Joe Biden

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, let me conclude by saying that I know there are thousands of other families who made the same kind of sacrifices. When we talk about family values, this is what I mean by family values, family values that reflect a common consensus about sacrifice to make things better for everyone else in the family. Mr. President, I am proud to know the entire Kimmel family, and I am proud that one of the young children in that family--not quite so young anymore, she is still very young by our standards--is down here making her contribution to her Nation by working on the staff of one of our colleagues from Florida. Mr. President, with the Chair's permission, I would like to move onto a different subject, the subject spoken to by my friend from Alabama. If my friend, Senator Durbin, is ready to move on his, I will withhold that until the next lull we have and respond to my friend from Alabama on the issue he raised regarding youth violence. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to be able to proceed for 20 minutes as if in morning business.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will say at the outset I will cease if anyone comes to the floor. I am acting in a bit of a dual capacity here. I am comanaging the bill that is before us. We are waiting for some of our colleagues to come over with amendments. But in the meantime let me before the Senator from Alabama leaves the floor acknowledge and thank him for his acknowledgement of my efforts in this area and thank him for the knowledge he has brought to this body as a former prosecutor, an attorney general in his State, and as a former U.S. attorney running a Federal operation in his State as well, and for the vigor with which he has attacked the obvious problem. It is only of late that most people are acknowledging we should be focusing on juvenile crime. He in his capacity within his State both as a Federal official and a State official has been focused on it for some time. He and I have some outstanding disagreement on how to approach this, but we are substantially in agreement.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, does the Senator have a second amendment?

Mr. BIDEN. With the permission of the chairman, I think we can deal with this. There is no real objection to what the Senator is suggesting. It makes sense. There is another one of our colleagues who wishes to deal with a similar circumstance in Peru. Maybe the Senator could withhold seeking action on this and see if we can accommodate this all in one amendment, and possibly move to a second amendment.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I say to my friend, that is the case. The question is whether or not we can accommodate another one of our colleagues as well. It is always better than to have a rollcall vote. If the Senator will seek to lay aside this amendment temporarily and possibly proceed to his next amendment, maybe we can accommodate both at the same time.

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I agree, but if he will yield for me to make a comment, if I may, to my friend. The Senator has made the case for the Baltics and for Romania. As to the Baltics, it seems to me, the case is obvious. With regard to Romania, that important country has made significant strides in the last 6 months. I want to make clear so that we all know, what we are talking about is the NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act, which was passed in 1996. Basically, what the act does, Madam President, as you well know, is that it says there are newly independent states, which formerly were satellite states of the Soviet Union, who are seeking membership or may seek membership in NATO. It is kind of a two-stage process. We did the same thing for Hungary, we did the same thing for Poland, we did the same thing for the Czech Republic, and last year we added Slovenia. We basically said, look, we, the Congress and the President, will come up with some money to help you begin to organize yourself to meet the criteria for admission into NATO. This is not a club that you join because you like it, or join because you simply want to join. This is a deal where everybody has to carry their own weight proportionately within the club, and we are not going to admit anybody who cannot do that. But it requires some expenditure of money on the part of these countries to essentially do the political, economic, and military inventory they need to be able to determine whether or not they can meet the criteria. This is what it is. This is prep money to get them up and running to make their case. So, we are going to be doing here for the Baltics--and I share my friend's view--and for Romania, what we did for Slovenia, for Hungary, for the Czech Republic, and for Poland. I respectfully suggest, now that our friend from Washington is on the floor as well, that there be consideration of amending their amendment to add Bulgaria. Let me explain why. I stated earlier on this floor that I was pleased that the Clinton administration decided to support the first three countries mentioned in the first round. In our meetings we had an opportunity to make our case to the President as to who we thought should be invited to final accession negotiations at Madrid next month. I was disappointed, quite frankly, that the administration decided not to push Slovenia in the first round. After discussion with the President and his advisers, however, I am absolutely confident that Slovenia will make it in the second round, and I am confident that Romania will too. For everybody to understand, we are not just talking about a one-time event. NATO enlargement is an evolving process. Every European democracy, theoretically, is eligible. Probably the Baltics elicit more support than any other area of Europe, for the reasons stated by my friend. With that in mind, the Senator's amendment designates Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Romania to join Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia to be eligible for receiving assistance to prep them for future membership in NATO. They have established democracies, made courageous reforms to create free-market economies, are putting their armies under civilian control, and deserve our support. Another Eastern European country that deserves inclusion in this amendment to let them get prepped and make their case is Bulgaria. After having gotten off to a very slow start toward democracy after the Wall came down, it has now voted the post-Communists out of office. The new Bulgarian administration has begun free-market economic reforms, and recently the Bulgarian Parliament went on record as naming NATO membership as its primary foreign policy goal. Madam President, over the centuries, Bulgaria has been the most pro- Russian country in Europe. So these changes are truly noteworthy. Bulgaria is not as far along the path to NATO membership as the other four countries named in Senator Durbin's amendment, but they have made a definitive break with the past, and the democrats in Sofia, I think, deserve our support and encouragement to move further. I will not push my second-degree amendment now. Before we vote on this, however, or before the chairman makes a decision, I would like them seriously to consider, while the Senator from Washington is making his case, whether or not we should include Bulgaria. As the Senator found in traveling to the Baltics, what I found, whether I was in the Balkans or whether I was in Central or Eastern Europe, that the prospect of becoming a member of NATO has a significant positive impact on whether they establish a market economy, whether they move away from the Communist-controlled apparatchiks who are left over, and whether or not they embrace a foreign policy that looks to the West rather than to the East. So I would ask for his consideration.

Mr. BIDEN. I thank the Senator from Illinois. I will check with my chairman to see if he agrees with that. In the meantime, I see our friend from the State of Washington is here, so I yield the floor. Mr. GORTON addressed the Chair.

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I apologize to my colleague. I was on the phone. If he could give me a second to catch up with my staff on what the Senator just had to say before I attempt to answer him. I apologize for not being here while he spoke. If he has a second amendment, he can go ahead and we may be able to work this out. Let me check.

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, rather than take the time of the Senate, I think the suggestions made by the Senator are appropriate, and I would be happy to--and my colleague from North Carolina indicates he would also--accept the Senator's amendment.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I think the point my friend makes is a valid one. I don't think it was our intention to have this blanket exemption. As I understand the Senator's amendment--and, obviously, the chairman is checking this out himself for his position--from my perspective, it seems to make sense. I want to ask a question. Where there is the potential for a direct conflict--that is, if I were representing the employees on one side of the table, then I were to shift to a policy position or a management position that had jurisdiction over the very issues I was negotiating, I would still be precluded from taking that management position; but if I were to go off to be the economic counselor to the Embassy in Paris, or in Beijing, I would not be precluded, is that right?

Mr. BIDEN. What is happening now, as I understand what the Senator is saying, is a very talented, hopefully ambitious, Foreign Service officer who may very well want the opportunity to have those positions filled--for example, the economic consular in the Embassy in Beijing-- may not take the time to fill the position representing the union; that he or she would be precluded from any reasonable prospect for advancement for 2 years after they leave that position for a practical matter.

Mr. BIDEN. Based on what I understand the amendment intends to do, as the staff informs me, I personally don't have any objection, nor I am told does the chairman. So I urge that we accept the Senator's amendment.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I, myself, am in the strangest position I have found myself in, probably, in the 25 years I have been here. I don't disagree with a single thing that my friend from Indiana has stated. Let me review the bidding, as I understand it, very, very quickly. No. 1, we have to decide, is the United Nations useful? Is the United Nations an important instrument in dealing with crises and conflicts in the world? Should we be a part of it? Does it augment our foreign policy? Is it important? Is it vital? In my view, the answer to every one of those questions is a resounding yes. As a matter of fact, I went so far, as the fellow with whom I engaged in a political campaign last year repeatedly pointed out--I wrote a very long paper, not too long ago, about 4 years ago, where I wrote that I believed we missed an opportunity for making the United Nations the centerpiece for the architecture of peace well into the next century. I think it has a capacity far beyond that which we are asking of it, and I think it has a capacity that is unparalleled by any other potential organization existing or one that I can contemplate. I think we do not spend nearly enough time pointing out what my friend from Indiana has, that 80 percent of the U.N.'s work is helping developing countries help themselves. The fact of the matter is, their work includes promoting and protecting democracy and human rights, developing effective food distribution and food cultivation strategies, assisting disaster victims, helping nations avert military threats by providing a diplomatic floor for dispute resolution. Who else does that besides the United Nations? Where else in the world--where in the world can we possibly go to have any of those functions undertaken? Some would say the United States should do that. The very people who say the United States should do that are the very people who, when the rubber meets the road, say, ``No, no, no, no, we should not be involved. We, the United States, should not be involved. We can't be the world's policemen. We can't be expected to do everything.'' I find it ironic, the same people say the United Nations isn't worth the powder to you know what. So much--all of what the United Nations does, frankly, even though it is exasperating and time consuming and frustrating sometimes, is clearly in our interest. We rely on the United Nations to provide humanitarian assistance to millions who otherwise would have no source of food or shelter. We rely on the United Nations to eradicate disease and improve health around the world. And particularly, it is the United Nations that leads the world in helping children by providing food and shelter and by protecting them from the scourge of disease that threatens their health in many parts of the world. We, the United States, rely on the United Nations to handle the increasing flow of refugees across borders and to prevent refugees from devastating and destroying neighboring economies, security, and the environment. We rely upon the United Nations to counter global crimes. The United Nations coordinates the international cooperation to fight terrorism, to counter drug trafficking. We rely on the United Nations to facilitate and maintain peace. In short, we rely on the United Nations in a way that we rely on no other organization. It is indispensable. So, that is the place from which we both start. I think it is fair to say our voting records for the last 20 years or so have been almost identical relative to the United Nations. I have not been one who has voted to cut the United Nations. The point that the Senator has made repeatedly and I have made repeatedly is the average American thinks, when we talk about arrearages we owe the United Nations, they think we owe money to a bloated bureaucracy out there that is wasting our money with all of these ghost employees who are doing nothing but subsidizing the economy back home and wasting our money and then voting against our interests, and that is where the money goes. Hardly any of the money that we owe goes to the Secretariat, goes to pay salaries at the United Nations, or goes to turn the heat and light on. The bulk of the money we owe, we owe to our friends for the reason my friend said. We said: Hey, we ain't sending GI Joe. You send your guys. You send your guys. We can't be expected to be everywhere. And we vote. We have a vote in the U.N. Security Council. If we don't want to vote to send anybody there, we can say no, and they don't go. But we vote yes because we view it to be in our policy interests, our foreign policy interests. So, who do we owe? We owe France, we owe England, we owe Belgium. I have a list right here. I will repeat it. It bears repeating: France, Great Britain, The Netherlands, Pakistan, Germany, Belgium, Italy, India, Canada. That is where the bulk of the money is we owe--for peacekeeping. I say to my friend from Indiana, one of the things I tried to note in negotiating this is: I'll tell you what, why don't we just pay all the peacekeeping stuff up front? We can sell that to the folks here. Even the those that don't like the United Nations, they like Great Britain, they like Germany. Even the folks that don't like the United Nations acknowledge France is an ally. Why don't we just pay them, no strings, nothing, pay what we owe, bingo. I even tried to put in an amendment. The Senator used the phrase, ``pass through.'' In a sense, the United Nations is passing through that money to them. I even came up with language--I should say this young man on my staff came up with language--to say: Guarantee that the money just passes through, cannot be diverted to go anyplace else: Pass through, pay France; pass through, pay Belgium, pass through--et cetera. Tried that route. As was pointed out accurately by my friends with whom I was negotiating, ``Hey, look, we realize if you pay our friends, then the pressure is relieved. The pressure is relieved. We're not likely to get these changes we want in the United Nations.'' So you are right, this is pressure; you are right. We finally, after all these negotiations, which included the administration, said, ``OK, what do we do? Do we end up essentially emasculating the United Nations, causing its further''--talk about resentment--``further resentment?'' Let me back up. I apologize to my friend for him having to hear this for the third time from me. I have heard from him as well three times, and I welcome hearing 10 more times, because he is right on the merits. I was asked if I would have a meeting with the President of the General Assembly. I forget how many people he brought along with him, three or four folks representing their countries in the United Nations, their Ambassadors. They came down to see me--I am paraphrasing as was stated by the spokesperson for the President--as a friend of the United Nations seeking my help. We sat around the conference table in my office for, I don't know, an hour, hour and a half. I listened to what they had to say. I said, basically, ``You're right.'' I said, ``Let me get this straight now. You are saying three things to me: One, you acknowledge the United Nations needs some reform and you want that reform to take place anyway and you're going to initiate it. But if we even request, if Senator Helms' benchmark includes any of the reforms you have already contemplated you want to do, if it did, then it would make it harder for you to do them because people would resent the fact that we were telling you you had to do them.'' I said, ``Do I have that straight?'' They said, ``Yes, that's right.'' I said, ``Let me get the second point. The second point is you desperately need a demonstration of the board of findings of the United States that we're going to pay our debt, and that you can't wait another year on promises. It is no longer good enough you have a President who says he is with you and you have a minority of Senators who say they are with you, you need something tangible right now.'' ``Yes, that's my second message, Senator.'' ``But your third message is: Give us the money with no strings now, even if it is not all of it, in order for us to be able to get things underway to demonstrate we will reform in order for you then to have enough votes to produce the rest of the money.'' I said, ``So you acknowledge it is going to have to be staged, right?'' ``Yes.'' I said, ``I agree with you, but before you leave, let me ask you a question. Given your choice, no money and no conditions this year or conditions that are consistent with the things you say you want to do anyway and you are willing to attempt to do, and significant money this year with a significant commitment for the bulk of the money the next year and the remainder the third year, which do you pick?'' They said, ``We pick the conditions and money rather than no money, no conditions.'' So I sat down with the administration and I said, ``OK, folks, you sent up here a proposal for over a billion dollars in 1 year. Got anybody to support it besides me?'' ``Yeah, we got some other people to support it,'' and named, I believe your name was taken in vain, I say to Senator Lugar, and a few others. I said, ``Do you think you have enough votes to get that done?'' They said, ``No, we don't think so.'' ``What do you want me to do? Well, let's see what we can get done.'' So I met with the Secretary, and I met with our U.N. Ambassador, our former colleague from the House. I said, ``You have to tell us your drop-dead number''--excuse the expression. ``What is the bottom line on this? If I can't get all you need, what is the bottom line on all this? And I want to tell you what the conditions are here that Senator Helms wants. I don't want any of those conditions, but what ones can you live with and what can't you live with?'' And we began a long, long process of negotiating. The end result is what you see here. The end result is the administration, whether they are right, wrong or indifferent, told me on this part of the U.N., they want more. They don't like the conditions. They believe the minimum number should be $1.21 billion. They don't believe we owe, by the way, 1 billion 4. They don't agree with that. They don't think we owe that, which is the number everybody uses. They say we don't owe that. When the day was done, the Senator from North Carolina made some significant concessions. That left the Senator from Delaware in a position to say, ``OK, the U.N. says, bottom line, they would rather run the risk of not risking another year of nothing,'' notwithstanding the fact it will cause them serious problems. In turn, I think the Senator is right; it is going to cause us additional problems. The administration says we can do it on this amount of money and we can make those conditions work if you stagger the conditions to the end. ``Give us the bulk of the money upfront and make the hard conditions at the end.'' That is what they said. So we go back to the threshold question: Is the United Nations in our interest? I believe deeply that it is essential--essential--to the ability to carry a sound foreign policy for this country into the next decade and beyond. OK. Now, what is the best chance of the U.N. continuing to be viable? Take a chance on something that the President of the General Assembly doesn't like but acknowledges, given two bad choices, would rather have, take the position the President does not like, our U.N. Ambassador does not like but believes can get the job done if that is what it has to be, or go back to square one, which is debate this on principle--and I am not belittling and I am not being a smart guy saying that--debate the principle of this for another 4 months or 2 months or 6 months or a year and leave Ambassador Richardson totally empty-handed, with no money, not give the Secretary General anything to demonstrate that we have other than a minority of us and the President saying we will pay, the check is in the mail, or go ahead and do what is proposed in this legislation? I honestly believe, unless the administration is fundamentally wrong in their calculation, this is in the absolute best interest of the United States of America and has the greatest prospect of continuing to have the United States viable than any other alternative I can come up with. The next question, it seems to me, is reasonable to ask: OK, Biden, geez, you agree with Senator Lugar, he is your ally, you are in the same boat on this thing, you agree with the principle he is saying, you got this much, why not go along with him and raise it? Maybe if you speak up now, you may get enough votes to get 51 people in this body to vote up that number. There is a simple answer to that. It may not be a good answer in the minds of most people. The editorial boards of the New York Times and others won't like it, but if I do that, there is no deal. Then we go back, not negotiating between 819 and 1 billion 21 or whatever the Senator's amendment is going to say precisely, or saying we pay all the 819 without any conditions and whether we pay the 819 with conditions, we go back to zero versus 1.021, or zero versus 819 and no conditions. I don't suggest that I know any more than my friend from Maryland, Senator Sarbanes, and my friend from Indiana, Senator Lugar, but I do suggest I don't know any less about how this place works. I do suggest that paying this over 2 years will be better than over 3, but the issue is whether it is over 5 or none when we started this. I do suggest it is better to have no conditions than the conditions we have in here, but I suggest it is much worse to have the original conditions than the conditions that are in this bill. I have a vast amount of respect for both my colleagues. As my friend from Indiana will tell you, when I thought that the Senator from North Carolina was unwilling to raise the level to the amount that the administration said they needed, I picked up the phone and I called the Senator from Indiana, and I called two other of my Republican colleagues on the committee, and I said, ``If I offer an amendment to fully fund this,'' or if we offer it, ``can we get it adopted?'' In the case of two other Republican Senators, I said, ``If I offer it, will you vote for it?'' In the case of the Senator from Indiana, I said, ``If we offer it, what do you think our chances are?'' In the meantime, the Senator from North Carolina, the chairman of the committee, said, ``All right, I will go to the minimum number that the administration says they need, but I won't go any further.'' In addition to that, we also were able to get the number up for the international organization account for this year's State Department authorization and a lot of other things that the administration wanted. So here we are. I will end where I began, where the Senator from Indiana began. This is one of the most important decisions we are going to make. The viability of the United Nations and our influence on that organization is critical to American foreign policy interests, to the interests of the United States over the next several decades. Strategically, we have not one bit of difference. Tactically, is it better to get what the administration says they can make work, what the Secretary General says he appreciates--the attempt we are making and doesn't know if he will get funding from, but thanks for the effort, and what the President of the General Assembly says he would rather have, given two bad choices. Is it tactically better to go that route, to ``save the U.N.'' and us in it, or is it tactically better to not go this route, go the route of the amendment of my friend from Indiana, and if we win, hope that my friend from North Carolina says, ``Well, I lost here on the floor, that's OK by me''? I choose the first tactical option for the same strategic reason the Senator from Indiana chooses the second. I had one of my colleagues say, ``You know, you got the chairman to go up to 819. The trouble with you is you just didn't have a tough enough bargain. You could have gotten him to go higher. If you just held faster, he would have gone higher.'' I respectfully suggest, name me someone else who got the chairman up to 819 or even remotely close. There is one other provision I am almost reluctant to raise here, but one of the provisions the chairman has in this mark is that we get paid money for our peacekeeping. The administration believes there are moneys owed us as well and believes the U.N. owes us about $107 million. That is not part of this legislation, but it is part of the calculus. It may end up being a fight between OMB and the administration--I mean, within the administration. It may be a fight in some other place if the administration really cares about this. Do not come to me and tell me it is easier to get another $107 million from my good friend here and a majority of his colleagues, our colleagues who are his allies, if they cannot work out an internal problem within the administration. So we are at least theoretically talking about $925 million versus $1.021 billion. We have all been in this business long enough. If, in fact, our Ambassador to the United Nations--probably the most skilled negotiator we have ever had in that spot in the history of the United Nations--if he cannot figure out the difference over 3 years for roughly $90 million, then he is not the fellow I worked with in the last decade and a half. Like I said, as one of my colleagues said to me, ``Joe, I've been here too long. I'm not doing this on anything other than on pure principle anymore.'' Well, that is great. That is great. My honest opinion--and that was not said by my friend from Indiana, although he is an incredibly principled guy--in my view, tactically, this is the single best thing that can happen to enhance and give the greatest prospect for the outcome that I desire occurring, and that is, a viable United Nations, with the United States playing a vital role and the United Nations playing a vital role. Again, every argument made by my friend from Maryland in the committee and my friend from Indiana in the committee, and here, is accurate as it relates to whether or not we are imposing on the United Nations. We are. I might add, I do not know how they voted, but we voted on legislation that imposed on the United Nations an IG, an inspector general. We imposed that on them. I did not hear anybody standing on the floor then saying, ``We are imposing on the United Nations.'' Maybe somebody did. It sure did not reach this level. It is not new. Some may recall in a previous Republican administration, the Secretary General discussed with us reducing our share to 20 percent-- actually, below 20 percent, between 10 and 15 percent --and the then Republican Secretary of State said, ``No, we don't want to go that low. It will diminish our influence.'' So it is not like we are coming out of the blue with a number that cannot possibly be met. Agreed, I do not like doing business this way. If I sign on to a contract, even though the terms turn against me, I stick with the contract until--as our friend from Mississippi, Senator Stennis, used to say every time you would look at him--I have one of his letters he sent me. He said, ``You got to plow the field to the last furrow, to the end of the road.'' Well, that is how I think contracts work. You plow the field to the last furrow, to the end of the road, then negotiate next year's crop, then negotiate how many furrows next year. That is the better way to do it. That is how I am used to doing business. Personally, as a Senator, as a legislator, as a man--as a man--this field is not going to have any crops. It is not going to grow anything because there is no plow in the field right now. We may not have enough of a plow to plow the field to the last row, to the last furrow at the end of the row, but, boy, we have 99 percent of the field covered. Then, as I said earlier--and I will yield the floor with this--in a slightly different context today I said, you know, I am a Senator. That means I am an optimist. To be a Senator, it seems to me, you have to be an optimist. You would not choose this job knowingly if you thought things were not going to turn out. Well, look, 3 years is a long time. Kofi Annan, the Secretary General, called me on Friday. I realize that is nothing unique. I am not the only guy that has spoken to him. But he called me. I happened to have known him in his former incarnation in the United Nations. He is one heck of a guy. And he called and said, ``Joe, I want to thank you for the try.'' He did not say, ``I called and said I think it is a good deal.'' He said, ``I want to thank you.'' I do not recall whether he said it or I said it, but he will hear it, so he will correct me if I am wrong. My recollection was that one of us said off the other's sentence, ``Three years is a long time.'' And then he said, ``I hope by the end of this year many of the very proposals and reforms you're asking for will already be done and maybe that will change some people's minds.'' The administration only asks for $100 million in fiscal year 1998, and this gives them $100 million in fiscal year 1998. The conditions they have to meet are basically zero. They have to promise our sovereignty is not in jeopardy, essentially. The second year, the $400 million and some, the conditions get a little tougher--not very tough. The third year, the last $244 million, that is where the rubber meets the road. The Senator did not want to do it that way. The Senator wanted the rubber to meet the road the first date. Is that a fair statement, I say to my friend from North Carolina? He has actually made some genuine, serious concessions. I said, let us keep this ball in play. That is my plea. Let us keep the U.N. in play. Get them money now. Start to pay back our debts now. Get it underway now. As I am one of those guys that thinks once you put the ball in play, we win--we will reach the appropriate outcome. My concern with the approach taken by my friend from Indiana--and he, as I said, has been here almost as long as I have; he is a skilled politician in the best sense of the word, as well as a principled, knowledgeable legislator--he could be right that the route I am taking you down tactically will not get us to the strategic objective, and maybe the way to do this is call the bluff, call the bluff. But I doubt whether or not even he believes that if we were to prevail, or if I were to abandon this fairly reached deal, that we would likely, at the end of the process, be any further along than we were the end of last year. Keep in mind--I want to say it again because I have been absolutely, completely straight with my friend from North Carolina--if we go to conference and they have no money--by the way, unless something happened in the last couple days, they have zero, nothing, for the U.N., zero--if this means we go to conference and Biden is expected to go from $819 million to $408,500,000, they have the wrong guy. My bottom line is $819 million. So we may not get to there from here even if we do it my way--not my way, the way suggested in this legislation. But I respectfully suggest no one has laid out for me, and I am anxious to hear it, how we get from here to there. And the ``there'' is preserving the United Nations, our position within it, its viability, credibility, and ours as well. I cannot believe, if the Senator from Indiana were President--and he would have made a good one--and I were the Secretary of State--I doubt he would have picked me--I cannot believe, if he said, ``Joe, you go see Chirac, you go see Blair, you go see Kohl, you work out something on this arrearages deal with them.'' I cannot believe I could not get that done for him without damaging my relationship with them and figuring out a way at the end of the day--the end of the day, whether that means 3 years or 5 years or 7 years--to pay what we owe. But I do not know how to get from here to there. Were he President and I Secretary of State, and he said, ``Joe, go work out a deal with those guys. And, by the way, you have no money. We can't come up with a nickel. You go work it out.'' I do not know, folks--I do not know. I think I have a little bit of a greater faith in this administration than my colleagues do, and a little greater faith in the ability of our Ambassador to the United Nations to make this work without suffering the consequences that could and may be suffered if this were to pass. But like I said, I have not heard any other idea. And I have been working with this too long to fall on my sword. I again close where I opened. I think on the merits--my friend from North Carolina knows how I feel--I think on the merits my friend from Indiana is correct. But I think the merits and the friendship of the Senator from Indiana may get me into the girls State championship basketball game in Indiana, maybe, but it will not get me much further--probably will not even get me there. I yield the floor. Mr. SARBANES addressed the Chair. Mr. HELMS addressed the Chair.

Mr. BIDEN. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. BIDEN. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. BIDEN. Yes.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, last Thursday, 55 of us joined Senators Leahy of Vermont and Hagel of Nebraska in cosponsoring the Landmine Elimination Act of 1977. This landmark legislation will bar, as of January 1, 2000, the use of any U.S. funds for new deployments of antipersonnel landmines. I am proud to be one of the cosponsors of this legislation, which addresses a subject of terrible urgency. Every hour, more innocent civilians are killed or wounded by landmines in Angola, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Cambodia, Ecuador, and elsewhere. The scourge of landmines is so great that the United States and other governments have special aid programs to help locate and destroy landmines left over from the wars of the past. The United States is pursuing many avenues to battle this plague. We are a signatory of the antipersonnel landmine protocol to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, which I would hope the Senate will give its advice and consent to ratification of that protocol sometime this year. That protocol bans undetectable mines, such as the toy-like plastic butterfly mines that maim so many children. The United States is well on its way toward converting all its nondetectable mines, so there will be very few costs associated with ratification of this protocol. We are also engaged in negotiations in Geneva and working with the Government of Canada on the projected Ottawa convention in hopes of obtaining a worldwide ban on antipersonnel landmines. But those negotiations have left the United States in a quandary. Russia and China--the world's major suppliers of antipersonnel landmines--have refused to participate in the Ottawa process to achieve an immediate ban on these mines. And Mexico has blocked the U.N. Conference on Disarmament from opening the formal negotiations in which Russia and China are willing to participate. Nobody is clear on whether Mexico's step reflects frustration with the idea of gradualism in eliminating antipersonnel landmines, or a desire to continue using such mines in Mexico's own war against the domestic guerrilla movements. What is clear, however, is that bold steps are needed to regain momentum in the crusade to end this most horrendous aspect of modern warfare. Two years ago, two-thirds of this body voted for a moratorium on new antipersonnel landmine deployments, beginning in February 1999. The Landmine Elimination Act of 1977 will go a giant step further, by committing the United States to just say no to these mines on January 1, 2000. This action will put the United States on a higher moral plane than ever before on this issue. With a legally binding commitment to end our own role in sowing needless destruction, perhaps we can more effectively influence Russia and China and Mexico to step up to the responsibility of protecting the innocents even when we make war on our enemies. S. 896 is a carefully constructed bill, Mr. President, and that is a sign of the seriousness with which this body approaches the topic of landmines. Subsection 2(d) of the bill permits the President to delay application of the ban with respect to the Korean peninsula on a yearly basis if he determines that new deployments would be indispensable to the defense of the Republic of Korea if war should occur there. This is a broader exemption than that in the moratorium we passed 2 years ago, which allows such mining only along international borders and in the DMZ. Given the risk that a dying Stalinist regime in North Korea might throw all its forces into a last-gasp effort to conquer the South, this broader exemption is sensible indeed. S. 896 also is clearly limited to the most heinous landmines: Mines delivered by artillery, rocket, mortar, or similar means, or dropped from an aircraft. The bill goes to state, at subsection 4(b): ``The term `anti-personnel landmines' does not include command-detonated Claymore munitions.'' Command-detonated landmines do not cause the many civilian casualties that have prompted work action. They are generally set off either by a nearby soldier, who waits for the enemy to approach, or by a tripwire in an ambush. They are used often to blow up tanks, and do not leave the indiscriminate killing fields that so plague farmers and travelers and children today. Nobody is comfortable manufacturing any instrument of death. But at least Claymore munitions are targeted munitions, designed to kill the enemy rather than his neighbors and his children. The care with which S. 896 has been drafted makes this a bill that all of us can support. I am happy to cosponsor it and I am confident that it will be enacted into law.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, having recently returned from Paris and the signing of the NATO-Russia charter, I rise today to discuss what is one of the most important foreign policy questions facing the United States--and facing this body: The enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to include several new democracies of Central Europe. Mr. President, I know that what I have just said will at first seem counterintuitive to many Americans. Why is NATO enlargement so important? After all, the Soviet Union is but a bad memory, communism in Europe lives on in stunted form only in Serbia and Belarus, and no military threat in Europe is in sight. Moreover, some will correctly point out, the Pacific Rim has become the world's premier area for economic growth, and Latin America, while also a prime opportunity for trade and investment, is vitally important to the United States because of problems like illegal immigration and drug trafficking. So why are we bothering with Europe, much less tinkering with a hugely successful alliance like NATO? Mr. President, these are legitimate questions that must be answered. I would submit, first of all, without minimizing the importance of Asia and Latin America, that Europe remains a vital area of interest for the United States for political, strategic, economic, and cultural reasons. A sizable percentage of the world's democracies are in Europe, and the continent remains a major global economic player and partner of the United States. The European union, composed of 15 vibrant free-market democracies, has embarked upon an ambitious program to create an ever closer union with greater political, economic, and social integration. Most of Central and Eastern Europe has gone through several free elections, and democracy is putting down firm roots. In economic terms, the European union, with a combined population a third larger than ours, has a combined gross domestic product that exceeds ours. While the United States has a larger--and, I might add, less balanced--trading relationship with Asia than with Europe, we invest far more in Europe. Several new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe have highly educated work forces, already boast rapidly expanding economies, and already attract considerable American investment. Moreover, most Americans trace their cultural roots to Europe, and millions retain personal ties to it. By any geopolitical standard, it would be a catastrophe for U.S. interests if instability would alter the current situation in Europe. How might that instability occur? Well, no one believes that the Russian army is poised to pour through the Fulda Gap in Germany--NATO's horror scenario for 45 years. The Russian army is in such pitiful shape that it could not even reconquer little Chechnya, a part of the Russian federation. No, the threats to stability in Europe have changed, but they are, if anything, even more real than those of the cold war. We all know what they are. They are ethnic and religious hatred as horrifyingly shown in the hundreds of thousands killed, raped, made homeless, or otherwise brutalized in Bosnia. They are the well-organized forces of international crime, whose tentacles extend from Moscow and Palermo to New York and Los Angeles. True--but some might ask why the Europeans can't take care of their own problems? Mr. President, life is not fair. Unfortunately, the history of the 20th century has demonstrated that the United States must play a leading role in organizing the security of Europe. In World War I, in World War II, and lately in Bosnia and Herzegovina, without American leadership the countries of Europe have been unable to resolve their differences peacefully. While American idealism has certainly played a role in our various interventions to rescue Europe, enlightened self-interest has been the dominant motive. Put simply: It is in the vital interest of the United States that stability be preserved in Europe. How does that translate into 1997 terms? It means that we must lead the Europeans to create what is called in current policy jargon a new security architecture to guarantee stability to the areas most vulnerable to disruption. To no one's surprise, I am talking about Central and Eastern Europe, where Newly Independent States are striving to create and solidify political democracy and free markets. It is a difficult process, which if not put into a larger framework could spin out of control. It is in this context that the enlargement of NATO must be seen. During the cold war, NATO provided the security umbrella under which former enemies like France and Germany were able to cooperate and build highly successful free societies. It was the framework in which former pariahs like Germany, Italy, and Spain could be reintegrated into democratic Europe. And it was NATO that kept the feud between Greece and Turkey from escalating to warfare. The enlargement of NATO can now serve to move the zone of stability eastward to central Europe and thereby both prevent ethnic conflicts from escalating and forestall a scramble for new bilateral and multilateral pacts along the lines of the 1930's from occurring. For if NATO were not to enlarge, the countries between Germany and Russia would inevitably seek other means to protect themselves. The question for today is not ``enlarge NATO or remain the same.'' The status quo is simply not an option. In fact, we already have clear evidence of how NATO can act as a stabilizing influence in the region. Two years ago, NATO listed friendly relations with neighbors as one of the core criteria for joining the alliance. Merely the possibility of attaining membership rapidly induced centuries-old enemies like Hungary and Romania to bury the hatchet, conclude a treaty of friendship, and even begin intensive military cooperation. The same is true to a lesser extent between Hungary and Slovakia. Italy and Slovenia have settled a long-festering property dispute. The Czech Republic and Germany have formally come to terms with the Nazis' war-time atrocities and with Czechoslovakia's post-war expulsion of 3 million sudeten Germans. I submit that none of these highly encouraging developments would have occurred without the carrot of admission to NATO having been offered. Mr. President, there is one additional argument for NATO enlargement: The moral one. For 40 years the United States loudly proclaimed its solidarity with the captive nations of Central and Eastern Europe who were under the heel of Communist oppressors. Now that most of them have cast off their shackles, it is our responsibility to live up to our pledges to readmit them into the West through NATO and the European Union when they are fully qualified. Let me be precise in my policy formulation. I believe it would be in our national interest for NATO to extend invitations to final negotiations for membership at its July summit in Madrid to Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia. All of these countries have fulfilled the basic criteria for NATO membership--Political democracy, free-market economy, civilian control of the military, peaceful relations with neighbors, and a commitment to NATO principles and Trans-Atlantic security. In each of these countries democracy and free-market capitalism are on sound footings. All four are able to assume the political, military, and financial responsibilities of membership. Mr. President, this morning the administration announced that it will only support the candidacies at Madrid of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. I regret the omission of Slovenia from this list, but I recognize the political realities--especially among the current European members of NATO--that argued for this decision. After my discussions last night with the President and his advisers, I am convinced that Slovenia will be the No. 1 candidate for membership in the second round of NATO enlargement--and in a short time. For me, the logic of enlargement is inescapable. But because the issue is complex and remote from the daily lives of most Americans, I also believe that it is critically important immediately to initiate a national debate on NATO enlargement. No foreign policy, no matter how well-formulated, can be sustained without the informed consent of the American people, which is why we need to launch a national debate to explore the costs, obligations, and benefits to the United States of NATO enlargement. I have asked Chairman Helms to hold hearings in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; I believe they will be an essential part of this debate. Meetings in non-governmental forums across the country are likewise essential if our people are to understand the profound importance of the issue before us. I believe that when they have examined the facts, the American people will support us in our effort to enlarge the alliance and build the new European security architecture. For 40 years after World War II, NATO bound together the democracies of Western Europe and North America in a military alliance to counter the threat of Soviet communism. The statesmen who crafted the Washington treaty of 1949 bequeathed their successors an alliance of unparalleled effectiveness, one that deterred aggression for four decades until its adversary collapsed from internal weakness. Ironically, within the fruits of NATO's success lie the seeds of its possible demise. Alliances are formed to fight wars or to deter them. Once the adversary is gone, unless they adapt to meet changing threats, they lose their reason for being. My good friend from Indiana, Senator Lugar, recognized this fact when he said that NATO must ``go out of area or go out of business,'' and I wholeheartedly agree with him. For this reason too, the status quo is simply not an option. Enlargement must be accompanied by a redefinition of NATO's mission. The Alliance's primary mission as outlined in article 5 of the Washington Treaty of April 4, 1949, remains the same: Treating an attack on one member as an attack on all and responding through the use of armed force if necessary. Now, in the current post-cold-war situation, non-article 5 missions like peacekeeping, sometimes in cooperation with non-NATO powers have become possible. The SFOR joint effort in Bosnia and Herzegovina with Russia and several other non-NATO countries is an excellent example. But what about our erstwhile adversary, Russia? Many ask whether enlarging NATO will not rekindle the cold war and strengthen the hand of hostile nationalists and communists in Russia. Again, this is not only a legitimate question to ask, but a necessary one. Mr. President, I firmly believe that NATO enlargement need not adversely affect United States relations with Russia. I came to this conclusion on a trip to Moscow and several central European capitals earlier this spring. My observations are contained in greater detail in a Foreign Relations Committee report that I wrote entitled: ``Meeting the challenges of a Post-Cold War World: NATO Enlargement and U.S.-Russia Relations.'' Although few Russians are fond of NATO enlargement, policymakers in Moscow have accepted it. Moreover, no Russian politician whom I met-- from communist leader Zyuganov, to liberal leader Yavlinsky, to the nationalist General Lebed--believed that NATO enlargement constitutes a security threat to Russia. In fact, nearly all politicians and experts whom I met understood the non-aggressiveness implicit in NATO's ``three no's" --the Alliance's declarations of having no reason, intention, or plan in the current and foreseeable security environment permanently to station nuclear weapons or substantial combat forces of current members on the territory of new members. Rather, the Kremlin's public opposition to enlargement is largely a psychological question connected with the loss of empire, wounded pride, and--most importantly--an uncertainty about Russia's place in the world of the 21st century. As part of this uncertainty, most Russian leaders are worried about their country's being marginalized, and as a result they are eager to move forward with its bilateral relationship with the United States. Mr. President, let us not kid ourselves. Never is a long time, and Russia's current weakened condition is sure to improve. We must continue to engage Russia politically, militarily, and economically. The Clinton administration, together with our NATO allies, has already begun to do so. As I mentioned earlier, 2 weeks ago in Paris, the heads of government of the 16 NATO members and President Yeltsin signed the so-called ``Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security Between NATO and the Russian Federation.'' President Clinton asked me to accompany him to represent the United States at the signing ceremony. Time does not permit me to go into detail about this lengthy document, except to say that it is a good start at binding Russia closer to the West and soothing its bruised feelings, without giving Moscow a decision-making role in NATO's core structures. It creates a new body called the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, which will serve as a forum for consultation on matters such as peacekeeping operations, conflict prevention, and combatting terrorism. But let me reemphasize to my colleagues that the Alliance will not in any way be subordinated to the NATO-Russia Joint Council. When NATO members gather to discuss alliance policy, no outside country will have any right or privilege to prevent NATO from doing what is best for its member states. And no outside country will have any say in whether new countries are admitted to NATO. Its purely consultative mandate, however, does not mean that the Joint Council cannot evolve into a truly valuable mechanism for promoting mutual trust. As Russian officials better understand that NATO is not the rapacious caricature of Soviet propaganda, but rather a defensive alliance and force for security and stability in Europe, their animosity toward the organization may dissipate. And by working together in the Joint Council, Russia can prove that it is a responsible partner for the West. Through this mechanism and others, over time Moscow can come to realize that the enlargement of NATO by moving the zone of stability eastward to Central Europe will increase Russia's own security. One problem, however, requires immediate attention. There needs to be a mechanism by which the countries invited at Madrid can participate in NATO before their full accession to membership. I would suggest in this regard making the candidates observers to the North Atlantic Council. I am pleased that the chairman of the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, my friend from Oregon, Senator Smith, plans to hold a hearing on the NATO-Russia Founding Act to examine these issues in detail. Mr. President, it is also essential that arms control agreements with Russia be ratified and expanded. Of special importance is getting the State Duma to ratify the START II Treaty and then, together with the United States, to move on to further reductions in START III. Despite recent press commentaries, I do not believe that the NATO-Russia Founding Act or NATO enlargement will substantially affect START II's ratification prospects in the Duma. Moreover, as the NATO-Russia Founding Act recognizes, the treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe [C.F.E.] must be adapted to reflect the changed environment. The overwhelming Senate ratification last month of the C.F.E. Flank document, together with its approval by the other twenty-nine states parties to the C.F.E. Treaty, augurs well for the C.F.E. adaptation negotiations. In addition, it is vitally important that the United States continue its economic engagement with Russia, not through massive infusions of money, which Moscow, especially if it cleans up its corruption, does not need, but more through broadened investment and trade, expanded grassroots partnerships, and some targeted technical assistance. Significantly, not a single senior official in Warsaw, Prague, Budapest, or Ljubljana whom I met wanted to isolate Russia from the West. In order for NATO enlargement to proceed, both our current allies and the candidate countries invited to join at the Madrid Summit next month must agree to shoulder their fair share of financial costs and all mutual obligations. An agreement on sharing these costs is essential not only to enlargement, but to the continued viability of NATO itself. The candidates for membership in NATO must assume the financial burden of making their armed forces interoperable with those of NATO members, in addition to meeting the costs of modernizing their militaries, which they must undertake in any event. Other obligations are political and military, such as agreeing to come to the aid of allies, as described in article 5; allowing basing of NATO troops on their territory, if necessary; and allowing overflights of NATO aircraft, if necessary. The February 1997 Pentagon study on NATO proposed a distribution of direct costs of enlargement whereby 15 percent would be assumed by the United States, 35 percent by the new members, and 50 percent by the other current members of NATO. Calculating these ratios begins with the estimate that about 40 percent of direct enlargement enhancements could be nationally funded, and 60 percent common funded. Estimated direct costs of enlargement total between $9 and $12 billion over 12 years, through 2009. Let me point out to my colleagues that it is only these direct costs that the United States would help pay for. Additional costs not directly related to enlargement will have to be paid for by our current allies and our new allies. The central European countries must modernize their militaries--a cost they will incur whether or not they join NATO. Those costs are estimated at $10 to $13 billion through 2009. And the responsibilty for bearing these costs rests solely with the governments of the four leading candidates. Another pivotal issue is that our current allies must develop power projection capabilities, which the United States achieved in the 1980's, if they are to contribute to the new missions of the alliance. While these capabilities will allow them to help defend new members, they are necessary even if NATO were not to enlarge. As a result, these costs of $8 to $10 billion over 12 years are, likewise, not a direct cost of enlargement, but they are essential to the future of NATO, and they must be borne alone by our current allies. The expected U.S. contribution of $150 to $200 million per year for 10 years, although a small fraction of our total defense budget, is nonetheless not trivial, given our mandate to balance the U.S. Federal budget by the year 2002. Mr. President, prospective new NATO members must keep that basic political fact of life in mind, lest they get the erroneous impression that their accession to the alliance would be a painless, free ride. The candidate countries must make the financial means available if they expect current members to ratify their accession to membership. As I told one Polish military official, ``If you want to fly first class, you have to buy a first class ticket.'' They must realize that freedom isn't free, and security isn't cheap. Having given this warning, I fear that the 50 percent share of direct enlargement costs allocated to the Western European NATO partners and Canada may, in fact, be politically more difficult than the 35 percent allocated to the new members, particularly after our current allies pay for their power projection enhancements. One of the complicating factors is that the 11 European NATO members who are also members of the European Union are currently engaged in painful budget cutting in order to meet the Maastricht convergence criteria for Economic and Monetary Union [E.M.U.] on January 1, 1999. Those who qualify may be held to rigid fiscal discipline thereafter, if a stability pact is enforced without ``political'' criteria. Resentment against this belt-tightening played a key role in the defeat of President Chirac's conservative coalition in the French elections on June 1st. As a politician, I empathize with the challenge our European friends face. But we all have to make difficult choices, and if our European allies want continued American involvement in their security, they must step up to the plate. In order for NATO to remain a vibrant organization with the United States continuing to play a lead role, the non-U.S. members must assume their fair share of direct enlargement costs and for developing power projection capabilities. To do otherwise would cast the United States in the role of ``the good gendarme of Europe''--a role that neither the American people, nor the Senate of the United States, would accept. Mr. President, there is one more dark cloud looming on the horizon of European-American relations. I fear that a coincidence of events in the late spring of 1998 may make Senate ratification of NATO enlargement problematical. Just when the Senate is likely to be voting on amending the Washington Treaty to accept new members, American ground forces will be completing their withdrawal from Bosnia. As it now stands, our European NATO allies will follow suit, repeating an ``in together, out together'' mantra, despite a United States offer to make air, naval, communications, and intelligence assets available to a European-led follow-on force, with an American Rapid Reaction Force on standby alert ``over the horizon'' in Hungary or Italy. Many of my colleagues, mindful of the repeated calls by some European NATO members, led by France, for more European leadership in the alliance and a sturdier ``European pillar'' within NATO, may see in the european refusal to maintain troops in Bosnia evidence of inequitable burden-sharing or--worse still--may question the worth of NATO altogether. Therefore, I believe that our European NATO partners, especially France and the United Kingdom, should reconsider their unwillingness to lead a post-SFOR ground force in Bosnia after mid-1998. Mr. President, international organizations other than NATO also have meaningful security components and should be encouraged to intensify their efforts. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [O.S.C.E.], which during the past few years has undertaken conflict-prevention, crisis management, and electoral missions in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, Chechnya, Bosnia, and Albania, will likely continue to grow in importance. The United States is playing an increasingly important role in the O.S.C.E. And should continue to do so. The European Union also plays a profound role in stabilizing the continent. The E.U.'s immense economic clout has made it vital to the development of central and Eastern Europe, and it is therefore virtually inconceivable that even a non-NATO E.U. member state would be the object of aggression. The E.U. hopes some day to create a common foreign and security policy, and in the recent past France concentrated on giving the E.U. an independent military dimension through the Western European Union [W.E.U.]. Two events in the 1990's have altered this development. First, the gulf war revealed how far the U.S. was ahead of Europe in military technology. Second, NATO endorsed a European security and defense identity within the alliance, which would allow European members to carry out contingency operations under W.E.U. political control and strategic direction. As a result, Paris reconsidered and now intends to re-enter NATO's integrated command. Its demand, however, for European control of the southern command in Naples--a nonstarter idea, totally rejected by the United States--is complicating the issue. There is, though, a sub-surface tension between NATO and the E.U. from the early 1990's the E.U. firmly proclaimed that NATO enlargement had to precede E.U. expansion [the accession 2 years ago of Austria, Finland, and Sweden excepted]. Some observers have feared that the E.U. has used NATO enlargement as a pretext for postponing the admission of qualified central and Eastern European countries. Now that NATO has set a 1999 date for completion of its first round of enlargement, the E.U. should move ahead with its own expansion. A first-round target date of 2002 has been cited and should be met. In the meantime, as President Clinton advocated 2 weeks ago in the Hague, western governments and private enterprise should cooperate on investment mechanisms to assist the economies of the new democracies to move rapidly forward. Public opinion polls in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary reveal that, to a greater or lesser degree, the citizenries are unclear about the mutual military obligations that NATO membership entails. With these data in mind, I have personally urged the three national governments quickly to embark upon public education campaigns so that invitations to join NATO in Madrid in July will not catch their populations off guard and unaware of the action their governments are proposing. The process of NATO enlargement must not lead to the drawing of new lines through Europe. In order to prevent such a development, NATO must make unmistakably clear that the first round of enlargement is not the last, but rather the beginning of an ongoing process. Moreover, NATO should take steps to strengthen and deepen ties with candidate countries that do not receive invitations at Madrid, in preparation for their joining the alliance at a future date. The newly created Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, an enhanced partnership for peace program, and bilateral agreements should all be used to underscore the ongoing nature of the NATO enlargement process. To sum up, NATO is necessarily transforming itself from an alliance that defended its members against the Soviet threat into an alliance that allows democracies to maintain stability in Western Europe and that extends that zone of stability to central and Eastern Europe to deter conflicts and prevent crises from escalating. An enlarged NATO will allow the new, free-market democracies of Central Europe to undertake their share of the burden of the common defense of their continent. It will allow them to cooperate with one another and with neighboring alliance members. And, contrary to what many critics have argued, it will allow them to save money in providing for their defense. There will continue to be other institutions essential for European security affiliated with NATO such as the new Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council to enable closer cooperation between NATO and nonalliance countries in the partnership for peace. There will be a joint commission between NATO and Ukraine similar to the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. And there continue to be fundamentally important organizations like the European Union and the O.S.C.E., all of which I discussed earlier. By combining NATO enlargement with a formalized relationship with Russia in the new permanent joint council, the United States and its allies can take advantage of the historic opportunity presented by the end of the cold war and lay the foundation for long-term European security. I believe it is squarely in our national interest to do so, and in the coming year as the Senate prepares to exercise its constitutional responsibility of ratifying or rejecting the accession protocols to the Washington Treaty, I will continue to speak out on the course of NATO enlargement. I thank the Chair and yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, in 1981, the Senate Judiciary Committee had a new chairman, and a new ranking member, and there were more than a few folks who were eagerly looking forward to the fireworks. With the election of a new, conservative Republican administration and a new Republican majority in the Senate, The Judiciary Committee seemed destined to be a battleground for many of the great philosophical questions which divided us then, and which divide us now. And to many ``Washington Insiders,'' there was little prospect that Strom Thurmond--the veteran conservative Republican chairman from South Carolina who first made his mark on national politics as a principal advocate of States rights--and Joe Biden--a northeastern democrat still in his thirties whose interest in politics was sparked in large part by the civil rights movement--could ever find common ground as we grappled with many of those fundamental questions. I never shared those doubts, because by that time, Senator Thurmond and I had served together for 8 years. I knew that Strom Thurmond's personal strengths, which I admired greatly regardless of our political differences, would guide the committee toward responsible consensus rather than divisive gridlock, and establish an atmosphere of civil and constructive debate rather than divisive and meaningless partisan rhetoric. In his 6 years as chairman, and for several years after we switched roles in 1987, Senator Thurmond exceeded my expectations in every way. While the Judiciary Committee did indeed go through some heated debates and contentious hearings--weathering the kind of controversy which I have seen poison the well for other committees for years afterward-- Senator Thurmond and I worked together to ensure that the committee's business, the Nation's business, would go forward once the day was done. That would not have happened had it not been for the strength of character of our chairman. First and foremost, Strom Thurmond is an absolute gentleman, unfailingly courteous and respectful of each individual's dignity. Throughout a lifetime spent in the political arena, he has never forgotten that those who disagree with us are nonetheless entitled to being heard out and treated with dignity. Indeed, that is an important reason that his lifetime in politics has been such a long and productive one. Here in the Senate, and--as I have seen firsthand--back home in South Carolina, Strom Thurmond's honesty and integrity are the hallmark of his public and private reputation. His word is his bond, and each of us--even the most partisan of political opponents--knows that through the heat of political debate, regardless of the intense pressure that may be upon him, Strom Thurmond can be trusted to keep that word; not when it's politically possible or expedient, but always. Here in the Senate, our integrity is, ultimately, our most valued possession, and Senator Thurmond is a living example of the value of personal integrity. Throughout our service on the Judiciary Committee, ``The Chairman'', has distinguished himself by his commitment to absolute fairness; to Republican and Democrat, political ally and philosophical opponent, alike. During the years when I held the gavel--and Strom will always be ``The Chairman'' to me--I tried to match the example of fairness that he set. Indeed, it is a legacy which I hope every committee chairman-- and every senator--now and in the future, can strive to follow. Long before he was a committee chairman; indeed long before he came to the Senate so many years ago, Strom Thurmond was the consummate public servant, dedicated to the proposition that the political system is not an end in itself, but an arena for doing the public good. To that end, he has been committed to getting things done; to meeting the challenges facing our Nation and our people; and to accomplish those goals regardless of partisan politics. Though he holds the record for the Senate's longest filibuster, Strom Thurmond is a doer rather than a talker, and his long list of accomplishments here in the Senate is a testament to his determination to serve the people of South Carolina and this Nation. ``Patriotism'' is a word that is used often in the course of political debate, sometimes by those seeking to further nothing more than their own personal or political agendas. But patriotism has always been at the core of Strom Thurmond's being, whether in the fields of Normandy or in the Halls of the United States Senate. Senator Thurmond has epitomized the notion that patriotism is neither an outdated value nor a term for scoring political points; but a living principle that challenges us daily and refuses to let us rest on our laurels when it comes to doing the public good. Today, we commemorate Senator Thurmond's record-setting tenure here in this body. In recent weeks, because I am his friend in spite of our ages and differing political philosophies, I have been asked numerous times to explain the secret to his long tenure. The truth of the matter is that--in addition to the fact that he is a testament to healthy living--the secret to Strom Thurmond's political longevity lies, not with his considerable political skills or with any local anomaly in South Carolina, but deep within Strom Thurmond himself. It lies in his strength of character, his absolute honesty and integrity, his strong sense of fairness, and his commitment to public service. None of those things are skills which you learn; they are qualities deep within you which, when people know you well, they can sense. That is the secret to Strom Thurmond's success. Strom Thurmond's ongoing legacy is not the number of years, months, and days he has served in the U.S. Senate. Rather it is his many accomplishments and the good that he has done during those years. I have been honored and privileged to serve with and work with Senator Thurmond for many of those years. I am proud of the work we have done together on the Senate Judiciary Committee. And I am proud to call him my friend. Mr. President, I join my colleagues in honoring this important benchmark in Senator Thurmond's long career in public service, knowing that he still has much to give and looking forward to working with him as we confront the challenges of the 21st century. Mr. FRIST, Mr. President, on May 25, this Congress made history. On that day, we became the Congress to have the longest sitting Senator in the history of the United States. Our distinguished colleague and friend, the senior Senator from South Carolina--Strom Thurmond--set the Senate longevity record, serving his State and Nation for 41 years and 10 months. And like that little bunny, he just keeps going and going and going. However, as impressive as Senator Thurmond's legacy of service are his record of successes and the example of leadership he has achieved during his tenure. Today he serves as President pro tempore--a constitutional office that places him fourth in line to the Presidency. He has served as chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, the senior member of the Veterans' Affairs Committee, and he now serves as chairman of our powerful Armed Services Committee. Senator Thurmond has been elected to eight consecutive terms since winning his seat as a write-in candidate back in 1954. We know of his breadth of experience: teacher, soldier, lawyer, judge, administrator, Governor, and even Presidential candidate; and we have been inspired by his example. We see in his life the values and possibilities that still distinguish our great Nation. Small town virtues, selfless service, a sense of duty--roots buried deep in lifelong membership in the local Mason Lodge, the Lion's and Rotary service organizations, the community church and hometown businesses. These all give Strom an authentic quality--a richness of character--an accessibility that's felt even by those who don't know him as well as we do. I cherish Strom's friendship. I count myself fortunate to have served the many years I have served with this great Senator, and I can say that I know of no one in this Chamber who doesn't look to him as I do-- as a friend. And when you think about it, Mr. President, that's quite a remarkable thing to say about a man who started his political career when Calvin Coolidge was in the White House. During this special time--as Senator Thurmond continues to bring distinction to himself and to the U.S. Senate through his historic service--I want to be counted among those who recognize and appreciate all that he has offered to South Carolina and to the United States of America.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I want to compliment my esteemed chairman, Senator Hatch, for forging a consensus on this complex issue. As my colleagues know, I was engaged in negotiations on the Chemical Weapons convention resolution of ratification for months, and I know first hand how many deeply held views this treaty implicates and how difficult it is to bring the parties together. But we succeeded on the treaty and now, with the help of many Senators on both sides of the aisle, have succeeded on the implementing legislation. I supported this compromise measure in committee and will do so again now because it takes the important steps necessary to implement the Chemical Weapons Convention. As required by the convention, this bill will enact tough criminal sanctions for possessing, stockpiling, transferring, and using chemical weapons. It will also require U.S. companies to report on their production and use of potentially dangerous chemicals and submit to inspections of their facilities. Taking these steps will demonstrate to the rest of the world that the United States is committed to continuing its leadership role in arms control and other issues of global importance. I want to make clear, however, that I do not support some of the provisions in this bill and have very serious concerns about their impact on the convention. In particular, I do not believe we should be granting the President discretionary authority to deny a CWC inspection based on national security grounds, as would be done by section 401. By signing and ratifying this treaty, the United States--with the advice and consent of 74 Members of this body, given less than a month ago--agreed to allow certain inspections, subject to our constitutional requirements. With few exceptions, denial of a duly authorized inspection would violate the convention. Even if the President never exercises this authority, the mere inclusion of this provision in the legislation will encourage other countries to deny inspections on national security grounds. If we should enact to so-called national security exception, we can be sure that the Chinese will seize upon the precedent we set and use it to undermine the effectiveness of the entire certification regime. I have similar concerns regarding section 403, which would exempt from reporting and routine inspection requirements unscheduled discrete organic chemicals that are coincidental byproducts and are not isolated or captured for use or sale. While waste streams are not, in themselves, a threat to the object and purposes of the CWC regime, monitoring of such streams does afford one of the most convenient and nonintrusive means of determining whether a facility is worthy of concern in the first place. The drafters of this provision are concerned that CWC implementation would otherwise require paper manufacturers to undertake costly monitoring of their waste streams, and that is an understandable concern. There is no need, however, to grant such a broad exemption as is currently contained in this section. I am also troubled by: The broad compensation scheme in section 103 that does not even require a plaintiff to prove its case by a preponderance of the evidence to receive taxpayer funded compensation for the loss of trade secrets; and The limitation in sections 102 and 308 on the Government's power to require contractors to submit to CWC inspections. I hope to work with other Senators and the administration to ameliorate these concerns prior to enactment of this measure. Treaties are solemn obligations, and the Chemical Weapons Convention, with all its faults, is our best hope for exposing violators and mobilizing the world so as to put a stop to chemical weapons. We must resist the urge, therefore, to enact provisions that could conflict with our treaty obligations and do damage to the effectiveness of the treaty regime.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I want to commend President Clinton and congressional leaders on both sides for bringing before the Senate a balanced budget. I also believe that this budget goes a long way toward protecting the key priorities I believe must be protected. But, of all those priorities, I believe that none is more important than continuing our fight against violent crime and violence against women. To a great extent, this budget resolution meets this test--but, in at least one area of this crime front, I believe the budget resolution must be clarified. The amendment I am offering, along with Senators Byrd and Gramm does exactly that--by clarifying that it is the sense of the Senate that the violent crime control trust fund will continue through the end of this budget resolution, fiscal year 2002. I am particularly pleased that Senator Byrd--who, more than anyone, deserves credit for the crime law trust fund. Senator Byrd worked to develop an idea that was simple as it was profound--as he called on us to use the savings from the reductions in the Federal work force of 272,000 employees to fund one of the Nation's most urgent priorities: fighting the scourge of violent crime. Senator Gramm was also one of the very first to call on the Senate to put our money where our mouth was. Too often, this Senate has voted to send significant aid to State and local law enforcement--but, when it came time to write the check, we did not find nearly the dollars we promised. Working together in 1993, Senator Byrd, myself, Senator Gramm, and other Ssenators passed the violent crime control trust fund in the Senate. And, in 1994, it became law in the Biden crime law. Since then, the dollars from the crime law trust fund have: Helped add more than 60,000 community police officers to our streets; Helped shelter more than 80,000 battered women and their children; Focussed law enforcement, prosecutors, and victims service providers on providing immediate help to women victimized by someone who pretends to love them; Forced tens of thousands of drug offenders into drug testing and treatment programs, instead of continuing to allow them to remain free on probation with no supervision and no accountability; Constructed thousands of prison cells for violent criminals; and Brought unprecedented resources to defending our southwest border-- putting us on the path to literally double the number of Federal border agents over just a 5-year period. The results of this effort are already taking hold: According to the FBI's national crime statistics, violent crime is down and down significantly--leaving our Nation with its lowest murder rate since 1971; The lowest violent crime total since 1990; and The lowest murder rate for wives, ex-wives and girlfriends at the hands of their intimates to an 18-year low. In short, we have proven able to do what few thought possible--by being smart, keeping our focus, and putting our money where our mouths are--we have actually cut violent crime. Today, our challenge is to keep our focus and to stay vigilant against violent crime. Today, the Biden-Byrd-Gramm amendment before the Senate offers one modest step toward meeting that challenge: By confirming that it is the sense of the Senate that the commitment to fighting crime and violence against women will continue for the full duration of this budget resolution. By confirming that it is the sense of the Senate that the Violent Crime Control Trust Fund will continue--in its current form which provides additional Federal assistance without adding 1 cent to the deficit--for the full duration of this budget resolution. The Biden-Byrd-Gramm amendment offers a few very simple choices: Stand up for cops--or don't; Stand up for the fight against violence against women --or don't; Stand up for increased border enforcement--or don't. Every Member of this Senate is against violent crime--we say that in speech after speech. Now, I urge all my colleagues to back up with words with the only thing that we can actually do for the cop walking the beat, the battered woman, the victim of crime--provide the dollars that help give them the tools to fight violent criminals, standup to their abuser, and restore at least some small piece of the dignity taken from them at the hands of a violent criminal. Let us be very clear of the stakes here--frankly, if we do not continue the trust fund, we will not be able to continue such proven, valuable efforts as the Violence Against Women law. Nothing we can do today can guarantee that we, in fact, will continue the Violence Against Women Act when the law expires in the year 2000. But, mark my words, if the trust fund ends, the efforts to provide shelter, help victims, and get tough on the abusers and batterers will wither on the vine. Passing the amendment I offer today will send a clear, unambiguous message that the trust fund should continue and with it, the historic effort undertaken by the Violence Against Women Act that says by word, deed and dollar that the Federal Government stands with women and against the misguided notion that domestic violence is a man's right and not really a crime. I urge my colleagues to support the Biden-Byrd-Gramm amendment.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise to condemn in the strongest possible terms recent comments that have been attributed to Mr. Freih Abu Medein, the Justice Minister in the Palestinian authority. In a May 17 article in the Washington Post, journalist Barton Gellman reported that Mr. Medein stated last month that ``five Zionist Jews'' are running the United States' Middle East policy and, in the words of the article, he ``added that it is implausible that a nation the size of the United States can find no one else to maintain diplomatic contacts with Palestinians.'' This statement, if quoted correctly, is deeply offensive on two counts. First, it is patently anti-semitic, or more properly, anti- Jewish. Its conspiratorial overtones reflect the worst traditions of hate-mongering that characterizes classical anti-semitism. Second, it is a thinly veiled attempt to manipulate our sovereign right as a country to choose whoever we wish to represent us diplomatically. It also evinces complete ignorance of the American system. I am confident that the individuals to whom Mr. Medein refers were not chosen for their religious beliefs, but rather on the strength of their qualifications for the jobs for which they were selected. Anyone who thinks otherwise has great deal to learn about this country. If Mr. Medein or anyone else in the Palestinian Authority has difficulty meeting with American representatives who happen to profess a particular religious faith, then that is their problem, not ours. I would submit, Mr. President, that we have the right to choose a person of any faith, any gender, and any race to represent us in any place. Should we choose an American who happens to be a Muslim to represent us in Israel, a Hindu to represent us in Pakistan, a Jew in Syria, a Roman Catholic in Yugoslavia, a Greek Orthodox in Turkey, or a Buddhist in China, then that is our sovereign right as a nation. The only criterion should be that the person be qualified for the job for which he or she is selected. Religious affiliation should have absolutely nothing to do with it. Zero. Zilch. That is what distinguishes us from the rest of the world. For unfortunately, Mr. Medein's views are not isolated ones. They reflect an all-to-common obsession with race, religion, and ethnicity that plagues much of the world. We may not be perfect, but our guiding ideals are unassailable. And we have successfully put those ideals into practice, with the result that many others seek to emulate us. Mr. President, the day we pause even for a fraction of a second to contemplate the possible validity of remarks such as Mr. Medein's is the day that we abandon our most fundamental beliefs. Bigotry must be denounced, whether it is at home or abroad. American representatives who are the object of bigoted attacks deserve to know that their country stands four-square behind them.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.