Joe Biden

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I say to the distinguished leader, depending on how many votes we have, I may go through only a very small portion of it.

Mr. BIDEN. I would like to just wait and give the chairman the opportunity to make his statement.

Mr. BIDEN. Before the clock starts to toll here on the 10 hours, I understand the distinguished chairman of the committee is running just a little bit late, and he asked whether or not it would be permissible to have a 10-minute quorum call; is that correct?

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, will the majority leader yield?

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. I thank the Chair. Mr. KYL addressed the Chair.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, we yield back all of our time.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I have 15 minutes.

Mr. BIDEN. I have colleagues who have planes to catch, so I will try to be brief. Let me be very, very blunt, as the Chair knows I usually am, much to my detriment on occasion. This is not about anything, this vote. This vote is really designed to try to come up with a substitute for the chemical weapons treaty--to give people who want to say they voted against chemical weapons an ability, then, to vote against the Chemical Weapons Convention. I know we are supposed to be more diplomatic than that, and I know all that, and I am not suggesting that things in the bill are not worthwhile. They are. But this is what happens after we pass the treaty, that is, the implementing legislation. The way treaties work is, if we pass a treaty like the Chemical Weapons Convention, then we will come back here and pass implementing legislation. Just today, Senator Lugar and I have introduced legislation called the implementing legislation. That is, how do we domestically implement what we have just signed on to internationally. Now, this bill does some of those things. Some of the things in here, in this bill--and I have great respect for my friend from Arizona, I really do. I always kid him and say my problem with him is he is too bright. I always prefer people who I am usually in disagreement with philosophically that are not very bright. He is very bright. That is a problem. So he is more effective. But I hope he will not be offended. I think he would be willing to tell you not only does he believe in what is in here, he also hopes it has the political benefit of gathering enough votes to allow people the option to vote against the Chemical Weapons Convention. So, when I give this short shrift, I am not giving short shrift to the ideas, please understand. But the Record should note that this is not the norm; nobody that I am aware of, at least as long as I have been here, is usually willing to allow, without any hearings, a major bill to be brought up that is 64 pages long that most of us have not had a chance to read. I just want the Record to reflect why I am going to truncate this a great deal because this debate is not really about the substance here but about the treaty. I will tell you why we need a treaty and why this legislation, even if I knew all that was in it, and even if I agreed with all that was in it, would not get the job done. First, the treaty addresses two flaws in the Geneva Protocol which focused on a single wrong. It said we would ban the use of chemical weapons. The Chemical Weapons Treaty says you cannot produce chemical weapons, you cannot own chemical weapons, you cannot stockpile them. This legislation does nothing to affect any other country. Nothing we do in here in any way puts or imposes a prohibition on other countries other than as it relates to how we will deal with them on a bilateral basis. Second, we need a Chemical Weapons Convention because it will strengthen the ability of nations of the world to cooperate in placing strict global controls on trade and chemicals. We want to be able to trace the precursor chemicals that go from one country to another country, from one country or company to an individual, because that is the thing that will allow us to trace down and see whether the bad guys, whether they be terrorists and or countries at large, are doing bad things. That is, possessing, building, or designing chemical capability. This does nothing on that score. Third, we need a Chemical Weapons Convention because we have decided to get rid of most of our chemical stockpile, and that decision was jointly made by the Congress and the President in the 1980's. After the Gulf War, George Bush announced we would destroy the rest. The fourth reason is we need a treaty because it greatly enhances our ability to detect and deter a chemical weapons program. This will do nothing to affect anybody else's chemical weapons programs. In sum, the CWC will be a powerful instrument. This, at best, you could say, would be something along the line of implementing legislation, if we had that treaty passed, which I hope we will. I might add, I agreed to allow this bill to come up before the treaty, which is a very unusual way to do this because, quite frankly, I had no other way of getting the treaty up. Had I not agreed to this, my colleagues could have filibustered or prevented it from coming out of committee. Even though I have the votes in the committee for the treaty I could have prevented it from coming to the floor. This must be confusing to people listening to this debate today, because why would we vote on this before the international treaty? The answer is that we have no choice. The answer is they've got me by the procedural ears here. If we don't get a chance to vote on the CWC by the 28th, we are not in the deal and we, as a nation, are very much out of sync. I will conclude by suggesting that Senator Kyl's bill calls for a couple of things that already are in the treaty. The bill does nothing to eliminate other nations' chemical weapons. It requires us to go back and renegotiate the Chemical Weapons Convention, which, as General Brent Scowcroft, not a man known for hyperbole, said the concept of starting over was pure fantasy. Next, this bill does nothing to strengthen trade controls internationally. It has language about the Australia Group--an organization that is already in place and will stay in place. There is nothing extraordinary about that. The Australia Group exists and will continue to enforce trade controls. Third, the Kyl bill provides sanctions against nations that use chemical weapons. That's already in law. The bill does strengthen this in minor respects, but it weakens it in others. It doesn't make it illegal to produce or stockpile these weapons. Fourth, the Kyl bill does nothing to address trade sanctions that will apply against U.S. companies if the Chemical Weapons Convention enters into force with us. In sum, the Kyl bill is not a substitute for the Chemical Weapons Treaty, although there are things in the Kyl bill that I would vote for. As I told my friend--and I really do think he is my friend, and we have been completely straight with one another--I am going to vote against this and urge my colleagues to do the same, because I don't know enough to know what is in here. I will never forget that when I first got here, Senator Pastore of Rhode Island, an old fellow, was a very powerful Senator; I asked him about something and he said, ``Boy, let me tell you something. If you don't know what's in it, it's always safer to vote no.'' So I am voting no. Although there might be some merit to this, I can't find it. It is clearly not a substitute for the CWC. I yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I wish we were not here debating this legislation today--not because I don't think it is right; I do, and I am a cosponsor of the bill; but because I wish there was no need to take up a bill like this in the first place. Unfortunately, our hands have been forced, largely by the courts. In March of last year, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a Washington State law prohibiting physician-assisted suicide was unconstitutional under the constitutional right of privacy. Then, a month later, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals struck down a similar New York State law, arguing that the equal protection clause of the Constitution gives the terminally ill the same rights to hasten their own death through drugs as other patients have to refuse artificial life support. Although implementation has been delayed by the courts, in 1994, Oregon voters approved a referendum making physician-assisted suicide legal in that State. The Supreme Court has heard oral arguments on the matter--and it is expected to rule before the end of this term. Now, if physician-assisted suicide does become legal--through the courts or through State referendums or by some other means--there will be no doubt an attempt made to have the Federal Government pay for this. I can hear the arguments already. People will demand that Medicare or Medicaid reimburse physicians who help people commit suicide. Mr. President, this is not such a farfetched notion. After the voters approved the Oregon referendum in 1994, Oregon officials actually admitted they would seek Medicaid reimbursement if the law were to go into effect. Now, truth in advertising here, Mr. President. I am opposed to physician-assisted suicide becoming legal in this country, period. So I don't want to hide under some false cloak here. I am one of those who does not support abortion, but I acknowledge that my personal religious view should not be imposed upon the rest of the world because, for me, it is hard to determine and insist that my view on when there is a human life in being is more accurate than someone who is equally as religious as me, but might have a different view. But a suicide is a different story. There is no question that there is a human life in being. Physician-assisted suicide is the most dangerous slippery slope, in my view, that a nation can embark upon. So I make it clear that this has nothing to do with whether physician-assisted suicide should be allowed. I don't think it should be. But that is beside the point today. What is at issue is--if it becomes legal in one State, several States, or all States--is the Federal Government going to have to pay for it? To that, I hope we will emphatically say ``no,'' regardless of what each of us thinks about the legality or constitutionality of physician- assisted suicide. No matter where you are on the issue, under no circumstances should the Federal Government be paying physicians to help people kill themselves. Let me say what else this debate today is not about. It is not about refusing to accept medical treatment. The Supreme Court has already ruled that individuals have a right to refuse unwanted medical treatment. I am not sure how a physician or a hospital would bill Medicare or Medicaid for not providing a treatment that the patient did not want. But, regardless of that, this bill explicitly states that the funding prohibition does not apply in such circumstances and does not apply to drugs given to alleviate pain. What we are talking about is when physicians specifically give a patient a drug to kill them--when there is a proactive attempt to kill a patient. That is what we are talking about--no Federal dollars allowed. I commend Senator Ashcroft and Senator Dorgan for their work on this bill. This has been a bipartisan effort from the start--going back to when this bill was first put together last summer. Mr. President, it is important that we swiftly and definitively resolve this issue. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I am pleased to support the nomination of former Congressman Pete Peterson for the Post of Ambassador to Vietnam. At this critical juncture in our relations with Vietnam and Southeast Asia there are many important United States interests that can be advanced only with the presence of an able Ambassador in Hanoi. The most important of these interests is the continued accounting for our POW/MIA's. A Vietnam veteran and former prisoner of war, Pete Peterson has both a professional and profoundly personal stake in ensuring the fullest possible accounting of his comrades-in-arms. As ambassador, he has pledged to make achieving that goal his highest priority. In addition to enhancing cooperation on the POW/MIA issue, Peterson will be charged more broadly with encouraging and facilitating Hanoi's entry as a peaceful, cooperative member of the community of nations. Vietnam has begun working with us in the important area of counternarcotics, and this cooperation should be expanded to curtail the flow of heroin and other deadly drugs from Southeast Asia to our shores. We have also begun a dialogue on human rights which must be buttressed by expanded cultural ties and educational opportunities. The advocacy of a strong United States Ambassador coupled with the collective efforts of the American people and numerous nongovernmental organizations can do much to foster greater Vietnamese respect for international norms in the areas of human rights, democracy, and religious freedom. Finally, approving the nomination of Congressman Peterson as Ambassador to Hanoi will greatly assist efforts already underway to advance United States economic interests in Vietnam and throughout Southeast Asia. Vietnam has made significant progress toward transforming its inefficient centrally planned economy to a market- based economy, and it is actively seeking foreign participation in its economic development. Vietnam's efforts to rebuild its infrastructure and modernize its economy present great opportunities for United States businesses in the areas of energy, telecommunications, health, education, tourism, and environmental protection. But for United States firms to compete successfully with the numerous foreign companies already doing business in Vietnam, the administration must negotiate and Congress must approve a comprehensive bilateral trade agreement. As Ambassador, Peterson will play a central role in expediting negotiations on an agreement which will safeguard U.S. commercial interests in the fastest growing region of the world. There are some who have speculated about the administration's motives for normalizing relations with Vietnam at this time, questioning whether officials from the Lippo Group or other United States businesses with prospective commercial interests in east Asia sought to influence the decision in exchange for their campaign contributions to the Democratic National Committee. As our colleague, Senator McCain--like Congressman Peterson a former POW--noted at Congressman Peterson's confirmation hearing, ``This rumor is entirely unsubstantiated by fact.'' President Bush and Secretary Baker put the United States firmly on the path toward normalization in 1989 when they drafted a ``road map'' whose goal was the establishment of full diplomatic relations. The pace of normalization has actually slowed during the Clinton administration. As Senator McCain stated during the Foreign Relations Committee hearing, the Clinton administration was worried about the political ramifications for the President in making a decision to normalize--with the veterans organizations and others--and was not possessed with concern about helping business interests, whether domestic or foreign. In short, we have reached the point of preparing to exchange ambassadors because of the bipartisan conviction that normalizing relations is in our best interests. It had nothing to do with foreign lobbyists or contributions to any Presidential campaign. Peterson traveled first to Vietnam 30 years ago as an Air force fighter pilot. He served his country nobly, receiving two Silver Stars, several Bronze Stars, and two Purple Hearts. he flew 66 combat missions over Vietnam before his aircraft was downed near Hanoi on September 10, 1966. He then endured almost 7 years of unimaginable hardship as a prisoner of war, before finally returning home in March 1973. Now he seeks to return to Vietnam, not as a warrior, but as an ambassador of peace, helping to heal old wounds and bring Vietnam into the world community after 30 years of isolation. It is a testament to Congressman Peterson's commitment to public service that he is willing to take on this difficult mission. I wish him God's speed.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, the forthcoming reversion of Hong Kong to Chinese control is, as a matter of diplomacy, the mere implementation of a diplomatic agreement between the United Kingdom and the government of the People's Republic of China. But it is, of course, far more complicated, and its implications far more profound. The challenges ahead are many. Will Beijing abide by the rule of law and uphold its commitment to the United Kingdom and the people of Hong Kong to ``one country, two systems?'' Will America and the major powers have the political will to challenge China should they renege on their commitments? Nowhere are the challenges of reversion greater than for United States law enforcement--for Hong Kong has long been a center of the international criminal organizations which control the trade in Asian heroin, money laundering is on the rise, and there are a host of other law enforcement problems. Here in the United States, we see the related problems of Asian organized crime, or Tongs, heroin trafficking from Asia through Hong Kong, alien smuggling, arms trafficking, and the use of Hong Kong as a money laundering center for criminals. Unfortunately, the capacity of U.S. law enforcement to respond to this threat is limited by the fact that we simply do not have enough agents with the language skills, intelligence background and contacts to infiltrate Asian organized crime. This is why I am introducing today the Royal Hong Kong Police Anticrime Strategy Act of 1997. I am pleased to be joined in doing so by Senator Grassley, my colleague on the Senate International Caucus on Narcotics Control. This legislation seeks to take advantage of a potential opportunity-- even in the face of all the challenges which will come with the reversion of Hong Kong. To describe in simplest terms the opportunity-- as officers of the Royal Hong Kong Police leave their force, U.S. law enforcement agencies may be able to bolster our anti-drug, money laundering, alien smuggling and Asian organized crime capabilities with the unique knowledge of the former officers of the Royal Hong Kong Police. For example, it could be of significant value to federal law enforcement to simply retain on a one-time or continuing basis former Royal Hong Kong Police personnel to use them to help build a major Asian-Crime investigative database. Such a database could form the backbone of U.S. investigations in the years to come. I offer this simply as a means to illustrate to my Senate colleagues the potential law enforcement benefits of this legislation. Of course, the best uses must be decided by the law enforcement professionals within the Justice and Treasury Departments. I also point out that I have long worked on this issue--beginning with a hearing with the FBI on the issue of Asian organized crime way back in August, 1990. My January 1992 drug strategy also called on the Bush Administration to determine if these police officers could be of assistance. In fact, a DEA operation began in 1992 which used some retired Royal Hong Kong Police in a very limited capacity to provide translation services to support investigations of Asian heroin trafficking. I was also pleased to include a provision offered by Senator Roth in the 1994 Biden Crime Bill to study this issue--unfortunately, this provision was dropped from the final agreement due to opposition in the House. But, today, with the continuing rise of the heroin trade, I am reiterating my call for us to address this issue. The legislation I offer today calls on the Attorney General and the Treasury Secretary to report to Congress on the need and potential benefits--as well as any potential security or administrative problems--of adding former officers of the Royal Hong Kong Police to our federal law enforcement agencies. And, if the benefits exist, this legislation authorizes the addition of up to 200 former officers to assist in the investigation of international drug trafficking, alien smuggling, money laundering and organized crime undertaken by the Justice and Treasury Departments. Mr. President, preparing for the reversion of Hong Kong primarily means preparing for the challenges ahead--but it also requires us to recognize the opportunities ahead. Taking advantage of this opportunity is what the ``Royal Hong Kong Police Anticrime Act of 1997'' is all about. I ask unanimous consent that the full text of the legislation appear in the Record.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, there is no doubt a lot of women in their forties who are awfully confused these days about whether they should receive a regular mammogram to test for breast cancer. Over the last several years--and especially over the last couple of months--the debate in the scientific community and the conflicting scientific studies have not painted a very clear picture for younger women. But, what is perfectly clear--what is not in dispute--is that older women should receive regular mammograms. Mammograms save lives. And, the scientific studies confirm it. If all women over 50 received regular mammograms, breast cancer mortality could be reduced by one- third. The recommended screening guidelines reflect this, no matter what group's guidelines you read. The American Cancer Society, the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, the American Medical Association, the American Academy of Family Physicians, and the American College of Physicians all recommend that women over 50 receive annual mammograms. Now, here's the problem. Women 65 and over have Medicare as their health insurance. The guidelines tell them--and their doctors are telling them--to get a mammogram once a year. But, Medicare pays for mammograms only once every 2 years. This means that an elderly woman must pay the cost of every other mammogram herself--or go without a mammogram every other year. And, even when Medicare pays for the mammogram, the woman is still responsible for at least 20 percent of the cost. The result, Mr. President, is that too many women are following Medicare's payment rules--and not getting tested--rather than following the scientific guidelines--and being tested. Two years ago, a study was published in the New England Journal of Medicine. It found that only 14.4 percent of women without Medicare supplemental insurance--that is, women who do not have, on top of Medicare, private insurance that may cover mammograms on an annual basis--only 14.4 percent of those women received even a mammogram once every 2 years, let alone annually. Even among those women with supplemental insurance, less than half had a mammogram over the course of 2 years. The study concluded that a woman's inability to pay a share of the costs for mammograms ``is an obstacle to the effective mass screening of older women for breast cancer.'' And, I would add, an obstacle to saving thousands of lives. So, Mr. President, today I am introducing the Medicare Mammography Screening Expansion Act. This bill does two things. First, it would cover mammograms under Medicare once every year, as recommended by the guidelines, instead of once every 2 years, which is now the law. Second, it would eliminate the 20-percent copayment that is currently charged to women when they receive a mammogram, so that women are not discouraged from obtaining this important preventive measure because of the cost. I should note that eliminating the copayment is not unprecedented. Medicare already does not charge copayments for flu shots and most clinical laboratory tests. Mr. President, we know that mammograms save lives. Yet, current Medicare policy creates barriers that are preventing women from seeking this simple, life-saving procedure. I urge my colleagues to join me in making mammography screenings more available and more affordable for American women.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I am pleased to join in introducing today with Senator Grassley and others the Drug-Free Communities Act of 1997. This legislation will help take an important step forward toward a goal we all share--keeping kids away from drugs and drugs away from kids. This 5 year, $140 million authorization to fund local antidrug prevention efforts could be an important catalyst to getting local groups together to plan, coordinate, and carry out the wide variety of drug prevention treatment activities we all know are necessary to reverse the rise of drug abuse among our children. By unleashing the talents and energy of local coalitions of local businesses, schools, law enforcement, religious organizations, doctors, and others we can build community-wide and community-based drug prevention efforts. For all these reasons, I am pleased to offer my support for the concept embodied in this legislation. But, I must offer two important conditions to my support for this bill. First, as potentially valuable as antidrug coalitions can be, I do not believe it would be wise for us to ``rob Peter to pay Paul'' by trying to fund this drug prevention effort by cutting funding for other, worthy drug prevention efforts. It is my understanding that the other sponsors of this legislation in both the House and the Senate share this view, and I look forward to working with them to find the modest dollars necessary to fund this effort. Second, it is also my understanding that the sponsors of this legislation are continuing to work with the Drug Director to iron out the bureaucratic details of how this effort will be undertaken at the Federal level. I am confident that none of the sponsors of this bill have any desire to establish any new layers of wasteful bureaucracy, so I look forward to working with them to pass the most efficient, effective effort possible. This bill offers a key example of the bipartisan support for drug prevention and drug treatment efforts which exists at the grassroots level throughout our Nation. In the weeks and months ahead, I look forward to working with my colleagues in the same bipartisan fashion. As my colleagues have heard me note on numerous occasions--our Nation stands on the edge of the ``baby boomerang''--with 39 million American children under the age of 10, the greatest number since the 1960's. We must prepare for these 39 million as they enter their teen years when they will be at their greatest likelihood of falling prey to drugs and crime. If we do not, we will pay for our lack of foresight with what could be the most severe epidemic of youth drug abuse, youth violence, and youth crime our Nation has ever suffered. Preparing each of these 39 million American children means giving them the techniques and the desire to stay away from drugs--in short, drug prevention. The Drug-Free Communities Act of 1997 is one of what must be many elements of a comprehensive, nationwide drug prevention effort. I am pleased to cosponsor this legislation and I look forward to passing it into law.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I am pleased to join in introducing today with Senator Grassley and others the Drug-Free Communities Act of 1997. This legislation will help take an important step forward toward a goal we all share--keeping kids away from drugs and drugs away from kids. This 5 year, $140 million authorization to fund local antidrug prevention efforts could be an important catalyst to getting local groups together to plan, coordinate, and carry out the wide variety of drug prevention treatment activities we all know are necessary to reverse the rise of drug abuse among our children. By unleashing the talents and energy of local coalitions of local businesses, schools, law enforcement, religious organizations, doctors, and others we can build community-wide and community-based drug prevention efforts. For all these reasons, I am pleased to offer my support for the concept embodied in this legislation. But, I must offer two important conditions to my support for this bill. First, as potentially valuable as antidrug coalitions can be, I do not believe it would be wise for us to ``rob Peter to pay Paul'' by trying to fund this drug prevention effort by cutting funding for other, worthy drug prevention efforts. It is my understanding that the other sponsors of this legislation in both the House and the Senate share this view, and I look forward to working with them to find the modest dollars necessary to fund this effort. Second, it is also my understanding that the sponsors of this legislation are continuing to work with the Drug Director to iron out the bureaucratic details of how this effort will be undertaken at the Federal level. I am confident that none of the sponsors of this bill have any desire to establish any new layers of wasteful bureaucracy, so I look forward to working with them to pass the most efficient, effective effort possible. This bill offers a key example of the bipartisan support for drug prevention and drug treatment efforts which exists at the grassroots level throughout our Nation. In the weeks and months ahead, I look forward to working with my colleagues in the same bipartisan fashion. As my colleagues have heard me note on numerous occasions--our Nation stands on the edge of the ``baby boomerang''--with 39 million American children under the age of 10, the greatest number since the 1960's. We must prepare for these 39 million as they enter their teen years when they will be at their greatest likelihood of falling prey to drugs and crime. If we do not, we will pay for our lack of foresight with what could be the most severe epidemic of youth drug abuse, youth violence, and youth crime our Nation has ever suffered. Preparing each of these 39 million American children means giving them the techniques and the desire to stay away from drugs--in short, drug prevention. The Drug-Free Communities Act of 1997 is one of what must be many elements of a comprehensive, nationwide drug prevention effort. I am pleased to cosponsor this legislation and I look forward to passing it into law.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I am pleased to join my colleagues on the Foreign Relations Committee in bringing forward this compromise resolution with regard to Mexico and the narcotics issue. At the outset, I want to compliment the Senators who have been deeply involved in the negotiations on this matter--the chairman of the committee, the Senator from Georgia, the Senator from California, and the Senator from Texas. They and many other Senators have a deep and abiding concern about the serious threat that drug trafficking in Mexico posts to both that country and the United States. Indeed, we all agree, I suspect, on several issues. First, it is clear that we cannot overstate the role of Mexico as a source for narcotics. Mexico is the primary transit route for cocaine entering the United States, a major source country for heroin, methamphetamines, and marijuana, and a major money laundering center for illicit profits from the narcotics trade. Second, I believe we agree that the United States bears a significant responsibility for combating the narcotics trade. Undeniably, the demand for narcotics in this country spurs the narcotics trade. But we are not solely to blame for Mexico's ills. As the Mexican Government continually reminds us, Mexico is a sovereign nations, and it has the responsibility to do all that it can to confront the threat of the powerful drug cartels--cartels which now have considerable influence in Mexican society. Third, we agree that corruption in Mexican law enforcement is endemic. That corruption is deeply rooted, as even Mexican President Zedillo acknowledged in his State-of-the-Nation address last fall. Fourth, we all agree that Mexico must do much, much more in the war on drugs--as the White House acknowledged last month when the President made his certification. All this leads to the fundamental question now facing us: What can Congress do to help us achieve our objective of reducing the flow of narcotics from Mexico to the United States? I was disappointed that the President certified that Mexico had met the standard of fully cooperating, or taking adequate steps on its own. The systemic corruption in Mexico, combined with several failures to follow through on commitments made, argued against granting Mexico a full stamp of approval. Instead, I urged the President to invoke the national waiver, because I believed that our interests would be better served by not isolating ourselves from Mexico--which would surely occur were we to fully decertify Mexico. For my part, I believe it could have long-lasting, damaging repercussions that we cannot now predict. At a minimum, it would inhibit the political space that President Zedillo has to press forward with his agenda of reform. And if we destroy President Zedillo's political resolve to combat the drug traffickers, we will have achieved nothing--and we may well lose the gains we have recently made. In other words, decertification and exercising the full penalties possible under decertification offers a cure that appears to be worse than the disease. I am pleased that we have come to a bipartisan agreement--reached last night in negotiations with the administration--on the best way forward. The resolution recognizes the aspects of the issue that I have stated--specifically that both countries must take strong action to combat the scourge of narcotics. In addition, the resolution lays out several benchmarks--a set of policies that we expect both the Mexican Government and the United States Government to undertake in the coming months. For example, it makes clear that Mexico must implement its recently enacted anti-crime laws, including the new money laundering statute and the organized crime law. In addition, Mexico must investigate and prosecute official corruption at all levels of government--and we must do all we can to assist Mexico in that effort. And Mexico must deny safe haven to persons and organizations responsible for drug trafficking. These and many other measures--if vigorously implemented--will be critical to strengthening the effort against the drug trade. Mr. President, we have a major problem in Mexico. It is, in part, the result of our success in reducing the flow of narcotics through the Caribbean and Florida--and our success, in cooperation with the Government of Colombia, in dismantling the major cartels in that country. The emergence of powerful cartels in Mexico is a manifestation of the so-called balloon effect--if you pressure the drug traffickers in one area, they will move to another. Unfortunately, the traffickers are nothing if not resilient. The result, for both Mexico and the United States, is the expansion of organized crime syndicates that have considerable power and influence over not only the drug trade, but also Mexican society itself. Combating this development will require a major commitment--of resources and political will--by both our Government and the Mexican Government. The cooperation we have received from Mexico in the past year is far from perfect. We all acknowledge that. But we have made important progress in the past few years, and this measure will be an important contribution to spurring even greater cooperation between our two Governments.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, 2 of the 12 seats on the District of Columbia Court of Appeals are currently vacant. Some have argued that the vacancy to which Merrick Garland has been nominated should not be filled because the D.C. circuit is overstaffed. But the reasons Congress gave for approving 12 seats for the D.C. circuit remain compelling today and justify filling this vacancy. Further, to propose eliminating a circuit court judgeship within the context of a particular nomination, rather than through the deliberative process we normally follow in addressing judgeship needs, jeopardizes the impartiality and independence of the judiciary. Merrick Garland's nomination was first delivered to the Senate on September 6, 1995--more than 18 months ago. The Judiciary Committee held a confirmation hearing on the nomination on November 30, 1995, and forwarded the nomination for consideration by the full Senate 2 weeks later. The full Senate failed to act on Garland's nomination for 9\1/2\ more months, however, returning it to the President at the close of the 104th Congress. In fact, the Senate refused to confirm a single circuit court judge during the entire second session of the last Congress. This was the first time in more than 20 years that an entire session of Congress had passed without a single circuit court confirmation. Nonetheless, some argued that shutting down the confirmation process is par for the course in an election year. They are wrong. And let me set the record straight. George Bush made nearly one-third of his 253 judicial nominations in 1992, a Presidential election year. As chairman of the Judiciary Committee, I held 15 nomination hearings that year, including 3 in July, 2 in August, and 1 in September. In 1992--the last Presidential election year--the Senate continued to confirm judges through the waning days of the 102d Congress. We even confirmed 7 judges on October 8--the last day of the second session. As a result, the Senate confirmed all 66 nominees the Judiciary Committee reported out that year--55 for the district courts and 11 for the circuit courts. Let me repeat: last session, only 17 district judges were confirmed and no circuit judges were confirmed. Now that the election is over and Merrick Garland has been renominated, Republicans argue that we should not vote to confirm him because the District of Columbia circuit needs only 10 judges. They are wrong. And let me set the record straight. Congress has previously recognized the need for 12 judges. Twelve years ago, based on the recommendation of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Congress concluded that the D.C. circuit's caseload warranted 12 judgeships. The Senate report to the 1984 legislation creating an additional judgeship states: Located at the seat of the Federal government, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia inevitably receives a significant amount of its caseload from federal administrative agencies headquartered in that area. Administrative appeals filed in this court numbered 504 in 1982 and represented 34.8 percent of the incoming caseload. Due to the nature of the caseload which includes many unique cases involving complex legal, economic and social issues of national importance and a large backlog of pending appeals, this court requires one additional judgeship. The D.C. circuit needs 12 judges to handle its complex caseload. A large portion of the D.C. Circuit caseload consists of complex administrative appeals which generally consume a larger amount of judicial resources than other appellate cases. Therefore, comparison of raw caseload data between the D.C. circuit, with its high percentage of complex administrative cases, and the other circuits is misleading. According to the statistics provided by the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts for the period from September 30, 1995 to September 30, 1996, 1,347 cases were filed in the D.C. circuit, 474 of which--or 35.2 percent--were administrative appeals. In contrast, in the remaining 11 circuits, of the 51,991 cases filed, only 2,827--or 5.4 percent--were administrative appeals. The D.C. circuit has a long time interval between filing a notice of appeal and final disposition. Because the D.C. circuit has this incredibly high percentage of administrative appeals relative to the other circuits and because these types of cases require tremendous amounts of judicial resources, litigants in the D.C. circuit must wait an average of 12 months between the filing of the notice of appeal and final disposition. Only 3 of the 12 circuits have a longer average for this time frame. The fact that the D.C. circuit has a long time interval between filing and disposition is indicative of the complex cases that the circuit handles. Other circuits have more criminal appeals and garden- variety diversity cases that often are amenable to summary disposition without oral argument. The D.C. circuit has fewer pro se appeals than other circuits. In addition to having fewer criminal appeals and diversity cases, the D.C. circuit has a lower percentage of pro se mandamus cases than all other circuits. Chief Judge Edwards has noted that pro se appeals are often frivolous, easily identified as lacking merit, or otherwise amenable to disposition without significant expenditure of judicial resources. The D.C. circuit has more cases of national importance than other circuits. Not only are complex administrative appeals commonly heard in the D.C. circuit, but as a result of its location at the seat of the Federal Government, the D.C. circuit also hears a disproportionate number of the high-profile cases of national importance that reach the U.S. Courts of Appeals. The D.C. circuit decided in 1996 alone National Treasury Employees Union versus United States of America, a challenge to the constitutionality of the Line-Item Veto Act, as well as Perot versus Federal Election Commission, an appeal from a district court's rejection of Ross Perot's attempt to participate in last year's Presidential debates. The same reasons that supported the creation of a 12 judgeship for the D.C. circuit in 1984 justify its existence now. If reasoned deliberation and study of this circuit leads to the conclusion that a future vacancy should not be filled, then we should address that issue, but not within the context of this nomination. If ad hoc analysis becomes our mode of operation, we will give the appearance of a politicized judiciary. I congratulate Merrick Garland for his distinguished career and commend President Clinton for making this nomination. I hope that the Senate will act to confirm him as expeditiously as possible.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. I will be happy to.

Mr. BIDEN. I got it.

Mr. BIDEN. And I was chairman.

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I have not spoken on judges this year, but having worked on it for so many years with my friend from Utah, having either been the ranking member or chairman of that committee. But let me make one point. It is one thing to say that we are going to disagree on judges. We did that when we were in control. We did that. And we said that all the judges that have been nominated here by two successive Republican Presidents--we picked seven out of a total of over 500--we said we disagree with these judges. The most celebrated case was Judge Bork, and less celebrated cases were people who have gone beyond being judges. Some are Senators. But the bottom line was that we understand that. But what I do not understand is this notion and all of the talk about activist judges without any identification of who the activist judges are. It is one thing for the Republicans to say that we are not going to vote for or allow activist judges. We understand that. We are big folks. We understand baseball, hardball. We got that part. No problem. But what I do not understand is saying we are not going to allow activist judges and then not identifying who those activist judges are. This is kind of what is going on here, and no one wants to say it. But since I have the reputation of saying what no one wants to say, I am going to say it. Part of what is going on here is, and in the Republican caucus there are some who say, No. We want to change the rules. We want to make sure, of all the people nominated for the Federal bench, that the Republican Senators should be able to nominate half of them, or 40 percent of them, or 30 percent of them. That is malarkey. That is flat- out malarkey. That is blackmail. That has nothing to do with activist judges. I do not doubt the sincerity of my friend from Utah. We have worked together for 22 years. But here is my challenge. Any judge nominated by the President of the United States, if you have a problem with his or her activism, name it. Tell us what it is. Define it like we did. You disagreed. You disagreed with the definition. But we said straight up, ``Bang. I do not want Bork for the following reasons.'' People understand that. But do not try to change 200 years of precedent and tell us that we are not letting judges up because we want the Republican Senator to be able to name the judge. Don't do that, or else do it and do it in the open. Let's have a little bit of legislating in the sunshine here. Do it flat in the open. I see my colleagues nodding and smiling. I am sort of breaching the unspoken rule here not to talk about what is really happening. But that is what is really happening. I will not name certain Senators. But I have had Senators come up to me and say, Joe, here is the deal. We will let the following judges through in my State if you agree to get the President to say that I get to name three of them. Now folks, that is a change of a deal. That is changing precedent. That isn't how it works. The President nominates. We dispose one way or another of that nomination. And the historical practice has been--and while I was chairman we never once did that--that never once that I am aware of did we ever say, ``By the way, we are not letting Judge A through unless you give me Judges B and C.'' Now, let me set the record totally straight here. There are States where precedents were set years ago. The Republican and Democratic Senator, when it was a split delegation, have made a deal up front in the open. In New York, Senator Javits and Senator Moynihan said: Look. In the State of New York, the way we are going to do this is that whomever is the Senator representing the party of the President--I believe they broke it down to 60--for every two people that Senator gets to name, the Senator in the party other than the President gets to name one. OK, fine. Jacob Javits did not go to Pat Moynihan and demand that he was going to do that. Moynihan made the offer, as I understand it, to Jacob Javits. That is not a bad way to proceed. But now to come along and say, ``By the way, in the name of activist judges, we are not going to move judges'' is not what this is about. I might point out that all the talk last election that started off-- it all fizzled because it did not go anywhere--about how there is going to be an issue about activism on the courts, we pointed out that of all the judges that came up in Clinton's first term, almost all of them were voted unanimously out of this body by Democrats and Republicans, including the former majority leader. He only voted against three of all the nominees, then he argued, by the way, that Clinton nominated too many activist judges. And then it kind of fizzled when I held a little press conference, and said, ``By the way. You voted for all of them.'' It kind of made it hard to make this case that they were so activist. So look. Let me say that I will not take any more time, but I will come back to the floor with all of the numbers and the details. But here is the deal. If the Republican majority in the Senate says, ``Look, the following 2, 5, 10, 12, 20 judges are activist for the following reasons, and we are against them,'' we understand that. We will fight it. If we disagree, we will fight it. But if they come along and say, ``We are just not letting these judges come up because really what is happening is they are coming to guys like me and saying, `Hey, I will make you a deal. You give me 50 percent of judges, and I will let these other judges go through.' '' Then that isn't part of the deal. Look, I have a message to the Court. I know the Court never reads the Congressional Record, and Justice Scalia said that we should not consider the Record for legislative history because everybody knows that all the Congressional Record is is what Senators' staff say and not what Senators know. He is wrong. But that is what he said. Maybe they don't read it. But I want to send a message. Madam President, when I was chairman of the committee and there was a Republican President named Reagan and a Republican President named Bush, the Judicial Conference on a monthly basis would write to me and say, ``Why aren't you passing more judges?'' They have been strangely silent about the vacancies that exist. Now, I agree that the administration has been slow in pulling the trigger here. They have not sent enough nominees up in a timely fashion. And I have been critical of them for the last 2 years, Madam President. But that is not the case now. All I am saying to you is, as they say in parts of my State, ``I smell a rat here.'' What I think is happening--and I hope I am wrong-- is that this is not about activism. This is about trying to keep the President of the United States of America from being able to appoint judges, particularly as it relates to the courts of appeals. Now, what is happening is what happened today. Merrick Garland was around for years. Now, what is going to happen is they are going to say we reported out a circuit court of appeals judge. Aren't we doing something. The truth of the matter is the proof will be in the pudding several months from now when we find out whether or not we are really going to move on these judges. Let me point out one other thing. And I see my friend from Maryland in the Chamber, and I will yield particularly since I had not intended speaking at this moment.

Mr. BIDEN. The point I wish to make is this. When I was chairman of the committee and a Republican was President, we held, on average, a hearing for judges once every 2 weeks and had usually five judges, circuit court and district court, who we heard. Last year we essentially had one hearing every other month and we had to fight to get three to four on the agenda to be heard.

Mr. BIDEN. If I may respond to the Senator, obviously the facts are correct, but I think it worth elaborating a little bit more on the facts. I saw my very able colleague, the present chairman of the Judiciary Committee, on television the other day, and he was talking about the number of judges that were ``left hanging,'' who were not confirmed and sent back to the administration at the end of 1992, the Bush administration. And he cited an accurate number. But as my very distinguished friend, who is, as well, a scholar, knows, there is an old expression attributed to Benjamin Disraeli, who said there are three kinds of lies: lies, damn lies, and statistics. What my able friend from Utah did not mention is that just like President Carter--Carter's judges is a separate charge we can go back to, but just like President Clinton, President Bush did not get his nominees up here until the end of the process. In other words, they were late getting here. Notwithstanding the fact that he was late in getting his nominees up, the Senator may remember in the caucus over the objection of some Democrats who said the Republicans would never do this, I insisted we confirm judges up to the day we adjourned the Senate. During the last week the Senate was in that year, we confirmed seven judges. I could have easily just sneezed and they would not have been confirmed. And the fact is the reason why we did not confirm more is because we did not have time to hold the hearings and we were holding hearings on 20 or more a month.

Mr. BIDEN. Republican judges.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Now let me move to the third issue. The notion of, as my friend from North Carolina stated, that there is an artificial date of April 29 made up by the administration to put undue pressure on the Senate to act. Let me point out for the Senate that there is nothing artificial about that date. It is real. What does that mean? It means that our failure to ratify before the 29th will have consequences. First, the chemical weapons treaty mandates trade restrictions that could have a deleterious impact upon the American chemical industry. If the United States has not ratified, as long as they have not ratified, American companies will have to supply end user certificates to purchase certain classes of chemicals from the CWC signatories. After 3 years, they will be subject to trade sanctions that will harm American exports and jobs. I know that my friend says a lot of chemical companies do not like this. I come from a State that has a little bit of an interest in chemicals, the single most significant State in America that deals with chemicals. A little company called Du Pont; a little company called Hercules; a little company called ICI Americas; a little company called Du Pont Merck--little pharmaceutical outfits who are among the giants in the world. They are not what you call liberal Democratic establishments. They are ardently--I can testify--they are ardently in favor of this treaty. They believe it is desperately in the interest of the United States of America and their interest. This is not a bunch of lib labs out there who are arms controllers running around saying, ``Disarm, ban the bomb.'' These are Fortune, not 500, not 100, 10, Fortune 10 companies that are saying, ``We want this treaty.'' And further, ``We will be harmed if we do not enter this treaty.'' This overall governing body, known as the Conference of State Partners, is going to meet soon after April 29 to draw up the rules governing the implementation of this treaty. If we, to use the vernacular, ``ain't'' in by the 29th, if we are not on by the 29th, we do not get to draw up those rules. There used to be a distinguished Senator from Louisiana I served with for a long time. My friend, the Presiding Officer, knew him from his days up here. His name was Russell Long. He used to say kiddingly, ``I ain't for no deal I ain't in on.'' But the chemical industry, which is our largest exporter--hear what I just said--the biggest fish in the pond are saying, ``We want to be in on the deal.'' That is why the 29th is important. If we are not a party to the CWC, we will not be a member of that conference. And this body, with no American input, could make rules that have a serious impact upon the United States. Third, there will be a body called the executive council with 41 members on which we are assured of a permanent seat from the start because of the size of our chemical industry, that is, if we have ratified by the 29th. If we ratify after the council is already constituted, then a decision on whether to order a required surprise inspection on an American facility may be taken without an American representative evaluating the validity of the request and looking out for a facility's interest because we will not be on the standing executive council that makes that decision. Fourth, there will be a technical secretariat with about 150 inspectors, many of whom would be Americans because of the size and sophistication of our chemical industry. If we fail to ratify the convention by the 29th, there will be no American inspectors. And finally, and most importantly, in the long term, by failing to ratify, we would align ourselves with those rogue actors, those rogue states who have chosen to defy the Chemical Weapons Convention. There would be irreparable harm to our global leadership on critical arms control and nonproliferation issues. I will not take the time now to address other concerns that have been raised, because I said I would limit myself to these three points. Concluding, Mr. President, first, there has been good-faith, long and serious negotiations resulting in significant movement by the administration on conditions to the Chemical Weapons Convention. Second, this treaty is in the overwhelming national interest of the United States of America, a topic I am ready, willing, and anxious to debate with my distinguished colleague from North Carolina and others who think it is not. But at a minimum, Mr. President, the Senate should get a chance to hear that debate and vote on whether or not the distinguished Senator from North Carolina is correct or the Senator from Delaware is correct. Third, Mr. President, April 29 is not an artificial date. Because the triggering mechanism was when we got to 65 signatories, and that 6 months after that date the treaty would enter into force. Well, 65 have signed on. And 6 months after they got to the No. 65, happens to be April 29. This is not artificial. We did not make up the date. That is what the treaty says. So, Mr. President, I sincerely hope that my friend from North Carolina, having reflected on the quandary the administration was placed in, which was to negotiate with the Lott group--they thought they were negotiating with Senator Helms; they thought they were negotiating with every Republican who had an objection, under the auspices of Senator Lott--if they had known that Senator Helms did not view that as the appropriate forum for this negotiation, they would have simultaneously met with him. But now at the end of the process, when we are about to go out on recess, to say that we are not ready to bring this treaty up when we get back unless there is a new negotiation, I find unusual, particularly since I have agreed with the Senator from North Carolina that I will sign on to additional conditions with him. Let us vote on the only nine outstanding issues that I am aware of that have been raised. None other has been raised that I am aware of, that the administration is aware of, anyone in the Lott group is aware of, to the best of my knowledge. So, Mr. President, let me conclude by saying, the Senator from North Carolina has dealt with me in good faith. We have negotiated in great detail. He has listed his 30 objections. We have agreed on 21 of the 30. We disagree on nine. We agree on a method to vote on those nine. I sincerely hope--I sincerely hope--for the interest of the United States of America, after having already decided in the Bush administration that we would do away with the use of chemical weapons regardless of what anybody else did, that we would not now lose our place of leadership in the world and our ability to engage in the moral suasion that relates to nonproliferation and the diminution of weapons of mass destruction, that we would not now forgo that position merely because 1, 2 or 5 or 10 Senators said we should not even bring it on the floor to debate. I do not believe that will happen. But then again, my wife thinks I am a cockeyed optimist. But I do not think I am being unduly optimistic or a cockeyed optimist. I think having been here this long, that the Senate will get a chance to work its will. That is all I am asking. All I am asking is the Senate get a chance between now and the 29th of April to decide whether it likes this treaty or not. I believe every Member of this Senate has the national interests of the United States of America in mind when they act and when they vote. Let each of them vote their conscience on this treaty. If it turns out that 66 do not agree with me, then we have spoken, as we did in the League of Nations. The consequences of that vote I think were disastrous. I think the consequence of failure to ratify this treaty would be disastrous. But I think the consequence of not even letting the Senate vote will be catastrophic. I yield the floor, Mr. President. Exhibit 1 Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA, September 9, 1996. Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Ranking Member, Senate Judiciary Committee, Washington, DC. Dear Senator Biden, You have asked me to comment on the suggestion that the Chemical Weapons Convention (the Convention), now before the Senate for its advice and consent, conflicts with the provisions of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures. In my view, the suggestion is completely without merit. The Convention expressly provides that: ``In meeting the requirement to provide access * * * the inspected State Party shall be under the obligation to allow the greatest degree of access taking into account any constitutional obligations it may have with regard to proprietary rights or searches and seizures,'' (Verification Annex, Part X, par. 41)(emphasis supplied).\1\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ The Verification Annex is, of course, an integral part of the Convention. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- As you know, this provision of the Convention was inserted at the insistence of the United States after earlier drafts, which provided insufficient protection in regard to unreasonable searches and seizures, had been criticized by a number of U.S. scholars. The plain meaning of these words, which seems too clear for argument, is that the United States would have no obligation under the Convention to permit access to facilities subject to its jurisdiction in violation of the provisions of the Fourth Amendment. It was the clear understanding of the negotiators that the purpose of the provision was to obviate any possibility of conflict between the obligations of the United States under the Convention and the mandate of the Fourth Amendment. The Convention in its final form is thus fully consistent with U.S. constitutional requirements. Inspections required by the Convention will be conducted pursuant to implementing legislation to be adopted by Congress that will define the terms, conditions and scope of the inspections to be conducted in the United States by the Technical Staff of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) established by the Convention. I understand that draft implementing legislation entitled the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act, now before the Congress, specifies the procedures that will be followed in the case of both routine and challenge inspections carried out pursuant to the Convention. The Act requires, at a minimum, an administrative search warrant before an inspection can be conducted, and has elaborate provisions for notice and other protections to the owner of the premises to be searched. These provisions of the Act are modeled on similar administrative inspection regimes already authorized by Acts of Congress such as the Toxic Substances Control Act and upheld by the courts. However, if Congress is concerned that these provisions are constitutionally insufficient, it is free under the Convention to revise the Act to include more stringent requirements that conform to constitutional limitations. Finally, a person subject to inspection may challenge the inspection in a U.S. court, which in turn will be bound to invalidate any inspection that fails to comply with constitutional requirements. In view of the provisions of the Verification Annex quoted above, the United States would not be in violation of any international obligation in such an eventuality. For these reasons I conclude that there is no constitutional objection to the Convention, and that the rights of individuals under the Fourth Amendment will be fully protected under the Convention and implementing legislation of the character presently contemplated. In addition, I have been involved in the field of arms control as a scholar and practitioner for many years, going back to the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963, in connection with which I appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as Legal Adviser of the State Department. I have also closely followed the negotiations for the Chemical Weapons Convention. The United States has been a prime mover in the development of the Convention under both Republican and Democratic administrations. I am convinced that the prompt ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention is overwhelmingly in the security interest of the United States and should not be derailed by constitutional objections that are so plainly without substance. Sincerely, Abram Chayes, Felix Frankfurter, Professor of Law Emeritus.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I would like to offer just few comments to indicate why I believe the course chosen by the majority today relating to the independent counsel is unwarranted. First, the official responsible for initiating the appointment of an independent counsel--Attorney General Janet Reno--has maintained the highest standards of integrity and professionalism. Second, the Attorney General has proven her willingness to request the appointment of independent counsels in the past when she believed the statutory standard was met. And, third, the Attorney General has already undertaken a serious inquiry into the campaign fundraising issues and continues to consider, as the facts develop, whether to seek an independent counsel. As we review the facts, we must remember that the independent counsel statute is triggered only upon receipt of specific, credible evidence that high-ranking Government officials listed in the statute may have violated our criminal laws. This is an appropriately high threshold that must be met before the process of appointing an independent counsel can go forward. This standard is not met by vague allegations. The law does not apply to unethical, improper, or unseemly conduct. Rather, the statute is triggered only after the Attorney General determines, after consulting with career Justice Department prosecutors and engaging in a serious, deliberative process, that the statutory test has been satisfied. The conduct of the 1996 elections are being carefully scrutinized by the Department of Justice. A task force comprised of career prosecutors from the Public Integrity Section of the Criminal Division, supported by over 30 FBI agents, has been assembled to explore fully the range of issues that have been raised. This task force will determine which, if any, of the allegations warrant criminal investigation. Of course, if the task force receives specific evidence from a credible source that a person covered by the Independent Counsel Act may have violated the law, a preliminary investigation under the act would be initiated. But, to date, the Attorney General has determined that the Department has not received such evidence. In short, we are at the early stages of the task force's operations where the job is best left to career investigators and prosecutors. What is more, under the independent counsel statute, it is the Judiciary Committee--not the full Senate--which has the most proper oversight role of the independent counsel process. I argued last week that was unnecessary for the Judiciary Committee to make any conclusions at this time as to the propriety of appointing an independent counsel. But, a majority of the committee did exactly that last week. Now, the full Senate has been called on to embark on an even more unnecessary and unwarranted course by asking all Senators to--in effect--substitute their judgement for that of the career investigators and prosecutors. I do not believe that the members of the Judiciary Committee who spend so much of their time overseeing Justice Department activities could make such a judgement now--so, I certainly do not think it possible that all the other Senators who do not sit on the Judiciary Committee can prudently or accurately make this judgement. Not only do we have a comprehensive task force already reviewing the 1996 campaign fundraising issues, but we also have an Attorney General who has repeatedly shown her independence, integrity, and willingness to call for an independent counsel. Since taking office, Attorney General Reno has requested the appointment of at least four independent counsels--Kenneth Starr, Donald C. Smaltz, David M. Barrett, and Daniel S. Pearson--to investigate wrongdoing of high executive branch officials and other individuals covered by the statute. In short, the most prudent course today is to wait for the Justice Department's investigation to be completed. Then, and only then, can the need for appointment of an independent counsel can be evaluated based on a complete and full record. I would also add that this is consistent with how I have proceeded in past cases. For example, in 1992, I, along with several other Democratic Senators on the Judiciary Committee sent a letter to then- Attorney General William Barr requesting that he call for an independent counsel to investigate the possibility that high-ranking officials engaged in obstruction of justice in the prosecution of a particular case. I did so only after Attorney General Barr had appointed a special counsel, indicating that the Attorney General had already concluded that criminal conduct may have taken place. I called for an independent counsel at that point to ensure that this investigation be carried out by someone whose independence was clear, rather than by a special counsel hired by the Attorney General. Finally, we also need to keep in mind that there are some costs to appointing an independent counsel at this time. An inquiry is already well under way--FBI agents have been assigned to the task force and, according to press reports, subpoenas have been issued and a grand jury has been convened. Once an independent counsel is appointed, that inquiry must be shut down and the independent counsel will have to start from scratch. And as we know from past experience, independent counsel investigations can linger for years. So if we are interested in resolving this matter, and getting answers as soon as possible, we ought to allow the Justice Department to go forward and put our trust in Attorney General Reno to trigger the independent counsel statute only if and when she deems it necessary. Mr. LEAHY addressed the Chair.