Joe Biden

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. I yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, let me thank my colleague for his reference. I think it should be made clear that without the chairman's strong and wholehearted support and initiation here, we would not be where we are. I want to, just in a very brief time, review the bidding here a little bit. Let me remind everybody that this was in the crime bill, the original Biden-Hatch crime bill, and ended up having some other iterations before it was over. But we had provisions in there for prevention. One of the things that happened was on both sides of the aisle, left, right, center, was we got into this great debate about whether prevention works and whether or not the prevention money in the crime bill was to support prisoners in pink tutus dancing in ballet style, and all that kind of stuff. We got into big fights about midnight basketball, and all that. I am not suggesting we reengage those fights except to make this following point. The reason why in the original bill a while ago I specifically singled out Boys and Girls Clubs--I want to be up front about this--was real simple. It was the one place I knew that we could get consensus among Democrats and Republicans, liberals and conservatives, because this is prevention that works. And it was my view at the time that, if we singled out Boys and Girls Clubs--and we did, which is kind of unusual to do in a crime bill to single out a specific nonprofit to make sure they get money. That is a bit unusual. The reason to do it was, the statistics are overwhelming. Let me give you a few reasons why this works. There was a study done by Columbia University that demonstrated--and I am going to be brief--that public housing sites where there are Boys Clubs and Girls Clubs, compared with public housing sites without these clubs, there was a drastic difference. Let me make it clear now, this study was done, no one disputes--they took public housing sites with the same demographic makeup, same cities, same populations, same racial composition, put a Boys and Girls Club in the basements of one, not in the other. Here is what the study confirmed. Those public housing projects that had a Boys and Girls Club in the basement, or wherever they were in the building, had 13 percent fewer juvenile crimes, 22 percent less drug activity, and 25 percent less crack presence. This is in the crack epidemic. Still a big problem. We have other things to worry about, too. But the bottom line, Mr. President, is it works. I know the Presiding Officer from Montana has done a lot of work with kids over the years. He has been involved in things that have to do with everything from 4-H to rodeos to Lord only knows what. I hear all these stories he tells me about Montana and about how these kids are involved. The truth of the matter is you get a kid involved, you have less chance that kid is going to get involved in something bad. My mom has an expression that I am sure every one of our moms have said in different ways, the expression is: ``Remember, Joey, an idle mind is a devil's workshop.'' The bottom line is you give a kid nothing to do, he is likely to find trouble. Give a kid nothing to do in an area where there is nothing but trouble, he or she becomes part of the trouble. Give a child something to do, an alternative, an escape, a way out where there is nothing but trouble, give them a safe haven, and you increase the prospects that they are not going to be in trouble. So that is why we proposed and passed through the Senate in 1996 $20 million in spending for the first year of a 5-year effort to create 1,000 new Boys and Girls Clubs. Ultimately we got $11 million in the final appropriations bill. Senator Hatch and some of our colleagues, Senator Leahy and others that are mentioned, worked together to provide the second year of funding in last year's appropriations bill. If it were not for the fact that Senator Hatch in the majority party, the leader of the committee, jumped in at that point, I believe the appropriation would not have been anything. He used his influence and his weight, got this up on the radar screen and continued to save this program. So the second year of funding in last year's appropriations bill came through. Senator Hatch also worked to pass legislation supporting this concept, the whole notion, last year. The bottom line is, we are working together so that we can have a total of 2,500 Boys and Girls Clubs by the year 2000. This bill does a very important thing. It simplifies--let me emphasize, it simplifies--the application procedure. So, although it does not provide additional funding beyond that already authorized, the simplification is important, letting Boys and Girls Clubs go straight to the Justice Department. They do not have to go through their Governors, do not have to go through their State legislature, do not have to go through their city council. They go straight to the Justice Department and seek the funding. This is the simple, straightforward approach that I have always supported in the Biden crime bill and why I am so pleased that my colleague, the chairman of the committee, has in fact been so supportive and led on this. Last year's bill provided for consultation with the Department of Housing and Urban Development, an unnecessary requirement. I have nothing against HUD, but I believe we must get these important prevention dollars out to the Boys and Girls Clubs throughout the country as quickly and as efficiently as possible. And this bill well help do that. Let me conclude by saying, if we are able to fund 2,500 Boys and Girls Clubs, it could not come at a more important moment in our history from a demographic standpoint. There are 39 million children, Mr. President, under the age of 10 in the United States of America today, the largest cadre of young people about to enter the crime- committing years that we have had since the baby boom of those of us born in the 1940's. It is a big deal, Mr. President. If we through our police efforts, through our present efforts, hold the percentage of crime committed by young people to the same percentage it is now, without one one- hundredth of 1 percent increase in the amount of crime that is committed, as a percent of the population, we will in fact still have about an 8 percent increase in violent crime in America. You know why? That is how many more kids there are going to be. We better figure out now before this so-called baby boomlet--that's what the demographers are referring to--before this baby boomlet hits those crime-committing years. I can think of nothing--nothing--that the police can do, nothing that we can do, that can solve the problem alone without providing safe havens and alternatives for these children. boys and Girls Clubs are a proven--a proven--safe haven. A proven safe haven. So, Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to adopt this legislation. I hope this bill is a sign that we will continue to work together to deal with those prevention efforts that work. Another thing all our moms said to us, ``An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.'' ``An ounce of prevention.'' This is 2,500 ounces of prevention that will prevent tens of thousands of pounds of crime. This is a big deal. I thank my colleague for his support and allowing me to participate in this effort. I yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I supported and still support the partial- birth abortion bill. I voted for it in 1995 and voted to override the President's veto last year. The bill was a step in the direction of ending late-term abortions. But, it was not a perfect solution. It did not, as I would have liked, ban all post-viability abortions. There is no dispute that under the Supreme Court's Roe versus Wade decision, the government can ban post-viability abortions. But, I was and still am concerned that in banning only partial-birth abortions, we do not go far enough. In fact, there is a legitimate concern that in banning partial-birth abortions, not a single abortion would be prevented. The result would be merely to shift the type of procedure used in performing an abortion. Today, Mr. President, we have a better solution--a solution that goes beyond the ban on a single procedure by actually banning all late-term abortions. The Daschle proposal would make all post-viability abortions--regardless of the method used--illegal, except in very limited circumstances consistent with Roe versus Wade. As an article in The Washington Times put it--and the Times is one of the most conservative newspapers in America--``Mr. Daschle's plan would go further in restricting abortion than the . . . partial-birth plan.'' If the goal is to reduce the number of abortions in America and to eliminate late-term abortions consistent with Roe versus Wade--and that has been my goal from day one--then the Daschle proposal is the answer because the Daschle proposal bans all post-viability abortions. The only exception is when an abortion is necessary to save the woman's life or in the small number of cases where continuation of the pregnancy would, to quote the amendment, ``risk grievous injury to her physical health.'' Now, I wish to address for just a minute the health exception. Critics often claim that a health exception is a gigantic loophole--a loophole so big, some have said, that it would allow a teenage girl to get a late-term abortion just because she could not fit into her prom dress. That is an outrageously untrue claim to begin with, regardless of the language of the health exception. But, the rhetoric aside, the health exception under the Daschle proposal is extremely narrow. It must be a severely debilitating disease caused by the pregnancy or it must be a case where a woman cannot undergo necessary treatment for a life-threatening condition as long as she is pregnant. This is not mental health. This is not a minor ailment. This is grievous physical injury. There are some, Mr. President, who simply do not believe that there should ever be a health exception no matter how narrow. I disagree. There needs to be a narrow health exception. Take, for example, a woman who, during pregnancy, is diagnosed with breast cancer. Her life is not directly endangered by the pregnancy, but her long-term prospects for survival are. Early detection and treatment of breast cancer can increase survival rates by 30 percent. But, a pregnant woman cannot undergo chemotherapy treatment unless her pregnancy is terminated because the chemotherapy can result in permanent damage, even mutation, of the fetus. And, a continued pregnancy will weaken her body's immune system, making it harder for her to fight the cancer. That decision should be between the woman and God, not the government. Cases such as these are tragic situations--rare and tragic. But, it would be even more tragic to say that ipso facto a woman cannot have an abortion unless her life is threatened by giving birth. That is why the Supreme Court has required a health exception and why the Daschle proposal includes a very narrow health exception. Mr. President, I admit I am faced with a dilemma here. I can vote to ban one particular abortion procedure that I find repugnant--but in the process, allow late-term abortions to continue. Or, I can vote to eliminate more abortions, by banning all late-term abortions--but in the process allow the so-called partial-birth abortion procedure to continue under limited circumstances. I wish we were not faced with the choice of one or the other. I would like to do both. But, I must cast my vote now for the proposal that I believe will result in fewer abortions. In my view, that is the Daschle proposal. But, let me also be clear. If the Daschle proposal fails, I will again vote for the bill to ban partial-birth abortions.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, let me begin by acknowledging what the Senator and chairman of the committee said, and that is that this treaty has been around a long time, and all of a sudden it came popping up here. Some of us, like the Senator from North Carolina and the majority leader and others, myself included, have felt it is a Senate prerogative to determine whether or not this flank agreement should be agreed to. It is an amendment to the treaty. The administration for a long time concluded it was not a prerogative of the Senate, and it was not necessary to submit this treaty. Some have asked, why are we acting so expeditiously on this treaty? Why is there this deadline? Two reasons: One, we waited a long time to agree we had the responsibility to accede to this or it could not occur, and, two, there is a real May 15 deadline by which all 30 nations must ratify this agreement. If, in fact, they do not, the agreement will have to be reviewed by all of them. We are right now dealing with the enlargement of NATO, we are now dealing with the NATO-Russia Charter, and if it looks as though the United States is reneging on this flank agreement, it can just create a lot of confusion. Having said that, had I been chairman of the committee rather than the ranking member and had it been a Republican President, I probably would have spent more time chastising the administration than the distinguished Senator from North Carolina. He just rolled up his sleeves and said, ``OK, this is a necessary and important treaty,'' and didn't spend a lot of time in recriminations about why it took so long to get here. I thank him for that, and I thank him for the way in which he moved this. I doubt there is any treaty or change in a treaty as significant as this that has moved as rapidly through the Foreign Relations Committee with as studied an approach as under the leadership of my colleague from North Carolina. Mr. President, nearly 6 years ago, as chairman of the Subcommittee on European Affairs, I managed the ratification of the original CFE agreement for the then Democratic chairman of the committee. The treaty was, I believe then and I believe now, a monumental achievement, capping some two decades of negotiations between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries to establish a secure conventional military balance in Europe. I would argue, it was sort of the prelude to the undoing of our adversary at the time, the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. Mr. President, the treaty has succeeded as few other arms reduction measures have. Since 1992, it has fundamentally altered the military landscape from the Atlantic to the Urals, dramatically reducing the number of pieces of equipment that could be used to wage war. In the last 5 years, the CFE Treaty has resulted in the removal or destruction of more than 53,000 pieces of heavy equipment, including tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles, attack helicopters, and combat aircraft. Since 1991, of course, the political face of Europe has changed dramatically. These developments had an impact on the relevance and potential durability of the CFE Treaty. Particularly effective were the so-called flank limits. To the average citizen out there, a flank limit is not much different than a flank steak or flank cut. The fact of the matter is, it has real significance; it is very important. The flank limits were included to prevent military equipment that was removed from Central Europe from being concentrated elsewhere. We set limits on how much equipment could be set on that inter-German border, which we necessarily focused on for so many years. As that equipment was removed or destroyed, what we did not want to have happen is to have the Soviets take that equipment and move it into the flanks, moving it on the Turkish border or moving it up by Norway and having a predominance of force accumulated there. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia began to argue that the treaty, particularly the so-called flank limits, did not adequately reflect its security needs in the flank zone. We had placed limits on what type of equipment and how much could be placed in these flanks. Had I a map, I would reference it, but the fact of the matter is, we put limits on this. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia began to argue that the treaty, particularly the flank limits, did not adequately reflect its security needs in the flank zone. Put another way, all those folks in the Caucasus and Transcaucasus are now independent countries. When this was negotiated, they weren't part of the deal. They weren't part of the deal, and it was some Soviet general in Moscow deciding what could and could not be done in those countries. Now the Russians come back and say, ``Hey, wait, this isn't the deal we signed on to.'' Russell Long--a great Senator who the Senator from North Carolina remembers well, but not nearly as well as the Senator from West Virginia sitting behind me--one of Russell Long's many expressions used to be, ``I ain't for no deal I ain't in on.'' All of a sudden, the Russians realized that they had signed on to a deal that, in a strong way, they were no longer in on, as it related to what was left of the Soviet Union. Consequently, the NATO alliance agreed to negotiations on revising these flank limits, and the result was the agreement before us now known as the Flank Document that was signed by 30 states parties--a fancy term for saying 30 countries--to the treaty in Vienna on May 31, 1996. Reiterating the point made by my friend from North Carolina, this was signed a year ago, 1996. I believe that our negotiators, while meeting some Russian concerns, did an excellent job of protecting the interests of this country and the democracies on the northern and southern flanks of the former Soviet Union. The CFE Flank Document removes some areas from what we call the old flank zone, but maintains constraints on equipment both in the new flank zone and in the old one. There are also limits on armored combat vehicles in each area that were removed from the old flank zone so as to prevent any tremendous concentration of equipment in any one place. We all are concerned about Russian troop deployments outside its borders, Mr. President. We cannot allow Moscow to coerce its independent neighbors into accepting the presence of foreign forces on their soil or into giving up their own rights to military equipment, which would now be folded into this total limit. But I believe the Flank Document and the resolution of ratification now before the Senate addresses these concerns and recognizes that sovereign countries must have the right to refuse Russian demands. Indeed, the chairman and I have found common ground on most of the issues in this resolution. There are a total of, if I am not mistaken, 14 conditions, Mr. President. Two of these conditions of ratification, however, I think are extraneous and give me some concern. Of the 14, there are only two that I would flag for my colleagues, and I am not going to move to strike either one of them. I am not going to move to do anything about it. I just want to make the point of why I think they are unnecessary or counterproductive. The first is condition 5, which includes a provision calling for a special report on possible noncompliance of the CFE Treaty by Armenia. I regret that this provision was included in the resolution at the insistence of the majority, but I am pleased that we have reached an agreement through the efforts of Senator John Kerry and Senator Sarbanes--and I am sure if they reached an agreement they must have run it by the distinguished Senator from West Virginia or it would not have been agreed to--to mitigate the one-sided nature of this original agreement. More troubling, though, is condition 9. I will not speak more about condition 5 in the interest of time. Condition 9 also is insisted upon by the majority, and I note from a brief discussion, while working out yesterday out of the Senate environs with my distinguished friend from Virginia, that he feels very strongly about, and I happen to disagree with him on it. Condition 9 requires the President to submit an agreement which will multilateralize the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty to the Senate for advice and consent. Put another way, there is a condition placed on here, very skillfully, I might add, by my friends who have concerns about the ABM Treaty that has nothing to do with this flank agreement. I was of the view it should not be included as part of a condition to this treaty. I did not have the votes. I must say to my friend from North Carolina, it is not merely because I hope I am a gentleman that I am not attempting to remove the condition, I do not have the votes to remove the condition, so I am not going to attempt to do something that I know will not prevail. But, I would like to point out, the condition is titled ``Senate Prerogatives.'' The title is interesting but, I think, inaccurate. I take a back seat to no one when it comes to Senate prerogatives. As a matter of fact, it was the Byrd-Biden amendment attached to the INF Treaty. We have been jealous of the protection of our constitutional obligations and responsibilities. With all due respect, and it sounds self-serving, but I take a back seat to no one in the Senate in terms of protecting the constitutional obligations and responsibilities of the Senate. But in this case, I do not think we have a prerogative to exercise, notwithstanding condition 9 is called ``Senate Prerogatives.'' The issue involves two powers: recognition of successor states and the power to interpret and implement treaties, both of which are executive functions. Mr. President, it is undisputed that the President has the exclusive power, under the powers of article 2 of the Constitution, to recognize new states. I am not going to take a long time on this, so don't everybody worry I am in for a long constitutional discussion; I am only going to spend another 3 or 4 minutes, but I want to make the point for the Record. Under article 2, section 2 of the Constitution, the President and the Senate have a shared duty to ``make treaties.'' But once the treaty is made, it is the law of the land, and the President, under article 2, section 3, has the duty to take care that it is faithfully executed. In exercising this duty, it is for the President to determine whether a treaty remains in force, a determination that, of necessity, must be made whenever a state dissolves. So what are we talking about here? We had an ABM Treaty and CFE Treaty with the former Soviet Union. The Soviet Union dissolved. And the question remains, all those constituent countries that are now independent countries, is the President able to recognize Ukraine, for example, and, as a consequence, recognize the Ukrainians' assertion that they want to be part of the ABM Treaty? They were part of it when they were part of the whole Soviet Union, but as the constituent parts broke apart, the question was: As each individual country within that whole signs on to the continued commitment to ABM, does that require ratification by the United States Senate with each of them again? I would argue, and I will argue at a later date--I am sure we will hear more of this--that it does not require that. It is not a Senate prerogative. In the case before us, the ABM Treaty, the President has the power to declare whether Russia and the other New Independent States inherit the treaty obligations of the former Soviet Union, provided those states indicate a desire to do so and provided that the succession agreement effects no substantive change in the terms of the treaty. Both the Bush and Clinton administrations exercised this power following the breakup of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Ethiopia as it relates to other issues, not as it relates to ABM. Moreover, it bears emphasis that the two arms control treaties, the CFE Treaty and the INF Treaty, were multilateralized by the executive action without the advice and consent of the Senate. By definition, we are all here, we are not asking for multilateralization of the flank agreement. It is somewhat curious that we say ABM requires the Senate to have a treaty vote on every successor nation, but on CFE, which we all like and we have no substantive disagreement on, we are not asking for that. So the point I am making is that this condition has nothing to do with CFE and it is more about whether you like ABM or do not like ABM, not about who has what constitutional responsibility, I respectfully suggest. I agree with my colleagues on the other side of the aisle and the other side of the issue in one respect, that this is the subject of legitimate debate. But the debate, which I am confident we can win on the merits, can readily be conducted at another time on a more germane subject than a treaty that it has nothing to do with. Nonetheless, the majority insisted upon this extraneous condition, and I think I can count votes. I will never forget going to former Chairman Eastland as a young member of the Judiciary Committee asking for his support. He sat behind his desk, I say to the chairman of the committee, and said, ``Did you count?'' I didn't understand what he said. I said, ``I beg your pardon, Mr. Chairman?'' He took that cigar out--I was asking to be chairman of the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws, because Senator McClellan had just passed away and, for years, it had been his job. It was a contest between me and another Senator. I was looking at him, and he said, ``Did you count?'' I seriously did not understand what he was saying. ``I beg your pardon?'' I said. I tried to be humorous. I said, ``Mr. Chairman, I don't speak Southern very well.'' He smiled and looked at me, and he took the cigar out of his mouth, and said, ``Son, when you have counted, come back and talk to me.'' Well, I learned to count. The reason I am not contesting this now, as I said, I counted. I do not have the votes at this moment to remove condition 9 and still get this treaty up and out of here in time. So I will reserve that fight for another day. Despite the inclusion of condition 9, I will strongly support the flank agreement because of its integral role in protecting American interests in maintaining security and stability in Europe. Indeed, the Flank Document we will be voting on is an important bridge to the broader revision of the CFE Treaty now under discussion as we talk about the enlargement of NATO. Those talks will allow us to achieve further reductions in military equipment in Europe and ensure that the confidence-building measures embodied in the CFE Treaty remain in place. Mr. President, the CFE Treaty is just one component of the architecture of arrangements, including NATO, the Partnership for Peace, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, all of which are designed to ensure that in the post-cold war era, the European nations remain free and independent and are partners in a zone of security and prosperity. But by maintaining the integrity of the CFE Treaty, we maintain the forum in which an enlarged NATO will make clear to Russia that our objective is stability in Europe, not military intimidation. Ratification of the flank agreement is a modest but important step toward the new European security system. I urge my Senate colleagues to do two things--thank the chairman of the full committee for expediting this, and when we get very shortly to a vote on it, to vote their advice and consent to ratification. I thank again the chairman of the full committee. I reserve the remainder of my time.

Mr. BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BIDEN. I yield 12 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President--Madam President, I made the mistake of referring to the Presiding Officer as ``Mr. President" before I turned around. And I also made the mistake of referring to Under Secretary Davis as ``he.'' It is ``she.'' I knew that, and I apologize on both scores.

Mr. BIDEN. Let me say, this all came about--and they are, obviously, as usual, very good, incisive and insightful questions. I think it is unnecessary because I think it is a given. But let me explain, in fairness, why we got to this point and why I thought it was--speaking only for myself--a clarification, although in some sense I thought it was a demeaning clarification. Let me explain. During the negotiations on the flank agreement, there was concern about what became referred to as a ``side agreement.'' That was, there was an issue that came up during the negotiations where a diplomatic note was passed, which is classified--I am not able to give you, but I can tell you from the committee testimony what it said--a note that was passed to the Russian representative dealing with the issue of the stationing of Russian troops on the soil of the countries you named. The Under Secretary of State, Lynn Davis, who appeared before the committee on April 29, was asked to explain. He went on to explain why a statement was made to the Russians. The statement made was that we would--this is the quote, in part--``the United States is prepared to facilitate or act as an intermediary for a successful outcome in discussions that could take place under the flank agreement and the CFE Treaty between Russia and other Newly Independent States.'' The worry expressed by my friends in the Republican Party was that this reflected a possible inclination to try to mollify Russia and put American pressure on Moldova or Georgia or other states to accept Russian deployment of Russian forces on their soil. The concern was that the assertion made by the U.S. negotiators was a way of saying, do not worry, we are going to help you to get Russian troops placed in those regions. Lynn Davis, the Under Secretary said, no, that was never the intention of that ``side agreement,'' as it became referred to. I will quote what he said at the hearing to my friend from West Virginia. He said: We see this particular statement of our intentions as part of the reassurance that we can make so that those countries will feel that this is an agreement that continues to be in their security interests. This statement of our intentions makes clear that the commitment is predicated on an understanding that any agreements between Russia and the Newly Independent States must be done on a voluntary basis with due respect for the sovereignty of the countries involved, and our role here is indeed to reinforce that and ensure that it is carried out. This was the concern that was expressed by my friends on the Republican side, that the United States intention to level the playing field between Russia and other Newly Independent States had not been seen that way by all concerned. So what was done--and the administration signed on to the condition-- was to make it crystal clear that this offer of an intermediary role was not for the purpose of using our influence or power to coerce them into accepting a demand or a suggestion from their Russian brethren. That is the context, I say to my friend, in which it came up. You used the phrase ``the committee became alarmed.'' Some in the committee were alarmed because of the wording of the ``side agreement.'' This was done to clarify what the administration says was their intent from the beginning but now locks in the stated interpretation by the administration of what that whole thing was all about. I hope I have answered the question, and I hope I have done it correctly.

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, depending on the disposition of the chairman of the committee, I am prepared to yield back whatever time we have left and am ready to vote. The distinguished minority leader does not wish to speak on this at this moment. I yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I have nothing more to say, which will surprise my colleagues, except that the distinguished Democratic leader, I am told, may wish to speak on leader's time for a few moments on this issue. Give me a minute to check on whether or not the distinguished leader, Mr. Daschle, wishes to speak. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. BIDEN. I would like to publicly comment and compliment the Senator from Mississippi. The truth of the matter is that this treaty would not be before the Senate today as a treaty without the efforts of the majority leader. The executive believed that they can do this by executive agreement. They did not think they needed to submit this to the Senate, although I had been for several months explaining that I thought it should be treated as a treaty. It was not until the distinguished leader from Mississippi said, if it is not treated as a treaty, we have a problem. The truth of the matter is the reason it is here is because of the distinguished Senator from Mississippi. I thank him for that.

Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. BIDEN. I reserve the remainder of my time, if I have any.

Mr. BIDEN. We make a pact.

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, the Senate has always been served well by the talent of the Senator from West Virginia and, most importantly, in making sure that we do our job responsibly. I would make only one 20-second explanation of why I think this treaty got less of a cover than any others. One was the way in which it was delayed and being presented and the timeframe. But a second reason is that people who followed this, which is a mistake to assume everyone should, people who follow this have been aware of what the terms of the agreement were since May of last year. I think many of us fell into the routine on Foreign Relations and Armed Services of thinking that its terms were well known. And it was widely accepted, the broad outlines of the treaty. But I think the Senator makes a very valid point and I, too, as ranking member of this committee, do not want to be party to these expedited efforts to deal with very significant security issues relating to the United States.

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, before the distinguished leader takes the floor, if I could just take 60 seconds of the 3 minutes I have remaining to comment on something the Senator from West Virginia said.

Mr. BIDEN. I would say yes, as well, Madam President.

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, as the distinguished former majority leader knows, another former majority leader, Senator Baker, used an expression all the time. He would come to the floor, and he would say, ``I ain't got no dog in that fight.''

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Yes, it is. If I may say, Madam President, to the distinguished leader, that in a November 25, 1996, memorandum for Alan J. Kreczko, Special Assistant to the President and Legal Adviser to the National Security Council, from Christopher Schroeder, Acting Assistant Attorney General, there is this phrase on page 14 of that memorandum. It says: Because the Senate took the view that such ``common understandings'' of a treaty had the same binding effect as express provisions of the treaty for the purposes of U.S. law, the Biden condition logically supports the proposition that the President may be authorized to accept changes in treaty obligations either by further Senate advice and consent or by statutory enactment. The next paragraph: In light of these judicial and historical precedents, we conclude the Congress may authorize the President, through an executive agreement, substantially to modify the United States' international obligations under an arms control (or other political-military) treaty. So the purpose, again, was to make it clear what you and I, as we understood at the time that condition was added--I might add, I get credit for it being called the Biden-Byrd condition, of which I am very proud, but the truth of the matter is, after having suggested such a condition early in the ratification process, I spent the next 7 months in the hospital during the remainder of the whole ratification process, and it was the distinguished leader, the Senator from West Virginia--it really should be the Byrd-Biden condition. Nonetheless, that is the reason. You and I never thought a majority vote in both Houses as a simple piece of legislation would be sufficient to approve an amendment to a treaty, and that was the concern expressed by the majority that it be memorialized, if you will, in condition (8).

Mr. BIDEN. The Senator makes a valid observation. The truth is, it was not necessary, but I would like to give the explanation why it was included, and the majority can speak even more clearly to it. The concern on the part of the majority was that the Clinton administration would use the Biden-Byrd language to justify sending a modification of a treaty for a two-House approval by majority vote rather than to the Senate for a supermajority vote when, in fact, it was a modification that constituted an amendment to the treaty. You never intended it for that purpose; I never intended it for that purpose. The concern was, I think it is fair to say on the part of the majority, that the Clinton administration might have attempted to read it to allow them to avoid submission to the Senate for a supermajority vote under the Constitution and just go to each House for a majority vote.

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, would the Senator like me to respond?

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. I yield 12 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Michigan.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, today marks the publication date of a remarkable compilation of letters from a remarkable man, imprisoned Chinese political dissident Wei Jingsheng. His book, ``The Courage To Stand Alone: Letters From Prison and Other Writings,'' should be required reading for anyone who takes for granted the freedoms enshrined in our Constitution and Bill of Rights. Wei is currently serving 14 years for the crime of advocating democracy in a country where freedom of speech does not extend to criticism of government authorities. An electrician by training, Wei lacks the formal education of some other famous 20th century champions of democracy and civil rights-- Vaclav Havel, Andrei Sakharov, or Martin Luther King--but whatever he may lack in sophistication, he more than makes up for with his blunt eloquence. Just days before the Chinese crackdown against pro-democracy protesters in Tiananmen Square, Wei offered some candid advice for China's top leaders from his prison cell, urging them to ``take great strides to implement a democratic government as quickly as possible.'' A great tragedy might have been avoided if Beijing's gerontocracy had heeded Wei's call. Wei was first imprisoned from 1979 to 1993 on charges of ``counter- revolutionary propaganda and incitement,'' the result of his participation in the Democracy Wall Movement. During this brief flowering of officially authorized political dissent in China, Wei had the nerve to argue that China's modernization goals could not be met without democratic reform. For this affront, he was severely punished. In 1993, on the eve of the International Olympic Committee's decision about whether to award the 2000 Olympics to Beijing, China briefly released Wei in an effort to strengthen its Olympic bid. On April 1, 1994, just days after meeting with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, John Shattuck, Wei was detained once more. He was subsequently sentenced to 14 years for trying to ``overthrow the Chinese Government.'' The actions cited as proof of Wei's ``counter-revolutionary'' intent included publishing articles critical of the government and raising funds for the victims of political persecution in China. Wei has spent most of his last 18 years in solitary confinement, enduring a variety of physical and psychological hardships. He is now widely reported to be in very poor health, suffering from heart and back ailments that require urgent medical attention. Attention he is currently denied. Today, I join with my colleagues to urge the Chinese Government to take all necessary steps to release Wei Jingsheng from prison on humanitarian grounds. Chinese authorities should ensure that Wei immediately receives the medical care he requires. Wei's imprisonment comes as a result of his peaceful advocacy of democracy and basic human rights. His words warrant our admiration, not a death sentence.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise in strong opposition to both of these amendments, notwithstanding my great respect for the Senator from Wisconsin, and I mean that sincerely. I have great respect for him. But I think this is another in a series of bad ideas this floor has produced over the last 5 years with regard to Bosnia. Mr. President, I echo the sentiments expressed by my friend from Connecticut. Let me say it in a slightly different way. In my view, we could have avoided the tragedy, the extent of the tragedy in Bosnia, had we the courage, the foresight to lift and strike 4 years ago, had we stood up to that war criminal Milosevic in Serbia and had we made clear to Tudjman in Croatia that we would broker no alternative but their ceasing and desisting. Every time America has spoken and followed up its speech with action, we have produced the results that we suggested would occur. It is a sad commentary, Mr. President, that there is no leadership in Europe. There is no leadership in Europe. And the ability of the Europeans to get together and solve the problem in their own backyard and keep it from spreading into other people's front yards is nonexistent based upon their actions for the previous 5 years, until the United States led, but led at a moment and a time when our options were reduced relative to the ones that existed a year or two earlier. The Senator from Connecticut and I initially never argued that American troops should be put on the ground in Bosnia. We felt very strongly that could have been avoided had we used our airpower, had we lifted sanctions to allow the Bosnian Government--that at that moment was still multi-ethnic--to have a chance to fight for itself. But that is water under the bridge. That is past. We are left with Dayton, which was making the best out of a bad circumstance. The end result of Dayton is that we will have invested about $5 billion by September of this year, plus America's prestige and American forces on the ground in Bosnia. I must tell you straight up, I am opposed even to the administration's announcement that we withdraw and have a drop-dead date for June 1998. But I think it borders on the ridiculous for the U.S. Senate to instruct the President that we must withdraw as early as the initial proposal called for, in September.