely divided over whether the United States will be able to maintain nuclear deterrence without nuclear testing. Achieving the Senate's advice and consent to ratification depends, therefore, in my opinion, upon careful and intensive education both of the public and of this body, myself included. It is time for the administration to begin the sustained effort that will be required to assure that 67 U.S. Senators will feel that this CTBT is in our national interest. The world in which we live today, Mr. President, is, as I said before, not your father's cold war. But there has been no end of history as has been prophesied. Neither will there be any end of arms control. Already this year the Senate has acted on the Chemical Weapons Convention and the ``Flank Document'' to the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, referred to as CFE. Measures awaiting Senate action include: the Convention on Nuclear Safety; protocols to the Convention on Conventional Weapons on undetectable landmines, blinding lasers, and incendiaries; and two treaties to establish nuclear-free zones. Over the next 2 years, the executive branch will likely submit to the Senate a START III treaty, an extension of the START II weapons destruction deadlines, an amendment or protocol making START I a permanent treaty, a CFE adaptation agreement, a succession memorandum and demarcation agreement regarding the ABM treaty, a new safeguards protocol between the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency, a nuclear liability convention, a nuclear waste convention, and a verification protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention. Given that lengthy agenda, Mr. President, I am not in a position to say that the CTBT must be taken up as the next item for the Senate's attention. Indeed, I hope we will approve some of these less controversial measures--such as the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the protocols to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, and a new safeguards protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency--before we bring this issue to the floor. But that need not stop the administration from submitting this treaty and beginning the work of educating us as to its merits. Chairman Helms and I have shown that the Foreign Relations Committee can get things done, and I am confident that we will secure agreement on many more issues, hard ones as well as the easier ones. The time has come, Mr. President, to move ahead on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, as well as other arms control initiatives and NATO enlargement. The end of the cold war has made all these both possible and--I would emphasize--also necessary. This is an ambitious agenda for the Senate in the field of foreign relations, and the issues will be difficult. But we represent the citizens of the world's greatest country. Or, the best phrase I have heard in my 25 years here to describe us is President Clinton's phrase. He said, we are the ``essential nation.'' We are the ``essential nation.'' We represent the citizens of the essential nation. We are charged with the historic task of making the world a safer place for coming generations--not through war, but through fashioning of durable agreements and institutions. We must not--and I am sure we will not-- flinch at that challenge. This is a rare opportunity that you and I have, to serve at a time when we are setting down a whole new institutional framework for the conduct of world affairs. It has not happened in 50 years; it is happening now. I pray we are as wise as our fathers and grandfathers and grandmothers and mothers were when they did the job at the end of World War II. I thank the Chair for its indulgence and for listening to me. I appreciate it very much. I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will attempt to keep this under 15 minutes, if that will help. Mr. SPECTER addressed the Chair.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I thank the chairman of the committee, Senator Specter, for accommodating me and my friend from Arizona.

Mr. BIDEN. That is fine.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be able to proceed for up to 20 minutes as in morning business.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, having just returned from a trip to Bosnia, I would like to describe my impressions and offer my views on American policy there, if I may. As many of my colleagues will remember, and some would rather not remember, over the last 6\1/2\ years I have been bipartisan in my criticism and my critical statements about our policy toward the states of the former Yugoslavia. I began criticizing the Bush administration early in 1991 and continued to criticize the Clinton administration until September of 1995 when it finally carried out the airstrikes that I had called for 3 years earlier and subsequently lifted the immoral and illegal arms embargo on Bosnia as part of the Dayton accords. Now, Mr. President, for the first time I find myself in general agreement with the direction of American policy. My change of opinion does not, however, reflect either complete satisfaction or complacency. We have reached a very critical point in our policy toward Bosnia, Mr. President, as all of my colleagues know. Resolute American action, combined with allied support and local compliance, can turn the corner. But I respectfully suggest, absent any one of those factors--resolute American action, combined with allied support and local compliance--we will not only not turn the corner; I believe we will return to the genocide and chaos that prevailed 6 years ago. To that end, we can, Mr. President, and we must, in my opinion, act decisively to bring indicted war criminals to trial before the International Tribunal in the Hague. We can, and must, Mr. President, induce the authorities in the Federation and the Republika Srpska to greatly expand the number of refugees returning to their prewar homes. We can and must, Mr. President, ensure that the countrywide municipal elections in mid-September and the parliamentary elections in the Republika Srpska in October, are held and that they are free and fair. We can and must, Mr. President, guarantee free access to electronic media for all points of view in both the Federation and the Republika Srpska. I hope that the agreement on the television transmitter reached yesterday with the Karadzic forces is a move in that direction. If they go back on the bargain, SFOR troops should reoccupy that transmitter and take it back. We can and must continue to support the Republika Srpska's President Biljana Plavsic in her struggle against indicted war criminal Radovan Karadzic. We can and must, Mr. President, ensure that the decision of the arbitrator on Brcko in March 1998 is accepted peacefully. In short, Mr. President, a lot remains to be accomplished in the coming months. But it is critically important for the American people and for my colleagues in the Congress to be clear on one fundamental point: Contrary to what is frequently stated, there has been progress on the civilian provisions of the Dayton accords, as well as on the well-publicized military side of the equation. To guarantee that this progress continues and expands, the international community must not withdraw its entire military stabilization force after June 1998. The negative consequences of backsliding into renewed warfare in Bosnia would far outweigh the cost of a continued, if scaled-down commitment with no or much fewer American troops. Let me then, Mr. President, discuss the current situation in Bosnia. First, the war criminals issue. The type of operation carried out in Prijedor in July in which British and Czech SFOR troops, supported by American forces, captured one indicted criminal and killed another indicted war criminal after being fired upon, must be repeated against Dr. Karadzic and General Mladic. After conversations with leading American military officers in Bosnia, I am confident that such an operation is feasible. No American wishes casualties to occur, but if all other means fail, force must be employed and risk taken in order to arrest these war criminals. I am confident that the opportunity will present itself, and if it is seized upon, the operation will succeed. Moreover, I suspect that after an initial angry response, most people in the Republika Srpska would be content to go about improving their impoverished lives, relieved of the plague of the authoritarian extortionists in Pale. Apprehension of the war criminals will not be a panacea for Bosnia's ills, but in my view it is a necessary precondition for the Dayton accords to have a chance of continuing to work. I met with opposition leaders in the Republika Srpska. I met for well over an hour with President Plavsic. I met with a Russian military commander. I met with the American military. I met with the French military. In fact, I met with most of the major players in Bosnia during the time I was there. There is not anyone who will privately tell you that Karadzic and Mladic on the loose and continuing to run the Republika Srpska does anything, anything at all positive. As a matter of fact, all will tell you privately, and most will tell you publicly, that these two must be withdrawn from the scene. They will say it in different ways. They will say, ``withdrawn, captured, tried and convicted,'' or they will say ``driven out of the country.'' But the bottom line is that nobody believes there is any possibility of the Dayton accords being fully implemented if, in fact, the most notorious of the war criminals continue to run the Republika Srpska like a thug operation, undermining free elections in the Republika Srpska within Bosnia and undermining Mrs. Plavsic. Now Mrs. Plavsic is no shrinking violet, is clearly a nationalist, and is not someone we would choose if we could invent a President for the Republika Srpska. But she is, at a minimum, honest and not running the rackets. She has greatly undermined Mr. Karadzic's power by pointing out the corruption he has engaged in and how he is literally robbing the people of the Republika Srpska. There is still 90 percent unemployment there. At least in the Federation it has dropped from 90 percent to 50 percent. As I will discuss in a moment, there is progress being made in the Federation, slow as it may be, but there is a gigantic impediment in the Republika Srpska, and his name is Karadzic, an indicted war criminal. I have met him in the past. I told him more than 4 years ago that he was--I will not precisely repeat what I said--but I said bluntly to his face that he was a war criminal and should be tried as one. He looked at me and resumed talking as if he were saying, ``Lots of luck in your senior year. No problem; thanks for talking to me.'' This guy is a madman, and he is undermining the prospects of any peace for the people of Bosnia-- Serb, Croat, or Muslim alike. Over the last year, the government of the Federation, comprised mainly of Muslims and Croats, has slowly begun to take meaningful shape. New national, entity, and cantonal governments were chosen in the September 1996 elections and are starting to function. The Bosnian Presidency and the council of ministers meet in regular sessions. In Sarajevo, I had a lengthy discussion with Kresimir Zubak, the Co- President of the National Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with many leading figures in the Federation administration and the Cabinet, and with nonnationalist Muslim and Croat opposition leaders. No one attempted to gloss over the friction that persists, Mr. President. As a matter of fact, I invited a group--and I will submit the list of people we invited--of leading Muslims, Croats, and Serbs to a dinner the first night I arrived. The first comment made by, I think, Federation Vice President Ejup Ganic, a Muslim, was ``Senator, we have not sat down at a table like this for 6 years. You have accomplished something all by itself just by getting 15 of us to show up.'' I do not want to paint a picture here that things in the Federation are rosy and wonderful. They are not. But everybody agreed on two things: First, enormous progress was being made in the Federation; and second, it is absolutely essential for the international military force to remain in Bosnia after June 1998 to guarantee that progress will continue. I made clear that a partnership is a two-way street. Politicians from all three principal religious groups in Bosnia must make redoubled efforts to carry out the terms of the Dayton accords, especially the return of refugees. As Americans see evidence of increased success in civilian implementation, our willingness to stay the course in Bosnia will increase accordingly. And, Mr. President, there is much evidence to support the view that positive change is already occurring. Approximately 150,000 refugees have returned to Bosnia from abroad and another 160,000 internally displaced persons have returned to their homes, including a few to areas where they will be a distinct minority. Meanwhile, the Train and Equip Program, led by private American military instructors, retired military, is molding a Muslim-Croat defense force for the Government of Bosnia guaranteeing the Federation's security in the future. Agreements on the Federation force structure and command have been reached, and over 300 million dollars' worth of military equipment has been procured. Remember, Mr. President, the big problem was initially that we could not get the Muslim and the Croats in the Federation to agree to a joint military command. They would not train together. Now we have a joint military command. Muslims and Croats are sitting in the same classrooms. The officer corps and the enlisted men are all training together. There has been solid progress. In Hadzici, west of Sarajevo, I visited the headquarters of the Train and Equip Program and spoke with the Federation's Minister of Defense and his deputy, with the commanders of the Muslim and Croat forces, and with soldiers of both armies. The cooperation is excellent, and their American trainers had high praise for their eagerness to learn and their aptitude. In the Federation, joint police forces are being formed, including in the city of Mostar, site of the worst warfare between Muslim and Croats. Within the framework of this modicum of stability, the economy is beginning to revive. Real gross domestic product has nearly doubled since 1995. As I mentioned, unemployment has dropped from 90 percent to 50 percent. Corruption, though, remains a major problem. Nonetheless, if there is continued security, political progress, and international technical and financial assistance, the Federation, I believe, can be a going concern within a few years. One of the nonnational opposition leaders with whom I met, Stjepan Kljujic, an ethnic Croat, offered the opinion that the Federation had to be better than the Republika Srpska politically, economically, and morally. Making an intriguing historical parallel, he continued that the Federation should become Bosnia's West Germany against the Republika Srpska's East Germany, even attracting guest workers from the latter as the economic disparity between the two entities widens. In this way, he felt, the two halves of the country could eventually grow together. Whatever the validity of this vision, conditions in the Republika Srpska are already quite different from those in the Federation because of Mr. Karadzic's heavy hand. The Bosnian Serb member of the tripartite Presidency, Momcilo Krajisnik, an ally of Karadzic, has refused all but minimal fulfillment of the Dayton provisions. As a result, the international community has withheld most of its development aid from the Republika Srpska. The economy there remains in shambles with less than 10 percent of the work force gainfully employed. In the midst of this misery, Dr. Karadzic--it is hard to even call him a doctor, but he is a doctor--and his cronies ostentatiously flaunt the wealth they have amassed through smuggling and protection rackets. It is no wonder, then, that Mrs. Plavsic's anticorruption message has struck a chord with wide segments of the population in the Republika Srpska. I met with her for an hour and a half in Banja Luka. We must not have any illusions that President Plavsic, who loudly supported Serbian ultranationalists and ethnic cleansing during the war, has suddenly become a Jeffersonian Democrat. She is, however, a realist who understands that the Bosnian Serb entity is in danger of total disintegration unless it rids itself of the lawlessness, corruption, and warped religious hatred of the Karadzic gang and begins to cooperates with the West. In all likelihood, by seizing the Banja Luka police headquarters, SFOR prevented a coup d'etat against Mrs. Plavsic last month. Our support of her police forces and television journalists may be turning the tide against the thugs in Pale, at least in the western part of the Republika Srpska. Since two-thirds of the population of the Republika Srpska lives in the western part of the entity, there is a good possibility that President Plavsic's supporters can win control of the Parliament in next month's election. If that occurs, we should be able to leverage the promise of reconstruction assistance to induce President Plavsic to begin to cooperate on refugee returns. Moreover, a lively antinationalist Serbian opposition exists in the Republika Srpska. In Banja Luka, I met with three of its leaders-- Miodrag Zivanovic, Mladen Ivanic, and Milorad Dodik. They feel that democracy is unstoppable and that Mrs. Plavsic, of whom they have been sworn enemies, is only a transitional figure whom they will support during this election as a step toward genuine democracy. Actually, the beginnings of refugee returns are already occurring, including some into areas controlled by other religious groups. I visited two such sites, one in the zone of separation near the critical northern town of Brcko, the other in Vogosca, a suburb of Sarajevo which was returned to the Federation as part of the Dayton settlement. In the Brcko area, rebuilding is proceeding under the skillful direction of the U.S. supervisor, Ambassador Bill Farrand, and the protection of the local American SFOR contingent, based nearby in Camp McGovern. I might add that I was amazed at how high the morale was in Camp McGovern and how greatly impressed I was by Brig. Gen. Mark Curran and Lt. Col. Bill Greer, the two senior officers, who were doing a phenomenal job there. Hostility in Brcko lies just below the surface, as shown by the riots organized by Karadzic loyalists less than 2 days after I left the city. The soldiers from Camp McGovern handled that potentially explosive situation with consummate professionalism, and I am confident they will continue to do so. I will digress briefly at this point, Mr. President, to mention that an important feature of SFOR are the Russian troops under the command of General Clark, the SACEUR, the [Supreme Allied Commander Europe]. At Camp McGovern, I met with the commanding officer of the Russian SFOR airborne brigade who was enthusiastic about the cooperation with our forces and totally supportive of our action. To return to refugee resettlement, unlike the palpable hostility in Brcko, in the Sarajevo suburb the situation was peaceful. There I saw Muslims, Croats, and one or two Serbs who were returning to rebuild their devastated homes under an imaginative program run by the United States Agency for International Development in cooperation with Catholic Relief Services. Mr. President, it is worth underscoring here that not only are our magnificent Armed Forces under the inspired command of Gen. Eric Shinseki playing the largest single role in SFOR, but our United States Government development specialists have won universal respect among the Bosnians for being the international community's most efficient providers of assistance. As a matter of fact, one of the Bosnian Serb opposition leaders said to me in Banja Luka that the Europeans are incapable of solving Bosnia s problems. By way of contrast he characterized the Americans as ``not always sensitive but very efficient.'' That is just what I would like us to be--``not always sensitive but very efficient.'' In summation, where do I see Bosnia and Herzegovina heading if the United States and our allies stay the course? Personally, I would like to see a multi-ethnic, multireligious society re-emerge like the one that existed in Sarajevo before the war. I fear, however, that too much blood has been shed and too many atrocities committed for that to happen in the near future. More realistic, and politically feasible, is the development of a multi-ethnic state, most likely in the form of a confederation with a good degree of decentralization. My sense from this trip is that the ardor has cooled in the Republika Srpska for union with Serbia, since President Milosevic is regarded as a betrayer of the Serb cause and as a figure totally incapable of providing the basic material prosperity that the Bosnian Serbs so desperately crave. Unreconstructed Croat nationalists in Herzegovina may still long for union with Croatia, but as the leadership changes in Zagreb, the new government there will be more intent on integrating with Western Europe than on annexing provincial bandits. In short, for the first time in years, developments are moving in the right direction. As I have outlined, much hard political and economic work remains to be done, most of it by the Bosnians themselves. The United States and its allies can, and must, provide the framework for the Dayton accords to be fully implemented. I do not minimize the cost to the American taxpayer of our efforts. Neither, however, can I underestimate the cost of a failure of the Bosnian operation. In the near future, I will indicate in some detail what I think the costs would be to the United States if, in fact, Bosnia were to erupt once again. Suffice it to say now that not only would all that has been accomplished go up in smoke as fighting reignited, but a failure in Bosnia would signal the beginning of the end for NATO, which is currently restructuring itself to meet Bosnia- like challenges in the 21st century. Therefore, I call upon the Clinton administration immediately to begin discussions with our allies about creating a post-SFOR force after June 1998. For months, I recommended a combined joint task force with our allies, which the Senate overwhelmingly advocated in July in the 1998 defense authorization Bill. The question of whether American participation in a post-SFOR force will be limited to air, naval, intelligence, and communications support with a rapid deployment force in reserve in Hungary, or also might include a greatly reduced ground contingent can be resolved in these negotiations. The immediate priority is to begin the negotiations now--to make clear to all parties in Bosnia that, if they cooperate, the security framework will continue for a limited time--and to make clear to the skeptics that the new NATO can and will be the driving force in the European security architecture of the 21st century. I thank my colleague from Arizona for his indulgence. I thank the President for the time. I yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. Leader, on the matter of the legislation we just passed, I want to make one comment. It is obvious that the Senator from New Mexico is recognized as an effective chairman. It is obvious that the Senator from New York [Mr. Moynihan] is viewed as articulate and as one of the brightest people here. It is obvious that everybody knows how effective the ranking member of the Budget Committee is. I want to make a personal comment that I never thought I would make, or need to make. I think the single-most underestimated person in this body is one of the single-most effective people, and that is my senior colleague, Bill Roth. He has a style that is so low-key and so quiet that I don't think he gets the credit he deserves. I just want to remind everybody, notwithstanding the fact that everyone sees and hears more about the able leaders I mentioned, this deal would not have been done without Bill Roth. Bill Roth. People in my State love him, but they don't even realize that. I just want everybody to be reminded that this quiet guy from Delaware, who has a very different political view on a lot of things than I do, is one of the single-most effective people we have. On last year's welfare reform bill, and every major thing we have done in the past 18 months, he has been at the helm, or has played a major part. I want to personally recognize the contribution he makes and state for the record, I think he gets--not intentionally; I think unintentionally--less credit than anybody in this place, and I think he plays the most significant role in all of what we are rightfully celebrating here, which is the passage of the tax bill and the reforms that have taken place in welfare, et cetera. So I want the Record to reflect that the man from Delaware, my senior colleague, deserves a heck of a lot of credit.

Mr. BIDEN. Will the majority leader yield?

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, earlier this month in Madrid the North Atlantic Treaty Organization held a momentous summit meeting, which brought together the heads of state and government of its 16-member countries to discuss the future of the Alliance in the 21st century. Mr. President, I was privileged to be a member of a bipartisan, bicameral Congressional delegation to the summit meeting. Today, I would like to discuss the results of Madrid and their important implications for American foreign policy. At Madrid, NATO took the historic step of inviting Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to begin accession talks with the alliance. The alliance now has several pressing priorities as a followup to the summit. As its first priority, NATO must complete these accession talks this fall with the three prospective new members. Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary have all met the basic alliance membership requirements--democracy, civilian control of the military, the rule of law, no conflicts with neighbors, and the willingness and ability to assume alliance responsibilities. NATO and the candidates must now assess the military capabilities of each of the three in detail, and must plainly state each country's responsibilities and tasks within the alliance. Of particular importance is that the issues of cost of enlargment must be forthrightly addressed, both by the three prospective members and by all the current members of the alliance. The goal is to successfully conclude the talks with Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary in time for the Protocol of Accession to be signed at the NATO ministerial meeting in December of this year. The next step is for each of the 16 current NATO members to begin the process of ratification of amending the Washington treaty. Of course, Mr. President, according to our constitution, it is the U.S. Senate that is responsible for advice and consent to treaties, and we anticipate that we will consider the NATO enlargement treaty amendment next spring. NATO's second major priority after Madrid is developing a strengthened cooperative relationship with those countries that were not invited to be in the first group of new members. At Madrid, NATO re-emphasized an ``Open Door'' policy by which the first group of invited countries will not be the last. Additional candidacies will be considered, beginning with the next NATO summit, to be held here in Washington in April 1999 on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the founding of the alliance. In an important gesture, the Madrid summit communique singled out for special mention the positive developments toward democracy and the rule of law in Slovenia and Romania. As many of my colleagues will remember, I was a strong advocate of Slovenia's being included in the first group of new members. I anticipate that both Slovenia and Romania, and perhaps other countries, will be invited to accession talks with NATO in 1999. In addition, in a thinly veiled bow to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, the Madrid summit communique reiterated conditions set forth in NATO's 1995 study whereby no European democratic country will be excluded from consideration for membership because of its geographic location. Translated into real English that means that NATO will not allow Moscow to give the three Baltic states a double whammy. In other words, the Soviet Union's illegal, forcible incorporation of the Baltic states in 1940--which, I am proud to say, was never recognized by the United States--will not be used as a pretext to veto their consideration for NATO membership. Mr. President, Ukraine, with an area and population the size of France, is arguably the most strategically important country in East- Central Europe. At Madrid, NATO and Ukraine signed a Charter on a Distinctive Partnership. Ukraine is currently not seeking NATO membership, but under President Kuchma (KOOCH-ma) it has undertaken democratic and free-market reforms in an attempt to move closer to the West. This charter should reinforce this trend. In order to keep the enlargement momentum going in the countries not yet ready for membership, a new Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council was inaugurated at Madrid. This body will direct an enhanced Partnership for Peace Program--a program involving more than two dozen countries, which, incidentally, has already far exceeded our most optimistic expectations. Of vital importance to the new security architecture in Europe is NATO's new relationship with the Russian Federation. Based on the Founding Act between NATO and Russia, that new relationship has begun to take shape. The permanent joint council, whose consultative functions are outlined in the Founding Act, recently held a preliminary meeting, and more are planned for the autumn. Rather than being a rival for to the North Atlantic Council, as some critics have asserted, the permanent joint council will be a proving ground where Russia can show its intention to cooperate in a positive spirit with the West. I hope and expect that it will act in this manner. If, however, Moscow chooses the old path of propaganda and confrontation, then the permanent joint council will atrophy. But, I re-emphasize, in no way will the permanent joint council usurp the leading role in NATO played by the North Atlantic Council. The third and final immediate priority for NATO after the Madrid summit is to finalize the internal adaptation of the alliance. This, Mr. President, is a complex and crucially important issue. Beginning in 1991, NATO approved a new strategic concept, which moved beyond the cold war focus on collective defense and toward more diverse tasks in a global context. In order to carry out these new tasks, the new strategic concept emphasized the need for NATO to achieve an effective force projection capability. At the January 1994 Brussels summit, NATO agreed to set up a more flexible set of options for organizing and conducting military operations. This goal was, and is, to be achieved through the mechanism of the combined joint task force, known by its acronym CJTF. Although there has been considerable disagreement between the United States and France as to the theoretical details of how the CJTF is to be controlled, in practice both the IFOR and SFOR operations in Bosnia have been unofficial combined joint task forces under NATO command and control. Mr. President, I am going into this level of detail because, as I will discuss shortly, the question of post-SFOR Bosnia is inextricably tied in with the ratification of NATO enlargement. Another aspect of NATO's internal adaptation concerns reforms in the alliance's command structure. At the June 1996 ministerial meeting in Berlin, NATO agreed that a European security and defense identity-- known by its initials ESDI--would be created within the framework of the alliance by allowing European officers to wear a Western European Union [WEU] command hat as well as their NATO hat. As part of the restructuring, NATO has already reduced the number of its strategic commands from three to two, and it is also planning to reduce the number of major subordinate commands. It is at this intersection of ESDI and command structure, Mr. President, that the expressed interests of France and the United States have collided. The French want to have a European officer take over from an American as Commander of Armed Forces South [AFSOUTH] in Naples. We have rejected this proposal since it would impact upon our Sixth Fleet, even if the Fleet would formally remain under American command. Until now, the dispute remains unresolved, but at Madrid the French agreed to keep talking. In any event, disagreements over internal adaptation will not threaten the enlargement process. Mr. President, having been privileged to have been at Madrid and having followed the immediate follow-up to the summit, I find my belief reinforced that NATO is on the right track. There remain, however, two challenges, which if not satisfactorily met, could well torpedo ratification of NATO enlargement by this body. They are, first, burdensharing and, second, post-SFOR Bosnia. The first challenge is an existential one for NATO. The heads of state and government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Madrid directed the Council to ``bring to an early conclusion the concrete analysis of the resource implications of the forthcoming enlargement.'' The coming months will see serious discussion and study on the actual costs of enlargement. The Pentagon Report to the Congress in February 1997 was an excellent starting point. Personally, I find its methodology and conclusions convincing, but they have already been challenged by some of our European NATO partners. On other occasions I have discussed the details of the Pentagon study, so I will not take time today to repeat most of them. One aspect, though, bears special mention. Because the United States spent considerable sums of money in the 1980's and early 1990's to make our Europe-based forces deployable and sustainable, the Pentagon study calculates our share of the total bill to be less than some Europeans apparently would like. I believe that, in making that criticism, the Europeans are forgetting that in 1991 they signed onto the new NATO strategic concept that emphasizes force projection, to which I referred earlier. If our European friends disagree, let them offer an alternative methodology in the cost negotiations that were mandated at Madrid. Even if the absolute cost to the United States of NATO enlargement is well within our capabilities--as it is likely to be--we must insist that the costs are fairly apportioned within the alliance. I regret that the Madrid summit communique did not specifically call for an equitable sharing of the burden of providing the resources for enlargement. Moreover, the immediate post-Madrid statements by French President Chirac who said that France would not spend an extra franc for enlargement, and by German Chancellor Kohl, who said that United States cost estimates of enlargement were exaggerated, were not encouraging. They may accurately reflect Chirac's and Kohl's views, or they may merely be opening negotiating positions. In any event, I must emphasize in the strongest possible terms that the North Atlantic alliance is a partnership, not an American charity enterprise. While some of our European allies are making significant contributions to alliance multinational military activities, to cost- sharing for stationed U.S. forces, and to foreign assistance--all of which have been listed by the Pentagon as relevant burden-sharing criteria--only Italy, Greece, and Turkey met congressional targets last year on defense spending as a percentage of gross domestic product. And, Mr. President, one might add that the motivations of the last two countries include arming to defend against each other. I will be very surprised if NATO's definitive enlargement cost study--to be completed in the coming months--does not call for outlays that will force Western European parliaments to increase considerably their appropriations for defense. At that point, Mr. President, we will reach the alliance's moment of truth. Eleven NATO members are also members of the European Union. I have great sympathy for the European Union's strenuous efforts to achieve an ever closer union. Merely trying to fulfill the criteria for launching a common European currency is proving extremely difficult and causing social tensions in several Western European countries. But, Mr. President, we in the United States have also been taking painful steps to balance our own budget. The U.S. Federal work force is being reduced by more than a quarter-million, and our appropriations for many worthy social, medical, and educational causes have been drastically pared down on austerity grounds. So, Mr. President, I don't think it is too much to ask of our European allies what we have been asking of the American people. If one Europe, whole and free is worth ensuring through an enlarged NATO, then our European allies will take up the challenge and make the sacrifices that we have made. If they feel it is not worth the price, then I fear that the future of the entire alliance will be cast in doubt. A corollary of burdensharing in NATO is the responsibility that the United States takes for the entire free world through its military activities outside of Europe, especially in the Pacific and the Middle East. As we proceed with NATO enlargement, we must be certain not to use a disproportionate share of our defense funds in Europe and thereby weaken our ability to carry out our responsibilties elsewhere. I am confident that with equitable burdensharing of enlargement, this will not happen. The second looming challenge, Mr. President, is creating a post-SFOR force for Bosnia. I have long called for applying the CJTF concept, to which I referred earlier, to Bosnia, so that our European allies can provide ground forces there after June 30, 1998, supported by awesome American air, naval, communications, and intelligence assets and an over-the-horizon U.S. Ready Reserve Force in the region. An amendment to that effect was included in the fiscal year 1998 Defense Authorization Bill passed by the Senate. If our European allies follow the logic of their repeated calls for a European security and defense identity within NATO, which has been officially recognized by the alliance, then they should seize the opportunity offered by the expiration of SFOR's mandate next June. By taking up our offer of a CJTF they can consolidate the Dayton peace process and remove a major impediment to the ratification of NATO enlargement by the U. S. Senate. If, on the other hand, our European allies persist in their in together, out together mantra, oblivious to the Madrid communique's call for--``a true, balanced partnership in which Europe is taking on greater responsibility'' then this body will come to the obvious conclusion that the alliance's official policy upon which enlargement is based no longer obtains. Such a development would have the gravest consequences, not only for enlargement, but for the future of NATO itself. Mr. President, I sound these warnings in the firm belief that my two doomsday scenarios will not come to pass. For all but the most provincial Europeans and isolationist Americans recognize the need for the United States to remain intimately involved with Europe and will not want to jeopardize that involvement. The history of the 20th century has shown that when the United States absents itself from European affairs, the Europeans--unfortunately--are unable peacefully to resolve their disputes. The result in World War I and World War II was an enormous American sacrifice of blood and treasure. In order that we should never repeat that isolationist mistake, the United States in 1949 led the founding of NATO, the most successful defensive alliance in history. For nearly half a century it has kept the peace in Western Europe, allowing its European members to rebuild, overcome their own ethnic and national animosities, and eventually to prosper. Mr. President, NATO enlargement involves serious policy commitments for the United States, and therefore must be held up to the closest scrutiny. Many of us have been posing relevant questions to the administration for several months, and we have received satisfactory answers. There will, of course, continue to be new issues to be faced as we get deeper into the details of enlargement. But I believe that it serves no useful purpose to repeatedly recycle already answered questions, as if possessed with a need to reinvent the wheel. For example, some of my colleagues recently asked, once again, what threat NATO enlargement is designed to counter. But both the Clinton administration and NATO long ago answered that question: the threat is instability in Central and Eastern Europe, the crucible for two world wars in this century. NATO enlargement will extend the decades-old zone of stability eastward on the continent. In case anyone thinks that I am only spouting theoretical political science phrases, let me cite an article in the July 28, 1997 edition of The Washington Times, which quotes the head of the Security Policy Division of the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry. Saying that his country was delighted by NATO's decision in Madrid to invite Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to join, the Lithuanian official explained-- ``because that extends the zone of stability to our borders.'' By now we surely know that the addition of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, NATO is not drawing new dividing lines on the continent, as some of my colleagues recently suggested. I think the jubilant crowd that welcomed the President in Bucharest--after the Madrid summit--has laid that myth to rest. The Romanians knew that NATO, by emphasizing its open door policy at Madrid, had once again made clear that its goal is an undivided, peaceful, and free Europe-- and an alliance that will welcome Romania as a member in the near future. Some of my colleagues would like to come up with a finely delineated taxonomy of ethnic quarrels, border disputes, external aggression, and the like, as a precondition for moving ahead with NATO enlargement. But, of course, such theoretical discussions are rapidly being made superfluous by the lure of NATO membership. Since enlargement became a real possibility Hungary and Romania have formally improved their relationship, as have Hungary and Slovakia, Romania and Ukraine, Slovenia and Italy, Poland and Lithuania, Germany and the Czech Republic, Russia and Ukraine, and other European countries that I am probably forgetting. Mr. President, these historic reconciliations did not happen by accident. With the notable and sad exception of parts of the former Yugoslavia, the various peoples of Central and Eastern Europe are no longer wallowing in the swamp of ancient, tribal hatreds. Rather, they are attuned to the 21st century and the opportunities that NATO enlargement, above all, can offer. Some of my colleagues have asked whether NATO membership will force the new Eastern European democracies to spend too much on arms when expenditures for infrastructure critical to economic growth are more pressing. Leaving aside the rather patronizing tone of the question, the answer has been clear for months: Warsaw, Prague, and Budapest each has no trouble defining its national interest. Pending verification in this fall's accession negotiations, the Polish, Czech, and Hungarian procurement plans fall well within prudent limits of the free-market economic reforms that all three have been implementing for several years. Some of my colleagues have asked whether membership in the European Union might be a better option for these countries to achieve economic stability than NATO membership. Again, Mr. President, I think we must treat the Central and East Europeans like adults. They know what is vital to them. Moreover, why--other than to throw up roadblocks in the NATO enlargement process--would one posit an artificial dilemma? It's not an either or choice: many of these countries are viable candidates for both NATO and EU enlargement. In fact, earlier this month the European Union invited the first three NATO enlargement candidates--Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary--plus Slovenia, Estonia, and Cyprus to membership talks for the next round of EU enlargement. Some of my colleagues have asked, what have we given up in terms of NATO's own freedom of action to deploy forces throughout the expanded area of the alliance in order to obtain Russian acquiescence to the expansion plan? Well, Mr. President, the answer is a simple, nothing. We have known since NATO made crystal clear last March as part of its famous three no's declaration that the alliance has no reason, intention, or plan in the current and foreseeable security environment permanently to station substantial combat forces of current members on the territory of new members. Obviously, if the security environment changes, so too will NATO's troop stationing policy. In short, we have retained our freedom of action and have given up nothing--zero. I hope that issue has been laid to rest. While everyone by now admits that Russia's leaders have acquiesced to NATO enlargement, some of my colleagues have asked the unanswerable question: But what of tomorrow's Russian leaders? They wonder whether NATO enlargement will create an incentive for Moscow to withhold its support for further strategic arms reductions. First of all, no one can categorically disprove a negative. Some Russian leaders are against further strategic arms reductions for a variety of reasons. NATO enlargement may be one of them, although I seriously doubt that it is one of the more important ones. Ultimately, I believe that the next generation of Russian leaders will see that arms control is in their own national self-interest. Additionally, we should not forget that through the NATO-Russia Founding Act the Russians will have the opportunity not only to observe NATO first hand, but will also be able to work cooperatively with it. They may not learn to love NATO, but at least they will see that it does not correspond to the aggressive, rapacious Stalinist caricature that they grew up with. Many of us in this body are justifiably concerned about the cost to the American taxpayer of NATO enlargement, and I have talked myself blue in the face to Europeans making clear my insistence on equitable burdensharing. But I would also remind my colleagues that freedom is not cost free. As a deterrerent to aggression, ethnic conflict, or other kinds of instability, an enlarged NATO is far less expensive than conducting a military operation after hostilities have broken out would be. Here again the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina is instructive. Had we become directly involved earlier with the lift and strike policy that I advocated as early as 1992, we could have prevented many of the quarter-million deaths and 2 million displaced persons in that tormented country. Moreover, we would not be saddled with the enormous reconstruction costs that the United States and the rest of the world community are now bearing. So while we persist in our goal of a North Atlantic alliance of truly shared responsibilities, let us not lose sight of the bigger picture that American expenditures on NATO are the best security investment that this country can ever make. Mr. President, I would summarize my thoughts since Madrid in the following way: NATO enlargement is on the right track. It is a vital force in the integration of the new Europe. Tough negotiating and bargaining lie ahead. Several key questions must be definitively answered in the coming months, above all the actual cost of enlargement and how it will be apportioned. We must work out a satisfactory NATO- led, post-SFOR force for Bosnia. The Committee on Foreign Relations, for example, will hold an extensive series of hearings on these topics. But let us not confuse the debate by repeating already answered questions. I am convinced that after thorough scrutiny and debate, NATO enlargement will occur on schedule and will contribute to expanding and enhancing stability in Europe, and thereby will strengthen America's security. I thank the Chair and yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 established a process for developing new discovery and case management procedures designed to reduce costs and delay in Federal litigation. My amendment to S. 996 would make permanent one very successful reform from the Civil Justice Reform Act--the requirement that a list of each Federal judge's 6-month-old motions and 3-year-old cases be published and disseminated twice every year. According to the Rand Institute for Civil Justice, this public reporting requirement led to a 25 percent reduction in the number of cases pending more than 3 years in the Federal system, even though the total number of cases filed during the 4-year study period actually increased--proving again that Justice Brandeis was correct in saying that ``sunlight is the best disinfectant.'' This very effective reporting requirement will expire in December unless Congress acts. With my amendment, I seek to extend this reporting requirement. This amendment marks the first step in implementing the findings of the studies called for by the original Civil Justice Reform Act. The Rand study of the pilot projects set up by the act found that early judicial supervision of the discovery process can both reduce delay and litigation costs. These and other procedural reforms ought to be incorporated into the everday practices of our Federal bench to produced savings for the taxpayers and increase the efficiency of our Federal courts. I intend to continue working with my colleagues on the Judiciary Committee, as well as the Judicial Conference, to search for and implement improvements in our Federal civil justice system.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. The United States has a long tradition of responding generously to people in need. By sharing our bounty we have saved millions in Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Angola. To date, however, our response to North Korea's famine has been cautious and inadequate. Over the past 12 months, the United States has provided a total of about $60 million in food aid, including the recent announcement of $27.4 million for 100,000 metric tons of grain. The world, following our restrained lead, has been slow to meet the genuine emergency needs of the North Korean people. According to the World Food Program, the North began 1997 roughly 2 million tons of grain short of what it would need to avoid famine. But as of July 1, the North had received a total of only about 423,000 tons of food aid, It had managed to purchase or barter another 330,000 tons, leaving a shortfall of more than 1 million tons for the remainder of the calendar year. The United States has never linked politics with emergency food assistance, and we should not do so now. We can do more. And we should do more to avert mass starvation and the incumbent risk of political and military instability of the Korean peninsula. roots of famine Why is the North experiencing a famine? North Korean authorities attribute the shortages to a string of bad weather, including serious flooding in 1995 and 1996. Truth be told, however, the famine is largely the result of wrong-headed, discredited Communist economic policies and the devotion of vast resources to the North Korean armed forces. But this does not make the North Korean people less deserving of emergency relief. It is not ethically permissible to use starvation as a weapon to force the North Korean dictatorship to undertake essential economic reforms. Some observers worry that the North might divert our food aid from those who are truly hungry to the military or party elite. But international relief agencies are able to send their monitors through-out the famine-stricken areas where supplies are being delivered. The World Food Program has even chartered a helicopter to facilitate oversight. United States private voluntary organizations will soon begin directly supervising the distribution of American assistance, opening another window into life inside the hermit kingdom. The bottom line? We can have a high degree of confidence that the vast majority of any assistance we provide will reach the intended targets. why not starve them out? Opponents of emergency famine relief for North Korea wonder aloud whether the famine might not be a blessing in disguise; the perfect mechanism to bring about the downfall of one of the most repressive regimes left on the planet. But this cynical view is not only immoral, it displays a total disregard for the potentially explosive results of such a policy of strangulation. Famines are profoundly restabilizing events. No one can predict with confidence how North Korea might respond. But it is obvious to me that we do not want the North--which may possess one or two nuclear weapons--to experience panic, massive population migrations, and instability. In testimony earlier this month before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Andrew Natsios, director of foreign disaster assistance during the Bush administration and now vice-president of World Vision, a nongovernmental relief organization operating in North Korea, warned that the North's famine could soon reach the irreversible stage. He added that by the time the world sees CNN broadcasts or emaciated North Korean children too weak to lift themselves off their cots, it will be too late to save them. food for peace Next Tuesday, August 5, representatives of North Korea, South Korea, China, and the United States are scheduled to convene talks aimed at replacing the tattered 1953 Armistice with a peace treaty. If history is any guide, these historic negotiations are likely to be both difficult and protracted. But while the diplomats talk and the world waits and prays for peace, famished innocent North Koreans move closer to death. It is time for the United States to lead a comprehensive, humane response to the North's famine. Not because the North has agreed to peace talks; Not because the North has frozen its nuclear program and accepted international atomic energy agency monitoring of its Yongbyon nuclear facility; and Not because the North is cooperating for the first time in 50 years in the search for the remains of America's 8,000 missing servicemen from the Korean war. We should respond because it is the smart thing to do. It is the noble thing to do. It is an expression of all that is best about America that cannot help but resonate in the hearts of the North Korean people.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise to address a great human tragedy silently unfolding in North Korea and the urgent need for the United States to respond. The North is experiencing a severe famine and has asked the world for help. Pyongyang has gratefully acknowledged our past assistance. It is in our interest to respond generously to their plight. on the brink of starvation According to experts from the World Food Program [WFP] who recently returned from extensive travels in North Korea, tens of thousands of people are on the brink of starvation. Hundreds of thousands more are suffering from severe malnutrition, the result of several years of scarcity. The public food distribution system on which 78 percent of the North's population depends has effectively ceased to function in most parts of the country. In those few rural areas where the public distribution system still is operating, rations have fallen to below 100 grams per day, the equivalent of a small handful or rice or corn for each person. The evidence of famine is pervasive and undeniable. Children are among the hardest hit, their hair tinged red from malnutrition, their growth stunted, their eyes sunken and listless. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record an article from this week's copy of Newsweek magazine, which includes a photograph of starving North Korean children into the Record. I'd like to note for the record that a photograph of a Andrew Cunanan graced the cover, while the poignant photo of four starving North Korean kindergarten students was on page 46.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I am pleased to rise in support of the compromise amendment to S. 39--the so-called tuna-dolphin bill. In forging this bipartisan agreement, we have struck a proper balance between resolving the market access problems now faced by other countries and keeping the faith with American consumers. It is a fair deal. In short, the bill implements an international dolphin protection regime--known as the Panama Declaration--while maintaining the current dolphin-safe label during the pendency of a study on the impacts on dolphins from purse net tuna fishing. In March 1999--after scientists have preliminary determined whether purse net tuna fishing harms dolphin stocks--the Secretary of Commerce is to make a determination as to the appropriate dolphin-safe label, whether that be the current one that Senator Boxer and I wrote into law in 1990, or another protective version. This decision will be reviewed in the year 2001. Also included in the bill are provisions requiring Latin and South American countries tuna fishing the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean to enroll in an expanded dolphin protection program, which includes on- board observers. This will enable us to lock-in and improve upon the tremendous gains that we have already made in decreasing dolphin mortalities. This amendment represents a compromise on process, not a cave-in on principles. Again, we retain for every letter of the current dolphin- safe label. In 2 years' time the question will be if the label should be changed--not when it should be changed. I would also note that I do have some reservations regarding the adequacy of the data that will form the basis of the March 1999 label review. Only one population survey will be available at that time; this will not be an abundance of information upon which to make an informed and unbiased decision. I urge the Secretary of Commerce to err on the side of caution during the preliminary review and not make science conform to political will. I would like to recognize and publicly thank my colleagues who worked so hard in crafting this agreement, particularly Senator Boxer, Senator Kerry, Senator Breaux, Senator Snowe, Senator McCain, and Senator Stevens. Each spent a great deal of personal time trying to bridge the gap in this debate, and I am grateful for their efforts. In closing, this agreement continues to protect dolphins while keeping our faith with the American people. It is environmentally and economically the right thing to do, and I urge its passage. Funding for Dolphin Research

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, this amendment extends the crime law trust fund through 2002 at the funding levels of the budget agreement. This amendment has the same effect as the Biden-Gramm-Hatch amendment passed by the Senate 98 to 2 on June 27, 1997. Let me point out just one practical effect of my amendment. The Senate Judiciary Committee reported major youth violence legislation last week--this Hatch-Sessions bill calls for $1.5 billion from the crime law trust fund in 2001 and 2002--this is almost one-half of the dollars to fund a new Republican youth violence block grant. Now, I do not agree with many of the specifics of this block grant and I look forward to debating these issues on the floor. But, the bottom line is real simple--if we do not pass this amendment, there will be no trust fund in 2001 and 2002, and so, there will be no youth violence block grant in 2001 and 2002--no matter what form this block grant ultimately takes. And, it is the same for prisons, 100,000 cops, and violence against women. If we do not pass my amendment, there will be no trust fund in 2001 and 2002, and there will be no more funding for prisons and no more to fight violence against women. I also want to point out to my colleagues that I believe that there are Budget Act points of order which could be lodged against my amendment. I say that just so all of us are clear about my amendment. I would move to waive such a point of order were it raised. I just want my colleagues to understand this fact as we pass this amendment. I urge my colleagues to support my amendment.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator from Maryland yield for a brief comment? Mr. President, this is the second time we have addressed this issue in the last several weeks. A similar provision was in the State Department authorization bill that we dealt with. We raised the issue then, and the Senator moved to strike a similar provision, a withdrawal provision. It was accepted by a voice vote. This bill went on to pass the Senate 90 to 5, I believe. I am surprised this issue has surfaced again. Not only does section 408 depart from the State Department authorization bill, but it is bad policy; it is just simply bad policy. I hope my friends, the managers of this bill, will consider the fact that we have been through this once already and maybe allow us just to have a voice vote and move on. We have enough to fight over in this bill. I have much more to say on this, but, as the old joke goes, everybody has already said it, so I am not going to repeat it. The Senator from Maryland is absolutely right; it is a repeat of what we did. I thank the Senator for yielding to me, and I yield the floor.