Joe Biden

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Thank you very much. Mr. President, this is not the right way to do this. Let me repeat that again. This is not the right way to do this. If the circuit were to be split, we should do it in a way we have done it in the past. When some of my colleagues who have argued for the split in the past have come before the committee, they have said some of the following things. The argument is, ``Well, the reason we want a split is we don't want to have the court, basically a California-dominated court, making judgments for the folks in my State. We are different.'' And I point out to my colleagues who say that, you know, it is a funny thing about the circuit courts. Our Founding Fathers set the circuit courts up for a basic fundamental reason. They didn't want 50 different interpretations of the Federal Constitution. It is kind of strange. The whole purpose of the circuit court of appeals was to make sure there was a uniform view as to how to read the Constitution--not a Montana reading, not a Washington State reading, not a Nevada reading, not a Hawaii reading, and not an Alaska reading. Geography is relevant only in terms of convenience--not ideology. This is all about ideology at its core. That is what this is about. That is what the attempt to split it is about. There is no data to sustain that this should be done. Let the Judicial Conference make a judgment, make a recommendation to us. Let them decide as they have in the past. I say to my friends from the South, before I got here, we split up what used to be a giant circuit from Texas to Florida. The Senator's home State was part of the Presiding Officer's home State, was part of this giant district of the circuit court, and it got split. We did it the right way. We got the facts. We heard from the Judicial Conference. We listened to the court. This is about politics. It is no way to deal with the court. It isn't how to do this. Let's look at what we have. We don't have any data on the operation of the circuit as it is presently configured. So, therefore, it seems to me, we should at least give some weight to those folks who are on the court, and those folks who are litigants argue before the court-- the bar of those States. With that in mind, let me point out that the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council, the governing body of all the courts in the ninth circuit, is unanimously opposed to this--Republican appointees to that court, Democratic appointees to that court, liberal appointees, conservative appointees, pointed-head appointees, flat-headed appointees. They are all opposed. Let's look at the next thing that makes sense to look at--those who litigate before the court. The California bar is opposed to this. The Arizona bar is opposed to this. The Hawaii State Bar Association is opposed to this. Big Sky Country Bar from Montana is opposed to this. The State of Nevada's bar is opposed to this, and the State of Idaho. Mr. President, I would also point out that splitting the circuit, as proposed, will not guarantee that certain regional interests will be better represented. Keep in mind that is what this is really about-- regional interests. That is the part that bothers me about how we are going about this. Look, I am from the third circuit way back East--Pennsylvania, Delaware. So I am not telling anybody in the other part of the country what their business is. But it offends me that we have argued at least--I have not been here for the debate--in the committee based upon regional bias. There is not a Western Federal Constitution. There is not an Eastern Federal Constitution. There is not a Southern Federal Constitution. There is one Constitution--one. Another problem with this legislation that the court will face is the costs incurred. Dividing this circuit requires trading an infrastructure to support the new twelfth circuit. The Ninth Circuit Executive Office estimates that the initial startup cost for the establishment of the new twelfth circuit would amount to tens of millions of dollars. Operating costs of maintaining two circuits have been estimated to be more than $5 million per year. Look, I think the Senator from California has been eminently reasonable throughout this whole process. By the way, if anybody wonders whether this is not about regionalism, which is the worst thing we could be talking about when we talk about the Federal Constitution, let me remind my colleagues of a point in fact. No ninth circuit judge has been appointed to the court for a long time because those who, in fact, are suggesting that this should be split said, ``Unless it is split, we are not letting any judges go on the court.'' Think of that now, Mr. President. Isn't that nice? ``You won't split the court so we can have a regional division. We are not letting any folks get on the court. And then we are going to tell you that the court is overworked. Then we are going to tell you the court has a backlog. Then we are going to tell you the court has a problem.'' The reason, if it does, is because they have arbitrarily held up the appointments. Republican judges from the circuit have come to my office--Democratic judges from the circuit, Reagan appointees, Bush appointees--and said, ``Can't you do something?'' I said, ``You are talking to the wrong guy. You are preaching to the choir. Go to the guys who are blocking these judges.'' So, Mr. President, you can make an argument that this court is overworked. You can make the argument that this distribution is but part of the argument. The reason is a self-fulfilling prophesy. You don't put judges on the circuit. You create a problem. I can see my time is up. I thank my colleague for yielding. This is a bad idea. It is not the right way to go about it. Mrs. FEINSTEIN addressed the Chair.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise in support of the amendment to restore funding for the National Endowment for Democracy [NED]. Last month the Senate expressed its overwhelming support for the NED when it passed the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1997--90 to 5. That legislation provided $30 million, full funding, for the NED. Even more recently we voted unanimously to congratulate Mexico on its elections. The NED provided critical support to the Civic Alliance in Mexico, a nonprofit election monitoring and civic education group that played a key role in that success story. When the Reagan administration proposed the NED, I thought it was a bad idea and voted against it. After seeing all of the good work they have done and are doing, I have been converted to a supporter. The NED continues to play a critical role in promoting democracy and democratic values, and is vital to U.S. national interests. Mr. President, let me make this clear--NED is not a foreign aid program. This is because it builds self-sufficiency by working with indigenous groups that demonstrate a real commitment to democratic principles. NED only receives $30 million, but is very cost-effective. It makes hundreds of grants annually in over 90 countries for civic education, media, human rights, and other organizations dedicated to supporting those who desire democracy. NED funds support political party training and the establishment of opposition newspapers, helping to promote an independent press. For example, NED has done important work in China through its support of Chinese human rights activists. Another well-known example is Burma, where the NED has strongly supported Aung San Suu Kyi and the pro-democracy movement there. Still another important aspect of the NED is that it is rooted in the U.S. private sector, and operates in situations where direct government involvement is not appropriate. It is particularly effective in reaching those groups seeking to counter nationalist and autocratic forces that are responsible for so much conflict and instability. The NED provides a successful and cost-effective mechanism for spreading our democratic values and enhancing American security. This point was made today in a Wall Street Journal editorial that highlights and praises the NED's effective and innovative approach to democracy promotion. Elimination of this program could be interpreted as a sign of America's disengagement from the vital policy of supporting democracy around the globe. I urge my colleagues to continue to support this critical democracy- building organization.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. I rise to congratulate the Senate on having adopted Senate Concurrent Resolution 41, which calls for a United States initiative seeking a just and peaceful resolution on the situation on Cyprus. Senator Smith of Oregon and I submitted this resolution last week in the Committee on Foreign Relations, where it received speedy and favorable action. I applaud my colleagues for having adopted the resolution today. For 23 years Cyprus has been divided, with the northern part occupied by Turkish troops, and the southern part home to the Greek Cypriot community. Tensions remain high, and since Cyprus has become one of the most heavily armed places in the world, the possibility for serious hostilities is high. So, Mr. President, it is clear that the status quo on Cyprus is detrimental to U.S. interests in the volatile Eastern Mediterranean region. The resolution declares that lasting peace and stability on Cyprus could best be served by complete demilitarization leading to the withdrawal of all foreign occupation forces, the cessation of foreign arms transfers to Cyprus, and the provision of alternative internationally acceptable and effective security arrangements with guaranteed rights for both communities as negotiated by the parties. The resolution also welcomes and supports President Clinton's commitment to give increased attention to Cyprus as witnessed by Ambassador Holbrook's appointment as Special Presidential Emissary for Cyprus. Finally, the resolution calls upon the parties to lend their full support and cooperation to United States, United Nations, and other international efforts to promote an equitable and speedy resolution of the Cyprus problem on the basis of international law, relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions, and democratic principles, including respect for human rights, and in accordance with the norms and requirements for accession to the European Union. This last item is important, Mr. President, giving the naming earlier this month of Cyprus to the first group of candidate countries for final membership negotiations with the European Union, along with Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, and Estonia. Mr. President, the intolerable situation on Cyprus must be changed. Face to face negotiations between the two parties have resumed, and there are some grounds for optimism. I hope that this resolution will serve to energize the parties to come to a just and lasting agreement. I thank the Chair and yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, today I voted against the resolution offered by Senator Murkowski condemning the Government of Canada for its failure to resolve the blockade of a United States vessel in Canadian waters. Canada's inaction clearly was wrong. The M/V Malaspina, a United Stats passenger vessel operated by the Alaska Marine Highway System, was blockaded in port by Canadian fishing boats for 3 days. The Canadian Government not only failed to condemn the blockage of the Ferry boat, it also took no action to enforce an injunction issued by a Canadian court requiring the M/V Malaspina to be allowed to continue its passage. The ferry was able to continue its passage only when the fishing boats voluntarily ended their blockade. There is no doubt that the M/V Malaspina has the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea of Canada. Article 17 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea guarantees that right to the ships of all states. There can also be no doubt that Canada failed to handle the illegal blockage of the United States vessel responsibly. The amendment introduced by Senator Murkowski, however, is overkill. It would grant broad authority to the President and instruct him to compel Canada to prevent any further harassment of United States shipping. The amendment hints at the use of military force to escort shipping through Canadian waters, and offers only vague guidance on how outstanding maritime disputes with Canada might ultimately be resolved. I believe that we should not jump to coercive methods to deal with maritime disputes--especially with one of our closest allies and largest trading partners--until all other diplomatic avenues have been tried and exhausted. Moreover, as a general rule, the Senate should avoid granting the President broad authority to accomplish vague objectives. Rather than escalating this dispute, the Senate should call on Canada to fulfill its international commitments and provide assurances that the M/V Malaspina episode will not be repeated. We deserve at least that mush consideration from our ally to the north.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I wish to comment on my vote on tobacco farmers' eligibility for Federal crop insurance. I begin by noting that no substance rivals tobacco in its negative impact on our Nation's health: It is estimated that tobacco use is responsible for the premature deaths of 400,000 people annually. Caught up in the battle between elected and public health officials and tobacco companies are the tobacco farmers, whose honest labor is spent raising this dangerous but unfortunately often lucrative crop. It is contradictory at best--and irrational at worst--for the American taxpayers to on the one hand pay for the medical costs associated with tobacco use, and on the other, pay to subsidize tobacco production through reduced-rate crop insurance. For this reason, I oppose continuing to provide tobacco farmers with taxpayer-subsidized crop insurance. I do, however, believe that tobacco growers ought to be given reasonable warning that they stand to lose their Federal insurance, enabling them to find comparable coverage in the private insurance market. To me, it is simply an issue of fairness. I was troubled by the immediacy of the Durbin amendment's provisions, and, though I supported its objective, voted against it for this reason. Amendment No. 970 (Purpose: To limit funding for the market access program)

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, since I released my first annual drug strategy in 1990, I have argued that it was imperative that we needed to act, instead of just talk, in order to confront the problem of drug abuse and drug related crime. This means focusing quickly on the risks confronting our youth, identifying practical steps our communities can take to reduce these risks, and committing ourselves to the hard work and resources needed to steer young people to productive lives instead of wasted lives. The administration's 1998 national drug strategy provides significant steps toward these goals. Under the leadership of General McCaffrey, the administration's 1998 drug strategy calls for a 10-year antidrug plan and a 1998 budget request that includes full funding for drug control efforts that have proven to work. The administration's budget request includes: $8.4 billion for domestic drug enforcement; $3.3 billion for drug treatment; $2.2 billion for drug education and prevention--including $680 million for Safe and Drug-Free Schools; and $2.1 billion for interdiction and international antidrug efforts--including broad, across-the-board increases for law enforcement agencies like the FBI, DEA, INS, and U.S. Attorneys. In addition to funding these existing programs, the budget request establishes a national media campaign of prime-time antidrug television advertisements to stop kids from trying drugs in the first place-- funded by $175 million from Federal Government and $175 million from private industry. These are all positive steps which I urge my colleagues to pass into law. What is more, these positive steps illustrate just how vital the office of the Drug Director truly is. Because, if we did not have an office--a single, responsible office charged with overseeing the Federal antidrug policy we could not even debate whether General McCaffrey's drug strategy makes sense. I believe it does. But, there may be others who do not. My key point is that without a Drug Director, we would have lost even the chance to have an informed debate over a specific proposal. I remind my colleagues what we faced on the drug policy front when I first began calling for a drug office in 1980: it was pretty simple, there was no drug office, there were more than 50 Federal departments, agencies, and offices putting together a hodge-podge of antidrug efforts with no coherant plan. Contrast this to what we have today, General McCaffrey has submitted a strategy and a budget--and we can now all debate what a majority of us favor and what a majority of us oppose. This is the fundamental reason why I am today introducing legislation to reauthorize the Office of National Drug Control Policy. I know that the administration, led by General McCaffrey, has worked hard to craft this legislation, and I believe that it deserves speedy consideration-- and the votes--of my colleagues. One of the important refinements offered in this legislation is to build in some long-term planning while at the same time adding some greater accountability for the drug strategy and all its component parts. This legislation does so by calling on the Drug Director to develop a 10-year plan, a 5-year budget coupled with a detailed annual status report assessing the progress on the strategy, as well as a detailed, program-by-program, annual budget. In other words, this legislation would keep the Drug Director's key power to develop, define, and submit to Congress a detailed annual drug budget. A process which holds unique powers to focus congressional debate on the topic of drug policy, and which is the strongest institutional power of the Office of National Drug Control Policy within the executive branch. In addition, this legislation will enhance a function which too often is ignored--that function: accountability. Here, the Drug Director has called for long- and short-term measureable objectives. In fact, as part of General McCaffrey's on-going efforts at the Drug Office, the General has already identified more than 54 performance targets and another nearly 80 measures of program effectiveness. The legislation I am introducing today will help formalize this process. Let me also add, that calling on the Drug Director to provide a 10-year plan will not prevent any future administration--nor even this administration--from changing or refining that plan. It is simply to recognize that we are at a stage in our effort against drugs where we must focus on implementation and results. And, this is exactly what the legislation I offer today is all about. I urge my colleagues to support the legislation I offer today.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, since I released my first annual drug strategy in 1990, I have argued that it was imperative that we needed to act, instead of just talk, in order to confront the problem of drug abuse and drug related crime. This means focusing quickly on the risks confronting our youth, identifying practical steps our communities can take to reduce these risks, and committing ourselves to the hard work and resources needed to steer young people to productive lives instead of wasted lives. The administration's 1998 national drug strategy provides significant steps toward these goals. Under the leadership of General McCaffrey, the administration's 1998 drug strategy calls for a 10-year antidrug plan and a 1998 budget request that includes full funding for drug control efforts that have proven to work. The administration's budget request includes: $8.4 billion for domestic drug enforcement; $3.3 billion for drug treatment; $2.2 billion for drug education and prevention--including $680 million for Safe and Drug-Free Schools; and $2.1 billion for interdiction and international antidrug efforts--including broad, across-the-board increases for law enforcement agencies like the FBI, DEA, INS, and U.S. Attorneys. In addition to funding these existing programs, the budget request establishes a national media campaign of prime-time antidrug television advertisements to stop kids from trying drugs in the first place-- funded by $175 million from Federal Government and $175 million from private industry. These are all positive steps which I urge my colleagues to pass into law. What is more, these positive steps illustrate just how vital the office of the Drug Director truly is. Because, if we did not have an office--a single, responsible office charged with overseeing the Federal antidrug policy we could not even debate whether General McCaffrey's drug strategy makes sense. I believe it does. But, there may be others who do not. My key point is that without a Drug Director, we would have lost even the chance to have an informed debate over a specific proposal. I remind my colleagues what we faced on the drug policy front when I first began calling for a drug office in 1980: it was pretty simple, there was no drug office, there were more than 50 Federal departments, agencies, and offices putting together a hodge-podge of antidrug efforts with no coherant plan. Contrast this to what we have today, General McCaffrey has submitted a strategy and a budget--and we can now all debate what a majority of us favor and what a majority of us oppose. This is the fundamental reason why I am today introducing legislation to reauthorize the Office of National Drug Control Policy. I know that the administration, led by General McCaffrey, has worked hard to craft this legislation, and I believe that it deserves speedy consideration-- and the votes--of my colleagues. One of the important refinements offered in this legislation is to build in some long-term planning while at the same time adding some greater accountability for the drug strategy and all its component parts. This legislation does so by calling on the Drug Director to develop a 10-year plan, a 5-year budget coupled with a detailed annual status report assessing the progress on the strategy, as well as a detailed, program-by-program, annual budget. In other words, this legislation would keep the Drug Director's key power to develop, define, and submit to Congress a detailed annual drug budget. A process which holds unique powers to focus congressional debate on the topic of drug policy, and which is the strongest institutional power of the Office of National Drug Control Policy within the executive branch. In addition, this legislation will enhance a function which too often is ignored--that function: accountability. Here, the Drug Director has called for long- and short-term measureable objectives. In fact, as part of General McCaffrey's on-going efforts at the Drug Office, the General has already identified more than 54 performance targets and another nearly 80 measures of program effectiveness. The legislation I am introducing today will help formalize this process. Let me also add, that calling on the Drug Director to provide a 10-year plan will not prevent any future administration--nor even this administration--from changing or refining that plan. It is simply to recognize that we are at a stage in our effort against drugs where we must focus on implementation and results. And, this is exactly what the legislation I offer today is all about. I urge my colleagues to support the legislation I offer today.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I want to explain why I voted against the amendment offered by the Senator from Arkansas, [Mr. Hutchinson] calling for a revocation of China's most-favored-nation trading status. Revoking China's nondiscriminatory trading status is not a silver bullet we can fire to address our many legitimate concerns with China. MFN is ill-suited to carry single-handedly the burdens of our complex and multifaceted relationship. Yet, simply extending China's most-favored-nation status does little to advance our interests with China. Moreover, it does nothing to address those areas where China's conduct is inconsistent with international norms or in violation of their bilateral commitments. In short Mr. President, engagement with China is not a policy, it is just a means to an end. It is the content of the engagement that matters. In the area of nonproliferation, for all of our engagement, China's conduct clearly remains unacceptable. Just last May, the State Department belatedly imposed sanctions on two key Chinese chemical firms--Nanjing Chemical Industries Group and Jiangsu Yongli Chemical Engineering and Technology Import Export Corp.--that knowingly and materially contributed to Iran's chemical weapons program. If this case were the lone exception, it would still be troubling. Unfortunately, it appears to be the norm. China has knowingly aided the development of weapons of mass destruction, and the means to deliver them, in irresponsible states or in countries located in unstable regions of the world. China has provided nuclear technology, cruise missiles, and ballistic missile technology to Iran. China has also exported M-11 missiles--which can be equipped with nuclear warheads--and missile production know-how to Pakistan. These exports appear to be part of a deliberate government policy that traces its roots to the ancient Chinese strategy of balancing one barbarian off against another, and we may be one of the barbarians Beijing has in mind. A critical objective of our relationship with China must be to convince Beijing not only to sign up to international nonproliferation regimes, but to follow through on its commitments. In general, we should: stick to incentives and penalties we are prepared to deliver; act multilaterally, where possible, to avoid having our initiatives undercut; and replace our once-a-year debate on MFN with a sustained, high-level commitment to improving our overall relationship. I hope that diplomatic pressure, international suasion, and targeted sanctions will change Beijing's attitude toward nonproliferation. Chinese compliance with international regimes appears to improve when they are convinced that officials at the highest levels of the U.S. Government are scrutinizing their behavior. But my patience is not limitless. My vote today should not be interpreted as an expression of my satisfaction with China's behavior or the administration's policy of engagement. Moreover, it should not be viewed as an indication of how I might vote when MFN comes up for renewal next year. If China fails to clean up its act, it may leave me no choice but to vote to revoke MFN. Sending a strong message--knowing full well that it won't miraculously bring about positive changes in China--may prove preferable to doing nothing while China makes the world a more dangerous place.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I am pleased the managers of the bill will accept my amendment to the foreign operations appropriations bill. My amendment will apply the same standards for sanctions on countries that harbor Rwandan indicted war criminals as are applied to countries that provide sanctuary for individuals indicted by the Yugoslav war crimes tribunal. As the bill is currently written, with the exception of certain types of humanitarian assistance, no foreign aid can be given to any country that provides sanctuary to individuals indicted by the Yugoslav war crimes tribunal. But for those individuals indicted by the Rwandan war crimes tribunal, the bill contains only a discretionary authority to withhold aid. Mr. President, the United States was a cosponsor of the U.N. Security Council resolution which authorized the establishment of the Rwandan war crimes tribunal. Accountability for the 500,000 people killed in the 1994 genocide is an integral part of any effort for reconciliation and reconstruction in Rwanda, much like the Truth Commission in South Africa. Mr. President, my amendment is not without precedent. The foreign operations bill 2 years ago restricted foreign assistance to countries that harbored both Rwandan and Yugoslav indicted war criminals. I believe this was the right standard, and to do anything less sends the wrong message on war crimes. If we say we are against war crimes in Yugoslavia, we should also equally say we are against war crimes in Rwanda. I don't believe that there's one Senator who doesn't share this belief--but it is important that we say so. My amendment makes a strong statement of support for the Rwandan tribunal and for the cause of human rights in Africa.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I wish to congratulate the European Union for its decision yesterday to begin membership talks with six countries, five of them in Central and Eastern Europe. Mr. President, as anyone who has followed my numerous statements on NATO enlargement knows, I have frequently criticized the European Union for not moving speedily enough toward its own stated goal of enlargement. The EU's announcement that it will begin talks early next year with Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia is welcome for several reasons. First of all, it recognizes that these are the countries that have already made the most progress in meeting the EU's demanding economic and political qualifications. Five other prospective candidates-- Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovakia--now realize that they have more work to do. Second, the naming of five Central and East European countries for the next round of EU enlargement in itself will add to the emerging European security architecture, along with the other web of ties connected with EU membership. Third, the naming of Cyprus to the list of prime candidates for EU membership should help to move the parties on that island to a final, equitable solution that eliminates the division of the country, which has persisted for twenty-three years. I do not underestimate the complexity of accession negotiations as the European Union concurrently moves toward ``an ever closer union.'' Nonetheless, I hope that the talks with the six prime candidates will move speedily so that they can join the European Union before the end of this century. Again, I congratulate the European Union on the step it has taken.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I support the foreign operations appropriations bill now before the Senate, which will provide the necessary funds for foreign assistance programs of the United States in the coming fiscal year. Foreign aid is an important component of U.S. foreign policy. In addition to being a tangible demonstration of American leadership, it is a key instrument in encouraging and supporting American values of democracy, respect for human rights, and free trade. In recent years, foreign policy spending has suffered drastic cutbacks. According to a study of the Congressional Research Service, prepared earlier this year at my request, foreign policy spending for the current fiscal year is at its lowest level in 20 years. Moreover, the steepest reductions in our foreign policy budget have come in foreign assistance, which at $11.5 billion last year, in fiscal year 1998 dollars, is lower, in real terms, than any year of the last twenty, and some 36 percent below the historical average of that period. Mr. President, this year's foreign operations bill thankfully has started to reverse this precipitous decline. It provides $13.24 billion for foreign assistance and export financing programs. I commend the Appropriations Committee for its hard work and applaud the bipartisan effort its members have shown in enhancing the level of funding for our Nation's foreign assistance programs. This legislation provides enhanced funding for critical foreign assistance programs, a few of which I will mention briefly. The Appropriations Committee has recognized the importance of development assistance programs by providing $1.8 billion, $100 million over the President's request. While the $485 million appropriated for the seed program for newly democratizing countries in Eastern Europe is regretfully below the President's request, the Committee's recommendation of $800 million for the nations of the former Soviet Union will allow our Nation to continue its efforts to bring democracy, stability, and prosperity to those former Communist States. Mr. President, I am somewhat concerned about the considerable number of earmarks in this bill, and the number of ``subearmarks,'' that is, designation of funds for specific programs within specific countries in Eastern Europe and Eurasia. I am not opposed to earmarks in principle; Congressional priorities often differ with those of the executive branch, and the Congress has every right to protect those priorities by specific earmarks. But the proliferation of such provisions unduly limits the administration's flexibility in a region that is constantly in flux. So I hope the committee will consider reducing the number of earmarks in the conference with the House. Mr. President, unfortunately it has become popular of late to assert that foreign aid is merely the foreign policy equivalent of welfare--a supposed massive giveaway that yields few benefits to American interests. To the contrary, American contributions to these efforts are an important way in which we protect our interests abroad, a fact that the Appropriations Committee has recognized through its enhanced funding levels for foreign assistance programs. I wish to congratulate Senator McConnell and Senator Leahy once again for their work on this important piece of legislation. I urge my colleagues to support it. Child Survival and Disease Programs

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I would like to speak in a generic sense to this issue and then briefly to the amendment, if the managers do not mind my doing that at this moment. Mr. President, we are going to have several amendments that call for cutting off of funds, that call for withdrawal of American forces from Bosnia by a date certain, and so on, amendments like the amendment No. 759 of the Senator from Wisconsin and the substitute amendment No. 802 of the Senator from Michigan. I understand this may be a work in progress here, since I know there are very bright people of all our staffs sitting down right now trying to figure out whether or not we can cobble together a reasonable compromise in this area. That is why I am not going to speak to the detail of any amendment, but I would like to speak to the issue because the issue does not change regardless of how the amendment is crafted. In reviewing the history of our policy in Bosnia, I feel like an odd variant of a worker on a decision tree who, instead of taking the best choice available to him, was forced to take the second best one in almost every instance where he had a choice to make. It's like that old joke, you know, from Yogi Berra, ``When you come to a fork in the road, take it.'' Forks in the road that we have been presented with have usually involved two bad choices. For most of the duration of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, over the last 4 years I have found myself taking a minority position and sometimes being a minority of one or two or three here in the Senate. As early as September 1992, on the floor of the Senate, I called for lifting of the immoral and illegal arms embargo against Bosnia. I also called for conducting airstrikes against the genocidal Serbian aggressors. I went to Bosnia during that period, came back, wrote a lengthy report, which was characterized as ``lift and strike,'' and engaged the President on that policy. We had significant debates here on the floor of the Senate about whether or not that policy was a sound one. I was told by very knowledgeable people on the floor of the Senate that, ``Obviously, airstrikes didn't work,'' and, ``What was I talking about?'' and, ``The Serbs would just be more emboldened,'' all of which turned out to be dead wrong--dead, flat wrong. Three years and a quarter of a million dead later, we finally conducted airstrikes, which led to the Dayton accords and lifting of the arms embargo. What is done is done, Mr. President. After Dayton, we committed our troops to a multinational peace implementation force. But I remind my colleagues that had we followed the lift-and-strike policy when first advocated, we would not have needed to send American troops to Bosnia, either in IFOR or in SFOR. But now our forces are there. So, to review the bidding, my original preference was lift and strike. There were European forces on the ground. We would lift the embargo, use our air power to supplement those ground forces that were there, and therefore, there would be no need to have American forces there. But we ended up with a situation that was the next best, but still not good. We waited. We dillied around for 3 years and then finally conducted airstrikes. We finally got the Dayton accords. Since we were now part of the deal, we had to provide ground forces as well. So that was the second-best alternative. Going back to that decision tree I spoke of, we took a route over here that was better than not being on the tree, but it was not what it should have been in the first place. So I find myself in the strange position of having argued, initially, 4 years ago, 5 years ago, that there was no need for American ground troops in Bosnia, to now being on the floor defending the presence of our ground troops there. But again I want to emphasize that we made the wrong decision at the outset. We finally made the right decision 3 years later, but by that time we had fewer options once we made the right decision. Now our forces are there, and they have been the principal reason for the successes that have been achieved by SFOR. Although many of the provisions of the Dayton peace accords remain to be carried out, absolutely nothing would have been accomplished had it not been for the job that SFOR has done, and its predecessor, IFOR. These men and women from NATO member states and many non-NATO states, led by an American contingent, have successfully separated the warring factions, the Muslims, the Serbs, and the Croats, and have ended at least temporarily the blatant, planned genocide of the Muslims by the Serbs and the direct, immediate involvement of the country of Serbia, led by a war criminal named Milosevic. They have succeeded in putting a substantial amount of heavy weaponry in storage sites. And the carnage--though not the damage--in Bosnia has stopped. Yet much remains to be accomplished. There are still incidents of beatings and house burnings, which are inexcusable and must be halted. Most refugees are still not able to return to their homes. And if their homes lie in territory controlled by another of the three main religious groups, in almost every instance they have not been able to return. Most of the indicted war criminals remain at large. I have been very critical of the British conduct in Bosnia, but let me say publicly that I compliment them for doing yesterday what all of SFOR should be doing with indicted war criminals. These are people who engaged in genocide, and they should be taken to court, an international tribunal, which exists. If they resist, all force necessary should be used to apprehend them. Yesterday the British SFOR troops acted. One indicted Bosnian Serb war criminal was taken into custody. Another who resisted was shot and killed. So, hurrah for the British. I hope we are emboldened enough to act in the same way. So, again, most of the war criminals still remain at large, institutions of government, both at the national level and in the Muslim-Croat federation, need to be fleshed out and developed, notwithstanding the progress we have made. So now, once again I find myself in the minority. I think it was a mistake for the Clinton administration to have set a deadline of the end of June 1998 for the withdrawal of American ground forces from Bosnia, before we were sure that all the tasks enumerated in the Dayton accords will have been accomplished. Moreover, as I have repeatedly said over the last half year, I think our West European allies, particularly Great Britain and France, are making a serious mistake by not accepting our offer of United States air, sea, communications, and intelligence assets, plus an American ready reserve force, as they say, over the horizon, in Hungary or Italy, if they would keep their ground forces in Bosnia when ours withdraw. I recently attended the NATO summit meeting in Madrid with President Clinton and my colleague, Bill Roth and several others. At that meeting I suggested exactly that course of action. I hope the administration will push our European allies very hard on that point. But, once again I find myself in the minority, suggesting that it was a bad idea to set a date of withdrawal once we had put troops on the ground. It would be even worse idea if we mandated that they leave or cut off funds. And it would be a still worse idea, if we do withdraw, if the Europeans withdraw. As I have stated repeatedly over the last half year, I think our European allies, particularly France and Great Britain, would be making a major mistake. Our allies talk ceaselessly in Brussels about a European security and defense identity and a European pillar within NATO, but when they get a chance to put their troops where their mouths are, they somehow change their tune. Now, once more, we face a Hobson's choice. I wish we had not set a date certain for withdrawal from Bosnia. I want the Europeans to play the military role to which they declare they aspire. But I do not want to give hope to the sordid opponents of Dayton, like Milosevic and Tudjman, who would like to carve up Bosnia after international troops leave. So, I am reluctantly forced, in Mr. Hobson's terms, to take the horse nearest the door; that is to give the Clinton administration the freedom of action to come up with a better plan within the next 12 months. Could all the Bosnian horrors of ethnic cleansing, rape camps, and shelling of innocent civilians and children reemerge? You bet they could. In fact, if the international force withdraws before the tasks enumerated in Dayton have been accomplished, you can be sure they all will return--ethnic cleansing, rape camps, shelling of innocent women and children. By locking us into a specific withdrawal date without providing a viable alternative, we will guarantee that all we have accomplished in Bosnia will quickly fall apart and that what remains to be accomplished will never get off the drawing board. It will guarantee that a tinhorn dictator like Milosevic in Serbia, and an authoritarian thug like Tudjman in Croatia, will be able to proceed with their ill- conceived plans to torpedo Dayton and do what they have intended all along--since 1992, I have been saying this--to carve up Bosnia and Herzegovina, with part going to Serbia and the rest to Croatia. We have accomplished a great deal in Bosnia and Herzegovina. We have made a commitment to the people of that tragic land and to our allies, and to other cooperating partners in SFOR. Largely, though, because of congressional pressure, it is not an open-ended commitment. Some of my colleagues suspect that the President will come back to us with a request for another extension of funding for our troop commitment to SFOR. Fine. If he does, we will have a thorough debate and then decide whether or not to support his request. But to say now, as is being contemplated by some, that we should cut off any funds in the future, to say that now we will dictate what the outcome will be a year from now, is the ultimate in stupidity, in my view. We are micromanaging. We are sending every wrong message we possibly can throughout Bosnia and the rest of Europe. What do we accomplish by doing that? Well, we accomplish, I guess, satisfying ourselves and telling people we are withdrawing troops. We have the authority to do that if the President does not withdraw troops by the end of June of next year. That is the operative date. So let's give the President an opportunity to jawbone with our European colleagues, to come up with a follow-on plan for what will occur after we withdraw our ground forces from Bosnia a year from now. But let's not do it now. Again, my friend from Michigan is trying very hard to come up with a proposal that basically says the same thing: look, Europeans, stay. We get out but we provide support. That is a reasonable approach. But, again, let's not, further on this decision tree, make another bad choice that leads us down the road further to less opportunity and fewer options for peace and security in Europe. As I said, I just had the great honor of being in Madrid, Spain, with the leaders of more than 16 European nations. I was playing what was very much a bit role, along for the ride, but there. I find it somewhat ironic that at the very moment some of us are supporting the enlargement of NATO to spread the zone of stability eastward within Europe so we do not end up in a circumstance like we did between World War I and World War II, when several smaller states unable to be part of the West were forced to seek their own bilateral military arrangements and their own attempts to provide their collective security--we, on the floor of the U.S. Senate, are contemplating voting to increase the instability in the most insecure part of Europe. To conclude, my hope is that we will not lock the President into a policy straitjacket while the situation remains so unstable. To those who have a philosophic disagreement with me that we should not be involved, that Bosnia is not so important, I say to them: you are not giving up any option, by opposing an attempt to determine the outcome a year before it is required, because there will be American forces there for the next year unless there is a foolhardy amendment that suggests we withdraw all American forces right now from SFOR. Mr. President, I thank my colleagues for their time, and I yield the floor. Mrs. HUTCHISON addressed the Chair.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, what is the business before the Senate? Amendment No. 802

Mr. BIDEN. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I would like to state for the record that although I voted for the Levin substitute amendment, I did so as one of the second choices that I described in my statement earlier today. The Levin substitute amendment, in my opinion, was an improvement over the Feingold amendment in that rather than cutting off funds for United States ground forces in Bosnia after June 30, 1998, it puts our NATO European Allies on notice that we expect them to provide the post- SFOR ground forces, while we provide command and control, intelligence, logistics, and if necessary a ready reserve force in the region. My first choice, as I said earlier, would have been to give President Clinton freedom of movement for the next 12 months to carry out the unfulfilled portions of the Dayton accords and to negotiate appropriate international security arrangements for Bosnia and Herzegovina after June 30, 1998. I thank the Chair and yield the floor. Amendment No. 759, As Amended

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise to express my deep concern about the brutal subversion of democracy underway in Cambodia. I urge the administration to condemn the action for what it is: A bloody coup d'etat perpetrated by co-Prime Minister Hun Sen and his Cambodian People's Party. The administration today announced it was suspending for 30 days all assistance provided to the Cambodian Government. All such assistance, including loans provided by the World Bank and other international financial institutions, should remain suspended until the democratically elected Government of Cambodia is restored. Programs implemented through nongovernmental organizations--efforts supporting the rule of law, public health, prosthetics for mine victims, et cetera--should be reviewed to determine which ones can continue in light of recent events. I applaud the decision taken by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN] to delay Cambodia's membership in that organization. Cambodia's neighbors are under no illusions that Cambodia today is prepared to be a responsible member of the international community.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. The amendment of Senator Lugar and others will correct a situation that threatens the very security of the United States. Unless recent efforts to cut the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and similar programs of the Department of Energy are overturned, we and our children will all be in greater danger. I am proud to be an original cosponsor of this amendment and I urge my colleagues to support it. The administration's request for the important Nunn-Lugar program is for $382.2 million. Last week, the Armed Services Committee cut $60 million from that important program. At the same time, the House National Security Committee cut $97.5 million from the Nunn-Lugar account, and reportedly those cuts were from different parts of the program. Thus, over 40 percent of the Nunn-Lugar program is now at risk. The Armed Services Committee also cut $25 million from the Energy Department's program of international assistance in nuclear materials protection, control and accountability, as well as all $50 million in its program of international nuclear safety assistance. The former program is vital to protecting the American people against the diversion of nuclear material from former Soviet laboratories to countries like Iran, Iraq or Libya that would like to build or buy nuclear weapons. It also helps keep nuclear material out of the hands of terrorists, who could use it to poison innocent people in Moscow or Tokyo or Tel Aviv--or right here in Washington. Nuclear safety assistance helps guard against future Chernobyl incidents, which pose fallout dangers far beyond the borders of the former Soviet countries in which they might occur. The Nunn-Lugar program makes significant contributions to the national security of our country. Through this program, we have helped Russia to remove over 1,400 strategic nuclear warheads from deployment sites to storage areas, to await dismantlement. We have helped Russia to eliminate 64 SLBM launchers, 54 ICBM silo launchers, 61 SS-18 ICBM's and 23 strategic bombers. And we have helped Belarus, Kazakstan, and Ukraine to eliminate their strategic nuclear forces and to repatriate all their nuclear warheads to Russia. But the work of the Nunn-Lugar program is far from completed. Over 400 Russian SLBM launchers remain to be eliminated. Nearly 100 ICBM silo launchers must still be destroyed, along with over 190 SS-18 missiles and another 7 strategic bombers. Over 130 tunnels must be closed at a former nuclear test site in Kazakstan. Massive stocks of old, but still very dangerous, chemical weapons must be destroyed. And security must be improved in Russian storage and transportation of nuclear material. There are two basic ways to increase our national security. One is to maintain the finest military and intelligence services in the world. We do that, and I am very glad that we do. But we do that at great expense, and at some risk. For none of us can guarantee that nuclear deterrence will work forever, especially in a Russia where troops and officers and nuclear scientists go for months without pay--Russia where, within the past year, generals and lab directors have closed the door to their offices and put bullets through their heads, out of despair over what has happened to their programs and their personnel. The other basic way to increase our national security is to work with potential foes to reduce the threat that they pose to U.S. interests or U.S. forces. We do some of this through arms control agreements, but often we wonder whether other countries are obeying those agreements. The Nunn-Lugar program is a way to make sure that Russia and other former Soviet states actually do reduce their bloated strategic nuclear forces. It isn't free. The administration has asked for $382 million for this program in fiscal year 1998. But let's put that in perspective. The defense budget reported out by the Armed Services Committee is $268 billion. So a fully-funded Nunn- Lugar program would cost only one-seventh of 1 percent of the defense budget. The Armed Services Committee added $2.6 billion to the administration's request for defense spending. So the Nunn-Lugar program costs only 14 percent of the increase. And the Armed Services Committee's cut in this program could be restored using only 2.3 percent of that increase. The Energy Department's program of international assistance in nuclear materials protection, control and accountability--known as MPC&A--is similarly vital to our national security. Just as the Nunn- Lugar program helps the Russian military to improve its security for nuclear materials, the MPC&A program helps dozens of laboratories in the former Soviet Union to improve their security for nuclear materials. What are we talking about here? Often it's as simple as bars on the windows, locks on the doors, and doors that will take more than a crowbar to open. Just as often, however, the need is for completely revised accountability schemes so that institutions with nuclear materials will always know where those materials are. That is a complicated task, and it requires a change in mind-set as much as changes in forms or procedures. DOD personnel who participate in Nunn-Lugar programs can relate to the military officers who man Russia's strategic nuclear forces. But it takes scientists to build peer relationships at former Soviet laboratories and spread the word about nuclear control. Just last month, a committee of the National Research Council [NRC]-- an arm of the National Academy of Sciences--reported that the MPC&A program is beginning to have some real success. The NRC committee says: ``progress attributable to the joint efforts of U.S. and Russian specialists in MPC&A greatly accelerated in 1995 and 1996'' and calls that ``a significant political and organizational achievement.'' At the same time, however, the NRC committee found that ``the task has not been completed at any Russian facility and serious efforts are only beginning at most facilities.'' The committee says that ``much remains to be done.'' Its principal recommendation on this program is as follows: For the near term it is essential that the United States sustain its involvement until counterpart institutions are in a position to assume the full burden of upgrading and maintaining MPC&A programs over the long term. This program is just taking off. If you cut it back now, it may crash. But if, instead, we sustain and encourage this program, we can help former Soviet scientists to turn around what remains, frankly, a truly dangerous situation. President Yeltsin can assure us, as he does, that Russia would never give or sell a nuclear weapon to another state. But he cannot assure us today that the dozens of Russian laboratories with nuclear materials will not let potential weapons material leak out to criminals, or to terrorists, or to rogue states that we know are willing to pay good money for the material and technology that would enable them to threaten the peace of the world and of our country. President Yeltsin cannot, by himself, turn this situation around. But we can help him, and that is what the MPC&A program does. I do not pretend to know what should be cut in the defense bill. But I do know that Nunn-Lugar and the similar Energy Department program are not cash cows to be milked for other defense purposes. Just as Senator J. William Fullbright will always be remembered for the Fullbright fellowship program, so will Senators Sam Nunn and Dick Lugar be remembered for the simple, brilliant idea that it's more humane and a lot cheaper to pay for destroying Russian weapons than it is to fight against them. Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction projects and the Energy Department's MPC&A and International Nuclear Safety assistance are vital programs. They are successful programs. And they deserve our full support. I urge my colleagues to vote for Senator Lugar's amendment, which will help make this a safer world for all of us.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that Senators Hatch and Gregg be added as cosponsors to the amendment.

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, there is nothing to add. This is simply extending the extent, the life of this agreement--the existence of the trust fund. Vote On Amendment No. 537, As Amended

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I am pleased that the Senate has passed my amendment to make a modest change in current law. A modest change, but one which will make an enormous difference in the lives of some very special Americans--the families of public safety officers--police officers and firefighters--who have given their lives in the line of duty. This amendment would forgive Federal tax liability on the annuities received by the families of these fallen heroes. The cost is modest-- about $25 million over the next 10 years. I would also add that this tax treatment would be the same as that for the families of fallen soldiers. In other words, my amendment gives to those who fight and die in domestic battles to keep us safe the same treatment we give to those who fight and die in keeping us safe from foreign battles. Mr. President, again, I welcome my colleagues support for my amendment--we have stood with the cops, stood with the firefighters, and stood with the paramedics who have given their lives in service to all of us.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I am pleased to join the Senator from Connecticut in sponsoring legislation aimed at preventing the commencement of an arms race in Latin America. For the past two decades, the United States has prohibited the sale or transfer of advanced military equipment to the region. The ban, instituted by President Carter, has been generally maintained since the late 1970's, including during the administrations of Presidents Reagan and Bush. The lone exception occurred in 1982, in response to a perceived Cuban military buildup, when the United States sold F-16 fighter aircraft to the Government of Venezuela. The ban was instituted during a different era, when many nations of the region were under the rule of military dictators. To be sure, the nations of Latin America have made important advances since that period. Politically, dictatorship has given way to democracy. Every nation of the hemisphere--with the glaring exception of Cuba--is now governed by a democratically chosen leader. Additionally, after the lost decade of the 1980's--a period of negative economic growth in many nations of the region--the region is beginning to recover economically. Indeed, the nations of the region have made tremendous progress in the past few years, shedding the statist policies of past decades and embracing free markets and free trade. Although the times have changed, the need for restraint in the sale of arms has not. First, although the region is advancing economically, it is abundantly clear that few nations of the region can afford the high costs that an arms race would impose. Second, an arms race in the region would be destabilizing--not only among nations of Latin America, but within those nations where civilian control of the military is not yet fully consolidated. The Armed Forces remain important institutional actors in many nations of the region; the increased emphasis on arms procurement and arms budgets could undermine the priorities and powers of the civilian leadership. In the past year, there has been considerable discussion within the Clinton administration, and among the nations of the region, about the wisdom of lifting the U.S. ban on the sale of advanced weapons. In this respect, it is important to note that many senior figures in Latin America have come down on the side of restraint. In April of this year, for example, the Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government--an organization consisting of current and former hemispheric leaders from leading countries in the region--called on Latin American governments to ``accept a moratorium of two years before purchasing any sophisticated weapons.'' In the interim, the Council urged governments of the region to ``explore ideas to restrain such arms,'' and urged governments that sell arms, including the United States, ``to affirm their support for such a moratorium.'' This legislation that Senator Dodd and I introduce today would heed that request by expressing support for such a moratorium, and banning the transfer to the region of highly advanced weapons by the United States, unless such transfer conforms to an international agreement governing sales to, or purchases by, nations of the region. In other words, if a regional arms control agreement is negotiated permitting some sales but prohibiting others, arms transfers by the United States would be allowed, provided such transfers conform to the arms control agreement then in place. It should be emphasized that this bill would not ban all sales of military equipment to Latin America. Rather, it would merely continue, in law, the policy and practice adhered to by the executive branch for the past two decades: to not sell sophisticated military equipment such as advanced combat aircraft and attack helicopters to the nations of Latin America. It would permit U.S. firms to continue to sell other military equipment to Latin America--a market in which the United States now holds the largest share, and in which U.S. firms have sold a total of nearly $800 million over the past 4 fiscal years. Mr. President, it is the policy of the United States to promote greater hemispheric integration--an objective pursued in the process initiated at the Summit of the Americas, which was hosted by President Clinton in 1994. The policy set forth in this bill advances that objective by honoring the request of several Latin American nations that they pursue a regional arms control approach before advanced weapons are introduced into the region. I urge my colleagues and the administration to support this legislation.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I am pleased to join the Senator from Connecticut in sponsoring legislation aimed at preventing the commencement of an arms race in Latin America. For the past two decades, the United States has prohibited the sale or transfer of advanced military equipment to the region. The ban, instituted by President Carter, has been generally maintained since the late 1970's, including during the administrations of Presidents Reagan and Bush. The lone exception occurred in 1982, in response to a perceived Cuban military buildup, when the United States sold F-16 fighter aircraft to the Government of Venezuela. The ban was instituted during a different era, when many nations of the region were under the rule of military dictators. To be sure, the nations of Latin America have made important advances since that period. Politically, dictatorship has given way to democracy. Every nation of the hemisphere--with the glaring exception of Cuba--is now governed by a democratically chosen leader. Additionally, after the lost decade of the 1980's--a period of negative economic growth in many nations of the region--the region is beginning to recover economically. Indeed, the nations of the region have made tremendous progress in the past few years, shedding the statist policies of past decades and embracing free markets and free trade. Although the times have changed, the need for restraint in the sale of arms has not. First, although the region is advancing economically, it is abundantly clear that few nations of the region can afford the high costs that an arms race would impose. Second, an arms race in the region would be destabilizing--not only among nations of Latin America, but within those nations where civilian control of the military is not yet fully consolidated. The Armed Forces remain important institutional actors in many nations of the region; the increased emphasis on arms procurement and arms budgets could undermine the priorities and powers of the civilian leadership. In the past year, there has been considerable discussion within the Clinton administration, and among the nations of the region, about the wisdom of lifting the U.S. ban on the sale of advanced weapons. In this respect, it is important to note that many senior figures in Latin America have come down on the side of restraint. In April of this year, for example, the Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government--an organization consisting of current and former hemispheric leaders from leading countries in the region--called on Latin American governments to ``accept a moratorium of two years before purchasing any sophisticated weapons.'' In the interim, the Council urged governments of the region to ``explore ideas to restrain such arms,'' and urged governments that sell arms, including the United States, ``to affirm their support for such a moratorium.'' This legislation that Senator Dodd and I introduce today would heed that request by expressing support for such a moratorium, and banning the transfer to the region of highly advanced weapons by the United States, unless such transfer conforms to an international agreement governing sales to, or purchases by, nations of the region. In other words, if a regional arms control agreement is negotiated permitting some sales but prohibiting others, arms transfers by the United States would be allowed, provided such transfers conform to the arms control agreement then in place. It should be emphasized that this bill would not ban all sales of military equipment to Latin America. Rather, it would merely continue, in law, the policy and practice adhered to by the executive branch for the past two decades: to not sell sophisticated military equipment such as advanced combat aircraft and attack helicopters to the nations of Latin America. It would permit U.S. firms to continue to sell other military equipment to Latin America--a market in which the United States now holds the largest share, and in which U.S. firms have sold a total of nearly $800 million over the past 4 fiscal years. Mr. President, it is the policy of the United States to promote greater hemispheric integration--an objective pursued in the process initiated at the Summit of the Americas, which was hosted by President Clinton in 1994. The policy set forth in this bill advances that objective by honoring the request of several Latin American nations that they pursue a regional arms control approach before advanced weapons are introduced into the region. I urge my colleagues and the administration to support this legislation.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I send an amendment to the desk.

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I wonder if the Democratic manager would yield me time off the bill.

Mr. BIDEN. I would be happy to.