Joe Biden

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, how much time is under the control of the Senator from Delaware?

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I will yield 2 more minutes to the Senator from Connecticut.

Mr. BIDEN. Then I will not yield any more time. How much time do I have?

Mr. BIDEN. If I may, how much time remains under my control?

Mr. BIDEN. I yield another 2 minutes to the Senator to finish his answer, but then I would want to speak briefly to this, if I may.

Mr. BIDEN. Sure.

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I yield myself 3 minutes of the remaining 9 minutes I have, and I yield 10 seconds of that to my friend from Maryland.

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I rise to explain why three brilliant lawyers can be all right at the same time--because they all started from a different premise, part of the confusion for the debate that listeners will find on the floor. I join my friend from Arizona and my friend from Virginia in being opposed to this amendment, but for reasons different than theirs. Let me try to explain as briefly as I can. The point about whether or not there needs to be an imminent threat to justify the President taking action is what is at stake. I am of the school that suggests the President need not, if the underlying amendment passes, have to show there is an imminent threat. He is enforcing a peace agreement in effect. He is enforcing, not preempting. And he is not responding to imminent threat. I do not believe there is an imminent threat in the next day or two or week or a month. The reason why I oppose my friend from the State of Michigan is because I believe there is an inevitable threat. We are either going to have to react, if not tomorrow, we will have to in the next 5 years. If this man is unfettered, with $2 billion per year in revenues, on the course he is on, I guarantee you, we will be responding. I guarantee you, we will. Is it imminent now? No. Is al-Qaida involved now? No. Is all this talk about the likelihood of cooperation with terrorist groups a real immediate threat? No. I don't believe any of that now. But I do know we are going to have to address it. So the question is, do we address it now or do we wait a year or two or three. The reason I oppose the amendment of my friend from Michigan is because the basic premise upon which I began is consistent with where my friend from Connecticut began, and that is the threat need not be imminent for us to take action. That is because we would be enforcing Security Council resolutions. That is authority we are about to delegate to the President. I can understand why my friend from Maryland is upset about the way it is characterized by the Senator from Connecticut. The bottom line is I believe if, in fact, we do not get a U.N. resolution, we are in a position we were in with regard to Kosovo. My friend from Arizona and I stood shoulder to shoulder on Kosovo trying to encourage the previous President of the United States to use force against the Serbs in Kosovo. I will submit for the Record at the appropriate time, after we had gone through an effort to get the U.N. to support it. The U.N. would not support it. And then we went. The bottom line was, the Senator from Arizona and I felt strongly we had to go. We had to move. Were the Serbs an imminent threat to the United States of America? No. Was it a threat to our security interests? Yes. The stabilization of southeastern Europe. And so I think part of the thing that confuses people here--anyone listening to the debate, myself included, as part of the debate--is this notion of the place from which you began. I reserve the remainder of my time.

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, how much time do I control?

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I yield myself the remainder of my time. The reason to go to the U.N. Security Council does not relate to sovereignty, it relates to security, and the security of the United States based upon the notion the President of the United States has recognized when he said he thought it was necessary to go to the U.N. Security Council. I think the arguments made against the first part of the Levin amendment are specious. Why did the President of the United States go to the Security Council? Was he yielding our sovereignty? No more than our friend from Michigan is ``yielding our sovereignty.'' The President went to the U.N. because, as one White House official said to me, he had to do so. Why? For our security interests. If we did not go to the U.N. Security Council and check off the blocks, the moment any force crossed into Iraq, we would find every U.S. embassy burned down in every Muslim country in the world. He went for security reasons. My only disagreement with my friend from Michigan is I do not think we need a two-step process. We should go to the United Nations, and the President says we should go to the United Nations. We should seek the authority to enforce the inspectors in disarming weapons of mass destruction. And if he fails, my friend says come back and get authorization to proceed anyway. I am prepared to give him the authorization now. That is the only disagreement we have. I would disagree with those who argue against my friend from Michigan saying that by his making this contingent of going to the United Nations first, he is in no way yielding to American sovereignty, any more than the President has. In the underlying resolution, it requires the President, in effect, to go to the United Nations and exhaust all diplomacy. Nobody has suggested the President of the United States has yielded our sovereignty. No one should suggest the Senator from Michigan is, either.

Mr. BIDEN. My time is up.

Mr. BIDEN. Correct.

Mr. BIDEN. Yes, with one caveat. He has expressed to me his ability to achieve a tough resolution would be enhanced by our not making it a two-step process. But he personally has told me and my committee he would consider and the President would consider a U.N. two-step process if they had to. The reason for my saying not two steps now is it strengthens his hand, in my view, to say to all the members of the Security Council: I just want you to know, if you do not give me something strong, I am already authorized, if you fail to do that, to use force against this fellow.

Mr. BIDEN. In response, I cannot honestly say substantially reduce it. I think it will reduce it some. This resolution, for example, reduces the possibility of getting a strong response compared to what Lugar-Biden would have done. The truth is it is marginal. Everyone has to make their own judgment. I think it would reduce his ability. I would be hard pressed to say it was substantial. He has a stronger hand having the authority granted to him after he exhausts the U.N. outcome to say to them: Look, if you do not give it to me, I now have the authority to move.

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 30 seconds.

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, if the President attempts to take this Nation to war over Kuwaiti prisoners, I hope to God that is not what you all mean by this underlying provision. If this President attempts to take this Nation to war over return of Kuwaiti property, if this President attempts to take this Nation to war based on this authority for any reason--any reason--other than weapons of mass destruction, I will be on this floor every day taking issue with this President attempting to stop the war. I cannot fathom anyone suggesting that Kuwaiti prisoners warrant us going to war. This is about weapons of mass destruction, in this Senator's view.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, let the Record show I have spoken about one-tenth the amount of time my friend from Virginia has, but not nearly with the persuasiveness he has. I want the opportunity to speak before the final vote.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, as chairman of this committee, I have yet to make a full speech on this subject. I have withheld for 3 days on the request of everyone else. I understand that. Two things: No. 1, I just want to make sure I get to speak before the final vote; and, No. 2, that I speak at some point after Senator McCain speaks and very close to Senator Byrd's speech.

Mr. BIDEN. This is highly unusual. I can't think of another time when the chairman of the Foreign Relations has been denied an opportunity to speak when he wishes to. But I will be happy to yield, because I just want to be a nice fellow. But this is preposterous.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, there is no need for that. I just want an opportunity to make my speech. It will take about 35 or 40 minutes to lay out in the Record why this is an important position which we are all about to take.

Mr. BIDEN. I thank the Senator. I am delighted to wait in line, and I will wait until after the Senator has finished.

Mr. BIDEN. No problem.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I seek the floor in my own right. I understand the distinguished Senator from West Virginia offered me 20 minutes of his time. I seek the floor in my own right. As I understand, under the present state of affairs, I have up to 1 hour.

Mr. BIDEN. I thank the Chair. Mr. President, I will vote for the Lieberman-Warner amendment to authorize the use of military force against Iraq. And unlike my colleagues from West Virginia and Maryland, I do not believe this is a rush to war. I believe it is a march to peace and security. I believe that failure to overwhelmingly support this resolution is likely to enhance the prospects that war will occur. And in line with what the distinguished Senator from New York just said, I believe passage of this, with strong support, is very likely to enhance the prospects that the Secretary of State will get a strong resolution out of the Security Council. I will vote for this because we should be compelling Iraq to make good on its obligations to the United Nations. Because while Iraq's illegal weapons of mass destruction program do not--do not--pose an imminent threat to our national security, in my view, they will, if left unfettered. And because a strong vote in Congress, as I said, increases the prospect for a tough, new U.N. resolution on weapons of mass destruction, it is likely to get weapons inspectors in, which, in turn, decreases the prospects of war, in my view. I am among those who had serious reservations about and flat out straight opposition to the first draft proposed by the White House on September 19. It was much too broad. The draft raised more questions than it answered. It was not clear whether the authorization requested by the President to use force was limited to Iraq or applicable to the region as a whole. It was not clear whether the objective was to compel Iraq to destroy its weapons of mass destruction programs, to liberate Kuwaiti prisoners, or to end Saddam Hussein's regime. It was not clear whether the rationale for action was to enforce the U.N. Security Council resolutions that Saddam has flouted for the last decade or to implement a new doctrine of preemption. And it was not clear whether the administration considered working through the U.N. and working with allies important or irrelevant. The second draft negotiated with congressional leadership--and I would say I believe, in part, as a consequence of the efforts of my good friend, Senator Lugar, and me, and roughly 23 or 24 Republicans-- got the attention of the administration. They were simultaneously negotiating with the Senator from Indiana and me as well as the leader in the House. The leader in the House reached an agreement first. I thought that was unfortunate because I believe we could have had a better resolution had that not occurred. Nonetheless, the second draft negotiated addressed some of these questions but left others unanswered. Along with many of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle--notably, Senator Lugar--I continued to seek greater clarity about the focus of the proposed resolution. President Bush brought the resolution into sharper focus this week in his speech to the Nation. He said: War is neither imminent nor inevitable. He also said his objective was to disarm Iraq, that his rationale to enforce United Nations resolutions was not based upon preemption, and that he desired to lead the world, and if war was necessary, it would be with allies at our side. Mr. President, the resolution now before the Congress, similarly, is clear and more focused than previous drafts. It is not perfect, but it acknowledges the core concerns that Senator Lugar, I, and others raised and that have been raised by such Senators as Hagel and Specter and many others. Considered in the context of the President's speech this week, and his address last month to the United Nations General Assembly, this resolution, though still imperfect, deserves our support. Let me explain why. First, the objective is more clearly and carefully stated. The objective is to compel Iraq to destroy its illegal weapons of mass destruction and its programs to develop and produce missiles and more of those weapons. Saddam is dangerous. The world would be a better place without him. But the reason he poses a growing danger to the United States and its allies is that he possesses chemical and biological weapons and is seeking nuclear weapons, with the $2 billion a year he illegally skims from the U.N. oil-for-food program. For four years now, he has prevented United Nations inspectors from uncovering those weapons and verifying Iraq's disarmament, and he is in violation of the terms he agreed to allowing him to stay in power. What essentially happened was, he sued for peace. What essentially happened was, the U.N. resolutions were a reflection of what ordinarily, if there were no U.N., would be in the form of a peace agreement. This resolution authorizes the President to use force to defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions. . . . In my view, and as has been stated by the President and Secretary of State, the threat to the United States is Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs. The relevant U.N. resolutions are those related to Iraq's nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. And the fact that we use the conjunctive clause, the word ``and,'' and not the word ``or,'' means that the authorization we are granting to the President is tied to defending the national security of the United States in the context of enforcing the relevant U.N. resolutions relating to weapons of mass destruction. This is not a blank check for the use of force against Iraq for any reason. It is an authorization for the use of force, if necessary, to compel Iraq to disarm, as it promised after the Gulf War. Some in the Administration have argued that our stated objectives should be the end of Saddam Hussein's regime. Regime change is the ultimate goal of American policy, as embodied in the sense-of-the- Congress provision of the Iraq Liberation Act in 1998. Indeed, an effective effort to disarm Iraq could well result in regime change. After all, such an effort would force Saddam to make a hard choice-- either give up his weapons or give up power--and he has made the wrong choices many times before. In his own words, the President said: Taking these steps would also change the nature of the Iraqi regime itself. America hopes the regime will make that choice. But this resolution does not make Saddam's removal its explicit goal. To have done so, in my view, would run the risk of alienating other countries who do not share that goal and whose support we need to disarm Iraq and possibly to rebuild it. And it would significantly weaken our hand at the United Nations. Nor does this resolution give the President the authorization to go to war over Bahraini prisoners, reparations owed to Kuwait, foreign MIAs, the return of Kuwait's national archives, or Saddam's ties to terrorism and human rights abuses. These are serious problems. The United Nations must continue to insist they be resolved, including maintaining embargoes and tightening and strengthening those sanctions against Iraq. But I doubt seriously the American people will support going to war to rectify any of them; nor will our allies. The Secretary of State, in testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations, made clear that our core objective is disarmament. I quote: I think it is unlikely that the President would use force if [Iraq] complied with the weapons of mass destruction conditions. . . . we all know that the major problem . . . the President is focused on and the danger to us and to the world are the weapons of mass destruction. By the way, even if my reading is incorrect and he would be able to go to liberate Bahraini prisoners, does anybody in this body think the President of the United States would risk American forces and, in a very crass sense, his presidency by going in with American forces unilaterally to make sure that Bahraini prisoners were in fact released? That is fiction. This week the President stated the objective clearly and concisely. He said: Saddam Hussein must disarm himself or, for the sake of peace, we will lead a coalition to disarm him. The President is right to focus on disarming Iraq and not on regime change. Second, the rationale is more tightly focused. It is to enforce the U.N. Security Council resolutions on weapons of mass destruction that Saddam has defied for more than a decade. This is a man who waged a war of aggression, lost the war, and sued for peace. The terms of surrender dictated by the United Nations require him to declare and destroy his weapons of mass destruction programs. He has not done so. This resolution sets out in detail Saddam's decade of defying the Security Council resolutions on disarmament. It states that Iraq ``remains in material and unacceptable breach of its international obligations,'' through its weapons of mass destruction programs. It authorizes the President to enforce all ``relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq,'' with force, if necessary. As the President said this week: America is challenging all nations to take the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council seriously. That is what this is about. Yet some administration supporters have argued using force against Iraq is justified on the basis of a new doctrine of preemption, a doctrine that would represent the most far- reaching change in our foreign policy since the end of the cold war. In fact, the concept of preemption has long been part of our foreign policy tool kit. It is a doctrine well established under international law. What we are talking about here in this new policy is a policy of prevention, striking first at someone who may some day pose a threat to us, even if that threat is not imminent today. This policy merits a serious national debate, but not adoption by this body, nor is it contained in this resolution. The speed and stealth with which an outlaw state or terrorist could use weapons of mass destruction and the catastrophic damage they could inflict require us to consider new ways of acting, not reacting. But that is not what this is about. It would be dangerous to rush to embrace as a new principle of American foreign policy a rule that gives every nation the right to act preventively. The former Secretary of State, Secretary Henry Kissinger, made this point powerfully in his testimony before my committee 2 weeks ago. I quote him: As the most powerful nation in the world, the United States has a special unilateral capacity and indeed obligation to lead in implementing its convictions. But it also has a special obligation to justify its actions by principles that transcend the assertions of preponderant power. It cannot be in either the American national interest or the world's interest to develop principles that grant every nation an unfettered right of preemption against its own definition of threats to its security. Dr. Kissinger is right. What message would declaring a policy of prevention send to the Indians and Pakistanis, the Chinese and the Taiwanese, the Israelis and the Arabs, the Russians and Georgians? This resolution does not send that message because it does not endorse the prevention doctrine. It does not need to. Because, as the President has argued, this is about compelling Saddam Hussein to make good on his requirement and obligation to disarm. Third, this resolution makes clear the President's determination to build international support for our Iraq policy. Our allies throughout the world and in the region have important contributions to make in the effort to disarm Iraq and to rebuild Iraq, if we go to war. And we depend upon their continued cooperation in the unfinished war against terrorism. The United States has a singular capacity to act alone, if necessary. We must--and this resolution does--preserve our right to do so. But acting alone in Iraq would cost us significantly more in lost lives, in dollars spent, and influence dissipated around the world. Acting alone must be a last resort, not a defiant retort to those not yet convinced of our policy. This resolution emphasizes the importance of international support, manifested through the United Nations Security Council. It states that: The Congress of the United States supports the efforts by the President to-- (1) strictly enforce through the United Nations Security Council all relevant Security Council resolutions applicable to Iraq and encourages him in those efforts; and, (2) obtain prompt and decisive action by the Security Council to ensure that Iraq abandons its strategy of delay, evasion and noncompliance. . . . Similarly, the President, in going to the United Nations over the strong objection of half his administration, made clear his desire to work with others, not around them. In his speech this week, he talked about his determination ``to lead the world'' in confronting the Iraqi problem. He stated that if we act militarily, we will act ``with allies at our side.'' I am convinced he will follow through on this commitment. In short, the combination of this resolution and the President's own words in recent speeches, both publicly and privately, give me confidence that most of our core concerns have been addressed. I also take confidence from how far this administration has come on Iraq over the past year. Many in this Chamber predicted, and many who oppose this resolution predicted, that the administration would use the terrible events of September 11 as an excuse to strike back at Iraq. This, despite any credible evidence that Iraq was involved in the terrorist attacks on America. Both The New York Times and The Washington Post have reported that in the days following 9/11, the most senior Pentagon officials urged the President to consider setting his sights on Iraq, not Afghanistan. I can say from personal conversations, I know that to be true. As a matter of fact, I gathered my Foreign Relations Committee staff not long after 9/11, when talk of going to Afghanistan was in this Chamber and at the administration. I suggested, based on conversations I had with some, be careful, prepare. We are not going to Afghanistan. We are going to Iraq. I know there was a proposal that was being promoted to the President that he should use this as an excuse to go to Iraq. Secretary Rumsfeld is reported to have argued there would be a big buildup of forces with not that many good targets in Afghanistan. At some point, the United States would have to deal with Iraq and is this not the opportunity? he apparently suggested--not to me; that is as reported. Many predicted the administration would ignore the U.N. and the need to build international support for its Iraqi policy. That is not surprising because senior administration officials said as much. During the spring and early summer, literally dozens of articles flatly stated that the President planned a unilateral attack against Iraq. As late as August 29 of this year, The New York Times reported: Officials in Washington and Crawford, TX, are engaged in an intense debate over whether they should seek to involve the United Nations one last time. . . . As one top adviser described the argument, Mr. Bush must decide ``whether to go it alone or go to the United Nations.'' He went to the United Nations. Many predicted the administration would refuse to give the weapons inspectors one last chance to disarm. That is not surprising. That prediction would have been made because administrative officials consistently disparaged inspections. Richard Perle, senior adviser to the Pentagon, said: The inspectors are not going to find anything. . . .They will flounder if they are permitted to return. Vice President Cheney, as late as August 26 of this year, took this line: A person would be right to question any suggestion that we should just get inspectors back into Iraq and then our worries will be over. A return of inspectors would provide no insurance whatsoever of Saddam's compliance with U.N. resolutions. I don't know how many Sunday shows I did from June through now, where every interviewer would say: But, Senator, you are wrong, the President is going to act alone. And they read me quote after quote from high officials. Thank God for Colin Powell. Thank God for Colin Powell because that was the other half being argued by the administration quietly, saying: Mr. President, do not listen to those voices who counsel ``no inspectors and do not go back to the U.N.'' Many predicted the administration would not seek authorization from Congress for the use of force and, again, that is not surprising. As late as August 29 of this year, the White House counsel--the White House counsel--reportedly told the President that he had all the authority he needs to wage war against Iraq--there was a big deal about leaking a memorandum from the White House counsel to the world that Congress need not be involved, Mr. President. I had two private meetings with the President myself, where I made clear that I thought that was dead wrong and he would be--to use the slang on the east side of my city--``in a world of hurt'' if he attempted to do that. The President said to me personally he was going to come to Congress if he sought authority. What did he do? He came to Congress. But it is not strange that my colleagues up here would believe he would not do that. The White House press secretary actually reiterated that conclusion of the White House counsel at a White House briefing. Each prediction by those who thought the President would make, in my view, the wrong choice, seemed very well founded because it was based on the beliefs and statements of very senior administration officials, including the Vice President of the United States. We all know the lore around here--that the Vice President of the United States is the most powerful man in the administration. Some even suggest it goes beyond that. But guess what? Each prediction proved to be wrong, as some of us, quite frankly, predicted all along. My colleague from New York may remember my getting a little bit of a sarcastic response in the Democratic Caucus when I suggested there was no possibility there would be a war before November; there was no possibility of an October surprise; there was no possibility that he would go and seek power to go to war, if need be, absent congressional authorization. There was no possibility he would fail to go to the U.N. It is not just because that is the only thing I believe a rational President could do, but because he told me--and I suspect many others-- that that is what he would do. Mr. President, President Bush did not lash out precipitously after 9/ 11. He did not snub the U.N. or our allies. He did not dismiss a new inspection regime. He did not ignore the Congress. At each pivotal moment, he has chosen a course of moderation and deliberation. I believe he will continue to do so--at least that is my fervent hope. I wish he would turn down the rhetorical excess in some cases because I think it undercuts the decision he ends up making. But in each case, in my view, he has made the right rational and calm, deliberate decision. As I noted a few moments ago, the President said this week that the use of force in Iraq is neither ``imminent nor inevitable,'' and that makes sense because while the threat from Iraq is real and growing, its imminence and inevitability in terms of America's security have been exaggerated. For two decades, Saddam Hussein has relentlessly pursued weapons of mass destruction. There is a broad agreement that he retains chemical and biological weapons, the means to manufacture those weapons and modified Scud missiles, and that he is actively seeking a nuclear capability. It remains less clear how effective his delivery vehicles are, whether they be the al-Hussein missiles, with a 650 kilometer range, short-range missiles, or untested and unmanned aerial vehicles for the dispersion of chemical and biological weapons. Shifting weather conditions, the likely incineration of much of the chemical or biological agent in a warhead explosion, and the potential blowback on Iraqi forces, all complicate the Iraqi use of these weapons. But we are right to be concerned that, given time and a free hand, Saddam would improve this technology. Other countries have, or seek, weapons of mass destruction. Saddam actually used them against his neighbors, against his own people. He has a lengthy track record of aggression--first, in Iran, then Kuwait. He has brutally repressed Iraqi civilians--the Kurds in the North, then the Shias in the south, and then the Kurds again. And the combination of Saddam Hussein and weapons of mass destruction is dangerous, destabilizing, and deadly. Ultimately, either those weapons must be dislodged from Iraq, or Saddam must be dislodged from power. But exactly what threat does the combination of Saddam and weapons of mass destruction pose to the United States? How urgent is the problem? Some argue the danger is threefold: one, Iraq could use these weapons against us; two, it could use them to blackmail us; three, it could become a surreptitious supplier to terrorist groups. Others question these scenarios. For example, Brent Scowcroft, President George Herbert Walker Bush's National Security Adviser, and chairman of President Bush's foreign intelligence advisory board, recently wrote: Threatening to use these weapons for blackmail--much less their actual use--would open [Saddam] and his entire regime to a devastating response by the U.S. While Saddam is thoroughly evil, he is above all a power-hungry survivor. Similarly, Scowcroft wrote ``there is scant evidence to tie Saddam to terrorist organizations, and even less to the September 11 attacks. Indeed, Saddam's goals have little in common with the terrorists who threaten us . . . and he is unlikely to risk his investment in weapons of mass destruction, much less his country, by handing such weapons to terrorists who would use them for their own purposes and leave Baghdad as a return address.'' Daniel Benjamin, former Director of Counter-terrorism on the National Security Council staff, and co-author of the remarkable new book, ``The Age of Sacred Terror,'' wrote recently in The New York Times the following: Iraq and Al Qaeda are not obvious allies. In fact, they are natural enemies. . . .To contemporary jihadists, Saddam Hussein is another in a line of dangerous secularists, an enemy of the faith. . . .Saddam Hussein has long recognized that Al Qaeda and like-minded Islamists represent a threat to his regime. Consequently, he has shown no interest in working with them against their common enemy, the United States. . . . Iraq has indeed sponsored terrorism in the past, but always of a traditional variety: it sought to eliminate Iraqi opponents abroad or, when conspiring against others, to inflict enough harm to show the costs of confronting it. But Mr. Hussein has remained true to the unwritten rules of state sponsorship of terrorism: never get involved with a group that cannot be controlled, and never give a weapons of mass destruction to terrorists who might use it against you. I reiterate here, just as Mark Twain said, ``The reports of my death are much exaggerated,'' the reports of al-Qaida in Iraq are much exaggerated. Our own intelligence community, in testimony before the Foreign Relations, Armed Services, and Intelligence Committees--that has been declassified--concluded that the probability of Iraq initiating an attack against the United States with weapons of mass destruction is ``low''--l-o-w--low. They also have concluded that ``Baghdad for now appears to be drawing a line short of conducting terrorist attacks . . . with chemical or biological weapons against the United States.'' I believe it is unlikely Saddam Hussein will use weapons of mass destruction against us unless he is attacked. To do so would invite immediate annihilation, and I am skeptical that he would become a supplier to terrorist groups. He would risk being caught in the act or having those weapons turned against him by groups who disdain Saddam as much as they despise us, and he would be giving away what is to him the ultimate source and symbol of his power, the only thing that makes him unique among the thugs in the region. Of course, Saddam has miscalculated before, and we are right to be concerned about the possibility, however remote, that he will do it again, but we are wrong on this floor to exaggerate and suggest this is the reason and justification for going against Saddam. What I do believe is that Saddam's primary goal is to dominate his region. His history, his actions, and his statements make that clear. Weapons are a means to that end for him, a terrible tool of intimidation that he could use to bully his people and his neighbors. During the gulf war, the knowledge that Saddam Hussein had chemical and biological weapons did not deter us from expelling his forces from Kuwait. We gave him clear warning that using these weapons against our troops would invite a devastating response. Let me remind everybody, he did not use them. But a nuclear weapon could well change Saddam's calculus. It could give Saddam an inflated sense of his invisibility. It could lead him to conclude erroneously that he finally had the great equalizer against American power and that he could fuel a new spasm of aggression against his neighbors or the Kurds in the mistaken belief that we would be deterred for fear that, if we put anyone on the ground, they would be annihilated with his theater or tactical nuclear weapon. We cannot let Saddam Hussein get his hands on nuclear weapons. In particular, we must deny Iraq the necessary fissile material, highly enriched uranium, or weapons grade plutonium needed for a nuclear weapon. According to an unclassified letter released by the Director of Central Intelligence this week: Iraq is unlikely to produce indigenously enough weapons grade material for a deliverable nuclear weapon until the last half of this decade. Therefore, if Iraq wants a nuclear capability sooner, it will need to turn to foreign sources for fissile material which could shorten the timetable for an Iraqi nuclear weapon to about a year. This reality underscores the importance of U.S. and international efforts not only to disarm Iraq, but also to reduce and better secure fissile materials in the former Soviet Union, the most logical source of black market purchases or theft. Concerning Iraq, our first step should be the one the President apparently has chosen: to get the weapons inspectors back into Iraq. There is disagreement about the value of weapons inspections. Skeptics, particularly our Vice President, contend that inspections can never guarantee the complete disarmament of Iraqi weapons, especially given the prevalence of dual-use materials and mobile facilities for the production of chemical and biological weapons. Proponents believe that inspectors heighten the barrier to development and production of WMD and will buy time until a regime change in Iraq occurs. They point to the success of UNSCOM and IAEA. For example, the British white paper on Iraq's WMD issued last month, which was quoted by those who wish to move against Iraq, says: Despite the conduct of the Iraqi authorities toward them, both UNSCOM and IAEA action teams have valuable records of achievement in discovering and exposing Iraq's biological weapons programs and destroying very large quantities of chemical weapons stocks and missiles, as well as the infrastructure for Iraq's nuclear weapons program. It has been argued that UNSCOM's most notable achievements were the result of fortuitous defections. In fact, much of UNSCOM's success was due to diligent detective work in Iraq. But let's assume that defections and not detection are the key to success. Isn't the best way to encourage defections, isn't the best way to get firsthand information about Iraq's weapons programs to have inspectors back on the ground talking to the key people? I agree with President Bush that given a new mandate and the authority to go any place, any time, with no advance warning, U.N. inspections can work. They can succeed in discovering and destroying much of Saddam's chemical and biological arsenals and his missile program. They can delay and derail his efforts to acquire nuclear weapons and, at the very least, they will give us a clearer picture of what Saddam has, force him to focus on hiding his weapons and not building more, and it will buy us time to build a strong coalition to act if he refuses to disarm. There is no question that with regard to Iraq, we have a real and growing problem. But I also believe we have time to deal with that problem in a way that isolates Saddam and does not isolate the United States of America . . . that makes the use of force the final option, not the first one . . . that produces the desired results, not unintended consequences. That is the course President Bush has chosen, in my view. Now it is incumbent upon the United Nations and the U.S. Congress to help him stay the course. The United Nations Security Council must deliver a tough new resolution that gives the weapons inspectors the authority they need to get the job done. As the President put it, the inspectors ``must have access to any site at any time without preconditions, without delay, and without exceptions.'' Mr. President, the resolution should set clear deadlines for compliance, and it should make clear the consequences if Saddam Hussein fails to disarm, including authorizing willing U.N. members to use force to compel compliance. I also agree with the President that a key component of any inspections regime must be the U.N.'s ability to interview those with knowledge of Iraq's weapons programs in a climate free of fear and intimidation, including being able to take them outside of Iraq. Offering sanctuary to those who tell the truth would also deprive Saddam Hussein of their expertise. To that end, this week, Senator Specter and I introduced legislation called ``The Iraqi Scientist Liberation Act'' that would admit to our country up to 500 Iraqi scientists, engineers, and technicians, and their families who give reliable information on Saddam's programs to us, to the United Nations, or to the International Atomic Energy Agency. It is also critical the Congress send the right message to the United Nations Security Council. Its members must not doubt our determination to deal with the problems posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, including our willingness to use force, if necessary. The stronger the vote in favor of this resolution, the stronger the likelihood, in my view, that the Security Council will approve a tough U.N. resolution. That is because the U.N. will conclude if we do not act, America will. So we'd better. The tougher a U.N. resolution, the less likely it is that we will have to use force in Iraq. That is because such a resolution would finally force Saddam to face the choice between inspectors and invaders, between giving up his weapons and giving up power, and there is at least a chance that he might make the right choice. There is also a chance Saddam will once again miscalculate, that he will misjudge our resolve, and in that event we must be prepared to use force with others if we can, and alone if we must. The American people must be prepared. They must be prepared for the possible consequences of military action. They must be prepared for the cost of rebuilding Iraq as the President said he is committed to do. They must be prepared for the tradeoffs that may be asked of them between competing priorities. They must be prepared for all these things and more because no matter how well conceived, no matter how well thought out a foreign policy, it cannot be sustained without the informed consent of the American people. If it comes to that, if it comes to war, I fully expect the President will come back to the American people and tell us what is expected of us. As a matter of fact, when he met with the congressional leadership and the committee chairmen about 10 to 15 days ago--I forget the exact date--we were all around the Cabinet table and at one point he turned to me and he said: Mr. Chairman, what do you think? And I said: Mr. President, I will be with you if you make an earnest effort to go through the United Nations, if you try to do this with our allies and friends; if in fact the U.N. does not support our effort, as in Kosovo, and if you are willing to be square with the American people, Mr. President, of what sacrifices we are going to ask of them, particularly the need to have a significant number of American forces in place in Iraq after Saddam Hussein is taken down. In the presence of all my colleagues at that meeting, he said: I will do that. He has never broken his word. He has made two very important speeches so far--one at the U.N. and one to the American people--about the danger of Saddam Hussein, but no one yet has told the people of Georgia, the people of Delaware, the people of this country what we will be asking of them because it will be profound. It may be necessary, but it will be profound. As I said, if it comes to war, the President, I am confident, will go to the American people. In his speech this week, he made a compelling case that Iraq's failure to disarm is our problem as well as the world's, but he has not yet made the case to the American people that the United States may have to solve this problem alone or with relatively few others, nor has he told us of the sacrifices that such a course of action could involve. I am confident he will do so, if and when it proves necessary, but I also want to be clear about the issues the President must address before committing our Armed Forces to combat in Iraq, as a moral obligation to level with our people. First, the consequences of military action: Attacking Iraq could and probably will go smoothly. We have the finest fighting force in the world. Our defense budget exceeds that of the next 15 countries combined. According to expert testimony my committee received this summer, Iraq's conventional forces are significantly weaker than they were during the Gulf War. As a leading expert in the Middle East, Mr. Fouad Ajami told the committee there is a strong likelihood the Iraqis will welcome us as liberators. While it would be reasonable to expect the best, it would be foolhardy not to prepare for the worst. There is a danger in assuming that attacking Iraq will be, as some suggest, ``a cakewalk.'' We should all heed the powerful words of military analyst, Anthony Cordesman, who testified before the Foreign Relations Committee in July. He said to my committee: I think it is incredibly dangerous to be dismissive [of the difficulty]. It is very easy to send people home unused and alive. It is costly to send them home in body bags because we did not have a sufficient force when we engaged. And to be careless about this war, to me, would be a disaster . . . This is not a game, and it is not something to be decided from an armchair. There is a danger in attacking Iraq. There is a danger that attacking Iraq could precipitate what we are trying to prevent: Saddam's use of weapons of mass destruction against our troops. My friend from Georgia who is presiding is a military man. He is a former marine. He is a tough guy. He is level headed and straight. He might be interested that last Sunday, as I came down to the memorial for firefighters--he knows I commute every day and I never come to Washington on Sunday--but there was a tribute to fallen firefighters which occurs every year and I was asked to speak. As I got off the train, I ran into a four-star--I do not want to identify him too closely--general in one of our branches who held a very high position very recently and still holds a very high position. I asked him what he thought about the possibility of this war, and he said he did not like it. He said two things to me, and I say this to the Presiding Officer, an ex-marine. He said there are two things that will be fundamentally different from ever before: We have never gone to war in an environment that could possibly be totally contaminated before we get there; and, number two, we have never gone house to house in a city of 4 million people. This all may work perfectly well. This all may go just so nicely. But to imply to the American people that is a surety would be immoral, disingenuous, and would reap a whirlwind if it does not occur. The American people are tough. They will do what they think is necessary for our security and they will make sacrifices. But I will have no part if we go to war providing pablum to them that somehow this is going to likely be an overwhelmingly easy undertaking. If we notice, everybody says the American people support this war. That is not true. They support this war if it is a 100-day war like the last war was. They do not support the President's ability to go to war unilaterally. If we look at all the polling data, what they support is if we go with our allies in response to a genuine threat, which I think exists, and if it is not going to be costly in terms of the loss of human life, American soldiers, then they overwhelmingly support it. Over half still support it even if there is some loss of life, but hardly anyone supports it if it is alone or if there is a significant loss of life. As CIA Director George Tenet stated in a letter to Senator Graham this week: Should Saddam conclude that a U.S.-led attack could no longer be deterred, he probably-- Let me say that again-- He probably would become much less constrained in adopting terrorist actions. Such terrorism might involve . . . chemical and biological weapons. Saddam might decide that the extreme step of assisting Islamist terrorists in conducting a WMD attack against the United States would be his last chance to exact vengeance by taking a large number of victims with him. There is a danger that Saddam would seek to spark a wider war. I just did one of the shows we all do with Charlie Rose. He quoted to me what I knew privately from my discussions with him: the former commander of CENTCOM testifying that he saw no need to go into Iraq now, and the cost would be high. There is a danger that Saddam would seek to spark a wider war. Many experts have expressed concern to my committee that if attacked Saddam Hussein would lash out at Israel. Last month, The New York Times reported that Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon told senior administration officials that Israel would strike back if Iraq attacks Israel. Then, key Arab countries could come under tremendous pressure to break with us and confront Israel. It would be wrong for us to tell Israel what they should or should not do in their self-defense, but it would also be wrong to ignore the risk that a war against Saddam Hussein will ignite a much larger conflagration. There is a danger that Saddam's downfall could lead to widespread civil unrest and reprisals. There is only one thing I disagree with in the President's speech on Monday. He said what could be worse than Saddam Hussein? I can tell you, a lot. As I said, there is a danger that Saddam's downfall could lead to widespread civil unrest and reprisal. Chaos could invite the Kurds to seize valuable oil fields; the Turks to cross the border in an effort to prevent a Kurdish state from arising; and Iran and even Syria to move in to fill a vacuum. Not one of these scenarios is inevitable. None should be used as an excuse for inaction. But each must figure into our planning and into the minds of the American people if we ultimately use force against Iraq. We must be honest with the American people. In his speech this week, the President made it clear that if military action is necessary, ``the United States and our allies will help the Iraqi people rebuild their economy and create the institutions of liberty in a unified Iraq and peace with its neighbors.'' This is a much more complicated country than Afghanistan. We are not done in Afghanistan. We have not kept our commitment in Afghanistan. We are taking on a big deal here. I know the Presiding Officer and my colleague from Ohio and my colleague from Vermont know Iraq is an artificially constructed nation. When has there been a circumstance in Iraq when there has been anything remotely approaching a democratic republic? I cannot think of it in the history of Iraq as defined now. The Kurds are Indo-European Sunnis, the Sunnis are Arab Sunnis, the Shiites, who make up 60 percent of the population primarily between the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, are Shiites who have been at war with the Sunnis. The Iranians are Shiite. There are 700,000 Iraqi Shiites in Iran. This is complicated stuff. But to listen to some of my colleagues on the floor who blow this off like, no problem, take down Saddam, there is a James Madison waiting to step into the vacuum, we will have a democratic republic, it will set a new tone and tenor, as the Vice President said, for all of the Middle East, because we will have a new democracy there, that is a big deal. It is a big undertaking. Why did the President say this? This is a critical commitment, one I wholeheartedly endorse, but it is not done out of altruism, but out of a hard-boiled calculation that in Iraq we cannot afford to trade a despot for chaos. None of this will be cost free. It will require a significant investment of military, financial, and human resources. Let's start with the cost of war. Last month the White House economic adviser estimated the cost of the military campaign in Iraq at between $100 and $200 billion. My friends in the Senate are all economic conservatives. Where are we going to get the money? I say to my friends, as I said in committee, those who want to see a national health insurance policy, forget it for a while. Those who want to make permanent the present tax cut, forget it for a while. As they say in parts of my State, ``you ain't got the money.'' It doesn't mean we shouldn't move on Iraq, but it means we should be honest with the American people, and tell them what the estimated cost by this administration is. By the way, that estimated cost is similar to what the Congressional Budget Office suggested. The higher cost estimates would result from a lengthy campaign and external factors such as a spike in oil prices if that occurs. That is just to win the war. The cost of securing the peace could be significantly higher and could extend years into the future. On the other hand, maybe we will end up with an Iraqi Government in place. There is plenty of money in Iraq. They can fund their own reconstruction. And that may happen. I am not being facetious. But it is not anywhere near certain. I say ``could'' because there are those who believe our commitment to Iraq the ``day after'' need not involve exorbitant expenditures. Former Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger told my committee in August, and Secretary Rumsfeld repeated it last month, that the United States would not have to stay too long in Iraq. They and others argue that Iraq has a talented population and considerable resources to pay for its own reconstruction. The problem is, one-third of that population hates the other two- thirds of the population. They say Iraq will quickly be able to organize itself politically, economically, and militarily into a peaceful, unified nation, free of weapons of mass destruction. The American people need to know that most experts believe Iraq will require considerable assistance politically, militarily, and economically. Indeed, they say we should speak not of ``the day after'' but of ``the decade after.'' My committee heard testimony in July from a military expert in post-conflict reconstruction. The fellow who headed up that department in the Pentagon stated that 75,000 troops would be required at a cost of $16 billion for just the first year, to maintain order, preserve Iraq's integrity, and secure its weapons of mass destruction sites. Just to do that. Just to do that. Other experts predict the United States will have to engage substantial resources in Iraq, which has no history of democracy, for many more years. When my cowboy friends say, ``Why do we need anybody? Let's go get them,'' I don't want all 75,000 of the forces being American. Anybody happen to notice recently that in Kuwait American military personnel are being picked off? Anybody happen to notice that? Anybody happen to notice the targets in Afghanistan? Where have we been? The American people need to know what the experts know. We have an obligation, the President has an obligation, to tell them, if the need arises. In a recent study in the Atlantic Monthly, James Fallows summed up the significant challenges that Iraqis will not be able to handle on their own. This is overwhelmingly agreed upon by left, right, and center. He says they will not be able on their own to handle the following: Cleaning up the after-effects of battle and malicious destruction Saddam Hussein may create with chemical and biological weapons or by sabotaging his own oil fields; providing basic humanitarian needs in the short term such as food, water, and medical care; dealing with refugees and displaced persons, the 700,000 Shiites in Iran--I remind Members of the 700,000 in Iran; catching Saddam Hussein if he tries to flee--we are still looking for Osama bin Laden. We are still looking for Omar the tent maker. We are still looking for these guys. We don't have them; Providing police protection and preventing reprisal killings; denazification of Baathist officials and security services; aiding in the formation of a new government; ensuring Iraq's territorial integrity and dealing with possible Iranian and Turkish intervention; rebuilding the oil industry while ensuring a smooth reentry of Iraqi oil into the world market. That is a finite list that everyone acknowledges no new government in Iraq could do quickly. Those who argue most vigorously that a post- Saddam Iraq can be a model and source of inspiration for democracy in the region and throughout the Muslim world must be prepared to back the massive, long term American commitment. To set that objective, but then to believe it can be done on the cheap, is a recipe for failure. Let me quote from Mr. Gingrich. This is a news report in The New York Times. The advisers, who include former House Speaker Newt Gingrich and Mr. Perle, argue the White House should create a high-level interagency group to coordinate military and reconstruction planning before an invasion takes place. That sort of powerful council could overcome the bureaucratic and philosophic divisions that have hindered reconstruction planning, the advisers contend. ``It was a mistake we made in Afghanistan,'' said Mr. Gingrich who sits on the Defense Policy Board. ``You shouldn't go into a country militarily without having thought through what it should look like afterwards.'' The mere fact that these men on the board are saying we should do this is evidence it has not been done yet. We must be clear with the American people that we are committing to Iraq for the long haul; not just the day after, but the decade after. Finally, let's consider the possible tradeoffs here. The President has argued that confronting Iraq would not detract from the unfinished war against terrorism. I believe he is right. We should be able to walk and chew gum at the same time. But if military action comes, it will take a herculean effort for senior leaders of our Government to stay focused on two major undertakings at once. War is intense. A new front against Iraq must not distract us from job number one--taking down al-Qaida. Let's also be clear that this could involve sacrifices. For example, the war on terrorism is putting intense demands on Navy Seals, Army Green Berets, Delta Commandos, Air Force ground controllers, and Arabic linguists. Units have been deployed to Afghanistan, Pakistan, Georgia, Yemen, Africa, and the Philippines, and last month the commander of United States special-operation forces requested an additional $23 billion over the next 5 years to prosecute the war against al-Qaida and other terrorist groups. Not--not--Iraq. Our intelligence services have also redirected resources to the war on terrorism. How are we going to pay for all this? Can we take on Iraq, prosecute the war on terrorism, and maintain the President's tax cut for the wealthiest Americans? Can we afford to repeal the estate tax for the top 2 percent of the population who pay it? What would be the prospects for national health insurance and prescription drug benefits in the near term? The point is, we will do what we have to do to protect our national security, but let's not kid ourselves that it can come down cost free, without tradeoffs, and without setting priorities. Setting priorities and making hard choices is what governing is all about. So is being forthright with the American people about what is expected of them. We should not be afraid to ask our fellow Americans to sacrifice for a vital cause if we conclude we should go to war. Generation after generation of Americans has done so willingly and will do it again if that is what they are called upon to do. But we must be straight with them. In conclusion, few resolutions that come before the Congress are as grave and consequential as the one before us today. We have heard powerful arguments on both sides of the resolution, and concerning the various amendments that have been presented. That is how it should be. We have come a long way during the last year. The administration that many thought would ignore the United Nations, ignore the Congress, has and is seeking the support of both. We have come a long way in 3 weeks, a long way since the White House first offered its draft resolution. This resolution and the President's words make it clear that the administration's objective is to disarm Iraq and that the rationale to enforce Iraq's obligations to the United Nations is the reason we would go, and that its determination is to work with others, not alone. The President has made it clear that war is neither imminent nor inevitable. I am confident that the reason the President, thankfully, disregarded the advice of some in the administration--that he understands the significant need for others to support us--is that fighting two wars, a war in Iraq and a war against terrorism, can be greatly assisted the more the world is with us. We do not need them if it comes to that. But the cost we will pay will be significantly higher. I compliment the President for recognizing that. I am absolutely confident the President will not take us to war alone. I am absolutely confident we will enhance his ability to get the world to be with us by us voting for this resolution. I am absolutely confident, if it comes time and need to go to war, with others or alone, the President will keep his commitment to make the third most important speech in his life, to come to the American people and tell them what is expected of them, what is being asked of them. To do any less would be to repeat the sin of Vietnam. And the sin of Vietnam, no matter what our view on Vietnam is, is not whether we went or didn't go. But the sin, in my view, is the failure of two Presidents to level with the American people of what the costs would be, what the continued involvement would require, and what was being asked of them. We cannot, must not, and, if I have anything to do with it, we will not do that again. I thank the Chair for its consideration and its patience. I yield the floor. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I have time tomorrow to speak, too. I will make a much longer speech on my views on this subject. There used to be a trial lawyer I practiced law under. I used to sit in the counsel chair next to him and watch how he tried cases. He used to say to the jury, when he started the case, his opening statement, he would say: I want you to keep your eye on the ball. I want you to focus on the issue at hand. He would turn to his client, who sometimes was not the most admirable of people, who may have been innocent but not admirable. And he would say: I want you to take a look at my client. You wouldn't invite my client home for dinner. You wouldn't want your daughter going out with my client. As a matter of fact, I wouldn't even go have a cup of coffee with him after this. The question is not whether or not he is a homely guy or a bad guy, or whether or not he is a guy who you would like to have as a friend. The question is, did he kill Cock Robin? Keep your eye on the ball. What is going to happen here is you are going to have the State coming in saying this is a bad guy. He is an ugly guy. Look at him, he doesn't dress very well. Look at him, he is not very amiable. Keep your eye on the ball. Just listening to my friend from Kansas and others today, I think we are kind of taking our eye off the ball. Tomorrow I will go into this in great detail. But let's remind ourselves why are we here right now. Why are we here, notwithstanding the fact Senator Lieberman and Congressman Gephardt went down and stood with the President of the United States and said they adopted a resolution? That is not why we are here today. We are not here because of that. We are here because of what the President told us. Everybody remember, keep your eye on the ball. The President said he has not decided whether or not we are going to go to war. He said it is his hope that we not go to war. It is his hope it can be avoided. Yet, for the first time in the history of the United States of America, in my judgment, the President of the United States is asking for the Congress to give him the equivalent of a declaration of war--to go to war--before the President has made up his mind. He has not made up his mind. Keep your eye on the ball. Follow the bouncing ball like in the old Lawrence Welk days. A, the President has not decided whether or not to go to war; B, the President says give me the authority to go to war; C, we say on what basis do you want to go to war, Mr. President? The details matter. If, for example, we leave here, setting a precedent, suggesting the reason we might go to war is because of this new doctrine of preemption, which no one has explained--no one has explained it. I sat at the White House, I say to my friend from Virginia, with Dr. Rice for hours. Dr. Rice said it is no different than what has always been the policy of the U.S. Well, if that is the case, then I don't have any problem. The President always has the right to act preemptively if we are in imminent danger. If they are coming up over the hill, he can respond; if troops are coming out of Tijuana, heading north, we can respond; if they are coming down from Toronto, we can respond; if missiles are on their way, we can respond. But that is not the way I hear it being used here. We are talking about preemption, as if we are adopting a policy. As Dr. Kissinger said before our committee, that will undo an agreement the Western World made in the early 1640s at the end of the religious wars in Europe, which said no country has a right to preemptively move against another country because they think they are going to be bad guys. So this is a pretty big deal. Words matter. And so I say to my friends, let's go back. Why did the President ask us for a resolution when he sent up the draft resolution? Why? He stated forthrightly why. He said: Because I need to demonstrate that I have support in order not to go to war. That is what he said. He said: You, the Congress, give me overwhelming support. Then the U.N. will know I mean it. Then the Security Council will say if we don't, he will, so we better. That is the reason why we are here. That is the reason, I remind my colleague from Connecticut and my friend from Virginia, why we are here. Otherwise, it is ridiculous--a President saying I don't know whether I want to go to war yet, but declare it. So I hope people don't start confusing things on this floor. I may not be around here after November--I hope I am; I am up for reelection, but I don't want to be on this floor 6 years from now and have someone stand up and inaccurately say, by the way, back in the year 2002, in October, we adopted a policy of preemption. Therefore, even though we are in no imminent danger, even though there is no violation of any international rule, we think the country of Xanadu are bad guys and we are invading. That would be a serious mistake. Let me tell you why--not because as an American and as President, if I were President, or as a Senator, or as a Congressman, I would like to have that ability. But, guess what, I don't want Beijing waking up one morning and saying, you know, we have a right to preemptively attack Taiwan. I don't want India waking up one morning and saying, by the way, we have a right preemptively to attack Pakistan. In case you are all wondering--and I know my colleagues are not, because they know the score and they are thinking about both of those things--both of those countries could conceivably reach that conclusion. It's not an impossibility, if the most powerful Nation in the world establishes an unnecessary doctrine. So let's keep our eye on the ball. Why are we being asked to do this--to give the President the kind of momentum he needs to allow the Secretary of State to convince the Security Council to do what they should do in the first place? The second point I would like to make is this: We are, right now, talking about preemption, when there is no need for any doctrine of preemption to justify us going against Iraq with others, or alone, if need be. Let's get the facts straight. There is a guy named Saddam Hussein who, in the early 1990s, broke international law, invaded another country, violating every rule of international law. The world, under the leadership of a President named Bush, united and expelled him from that country. Upon expulsion, he said a condition for your being able to remain in power, Saddam Hussein, is you sue for peace and you agree to the following terms of surrender. Those terms of surrender, unlike with the Treaty of Versailles and other treaties where surrender comes about, were in the form of concessions to the U.N., to the world. So he signed onto a number of resolutions. If the world decides it must use force for his failure to abide by the terms of surrender, then it is not preempting, it is enforcing. It is enforcing, it is finishing a war he reignited, because the only reason the war stopped is he sued for peace. So, for Lord's sake, anybody who decides to vote for this resolution, please do not rest it on this cockamamie notion of preemption. You will rue the day. If that is the precedent we establish for our own safety's sake, you will rue the day. The third point I want to make about keeping your eye on the ball here is--the fact of the matter is the President of the United States has not yet, A, made the decision about going to war and, B, if he decides to go to war, he has not made the case to the American people. Let me explain what I mean by that before my colleagues jump all over it. He made a clear case to the U.N. that by the standards of the United Nations, this man, Saddam Hussein, has flouted the rules of the U.N.--absolutely an overwhelming case. Then he came along on Monday and he made a clear case, in the minds of many, to the American people that Saddam Hussein is a danger to the United States. But there is one more case he has to make. Those of us out of the generation of Vietnam, and those who were in power during the generation of Vietnam, know that no matter how well articulated, no matter how well formulated a foreign policy is, it cannot be sustained without the informed consent of the American people. What is being asked of them? The American people do not know what is going to be asked of them yet. I am fully confident if the President decides, in concert with others, war is necessary, he will have to inform them before he launches it. I say that because he personally told me that. I asked him. My friend from Virginia may have been at the leadership meeting 3 weeks ago in the cabinet room when the President turned to me after others had spoken and said, ``Mr. Chairman, will you be with me?'' I said, ``Mr. President, I will be with you on the condition that you do two things: One, you make every effort possible to do this under the auspices of the U.N. or the coalition, like we did in Kosovo; and you inform the American people that it is going to require substantial American forces and substantial American money to stay in Iraq after Saddam Hussein is down.'' He looked at me in the presence of everybody and said, ``I will do that.'' So I take him at his word. I lay you 8 to 5, if you go home and ask your constituents who say they are for war--ask them the following question: How long do you think we are going to have to keep American forces in Iraq? I will lay you 8 to 5 that 90 percent will look at you with a blank stare and ask: What do you mean, stay in Iraq? What are you talking about, stay in Iraq? They have no notion. Senator Dodd, Senator Sarbanes, and I, and the Foreign Relations Committee held several very good hearings. At one hearing, we had the fellow who headed up the office in the Pentagon as to what we do after we win the war--planning. We had two other military experts. Do my colleagues know what they told us? They probably told you the same thing in Armed Services Committee. It is probable we will have to keep at least 75,000 American forces in Iraq for at least 1 year at a cost of $19 billion. Maybe it will not be 75,000. Maybe it will be 25,000; maybe 105,000. I do not know. But we have an obligation to tell our constituents. As I said to my good friend, Mr. Brownback, who is on our committee, in one of our hearings: Everything may go smoothly. And I think there is a possibility it could happen. If we have to go to war, everything may go smoothly, and once he is down and does not use chemical weapons, the army surrenders and the Republican Guard crumbles, and he is assassinated on the way out of town, and we get our hands on the weapons of mass destruction quickly, we identify where they are, we destroy them, and the rest of the world comes in to help us with the burden of keeping Iraq from splitting into at least three separate pieces--that could all happen. That is possible. What happens if it does not? Big nations cannot bluff. We should tell the American people straight up, and I am prepared to do it and support it: If, in fact, we are forced to go into Iraq with other nations, for his failure to comply, say goodbye for a while to the new permanent tax cut; say goodbye for a while to significant increases in health care funding; say goodbye for a while to a whole lot of issues for those who vote for this. This is the time for a little honesty in advertising. This is the time the American people are strong, they are bright, and they are willing to take this on. The one thing I believe they will not stand for is being sold a bill of goods. We are not stopping 400 miles short of Baghdad this time if we go. We are not. The Senator from West Virginia has said repeatedly, this is a considerable undertaking.