Joe Biden

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. When you reach the point your time has expired, you sit down.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will make it real quick. First of all, I think the characterization of my friend from Iowa is bizarre. It makes it sound like this is a CIA plot that is still underway. It is one of the most noble undertakings that the Western World has ever engaged in. If you ask any people in Eastern Europe, from Lech Walesa to Vaclav Havel to Boris Yeltsin, and others, who in fact were there before the Wall came down, they credit Radio Free Europe or Radio Liberty more than any single thing. Number two, is it still needed? It is needed now. There is an enemy. The enemy is called censorship, and if you wonder whether or not it is true, some of us met this week with Mr. Gusinsky, the fellow who has the media empire in Russia now who is criticizing the present President. They are threatening to take down the television stations. They are taking down the radio and television access to the news for the people everywhere from Slovakia through Russia. The third thing is this notion it is no longer needed. Mr. President, 25 million people still listen to it on a regular basis in Eastern Europe and Russia. Anyone who thinks democracy has taken root and the free market system is in place in those areas, I respectfully suggest they take another close look. And the notion that they can watch CNN--I would say to my friends, CNN is in English; it can be censored. It, in fact, can be impacted upon. And CNN communicates international news, not what is happening within those countries--as RFE/RL does. What we are doing is fully emasculating the ability of Radio Free Europe or Radio Liberty to continue to function. I am a supporter, an unabashed supporter of public television. I believe it should be more than it is now. But this is like having the hearing impaired steal from the physically impaired, from those who are unable to walk. They are pitting two very important functions of government against one another. But we should not undermine Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. Again, those who think democracy is secure in those areas, please stand and raise your hands and tell me that censorship is still not the single biggest enemy of the prospect for freedom to flourish and democracy to flourish in Eastern and Central Europe. Let me give a few more examples. In Russia, we have heard about the media courageously reporting on the war in Chechnya. But that does not mean that Russia is now blessed with completely free media. Last year, the State Duma in Russia adopted a new media law which requires that State-owned media must inform the public of activities of the President, Government, and Parliament within 24 hours after any noteworthy event. And although the State Department reports that ``print media [in Russia] functioned largely unhindered,'' this optimistic picture is clouded by the situation in many provinces: Regional political authorities [in Russia] resorted to various devices to close down critical newspapers. Last winter and spring, during the parliamentary campaign in Kazakhstan, a television station went off the air for several days when local authorities, upset by broadcasts critical of the mayor of the capital, shut off electricity to the station. Tuesday, the newly elected Government has increasingly pressured--and at times forced--television, radio, and newspapers to accept wholesale changes or drop programs. In my view, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty are as important today as they were during the past 40 years. Because the establishment of free and independent media in the region has been a slow process, RFE/RL today have a dual role: To provide a model of how independent media should function in a free society, and to keep honest those who seek to reestablish repression and to silence the press. This function is not one conceived in the abstract; the practical reality lies in the public response: The people of the region continue to tune in to RFE/RL. In nearly every country in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the listenership of RFE/RL today equals or exceeds that of the Voice of America. It also exceeds the audience of the British Broadcasting Corporation's World Service. All told, some 25 million people in the region listen to RFE/RL on a regular basis. Surveys conducted last fall of leading citizens in the region found that an average of nearly 75 percent supported the continuation of western radio broadcasts. Equally important, every leader of the new democracies in the region continues to urge that these radios remain open. Let me quote from a letter from Czech President Vaclav Havel to President Clinton: [RFE broadcasts] remain important to the development of independent journalism and democracy in our country. The Presidents of the three Baltic States expressed a similar view: These broadcasts [are] an integral part of the continuing development of [our] democratic institutions. These are not leaders whose budgets benefit from RFE/RL--these are leaders who recognize that RFE/RL still make a contribution to the establishment of democracy. This year, the administration proposes to spend $100 million on the so-called ``Warsaw Initiative,'' a program to assist the new democracies of Eastern Europe to modernize their militaries. I would argue that Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty are as important as this military assistance in helping to secure the democratic foundation in the former East bloc. Yet I predict that hardly anyone around here will blink an eye when the Congress votes on the $100 million ``Warsaw Initiative.'' rfe/rl is cutting its budget I agree with the Senator's belief that we need to reduce our international broadcasting budget. We are doing just that. The State Department authorization bill, enacted last year, provides for the consolidation of all U.S. international broadcasting. The plan will reduce operations at both RFE/RL and the Voice of America. By next October, VOA and REF/RL will have reduced their combined broadcast hours to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union by 32 percent. RFE/RL will reduce its budget by 67 percent--from $220 million to $75 million annually by fiscal 1996. In terms of employees, RFE/RL will be cut by a similar amount--from 1,600 in September, 1993 to about 420 in fiscal 1996. The research arm of RFE/RL has already been privatized: Its operations have been taken over by the open media society--a project funded by the philanthropist George Soros. The new institute will undertake the restoration and preservation of the invaluable archives owned by RFE/RL--40 years of material that trace the dark era of totalitarianism in Eastern Europe and Eurasia. This is a project for which no Federal funds were available. But because of this public-private partnership, that important objective will be realized. The changes that I have enumerated will produce $400 million in savings over the period from 1994 to 1997. All this is not a one-time phenomenon--it is a permanent structural change. In addition, Congress has directed RFE/RL to begin an effort to privatize the radios--that is, that the funding should be assumed by the private sector by the end of the decade. The radios are taking that directive seriously. Their ongoing move to Prague is a critical part of the effort to prepare for privatization. Let everyone understand what this amendment will do--it will emasculate Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. The fiscal year 1995 budget for the radios is $229 million. That includes $103.5 million for one-time downsizing costs. Nearly $67 million of those costs are mandated by German labor laws. Restrictive German labor laws require RFE/RL to pay severance and other benefits to the hundreds of employees who will be laid off--laws that RFE/RL, as a private corporation operating in Germany, must comply with. It is undisputed that RFE/RL, Inc. is subject to German labor laws. A recent case, decided in February in the D.C. Circuit (Mahoney v. RFE/RL, Inc.), made clear that as a corporation with its principal place of business in Munich, RFE/RL would violate the laws of Germany if the corporation breached its collective bargaining agreements. this will stop an important move to prague In short, the effect of this amendment would be to place a dagger in the heart of the radios--at a moment when they are in the midst of a move from Munich to Prague, where they are preparing for the eventual privatization of RFE/RL. This would break faith with a decision that the President and Congress jointly made last year. Last January, the Senate voted to consolidate RFE/RL and the Voice of America. Last summer, the President sent a reprogramming to Congress which provided for the move of the headquarters of RFE/RL from Munich to Prague. I do not recall any of my colleagues objecting at that time to the continuation of RFE/RL. But now the move to Prague is in motion. Four language services are now being produced in Prague: Russian, Ukrainian, Latvian, and the South Slav service. RFE/RL plans to be out of Munich by June 10. Because Munich is one of the most expensive cities in Europe, the move will achieve important savings. Per capita personnel costs will be reduced by one-third. The President of the Czech Republic, President Havel, made an extremely generous offer to allow the radios to use the former Czechoslovak Federal Parliament Building for a nominal fee of one Czech crown per day--or 12 dollars per year. The President of the United States accepted that offer last summer. This amendment would obviously undercut that commitment. That is why the Clinton administration is strongly opposed to the Harkin amendment, as stated in the letter I read earlier from Joe Duffey, director of the U.S. Information Agency. rfe/rl and voa are not duplicative It is not true that RFE/RL duplicates the Voice of America. The two radios have different missions. The Voice of America's is mandated to tell America's story. By contrast, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, radios provide news and information about local events within the recipient countries. In this manner, RFE/RL act as home service or surrogate radios in the absence of fully free and independent media in the emerging democracies of the Eastern Europe and Eurasia. As a result of the broadcast consolidation, the amount of overlapping broadcasts--that is, broadcasts by both RFE/RL and the VOA in the same language at the same time--was reduced from 24 hours to zero. It is ludicrous to suggest that the cable news network now suffices for the countries of the former Soviet Empire. In most countries, there are only two ways to obtain CNN--by staying in an expensive hotel or to buy a satellite dish. I do not have any data on how many such dishes are available, but I cannot believe they are widespread. More important, the news of CNN is in English, and it is international news. The news on Radio Free Europe language; and it focuses mainly on local news. Do not take my word for it that these broadcasts are still needed. Listen to the results of a survey conducted last fall in the region. A poll of decisionmakers in each country--government, military, media, and economic leaders--clearly demonstrates this point. When the proposition was put to them that Western radio is needed despite the new media freedom, some 75 percent of those polled disagreed or strongly disagreed. I sympathize with my friend from Iowa about the choice we face in this bill. I am in favor of restoring the cuts to the corporation for public broadcasting--but not at the expense of one of the most valuable instruments in American foreign policy. The last point I will make is the administration is opposed to the amendment of my friend from Iowa. And I hope I have done this within 2\1/2\ minutes.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise to speak about an amendment that has been accepted by both sides. The dollars that would be rescinded by the legislation now before the Senate. My amendment restores $10 million of the $27 million rescinded from the Drug Courts Program. And, let me be clear, all of this $10 million is offset by cuts of $10 million in Justice Department funds that will not diminish law enforcement. They are funds that both the subcommittee chairman and ranking member have agreed to rescind because they will not adversely impact Justice Department operations. This amendment is necessary for two key reasons: First, we must stick to the promise we made in the violent crime reduction trust fund--we have already cut Federal bureaucrats to pay for the crime law, so the $30.2 billion crime law does not increase the deficit. Second, unless we restore this $10 million more than 5,000 drug offenders who are today released on probation will not be tested for drugs, will not be supervised, and will not be punished until many more American citizens have been the victim of a crime, because without drug testing, about the only way any offender is kicked off probation and into jail is to get caught committing another crime--in other words, after there is yet another victim. And as I mentioned, my amendment identifies $10 million in offsetting cuts so my amendment does not change the overall deficit cutting of this bill. This amendment simply takes a step to help preserve the integrity of the Drug Court Program. Let me review just some of the facts that point out just how great the need is to add real teeth to our probation system. Nationwide, about 3 million offenders are released on probation. Of these 3 million, about half, 1.4 million, of these offenders are drug abusers. And, of these 1.4 million offenders, only about 800,000 receive some drug testing and/or drug treatment. That all means that nationwide we have about 600,000 offenders, out on probation who are drug-abusers and who are not tested for drugs, not treated for their addiction, and barely supervised by our overwhelmed probation officers. In fact, in the Nation's largest States, probation officers' caseloads range from 90 to 100 offenders per officer; to 240 offenders per officer. Even at the 100-offender level, that means that in an average 40 hour week, a probation officer could spend about 20 minutes on each offender under his or her authority. At the higher levels, probation officers have less than 10 minutes every week to make sure that each offender is staying on the straight and narrow. Plainly, few of these offenders are being supervised the way they should. Unless these offenders face certain punishment, with the chance of treatment to beat their addiction, they will be the violent offenders of tomorrow. Unless we monitor these offenders on probation, they are probably continuing to take drugs, as well as committing crimes for which they have not yet been arrested. Drug testing means that these offenders will no longer get a free ride on probation. And that is the only choice these intensive drug testing and treatment, and certain punishment programs ask us to make. Instead of these offenders walking around the streets, unmonitored, they will have to check in every day or so and confirm that they have not been using drugs through a drug test or suffer the consequences. While all of us might wish that these offenders were all behind bars, I do not believe we have that choice. We all know that we can't build cells fast enough--even if we could afford to build 3 million new prison cells at a cost of at least $150 billion and that is based on a conservative construction cost estimate of $50,000 per cell. Let me also point out that these are not programs for violent offenders. These are cost-effective programs that combine the concepts of prevention plus responsibility to reach those offenders whose minor crimes have just brought them into the criminal justice system. The language in the Senate-passed bill specifically exempted violent offenders from participation in these intensive drug testing programs. And, the language in the crime law goes even further--adding language that prevents any offender who has ever been convicted of a violent offense from participating in the drug courts. The results of the Drug Court Program in Attorney General Reno's hometown are impressive: From June 1989 to December 1991, 1,740 offenders successfully graduated from the program--and only 3 percent have been rearrested. In addition, about 1,500 offenders failed out of the Drug Court Program--however, the strength of the drug testing program means that these offenders who should not be released on probation were identified early and sent to jail--where they belong. Before the Drug Court Program, was instituted, the re-arrest rate for these offenders was 33 percent. And the program is saving money--money that can be redirected to incarcerating and treating violent, career criminals. In Miami, it costs $17,000 a year to keep an offender in the county jail. That same offender can get the benefits of the drug court at a price of about $2,000 a year. The results from many other jurisdictions are similarly impressive: In my home State of Delaware, Judge Richard Gebelein wrote to tell me that in just the first 8 months of operation the Delaware drug court had put: Over 250 people who would have been placed on probation with little or no supervision have been placed in a [drug court] program where they are tightly controlled and monitored. We have increased public safety through this program. In Coos County, OR, the rate of positive drug tests dropped from more than 40 percent to less than 10 percent after the probation department subjected offenders to a tough program of drug treatment and drug testing. In Michigan, some judges have instituted a drug testing program which imposes progressively harsher sanctions with each failure. Most offenders--no matter how serious their addiction--seem to learn quickly: Of 200 offenders in the program, only 28 have failed. An Oakland, CA, Drug Court Program with regular drug testing found that the re-arrest rate was reduced by 45 percent when the program went into effect. And, based on this figure, the program estimated that participants spent--in total--35,000 fewer days in custody because they were not re-arrested. The bottom line: Alemeda County generated more than $2 million in savings from the unused prison space. I would like to thank Commerce/State/Justice Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman Gramm for his assistance on this important matter. I am happy that we could reach agreement and I am sure that Senator Gramm will continue to work on this important program when this bill reaches--as I believe it will--a conference with the House of Representatives. Senator Gramm was a key player when the Senate developed the crime law trust fund, so I know that he shares my support for this key funding mechanism. I would also thank the subcommittee's ranking member, Senator Hollings, for his efforts and assistance to preserve at least a portion of the drug court funding, and uphold the integrity of the trust fund. Appropriations Chairman Senator Hatfield also has my appreciation for his support of the Drug Court Program. Finally, I would express my personal gratitude to ranking member Senator Byrd for agreeing to this amendment. As my colleagues in the Senate know, the violent crime reduction trust fund that fully funded the $30.2 billion crime law without adding to the deficit was the product of the hard work and incredible creativity of Senator Byrd. I will do everything I can to maintain the integrity of the trust fund, but I would just acknowledge that there would be no trust fund for which to fight were it not for Senator Byrd.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, there is no greater legacy we leave on this Earth than our children. Keeping our children safe and helping them grow into productive adults is our greatest challenge and responsibility--as individuals and as a society. For the most part, parents assume this responsibility willingly. But with more than 50 percent of marriages ending in divorce, some of our children face special risks. Notwithstanding the fact that many divorced parents are sensitive to their children's needs and act in their best interests, in some cases, custody battles become prolonged wars. When this occurs, children can suffer severe emotional damage. More seriously, when conflict escalates, it can place children at risk physically through parental kidnapping; in 1988 alone, an estimated 354,000 children were abducted by parents or family members nationwide. In extreme cases, disputes between parents can even become fatal conflicts. Consider two recent chilling events in my State of Delaware: In one incident, the father picked up his three children in Delaware for a visit, but then drove them to North Carolina--where he shot them in the head, set the van they were in on fire, and then killed himself in a nearby field. In a second case, a father killed his two young children as they slept, then turned the gun on himself. The result of these incidents, which occurred in the space of 2 weeks time--five children dead, all innocent victims of divorce and custody disputes. Of course, these are extreme cases, but they illustrate what can happen when custody disputes escalate. That is why over the years, we have worked to ensure that the justice system works as smoothly and effectively as possible at handling custody matters, and in particular at making sure that interstate conflicts in custody orders are resolved quickly and appropriately. Between 1969 and 1983, all 50 States adopted the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, reducing the incentive for parents to abduct their children to another State in an attempt to obtain a favorable custody order. The act spelled out when a State has jurisdiction to issue a custody order and when it has to enforce the order of another State. We also addressed a second problem, because States had different views of when custody orders--which are subject to modification--were adequately final so as to trigger the full faith and credit requirements of the Constitution. In 1980, Congress enacted the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act to impose a Federal duty on the States to enforce and not modify the custody orders of sister States that issued orders consistent with the act. This act gives priority to States with home State jurisdiction over States that have what is called significant connections jurisdiction. It also provides that the State that issued the first custody order has continuing jurisdiction as long as the child or any contestant resides in that State. Unfortunately, over the years, cracks have surfaced in the application of this law, and contrary to congressional intent, many State courts have continued to modify the custody orders of States that retain continuing jurisdiction. Take for example a case in which a married couple obtained a divorce in Michigan in 1988. Custody of their child was awarded to the mother, with visitation rights to the father. The decree specifically set-out that Michigan would maintain jurisdiction over the parents and the child. But 6 months later, the mother, who had moved with the child to Illinois, petitioned an Illinois court to modify the father's visitation rights under the Michigan order. The Illinois trial court denied her motion, ruling that it had no jurisdiction. Yet the Illinois Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case, holding in part that Illinois could ``* * * modify a foreign custody judgment even if the other State has jurisdiction so long as the Illinois court has jurisdiction * * *'' The Child Custody Reform Act of 1995 that we introduce today makes it clear that in the case I just described, Illinois could not modify the Michigan court's grant of visitation rights because the father continued to reside in Michigan--and thus, Michigan maintained continuing jurisdiction to protect his interests. The Child Custody Reform Act of 1995 will help prevent conflicting custody orders and jurisdictional deadlock. I would like to commend Senator Domenici for his leadership on this issue. The act clarifies that a sister State may not enter a new custody order nor may it modify an existing custody order, as long as the original court acted pursuant to the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act. It also clarifies that continuing jurisdiction exists as long as the child or one of the contestants continues to reside in the State. There are two exceptions to this rule: If the State that issued the initial custody order declines to exercise jurisdiction to modify such determination; or If the laws of the State that issued the initial custody order otherwise limit continuing jurisdiction when a child is absent from such a State. Thus, the act we proposed today does not tread on a State's ability to formulate child custody policy. Instead, it merely provides a Federal obligation to give full faith and credit to the custody orders of sister States. The importance of this legislation is that it sets a clear line to guide State decisions by requiring that a State cannot modify and must enforce a custody order issued by a sister State that retains jurisdiction under the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act. A second problem the legislation that we are introducing addresses is that judges do not now have a reliable, efficient way to know that a judge in another State may have already issued a custody order relating to a particular child. In our age of advanced computer capabilities, we have the technology at our fingertips. So, let's put cyberspace to good use for our children. And we don't need to reinvent the wheel here--we can build on what we know works. The Federal Parent Locator Service, which has operated effectively and efficiently under the Social Security Administration for the last decade, already works to enforce State child support obligations. This legislation will expand this service to establish a child custody registry. We must give judges in different States the ability to communicate about custody cases, and computers are the tools to do that. State courts already are automated. With modest additional effort, we can link this information and put it to work for our children to prevent interstate custody battles. Finally, this legislation encourages local governments to take advantage of can never be 100 percent certain when, how, and even if children will return safely from visits with noncustodial parents. But visitation centers can provide a safe haven where parents can transfer their children for visitation, or leave their children for court-ordered, supervised visits. Such centers, which Senator Wellstone advocated successfully last year, should be established in communities in existing facilities, such as schools, neighborhood centers, in public housing complexes, and other convenient locations. So, by clarifying and strengthening the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, by putting critical child custody information at the fingertips of judges, and by providing State and local governments with the funding to open visitation centers, Mr. President, we can go a long way toward protecting our children from being caught in the middle of painful, sometimes violent custody battles. Mr. WELLSTONE addressed the Chair.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I have long held that separate enrollment is the solution to the tough question of how to provide the President with line-item veto power. Since 1984, when I joined Senator Mattingly and others in introducing a separate enrollment line-item veto bill, until this year, as cosponsor of Senator Bradley's bill, I have supported both the principle of a line-item veto and the specific approach of separate enrollment. Today, I want to explain my position on this important issue, a position that has, until just last week, had little support on either side of the aisle. I am gratified by the recent embrace of this approach as the compromise position that could finally permit a controlled experiment with a line-item veto to go forward. Mr. President, a controlled experiment is just what this proposal calls for. Mr. President, I share the concerns of many of my colleagues that a line-item veto could threaten the balance of power established in the Constitution between the Congress and the President. That is why I argued unequivocally against any constitutional version of line-item veto just 2 months ago in the Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution. Because this is a statutory line-item veto, Mr. President, and one, I must emphasize, with a built-in sunset it remains the prerogative of Congress to decide if this is, in the end, what we want to do and how we want to do it. And that is, indeed, the intended effect of the legislation before us today. It grants new power to the President--to veto separate items in appropriations bills, not the whole bill as would be required today. This change permits the President to target specific spending programs, not whole categories of Government activity. But this change would not only provide the executive with additional responsibility for controlling Federal spending at the margins. It would put additional responsibility on Congress to remove those items that would be easy targets for a presidential veto. No one can look upon the deplorable state of our Federal finances and tell me that a little more fiscal responsibility, at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue, is not in order. Of course, if the question were that simple, we would not be at the impasse we have reached today. There is honest, deeply held disagreement on whether we should go forward with any experiment in a line-item veto. Everyone of us in the Senate, and every citizen of this country, should be grateful for Senator Byrd's tireless efforts to remind us of the historical significance and constitutional implications of the step we are contemplating here. But I would like to make two points in defense of separate enrollment line-item veto legislation. First, our Constitution was intended to be flexible enough to adjust to a variety of new circumstances. Within the limits I believe are rightly imposed in this case--a statutory change, with a built-in sunset provision, in the year 2000--we should be willing to make incremental adjustments in our procedures that have some prospect of promoting our shared goal of deficit reduction and more responsible budgeting. Second, Mr. President, it could be argued that by enrolling each element in our spending bills separately, we are restoring a historical relation between the President and Congress, a relationship that took a new course when we began to write appropriations bills that lumped hundreds, even thousands, of items of spending together. I am pleased that some of my colleagues have cited arguments I made several years ago in the Judiciary Committee in defense of the constitutionality of the separate enrollment approach. It is my considered opinion that this approach can survive any court challenge on constitutional grounds. I am persuaded that the Congress may choose--as it will, if we accept this legislation--its own procedure for enrolling and presenting legislation to the President. There is nothing inappropriate about choosing to present our bills to the President in a way that will expose them to the same veto power that he has always possessed. I must stress, Mr. President, that I do have some concern about the difference between S. 4, the proposal before us today, and S. 137, the version I cosponsored this year and--with one exception--identical to the bill I introduced a decade ago with Senator Mattingly. That difference is in the level of detail that is required of the bills that we will send separately to the President. The version that I have consistently supported required the separate enrollment of numbered items or unnumbered paragraphs. To use one example, one of those items or paragraphs might include the budget for veterans' construction projects. Under the versions I have consistently supported, the President could veto that element of the Veterans' Affairs, Housing and Urban Development, independent agencies appropriations bill, rather than the whole bill. Now, some of my colleagues have expressed concern that the new requirement, added in S. 4, that Congress has to include additional detail, detail that could, to continue my example, include specific construction projects at specific veterans' hospitals in specific States. The temptation for a President to use the line-item veto to extort concessions, or to punish transgressions, may be greater under this new formulation than under the legislation I have supported in the past. Mr. President, we still retain the authority to determine the level of detail that we include in our committee reports, and thus the level of detail that will be required under S. 4. And again, Mr. President, the new process we will adopt here today is not a constitutional change, but a statutory one, and a statutory change with a date certain--5 years from now--when its authority automatically ends. Now, I supported a quicker sunset of line-item veto power in the versions that I cosponsored, this year and in the past. But I am satisfied that we have built in sufficient safeguard to give this experiment a chance to succeed--or to fail. Because of the sunset provision, we have reserved the right to reverse this decision if the anticipated benefits of this bill do not outweigh its potential costs. Its benefits, I believe, will come not only in the form of reduced spending; in these times, any money saved is important, but we should not expect this to affect deficits in any fundamental way. Its benefits are likely to be more subtle, in the reduction of spending programs that can't pass the ``laugh test''--that would be laughed at if they were exposed to public ridicule. That is the real promise of this line-item veto bill, that it will improve, at the margin, the quality, as well as the quantity, of our spending decisions. Mr. President, a major improvement of this proposal over earlier line-item veto proposals is that it includes those programs that spend money through the Tax Code--what we call tax expenditures, and what everyone else knows as loopholes. This is an approach I supported when I cosponsored Senator Bradley's separate enrollment bill this year. This is a substantial and far-reaching line-item veto proposal that we will vote on this afternoon. And we must recognize that it will grant power to the President that he does not have today. Bradley's separate enrollment bill, defining just what a tax expenditure is. And I supported Senator Bradley's attempt to clarify the tax expenditure definition in S. 4, that could be open to ``back- loaded'' tax cuts that lose revenue more than 5 years in the future. But the debate here on the Senate floor has convinced me that the language of S. 4 covers real tax loopholes, both the narrowest gimmicks and the broadest, that are such a drain on the Federal Treasury. Mr. President, at the heart of S. 4 is the traditional veto power that the President has always possessed. The change that this bill will bring about is a change in the way we choose to send our bills to the President. I have no doubt that this will shift some influence over spending priorities to the Executive; this is, of course, one purpose of the line-item veto--to exchance executive budget authority, and to put the Congress on notice that our spending proposals will be exposed to an additional level of scrutiny. This may well add to the President's influence on the legislative agenda, and, at the extreme, could provide a President with the temptation to use the line-item veto to threaten or to retaliate against Members of Congress. If some future President chooses to make such use of this new budget tool we offer him, then we will take it away. In the end, should we not examine each of our spending decisions individually? Should we not subject our spending plans to the closest possible scrutiny, down to presenting them separately to the President? In the face of the deficit problem we now confront, and in the face of corrosive public cynicism about our ability to get our houses in order, Mr. President, do we want to send the message that business as usual is good enough for us? In passing S. 4, we will take more care with our spending decisions, and in a small but important way, end business as usual.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise to make a very brief statement and ask for a speech to be printed in the Record. I attended the National Veterans of Foreign Wars Convention and heard a speech delivered by one of our colleagues that I think is one of the finest speeches I have ever heard any of our colleagues deliver, although it was not on the Senate floor. It was delivered before several thousand veterans of foreign wars. It was delivered by our colleague, John McCain, from the State of Arizona, in response to being the recipient of Legislator of the Year, picked by the veterans, the VFW. I strongly commend it to my colleagues, because it is the most articulate statement I have ever heard, and I believe one of the most articulate they will ever read, about what it means to serve one's country. I will say now what I said to John McCain after he delivered that speech, after listening to him: That is the John McCain that I knew 20 years ago. I am glad to see it is still the same John McCain. I ask unanimous consent that the address by our colleague, Senator John McCain, at the National Veterans of Foreign Wars Convention, March 7, 1995, be printed in the Record at this point.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, H.R. 889, the defense supplemental appropriations bill, has provided us an early rehearsal for a larger debate that will no doubt last throughout this session of Congress and beyond. This debate takes place at two levels: First, we will be deciding how best to provide for our Nation's defense--for now, and for the long term. At another level, we will be setting priorities for the monumental task of restoring balance to the Federal budget. This bill is before us today because we must fund unanticipated Defense Department expenses--for our operations in Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, Cuba--out of funds that were originally intended to support normal, peacetime functions. took their toll on the ability of our armed services to pay for some of those training functions. I believe that it is now clear that we need a better way--a contingency fund, for example--to deal with the inevitable, but unpredictable tasks that our Armed Forces will be asked to undertake. Unfortunately for colleagues in the House took a very short-sighted approach in their search for the funds needed to meet this year's needs. They decided to cut funds from two programs that are essential to our country's economic and military security. They eliminated the technology reinvestment program, cutting $502 million from this year's and next year's budgets. And they cut 25 percent, $107 million from the advanced technology program. These programs are part of an established, bipartisan decision to maintain the technological advantage that we displayed so convincingly in the Gulf War and will continue to need to meet the threats the world now presents. These programs are at the heart of an emerging base on domestic, American high-technology manufacturing capacity, the base we need to assure that we will continue to foster the discovery and development of the new ideas and products that the world's most sophisticated military demands. To establish and maintain that base, these programs take advantage of our country's historical strength--our private economy. By making our Nation's high-technology industries partners in the development of the kinds of technologies and processes that future defense systems will require, we are building the essential foundation for our national security. These programs are critical investments, in areas where there is the potential for both commercial and military applications. The potential spillover from these programs in both kinds of applications means that without the incentives they provide, we would engage in wasteful duplication of commercial and military research, on the one hand, or miss the opportunity for important breakthroughs, on the other. Mr. President, recent history and economic logic tell us that individual firms will not find it cost-effective to undertake the research and development that these programs support, because the payoffs are often unpredictable and many years in the making. In addition to promoting the private sector's involvement in this kind of long-term undertaking to preserve our Nation's competitive edge in the world economy--our Government has the responsibility to provide for the common defense. In this day and age, and certainly into the future, that constitutional responsibility will require the maintenance of an advanced manufacturing capability, along with the scientific knowledge, engineering skills, and information management that support it. Consider, Mr. President, the kinds of projects that these program make possible. TRP is supporting the development of advanced composite materials for advanced aircraft propulsion systems. Advanced engine designs now being considered for future production could increase performance and fuel efficiency for both commercial and military aircraft. This potential can only be realized if much of the metal engine structure in conventional designs is replaced with polymer composites that can be produced at reasonable cost. Another TRP Program supports private industry in the development of low- and high-power high-temperature superconductor microwave components for commercial and defense satellites. These new components could radically reduce the size and the power consumption of critical satellite components, creating longer-lasting communications and weather satellites. The ATP is supporting the development of manufacturing processes that can reduce by at least one third the cost of producing advanced composite components for use in thousands of different applications. These advanced manufacturing processes are the key to reducing the overall cost of employing new materials, such as the aircraft engine parts in the TRP Program I mentioned. And to illustrate the important public investment component in these projects, Mr. President, a recently awarded ATP grant supports the development of very large scale component parts that can be used on civilian as well as military infrastructure projects, such as auto and rail bridges. As we look for ways to rehabilitate our neglected public facilities, at all levels of our Federal system, these new materials offer ways of repairing conventional structures as well as constructing new ones, with longer lasting, low-maintenance components. Mr. President, only by supporting these innovative ATP and TRP Programs can we maintain the cutting-edge commercial manufacturing capacity that is essential to meeting the rapidly evolving demands on our military capabilities. At the same time, they provide the additional security of knowing that we are doing all we prudently can to assure that our domestic economy remains at the leading edge of commercial applications of new technologies. We can no longer afford--if we ever could--wasteful duplication of military and commercial development of the same technologies. And we certainly cannot afford to miss the next breakthrough in materials, information management, or communications, that could leave the men and women of our Armed Forces needlessly exposed to danger. The greater their exposure--if we allow our technological edge to grow dull with false economies--the more reluctant we will be to face threats to our security. For want of the next generation of nails, Mr. President, the next century's battles may be lost. These are difficult times--we must invest for long-term economic growth here at home and confront the confusing variety of new threats to our security abroad. The Technology Reinvestment Program and the Advanced Technology Program are prudent, cost-effective means of dealing with both of those problems. Mr. President, I want to commend the distinguished managers of this legislation, the members of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, Senators Bingaman and Lieberman, and the other members who have spoken up for these programs, for showing the foresight to restore these important programs to more adequate levels of funding. I am sure we will find ourselves revisiting these issues in the coming months and years. I will continue to support efforts that protect the technological foundations of our economic and military security.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I thank the Chair for being so gracious as to not only sit there, but to pay attention to what I had to say. I am flattered he would listen. I hope that he and others will engage their significant legislative skills in trying to work out a feasible war powers mechanism--whether it is exactly what I have proposed or something else--so we avoid the kind of gridlock that has occurred already in the last several years. I thank the Chair. I thank my good friend from California who has been waiting to be recognized. I yield the floor. Mrs. BOXER addressed the Chair.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce a piece of legislation that I worked on for the last several years. As time has passed, I believe my arguments for the legislation in the first instance are even more relevant today than they were then. This legislation will replace the War Powers Resolution of 1973, and it is designed to provide a framework for joint congressional-Executive decisionmaking about the most solemn decision that a nation can make: to send women and men to fight and die for their country. Decades ago, a noted scholar, Edwin Corwin, characterized constitutional provisions regarding the foreign policy of the Nation as an invitation to struggle--a struggle between the executive branch and the legislative branch. Professor Corwin's maxim accurately describes over 200 years of constitutional history--two centuries of tension between the executive and the legislative branches regarding the war power. But over the past four decades, what was intended as a healthy struggle between the executive and legislative branches has become an extremely excessively divisive and chronically debilitating struggle. The primary cause, in my view, is that Presidents have pushed the limits of Executive prerogative, Democratic Presidents as well as Republican Presidents. Their rationale has been the supposed burden of Presidential responsibility imposed by the stresses and dangers of the cold war. The era began in 1950, when President Truman deployed forces to defend South Korea without any congressional authorization. With elaborate legal argument, Truman asserted an inherent Presidential authority to act unilaterally to protect the broad interests of American foreign policy. A nearly lone voice of concern, Senate minority leader--Mr. Republican--Robert Taft--known, as I said, as Mr. Republican--declared that the President had usurped authority, in violation of the laws and the Constitution. But Taft's pronouncements availed him little, a fate that would often befall similar Executive attempts to restrain Executive aggrandizement. The dissenters were overwhelmed by the proponents of a thesis: The thesis that in the nuclear age--when the fate of the planet itself appeared to rest with two men thousands of miles apart--Congress had little choice, or so it was claimed, but to cede tremendous authority to the Executive. By the beginning of the 1970's, that thesis had become doctrine. In 1970, when President Nixon sent United States forces into Cambodia with neither congressional authorization nor even consultation, his accompanying assertions of autonomous Presidential powers were so sweeping and so extreme that the Senate began a search--a search led by Republican Senator Jacob Javits and strongly supported by Democratic Senator and hawk John Stennis--the Senate began a search for some means of rectifying what was now perceived as a dangerous constitutional imbalance in favor of the Executive. The result was the enactment, in 1973--my first year in the U.S. Senate--of the War Powers Resolution over a Presidential veto. Today, over two decades later, few would dispute that the War Powers Resolution has failed to fulfill its intent and has been, to state it quite simply, ineffective. It is commonly said that every President has disputed the constitutionality of the War Powers Act, but that is not wholly true. President Ford took no issue with the act while he was in office. And President Carter explicitly vowed to comply with its provisions, declaring that he would neither endorse nor challenge its constitutionality. Moreover, the Carter Justice Department conducted a detailed analysis of the resolution and declared, quite explicitly, that its most critical mechanism--the timetable for congressional authorization of use of force abroad--is fully and unambiguously constitutional. administrations, no body of practice under the resolution developed, because the only two military actions of that period--the Mayaguez incident under President Ford and Desert One under President Carter-- were over almost before they began. Then came President Reagan and President Bush, who dealt with the resolution pragmatically while declaring their blanket opposition to its provisions. Their assertion of the doctrine of broad Executive powers--what I call the monarchist viewpoint--is best exemplified by President Bush's statement on the eve of the gulf war. With half a million American forces standing ready in Saudi Arabia, President Bush petulantly declared that he did not need permission from some old goat in the Congress to kick Saddam out of Kuwait. Although Mr. Bush eventually sought congressional support in the gulf, he did so reluctantly, and continued to assert that he sought only support, refusing to concede that congressional authorization was a legal necessity. More recently, the notion of broad Executive power was claimed on the eve of the invasion of Haiti--an invasion that, thankfully, was averted by a last-minute diplomatic initiative. Last summer, Clinton administration officials characterized the Haiti operation as a mere police action, a semantic dodge designed to avoid the need for congressional authorization. Some of my Democratic colleagues suggested that the war clause of the Constitution was entirely ceremonial and that the President had virtually unlimited discretion to order an invasion of Haiti. These were some of the same Democrats who stood here on the floor and said President Bush did not have the authority to act in the gulf without congressional assent; proving the axiom that Senators and Congressmen tend to pick what side of their issue they are on depending on the partisan need. We have the interesting phenomena, Republicans on the floor who said there was a broad range of congressional authority, but when it came to Clinton exercising it, saying, no, he did not have the authority; and Democrats who were on the floor telling President Bush he did not have the authority but saying, no, President Clinton does. To be sure, there were some of my Republicans and Democratic friends who were consistent--who may have questioned the President's policy in Haiti but did not question the right to deploy those troops in the absence of congressional consent. In my view, the assertions expressed during the Haitian crisis underscore that the doctrine asserted by President Nixon 25 years ago still grips the executive branch. More alarming, the congressional viewpoints I summarized suggest that the legislative surrender of the war power continues, based in part on whether or not the man or woman in power is a man of your party and whether you agree with him on the substance of the action. With all respect to my colleagues and the administration, I believe this President, the last President, and the Presidents under whom I have served have misread the Constitution. Article I, section 8, clause 11, grants to the Congress the power ``To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water.'' To the President, the Constitution provides in article II, section 2, the role of ``Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.'' It may fairly be said that with regard to many constitutional provisions, the framers' intent was ambiguous, but not on the war power. Both the contemporaneous evidence and the early construction of these clauses, in my view, do not leave much room for doubt. The original draft of the U.S. Constitution would have given the Congress the power to ``make war.'' At the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, a motion was made to change to ``make war,'' to ``declare war.'' The reason for the change is very instructive. At the convention, James Madison and Elbridge Gerry argue for an amendment solely in order to permit the President the power ``to repel sudden attacks.'' They were fearful if you said it was the power of the Congress to make war, that could be read to deny the President the authority without congressional power to repel sudden attacks. Just one delegate at the convention, Pierce Butler of South Carolina, suggested that the President should be given the power to initiate war. All others disagreed. Only one to suggest that the President had the power to initiate war. The rationale for vesting the power to launch war in the U.S. Congress was quite simple: The framers knew their history. The framers' thoughts were dominated by their experience with the British king who had unfettered power to start wars and spend the treasure and blood of his nation. Such powers the framers were determined to deny the President of the United States. George Mason, for example, explained that he was opposed to giving the power to initiate war to the President because the President, the Executive, he believed, was not to be safely trusted with that power. Even Alexander Hamilton, a staunch advocate of Presidential power, emphasized that the President's power as Commander in Chief would be ``much inferior'' to the British kings, amounting to ``nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces,'' while that of the British king ``extends to the declaring of war and the raising and regulation of fleets and armies--all which [by the U.S.] Constitution would appertain to the legislature.'' It is frequently contended by those who favor vast Presidential powers that Congress was granted only ceremonial power to declare war, in effect, a designation to provide fair notice to the opposing States, and legal notice to neutral parties. At least that is what they argue. But the framers had little interest, it seems, in the ceremonial aspects of war. The real issue was congressional authorization of war. As Hamilton noted in Federalist 25, ``The ceremony of a formal denunciation of war has of late fallen into disuse.'' Indeed, by one historian's account, just 1 war in 10 was formally declared in the years between 1700 and 1870--1 in 10. The proposition that Congress had the power to initiate all wars except to repel attack on the United States is also strengthened in view of the second part of the war clause. That is the power to ``grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal.'' Now, most Americans, I daresay most Members of Congress, I daresay most members of Government, do not even know what the ``power to grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal'' means and why it is in the Constitution. An anachronism today, letters of marque and reprisals were licenses issued by governments, usually to private citizens, but on occasion to government agents, empowering these private citizens or government agents to seize enemy ships or take action on land, short of all-out war. In essence, it was the 18th century version of what we now regard as limited war or police actions. That is what letters of marque and reprisal were. If you are having trouble with pirates off the coast, you are not looking to declare war. The Federal Government, in this case the Congress, could go out and hire out, give permission to, give a letter of marque and reprisal to a local. Think of it in terms of a local security agency that comes by and patrols your neighborhoods. You could give letters of marque or reprisal and say, ``You are authorized under the law, through the Congress, to go seize those pirate ships.'' That is what it was about. A leading commentator of the day--that is, the late 1700's--a leading commentator of the day on international law explained the distinction this way: ``A perfect war is that which entirely interrupts the tranquility of the state. An imperfect war, on the contrary, is that which does not entirely interrupt the peace. Reprisals are that imperfect kind of war.'' So, when we hear people talk about imperfect wars, it is used as a term of art as it was used back in the late 1700's. The framers undoubtedly knew that reprisals or imperfect wars could lead to general or all-out wars. England, for example, had fought five wars between 1652 and 1756 which were preceded by public naval reprisals. someone or a group of people to go out and seize shipping, it was acknowledged that that could lead to a larger war. If the nation from which those ships came decided that it was not in their interest, they may very well send a larger armada and you are at war. You move from that imperfect war to the so-called perfect war--an odd phrase, ``perfect war.'' Surely, those who met at Philadelphia, all learned men, knew and understood this history of marque and reprisals. Given this understanding, the only logical conclusion that the framers intended by vesting the power to grant these letters of marque and reprisal authorizing imperfect war in the Congress, could be that it was designed to grant to Congress the power to initiate all hostilities, even limited wars. To review for a second, they changed from ``make'' to ``declare" in the Constitution for the purpose of allowing the President not to initiate a war, perfect or imperfect, large or small, but for the purpose of allowing the President to respond to a sudden attack. Then to be sure everyone understood what they meant, they said, ``And by the way, we are going to vest in the section of the Constitution that relates to congressional power the exclusive power to the Congress of issuing these letters of marque and reprisal.'' So they not only said Congress can only initiate war and the President can only respond, but even limited war only the Congress can initiate. A comparison of the war clause to related constitutional provisions suggest that this interpretation is the correct one. Unlike other foreign affairs provisions in the Constitution which grant to the President and the Senate the shared power to make treaties and appoint ambassadors, when it comes to the war power the Constitution provides a role for the Senate and the House of Representatives--but not a shared responsibility between the branches. The inclusion of the House, in particular, suggests a determination to mandate that public consensus be achieved before the initiation of a war. Think about it. If the Founders thought that they should not give the power to raise taxes to the Senate because we were more like the House of Lords, and that all taxes must be initiated in the House of Representatives, why did they do that? They did that because they knew that taxation could affect people's lives so drastically that it should be a democratic decision and it should be made first and foremost in the people's house, that group of legislators who stand for election every 2 years and are immediately answerable to the public. If they thought it was so important and so critical that taxes should be determined by the people's house because it had such an impact on the lives of the average citizen, what do you think they thought about the power of a Government to take your son or daughter and send them to war and die? It is illogical to me, and those who say that the President has this exclusive authority, to suggest that they would worry about taxation but not worry about taking a nation to war, which can cost them their lives, their monetary treasure, their lifeblood. The inclusion of the House in the decision to go to war was because the House was designed to be closely attuned to the views of the Nation and thereby would provide a means for gauging and ensuring public support for any war. Moreover, with both Chambers involved in the decision to go to war, the initiation of war could necessarily be slowed by the simple fact that securing passage of statutory authorization or a declaration of war through both Houses is potentially a time-consuming and cumbersome process. That is what it was intended to be, because when one goes to war, you cannot say, short of surrender, 2 weeks into it or 1 month into it, ``By the way, we made a mistake, we're passing legislation to correct it.'' You can do that with taxes. You can pass a tax bill and 2 months later, 3 months later say, ``We made a mistake and rescind it.'' You do not rescind a war. So it was intended--it was intended--in the Constitution that decision to go to war--not to repel attack, to go to war--to initiate war, to alter the state of peace, it was intended that it should be a process that consumed some time. It is bordering on the irrational, in my view, to suggest that the framers thought the appointment of ambassadors, although an important task, but not of the same consequence as war, that the appointment of ambassadors was so critical that they gave the Senate a veto power over it, but they considered the war powers so trivial that the decision to send Americans to fight and die was left deliberately vague so as to permit the Executive reasonable discretion to launch hostilities at his or her whim. I think that is irrational for anyone to think that is what the Framers thought, that who we have as Ambassador to England is so important that we are not going to leave it to a President alone, we are going to require the Senate to go along with it, but going to war with England was so trivial that we did not have to consult the United States Senate or did not have to consult the people's House before a President could take us to war. That is, in my humble opinion, an irrational view. In the same vein, I am continually amazed that many of my colleagues who zealously guard the Senate's power to advise and consent to treaties and to ambassadorial appointments, so cavalierly cede the war power to the Executive. I find that fascinating. What more can impact on the life of the average American than taking the Nation to war? Why would they possibly have left that to the President alone but said, ``By the way, when you want to stop a war, when you want to have a treaty, the President has no authority to do that. He has to come to us and get a supermajority.'' Does that make any sense? Talk about tortured logic. Yet, we have people on this floor, in the 22 years I have been here--and when I got here, the Vietnam war was still going on; that is one of the reasons I ran for the Senate in the first place--we have Members in both political parties with whom I have served and have great respect saying, ``War is up to the President, but who the Ambassador is, you better check with me.'' War is up to the President. But whether there is a peace treaty, you better check with me. I would respectfully suggest the reason that many have adopted that position is they do not have the political courage to take a stand on whether or not we should go to war. In sum, to accept the proposition that the war power is merely ceremonial, or applies only to big wars, is to read much of the war clause out of the U.S. Constitution. And such a reading is supported neither by the plain language of the text or the original intention of the Framers of the Constitution. In describing the Framers' intent, I hasten to add a caveat. We should always be cautious about our ability to divine the intentions of those who came 200 years before us, particularly when the documentary record is not at all voluminous. But any doubt about the wisdom of relying on original intent alone, in my view, is dispelled in view of the actions of the early Presidents, early Congresses, and early Supreme Court decisions. Early practice--shedding light on the Framers' intent Let me speak to that a minute. Advocates of Executive power often assert that Presidents have used force throughout our history without congressional consent. But with all due respect, history does not support that claim. Indeed, our earliest Presidents, who were involved in the ratification of the Constitution, were extremely cautious about encroaching on Congress' power under the war clause. Our first President, George Washington, adhered to the view that only Congress could authorize offensive action. Writing in 1793, President Washington stated that offensive operations against an Indian tribe, the Creek Nation, depended on congressional action alone. Let me quote from what Washington wrote. Washington as President said: The Constitution vests the power of declaring war with the Congress; therefore, no offensive expedition of importance can be undertaken until after they have deliberated upon the subject, and authorized such a measure. That was George Washington. States engaged in an undeclared naval war with France. These military engagements were clearly authorized by the Congress in a series of incremental statutes. The naval war with France also yielded three important Supreme Court decisions regarding the scope of the war power. In 1799, Congress authorized the President to intercept any United States vessel headed to France. President Adams subsequently ordered the Navy to seize any ship traveling to or from France. The Supreme Court declared the seizure of a United States vessel traveling from France to be illegal, thus ruling that Congress had the power not only to authorize limited war but also to limit Presidential power to take military action. The Court ruled in two other cases bearing on the question of limited war. Wars, the Court said, even if ``imperfect,'' are nonetheless wars. In still another case, Chief Justice Marshall opined that: The whole powers of war [are] by the Constitution . . . vested in the Congress . . . [which] may authorize general hostilities . . . or partial war. Now, modern monarchists, those who lean and tilt so far to the President on this, refer habitually to the actions of our third President, Thomas Jefferson, in coping with the Barbary pirates. But Jefferson's actions provide little solace to advocates of that position. In May of 1801, President Jefferson deployed a small squadron of ships to the Mediterranean to deter attacks against American shipping. Acting under the authority of an act of Congress which mandated that six frigates be maintained in the Navy during peacetime, Jefferson instructed the naval commander that if he arrived and found that the Barbary powers had declared war against the United States, to take action if necessary ``to protect commerce.'' But when he learned that the leader of Tripoli had, in fact, declared war, Jefferson referred the matter to the Congress. Reporting on a small skirmish won by a U.S. ship, Jefferson noted that the American ship was authorized by the Constitution, without the sanction of Congress, to go beyond the line of defense, and thus the U.S. commander did not take possession of the ship or retain its crew as prisoners of war. Jefferson sought further guidance from Congress about the next step, and I quote: The legislature will doubtless consider whether, by authorizing measures of offence also, [Congress] will . . . place our forces on an equal footing [with the Tripolitan forces]. Congress promptly enacted a statute empowering Jefferson to protect U.S. shipping, and to seize vessels owned by the Tripoli regime. The legislation passed 2 years later gave explicit support for ``warlike operations against Tripoli or other Barbary powers.'' I believe this episode, and the historical record of actions taken by other early Presidents, has significantly more bearing on the meaning of the war clause than the record of Presidents in the modern era. The reasons should be obvious. The men who were at Philadelphia and wrote the Constitution--or, as in Jefferson's case, participated in the ratification debates in the States--had a much better understanding of the intended meaning of the constitutional provisions than those of us 200 years later have. They participated. Their actions while in office should, therefore, be given great weight in interpreting the constitutional clauses in question. As Chief Justice Warren once wrote, ``The precedential value of [prior practice] tends to increase in proportion to the proximity'' to that Constitutional Convention. Restoring the Constitutional balance Unfortunately, this constitutional history seems largely forgotten, and the doctrine of Presidential power that arose during the four decades of the cold war continues to remain in vogue--even, to my dismay, among many of my colleagues in the Congress. To accept this situation requires us to believe that the constitutional imbalance serves our Nation well. But it can hardly be said that it does. As matters now stand, Congress is denied its proper role in sharing the decision to commit American troops, and the President is deprived of the consensus he needs to help carry that policy through. Only by establishing an effective war powers mechanism can we ensure that both of these goals are met. More importantly, we will guarantee that the will of the American people will stand behind the commitment of U.S. forces. The question then is this: How to revise the War Powers Resolution in a manner that gains bipartisan support as well as the support of the Executive? In the past two decades, a premise has gained wide acceptance that the War Powers Resolution is fatally flawed. Indeed, there are flaws in the resolution, but they need not have been fatal. For that law was designed--by legislators who were statesmen of a markedly conservative stripe--to embody constitutional principles and to set forth practical procedures. Ironically, a law designed to improve executive-legislative branch comity on the war power has instead contributed to frequent squabbles about the minutiae of the law's provisions. In 1988, determining that a review of the War Powers Resolution was in order, the Foreign Relations Committee established a special subcommittee to assume the task. As chairman of the subcommittee, I conducted an exhaustive series of hearings, the most extensive hearings held in recent times on this subject. Over the course of 2 months, the subcommittee heard from many distinguished witnesses: Former President Ford, former Secretaries of State and Defense, former Joint Chiefs of Staff, former Members of Congress who drafted the law, and many constitutional scholars. At the end of that process, I produced a lengthy law review article describing how the War Powers Resolution might be thoroughly rewritten to overcome its actual and perceived liabilities. I envisaged its replacement by a new act entitled ``The Use of Force Act''--which would aim to achieve, at long last, the goal of its predecessor: To restore the balance of power between the executive and legislative branches regarding the war power for purposes of complying with the intent and will of the American people as well as the Constitution. That effort provided the foundation for the legislation I introduce today. The bill that I offer has many elements; I will briefly summarize the most important. First, it bears emphasis that my bill would replace the War Powers Resolution with a new version. But I should make clear that I retain its central element: A time-clock mechanism that limits the President's power to use force abroad. That mechanism, I should repeat, was found to be unambiguously constitutional in a 1980 opinion issued by the Office of Legal Counsel at the Department of Justice. It is often asserted that the time-clock provision is unworkable, or that it invites our adversaries to make a conflict so painful in the short run so as to induce timidity in the Congress, forcing the President to remove troops. But with or without a war powers law, American willingness to undertake sustained hostilities will always be subject to democratic pressures. A statutory mechanism is simply a means of delineating procedure. And the procedure set forth in this legislation assures that if the President wants an early congressional vote on a use of force abroad, his congressional supporters can produce it. Recent history tells us, of course, that the American people, as well as Congress, rally around the flag--rally around the President--rally around the Commander in Chief--in the early moments of a military deployment. Second, my bill defuses the specter that a timid Congress can simply sit on its hands and permit the authority for a deployment to expire. As noted above, it establishes elaborate expedited procedures designed to ensure that a vote will occur. And it explicitly defeats the timid Congress specter by granting to the President the authority he has sought if these procedures nonetheless fail to produce a vote. Thus, if the President requests authority for a sustained use of force--one outside the realm of emergency-- is extended indefinitely. Third, the legislation delineates what I call the going-in authorities for the President to use force. One fundamental weakness of the War Powers Resolution is that it fails to acknowledge powers that most scholars agree are inherent Presidential powers, such as the power to repel an armed attack upon the United States or its Armed Forces, or to rescue Americans abroad. My legislation corrects this deficiency--and thus avoids the endless dispute over where the exact location of the line between what the President already possesses independently and what Congress was bestowing upon him by legislation--where that line rests. The bill enumerates five instances where the President may use force: First, to repel attack on U.S. territory or U.S. forces; Second, to deal with urgent situations threatening supreme U.S. interests--i.e. the Cuban missile crisis; Third, to extricate imperiled U.S. citizens; Fourth, to forestall or retaliate against specific acts of terrorism; and Fifth, to defend against substantial threats to international sea lanes or airspace. It may be that no such enumeration can be exhaustive. But it is worth noting that the circumstances set forth would have sanctioned virtually every use of force by the United States since World War II. This concession of authority is circumscribed by the maintenance of the time-clock provision. After 60 days have passed--2 months--the President's authority would expire, unless 1 of 3 conditions had been met: First, Congress has declared war or enacted specific statutory authorization; or Second, the President has requested authority for an extended use of force but Congress has failed to act on that request, notwithstanding the expedited procedures established by this act--that is, Congress, if he asks to continue the force must act to tell him he cannot or it is presumed he can continue--or; Third, the President has certified the existence of an emergency threatening the supreme national interests of the United States; in which case he can continue the force in place. The legislation also affirms the importance of consultation between the President and Congress and establishes a new means to facilitate that consultation. To overcome the common complaint that Presidents must contend with ``535 secretaries of state''--that is 535 Members of Congress--the Use of Force Act establishes a congressional leadership group with whom the President is mandated to consult on the use of force. Another infirmity of the War Powers Resolution is that it fails to define ``hostilities.'' Thus, Presidents frequently engaged in a verbal gymnastics of insisting that ``hostilities'' were not ``imminent.'' Even when hundreds of thousands of troops were positioned in the Arabian desert opposite Saddam's legions, President Bush argued that they were not in an area of hostilities and, even if they were, there was no prospect of imminent hostilities. Therefore the War Powers Act would not be triggered and engaged. Therefore, my legislation includes a more precise definition of what constitutes the use of force. And this definition contains two elements: First, a new commitment of U.S. forces, and second, the deployment is aimed at deterring a specific threat, the forces deployed have incurred or inflicted casualties, or are operating with a substantial possibility of incurring or inflicting casualties. If those conditions are met then there is a use of force as defined in the law. Finally, to make the statutory mechanism complete, the Use of Force Act provides a means for judicial review. Like many of my colleagues, I am reluctant to inject the judiciary into decisions that should be made by the political branches. Therefore, the provision is extremely limited: It empowers a three- judge panel to decide only whether the time-clock mechanism has been triggered. I have no illusions that enacting this legislation will be easy. The experience of the War Powers Resolution gives witness to the difficulty of finding the proper balance between the executive and legislative branches on war powers. But I am determined to try. The status quo, with Presidents asserting broad executive powers, and Congress often content to surrender its constitutional powers, serves neither branch, and clearly does not serve the American people. More fundamentally, it does not serve the men and women who risk their lives to defend our interests. For that, ultimately, must be the test of any war powers law. Mr. President, some would argue now that the cold war is over there is less need for this delineation of authority, this new set of ground rules. I would argue nothing could be further from the truth. We are more likely to be pulled into hostilities--although not a world war III in all probability. More Americans have been engaged in areas of hostility, have been killed, and have been put on the battlefield since the cold war has ended than all during the cold war but for Korea and Vietnam, in little parts of the world all over the world: Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti. What happens in a decade, a year from now--in the Ukraine, Byelarus, Russia--or any number of places where there might be hostilities and Americans or entire divisions of Americans may be called to action? So, Mr. President, I think to have an ordered plan to diminish the bickering between the executive and legislative branches on this issue is more needed today than it has been at any time. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill that I have sent to the desk and the accompanying section-by-section analysis be included in the Record at this point.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I thank you. (The remarks of Mr. Biden pertaining to the introduction of S. 564 are located in today's Record under ``Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.'')

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to be able to go into morning business for the purposes of discussing an issue totally unrelated to this, the introduction of a bill.

Mr. BIDEN. I did not come over to speak to this issue, but listening to my colleagues, with whom I agree with on this issue, I was struck by how much things have changed since I arrived here in the Senate in 1973. Back in 1973, which is not that long ago--I guess my kids think it is 100 years ago, but it is not that long ago. It is not like listening to my Grandfather Finnegan telling me about strikes in the 1920's and that kind of thing. It was the beginning, looking back on it, of sort of the end, if not the demise, of the balancing power of American organized labor in the country, where they were able to be major players in determining wages, hours, working conditions, their input on the economy, and which direction the economy could go. Over the last 23 years, something interesting has happened. If this debate were taking place in 1973, you would have some of our Republican colleagues standing up--and maybe even a few Democrats standing up--and saying, you know, the problem is that organized labor has become too powerful; organized labor is fat; organized labor is resting on its laurels; organized labor is not productive, and all of the list of horribles we used to hear. I find it kind of interesting in this debate that nobody who opposes our position--which is that you should not be able to replace people who are legitimately striking under the law--to maintain, not to gain but maintain, where they are. Nobody is making the argument we used to hear about how powerful and bullying the American labor movement is. Nobody is even making the argument that we used to always hear about how this is so unfair to business. What happened to them? When I attend chamber of commerce dinners in my home State--a corporate State, and I suspect the same is true in Massachusetts and Connecticut--I do not hear businessmen complaining about organized labor; because, in effect, organized labor has already given at the office, already gotten the living devil kicked out of them. Without making a judgment that I think is unfair, the point is that this is like beating up on a kid now. Organized labor now frequently gets put in the position where, because of horrible management practices over recent decades, they are told that, by the way, if you do not make the following concessions, we are going to shut down. We are just going to close the company. So organized labor is scared to death; the workers are scared to death. And they give much more than management gives in terms of concessions to keep a lot of these outfits open and running. And now they have gotten to the point where what happens--and it rarely happens--is that when they are truly being abused and when there is no serious good faith collective bargaining going on, they decide they have nothing left to do but go out on strike. And now some in American business are saying, we are about to strip you of the last bit of leverage you have. If you go out on strike, we are going to replace you. And thus union members are deterred because of what the Senator from Connecticut said: Fear. People are scared to death. They are scared to death to exercise what they believe to be even their legitimate rights. Even when they are being maltreated, they do not go on strike because they are afraid of the alternative because of the nature of the economy, the downsizing of American corporations, the way things are; the whole world is turning upside down. I find it interesting that on this issue, which you would think would be so basic, this is not even taking place in an environment where anybody is legitimately making the argument that these people who are going on strike are doing it because they are greedy and trying to take over a company, or because they are trying to put somebody under. You do not even hear that argument. When these people go on strike--I think this is an interesting point people should remember--it is desperation. It is not deciding whether they want to go on strike to get a better wage to be able to have a second car and a trailer and a vacation at the beach. That is the argument we heard in the 1960s and 1970s. They are going on strike now because they say, hey, wait a minute, I have given at the office; I have been giving at the office for the last 15 years. I have already had my standard of living lowered and now you are telling me think it is fair, you are not treating me fairly, and I am going on strike, which I am allowed to do under the law. It amazes me why we are even having this fight. When is the last time any of the people in this Chamber picked up a paper and read about how unions and organized labor have taken such horrible advantage of people? All they have done for the last 10 to 12 years is given concessions and increased their productivity. And now, we have reached the point that--to steal a phrase from Mr. Stockman, who commented on the Reagan tax policy--these folks are like pigs in a trough now. They not only want them to continue to give at the office, but they want to take away the last thing they have under the law. I, quite frankly, did not ever think this would be a debate we would be having on the floor of the U.S. Senate. Again, look at all the strikes that are taking place nationwide. Look at the effects of the strikes taking place nationwide. Look at what is being requested by those strikes that are taking place nationwide. I will lay you 8 to 5 that 85 percent of the people would say what is being asked is reasonable. They may or may not agree, but it is reasonable. No one is even making the claims anymore, I say to my friend from Massachusetts, that this is some muscle-bound organized labor, who is just out there ripping off everyone and intimidating companies. This is just people who are just trying to be in a position where they can--to use the expression of my friend from Massachusetts--``keep their heads above the water.'' And now they are being told they do not even have a right. What prompted me to say all this was the word used by the Senator from Connecticut: Fear. Can you imagine the fear and intimidation of an individual who, in today's circumstances, thinking that after roughly 60 years of practice under the NLRB, they are going to be put in the position if they even stand up and try to stop further erosion, that the alternative for them in an environment where there are no other jobs is that they lose their job permanently? That is simply not fair. Our former colleague from California, the present Governor of California, ran an ad I remember seeing. He was talking about immigration, but I will take the words he used and apply it here, because I disagreed with his view on immigration. He said something like this: Some people are playing by the rules. They are doing it the American way. Other people are not playing by the rules and they are being rewarded for it. That is not the American way. Striker replacement in circumstances where there is no evidence that there has been a violation of the labor laws is not the American way. It is a reflection of greed, the greed and avarice of those who want to make a fundamental change that working women and men are put into their proper place, from their perspective. I think it is, quite frankly, outrageous. The Senator said, ``Who is going to stand up and fight for them?'' Well, I know of no two people who have been better champions of their cause in making sure they are never left unspoken for than the Senator from Massachusetts and the Senator from Connecticut, and I compliment them.

Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, all of us here, on both sides of this issue, agree that the right to strike is essential to preserving the balance of power between labor and management in this country. But that right is hollow if, by exercising it, a worker faces the loss of his or her job. President Clinton has taken the important step of clarifying that in this country, as in the rest of the industrial democracies with less than a handful of exceptions, workers cannot be fired for exercising their legal rights. Unfortunately, our attempts to clarify that right through legislation, led for years by Senator Metzenbaum, were blocked by filibusters, despite clear majorities that favored a ban on striker replacements. President Clinton's Executive order is needed because Congress has been frustrated in its attempts to clear up the current untenable situation. His action follows established precedent, such as actions by President Bush, who, in 1992, issued an Executive order to require unionized contractors to post notices in their workplaces informing all employees that they could not be required to join a union. President Bush also used executive authority to ban unions from using for political purposes fees collected that had been collected from union members who disagreed with union policy positions. As a Republican Congressman said at the time, this was an ``effort by the President to do something through Executive order that he cannot get Congress to do.'' So let's not be distracted by procedural arguments. President Clinton was well within his authority and established precedent when he issued his Executive order. Let's stick to the substance of this issue, an issue that goes to the fundamental rights of workers, and to the very foundations of labor-management relations in this country. Mr. President, before the New Deal, striking workers had no legal protection against being fired. To provide legal protection for the right to strike, Congress passed and President Roosevelt signed the National Labor Relations Act in 1935. Without it, hostile, confrontational, and often violent labor-management relations would have persisted. But in 1938, a Supreme Court ruling that confirmed the right to strike offered an unsolicited comment that established a legal basis for hiring permanent replacements for striking workers. This language has remained a logical and legal anomaly ever since. In law schools across the country, law professors have struggled in vain to distinguish between firing and permanently replacing striking workers. For many years, this problem was, in fact, academic; it had little application in the real world. But for the last decade and more, the issue has become all too real for thousands of workers who have lost their jobs by exercising what the vast majority of Americans believe should be their right under the law. The permanent replacement of striking workers has become an all too common tactic in labor-management disputes. In a survey last year, 25 percent of employers said that they would hire or consider hiring permanent replacements, in response to a strike. A recent GAO report found that employers hire or threaten to hire permanent replacements in one of every three strikes. Today, the threat of permanent replacement calls into question the fundamental right to strike, upsets the balance of power between workers and management, and introduces an unnecessary source of friction and hostility into labor relations. We have evidence that strikes in which permanent replacement workers are hired are longer, and more heated, than those in which that tactic is not used. Mr. President, I know that there is much emotion on both sides of this issue, and I would like my colleagues who disagree with me to understand that I do not take their concerns lightly. Let me address a few of those concerns now. We have heard in recent debate that President Clinton's Executive order will upset the balance of power between labor and management and make strikes more likely as a result. This argument is not only inaccurate, Mr. President, it shows a fundamental misunderstanding of the costs of a strike to workers and their families. First, it is the increasing use of striker replacements that has upset the traditional balance of power between workers and employers. The President has acted to remove this source of much of the hostility and divisiveness that now attends labor-management relations. Second, Mr. President, under no circumstance is a strike an easy option for workers who will suffer the loss of wages, health benefits, savings, and even major assets such as cars and homes to undertake a strike with no knowledge of what the outcome will be. We have also heard, Mr. President, that without the threat of hiring permanent replacements, employers will be powerless in the face of union demands. The fact of the matter is that employers did quite well for over four decades, by stockpiling inventories, other tactics, without recourse to permanent replacement workers. As we seek new ways to encourage labor-management cooperation, to recognize the shared goals of American workers and employers in a changing global economy, a first step ought to be to eliminate the unnecessary, inflammatory practice of permanently replacing strikers. Mr. President, simple fairness demands it. And simple fairness demands that we defeat this attempt to cut out the funding for President Clinton's Executive order. I urge my colleagues to vote with me to put this relic of another era of labor-management relations behind us.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I am for this amendment. There has been a little bit of blood that has been spilled on the floor here in the last couple of days, especially when the unanimous consent to vote at a certain time was obviated by our being pushed into a recess, a legitimate parliamentary move, but one that sort of violated the spirit of what everyone thought was going to happen. I hope and I plead with the majority leader that when he moves to reconsider--and I will be with him; I will be for this under the following circumstance: as long as we all know it is going to be done and everyone is here. If the majority leader called for a motion to reconsider knowing that there were absences that would affect the outcome of this vote, I would, on a matter of procedure, change my vote to prevent that happening. I do not think that is the majority leader's intention, but I do not want to mislead anybody. I think this is so important that this has to be dealt with straight up, with all 100 Senators, unless they are ill, in the hospital and cannot make it, that every consideration should be given to every Senator to be able to vote. I yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, may I have another 60 seconds?

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I have a parliamentary inquiry. I am a supporter of this amendment. I voted for the amendment, and I will vote for it again if it comes up in a similar form that it came up now. But I have a parliamentary inquiry. When the majority leader changed his vote from ``yes'' to ``no'' and did not make the motion to reconsider, is it within the province of the majority leader at any time at any place as long as the Senate is in session to move without debate to the motion to reconsider?

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, last week I announced my decision to support the balanced budget amendment. I rise today to explain my choice. Considering amendments to our Constitution is one of the Senate's most profound responsibilities. Our Nation has made only 17 such changes since the Bill of Rights was ratified over 200 years ago. But in recent decades a structural imbalance has occurred in the way the Federal Government finances its operations. Each year, we find ourselves deeper and deeper in debt, with no reasonable prospect for constraining either the deficit or the debt. We cannot balance our budget. Or, more precisely, we will not. As I considered the balanced budget amendment as a possible solution to this problem, I had to first answer an important question--Is this an issue worthy of constitutional consideration? From the point over 10 years ago when I offered my own constitutional amendment to balance the Federal budget, up to my vote for Senator Reid's balanced budget amendment last year, I have held that this is an issue worthy of constitutional consideration. The decision to encumber future generations with financial obligations is one that can rightly be considered among the fundamental choices addressed in the Constitution. If this issue meets the test of constitutional significance, Mr. President, then is House Joint Resolution 1 the way to address it? Mr. President, many of my colleagues, whose very valid concerns I have shared, have honored this Chamber with an eloquent presentation of the problems this particular amendment could cause. I will respond to some of those arguments later. But none of their arguments has overcome my concern for the future of our Nation's economy--for the country we will pass on to our children. After so many years of seeking alternative solutions, I can see no other reasonable prospect for sharply curtailing the debt than the adoption of this amendment into our Constitution. Mr. President, it is one thing to have deficits of $20 to $40 billion per year, which we could live with for the foreseeable future. But it is quite another thing to have deficits of $200 to $400 billion. And just 6 years from now, Mr. President, $400 billion is just what our deficit will be, not counting the surplus in the Social Security trust fund. Under these extraordinary circumstances, it seems reasonable to me to require an extraordinary majority of Congress to continue deficit spending. Even if this amendment passes and is ratified by the States, I know that we will continue to have some deficits. It is the potential size of deficits that bothers me; there is nothing sacred about a balanced budget. But if we do decide to add to our national debt, it should be for important reasons, such as managing recessions or natural disasters--or securing the future well-being of our children--for reasons that can command the support of three-fifths of both Houses. Over a decade ago, Mr. President, we strayed from the course that had, since the end of World War II, shrunk the national debt as a share of our economy. Since the early 1980's, we have foolishly, and significantly, increased our national debt year after year. In 1980, Federal debt held by the public totalled $710 billion, and the interest we paid on the debt was $52 billion. This year, that debt has reached $3.6 trillion, and our interest payments will be $234 billion. Recognizing the folly of this course, in 1984 I proposed a freeze on every program of the Federal Government--across the board. Although I wrote the plan with two Republican Senators, we received little support for the proposal, from either side of the aisle. By the way, I am convinced, Mr. President, that had we acted then, the harm to many of the programs that I hold dear, responsibilities that moved me to enter public life, would have been softened. As it is, without the freeze--that we were warned would harm so- called liberal programs--I have had to watch as those programs have gone through the wringer. In 1981, when we lost control of the deficit, human services programs were 8.6 percent of Federal outlays. A decade later, they were 6.9 percent, a 20-percent reduction in their share of spending. In 1981, education, training, employment and social services were 3.7 percent of Federal outlays. Over the next decade, as deficits and interest payments grew, they shrank to 2.3 percent, a 40-percent cut in their share of Federal spending. After failing to pass the freeze, in the hope of restoring some discipline to our finances and reducing the deficit, I supported the Gramm-Rudman process, that put caps on the amount of deficit allowed, and required a balanced budget. But the requirements changed every year; the only constant in the process was the annual increase in the national debt, and the guarantee of annual deficits. And in 1993, we passed an historic budget agreement at the beginning of the Clinton administration, that will cut $500 billion from our deficits over 5 years. The healthy economy that followed passage of that plan has meant even more deficit savings. If I thought that we could sustain this trend, Mr. President, I would withhold my support for this amendment. But, what was the political response to that serious deficit reduction plan? It was denounced by those who now claim they want to attack the deficit. That plan was passed by a single vote in both Houses, without one Republican vote. Moreover, that plan has been used by so-called deficit hawks to defeat the very Members of Congress who had the courage to vote for it. And now we see again a plan by the new majority for tax cuts, defense increases--including star wars--and, of course, the promise of a balanced budget. Mr. President, I've read this story before. We are all living out the consequences of the first time we tried that program. It is clear now that there are no options left before us to turn the short-term success of the 1993 budget plan into a longer-term program to bring down future deficits. And there are no other options to force those who voted against deficit reduction back then to face the consequences--requiring them to look at everything including revenues rather than continue the charade that the only thing we need to do to balance the budget is to cut foreign aid and AFDC. Because they--and we--have been so successful in misleading the American people about the problem, those aspects of the Government's responsibilities that I entered public life to support have already been badly harmed as a consequence of these gigantic deficits: children, education, fighting crime and drugs, supporting organizations that promote international stability. And those areas of the budget that need help the least--tax loopholes for the privileged, exotic weapons systems, people who aren't middle class or poor but who make money off of their programs--those have done the best. I offer as evidence the recent votes in the House. Now, without the balanced budget amendment, our fiscal disarray is the pretext for cuts in school Head Start Program, and educational programs that our future depends on. Do my friends who share my values--who share my indignation at this disregard for those least able to help themselves, this short-sighted slighting of the future--do they really believe that if we were to vote down the balanced budget amendment that those legislative priorities would change? I am convinced--reluctantly--that unless we use this opportunity to try to restore control over our finances, we will not be able to re- establish our priorities. Our fight is not--or should not be--against making deficit spending a more difficult choice. Our fight, with or without a balanced budget amendment, is against those who would walk away from Government's responsibilities and who will sacrifice the future for short-term political advantage. Despite the shrinkage in those programs in recent years, we still face a future of increasing national debt, and rising annual deficits, and those programs and responsibilities I feel most strongly about will continue to take the hits. This year alone, we will pay $234 billion in interest on the debt. By 1997, interest will be $270 billion--more than either our defense or domestic spending. If this trend is unsustainable--and it is--and if the hard choices we make are turned against us--and they are--What, then can we do? I have concluded, Mr. President, that there is nothing left to try except the balanced budget amendment, forcing everything onto the table, and requiring us to justify why some areas have escaped the budget ax so far. But what of the many arguments against this amendment--concerns that I have shared in the past. Let me explain my thoughts on some of those concerns today. Mr. President, one of the strongest practical arguments raised against the balanced budget amendment is that it will cost us our ability to respond to recessions. There are two points that I want to make in regard to that serious charge. First, the sad fact is that we have already lost that flexibility--by making deficits the norm in good times and in recessions. Until we regain control of our finances, deficits will remain an unintended consequence of our budget process, not a selective policy choice. Second, Mr. President, even under the constraints of this amendment, it is possible to provide that flexibility. In Delaware, we have built a two percent surplus into each year's budget, to assure that we can cover unforeseen events that could raise spending or reduce revenues. We could do that with the Federal budget, and restore its important stabilizing role, a role that is now lost in the annual red ink. This is not something that appears to be a realistic option in the near term, but if that is the only way to restore the effect of automatic stabilizers in the Federal budget, we will be able to choose that option. This amendment will make automatic stabilization more difficult, but it will remain our choice to restore that function of the Federal budget to its former effectiveness. There are other concerns that I share with my colleagues who oppose this amendment. Together, we tried to make this a better proposal. I believe that this amendment could be improved by changes I have supported here on the floor and in the Judiciary Committee. We tried to keep the Social Security trust fund off budget, where it is now, and where it should stay. We failed to pass that amendment, and this will allow us to continue to mask the current deficit with funds that are needed to meet future obligations. I believe that this failure takes us further from the truth about our real deficit problems, and further from the truth about the very real problems in the Social Security system itself. But let me stress for those who are concerned about the effect of this amendment on the Social Security system--this change in our Constitution does not, by itself, cut a dime from current benefits. Under current rules, Social Security is now off budget, but by law its surpluses still go to purchase the accumulating pile Treasury bonds that we will have to pay off in the future. Taking Social Security out of the balanced budget amendment would not change that aspect of the system, or prevent tampering with the commitments we have made in the past. My concern, in addition to the ways in which that accumulating surplus will distort our definition of the budget, is that this amendment will increase the temptation to use the Social Security system to make the rest of the budget appear more balanced. This is a valid reason to try to insulate Social Security from that temptation--but not reason to renounce what I have concluded is our last chance to restore control over our country's financial future. We also tried, Mr. President, to assure that the real costs of a balanced budget amendment, and not just its surface allure, are apparent to the citizens who will be asked to ratify it in the coming months. And we tried to provide a capital budget--to treat public investments the way families, businesses, and States treat their investments. And we failed. But I want the record to show that we are not prohibited by this amendment from devising a capital budget. I predict that events and experience will show us that a capital budget is essential to setting priorities, and that we will find a way to fit such a process into our budget system. We tried to avoid a potential shift in the constitutional balance of powers by ensuring that only the Congress would enforce a balanced budget, Mr. President, and we tried to avoid tying up the courts with constitutional questions about the President's role in enforcing a balanced budget. Mr. President, I believe that these constitutional issues remain the greatest risk we will take when we add this amendment to our Constitution. Now, with the acceptance of Senator Nunn's amendment, Mr. President, some of my concern on that issue has been relieved. So where do we stand? We can vote for this less than perfect amendment, that requires 60 percent majorities to permit deficits--and I predict that we will choose to permit those deficits, but smaller deficits, and less frequently, than before. Or, Mr. President, we can continue to add every year to the debt burden of future generations. We will steal today from the next generation, squeezing out the savings and investment that could increase future wealth. We will continue to tie our own hands, to restrict our own ability-- indeed, our responsibility--to set priorities in our annual budget process. This year, interest on the national debt will cost the United States $234 billion; the entire domestic discretionary budget will be $253 billion. By the time this amendment is intended to become law, in the year 2002, interest on the debt will be $344 billion, larger than every other category in the budget except for Social Security. Given that prospect, Mr. President, I choose to take a chance on the balanced budget amendment. I hope that reverence for the Constitution and the procedural roadblocks in the amendment will establish an ethic of budget balance and a new, responsible, tradition will grow from the action we take here today. But only history will tell. But I have sufficient confidence in our citizens and in our political institutions that we will learn from any flaws that remain in this amendment, and will make the best of its virtues. Two hundred years of American history tells me it is right to have that confidence. But at the end of the day, Mr. President, I am willing to take the first step today down this new path. I will vote for the balanced budget amendment, but I will do so with my eyes open. It is not the panacea some of its proponents have advertised, but neither is it the plague its opponents have portrayed. For me, it as a reluctantly chosen opportunity to regain responsible control over our affairs. And I hope that the record of my words and actions on this amendment will help my fellow citizens, both in my consider its ratification. I hope that they consider fully the record of debate we have worked to establish here in the Congress. That record should make us all, on both sides of this profound issue, proud.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, my vote on the motion to table amendment No. 253 should have been ``no.'' I was mistaken on the sequence of the amendments before us today. I believe that a simple majority, as now provided in the Constitution, is appropriate for decisions to increase revenues. I do not believe that we--or future generations--should be constrained in the options available to keep the budget in balance. (Ms. SNOWE assumed the Chair.)

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, today, I am reintroducing legislation I first offered last year regarding the $150 veterans plot allowance to states. My bill would provide a payment for all veterans-- not just some veterans--who are buried free of charge in a State veterans cemetery, if they are eligible for burial in a national veterans cemetery. I am pleased to be joined in this effort today by Senators D'Amato, Hollings, Roth, and Stevens. The imperative for enacting this legislation is even greater today than it was when I introduced the same bill last May. Earlier this week, the Associated Press reported that our national cemeteries are fast running out of space. Of the 114 national cemeteries, 56--one short of half--are already full. And, space exists for just 230,000 more caskets and the cremated remains of just 50,000 more veterans. Compared that with the 27 million veterans living today who will be eligible for burial in a national cemetery. For those familiar with veterans issues, these statistics will not come as a great shock. In fact, the rapidly dwindling space in national cemeteries is one of the main reasons that over a decade ago, Congress established the state cemetery grant program. In doing so, we hoped to encourage States to build State veterans cemeteries to ease the burden on the national cemetery system. This Federal-State partnership has not only worked, it is a shining example of what the States and the Federal Government can do together. Since the creation of the program, over 25 States have built State veterans cemeteries--and there are now 42 such cemeteries throughout the United States. For States like Delaware, which do not have a national cemetery at all, the State cemetery program ensures that veterans will receive the dignified burial they deserve in a veterans- only cemetery, while being buried closer to home than if they were buried in a national cemetery. Now, however, I fear that this partnership is at risk--precisely when we need it the most. The reason is because of an anomaly in the law. States are required to bury in a State-owned veterans cemetery those veterans who are eligible for burial in a national veterans cemetery-- that is, all honorably Government promised to pay a $150 plot allowance to the State for each veteran who is buried free of charge. But--and here is the catch--this payment is not made for all honorably discharged veterans. Rather, a State is eligible for the plot allowance only for burying veterans who meet a set of more restrictive criteria. Specifically, the plot allowance is paid only for those veterans who: First, were receiving veterans disability compensation or a veterans pension; second, died in a VA hospital; third, were indigent, and the body was unclaimed; or fourth, were, or could have been, discharged from the military due to a disability. In short, State-owned veterans cemeteries exist to help relieve the Federal Government of its responsibility to bury all veterans in national cemeteries. At the same time, States do not receive the $150 plot allowance for burying all national cemetery eligible veterans. It seems to me that this disparate treatment is in conflict with the very purpose for which State veterans cemeteries were established. And, because of the limits on the payment of the plot allowance, I have heard anecdotal evidence in recent years that some States may soon stop burying veterans free of charge. They claim that they cannot afford to do so when the Federal Government does not pay the $150 plot allowance. To further complicate matters, last year, Congress extended eligibility for burial in a national cemetery to National Guard members and reservists who have served at least 20 years. By their eligibility for burial in a national cemetery, they are also now eligible for burial in State veterans cemeteries. But, of course, few, if any, will meet the four-point criteria I mentioned a moment ago--and the States will not receive a $150 plot allowance for their burial. So, Mr. President, as we are asking more of State veterans cemeteries--through expanded eligibility and through decreased space in national cemeteries--and as State veterans cemeteries become more vital to the national cemetery system, we need to ensure that States continue to participate in the program. To guarantee that--and to be fair to the States--my legislation would simply provide States the $150 plot allowance for burying without charge any veterans eligible for burial in a national veterans cemetery. No more restricted criteria. No more contradictory goals. Only one simple and fair rule: If a State buries a veteran in lieu of burial in a national cemetery, the State is paid the plot allowance. If my legislation were enacted, the Congressional Budget Office has estimated that it would cost the Federal Government about $1 million annually. While my bill does not have offsetting reductions in other Federal spending to cover this cost, I am committed to finding such reductions before the measure is passed. Mr. President, on this, the 50th anniversary of the Battle of Iwo Jima--at a time when we are honoring the brave men who fought there and the almost 7,000 who died there--it is well to remember that the Federal Government is duty-bound to give all of our veterans a decent and dignified burial. The legislation I am introducing today will help to ensure that we live up to that solemn commitment. I urge my colleagues to cosponsor this bill.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. BIDEN. If the Senator will yield, why did we allow them to deduct the interest they pay on their mortgage? To further encourage them to buy.

Mr. BIDEN. How much time remains in control of the proponents of the amendment?

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.