Joe Biden

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. I really appreciate the courtesy, and this is really the last thing I will say. I realize, and I don't think other people here do--I realize my friend is not ``against rail.'' He has said to me, I don't know how many times over the years: Why can't we work something out, Joe, that funds the places needed, the dense populations, the Northeast corridor? But the rest of this apparatus is bleeding us to death. And you have inefficiencies even in the corridor. Why don't we work that out? What I am saying to my friend, and I say it sincerely, he is right in this respect. We should either decide what we mean by Amtrak, that it is the Northeast corridor and West Coast system and that's it, or we should decide it is a national system and we are going to pay the price. We should decide what it is. He is right about that debate. Let's have that debate. Whatever it comes out, in terms of reorganization, let's then make sure it can function. I wasn't being smart with my friend. I am sincere when I say I know he is not ``against rail.'' He is against what he believes to be--and in many cases is right--total inefficiency and outrageous subsidies. That's the only way we have been able to keep the Northeast corridor going, because we had to get everyone from Texas to West Virginia and Minnesota to vote for it.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, as another semester begins, many college students are worrying not only about their course loads and class work, but about how they will pay for school. Today, the average cost of room, board and tuition at a public four-year college has jumped to over $9,000. Tuition and fees alone jumped 9.6 percent from last year. The average cost of room, board and tuition at a private four-year college has jumped to just over $25,000 with tuition and fees having risen 5.8 percent. What do the rising costs of attending a college or university mean for American families? It means that despite their best efforts to save and plan ahead, hard working families have to spend a larger percentage of their income than ever before to send their children to school. To attend my alma mater, the University of Delaware, it costs nearly 20 percent of a Delaware family's average annual income to cover costs. In fact just a few months ago, tuition was increased from the Fall to Spring semester by $120 to make up for an expected $3.1 cut in state aid to the university. If a Delaware family wants to send their child to a private university, approximately 50 percent of their income is required. To help counteract these spiraling costs, I come to the floor today to reintroduce ``The Tuition Assistance for Families Act,'' a comprehensive package of tax credits and deductions, grants and scholarships that will assist American families in sending their children to college. Building upon the previous efforts of mine and others, this legislation will provide more families with much needed assistance so that the decision to send one's child to school will not be overshadowed by the decision of how to pay for it. Specifically, the ``Tuition Assistance for Families Act'' will raise the current tuition tax deduction for higher education expenses from $3,000 to $12,000. Based on legislation that I previously sponsored with Senator Schumer, this $9,000 increase will go a long way in helping middle class American families afford tuition. The ``Tuition Assistance for Families Act'' expands tuition tax credits already in law, the Hope Scholarship and the Lifetime Learning Tax Credit. Currently, the Lifetime Learning Credit allows a 20 percent tax credit on the first $10,000 of one's higher education expenses. Under my bill, this percentage jumps to 25 percent while the amount of expenses subjected to the credit rises to $12,000. This means that a student who files a return in tax year 2003 under my plan could get up to $3,000 back in taxes. This is $1,000 more than the $2,000 maximum allowable credit available under current law. That means that under my plan, up to an additional $1,000 can go directly back into a student's pocket to pay for books, a computer or tuition. To maximize the utility of the tax credits, my bill also raises the income limits for both the Hope Scholarship and the Lifetime Learning Credit to up to $130,000 per family, per year. This will allow more families to access the help that they need. My bill reintroduces the idea of a $1,000 merit scholarship to be awarded to each high school senior graduating in the top 5 percent of his or her class. These types of scholarships not only reward student achievement, they help to ensure that the best and brightest students have the ability to go on to college thereby increasing the pool of well-qualified Americans in the workforce. Finally, the ``Tuition Assistance for Families Act'' will increase the maximum Pell Grant award from $4,000 to $4,500. During the 2001- 2002 school year, the maximum Pell Grant award covered approximately 42 percent of the average tuition, room and board at a public four-year university. During the 1975-76 it covered 84 percent of these same costs. Clearly, the purchasing power of these grants has declined dramatically over the years. As such, the debt load of American students and American families has increased as students have looked to federal and private loans to finance their education. Shockingly but not surprisingly, 64 percent of today's college students graduate with student loan debt at an average of $16,928, double the debt load of 1994. It is the dream of every American parent to provide for their child a better life than they had themselves. Part of doing this involves sending your kids to college. This is why I have spent a great deal of my time in the Senate fighting to provide tax relief for middle class American families struggling with college costs. And while I was pleased when some of the ideas I advocated were adopted in the 1997 tax cut bill, it is clear that as tuition costs rise dramatically, Americans need additional assistance. The ``Tuition Assistance for Families Act'' will provide extra help so that more families can afford to give their children a brighter and better future. The ``Tuition Assistance for Families Act'' goes one step further in committing the federal government to making college more affordable for Americans. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, as another semester begins, many college students are worrying not only about their course loads and class work, but about how they will pay for school. Today, the average cost of room, board and tuition at a public four-year college has jumped to over $9,000. Tuition and fees alone jumped 9.6 percent from last year. The average cost of room, board and tuition at a private four-year college has jumped to just over $25,000 with tuition and fees having risen 5.8 percent. What do the rising costs of attending a college or university mean for American families? It means that despite their best efforts to save and plan ahead, hard working families have to spend a larger percentage of their income than ever before to send their children to school. To attend my alma mater, the University of Delaware, it costs nearly 20 percent of a Delaware family's average annual income to cover costs. In fact just a few months ago, tuition was increased from the Fall to Spring semester by $120 to make up for an expected $3.1 cut in state aid to the university. If a Delaware family wants to send their child to a private university, approximately 50 percent of their income is required. To help counteract these spiraling costs, I come to the floor today to reintroduce ``The Tuition Assistance for Families Act,'' a comprehensive package of tax credits and deductions, grants and scholarships that will assist American families in sending their children to college. Building upon the previous efforts of mine and others, this legislation will provide more families with much needed assistance so that the decision to send one's child to school will not be overshadowed by the decision of how to pay for it. Specifically, the ``Tuition Assistance for Families Act'' will raise the current tuition tax deduction for higher education expenses from $3,000 to $12,000. Based on legislation that I previously sponsored with Senator Schumer, this $9,000 increase will go a long way in helping middle class American families afford tuition. The ``Tuition Assistance for Families Act'' expands tuition tax credits already in law, the Hope Scholarship and the Lifetime Learning Tax Credit. Currently, the Lifetime Learning Credit allows a 20 percent tax credit on the first $10,000 of one's higher education expenses. Under my bill, this percentage jumps to 25 percent while the amount of expenses subjected to the credit rises to $12,000. This means that a student who files a return in tax year 2003 under my plan could get up to $3,000 back in taxes. This is $1,000 more than the $2,000 maximum allowable credit available under current law. That means that under my plan, up to an additional $1,000 can go directly back into a student's pocket to pay for books, a computer or tuition. To maximize the utility of the tax credits, my bill also raises the income limits for both the Hope Scholarship and the Lifetime Learning Credit to up to $130,000 per family, per year. This will allow more families to access the help that they need. My bill reintroduces the idea of a $1,000 merit scholarship to be awarded to each high school senior graduating in the top 5 percent of his or her class. These types of scholarships not only reward student achievement, they help to ensure that the best and brightest students have the ability to go on to college thereby increasing the pool of well-qualified Americans in the workforce. Finally, the ``Tuition Assistance for Families Act'' will increase the maximum Pell Grant award from $4,000 to $4,500. During the 2001- 2002 school year, the maximum Pell Grant award covered approximately 42 percent of the average tuition, room and board at a public four-year university. During the 1975-76 it covered 84 percent of these same costs. Clearly, the purchasing power of these grants has declined dramatically over the years. As such, the debt load of American students and American families has increased as students have looked to federal and private loans to finance their education. Shockingly but not surprisingly, 64 percent of today's college students graduate with student loan debt at an average of $16,928, double the debt load of 1994. It is the dream of every American parent to provide for their child a better life than they had themselves. Part of doing this involves sending your kids to college. This is why I have spent a great deal of my time in the Senate fighting to provide tax relief for middle class American families struggling with college costs. And while I was pleased when some of the ideas I advocated were adopted in the 1997 tax cut bill, it is clear that as tuition costs rise dramatically, Americans need additional assistance. The ``Tuition Assistance for Families Act'' will provide extra help so that more families can afford to give their children a brighter and better future. The ``Tuition Assistance for Families Act'' goes one step further in committing the federal government to making college more affordable for Americans. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise along with the distinguished Senior Senator from Pennsylvania, Senator Specter, to introduce the DNA Sexual Assault Justice Act of 2003, a bill that guarantees prompt justice to victims of sexual assault crimes through DNA technology. This bill is not new to my colleagues. Last session, I introduced the DNA Sexual Assault Justice Act with Senators Specter, Cantwell, Clinton, and Schumer. The bill was voted favorably out of the Judiciary Committee with the key support of my good friend across the aisle, Senator Specter. And in September, with twenty co-sponsors, Republicans and Democrats, the DNA Sexual Assault Justice Act unanimously passed the Senate. Regrettably, our House counterparts were not able to act so quickly or decisively on a DNA bill, so I am back to re-introduce the bill and to urge quick passage of the DNA Sexual Assault Justice Act of 2003. I am pleased that, once again, this bill has strong bipartisan support and I look forward to working with my good friend from Utah, the distinguished Senior Senator, Senator Hatch, in acting promptly in marking up this bill when he assumes chairmanship of the Judiciary Committee. Promoting and supporting DNA technology as a crime-fighting tool is not a new endeavor for me. A provision of my 1994 Crime Bill created the Combined DNA Index System, called ``CODIS'', which is an electronic database of DNA profiles, much like the FBI's fingerprint database. CODIS includes two kinds of DNA information, convicted offender DNA samples and DNA from crime scenes. CODIS uses the two indexes to generate investigative leads in crimes where biological evidence is recovered from the scene. In essence, CODIS facilitates the DNA match. And once that match is made a crime is solved because of the incredible accuracy and durability of DNA evidence. 99.9 percent--that is how accurate DNA evidence is. 1 in 30 billion, those are the odds someone else committed a crime if a suspect's DNA matches evidence at the crime scene. 20 or 30 years, that is how long DNA evidence from a crime scene lasts. Just ten years ago DNA analysis of evidence could have cost thousands of dollars and taken months; now testing one sample costs $40 and can take days. Ten years ago forensic scientists needed blood the size of a bottle cap, now DNA testing can be done on a sample the size of a pinhead. The changes in DNA technology are remarkable, and mark a sea change in how we can fight crime, particularly sexual assault crimes. The FBI reports that since 1998 the national DNA database has helped put away violent criminals in 6,257 investigations in 40 States. How? By matching the DNA crime evidence to the DNA profiles of offenders. Individual success stories of DNA ``cold hits'' in sexual assault cases make these numbers all too real. Just last month, Alabama authorities charged a man in the rape of an 85-year-old woman almost ten years ago after he was linked to the case by a DNA sample he was compelled to submit while in prison on unrelated charges. In Colorado Springs, CO, a trial will soon begin of a man accused of at least fourteen rapes and sexual assaults. Due to the national DNA database, prosecutors were able to trace the defendant to rapes and assaults that occurred in Colorado, California, Arizona, Nevada and Oklahoma between 1999 and 2002. In Florida, Kellie Green was brutally attacked and raped in the laundry room of her apartment complex. Because of lack of funds, her rape kit sat on the shelf for three years until a persistent detective had it analyzed. The evidence matched the profile of a man already incarcerated for beating and raping a woman 6 weeks before Kellie. Or take, for example, a 1996 case in St. Louis where two young girls were abducted from bus stops and raped at opposite ends of the city. The police were unable to identify a suspect. In 1999, the police decided to re-run the DNA testing to develop new leads. In January 2000, the DNA database matched the case to a 1999 rape case, and police were able to identify the perpetrator. Last spring, the New York Police Department arrested a man linked to the rape of a woman years ago. In 1997, a woman was horribly beaten, robbed and raped, there were no suspects. Five years later, the perpetrator submitted a DNA sample as a condition of probation after serving time for burglary. The DNA sample matched the DNA from the 1997 rape. Crime solved, streets safer. Undoubtedly, DNA matching by comparing evidence gathered at the crime scene with offender samples entered on the national DNA database has proven to be the deciding factor in solving stranger sexual assault cases--it has revolutionized the criminal justice system, and brought closure and justice for victims. In light of the past successes and the future potential of DNA evidence, the reports about the backlog of untested rape kits and other crime scene evidence waiting in police warehouses are simply shocking. It is a national problem, plaguing both urban and rural areas, that deserves national attention and solutions. One woman, in particular, has reminded State and Federal lawmakers that we cannot ignore even one rape kit sitting on a shelf gathering dust, Debbie Smith. In 1989, Mrs. Smith was brutally taken from her home and raped. There were no known suspects and Mrs. Smith lived in fear of her attacker's return. Six years later, the Virginia crime laboratory discovered a DNA match between the rape scene evidence and a State prisoner's DNA sample. Mrs. Smith had her first moment of real security and closure and since then, she has traveled the country to advocate on behalf of assault victims and champion the use of DNA to fight sexual assault. I am pleased that the DNA Sexual Assault Justice Act of 2003 bears a provision entitled, ``The Debbie Smith DNA Backlog Grants.'' Today I am introducing legislation, ``The DNA Sexual Assault Justice Act of 2003'', to strengthen the existing Federal DNA regime as an effective crimefighting tool. My bill addresses five pressing issues. First, exactly how bad is the backlog of untested rape kits nationwide? A 1999 government report found over 180,000 rape kits were sitting, untested, on the storage shelves of police department and crime laboratories all across the country. While recent press reports estimate that the number today is approaching 500,000 untested rape kits, I am told that there are no current, accurate numbers of the backlog. Behind every single one of those rape kits is a victim who deserves recognition and justice. Accordingly, my legislation would require the Attorney General to survey law enforcement agencies nationwide to assess the extent of the backlog of rape kits waiting to undergo DNA testing. To combat the problem of rape kit backlogs, it is imperative to know the real numbers, and how best to utilize Federal resources. Second, how can existing Federal law be strengthened to make sure that State crime labs have the funds for the critical DNA analysis needed to solve sex assault cases? To fight crime most effectively, we must both test rape kits and enter convicted offender DNA samples into the DNA database. There has been explosive growth in the use of forensic sciences by law enforcement. A government survey found that in 2000 alone, crime labs received 31,000 cases--a 47 percent increase from almost 21,000 cases in 1999. In addition, the labs received 177,000 convicted offender DNA samples, an almost 77 percent increase from 100,242 samples in 1999. The backlog in DNA testing is found all across the country. Last month a Michigan newspaper reported that its State police forensic unit is expected to have a 10-year backlog of items in need of DNA testing. Similar news reports are elsewhere. The Florida crime lab system is facing a backlog of more than 2,400 rape, murder and assault and burglary cases with DNA evidence waiting for testing. In North Carolina, up to 20,000 rape kit tests sit on evidence shelves because the lab does not have the resources to conduct timely DNA testing. Many crime laboratories report personnel shortages in the face of this overwhelming work. According to a government survey, on average, there are 6 employees in a State crime lab, a lab that must not only conduct DNA testing for hundreds of cases, but also run forensic tests on blood, footprints or ballistic evidence. The bill I'm introducing would: 1. Increase current funding levels to both test rape kits and to process and upload offender samples; and 2. allow local governments to apply directly to the Justice Department for these grants. I thank my colleagues Senators Kohl and DeWine who began this effort with the DNA Backlog Elimination Act of 2000 and acknowledge their ongoing interest in this area. Third, what assistance does the FBI need to keep up with the crushing number of DNA samples which need to be tested or stored in the national database? I am told that the current national DNA database, ``CODIS'', is nearing capacity of convicted offender DNA samples. My bill would provide funds to the FBI to 1. Upgrade the national DNA computer database to handle the huge projections of samples; and 2. process and upload Federal convicted offender DNA samples into the database. Efforts to include more Federal and State convicted offenders in our database just makes plain sense to fight crime. We know that sexual assault is a crime with one of the highest rates of recidivism, and that many sexual assault crimes are committed by those with past convictions for other kinds of crime. Their DNA samples from prior convictions help law enforcement efforts enormously. We cannot wait; the 2001 FBI crime records show that one forcible rape occurs every 5.8 minutes, and the most recent reports from the first six months of 2002 indicate a 1.8 percent increase in the number of rapes as compared to 2001 statistics. Fourth, what additional tools are needed to help treat victims of sexual assault? One group that understands the importance of gathering credible DNA evidence are forensic sexual assault examiners, who are sensitive to the trauma of this horrible crime and make sure that patients are not revictimized in the aftermath. These programs should be in each and every emergency room and play an integral role in police departments to bridge the gap between the law and the medicine. I first recognized the importance of sexual assault nurse examiners in solving rape cases when I authored the Violence Against Women Act. A key provision in the Violence Against Women Act requires the Attorney General to evaluate and recommend standards for training and practice for licensed health care professionals performing sexual assault forensic exams. So I knew that any DNA bill aimed at ending sexual assault must include resources for sexual forensic examiners, and not just one type. My bill ensures that sexual forensic nurses, doctors, and response teams are all eligible for assistance. Tapping the power of DNA requires well-trained law enforcement who know how to collect and preserve DNA evidence from the crime scene. Training should be a matter of course for all law enforcement. No rape kit evidence will lead to the perpetrator if the DNA evidence is collected improperly. The DNA Sexual Assault Justice Act would create a new grant program to carry out sexual assault examiner programs and training. And it would train law enforcement personnel and prosecutors in the handling of sexual assault cases, including drug-facilitated assaults, and the collection and use of DNA samples for use as forensic evidence at trial. Fifth, what can be done to ensure that sexual assault offenders who cannot be identified by their victim are nevertheless brought to justice? Profound injustice is done to rape victims when delayed DNA testing leads to a ``cold hit'' after the statute of limitations has expired. For example, Jeri Elster was brutally raped in her California home, and for years the police were unable to solve the crime. Seven years later, DNA from the rape matched a man in jail for an unrelated crime. Yet the rapist was never charged, convicted or sentenced because California's statute of limitations had expired the previous year. The DNA Sexual Assault Justice Act of 2003 would change current law to authorize Federal ``John Doe/DNA indictments'' that will permit Federal prosecutors to issue an indictment identifying an unknown defendant by his DNA profile within the five year statute of limitations. Once outstanding, the DNA indictment would permit prosecution at anytime once there was a DNA ``cold hit'' through the national DNA database system. John Doe/DNA indictments strike the right balance between encouraging swift and efficient investigations, recognizing the durability and credibility of DNA evidence and preventing an injustice if a cold hit happens years after the crime. Criminal law must catch up with DNA technology without the wholesale eradication of prevailing statutes of limitations. I started looking at the issue of improved prosecution of sexual assault crimes almost two decades ago when I began drafting the Violence Against Women Act. The DNA Sexual Justice Act of 2003 is the next step, a way to connect the dots between the extraordinary strides in DNA technology and my commitment to ending violence against women. We must ensure that justice delayed is not justice denied. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise along with the distinguished Senior Senator from Pennsylvania, Senator Specter, to introduce the DNA Sexual Assault Justice Act of 2003, a bill that guarantees prompt justice to victims of sexual assault crimes through DNA technology. This bill is not new to my colleagues. Last session, I introduced the DNA Sexual Assault Justice Act with Senators Specter, Cantwell, Clinton, and Schumer. The bill was voted favorably out of the Judiciary Committee with the key support of my good friend across the aisle, Senator Specter. And in September, with twenty co-sponsors, Republicans and Democrats, the DNA Sexual Assault Justice Act unanimously passed the Senate. Regrettably, our House counterparts were not able to act so quickly or decisively on a DNA bill, so I am back to re-introduce the bill and to urge quick passage of the DNA Sexual Assault Justice Act of 2003. I am pleased that, once again, this bill has strong bipartisan support and I look forward to working with my good friend from Utah, the distinguished Senior Senator, Senator Hatch, in acting promptly in marking up this bill when he assumes chairmanship of the Judiciary Committee. Promoting and supporting DNA technology as a crime-fighting tool is not a new endeavor for me. A provision of my 1994 Crime Bill created the Combined DNA Index System, called ``CODIS'', which is an electronic database of DNA profiles, much like the FBI's fingerprint database. CODIS includes two kinds of DNA information, convicted offender DNA samples and DNA from crime scenes. CODIS uses the two indexes to generate investigative leads in crimes where biological evidence is recovered from the scene. In essence, CODIS facilitates the DNA match. And once that match is made a crime is solved because of the incredible accuracy and durability of DNA evidence. 99.9 percent--that is how accurate DNA evidence is. 1 in 30 billion, those are the odds someone else committed a crime if a suspect's DNA matches evidence at the crime scene. 20 or 30 years, that is how long DNA evidence from a crime scene lasts. Just ten years ago DNA analysis of evidence could have cost thousands of dollars and taken months; now testing one sample costs $40 and can take days. Ten years ago forensic scientists needed blood the size of a bottle cap, now DNA testing can be done on a sample the size of a pinhead. The changes in DNA technology are remarkable, and mark a sea change in how we can fight crime, particularly sexual assault crimes. The FBI reports that since 1998 the national DNA database has helped put away violent criminals in 6,257 investigations in 40 States. How? By matching the DNA crime evidence to the DNA profiles of offenders. Individual success stories of DNA ``cold hits'' in sexual assault cases make these numbers all too real. Just last month, Alabama authorities charged a man in the rape of an 85-year-old woman almost ten years ago after he was linked to the case by a DNA sample he was compelled to submit while in prison on unrelated charges. In Colorado Springs, CO, a trial will soon begin of a man accused of at least fourteen rapes and sexual assaults. Due to the national DNA database, prosecutors were able to trace the defendant to rapes and assaults that occurred in Colorado, California, Arizona, Nevada and Oklahoma between 1999 and 2002. In Florida, Kellie Green was brutally attacked and raped in the laundry room of her apartment complex. Because of lack of funds, her rape kit sat on the shelf for three years until a persistent detective had it analyzed. The evidence matched the profile of a man already incarcerated for beating and raping a woman 6 weeks before Kellie. Or take, for example, a 1996 case in St. Louis where two young girls were abducted from bus stops and raped at opposite ends of the city. The police were unable to identify a suspect. In 1999, the police decided to re-run the DNA testing to develop new leads. In January 2000, the DNA database matched the case to a 1999 rape case, and police were able to identify the perpetrator. Last spring, the New York Police Department arrested a man linked to the rape of a woman years ago. In 1997, a woman was horribly beaten, robbed and raped, there were no suspects. Five years later, the perpetrator submitted a DNA sample as a condition of probation after serving time for burglary. The DNA sample matched the DNA from the 1997 rape. Crime solved, streets safer. Undoubtedly, DNA matching by comparing evidence gathered at the crime scene with offender samples entered on the national DNA database has proven to be the deciding factor in solving stranger sexual assault cases--it has revolutionized the criminal justice system, and brought closure and justice for victims. In light of the past successes and the future potential of DNA evidence, the reports about the backlog of untested rape kits and other crime scene evidence waiting in police warehouses are simply shocking. It is a national problem, plaguing both urban and rural areas, that deserves national attention and solutions. One woman, in particular, has reminded State and Federal lawmakers that we cannot ignore even one rape kit sitting on a shelf gathering dust, Debbie Smith. In 1989, Mrs. Smith was brutally taken from her home and raped. There were no known suspects and Mrs. Smith lived in fear of her attacker's return. Six years later, the Virginia crime laboratory discovered a DNA match between the rape scene evidence and a State prisoner's DNA sample. Mrs. Smith had her first moment of real security and closure and since then, she has traveled the country to advocate on behalf of assault victims and champion the use of DNA to fight sexual assault. I am pleased that the DNA Sexual Assault Justice Act of 2003 bears a provision entitled, ``The Debbie Smith DNA Backlog Grants.'' Today I am introducing legislation, ``The DNA Sexual Assault Justice Act of 2003'', to strengthen the existing Federal DNA regime as an effective crimefighting tool. My bill addresses five pressing issues. First, exactly how bad is the backlog of untested rape kits nationwide? A 1999 government report found over 180,000 rape kits were sitting, untested, on the storage shelves of police department and crime laboratories all across the country. While recent press reports estimate that the number today is approaching 500,000 untested rape kits, I am told that there are no current, accurate numbers of the backlog. Behind every single one of those rape kits is a victim who deserves recognition and justice. Accordingly, my legislation would require the Attorney General to survey law enforcement agencies nationwide to assess the extent of the backlog of rape kits waiting to undergo DNA testing. To combat the problem of rape kit backlogs, it is imperative to know the real numbers, and how best to utilize Federal resources. Second, how can existing Federal law be strengthened to make sure that State crime labs have the funds for the critical DNA analysis needed to solve sex assault cases? To fight crime most effectively, we must both test rape kits and enter convicted offender DNA samples into the DNA database. There has been explosive growth in the use of forensic sciences by law enforcement. A government survey found that in 2000 alone, crime labs received 31,000 cases--a 47 percent increase from almost 21,000 cases in 1999. In addition, the labs received 177,000 convicted offender DNA samples, an almost 77 percent increase from 100,242 samples in 1999. The backlog in DNA testing is found all across the country. Last month a Michigan newspaper reported that its State police forensic unit is expected to have a 10-year backlog of items in need of DNA testing. Similar news reports are elsewhere. The Florida crime lab system is facing a backlog of more than 2,400 rape, murder and assault and burglary cases with DNA evidence waiting for testing. In North Carolina, up to 20,000 rape kit tests sit on evidence shelves because the lab does not have the resources to conduct timely DNA testing. Many crime laboratories report personnel shortages in the face of this overwhelming work. According to a government survey, on average, there are 6 employees in a State crime lab, a lab that must not only conduct DNA testing for hundreds of cases, but also run forensic tests on blood, footprints or ballistic evidence. The bill I'm introducing would: 1. Increase current funding levels to both test rape kits and to process and upload offender samples; and 2. allow local governments to apply directly to the Justice Department for these grants. I thank my colleagues Senators Kohl and DeWine who began this effort with the DNA Backlog Elimination Act of 2000 and acknowledge their ongoing interest in this area. Third, what assistance does the FBI need to keep up with the crushing number of DNA samples which need to be tested or stored in the national database? I am told that the current national DNA database, ``CODIS'', is nearing capacity of convicted offender DNA samples. My bill would provide funds to the FBI to 1. Upgrade the national DNA computer database to handle the huge projections of samples; and 2. process and upload Federal convicted offender DNA samples into the database. Efforts to include more Federal and State convicted offenders in our database just makes plain sense to fight crime. We know that sexual assault is a crime with one of the highest rates of recidivism, and that many sexual assault crimes are committed by those with past convictions for other kinds of crime. Their DNA samples from prior convictions help law enforcement efforts enormously. We cannot wait; the 2001 FBI crime records show that one forcible rape occurs every 5.8 minutes, and the most recent reports from the first six months of 2002 indicate a 1.8 percent increase in the number of rapes as compared to 2001 statistics. Fourth, what additional tools are needed to help treat victims of sexual assault? One group that understands the importance of gathering credible DNA evidence are forensic sexual assault examiners, who are sensitive to the trauma of this horrible crime and make sure that patients are not revictimized in the aftermath. These programs should be in each and every emergency room and play an integral role in police departments to bridge the gap between the law and the medicine. I first recognized the importance of sexual assault nurse examiners in solving rape cases when I authored the Violence Against Women Act. A key provision in the Violence Against Women Act requires the Attorney General to evaluate and recommend standards for training and practice for licensed health care professionals performing sexual assault forensic exams. So I knew that any DNA bill aimed at ending sexual assault must include resources for sexual forensic examiners, and not just one type. My bill ensures that sexual forensic nurses, doctors, and response teams are all eligible for assistance. Tapping the power of DNA requires well-trained law enforcement who know how to collect and preserve DNA evidence from the crime scene. Training should be a matter of course for all law enforcement. No rape kit evidence will lead to the perpetrator if the DNA evidence is collected improperly. The DNA Sexual Assault Justice Act would create a new grant program to carry out sexual assault examiner programs and training. And it would train law enforcement personnel and prosecutors in the handling of sexual assault cases, including drug-facilitated assaults, and the collection and use of DNA samples for use as forensic evidence at trial. Fifth, what can be done to ensure that sexual assault offenders who cannot be identified by their victim are nevertheless brought to justice? Profound injustice is done to rape victims when delayed DNA testing leads to a ``cold hit'' after the statute of limitations has expired. For example, Jeri Elster was brutally raped in her California home, and for years the police were unable to solve the crime. Seven years later, DNA from the rape matched a man in jail for an unrelated crime. Yet the rapist was never charged, convicted or sentenced because California's statute of limitations had expired the previous year. The DNA Sexual Assault Justice Act of 2003 would change current law to authorize Federal ``John Doe/DNA indictments'' that will permit Federal prosecutors to issue an indictment identifying an unknown defendant by his DNA profile within the five year statute of limitations. Once outstanding, the DNA indictment would permit prosecution at anytime once there was a DNA ``cold hit'' through the national DNA database system. John Doe/DNA indictments strike the right balance between encouraging swift and efficient investigations, recognizing the durability and credibility of DNA evidence and preventing an injustice if a cold hit happens years after the crime. Criminal law must catch up with DNA technology without the wholesale eradication of prevailing statutes of limitations. I started looking at the issue of improved prosecution of sexual assault crimes almost two decades ago when I began drafting the Violence Against Women Act. The DNA Sexual Justice Act of 2003 is the next step, a way to connect the dots between the extraordinary strides in DNA technology and my commitment to ending violence against women. We must ensure that justice delayed is not justice denied. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, like many important decisions in the Senate, we are today faced with something of a Hobson's choice. I agree that the consolidation of agencies currently responsible for securing the homeland will, if done right, result in greater security for the Nation and I support establishing a Department of Homeland Security. But, in my view, it would be better for us if we were implementing this massive government reorganization more gradually. We are shifting close to 200,000 workers under the new homeland security umbrella in this bill, and it would make more sense to do so in stages. Here we are trying to do too much at once and, if history is any guide, we will be back at this department many, many times in the years to come with amendments designed to fix what we enacted in haste this year. What we are left with is the choice of doing nothing, or taking the next best option of passing this bill and launching a new Federal agency. After careful thought, I come to the conclusion that passing this flawed bill is better than doing nothing. Consider our current structure. Today, homeland security responsibilities are spread among over 100 different government agencies. The structure of the Treasury Department provides a good example of the problem. That agency houses the U.S. Customs Service, an agency tasked with monitoring the shipping containers that come into our country. Keeping the Customs Service in the agency concerned primarily with fiscal matters makes little sense when Customs' primary mission should know be safeguarding those imports. Or consider the Coast Guard, an agency in charge of patrolling our borders. The Coast Guard currently reports to the Secretary of Transportation. The Immigration and Naturalization Service is tasked with enforcing our immigration laws and securing our borders, yet its director reports to the Nation's chief law enforcement officer, the Attorney General. These examples are just the beginning. The need for reorganization is clear. Modern management principles teach that the agencies and functions of government should be grouped together based on their major purposes and missions, and the bill before us accomplishes that goal. Once it is fully implemented, the Department of Homeland Security will be the one Federal agency with the responsibility of securing our borders, safeguarding our transportation systems, and defending our critical infrastructures. One agency will be charged with synthesizing and analyzing intelligence related to homeland security. One agency will be responsible for equipping and training the police officers, firefighters, and emergency medical technicians who are often the first to respond to a terrorist incident. These are constructive organizational changes, ones that I am hopeful will help us better defend the country against attack. But should we be rushing their implementation without thoughtful consideration? During debate on this measure I voted in favor of an amendment offered by Senator Byrd that would have required the Congress and the Administration to work together to develop a staged implementation of the new homeland security agency, an implementation far more deliberate than the one we consider today. I am sorry Senator Byrd's amendment was not adopted. Without Senator Byrd's approach, I fear we are doing things in reverse and I predict we will have to revisit this new Department's structure several times before we get it right. The government reorganization most similar to the one we consider today provides a guide. In 1947, we enacted the National Security Act and created the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Council. That approach still had to be revisited several more times, in 1949, 1953, 1958, and 1986, to perfect the structure. Given the choice we now face, between the current state of homeland security disorganization and this bill's approach, I am forced to vote in favor of the bill. I do so with the understanding that vigorous congressional oversight of the new agency will be critical to insure it is not only accomplishing its primary mission of protecting our Nation but also to guarantee that the vast new authorities we give to the President here are not abused. I will be watching to see if the administration abuses its authority over workers in this new Department. We must be wary of the potential politicization of our workforce. The employees of the new Department must be highly dedicated professionals, free from political pressure. We must be certain that the most expert and experienced employees are free to speak their minds and to act quickly and aggressively to defend our national security. They must not be looking over their shoulders, concerned about the ins and outs of Washington politics. They must be safe from the kinds of influence that could cause them to slant their analysis or trim their opinions to fit what is popular. I will be watchful that the employees of the new Department are free from the threat of political retaliation, and secure in their jobs so that they can perform their important tasks to the highest professional standards. I support the creation of a Department of Homeland Security, and I will vote in favor of this bill today. The increased coordination and communication that may result from the new governing structures created in this bill could, if properly implemented, provide the Nation with vastly improved security. But because of the speed with which we considered this proposal, the rapid, sweeping reorganization it immediately envisions, and the prospect for abuse in several of its provisions, I fear this bill will need to be revisited several times and its implementation will need to be closely monitored by Congress if we hope to get it right. I will be closely watching the new agency's creation, and I hope each of my colleagues does the same.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, it is with mixed feelings that I rise to speak on the HIV/AIDS bill that the Senate passed by unanimous consent tonight. This is the second time this year that the Senate passed a bill to combat the spread of HIV/AIDS overseas. As you recall, in July we unanimously passed a comprehensive bill to fight the deadly disease. The bill contained new authorities for the Department of Health and Human Services, authorized money for a contribution to the Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to enter into negotiations to improve the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative, and authorized funds for our bilateral assistance programs at the Agency for International Development. The funding levels and authorities provided in the bill the Senate passed in July reflected an understanding of the enormity of the problem, what it will take to address it, and the Senate's dedication to doing so. Unfortunately, our colleagues in the House of Representatives had neither the understanding nor the will to consider all of the provisions in the bill. Instead, the Republican led House slow rolled conversations and negotiations on the bill for so long that four months later we were still unable to come to an agreement on the original provisions in the Senate passed bill. What we are left with is a stripped down version of what the Senate passed. Our original bill authorized $2.172 billion in fiscal year 2003 and $2.576 billion in fiscal year 2004. The House insisted that we slash the title containing Health and Human Services authorities. The only version of the bill they would agree to authorizes a billion dollars less in fiscal year 2003 to fight HIV/AIDS overseas. The Senate provided $1 billion for the Global Fund to Combat AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria this fiscal year, giving a clear indication that we believe that the Fund is an important mechanism through which to meet the resource needs of countries highly affected by the disease. The compromise with the House authorizes $250 million less in fiscal year 2003. The Senate legislation included a bill I introduced in April which authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to move forward with negotiations for deeper debt relief for poor countries--especially those facing a health crisis like HIV/AIDS. More debt relief provides poor countries more resources to devote to healthcare. The House insisted that we eliminate even Sense of Congress language about debt relief from the bill despite the fact that it is now clear--and the World Bank itself has recently announced--that unless the current debt relief program is enhanced, the debt levels of those poor countries will remain too high. How can we expect to developing nations struggling under crippling debt to adequately meet the needs engendered by a severe health emergency such as HIV/AIDS? We cannot. I am bitterly disappointed in the decisions made by our House colleagues on the issues I have outlined above. Time and time again we have been given information about the human consequences of the spread of the disease. Three million people died of AIDS in 2001, according to the Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS. Over half a million of them were children. Over a million of them were women, who are the primary care givers in any society. There are currently over 40 million people living with AIDS. Time and time again, we have been alerted to the security implications of the spread of HIV. In January of 2000 the National Intelligence Council issued an estimate entitled the Global Infectious Disease Threat and Its Implications for the United States in which it states: The persistent infectious disease burden is likely to aggravate and in some cases, may even provoke economic decay, social fragmentation, and political destablization in the hardest hit countries in the developing and former communist worlds. . . . Some of the hardest hit countries in Sub- Saharan Africa--and possibly later in South and Southeast Asia--will face a demographic upheaval as HIV/AIDS and associated diseases reduce human life expectancy by as much as 30 years and kill as many as a quarter of their populations over a decade or less, producing a huge orphan cohort. That same month the United Nations Security Council convened the first ever session on a health issue to discuss the security implications of HIV/AIDS. On October 1 of this year, the National Intelligence Council released another report, The Next Wave of HIV/AIDS: Nigeria, Ethiopia, Russia, India and China, which details the impact that HIV/AIDS is expected to have on those countries through the year 2010. The findings in the report were grim: International efforts to combat HIV/AIDS to date have not checked the spread of the disease in these countries. None of these five countries will be able to halt rising infection rates unless they channel more resources into education and health services--resources that these countries do not have. Vaccines are currently being developed and tested, however even if a vaccine is developed soon it will be ineffective against the HIV/sub- types common in Ethiopia, Russia, China, India and Nigeria. A vaccine that is 75 percent effective would have to be given to 50 percent of the population in order stop the spread of HIV, according to some experts. Given the security threat and humanitarian concerns that HIV/AIDS poses throughout the world, I wish that my House colleagues had dealt with all of the provisions in the Senate passed bill in a serious and constructive way. We need to use all of the resources at our disposal to deal with this threat because make no mistake, the threat is very real. There is no question that we are left with a bill that is significantly more parochial. However, I will say that there are some very good things in the legislation. First, we are able to keep the fiscal year 2004 authorization levels that were in the original Senate bill. $1.2 billion for the Global Fund to fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria in fiscal year 2004 is a much more realistic contribution, than the 2003 level. Second, the bill contains a provision which requires the administration to produce a report which outlines a comprehensive integrated strategy to combat the global HIV/AIDS pandemic. A scattershot approach will not stop the disease from spreading. In addition to being well funded, our programs must be well thought out. This bill establishes the position of Special Coordinator for HIV/ AIDS at the State Department, which I think is critical. As there are several agencies involved in providing assistance to fight the spread of HIV/AIDS overseas. In order to avoid duplication and omissions, it is imperative that there be an office which coordinates and oversees all the activities being carried out. Finally, the bill contains a section which asks the Agency for International Development to develop a plan to empower women to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS. The plan is to include education for women and girls, and to provide access to programs which focus on economic independence for women such as micro-finance loans. In addition, this section authorizes money for product development of topical microbicides, medications which kill the HIV virus, that women can use to protect themselves without having to obtain the consent of an partner unwilling to use preventative measures. HIV/AIDS is the worst plague mankind has ever known. No corner of the globe is safe. It has hit hardest in the areas of the world with the least resources with which to respond. I would argue that we should help these nations on purely humanitarian grounds. To those for whom self-interest is a stronger motivating factor, let me say this: the spread of HIV/AIDS poses very grave threats to economic growth and security in countries whose stability has a direct impact on our own. If we do not help address the threat now, it may well be to our detriment tomorrow. I urge the House to take up and pass the measure on which the Senate has just completed action. The fight is not over. Next year, I plan to reintroduce legislation to improve the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative so that countries dealing with the AIDS epidemic are better able to respond. I hope that my colleagues will support these efforts. It is also my sincere hope that the Senate will revisit the provisions that we dropped in order to reach compromise with our House colleagues. Failure to do so would be unwise.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, like many important decisions in the Senate, we are today faced with something of a Hobson's choice. I agree that the consolidation of agencies currently responsible for securing the homeland will, if done right, result in greater security for the Nation and I support establishing a Department of Homeland Security. But, in my view, it would be better for us if we were implementing this massive government reorganization more gradually. We are shifting close to 200,000 workers under the new homeland security umbrella in this bill, and it would make more sense to do so in stages. Here we are trying to do too much at once and, if history is any guide, we will be back at this department many, many times in the years to come with amendments designed to fix what we enacted in haste this year. What we are left with is the choice of doing nothing, or taking the next best option of passing this bill and launching a new Federal agency. After careful thought, I come to the conclusion that passing this flawed bill is better than doing nothing. Consider our current structure. Today, homeland security responsibilities are spread among over 100 different government agencies. The structure of the Treasury Department provides a good example of the problem. That agency houses the U.S. Customs Service, an agency tasked with monitoring the shipping containers that come into our country. Keeping the Customs Service in the agency concerned primarily with fiscal matters makes little sense when Customs' primary mission should know be safeguarding those imports. Or consider the Coast Guard, an agency in charge of patrolling our borders. The Coast Guard currently reports to the Secretary of Transportation. The Immigration and Naturalization Service is tasked with enforcing our immigration laws and securing our borders, yet its director reports to the Nation's chief law enforcement officer, the Attorney General. These examples are just the beginning. The need for reorganization is clear. Modern management principles teach that the agencies and functions of government should be grouped together based on their major purposes and missions, and the bill before us accomplishes that goal. Once it is fully implemented, the Department of Homeland Security will be the one Federal agency with the responsibility of securing our borders, safeguarding our transportation systems, and defending our critical infrastructures. One agency will be charged with synthesizing and analyzing intelligence related to homeland security. One agency will be responsible for equipping and training the police officers, firefighters, and emergency medical technicians who are often the first to respond to a terrorist incident. These are constructive organizational changes, ones that I am hopeful will help us better defend the country against attack. But should we be rushing their implementation without thoughtful consideration? During debate on this measure I voted in favor of an amendment offered by Senator Byrd that would have required the Congress and the Administration to work together to develop a staged implementation of the new homeland security agency, an implementation far more deliberate than the one we consider today. I am sorry Senator Byrd's amendment was not adopted. Without Senator Byrd's approach, I fear we are doing things in reverse and I predict we will have to revisit this new Department's structure several times before we get it right. The government reorganization most similar to the one we consider today provides a guide. In 1947, we enacted the National Security Act and created the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Council. That approach still had to be revisited several more times, in 1949, 1953, 1958, and 1986, to perfect the structure. Given the choice we now face, between the current state of homeland security disorganization and this bill's approach, I am forced to vote in favor of the bill. I do so with the understanding that vigorous congressional oversight of the new agency will be critical to insure it is not only accomplishing its primary mission of protecting our Nation but also to guarantee that the vast new authorities we give to the President here are not abused. I will be watching to see if the administration abuses its authority over workers in this new Department. We must be wary of the potential politicization of our workforce. The employees of the new Department must be highly dedicated professionals, free from political pressure. We must be certain that the most expert and experienced employees are free to speak their minds and to act quickly and aggressively to defend our national security. They must not be looking over their shoulders, concerned about the ins and outs of Washington politics. They must be safe from the kinds of influence that could cause them to slant their analysis or trim their opinions to fit what is popular. I will be watchful that the employees of the new Department are free from the threat of political retaliation, and secure in their jobs so that they can perform their important tasks to the highest professional standards. I support the creation of a Department of Homeland Security, and I will vote in favor of this bill today. The increased coordination and communication that may result from the new governing structures created in this bill could, if properly implemented, provide the Nation with vastly improved security. But because of the speed with which we considered this proposal, the rapid, sweeping reorganization it immediately envisions, and the prospect for abuse in several of its provisions, I fear this bill will need to be revisited several times and its implementation will need to be closely monitored by Congress if we hope to get it right. I will be closely watching the new agency's creation, and I hope each of my colleagues does the same.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, it is with mixed feelings that I rise to speak on the HIV/AIDS bill that the Senate passed by unanimous consent tonight. This is the second time this year that the Senate passed a bill to combat the spread of HIV/AIDS overseas. As you recall, in July we unanimously passed a comprehensive bill to fight the deadly disease. The bill contained new authorities for the Department of Health and Human Services, authorized money for a contribution to the Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to enter into negotiations to improve the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative, and authorized funds for our bilateral assistance programs at the Agency for International Development. The funding levels and authorities provided in the bill the Senate passed in July reflected an understanding of the enormity of the problem, what it will take to address it, and the Senate's dedication to doing so. Unfortunately, our colleagues in the House of Representatives had neither the understanding nor the will to consider all of the provisions in the bill. Instead, the Republican led House slow rolled conversations and negotiations on the bill for so long that four months later we were still unable to come to an agreement on the original provisions in the Senate passed bill. What we are left with is a stripped down version of what the Senate passed. Our original bill authorized $2.172 billion in fiscal year 2003 and $2.576 billion in fiscal year 2004. The House insisted that we slash the title containing Health and Human Services authorities. The only version of the bill they would agree to authorizes a billion dollars less in fiscal year 2003 to fight HIV/AIDS overseas. The Senate provided $1 billion for the Global Fund to Combat AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria this fiscal year, giving a clear indication that we believe that the Fund is an important mechanism through which to meet the resource needs of countries highly affected by the disease. The compromise with the House authorizes $250 million less in fiscal year 2003. The Senate legislation included a bill I introduced in April which authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to move forward with negotiations for deeper debt relief for poor countries--especially those facing a health crisis like HIV/AIDS. More debt relief provides poor countries more resources to devote to healthcare. The House insisted that we eliminate even Sense of Congress language about debt relief from the bill despite the fact that it is now clear--and the World Bank itself has recently announced--that unless the current debt relief program is enhanced, the debt levels of those poor countries will remain too high. How can we expect to developing nations struggling under crippling debt to adequately meet the needs engendered by a severe health emergency such as HIV/AIDS? We cannot. I am bitterly disappointed in the decisions made by our House colleagues on the issues I have outlined above. Time and time again we have been given information about the human consequences of the spread of the disease. Three million people died of AIDS in 2001, according to the Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS. Over half a million of them were children. Over a million of them were women, who are the primary care givers in any society. There are currently over 40 million people living with AIDS. Time and time again, we have been alerted to the security implications of the spread of HIV. In January of 2000 the National Intelligence Council issued an estimate entitled the Global Infectious Disease Threat and Its Implications for the United States in which it states: The persistent infectious disease burden is likely to aggravate and in some cases, may even provoke economic decay, social fragmentation, and political destablization in the hardest hit countries in the developing and former communist worlds. . . . Some of the hardest hit countries in Sub- Saharan Africa--and possibly later in South and Southeast Asia--will face a demographic upheaval as HIV/AIDS and associated diseases reduce human life expectancy by as much as 30 years and kill as many as a quarter of their populations over a decade or less, producing a huge orphan cohort. That same month the United Nations Security Council convened the first ever session on a health issue to discuss the security implications of HIV/AIDS. On October 1 of this year, the National Intelligence Council released another report, The Next Wave of HIV/AIDS: Nigeria, Ethiopia, Russia, India and China, which details the impact that HIV/AIDS is expected to have on those countries through the year 2010. The findings in the report were grim: International efforts to combat HIV/AIDS to date have not checked the spread of the disease in these countries. None of these five countries will be able to halt rising infection rates unless they channel more resources into education and health services--resources that these countries do not have. Vaccines are currently being developed and tested, however even if a vaccine is developed soon it will be ineffective against the HIV/sub- types common in Ethiopia, Russia, China, India and Nigeria. A vaccine that is 75 percent effective would have to be given to 50 percent of the population in order stop the spread of HIV, according to some experts. Given the security threat and humanitarian concerns that HIV/AIDS poses throughout the world, I wish that my House colleagues had dealt with all of the provisions in the Senate passed bill in a serious and constructive way. We need to use all of the resources at our disposal to deal with this threat because make no mistake, the threat is very real. There is no question that we are left with a bill that is significantly more parochial. However, I will say that there are some very good things in the legislation. First, we are able to keep the fiscal year 2004 authorization levels that were in the original Senate bill. $1.2 billion for the Global Fund to fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria in fiscal year 2004 is a much more realistic contribution, than the 2003 level. Second, the bill contains a provision which requires the administration to produce a report which outlines a comprehensive integrated strategy to combat the global HIV/AIDS pandemic. A scattershot approach will not stop the disease from spreading. In addition to being well funded, our programs must be well thought out. This bill establishes the position of Special Coordinator for HIV/ AIDS at the State Department, which I think is critical. As there are several agencies involved in providing assistance to fight the spread of HIV/AIDS overseas. In order to avoid duplication and omissions, it is imperative that there be an office which coordinates and oversees all the activities being carried out. Finally, the bill contains a section which asks the Agency for International Development to develop a plan to empower women to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS. The plan is to include education for women and girls, and to provide access to programs which focus on economic independence for women such as micro-finance loans. In addition, this section authorizes money for product development of topical microbicides, medications which kill the HIV virus, that women can use to protect themselves without having to obtain the consent of an partner unwilling to use preventative measures. HIV/AIDS is the worst plague mankind has ever known. No corner of the globe is safe. It has hit hardest in the areas of the world with the least resources with which to respond. I would argue that we should help these nations on purely humanitarian grounds. To those for whom self-interest is a stronger motivating factor, let me say this: the spread of HIV/AIDS poses very grave threats to economic growth and security in countries whose stability has a direct impact on our own. If we do not help address the threat now, it may well be to our detriment tomorrow. I urge the House to take up and pass the measure on which the Senate has just completed action. The fight is not over. Next year, I plan to reintroduce legislation to improve the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative so that countries dealing with the AIDS epidemic are better able to respond. I hope that my colleagues will support these efforts. It is also my sincere hope that the Senate will revisit the provisions that we dropped in order to reach compromise with our House colleagues. Failure to do so would be unwise.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will be brief. I came over from my committee meeting for two reasons. One is to compliment the chairman, the Senator from South Carolina. Frankly, were it not for his consistent and persistent efforts on security--port security and, I might add, rail security--we would not be standing here today. There is much to say about this legislation and I am not going to take the time now. I do want to add one other point. I am sorry many more of my colleagues, understandably, are in committee meetings right now and are not here to hear this. We are taking the action that is necessary to deal with a legitimate and real security concern for America's ports. I might add there is more traffic up and down the Delaware River into Philadelphia, with oil traffic in particular, than I think almost any other place in the country. There are a number of refineries in my State and in the neighboring State of Pennsylvania and ports in New Jersey and Pennsylvania and Delaware. So this is very important to us. But equally important to us is rail security. My friend, the Presiding Officer, a former Governor, knows about security, what the CIA indicated. I can publicly indicate it. They indicated the most likely target is going to be rail. Since 9/11, my friend from South Carolina passed out very significant rail security legislation--$1.2 billion. It is a clearly documented need and an overwhelming concern, listed by the CIA as a likely target for terrorists--and we have done nothing on it. We have done nothing. I realize it is a bit of a broken record. I have been on the floor many times speaking to this. But I just say we are going to rue the day we failed to take the action that has been documented which we need to take to enhance the security of our rail system. Let me give you again two examples. Then I will cease. But I want the Record to show every day we wait, we are putting thousands of lives in jeopardy. When you say thousands of lives, what are you talking about, Senator? Right now, as we speak, there are more people in a tunnel on a train under New York City--at this moment--than there are on five full 747 aircraft. Those tunnels were built at the turn of the century. They have no escape. They have no lighting. They have no ventilation. Immediately after the Civil War, the Baltimore tunnel was built for freight and passengers. You may remember that a little over a year ago there was a fire in the Baltimore tunnel--just a regular old fire--no terrorist act. It shut down Baltimore. In that tunnel, there is nothing. It was cut through granite in 1869. Nothing has been done to that tunnel. Even its signal systems are not adequate. We know this. Contracts have already been let. We already have the design. There is no need for design work. It has already been done. We could literally start tomorrow. My friend from South Carolina has documented all of this in his hearings. He has laid it out in spades. He has made it clear to everybody. But somehow we just think, OK, rail transportation is not very much. It is the ultimate stepchild, both in terms of our transportation network and in terms of security. It has been over a year since my friend from South Carolina reported out a $1.2 billion piece of legislation on security. I am not even talking about Amtrak--just basic security needs. We don't even have dogs available to sniff luggage in cars. There is nothing. There is virtually nothing at all. I just want to say I am not going to be here saying I told you so, because that would be unfair. But we are making a serious mistake, totally ignoring what the CIA has publicly pointed out is a targeting concern, and what everybody knows; that is, the threat of terror and the richness of the targets available on the rail system. I am all for this port security bill. I think it is a very positive step forward. But I just say to my friends we are making a tragic mistake having held up now for the better part of a year the rail security legislation that was passed out of committee and for which I think there is a consensus. We can't get a vote on it. I think it is a tragic mistake. Again, this is not in any way suggesting my State is very much impacted by this port security legislation. We have thousands upon thousands of containers coming into my little State. We have major export and import of automobiles coming in the Port of Wilmington. We are within the shadow of the Port of Philadelphia in Camden. More oil comes up the Delaware River than I think any other estuary, taking care of the Delaware Valley where there are over 10 million people. I am in no way suggesting we shouldn't be doing what we are doing. I am suggesting we are making a tragic mistake by not acting on rail security. I yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I agree this is not the moment for debate on that. Let me respond very briefly. The bill was $1.2 billion and $900 million was for the tunnels, period. I don't know where the additional billions of dollars come from. OK, $1.2 billion. Subtract $900 million. You are then talking about $300 million. Of that, the money went to a lot of things that relate to dogs, sniffers, and a whole range of additional Amtrak police. We can argue about rail signal systems and other things, which I think are essential. Let us get the numbers straight. We are talking about $1.2 billion. Usually what we do when we have billions like this is we disagree. We at least bring them up and debate them on the floor. We can't even get the bill brought up and debated on the floor. If my friend from Arizona--and he is my friend--is correct about billions of dollars of subsidization to Amtrak, then I am sure he will prevail when we talk about a security bill. But I respectfully suggest that is not the case. No. 2, this really is for another day. I will just take 2 minutes. We talk about, for example, the Wisconsin line. We do airports. We pay $150 million a year. I think we added another $100 million--don't hold me to that--to go into something like 350 cities where nobody wants to fly, nobody wants to go. We pay the airlines. We subsidize them to go into Bemidji, MN. I don't know where they go--places that no one wants to fly into or out of. We subsidize them with 150 million bucks. We do that. We just roll over. That is no problem. At any rate, that is for another day. But in the meantime, I hope we will at least be able to get to the point where we can debate on the floor here the rail security legislation and not prevent it from being discussed on the floor unless we have what individual Members want in a bill before it even gets to the floor. I yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, today, the Senate will consider and approve a final agreement on maritime and seaport security. This important legislation will address critical security issues at America's seaports, and I rise to applaud the efforts of Chairman Hollings and my other colleagues who served on the conference committee that brokered this historic agreement. Conference negotiations always involve a delicate dance of give-and- take. In this case, the conferees have been true to the intent and spirit of the originally passed legislation. They have retained important improvements, including a requirement that ports develop terrorism response plans; the creation of a coordinated maritime intelligence system; and a mandate that the U.S. Department of Transportation conduct background checks of port workers and require worker identification cards. As important, the agreement reflects some of the priorities I advanced in my own port security legislation-- including enhanced requirements for the electronic submission of cargo information and the development of a uniform system for securing containers destined for the United States. This legislation, while not a cure-all, constitutes a substantial improvement over the current security situation at many of our Nation's ports, and I proudly cast my vote in favor of it. That said, passage of this legislation should not lessen our resolve to remain vigilant in our efforts to protect America's seaports. Each year, an estimated 11 million containers worldwide are loaded and unloaded at least 10 times. The U.S. marine transportation system alone moves more than 2 billion tons of domestic and international freight and imports 3.3 billion tons of oil. Surprisingly, notwithstanding the magnitude of cargo transported by sea, there exists no uniform or mandatory standards for security at leading facilities, no uniform or mandatory system of sealing containers, and no independent checks to ensure that basic safeguards are undertaken. In order to remedy these gaps in our current security scheme, there remains much work to be done. As I have suggested, we should recalibrate our transportation agenda to focus more sequarely on threats to sea and land. We should adopt stiffer criminal penalties, including enhanced penalties for noncompliance with certain reporting requirements; continue to explore policies and technologies that will ensure container security--shockingly, as an independent task force recently observed, most containers are now seated with a 50-cent lead tag--make sure that border agents are trained and equipped to detect threats like nuclear devices, which would easily be concealed in the mass of uninspected cargo that enters the United States each day; work in partnership with the trade community to ensure appropriate data security; and provide for proper data collection and reporting systems that capture the magnitude of serious crime at seaports and related facilities. Let there be no doubt about it: this legislation provides no reprieve from our obligation to safeguard the homeland. The task will be difficult and requires dogged perseverance, but the building blocks are before us. Moreover, we know what we must do: first, we must have solid intelligence to identify and track our enemies; second, we must erect the proper barriers and preventive strategies to keep weapons and other instruments of destruction out of their hands; third, if those strategies fail, we must be prepared and able to stop any threat before it arrives on our shores; and fourth, as a fail-stop measure, we must have the capacity to detect and destroy any threat that makes its way to our borders. No matter what your political stripe or special interest, those basic principles must guide our fundamental strategy. And this legislation moves us substantially in that direction. I am committed to continuing to work aggressively on these issues in the 108th Congress and invite my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to join me.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I am pleased the Senate passed S. 1868 by unanimous consent on October 17, along with a Biden-Thurmond substitute. Enactment of this measure will make our children safer, and I rise today to explain several of the bill's provisions. Today, 87 million of our children are involved in activities provided by child and youth organizations which depend heavily on volunteers to deliver their services. Millions more elderly and disabled adults are served by public and private service organizations. Organizations across the country, like the Boys and Girls Clubs, often rely solely on volunteers to make these safe havens for kids a place where they can learn. The Boys and Girls Clubs and others don't just provide services to kids, their work reverberates throughout our communities, as the after-school programs they provide help keep kids out of trouble. This is juvenile crime prevention at its best, and I salute the volunteers who help make these programs work. Unfortunately, some of these volunteers and employees come to their jobs with less than the best of intentions. According to the National Mentoring Partnership, incidents of child sexual abuse in child care settings, foster homes and schools ranges from 1 to 7 percent. Organizations have tried to weed out bad apples, and today most conduct background checks on applicants who seek to work with children. Unfortunately, these checks can often take months to complete, can be expensive, and many organizations do not have access to the FBI's national fingerprint database. These time delays and scope limitations are dangerous: a prospective volunteer could pass a name-based background check in one State, only to have a past felony committed in another jurisdiction go undetected. The intent of S. 1868 and the substitute, the Biden-Thurmond National Child Protection and Volunteers for Children Improvement Act, are to streamline the process for organizations to check the backgrounds of potential volunteers and employees. A review of the statutory background in this area is appropriate. Effective December 20, 1993, the National Child Protection Act, ``NCPA,'' P.L. 103-209, encouraged States to adopt legislation to authorize a national criminal history background check to determine an employee's or volunteer's fitness to care for the safety and well-being of children. On September 13, 1994, the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, P.L. 103-322, expanded the scope of the NCPA to include the elderly and individuals with disabilities. As envisioned by Congress, the NCPA was to encourage States to have in effect national background check procedures that enable a ``qualified entity'' to determine whether an individual applicant is fit to care for the safety and well-being of children, the elderly, or individuals with disabilities. The procedures permit this entity to ask an authorized State agency to request that the Attorney General run a nationwide criminal history background check on an applicant provider. ``Qualified entity'' is defined at 42 U.S.C. 5119c as ``a business or organization, whether public, private, for-profit, not-for-profit, or voluntary, that provides care or care placement services, including a business or organization that licenses or certifies others to provide care or care placement services....''. The authorized agency should access and review State and Federal criminal history records through the national criminal history background check system and make reasonable efforts to respond to an inquiry within 15 business days. Congress addressed this issue again in 1998 through enactment of the Volunteers for Children Act, Sections 221 and 222 of P.L. 105-251, ``VCA''. The VCA amended the NCPA to permit child care, elder care, and volunteer organizations to request background checks through State agencies in the absence of state laws implementing the NCPA. Thus, the NCPA, as amended by the VCA, authorizes national fingerprint-based criminal history background checks of volunteers and employees, including applicants for employment, of qualified entities who provide care for children, the elderly, or individuals with disabilities, and those who have unsupervised access to such populations, regardless of employment or volunteer status, for the purpose of determining whether they have been convicted of crimes that bear upon their fitness to have responsibility for the safety and well- being of children, the elderly, or individuals with disabilities. Two years ago, organizations seeking to conduct background checks on their employees and volunteers made me aware of serious problems with the current background check system, problems that were jeopardizing the safety of children. Groups like the Boys and Girls Clubs of America alerted me that, despite the authorities provided in the NCPA and the VCA, national check requests were often delayed, in some jurisdictions they were never processed, and that the prohibitive costs of some of these checks were discouraging entities from seeking the reviews. Under current law, whether they want a State or national criminal background check, organizations must apply through their state- authorized agency. The State agency then performs the State check and forwards the request to the FBI for a national check. The FBI responds back to the State agency, which then forwards the information back to the volunteer organization. In Delaware, the State Police Bureau of Identification works with groups to fingerprint prospective workers and check their backgrounds. A patchwork of statutes and regulations govern background checks at the State level; there are currently over 1,200 State statutes concerning criminal record checks. This has led to widely different situations in each State: different agencies are authorized to perform the checks for different types of organizations, distinct forms and information are required, and the results are returned in various formats that can be difficult to interpret. States have not been consistent in their interpretation of the NCPA and VCA. Put simply, the current system is extremely cumbersome, particularly for those organizations that must check criminal records in multiple States, and for those groups employing seasonal workers, such as summer camps, for whom time is of the essence when seeking the results of background checks. After careful study of this issue it became clear to me that the concerns of groups such as the National mentoring Partnership and the Boys and Girls Clubs are not merely anecdotal. In 1998, the FBI's Criminal Justice Information Services, ``CJIS'', Division performed an analysis of fingerprints submitted for civil applicant purposes. CJIS found that the average transmission time from the point of fingerprint to the State bureau was 51.0 days, and from the State bureau to the FBI was another 66.6 days, for a total of 117.6 days from fingerprinting to receipt by the FBI. The worst performing jurisdiction took 544.8 days from fingerprinting to receipt by the FBI. In a survey conducted by the National mentoring Partnership, mentoring organizations on average waited 6 weeks for the results of a national criminal background check to be returned. The danger these delays pose to mentoring groups and others cannot be overstated. Suppose a group seeks to hire a volunteer who grew up in a neighboring jurisdiction to work with children. The group has the volunteer fingerprinted at their local police department, forwards those prints along to the agency designated by State statute or procedure to receive such requests, and then waits for the national results. FBI data indicates they will wait close to four months, on average, for the final results of the background check. That's too long. It forces groups to choose between taking a risk on someone's background, not making the hire at all, or seeking out only candidates from their jurisdiction for whom a full national background check may not be necessary. Delay is not the only problem with the current system. The NCPA/VCA caps the fees the FBI can charge for national background checks at $24 for employees. For State fees, the NMCPA/VCA requires States to ``establish fee systems that insure that fees to nonprofit entities for background checks do not discourage volunteers from participating in child care programs.'' In a survey of mentoring organizations, the National mentoring Partnership found that organizations were paying on average $10 for a State records check, plus the fee for a national check. For organizations utilizing hundreds of volunteers and employees, the costs of conducting through background checks can be exorbitant. Small, community-based organizations with limited funding often must choose between funding services to children or checking the criminal history records of prospective volunteers. In an attempt at addressing some of these concerns with the current NCPA/VCA system, at the conclusion of the 106th Congress I introduced S. 3252. I reintroduced the same bill as S. 1868 in this Congress, and I am proud to have Senator Thurmond as a cosponsor. As introduced, S. 1868 would have permitted qualified entities like the Boys and Girls Clubs to apply to a clearinghouse within the Justice Department for national criminal history background checks. Checks would have been affordable and results would have been quickly returned to the qualified entities. The Judiciary Committee took up and passed the bill, along with a Biden/Thurmond/DeWine amendment in the nature of a substitute. On June 18, 2002, the Justice Department sent me a letter outlining their views on the legislation as reported by the Committee. In its letter, the Department noted that the bill's goal of providing effective, efficient national criminal history background checks will ``help to protect children and other vulnerable segments of the nation's population, [and will] promote volunteerism in the United States, which is one of the President's priorities.'' The Department went on to raise several concerns with the legislation. First, they noted that the funds authorized by the bill to perform the checks and operate a new clearinghouse within the Department may be prohibitive. The Biden-Thurmond substitute the Senate considers today addresses those concerns. In a change from the measure reported by the committee, the substitute authorizes the Attorney General to charge a modest fee $5 for volunteer checks. In addition, the substitute dramatically scales back the duties of the clearinghouse, now labeled the ``Office for Volunteer and Provider Screening.'' Where the bill as reported charged the clearinghouse with developing model fitness standards and applying standards against each applicant utilizing the resources of the clearinghouse, the version we consider today eliminates this fitness determination requirement. While I still feel it would be preferable for the Department to assist qualified entities in making these fitness determinations, the substitute provides that model standards will be developed and envisions qualified entities then using these standards to make their own fitness determinations. S. 1868 as reported by committee authorized $180 million over five years to cover the costs of volunteer checks and to establish the clearinghouse. The vision we consider today has scaled this authorization back to $100 million. Second, the Department expressed concerns with language in S. 1868, added in Committee at the behest of Senator DeWine and drawn directly from his S. 1830, which made amendments to the National Criminal History Access an Child Protection Act. There is a difference of opinion between the Justice Department and SEARCH, a group created by the States to improve the criminal justice system and the quality of justice, as to the impact of this language. Resolution has not been reached on the matter, and because I do not believe the issue raised by language drawn from S. 1830 to be directly related to the issue at hand of providing quick and effective background check results to qualified entities, the substitute the Senate considers today deletes the language objected to by the Justice Department. Third, the Department expressed administrative and constitutional concerns with the makeup and operations of the clearinghouse described in the bill reported out of Committee. I have reviewed the Department's concerns and find them to be valid. The language objected to by the Department is not a part of the substitute amendment considered today. Since introduction of S. 1868, through the Committee markup process, and stemming from extensive discussions regarding this measure over the past several months, I have agreed to modify the impact of the bill in several critical ways. Raised first in Committee by Senator DeWine, and then later by SEARCH and other groups, arguments were made to me that S. 1868 could unintentionally undercut the work done in many States to process background check requests. Senator DeWine rightfully pointed out to me that in some States, the system that the Congress put in place after enactment of the National Child Protection Act in 1993 and the Volunteers for Children Act in 1998 is working. In those cases, we should not uproot a system that is effective. The substitute we consider today acknowledges this concern. Upon enactment, the clock will toll on a one-year period during which the Attorney General will review the extent to which States have participated in the NCPA/VCA system. At the conclusion of that one year period, the Attorney General is charged with designating states as having ``qualified state programs''. The substitute lays out several objective criteria designed to guide the Attorney General's decision. States that are quickly, cheaply, and reliably processing background checks will be recognized as having a ``qualified State program'' by the Attorney General and will continue to process background check requests as under current law. But if the Attorney General determines that a State does not have a qualified State program, based upon the criteria delineated in the version of S. 1868 we consider today, qualified entities in those jurisdictions are permitted to apply directly to the Justice Department for background checks. This legislation thus creates a separate track for qualified entities seeking national criminal history background checks. This track will only be available, however, to qualified entities doing business in States without a qualified State program, as determined by the Attorney General. A concern has been raised during drafting of this measure that the substitute does not give the Attorney General the discretion to label a State's program as qualified for one category of qualified entities, but not qualified for another. The intention of the authors of S. 1868 is to give the Attorney General that discretion. The language of the substitute considered by the Senate today does not require the Attorney General to make a blanket determination for a State's entire universe of qualified entities. The substitute should be interpreted by the Attorney General to permit States to be qualified for some categories of qualified entities but not all categories if necessary. Other provisions of the version of S. 1868 we consider today deserve mention. SEARCH and others have suggested to me that one of the main impediments States face in fully implementing the NCPA/VCA is that current law does not authorize the Attorney General and States to deliver criminal history records information directly to qualified entities. S. 1868 changes this and makes clear that the Attorney General and States may provide this information to qualified entities should they desire to do so. Also, we have authorized in this measure grants to the States so they can purchase so-called Live-Scan fingerprint technology. These devices permit prints to be electronically transmitted, obviating the need for fingerprint cards. Wide dissemination of this technology would facilitate nationwide background checks, and I am hopeful this grant program will be adequately funded so that this equipment can be installed throughout the country. I would like to thank Robbie Callaway and Steve Salem of the Boys and Girls Clubs of America, Margo Pedroso of the National Mentoring Partnership, and Abby Shannon of the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children for their tireless advocacy on behalf of S. 1868. Captain David Deputy of the Delaware State Police and Director of Delaware's State Bureau of Identification offered invaluable comments throughout the drafting of this measure, and I thank him for his assistance. Thanks also to Bob Belair, General Counsel of SEARCH, for his helpful suggestions. I would like to pay a special tribute to Senator Thurmond, as well as to his Judiciary Committee counsel Scott Frick, for their dedication to this bill. I appreciate the assistance of Chairman Leahy and Senator Hatch for agreeing to report S. 1868 out of Committee last spring. I am also appreciative of the efforts made by Senator DeWine and his staff to move this legislation along. Finally, I thank Congressman Mark Foley, the author of the Volunteers for Children Act, as well as Elizabeth Nicolson and Bradley Schreiber of his staff, for agreeing to introduce this legislation as H.R. 5556 in the other body. I remain hopeful that S. 1868 can be taken up by the other body and sent to the President for signature this year.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, on October 8, the Committee on Foreign Relations ordered reported three bills, S. 2667, H.R. 3656, and H.R. 4073. I ask unanimous consent that the cost estimates prepared by the Congressional Budget Office with regard to these bills be printed in the Record.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I support S. 2667, The Peace Corps Charter for the 21st Century Act. I commend Senator Dodd for developing this legislation and for working closely with the administration to advance it through the Foreign Relations Committee, where last week it was reported unanimously. Support for the Peace Corps is not, and should not be, a partisan issue. Senator Dodd's quiet work in moving this legislation forward is a testament to that principle. From promoting environmental conservation, to teaching primary school classes; from working to increase food production to training health care workers, Peace Corps volunteers do a lot of good throughout the world. Since the organization was founded 40 years ago, over 165,000 volunteers have served in 135 countries. If you multiply that number by the number of people reached by each volunteer, the phenomenal impact of the Peace Corps becomes apparent. Our Peace Corps volunteers represent, in many ways, U.S. diplomacy at its best--reaching remote communities as well as urban neighborhoods, and helping people improve their lives in immeasurable ways. The Peace Corps is stronger and more popular than ever. Since January, the organization estimates that there has been a 300 percent increase in inquiries from potential volunteers. We must ensure that the Peace Corps has the necessary resources to capture and utilize this unprecedented surge in interest. For these reasons, I am pleased to support S. 2667, which goes a long way in advancing and strengthening the Peace Corps. The legislation authorizes yearly increases in funding for the Peace Corps to $560 million in fiscal year 2007, in order to double the number of volunteers over the next 5 years. This increase in funding and volunteer capacity is long overdue, and is now more crucial than ever. Furthermore, the bill calls for the Peace Corps to develop a strategy for special placement of volunteers in countries whose governments are seeking to foster greater understanding between their citizens and the United States, particularly in countries with significant Muslim populations. Through person-to-person contact, Peace Corps volunteers can make great strides in eroding the deep misconceptions of the United States that exist in many cultures. The volunteers give a human face to the term ``American,'' bringing personal knowledge of our ideals and attitudes to communities all over the world. The legislation also establishes a global infectious disease initiative to comprehensively train Peace Corps volunteers in the education, prevention and treatment of the infectious diseases HIV/ AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. The HIV/AIDS epidemic has killed more people than the bubonic plague of the Middle Ages. Five million people were infected with HIV/AIDS in the past year alone, creating an unthinkable number of orphans worldwide. In some countries, the disease threatens to wipe out an entire generation. Tuberculosis and malaria have also caused millions more preventable deaths. It is imperative that Peace Corps volunteers be equipped with the knowledge and resources to protect their health, and that of the communities in which they serve, to the greatest extent possible. Again, I congratulate and thank Senator Dodd for his enduring allegiance to the Peace Corps. At a time when we must do all we can to promote mutual understanding worldwide, this legislation is an important effort to strengthen the Peace Corps, the United States' most valuable international volunteer program.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise today as an original cosponsor of the Missing Children's Assistance Act and to urge its prompt consideration by this body. The Justice Department recently reported that in 1999, 797,500 children were reported missing to police or to missing children's agencies. That is equivalent to a startling 11.4 children per 1,000 in the U.S. population. There were 58,200 children who were victims of a non-family abduction in 1999. One hundred fifteen of these children were taken in a manner that we would think of as a stereotypical kidnapping, and tragically, in half of these cases, the child victim was sexually assaulted by the perpetrator. These statistics are unacceptable. As a Nation we should strive every day to eliminate the scourge of abducted children. That's exactly what the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children is all about. Since it was established in 1984, the Center has served as a resource to parents, children, law enforcement, schools, and the community to assist in the recovery of America's abducted children. It has worked on over 73,000 cases of missing and exploited children and successfully returned more than 48,000 of these children to their families. The Center is constantly striving to raise the Nation's awareness of preventative measures that can be taken to keep our children safe from abduction, sexual exploitation, and molestation. These notable endeavors have contributed to a substantial increase in nation's recovery rate of missing children from a dismal 61 percent in the 1980s to 91 percent today. For these reasons, I rise today with the Senator from Utah and the Senator from Vermont to introduce the Missing Children's Assistance Act. This act will expand the ability of the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children to protect our children by doubling the Federal contribution to the Center to $20 million a year and by ensuring that Congress will continue to support the Center's noteworthy efforts through 2006. The act also authorizes the creation of a CyberTipline. As technology continues to transform and modernize our lives, we must make provisions to insure that our children will be safe from perpetrators who prey on children through the Internet. The CyberTipline will provide a forum for individuals to contribute tips and suspicions of Internet-related and other types of sexual impropriety directed towards minors to the authorities. It will allow those wary of contacting law enforcement a safe place to do so, while making it possible for law enforcement and missing children agencies to send email alerts to thousands of individuals instantaneously. In the end, I believe that this act will make the Nation a safer place for our children. The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children has done a tremendous job of raising the nation's awareness of child abduction, and this act will make it possible for the Center to continue with these endeavors. I urge support for the Missing Children's Assistance Act. It is fundamental that our children's safety remain at forefront of our national agenda.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, we often talk about how best to encourage the talents of our young citizens. In my home town of Wilmington, DE, there is a school that fulfills that mission literally, and with great success--the Cab Calloway School of the Arts, which will celebrate its 10th anniversary at a ceremony on Friday, November 22, 2002. Cab Calloway students have performed in prestigious venues from New York City to Washington, DC. Our colleague, Senator Clinton, has been in their audience, as have Secretary of State Powell and members of the National Governors Association. They have earned recognition in the National Shakespeare Competition, the Delaware Theatre Company's Young Playwright's Festival, and various vocal and band competitions. In the visual arts, Cab Calloway students have won repeatedly in Delaware's Youth in Art Month Flag Competition, and their work has been included in the Delaware Foundation for the Visual Arts Calendar. When artists were invited to decorate downtown Wilmington with dinosaurs this past spring, a Cab Calloway student designed and made sculpture was in the display. Visual arts students have also worked with the March of Dimes to create educational materials, and they have been honored with Regional Scholastic Art Awards. That would be impressive as the whole story, but it is just one chapter. Cab Calloway students have excelled academically, earning as many honors for their work in the classroom as for their talents on the stage or in the studio. The school has been recognized for its innovative programs, and it proudly boasts the best attendance record among all secondary schools in the district. For a decade, Cab Calloway has given many of our State's most talented young citizens a chance to excel as student-artists. It is a true success story in public education, and we in Delaware are very proud to congratulate the administration, faculty, students and their families, as we all join to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the Cab Calloway School of the Arts.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, today I am introducing the ``Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism Threat Reduction Act of 2002.'' This is a bill to strengthen the efforts of the world community to gain control over the vast amounts of radioactive materials that, left uncontrolled, could cause economic disruption and sow terror in American cities. In the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's hearing on March 6 of this year, experts testified that an amount of ground up radioactive cobalt-60 the size of the ball in your ball point pen could contaminate an area of Manhattan greater than the footprint of the World Trade Center. The damage and risk would be so great that buildings in the affected area might have to be abandoned, destroyed, and trucked away as radioactive waste. We learned that if a terrorist dispersed a few hundred curies of radioactive material, the resulting public panic could make much of downtown Washington, DC uninhabitable without a difficult and expensive clean-up. Decontamination is a serious and poorly understood problem because many of the radioactive isotopes a terrorist might choose will bind chemically to construction materials such as marble and stone used in our most precious buildings. One curie of radioactive cesium-137, strontium-90, cobalt-60 or iridium-192 poses a significant risk. But sources as strong as several hundred curies are used every day in world-wide commerce. They serve to estimate the oil in active oil wells, to provide a compact and convenient source of x-rays to check the quality of welds in the field, and to provide pencil beams of radiation to measure the amount of soda or beer in an aluminum can. Hospitals, primarily in poorer countries, but also in the United States, use cesium-137 or cobalt-60 sources as strong as several thousand curies to provide radiation therapy in cancer treatment. Some of these sources are used in Southern California in mobile treatment centers mounted in trucks. These rolling radioactive sources move on the highways and through the streets of our country and perhaps of other countries, where they are vulnerable to accident or foul play. Each year many radioactive sources, world wide, are abandoned or stolen and leak out of the existing control system. They become ``orphan'' sources, unwanted and with nobody to care for them or keep them out of trouble. Sometimes industrial sources are abandoned in place when their owners go out of business. They can then find their way into the scrap metal pool, and may arrive on the doorstep of a steel mill. That happened shortly before our March 6 hearing. A 2-curie cesium- 137 source turned up on the conveyor belt of the Nucor Steel Mill in Hertford, NC. Caught just before it would have gone into the furnace, it was identified, removed, and taken into safe custody by the North Carolina radiation protection authorities. Where did it come from? A bankrupt chemical company in the Baltimore area whose equipment was sold for scrap. But when the records were traced it was found that the company had bought not one, but four, such sources. Fortunately, two more were traced and recovered, but one of those ``gauge sources'' still is missing. If the source found at Nucor had gone into the molten steel, the clean-up would have cost the company millions of dollars. If it had gotten into the hands of a terrorist who could disperse it with high explosives, it could have contaminated many square blocks of an American city and the recovery might have run into the billions. Far more intense radioactive sources turn up in strange places from time to time. In 1987, two junk collectors in Brazil broke open an abandoned gamma ray cancer treatment machine containing 1,400 curies of Cesium-137. Inside they found about 2/3 of an ounce of softly glowing powder. Several people were delighted at the idea of glowing in the dark and they rubbed the powder on their bodies. They contaminated not only themselves, but their homes and families. The toll: 5 people dead, 21 requiring intensive care, 49 requiring some hospitalization, 249 contaminated, and 111,800 people tested in improvised medical facilities at a local soccer stadium. And that was an accident. A deliberate attack using the same 20 grams of material could have had far greater consequences, as our witnesses told the Committee. ``Dirty bombs'' do not even need to explode. Murders have been committed by the simple act of inserting a small radioactive source in the victim's desk chair and simply waiting until radiation sickness and death followed. If a terrorist is willing to die, he could merely fling finely powdered material from the window of a tall building and allow the wind to spread his poison. Finally, I worry that other terrorist groups, not just Al Qaeda, could make a radiological dispersion device. Radioactive material is out there for the taking, especially in the former Soviet Union. In January of this year, three hunters gathering firewood in a forest in the former Soviet republic of Georgia found two abandoned cans of strontium-90, each containing 40,000 curies of material. Because the heat from these sources melted the snow for yards around, the hunters were delighted to find free warmth for their tent. They picked up and carried off the sources in their backpacks. All three woodsmen were critically injured, but since they did not break open the two cans, environmental contamination was limited. A team from the government of Georgia, assisted by the International Atomic Energy Agency, recovered the sources, but several more are apparently missing and unaccounted for. The nuclear industry of the former Soviet Union made hundreds of similar devices. In fact, 40,000 curies of strontium-90 represents a small source by Soviet standards. A string of 131 arctic sites in Russia is powered by radioisotope thermal generators--portable power plants that draw energy from the heat liberated by the decay of radioactive nuclei. Each site uses a 300,000-curie source. That raises the maximum damage that a terrorist dirty bomb could do by a factor of ten beyond anything the Committee heard at our March hearing. There once were 136 sites in this chain, but the Norwegian government replaced five with solar-powered installations. The remaining 131 should be replaced as soon as possible so as to remove a potential source of truly destructive dirty bombs. We must, and we can, raise significant and sensible barriers to protect against terrorists who would use the power of the atom to do us harm. To that end, Senators Lugar, Domenici, Clinton, Gregg and Schumer join me today in introducing the ``Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism Threat Reduction Act of 2002.'' The bill's principal cosponsors, Senators Lugar and Domenici, have been among the Senate's long-time leaders in the causes of non- proliferation, threat reduction and counter-terrorism, and I welcome their support. Senator Gregg's position on the Appropriations Committee has sensitized him to the need to protect our embassies. And both of the Senators from New York, Mr. Schumer and Mrs. Clinton, attended the Foreign Relations Committee's classified session where we learned some of the specifics regarding the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism. Our bill takes the initiative in several significant areas: One, it creates a new program to establish a network of five regional shelters around the globe to provide secure, temporary storage of unwanted, unused, obsolete and orphaned radioactive sources. The bill authorizes $5 million to get started in Fiscal Year 2003, and up to $20 million a year for construction and operation of the facilities in the future. We envision accomplishing our goals through bilateral negotiations with the host nations or, when advantageous to the United States, through special contributions to the International Atomic Energy Agency, the IAEA. Regional storage facilities can remove some of the most dangerous material from circulation. Two, to round up the sources to be stored in the regional facilities, we propose an accelerated program--in cooperation with the IAEA--to discover, inventory, and recover unwanted radioactive material from around the world. This would be similar to the Department of Energy's Off-site Source Recovery Program, but aimed at material outside our borders. This bill will make a modest start by authorizing $5 million a year in special voluntary contributions to the IAEA. Three, recognizing the threat posed by the very intense radioactive sources packaged by the former Soviet Union to provide electric power to very remote locations, such as lighthouses, weather stations, communications nets, and other measuring equipment, the bill authorizes funding to replace that equipment with non-nuclear technologies. We believe that $10 million a year over the next three years should not merely make a dent in this problem; it should largely solve it. Four, other bills this year have provided funding to train American first responders to handle a radiological emergency. The bill we introduce today authorizes $5 million a year for the next three years to train responders abroad. This is a matter of self-protection for the United States: we have diplomatic missions at risk around the world, and we will be funding the construction and operation of temporary storage sites for radioactive material. Should accidents or incidents occur, we would like to be able to rely upon competent responses by our host countries. Five, this bill requires the Secretary of State to conduct a global assessment of the radiological threat to U.S. missions overseas and to provide the results to the appropriate committees of the Congress in an unclassified form, but with a classified annex giving details if he deems necessary. We hope the Secretary will take into account the locations of the interim storage facilities and also the results of this threat assessment in choosing where first to provide the overseas first responder training authorized by this bill. Six, the Customs Service is charged with preventing illicit shipments of radioactive material and fissile material from reaching our shores. Inspection of today's large cargo containers for fissile material, in particular, is a technologically challenging task, one performed most safely and easily before the containers are loaded aboard ship. Customs has agreements to permit U.S. inspectors to do their jobs in ports of embarkation. In order to assist the Service, the Nuclear and Radiological Threat Prevention Act establishes a special representative with the rank of ambassador within the State Department for negotiation of international agreements that ensure inspection of cargoes of nuclear material at ports of embarkation. This special representative will work in close cooperation with the Customs Service to make certain that the agreements meet the Service's needs. Seven, we could diminish the threat of Dirty bombs by reducing use of radioactive material where other technologies could be substituted. This bill mandates a study by the National Academy of Sciences to tell us how and where safe sources of radiation can replace dangerous ones. Some substitutions are well known: for many applications, X-ray machines powered by the electric grid are almost as convenient as the gamma ray ``cameras'' that use intense iridium-178 sources. Powered radiation sources can replace radioactive sources in some oil well logging work. Linear accelerators are replacing radioactive cobalt and cesium in cancer therapy. All of the substitute sources have one thing in common: a switch. When that switch is turned ``off,'' the radiation source is safe. There may be many more applications in which a switchable source can replace a radioactive one and be at least as economical, particularly when the risks of dirty bombs are accounted for properly. Fissile material is the indispensable element of a true nuclear weapon. At our March 6, 2002, hearing experts from the Department of Energy weapons laboratories told the Committee that terrorists in possession of highly enriched uranium or plutonium could assemble a crude ``improvised nuclear device'' with a yield large enough to smash Washington from the White House to the Capitol. Such an improvised nuclear device would not require a Manhattan Project. In a study done in the 1970s, the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment wrote that a group of two or three technically competent individuals in possession of enriched uranium or weapons-grade plutonium could probably build a one-kiloton device in a few months. For that reason, one provision of this bill deals specifically with developing the tools to guard against illicit traffic in highly enriched uranium and plutonium. Last summer, a meeting in Washington to discuss ``nuclear science and Homeland Security'' was sponsored by the Department of Energy, the National Science Foundation, NSF, and other Federal science funding agencies. It brought together some of the best scientists in our universities and colleges, all of whom were willing to put aside their normal research to help strengthen our security at home. But few of those scientists can use the research money they already have for this work. Research support given for one purpose usually may not be channeled into other uses. Therefore, this bill establishes a small program within the NSF to support researchers at colleges and universities who will work on the detection of fissile materials--the hardest and most critical task or on real-time identification of radioisotopes and decontamination of buildings after a dirty bomb goes off. The Department of Energy has a special role to play in this program: we expect that Department and its national laboratories to work in cooperation with NSF to transition laboratory apparatus into field- ready operational hardware. This bill authorizes $10 million a year for research funded by the NSF and an additional $5 million a year for the Department of Energy to accomplish the transition. The threat of radiological terrorism, and even of true nuclear terror attacks, is real. We know that most radiological attacks will kill few Americans, but there is little doubt they will lead to economic crimes of the greatest consequence. The radioactive source that killed only a few people in Brazil cost hundreds of millions of dollars to clean up. And nobody tried to cause that destruction. We must do something to head off the nuclear and radiological terrorist threat where it will most likely first appear: in foreign countries. The ``Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism Threat Reduction Act'' gives us a good start at doing just that. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, today I am introducing the ``Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism Threat Reduction Act of 2002.'' This is a bill to strengthen the efforts of the world community to gain control over the vast amounts of radioactive materials that, left uncontrolled, could cause economic disruption and sow terror in American cities. In the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's hearing on March 6 of this year, experts testified that an amount of ground up radioactive cobalt-60 the size of the ball in your ball point pen could contaminate an area of Manhattan greater than the footprint of the World Trade Center. The damage and risk would be so great that buildings in the affected area might have to be abandoned, destroyed, and trucked away as radioactive waste. We learned that if a terrorist dispersed a few hundred curies of radioactive material, the resulting public panic could make much of downtown Washington, DC uninhabitable without a difficult and expensive clean-up. Decontamination is a serious and poorly understood problem because many of the radioactive isotopes a terrorist might choose will bind chemically to construction materials such as marble and stone used in our most precious buildings. One curie of radioactive cesium-137, strontium-90, cobalt-60 or iridium-192 poses a significant risk. But sources as strong as several hundred curies are used every day in world-wide commerce. They serve to estimate the oil in active oil wells, to provide a compact and convenient source of x-rays to check the quality of welds in the field, and to provide pencil beams of radiation to measure the amount of soda or beer in an aluminum can. Hospitals, primarily in poorer countries, but also in the United States, use cesium-137 or cobalt-60 sources as strong as several thousand curies to provide radiation therapy in cancer treatment. Some of these sources are used in Southern California in mobile treatment centers mounted in trucks. These rolling radioactive sources move on the highways and through the streets of our country and perhaps of other countries, where they are vulnerable to accident or foul play. Each year many radioactive sources, world wide, are abandoned or stolen and leak out of the existing control system. They become ``orphan'' sources, unwanted and with nobody to care for them or keep them out of trouble. Sometimes industrial sources are abandoned in place when their owners go out of business. They can then find their way into the scrap metal pool, and may arrive on the doorstep of a steel mill. That happened shortly before our March 6 hearing. A 2-curie cesium- 137 source turned up on the conveyor belt of the Nucor Steel Mill in Hertford, NC. Caught just before it would have gone into the furnace, it was identified, removed, and taken into safe custody by the North Carolina radiation protection authorities. Where did it come from? A bankrupt chemical company in the Baltimore area whose equipment was sold for scrap. But when the records were traced it was found that the company had bought not one, but four, such sources. Fortunately, two more were traced and recovered, but one of those ``gauge sources'' still is missing. If the source found at Nucor had gone into the molten steel, the clean-up would have cost the company millions of dollars. If it had gotten into the hands of a terrorist who could disperse it with high explosives, it could have contaminated many square blocks of an American city and the recovery might have run into the billions. Far more intense radioactive sources turn up in strange places from time to time. In 1987, two junk collectors in Brazil broke open an abandoned gamma ray cancer treatment machine containing 1,400 curies of Cesium-137. Inside they found about 2/3 of an ounce of softly glowing powder. Several people were delighted at the idea of glowing in the dark and they rubbed the powder on their bodies. They contaminated not only themselves, but their homes and families. The toll: 5 people dead, 21 requiring intensive care, 49 requiring some hospitalization, 249 contaminated, and 111,800 people tested in improvised medical facilities at a local soccer stadium. And that was an accident. A deliberate attack using the same 20 grams of material could have had far greater consequences, as our witnesses told the Committee. ``Dirty bombs'' do not even need to explode. Murders have been committed by the simple act of inserting a small radioactive source in the victim's desk chair and simply waiting until radiation sickness and death followed. If a terrorist is willing to die, he could merely fling finely powdered material from the window of a tall building and allow the wind to spread his poison. Finally, I worry that other terrorist groups, not just Al Qaeda, could make a radiological dispersion device. Radioactive material is out there for the taking, especially in the former Soviet Union. In January of this year, three hunters gathering firewood in a forest in the former Soviet republic of Georgia found two abandoned cans of strontium-90, each containing 40,000 curies of material. Because the heat from these sources melted the snow for yards around, the hunters were delighted to find free warmth for their tent. They picked up and carried off the sources in their backpacks. All three woodsmen were critically injured, but since they did not break open the two cans, environmental contamination was limited. A team from the government of Georgia, assisted by the International Atomic Energy Agency, recovered the sources, but several more are apparently missing and unaccounted for. The nuclear industry of the former Soviet Union made hundreds of similar devices. In fact, 40,000 curies of strontium-90 represents a small source by Soviet standards. A string of 131 arctic sites in Russia is powered by radioisotope thermal generators--portable power plants that draw energy from the heat liberated by the decay of radioactive nuclei. Each site uses a 300,000-curie source. That raises the maximum damage that a terrorist dirty bomb could do by a factor of ten beyond anything the Committee heard at our March hearing. There once were 136 sites in this chain, but the Norwegian government replaced five with solar-powered installations. The remaining 131 should be replaced as soon as possible so as to remove a potential source of truly destructive dirty bombs. We must, and we can, raise significant and sensible barriers to protect against terrorists who would use the power of the atom to do us harm. To that end, Senators Lugar, Domenici, Clinton, Gregg and Schumer join me today in introducing the ``Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism Threat Reduction Act of 2002.'' The bill's principal cosponsors, Senators Lugar and Domenici, have been among the Senate's long-time leaders in the causes of non- proliferation, threat reduction and counter-terrorism, and I welcome their support. Senator Gregg's position on the Appropriations Committee has sensitized him to the need to protect our embassies. And both of the Senators from New York, Mr. Schumer and Mrs. Clinton, attended the Foreign Relations Committee's classified session where we learned some of the specifics regarding the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism. Our bill takes the initiative in several significant areas: One, it creates a new program to establish a network of five regional shelters around the globe to provide secure, temporary storage of unwanted, unused, obsolete and orphaned radioactive sources. The bill authorizes $5 million to get started in Fiscal Year 2003, and up to $20 million a year for construction and operation of the facilities in the future. We envision accomplishing our goals through bilateral negotiations with the host nations or, when advantageous to the United States, through special contributions to the International Atomic Energy Agency, the IAEA. Regional storage facilities can remove some of the most dangerous material from circulation. Two, to round up the sources to be stored in the regional facilities, we propose an accelerated program--in cooperation with the IAEA--to discover, inventory, and recover unwanted radioactive material from around the world. This would be similar to the Department of Energy's Off-site Source Recovery Program, but aimed at material outside our borders. This bill will make a modest start by authorizing $5 million a year in special voluntary contributions to the IAEA. Three, recognizing the threat posed by the very intense radioactive sources packaged by the former Soviet Union to provide electric power to very remote locations, such as lighthouses, weather stations, communications nets, and other measuring equipment, the bill authorizes funding to replace that equipment with non-nuclear technologies. We believe that $10 million a year over the next three years should not merely make a dent in this problem; it should largely solve it. Four, other bills this year have provided funding to train American first responders to handle a radiological emergency. The bill we introduce today authorizes $5 million a year for the next three years to train responders abroad. This is a matter of self-protection for the United States: we have diplomatic missions at risk around the world, and we will be funding the construction and operation of temporary storage sites for radioactive material. Should accidents or incidents occur, we would like to be able to rely upon competent responses by our host countries. Five, this bill requires the Secretary of State to conduct a global assessment of the radiological threat to U.S. missions overseas and to provide the results to the appropriate committees of the Congress in an unclassified form, but with a classified annex giving details if he deems necessary. We hope the Secretary will take into account the locations of the interim storage facilities and also the results of this threat assessment in choosing where first to provide the overseas first responder training authorized by this bill. Six, the Customs Service is charged with preventing illicit shipments of radioactive material and fissile material from reaching our shores. Inspection of today's large cargo containers for fissile material, in particular, is a technologically challenging task, one performed most safely and easily before the containers are loaded aboard ship. Customs has agreements to permit U.S. inspectors to do their jobs in ports of embarkation. In order to assist the Service, the Nuclear and Radiological Threat Prevention Act establishes a special representative with the rank of ambassador within the State Department for negotiation of international agreements that ensure inspection of cargoes of nuclear material at ports of embarkation. This special representative will work in close cooperation with the Customs Service to make certain that the agreements meet the Service's needs. Seven, we could diminish the threat of Dirty bombs by reducing use of radioactive material where other technologies could be substituted. This bill mandates a study by the National Academy of Sciences to tell us how and where safe sources of radiation can replace dangerous ones. Some substitutions are well known: for many applications, X-ray machines powered by the electric grid are almost as convenient as the gamma ray ``cameras'' that use intense iridium-178 sources. Powered radiation sources can replace radioactive sources in some oil well logging work. Linear accelerators are replacing radioactive cobalt and cesium in cancer therapy. All of the substitute sources have one thing in common: a switch. When that switch is turned ``off,'' the radiation source is safe. There may be many more applications in which a switchable source can replace a radioactive one and be at least as economical, particularly when the risks of dirty bombs are accounted for properly. Fissile material is the indispensable element of a true nuclear weapon. At our March 6, 2002, hearing experts from the Department of Energy weapons laboratories told the Committee that terrorists in possession of highly enriched uranium or plutonium could assemble a crude ``improvised nuclear device'' with a yield large enough to smash Washington from the White House to the Capitol. Such an improvised nuclear device would not require a Manhattan Project. In a study done in the 1970s, the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment wrote that a group of two or three technically competent individuals in possession of enriched uranium or weapons-grade plutonium could probably build a one-kiloton device in a few months. For that reason, one provision of this bill deals specifically with developing the tools to guard against illicit traffic in highly enriched uranium and plutonium. Last summer, a meeting in Washington to discuss ``nuclear science and Homeland Security'' was sponsored by the Department of Energy, the National Science Foundation, NSF, and other Federal science funding agencies. It brought together some of the best scientists in our universities and colleges, all of whom were willing to put aside their normal research to help strengthen our security at home. But few of those scientists can use the research money they already have for this work. Research support given for one purpose usually may not be channeled into other uses. Therefore, this bill establishes a small program within the NSF to support researchers at colleges and universities who will work on the detection of fissile materials--the hardest and most critical task or on real-time identification of radioisotopes and decontamination of buildings after a dirty bomb goes off. The Department of Energy has a special role to play in this program: we expect that Department and its national laboratories to work in cooperation with NSF to transition laboratory apparatus into field- ready operational hardware. This bill authorizes $10 million a year for research funded by the NSF and an additional $5 million a year for the Department of Energy to accomplish the transition. The threat of radiological terrorism, and even of true nuclear terror attacks, is real. We know that most radiological attacks will kill few Americans, but there is little doubt they will lead to economic crimes of the greatest consequence. The radioactive source that killed only a few people in Brazil cost hundreds of millions of dollars to clean up. And nobody tried to cause that destruction. We must do something to head off the nuclear and radiological terrorist threat where it will most likely first appear: in foreign countries. The ``Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism Threat Reduction Act'' gives us a good start at doing just that. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, the Senator from Connecticut is right that article 1 of the Constitution does not provide for this, but article 1 of the Constitution also does not provide for a declaration of war before the President is asked to go to war. So this is a very different circumstance. The President has not asked us to go to war. He has said he wants the power to be able to go to war. It seems completely consistent with that request that we say: Yes, Mr. President, you have that power to go to war; you can do that within 1 year. If, in fact, you go to war in 1 year, you can extend that 1 year. Let me put it this way. If we are 2 years down the road still fooling around with Iraq, then my friends from Connecticut and other places have been so dead wrong about what we are supposed to do that it would be amazing. I point out that this is nothing like Bosnia and nothing like the Balkans. In that case, we were in the Balkans. There were forces there, and there were people on the floor who were attempting to put a time on how long they could stay after we had gone in, after we had already prevailed, after we were in place. The third point I make in the 2 minutes I have is, we learned from Vietnam the power of the purse is useless. The power of the purse is useless because it presents us with a Hobson's choice. We have our fighting men and women in place and we are told, by the way, the President will not take them home so let's cut off the support for them so they have no guns, no bullets, no ability to fight a war. And no one is willing to do that. This is a prudent way to do this, totally consistent with what the President is asking. I think it makes absolute eminent sense. I congratulate the Senator. Even though I disagree with him on his underlying notion, I do think he is right on this point and I support him.

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, the case that the Senator from West Virginia makes is a good case on the merits of whether or not we should, in fact, delegate this authority, but I am confused by the argument that constitutionally we are unable to delegate that authority. Historically, the way in which the delegation of the authority under the constitutional separation of powers doctrine functions is there have to be some parameters to the delegation. For example, we could not delegate to the President the authority to pick and confirm any Supreme Court Justice he wanted to confirm. The essence of the constitutional argument which my friend from West Virginia makes is, I assume, that there are no parameters to this delegation; therefore, the delegation per se is unconstitutional. I assume that is the rationale. But as I read this grant of authority, it is not so broad as to make it unconstitutional for us, under the war clause of the Constitution, to delegate to the President the power to use force if certain conditions exist. My time is about up, but I would argue that in section 4(a), subsections (1) and (2), the conjunctive ``and'' instead of ``or'' exists, which means that as a practical matter in reading this, the only circumstance the President could find, in my view, that the national security was being threatened would be as it relates to the resolutions relating to weapons of mass destruction. But I will speak to that later. I appreciate my friend yielding me the time. But, again, constitutionally, this resolution meets the test of our ability to delegate. It is not an overly broad delegation which would make it per se unconstitutional, in my view.

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, this is one of the confusing aspects of this debate. I find myself supporting this resolution but worried that supporting this resolution will get us into real trouble. We use Saddam, Hitler, and al-Qaida all in the same verbiage and language. Let me make the real distinction, as I see it, regarding preemption. If we knew that al-Qaida had particular weapons, knowing, as we did, what their stated objective was, and with the intelligence we had, we would be fully within our rights--not under any doctrine of preemption--because of the existence of a clear, present, and imminent danger to move against al-Qaida. Conversely, with Hitler in the 1930s, the rationale for moving against Hitler wasn't a doctrine of preemption because we knew he was a bad guy. It was because his country signed the Treaty of Versailles. He was violating the Treaty of Versailles. The Treaty of Versailles did not have an end date on it. It didn't say you cannot have forces for the first 2 or 3 years, or you cannot do the following things. We were fully within our rights as a world community to go after Hitler in 1934, 1935, 1936, or 1937. It was not based on the doctrine of preemption but a doctrine of enforcement of the Treaty of Versailles, and in a very limited time. What we have here, I argue, as the rationale for going after Saddam, is that he signed a cease-fire agreement. The condition for his continuing in power was the elimination of his weapons of mass destruction, and the permission to have inspectors in to make sure he had eliminated them. He expelled those inspectors. So he violated the cease-fire; ergo, we have authority--not under a doctrine of preemption. This will not be a preemptive strike, if we go with the rest of the world. It will be an enforcement strike. I hope we don't walk out of here with my voting for this final document and somebody 6 months from now or 6 years from now will say we have the right now to establish this new doctrine of preemption and go wherever we want anytime. The part on which I do empathize with my friend from West Virginia is this is not a very clearly written piece of work. That is why I think Senator Lugar and myself and others had a better way of doing this. But it does incorporate with the President's words the notion that we are operating relative to weapons of mass destruction and U.S. security interests and enforcement--not preemption. I conclude by saying that the President started his speech explaining the reason why he wanted his resolution on Monday. I guess it was Monday. And he said at the very outset that this is based upon enforcing what was committed to in dealing with weapons of mass destruction. I know my time is up. I will speak to this more later. I am opposed to the Byrd amendment, but I hope we don't establish some totally new doctrine in our opposition to it.

Mr. BIDEN. Parliamentary inquiry, Madam President: How much time is under my control?

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I would be happy to yield time for the Senator to respond.

Mr. BIDEN. I am happy to.