Joe Biden

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise to introduce the Law Enforcement Discipline, Accountability, and Due Process Act of 2003, along with the Chairman of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Corrections and Victims' Rights Senator Graham, Senator McConnell and Senator Bunning. These are trying times for the men and women on our front lines providing domestic security, our Nation's law enforcement personnel. State and local fiscal problems are forcing many communities to cut their police budgets. Each change in the Nation's homeland security alert level results in increased overtime and other costs for local law enforcement. Just yesterday, the FBI reported that the number of murders and rapes was up across the country in 2002. And this Administration is determined to dramatically scale back Federal crime- fighting initiatives like the COPS program, a proven initiative that has been hailed as one of the keys to the crime-drop of the nineties. At the same time, the men and women of law enforcement work in extremely dangerous environments. An average of 165 police officers are killed in the line of duty every year. And at times, internal police investigations and administrative hearings do not provide officers with basic protections. According to the National Association of Police Organizations, ``[i]n roughly half of the states in this country, officers enjoy some legal protections against false accusations and abusive conduct, but hundreds of thousands of officers have very limited due process rights and confront limitations on their exercise of other rights, such as the right to engage in political activities.'' The Fraternal Order of Police notes that, ``[i]n a startling number of jurisdictions throughout this country, law enforcement officers have no procedural or administrative protections whatsoever; in fact, they can be, and frequently are, summarily dismissed from their jobs without explanation. Officers who lose their careers due to administrative or political expediency almost always find it impossible to find new employment in public safety. An officer's reputation, once tarnished by accusation, is almost impossible to restore.'' This legislation we introduce today seeks to provide officers with certain basic protections in those jurisdictions where such workplace protections are not currently provided. This bill allows law enforcement officials to engage in political activities. It provides standards and procedures to guide State and local law enforcement agencies during internal investigations, interrogations, and administrative disciplinary hearings of law enforcement officers, and it calls upon States to develop and enforce these disciplinary procedures. The bill would preempt State laws which confer fewer rights than those provided for in the legislation, but it would not preempt any State or local laws that confer rights or protections that are equal to or exceed the rights and protections afforded in the bill. My own State of Delaware has its own law enforcement officers' bill of rights, and as such Delaware would not be impacted by the provisions of this bill. I am pleased that the bill has earned the endorsement of the Fraternal Order of Police and of the National Association of Police Organizations. Beyond benefiting those on the front lines of local law enforcement, this bill would enhance the ability of our citizens to hold their local police accountable if they do transgress while on the job. The legislation includes provisions that will ensure citizen complaints against police officers are investigated, and that citizens are informed of the outcome of these investigations. The bill balances the rights of police officers with the rights of citizens to raise valid concerns about the conduct of some of these officers. In addition, I have consulted with constitutional experts who have opined that the bill is consistent with Congress' powers under the Commerce Clause and that it does not run afoul of the Supreme Court's Tenth Amendment jurisprudence. While I believe that the bill we introduce today takes the right approach, I want to note the International Association of Chiefs of Police's opposition to this measure. In April of this year I met with Richmond, California Chief of Police Joseph Samuels, the president of the IACP. Chief Samuels and I acknowledged that we disagreed on this bill, but I pledged to him that their concerns would be heard and taken into consideration as the bill we introduce today is debated in Congress. It is my view that without a meeting of the minds between police management and union officials on this issue, enactment of a meaningful law enforcement officers' bill of rights will be difficult. It is my hope that the newly-constituted Subcommittee on Crime, Corrections and Victims' Rights, on which I serve as ranking member, will hold a hearing on this measure. That subcommittee is the proper forum in which to debate the merits of our approach to guaranteeing basic procedural safeguards to the men and women of law enforcement. I urge my colleagues to join Senators Graham, McConnell, Bunning and me in providing all of the Nation's law enforcement officers with the basic rights they deserve. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to be able to proceed on the time controlled by Senator Feinstein.

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I rise in support of the efforts of Senator McConnell and Senator Feinstein and acknowledge the leadership of Senator Baucus, as well, in working this out. Senator McConnell has been tireless in his efforts to promote democracy in Burma and has been an acknowledged leader in this area. I thank him for not relenting. I think it is to state the obvious that it is vital for us to express our concern for the freedom of Aung San Suu Kyi, leader of the National League for Democracy and a winner of the Nobel Peace Prize. On May 30, Government-affiliated thugs ambushed an automobile convoy carrying the leader and many of her supporters. Dozens of people were reportedly killed and injured in the crash. She was detained by Government authorities, who also ordered the NLD offices closed nationwide. Aung San Suu Kyi remains under arrest, and the Government has refused to allow supporters or members of the diplomatic community to meet with her. When Burma's military rulers freed Aung San Suu Kyi of house arrest last year, they claimed her release was unconditional and they pledged to continue the U.N.-facilitated dialog, which led to her freedom. With last month's premeditated attack and her current detention, the junta has abrogated all of its commitments and warrants no more time. It is not hard to discern the motives of the junta. They are scared. They are scared the people of Burma will rally and remove them from power, and they are right to be afraid. As Aung San Suu Kyi has toured schools, hospitals, businesses, and government organizations around Burma, she has been met by joyous crowds, and it is obvious to all observers that she remains as loved by the people of Burma as the military junta is reviled. It is time for the present military oligarchy to fade into history. Burma's transition to democracy would be a most welcome development for all of Southeast Asia. Despite pledges to crack down on narcotics production, the military continues to collaborate with heroin and methamphetamine traffickers. It has failed to address the legitimate demands of ethnic minorities for significant regional autonomy within a federal state, preferring military pressure to political accommodation. The generals have enriched themselves while bankrupting the country. They have dismantled Burma's education system and ignored the growing threat to public health posed by AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis. As the State Department notes with characteristic understatement in its most recent human rights report: The quality of life in Burma continues to deteriorate. That may be the understatement of the month. It is well past time for the generals to do what they said they would do; namely, begin a process that would eventually transfer the reins to a representative civilian government that would enjoy domestic and international legitimacy. Unfortunately, there are few indications that the regime intends to step down. Indeed, they apparently had high hopes the United States Government, taking note of Aung San Suu Kyi's release last year, would take steps to lift the many sanctions imposed when the army brutally suppressed Burma's democracy movement in 1988. The regime spent $450,000 to retain the services of a prominent Washington lobbying firm to help push the President and Congress to normalize relations, restore access to international financial institutions, and resume foreign aid. They were willing to spend $450,000 to improve their image, but last year the officials operating the government spent less than $40,000 nationwide on HIV/AIDS care and prevention. Each of the nation's 35,000 primary schools receives on average less than $1 from the central government each year; $35,000 for the national education budget; $450,000 for lobbying in Washington. No amount of money can hide the character of the Burmese military rulers. As the United States people stood with Nelson Mandela in his bid for freedom and democracy for the people of South Africa, so we should now stand with those who are moving Burma toward a free and open society and the National League for Democracy as they try through peaceful means to end the tyrannical, brutal rule of Burma's military rulers. Again, I thank Senators McConnell and Feinstein for their leadership in this area, and I am confident we will win wide support of our colleagues. It is time that we are clearly standing on the right side of this issue.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, yesterday evening the Senate confirmed the nomination of Michael Chertoff to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. I was in Delaware attending a funeral last evening and, accordingly, was unable to attend yesterday's vote on Mr. Chertoff's nomination. I wish to note for the record, however, that I would have voted for Mr. Chertoff's confirmation yesterday, having voted to report favorably his nomination from the Judiciary Committee last month.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise today to help introduce a bill with my good friend from California that will bring new and needed tools to the battle to end violence against children in America, whether it takes place inside the home or out on the street. Today, Senator Boxer and I are introducing the Violence Against Children Act, VACA, which provides a comprehensive approach to prevent crimes against children, treat child victims, and prosecute those who harm our Nation's children. In 1994, this body passed a piece of legislation that I authored, the Violence Against Women Act. When we passed this landmark legislation, we said as a Congress, and as a Nation as a whole, that domestic violence is not a family problem to be dealt with quietly behind the scenes, but a national crisis in need of a coordinated response from law enforcement, the courts and the medical community. Backed by almost one and half billion dollars of Federal funds, the Violence Against Women Act spurred a sea change on the Federal, State and local levels in how police, prosecutors, judges, medical personnel and others, process and handle cases of domestic abuse, sexual assault and stalking. Most importantly, the Violence Against Women Act also made it clear that victims of domestic violence and sexual assault were, in fact, victims: Victims who deserved the full extend of this Nation's medical and legal resources. The Violence Against Children Act, offered by Senator Boxer and myself today, is designed to bring this same type of concentered focus and coordinated response to end all child abuse, the most heinous and incomprehensible form of violence against the most vulnerable people in our lives. Last year in my state of Delaware there were 1,073 substantiated cases of child abuse and neglect--46 percent were cases of neglect, 31 percent were cases of abuse and 12 percent were cases of sexual abuse. Nationally, 3.9 million of the nation's 22.3 million children between the ages of 12 and 17 have been seriously physically assaulted. One in three girls and one in five boys are sexually abused before the age of 18. One study recently reported that in 2000, the homicide rate for U.S. infants is almost equal to the murder rate of teens. As stunning as these numbers are, we should be aware that these numbers are not the totals. Like incidents of domestic violence, we know that violence against children is under-reported. We also know that violence against kids cuts across all lines--it happens to children of doctors and lawyers, not just to poor children. We must do more to protect our children, and with the Violence Against Children Act we can. Designed to be a comprehensive measure, the Violence Against Children Act will fight the battle against child abuse on a number of fronts: by providing states with new resources, law enforcement with additional tools and families with more places to turn to for help. What specifically the legislation do? The Violence Against Children Act has three major provisions; 1. it deters crime by toughening Federal criminal penalties for crimes against children; 2. it requires the Federal Government to provide investigative, forensic and prosecutorial assistance to states working on cases of violent crimes against children; and 3. it authorizes two new grant programs--one aimed at providing more resources to state and local law enforcement for training, creating new courts and enforcement units focused solely on child crimes, and a second grant program for local governments and nonprofit organizations to provide emergency medical treatment and counseling for child victims, to increase the number of mental health professionals who specialize in child victims, and to establish child abuse and crime prevention programs. The Violence Against Children Act also encourages State and localities to take affirmative steps to fight crimes against children by conditioning receipt of grant monies on three points: 1. creating a statewide Amber Alert system to alert the public immediately after a child abduction has been discovered; 2. creating Safe Haven programs which allow parents to leave newborn babies for whom they cannot care in hospital emergency room anonymously and without fear of penalty; and 3. improving data gathering so that police, treatment providers and policy makers get a clearer view of the circumstances surrounding child crimes. We need to stop nibbling around the edges with piecemeal legislation that tackles just one aspect of child abuse or child exploitation. The Violence Against Children Act takes into account the larger landscape and provides wide-reaching tools and resources. I feel certain that once my colleagues become aware of this effort, this bill will gather broad and bipartisan support. Recently the Nation was stunned and relieved at the return of Elizabeth Smart to her parents Ed and Lois. As a father and grandfather my heart went out to them. I don't want to read about these types of cases anymore. My State of Delaware has an Amber Alert system in place. Delaware has a Safe Haven law. Not every State has these critical tools at their disposal. Senator Boxer and I are introducing the Violence Against Children Act for a reason. We must do everything that we can to prevent crimes against children and, if God forbid they do occur, we must do everything we can to treat the victims and their families and prosecute their perpetrators to the fullest extent of the law. As one child advocates succinctly said, ``a civilized society says children matter.'' The Violence Against Children Act says loud and clear, kids matter.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise today to help introduce a bill with my good friend from California that will bring new and needed tools to the battle to end violence against children in America, whether it takes place inside the home or out on the street. Today, Senator Boxer and I are introducing the Violence Against Children Act, VACA, which provides a comprehensive approach to prevent crimes against children, treat child victims, and prosecute those who harm our Nation's children. In 1994, this body passed a piece of legislation that I authored, the Violence Against Women Act. When we passed this landmark legislation, we said as a Congress, and as a Nation as a whole, that domestic violence is not a family problem to be dealt with quietly behind the scenes, but a national crisis in need of a coordinated response from law enforcement, the courts and the medical community. Backed by almost one and half billion dollars of Federal funds, the Violence Against Women Act spurred a sea change on the Federal, State and local levels in how police, prosecutors, judges, medical personnel and others, process and handle cases of domestic abuse, sexual assault and stalking. Most importantly, the Violence Against Women Act also made it clear that victims of domestic violence and sexual assault were, in fact, victims: Victims who deserved the full extend of this Nation's medical and legal resources. The Violence Against Children Act, offered by Senator Boxer and myself today, is designed to bring this same type of concentered focus and coordinated response to end all child abuse, the most heinous and incomprehensible form of violence against the most vulnerable people in our lives. Last year in my state of Delaware there were 1,073 substantiated cases of child abuse and neglect--46 percent were cases of neglect, 31 percent were cases of abuse and 12 percent were cases of sexual abuse. Nationally, 3.9 million of the nation's 22.3 million children between the ages of 12 and 17 have been seriously physically assaulted. One in three girls and one in five boys are sexually abused before the age of 18. One study recently reported that in 2000, the homicide rate for U.S. infants is almost equal to the murder rate of teens. As stunning as these numbers are, we should be aware that these numbers are not the totals. Like incidents of domestic violence, we know that violence against children is under-reported. We also know that violence against kids cuts across all lines--it happens to children of doctors and lawyers, not just to poor children. We must do more to protect our children, and with the Violence Against Children Act we can. Designed to be a comprehensive measure, the Violence Against Children Act will fight the battle against child abuse on a number of fronts: by providing states with new resources, law enforcement with additional tools and families with more places to turn to for help. What specifically the legislation do? The Violence Against Children Act has three major provisions; 1. it deters crime by toughening Federal criminal penalties for crimes against children; 2. it requires the Federal Government to provide investigative, forensic and prosecutorial assistance to states working on cases of violent crimes against children; and 3. it authorizes two new grant programs--one aimed at providing more resources to state and local law enforcement for training, creating new courts and enforcement units focused solely on child crimes, and a second grant program for local governments and nonprofit organizations to provide emergency medical treatment and counseling for child victims, to increase the number of mental health professionals who specialize in child victims, and to establish child abuse and crime prevention programs. The Violence Against Children Act also encourages State and localities to take affirmative steps to fight crimes against children by conditioning receipt of grant monies on three points: 1. creating a statewide Amber Alert system to alert the public immediately after a child abduction has been discovered; 2. creating Safe Haven programs which allow parents to leave newborn babies for whom they cannot care in hospital emergency room anonymously and without fear of penalty; and 3. improving data gathering so that police, treatment providers and policy makers get a clearer view of the circumstances surrounding child crimes. We need to stop nibbling around the edges with piecemeal legislation that tackles just one aspect of child abuse or child exploitation. The Violence Against Children Act takes into account the larger landscape and provides wide-reaching tools and resources. I feel certain that once my colleagues become aware of this effort, this bill will gather broad and bipartisan support. Recently the Nation was stunned and relieved at the return of Elizabeth Smart to her parents Ed and Lois. As a father and grandfather my heart went out to them. I don't want to read about these types of cases anymore. My State of Delaware has an Amber Alert system in place. Delaware has a Safe Haven law. Not every State has these critical tools at their disposal. Senator Boxer and I are introducing the Violence Against Children Act for a reason. We must do everything that we can to prevent crimes against children and, if God forbid they do occur, we must do everything we can to treat the victims and their families and prosecute their perpetrators to the fullest extent of the law. As one child advocates succinctly said, ``a civilized society says children matter.'' The Violence Against Children Act says loud and clear, kids matter.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, how much time do I have available under the unanimous consent agreement?

Mr. BIDEN. I thank the Chair. Before I begin speaking in support of the Kennedy amendment, I would like to make just one generic point. I find it fascinating that the United States of America, of all countries in the world, feels the need to increase its nuclear arsenal at this moment--low-yield, high-yield, no-yield, any yield. It is fascinating that, at this moment in the world's history, in our relative strength and power, we are the ones who think we need another nuclear weapon in our arsenal. But that is just, as a friend of mine named Arlen Mekler used to say, a random thought. Let me get to the heart of this. I obviously support the Feinstein- Kennedy amendment which would keep the 1993 Spratt-Furse amendment in place. That amendment, as we all know, bans all work on low-yield nuclear weapons, those with a yield below 5 kilotons. We had a lot of reasons to do that. It is sometimes useful to remember why we did these things in the first place. I might add we enacted that amendment at a time when the Russians had a whole heck of a lot more weapons than exist now; at a time when things were actually a little more dangerous, when our vulnerability to nuclear attack was greater than it is today. But the question now is, Why should we oppose the repeal of that ban? After all, section 3131 states: Nothing in the repeal . . . shall be construed as authorizing, testing, acquisition, or development of a low- yield nuclear weapon. So why stop our nuclear weapons labs from just thinking about these low-yield weapons? One answer is that the current law doesn't restrict research and early development on these low-yield weapons. It only prohibits later stages of development and engineering that are geared toward the production of low-yield nuclear weapons. Obviously, what we would do by lifting this ban is to be in the position of being able to move toward production of those weapons, a notion that will not be lost on the rest of the world. The other answer is that low-yield nuclear weapons are not like regular ones. Regular nuclear weapons are designed to deter adversaries. The massive destruction and civilian casualties that they can cause make nuclear weapons unlike even other weapons of mass destruction. Low-yield nuclear weapons are different. They bridge the gap between conventional weapons and the city-busting weapons of the cold war, and they offer the lure of a better way to destroy point targets. Supporters of low-yield weapons argue they could deter an adversary, and that is true. All nuclear weapons have a deterrent function. But the deterrent benefits that low-yield weapons provide are far outweighed by both the risk that they will actually be used and the dangerous signal they send to other countries, whether intentional or not, that we intend to fight a nuclear war. Low-yield weapons also blur the distinction between nuclear and conventional war, and they begin to make nuclear war more ``thinkable,'' as Herman Kahn might have said. Herman Kahn's book was titled ``Thinking About the Unthinkable.'' He understood that nuclear war was unthinkable, even as he demanded that we think about how to fight one, if we had to. Looking at the foreign defense policies of the current administration, I fear they fail to understand that very vital point. They want to make nuclear war ``thinkable.'' Section 3131 of this bill could make it ``thinkable'' that we could use these low-yield weapons-- as if we needed to have these low-yield nuclear weapons, despite the overwhelming conventional deterrent we have. Had we had them, I wonder if anyone might have suggested that we use these low-yield nuclear weapons that we may produce against any of the bunkers Saddam Hussein was in. I am sure we could hear a voice today that if we had a low- yield nuclear weapon, we could have used it that first night and guaranteed he was gone. The fact that we would have been the only country for the second time in world history to use a nuclear weapon, in this case unlike the first, without any real need, would have been lost on some people. But, I wonder what that message that would have sent to India and Pakistan, which are cheek to jowl with nuclear capability. The administration's failure, in my view, to understand that nuclear is still ``unthinkable'' is, I think, the most fatal flaw in this approach. That failure to understand could lead to bigger failures--a failure to understand how to keep other countries from developing nuclear weapons, a failure to view nonproliferation as a vital and a workable policy objective, and perhaps even a failure to avoid nuclear war which would do horrible damage to any country involved, including ourselves. Consider what the administration has said regarding nuclear weapons. We parse out what the administration says a piece at a time. I don't think we understand that the rest of the world, friend and foe alike, takes it in its total context. Let us look at the whole range of what they have said so far about nuclear weapons. The Nuclear Posture Review of December 2001 spoke of reducing U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons. But it also reportedly listed not only Russia and China but also North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Libya as potential enemies in a nuclear war with the use of nuclear weapons. I emphasize ``reportedly listed''--I have not looked at the classified document. I am referring to what has been printed on the Web and what has been in the press. The Nuclear Posture Review spoke of possibly needing to develop and test new types of nuclear weapons, and gave that as a reason for increasing our nuclear test readiness, and further said nuclear weapons might be used to neutralize chemical and biological agents. More recently, civilian Pentagon leaders ordered a task force to consider possible requirements for new low-yield nuclear weapons, even while assuring the Senate that no formal requirement has yet been established. A Presidential strategy document reportedly stated the United States might use nuclear weapons against a country with chemical or biological weapons. Then, in a runup to the war in Iraq, the administration proclaimed (but never explained) a new doctrine of preemption against any potential foe that acquired weapons of mass destruction. All that taken individually is understandable. Taken collectively, it could give someone a very foreboding picture. And do those statements increase our leverage over potential foes, and with a world community at large, or do they only give the rogue states the argument that they really are threatened and, therefore, really need nuclear weapons? Do our statements enable the rest of the world to ``blame the victim,'' as the neo-conservatives would say--and I would agree with them on the outrageousness of that--instead of blaming those responsible for setting disorder in motion? If you are North Korea, or Iran, or Libya, or Syria, which part of the reports I just referenced are you likely to rely on to make your specious case to the rest of the world? We have seen the willingness of the rest of the world to engage in the suspension of disbelief. As a friend of mine said, never underestimate the ability of the human mind to rationalize. We have seen our friends, from the French on, rationalize why we shouldn't do what needs to be done. Which part of the administration's strategy statements, which I briefly outlined, do you think the bad guys--North Korea, Iran, Libya, and Syria--are likely to rely on? The part where we say we reduce our reliance on nuclear bombs, or the part that names those countries as a possible target for nuclear preemption? As long as you are already listed on the possible target list, what are you going to say, and what are you going to do? Obviously, they are going to say, ``We have to do this because of what the United States is doing.'' There is no one in the world who doubts our capacity to annihilate, by conventional weapons alone, any other country in the world. There is no doubt in anyone's mind. And now we are saying that for our defense, we need another nuclear weapon. How do you think the world will interpret that? Some will say it doesn't matter what the rest of the world thinks. But it surely matters, in 1,000 different ways, whether it is a matter of deciding you will not let us sell chickens in your country or deciding whether you will allow businessmen to operate in your country or deciding whether you will cooperate in any other 500 ways we need cooperation on. What do our statements say, if you are North Korea or Libya or anywhere else? Do you say the United States is getting a low-yield nuclear weapon, so it is time we gave up our efforts to get nuclear weapons? Or if you think we are getting a low-yield nuclear weapon, might you decide it is time to accelerate your efforts? So far we have one clear answer, from North Korea. It is not the one we wanted. Iran appears to be accelerating its nuclear weapons program as well. I am not suggesting they would not be doing that if we weren't enunciating the policies of this administration. I suspect they would anyway. The whole question here is, How do we keep dangerous weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, out of the hands of the most dangerous people in the world, be they terrorists or those who would support them? That is our policy; that is the President's policy; and I agree with it. But obviously, we haven't quite gotten it right. So far, I don't think the administration has the answer to the question of how to achieve our objectives. For a while, it seemed as though the administration's answer was to declare war on every adversary that dared to go nuclear. But do we really intend to go to war with North Korea, if the price is the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of South Korean civilians? Do we intend to go to war with Iran, when we cannot guarantee security in Iraq? The list of countries that we accuse of having weapons of mass destruction is long; will we take them all on? And what do we do when Indian officials cite our Iraq war arguments as justification for a possible Indian attack on Pakistan that could risk a nuclear war? Is this the world we want? The Administration has refused to negotiate directly with North Korea, so we have yet to really test North Korea's claim that it would be prepared to meet all our security concerns in return for truly normal relations with us. Instead, we have demanded that North Korea first renounce its nuclear programs and take tangible steps to dismantle them. I sympathize with the concern not to be bullied or blackmailed. Nobody likes to be seen as backing down. I even sympathize with the President's intense dislike of North Korean leader Kim Jong Il. There is much to dislike in the man, and even more to dislike in his regime. But what have we achieved through this policy? So far, we have gotten the end of the 1994 Agreed Framework--which had kept North Korea from reprocessing more of its spent nuclear fuel to get plutonium for nuclear weapons. We have seen international inspectors kicked out of North Korea. And now North Korea may be reprocessing its spent nuclear fuel, which could give it enough material for a half dozen more nuclear weapons. We may be making some progress, with China engaging North Korea. If we are lucky, North Korea's posturing will lead China and Russia to finally support us and bring some pressure on North Korea. But we don't know whether they can really influence a North Korea that sees itself already in the American crosshairs as part of the ``axis of evil.'' The administration talks of stopping North Korea from exporting its nuclear weapons. That worries me a little bit because it implies we have already given up on stopping them from producing them. And North Korea could just export plutonium with which to make nuclear weapons; they will be able to become the plutonium factory of the world if they keep on the road they are on now. How are we going to stop that? The plutonium needed for a nuclear weapon can fit in a briefcase. It does not even need much shielding because it is not very radioactive. The whole shipment might be bigger than a bread box, as Steve Allen used to say, but it wouldn't be much bigger. It certainly wouldn't be bigger than a trash can. Can we really stop and search every trash can leaving North Korea? What will we do if a year from now North Korea claims to have provided weapons plutonium to groups in other countries that will destroy major cities unless we do what it wants? What are we going to do about Iran, which has North Korean medium- range missiles and is moving toward the ability to enrich its own uranium? Nobody ever said that nonproliferation was easy. I don't have a silver bullet, and I don't expect the President to have one either. But don't we have to keep our eye on the ball? When conservatives opposed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, they said countries would build nuclear weapons for their own strategic reasons. That's right. It means if we want to prevent proliferation, or roll it back, we have to affect those strategic calculations. Nonproliferation policy gives us a framework for those efforts. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty gives us international support and may affect the calculations of countries whose neighbors sign and obey the treaty. The Nuclear Suppliers Group buys us more time by restricting exports of nuclear and dual-use materials and equipment. But in the end, it still comes down to influencing a country's strategic calculations. How can we influence those countries? Deterrence is one big way to influence them. Any country that builds nuclear weapons knows if they use them on us, they will very quickly cease to exist. But deterrence is still a mind game. It didn't help when the administration belittled deterrence in order to press its case for missile defense. And deterrence may not work if we say: By the way, we may still target you, even if you don't build nuclear weapons. For countries that are not our enemies, security assurances are a big way to influence them. The U.S. nuclear umbrella offers a country a lot of security at a low cost; but that umbrella may not look so good if the United States is threatening nuclear war against a large number of countries. At that point, our friends may question whether we will really be able to protect them, when we are taking on all those other countries. That is the question you hear people asking in Japan. To achieve lasting nonproliferation, we must treat the regional quarrels that drive countries to seek nuclear weapons. We did that with Argentina and Brazil. As South Africa moved away from apartheid, we were able to do that there as well. We are making a real effort to help India and Pakistan step back from the brink and have to continue that effort. But we also have to address security concerns in east Asia, including North Korea's concerns, if we are to keep that whole region from developing nuclear weapons, weaponizing the peninsula, and Japan becoming a nuclear power. We have to pursue peace in the Middle East, if we are truly going to take advantage of our military victory in Iraq. Nor is there really any alternative to working with the international community. We don't have the ability to inspect sites in Iran; the Atomic Energy Agency does have that ability. Our forces in Iraq don't have a great record in their hunt for weapons of mass destruction; the IAEA and the U.N. could help in that hunt, both by providing detailed information from past inspections and by helping to monitor sites they have visited in the past. We cannot close down proliferation traffic by ourselves. The cooperation of other countries, especially Russia and China, is essential. These are the paths to nonproliferation. They are long and difficult. We don't know whether they will succeed, but we can see where we want to go, and we can see how working these issues will help us get there. But building low-yield nuclear weapons is not a path to nonproliferation; neither is a program to do R&D on such weapons, while Defense Department officials tell people to come up with reasons to build them; neither is a program to test these weapons, which would surely be necessary to develop a new low-yield weapon, and which would just as surely be the death knell not only of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty--which I think is the objective of some--but of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the NPT. Frankly, neither is nonproliferation served by the administration's plan to field a nearly worthless missile defense system in Alaska next year, just so the President can say he did it. The push to deploy that system has been at the expense of making an effective defense. The defense will lack the radar it needs for several years, and the space- based infrared collection it needs for even more years. And the funds and equipment to deploy it are coming out of the funds and equipment needed to test it, to improve it, and to make sure it works. You have to wonder what the administration's priorities are. The path of deterrence, security assurance, nonproliferation, diplomacy, and sensible weapons development is difficult, but at least it is headed in the right direction. The path of hasty deployment of a missile defense that cannot be useful for years to come is simply foolish. The path of new nuclear weapons, new nuclear testing, and looking at nuclear weapons as something ``normal'' may be a highway paved with good intentions, but as the nuns used to make me write on the board after school when I misbehaved: The road to Hell is paved with good intentions. This is a road to disaster. We should know better than to go down it. The Feinstein-Kennedy amendment, in my view, will keep us off that dangerous highway. It deserves our support. I yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator yield me 10 seconds?

Mr. BIDEN. I want to point out company lawyers were paid $700 million per year, per year, for 5 years. Plaintiffs' lawyers had to risk $100 million of their own money.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Will the minority leader yield?

Mr. BIDEN. We have a number of amendments on this side. And when I say ``a number,'' we have more than one. We are getting time agreements on all the amendments. For the benefit of the Senate, I might tell you quickly of the major amendments that we have and the time agreements: The Durbin-Kerry, et cetera, amendment on global AIDS funding is 10 minutes equally divided. Senator Feinstein has an amendment; it is up to 30 minutes equally divided. Senator Dorgan has an amendment and has agreed to 10 minutes equally divided. Senator Kennedy has an amendment, 30 minutes equally divided. Senator Dodd has one, 20 minutes equally divided; Senator Boxer, 10 minutes equally divided. The reason I bothered to tell you that is I think we can do this. I think we can meet the objective of the majority leader to get this bill passed. People are being very cooperative. If we move like this, I think we should do it quickly.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I misspoke. The Durbin-Kerry-Biden, et al, amendment is 20 minutes equally divided.

Mr. BIDEN. I yield whatever time the Senator from Illinois needs on the remaining time.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I understand the regular order is that my amendment on debt relief would be in order now.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, the hour is extremely late. The bottom line of this is that this provides for debt relief for the very countries we are trying to help with AIDS. They are swamped by debt. It is legislation that we have been through before. My staff and I sat with the White House, the National Security Agency. We sat down with the White House today, the National Security Agency representative for hours. We negotiated the exact language. I send the amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will respond to what I know firsthand. I can only speak firsthand to the White House. It is my understanding, and it has been asserted to me, that there have been discussions with senior Republicans--I assume that that was shared by everybody, with both the speaker and with Mr. Delay, and that they had signed on to this. But I will respectfully suggest that I yield to Senator Santorum, who may be able to give you a more direct answer. I personally, for the record, have not spoken with anybody in the House of Representatives.

Mr. BIDEN. If the Senator will yield. In addition, I agreed with the White House to further amend my amendment to change the effective date, which was a very important element to the White House. They wanted the original language we had in Lugar-Biden that we moved off of to go to the House bill, and in previous language that we had in other bills, including the original bill which came out of the committee and passed out of here. It had language relating to the effective date when countries could qualify to meet the test for this. The White House wanted it tighter, wanted it more stringent. We took the better part of the afternoon, 3 or 4 hours, negotiating back and forth. We yielded on that point as well. That is the point at which the White House spokesperson from the National Security Agency said to us, ``We have a deal.'' That is when it then got scrubbed. That was even more palatable, I am told, to the speaker and the majority leader. That is as much as I can say firsthand.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, how much time is remaining?

Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, on rollcall vote No. 162, I voted nay. It was my intention to vote yea. I ask unanimous consent that I be permitted to change my vote to yea, which was the Landrieu amendment, since it will not affect the outcome of the vote.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce a Resolution expressing the sense of the Senate that the United States should declare its support for the right of the people of Kosova to determine their political future, once Kosova has made requisite progress, as defined by United Nations benchmarks, in developing democratic institutions and human rights protections. In order to put my Resolution into the proper context, I would like briefly to discuss current conditions in the successor states of the former Yugoslavia, an area which has consumed a great deal of my attention for the last decade. Much progress has been made in this former region of conflict since the fall of Serbian strongman Slobodan Milosevic in 2001 and the subsequent final dissolution of the Yugoslav federation. Slovenia has been invited to join NATO, and last week this body unanimously ratified the accession to NATO of Slovenia and six other candidate countries. Slovenia has also been invited to join the European Union next year. Two other Yugoslav successor states--Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia--have joined Albania in signing the U.S.-Adriatic Charter to cooperatively advance their candidacies for NATO membership. Both Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia have also signed EU Stabilization and Association agreements. In Macedonia, although tensions that threatened full-scale conflict just two years ago remain, the newly elected coalition government is working to implement fully the Ohrid Framework Agreement of 2001, and the European Union assumed command of peacekeeping operations from NATO on March 31, 2003. SFOR, the NATO-led international force, continues to maintain stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina in significantly smaller numbers than its original contingent. There is serious discussion about turning over command of the operation to the European Union, a move about which I have some reservations. The European Union Police Mission assumed international police monitoring duties in Bosnia and Herzegovina from the UN on January 1, 2003. The High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Paddy Ashdown, continues to oversee reform efforts and has the rightly placed special emphasis on strengthening the rule of law. Serbia and Montenegro, under pressure from the EU, agreed to a constitutional charter that would keep them loosely united for the next three years, formally ending the entity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and setting them on a long-term path toward EU membership. Nonetheless, last week Filip Vujanovic, an advocate of Montenegrin independence, won a sweeping victory in the presidential elections. The runner-up candidate also advocated independence, as does Montenegro's prime minister Milo Djukanovic. Despite this considerable progress, as a distinguished task force assembled by the Council on Foreign Relations noted in its ``Balkans 2010'' report of December 2002, the goal of regional stability and the promises of democratic transition are not yet fulfilled. ``There is still a risk of backsliding in the region: the security situation in Macedonia remains tenuous; the coalition government in Serbia is irretrievably splintered; and in Kosovo all the political parties are organized around ethnic objectives and pander to nationalist sentiment. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, meanwhile, the elections in October 2002--which resulted in presidential victories for the three main nationalist parties at the expense of their moderate competitors--demonstrated that nationalist feelings remain potent. One reason for these trends is the increasing discontent of local populations whose embrace of the West has failed to bring immediate improvements in their standard of living . . . Irredentist, criminal and anti-democratic forces will try to exploit people's frustration brought on by the difficulties inherent in transitions.'' Following the tragic assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Djindic on March 12, 2003, the government of Serbia launched a major crackdown on criminal elements and initiated much-needed defense reforms to enhance civilian control over the military. Serbian officials took an important and overdue step by handing over to UN representative in Kosova the remains of 37 ethnic Albanians believed to have been killed during Milosevic's 1998-1999 campaign. Serbia must continue to step up its cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, ICTY. The single most significant move the Serbian government could make to prove its commitment to joining the West is to arrest former Bosnian Serb General Ratko Mladic and send him to The Hague. But there are other important measures, such as opening archives and turning over requested documents to the prosecution, that Serbia must take in order to meet its international obligations. Now, I would like to turn to Kosova, the subject of my resolution. Since the end of hostilities four years ago, the peace has been kept by KFOR, an international peacekeeping force in which United States forces play a kept role and have responsibility for the southeastern sector of the province. Last year for the first time since the 1999 conflict, refugee returns outnumbered departures, with around 2,700 refugees returning to the province. UN officials predict that the numbers will increase in 2003, and the United States has committed more than $14 million this fiscal year to that end. The Housing and Property Directorate has resolved nearly 2,000 property claims to date and estimates that it will have resolved 9,000 cases by the end of 2003--about one-third of all claims filed. The Kosovo Protection Corps, the local gendarmerie, is gradually becoming more representative of the ethics diversity in Kosova and more skillful in its policing operations. Crime, and particularly inter- ethnic crime, has been significant reduced, and murders decreased in 2002 by 50 percent over the previous year. The province held elections three times in the past three years, twice for municipal seats and once to select assembly representatives, and in each case OSCE monitors deemed the elections generally free and fair. Yet much remains to be done. The refugee returns of last year represent only a small fraction of the approximately 237,000 Kosova refugees currently in Serbia, Macedonia, and Albania. Moreover, there are 22,500 internally displaced persons within Kosova who, for various reasons, including loss of property, economic shortage, and fear of retribution or persecution, have been unable or unwilling to return to their homes. Many who have returned also fear for their security, are unable to secure employment, and have little or no access to social and economic opportunities. Formal unemployment hovers around 50 percent. Without the ability to sustain themselves and provide for their families, many young Kosovars have turned to criminal activity. And Kosova continues to provide a haven for traffickers and other criminals active throughout the Balkans. The head of the UN administration, UNMIK, an experienced German diplomat named Michael Steiner, has established ``benchmarks'' to focus the agenda of Kosova's elected officials pursuant to fulfilling the mandate of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 for progress toward self-administration. These benchmarks include: the existence of effective, representative, and functioning institutions; the enforcement of the rule of law; freedom of movement; respect for the right of all Kosovars to remain and return; the development of a sound basis for a market economy; clarity of property title; normalized dialogue with Belgrade; and reduction and transformation of the Kosovo Protection Corps in line with its mandate. The UN policy of ``standards before status'' is conceptually sound. Of course, real progress requires resources, and, unfortunately, the international community has not met all of its pledge commitments, and private investment until now has been sparse. Some argue that foreign capital is hesitant to invest in Kosova as long as its future political status remains undefined. This line, however, confuses cause and effect. The reason that Kosova's final status remains in limbo is because conditions on the ground there do not yet allow the international community to allow a final status to be chosen. To be sure, there have been serious attempts to move the process along. Mr. Steiner has initiated a dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade on technical issues and has begun the process of devolving many responsibilities onto Kosova's elected Assembly. Sad to say, both ethnic Albanians and Serbs have undercut these efforts by focusing on final status, rather than on practical progress. Ethnic Albanian representatives in the Kosova Assembly have twice tried to pass a resolution calling for independence but were dissuaded by officials from the UN and the international community who rightly fear that such a move would only increase tensions in the region. Kosovar President Ibrahim Rugova has publicly ruled out any dialogue with Belgrade officials on future status. The Serbs for their part, have been equally obdurate. Earlier this year, leading Serbian officials made aggressive statements regarding Kosova, including calling on the international community to take up the final status issue and demanding that Serb army forces be allowed to return there. I scarcely need comment that the latter demand is a total non-starter. The UN Secretary General's report of April 14, 2003, noted that Belgrade continues to support parallel administrative structures in virtually all of municipalities that have a considerable Serb population in direct violation of UN Security Council 1244. Following a meeting with Kosovar Serb leaders on April 16, 2003, Serbian Prime Minister Zivkovic and Deputy Prime Minister Covic issued a statement calling the UN plan to devolve considerable powers to the democratically elected officials in Kosova ``unacceptable,'' and the government in Belgrade is reportedly setting up a Serbian state council to deal with administrative issues in the ethnic Serb communities in Kosova. So what should we do? there are some who believe we should throw in the towel and declare support for one side or the other. I believe that those who would call for the United States to support either independence for Kosova, or reintegration of Kosova with Serbia, are prescribing a cure worse that the disease, however noble their intentions. When in doubt it is always wise to fall back upon basic principles. In this case, the basic principle of democracy is self-determination. And self-determination can best be expressed through a referendum, but only after the local Kosova authorities, with the help of the international community, fulfill the United Nations benchmarks. Let me be perfectly clear about the practical side of the issue. The demographics of Kosova, and the pro-independence stand of all the ethnic Albanian political leaders and parties there, make a future vote for independence nearly inevitable. If that is the will of the people of Kosova when conditions warrant their making a choice, then I will wholeheartedly support it. But no rationale of catering to immediate economic expediency outweighs the damage a unilateral declaration of independence, or Congressional support thereof, would do to the international regime in Kosova--especially to the credibility of the United Nations Mission there--or to the promising, but fragile crackdown on criminal elements by the new Zivkovic government in Serbia. The stakes of Balkan stability are simple too high to put the cart before the horse. In order to meet the UN benchmarks, the leaders of Kosova from all ethnic communities must accelerate the process of building a fully functioning democracy that respects human rights and the rule of law. Agreeing to a process for settling the status issue will give them the political incentive and procedural basis to do so. The Sense of the Senate resolution I have proposed recognizes the danger that an unnecessary delay in resolution of Kosova's final status would pose. But it also recognizes that the precondition for resolving the final status issue through self- determination is a democratic government in Kosova in which human rights, including the rights of religious and ethnic minorities, are respected. Therefore, the Resolution calls for holding a referendum on final status, once requisite progress has been made toward meeting the UN benchmarks, endorses continued cooperation with other international organizations, and supports continued U.S. economic assistance to encourage further development. Rebuilding a society shattered by a vicious war is a frustrating, time-consuming effort. There is an undeniable temptation to heed the siren song of a declaration of independence. But short-term gratification usually leads to more severe long-term problems, and the case of Kosova is no exception. The international cooperative efforts of KFOR, the UN, the OSCE, and various other governmental and non- governmental bodies are making slow but steady progress. We should continue down this path, which is precisely what my Resolution advocates. I hope other members will join me in supporting the people of Kosova in their efforts, through concrete political and social progress, to advance a decision on their final political status.