Joe Biden

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. If the Senator will continue to yield for just a moment, unless responding to questions, I do not plan on taking any more time. I am happy to yield the remainder of the time to Senator Lugar and other Senators. I am told Senator Durbin and others may want to speak. For the information of my colleagues, I do not plan, other than responding to questions if my good friend from Virginia has any, on using any more time. I yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, may I ask what the business before the Senate is?

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise today to support H.R. 3167, the Gerald B.H. Solomon Freedom Consolidation Act of 2001. This bill adds Slovakia to the countries eligible to receive assistance under the NATO Participation Act of 1994 and authorizes a total of $55.5 million in foreign military financing under the Arms Export Control Act to seven countries--Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Romania. This bill is a symbolic one. It authorizes funds that have already been appropriated, repackages them in order to highlight the ongoing process of NATO enlargement. Symbolism, however, in this case matters. Millions of central Europeans and east Europeans, and millions of Americans of central and eastern European descent, will welcome this restatement of NATO's so-called open-door policy--the policy of the Clinton administration and which had been continued by the current Bush administration. At the end of March, Prime Ministers and Presidents of all the NATO candidate countries, plus several leaders from current alliance members, met in Bucharest, Romania, to discuss the next round of NATO enlargement. Deputy Secretary of State Armitage led a high-level U.S. delegation to the meeting, which was characterized by a spirit of cooperation among the aspirant countries, many of which had been ancient rivals, which itself validated the process of enlargement, in my view. Parenthetically--I note that I have said before--even if the expansion of NATO in the last round did not materially impact upon the capacity of NATO and security of Europe, it did one incredibly important thing: Each of the aspirant countries, in order to be admitted to NATO, had to settle serious border disputes that existed; had to make sure their militaries were under civilian control; had to make sure they dealt with, in some cases, decades-old open sores within their society in order to demonstrate that they were part of the values, as well as the capacity, of NATO; that they shared the values of the West. I would argue that much of this would not have happened were it not for the aspirant countries seeking so desperately to become part of NATO. I think that, in and of itself, would be rationale enough to move. Much more than that has occurred. Four years ago, I had the honor of floor managing the resolution of ratification of an amendment to the Washington Treaty of 1949 whereby Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic were admitted to membership in NATO. On the night of April 30, 1998, in a dramatic rollcall vote in this Chamber, the resolution passed by a vote of 80 to 19. In November of this year, there will be an important NATO summit meeting in the ancient Czech capital of Prague. Several fundamental issues will be on the agenda in Prague, among them charting a new course for the alliance in the aftermath of September 11 and the antiterrorist campaign in Afghanistan, a qualitatively new relationship between NATO and Russia and a new round of enlargement of NATO. Last spring, NATO publicly declared that there would be no ``zero option'' for enlargement at Prague. Translated from diplo-speak, this means the alliance anticipates there will be at least one candidate country qualified for membership at Prague, and that country, and probably others, will be extended an invitation to join NATO. I have stated many times, including in the last round, that Slovenia has been qualified for NATO membership for several years and should have been invited to join the alliance as early as at the 1997 Madrid summit or at least at the 1999 Washington summit. My strong suspicion is that several other countries will be judged qualified for membership as well, but naming names at this time I think would be premature. Later this year, the alliance will evaluate how well each candidate country has fulfilled its so-called membership action plan and, equally important, will judge the strength of its democratic institutions and society. By late summer, the list of qualified aspirant countries should become much clearer than it is today. Meanwhile, this legislation wisely authorizes military assistance to all seven of the candidate countries generally judged to be in the running at this time and thereby sidesteps the pitfall of prematurely designating those to be invited. It seems to me this is not the time for lengthy debate on the merits of the next round of NATO enlargement. There will be ample opportunity for a thorough debate after candidates have been invited and their credentials submitted for ratification to the parliaments of the current 19 members of the alliance, including us. The rationale for enlargement, in my view, remains as valid as it was 4 years ago when this body overwhelmingly ratified the entry of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. NATO enlargement significantly furthers the process of moving the zone of stability eastward in Europe, thereby hastening the day when the continent will be truly whole and free. The three new members of NATO have made major contributions to the alliance campaigns in Bosnia and Kosovo and lately in the war against terrorism. Contrary to occasional sensational articles in the press, they are loyal, democratic allies contributing to the security of the North Atlantic area. Finally, NATO enlargement, contrary to the gloomy predictions of some pundits and some Members of this body, has not worsened our ties with Russia. A man I admire as much as any and with whom I served in the Senate, the distinguished former Senator from the State of New York, Patrick Moynihan--I hardly disagree with him on foreign policy. The one time we had a serious discussion and debate was on this issue. He was opposed to NATO enlargement. The basis for his rationale for being opposed to enlargement was that this would significantly damage bilateral relations with Russia at the time we needed to nurture that relationship. I argue--not that I was right--that the end result in 2002, after enlargement--I am not saying because of enlargement--the relationship between the United States and Russia is better than it was before enlargement, and it is as good as it has been since the last czar was in control in Russia. We have a leader in Russia now, who, for his own reasons--and I am not offering him as a Jeffersonian Democrat--is leading his nation to an open democracy. I suggest that not since Peter the Great has any Russian leader looked as far west as this man has and cast his lot with the West as much as he has. The predictions of doom and gloom relative to the relationship, for whatever reasons, have not turned out to be true. On the contrary, earlier this week, on May 14 at the NATO ministerial meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland, the alliance and Russia put their relationship on an unprecedented cooperative basis for creating a new NATO-Russia Council to deal with a variety of security issues. The Bush administration strongly supports this Freedom Consolidation Act. In a joint letter to me on May 7, Secretary of State Powell and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld wrote that the bill would ``reinforce our nation's commitment to the achievement of freedom, peace, and security in Europe . . . [and] would greatly enhance our ability to work with aspirant countries as they prepare to join with NATO and work with us to meet the 21st century's threats to our common security.'' Mr. President, I have no doubt that sometime next year this body will ratify the further enlargement of NATO by an overwhelming vote. For now, I urge my colleagues to join me in voting for the Freedom Consolidation Act as a symbolic gesture to support this so-called open- door policy that has served the alliance and this country so well. As I said, there will be time for us to debate whether or not the aspirant countries that are picked in Prague should or should not be the ones that are picked. I am sure we will have some disagreement in this Chamber about that. This is not to pick winners and losers. This is picking the aspirant countries that are known to everyone to have the most reasonable prospect of being issued an invitation to better situate themselves in meeting the criteria to be offered that membership. I look forward to discussion on this issue. I do not know there is all that much to discuss right now, but I look forward to discussion of this issue and to being in the Chamber with my two friends who are here to hopefully usher in a new round of members in the NATO enlargement scheme that will take place later in the year. I yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN. If the Senator will yield, how much time does the Senator from Delaware have under his control?

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I believe that is correct.

Mr. BIDEN. If the Senator will yield for me to answer, the answer is: The Senator is correct in his analysis as it relates to what the Secretary said. Let me speak to the first question, as I understood the specific question: When will the Senate get an opportunity to ascertain whether or not the countries chosen to be invited to become members of NATO are worthy of invitation and membership, and to answer indirectly the question, able to contribute to our mutual security? The answer is: We will do that at the time of the ratification debate. In the meantime, as my friend pointed out, the money has already been appropriated. The money is already going to these aspirant countries. I think it should have gone by the authorization process, and then the appropriations process. That is why I was smiling. We share a similar fate in armed services and foreign relations, more in foreign relations, quite frankly, than armed services, where the appropriators move in the absence of our moving. Let me be more specific. I argue that, even if not a single state that was, in fact, the recipient of any of this money, was invited to join NATO, it is in our interest that the money goes because the money is going for those aspirant countries to meet criteria we have set out, that we believe to be in the U.S. interest. It is in the U.S. interest that every one of the militaries in aspirant countries is under civilian control. It is in the U.S. interest that they have participatory democracies. It is in the U.S. interest they have no border disputes with their neighbors. It is also in the European interest. So even if not a single aspirant country meets the criteria that must be met, as cited by the Senator from Virginia quoting the Secretary of Defense, it is money well spent. The second reason we are doing this now is that it is important, in my view, to continue to display to these European aspirants that we are serious about considering them. What I do not want to see happen is us saying, well, we know only one of you are going to get in, and the other six say, well, what am I doing this for? Why am I making this effort? Why am I engaged in this? I want them to know we are serious about this. So even though the money is going forward, you say, well, they already know we are serious. We have already sent the money. It is being spent; it is being used. This authorization--which is putting, as my grandpop used to say, the sleigh before the horse--demonstrates to these folks that, if and when the President of the United States and NATO pick aspirants to join and the President sends the treaty up for amendment to the Senate, we are serious about it as well. This is not a game. This is not a game in our separation of powers-- most countries do not have the same system as we have. We confuse people a little bit because they have a parliamentary system. We have an executive branch and a legislative branch and never the twain shall meet, and constitutionally you have to get both of our approval. Notwithstanding the fact that the President may say we want to see Slovakia or Slovenia or whomever to join NATO, that is not good enough. It has to have a supermajority of the Senate saying yes as well. This legislation is an authorization after the fact. I promise there is not a single solitary ambassador representing any one of the countries who does not have C-SPAN on now listening to us. They know it doesn't mean much now. This is not going to resolve anything tonight, tomorrow, or next month, until the meeting in Prague, and it may not resolve anything then. This is to send the signal that we are serious, we mean it. You go out and do the things that are necessary to meet the criteria set out by the President, and the additional requirements, and we will seriously consider you. We are in the game with the President. The third point is the issue of whether or not these aspirant countries, if invited by 19 members of NATO to become a member of NATO, the question is, will they contribute to the security of the United States of America? Or will they be, as my friend implies or states--I don't want to put words in his mouth--a drag on our military? He cites Kosovo. It is true what my friend cites about the percentage of the airlift, the percentage of the air missions, the percentage of the munitions used, et cetera. But I also point out only 10 percent of those forces that remain in Kosovo are American forces. Mr. President, 85 percent are European and other willing nations there, keeping the peace. And I might add that if we do something too well, it is taken for granted and we forget what we did in the first place. I remind my friend that before we got into Kosovo, before we went to Bosnia, there were over a quarter million people killed, women and children. There were close to half a million people in the hills, freezing in the middle of the winter and we worried about them freezing. Every European capital was on edge worrying about immigration flows. It started this xenophobia about minority portions of the populations of Germany, France, and other countries. It is in our interest that there be a stable Europe. It is in our interest that a LePen is not getting 50 percent of the vote instead of 15 percent of the vote. It is in our interest that the skinheads in Germany do not become a morph of the neo-Nazi organizations that impact German policy. They have not. But I believe had another million people flowed out of the Balkans into those capitals, it would have further destabilized the political circumstance. It is true that no nation, none of our NATO allies, have kept their commitment to expand their military capability as we have. None have. He is absolutely right. Where does our interest lie? A number of our colleagues very much want to see us move into Iraq. It would be very useful if Bulgaria were part of NATO. We don't have to worry about overflight rights. They are part of NATO. We do not have to worry about a little thing like we worry about with our fickle Saudi friends as to whether they allow us to use an airbase we built for them and their protection. So I argue when we were trying to deal with this situation in Kosovo, Hungary became a valued ally. The issue for me is not so much that I think any aspirant country is going to be able to be the one man for a U.S. Air Force stealth aircraft moving on a precision-guided mission against an enemy. That will not happen. If the measure is, can they keep up with our technological capability, the answer is that none of the countries will ever qualify. I might add that some of our greatest and oldest allies may not qualify. Conversely, though, if the measure is, does their membership in NATO lend an additional capacity that impacts positively on U.S. interests, and they pay their way, then the answer to that question is, yes, they should be a part of NATO. That is a debate I am sure my friend and I will have when the President of the United States, if he does, comes back from Prague and says, I am sending up to Senator Warner and company an amendment to the Washington treaty asking for the following--1, or 7, or whatever--nations to become part of NATO. He will because he is so diligent and so knowledgeable about the U.S. military and military matters. I know him too well. And he should do this. We are lucky to have someone who will have the ability to do this. And then we will debate whether or not they warrant membership. What does Slovenia bring? What does so and so bring? That is the moment when that debate will take place. I yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I am sure my temperature will not rise as long as my good friend from Virginia continues to be the gentleman he always is.

Mr. BIDEN. Excuse me?

Mr. BIDEN. Let me respond briefly and then yield to my friend from Indiana or whoever seeks the floor. What I think we should be straight about here--I am not implying in any way the Senator from Virginia is not being straight--is that there is a growing school of thought that reflects the underlying view of my friend from Virginia--and, I might add, is made up of some of the most seasoned Members of the Senate, some of whom are World War II veterans, men who have been strongly supportive of NATO in the past and of our military--who basically do not think NATO is worth much anymore. The fact of the matter is, the indictment that the Senator paints is equally applicable to Britain, Germany, Spain, Italy--every NATO nation. Not the new guys. It was the old guys who did not let us have the overflight, remember?

Mr. BIDEN. The new guys are so gung ho being part of NATO, they would probably decide to give each of us citizenship if we asked for it. I am not at all worried about the new guys. I am worried about the old guys. We should have a debate someday on the floor, unrelated to expansion, about the utility of NATO because, in truth, many in the Defense Department and many--some on this floor-- think we are misallocating our resources to NATO, period; unrelated to Kosovo, unrelated to anything else. So I call everyone's attention to the subtext in this debate that really doesn't relate to new members. It relates to whether NATO has outlived its usefulness and whether we should be spending billions of dollars on NATO without any new members. It is a legitimate debate. I think it is dead wrong, but I think it is a legitimate debate. With regard to the issue of whether there is a fait accompli when an embossed document ends up on our desk, I might point out that my friend from Virginia had no difficulty with an embossed document that was the single most important treaty in the minds of our NATO allies--no difficulty rejecting it. It was called the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It did not slow you up a beat.

Mr. BIDEN. That may be. We can argue about that.

Mr. BIDEN. I don't doubt that. You were wrong then, you are wrong now. But that is irrelevant. The point is this. I was responding to a specific assertion. The Senator said: How will this body ever reject something that is put on our desk that is embossed, that has worldwide publicity, that the whole world is looking at, that all of our European friends are seeing? How could we ever reject anything like that? I point out that we have done that. We have no problem rejecting things in this place that we don't think we should do. I might add that we had multiple hearings in my committee--I don't remember, but I suspect also in my friend's committee, the Armed Services Committee. We had more than a dozen hearings before we voted on expansion, on whether or not the aspirant countries were qualified. Some of us, I think including the Senator from Virginia, traveled to the aspirant countries, sat down with their leadership, sat down with their chiefs of staff, sat down with their military and parliamentary leaders, and looked at their books--literally, not figuratively. I know I spent, with my colleague Dr. Haltzel, about 7 days doing that in the aspirant countries: Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and the Czech Republic. I spent that time as my other colleagues did. So I have no worry that we are going to have time. I am responding to the point made by the Senator, which is: Hey, look, this is a fait accompli. We are getting set up here. You guys passed this; you authorized this in addition to the money already going. What is going to happen here is we are going to come bouncing along and on December 9, or next January 14, or whatever date, we are going to have an embossed treaty, and it is going to be done, and there is not going to be any real debate, and it is going to be all over. I would say the past is prologue. The Foreign Relations Committee published a 550-page report on the last round of NATO enlargement. It contained the transcript of the hearings, a lengthy report on the trip that I took to Russia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, and many other reports. I do not remember--I do not want to state something I am not certain of--but I think the Armed Services Committee had hearings as well. So there is going to be no doubt there will be hearings. If the Senator, in Armed Services--if they want to hold hearings, I think that is a fine thing; no problem. I think it is premature now to hold those hearings. We had 7 days of debate on the floor the last time on NATO enlargement. I understand the concern of the Senator that we are going to, in effect, be presented with a fait accompli. Maybe his real worry is it is a fait accompli because he is a Republican and a Republican President would be submitting this. But I tell you, we Democrats are going to have no problem. We didn't have any problem with the last guy who submitted it, and my Republican friends had no problem when the last guy submitted it, a Democrat. I think it is an unfounded worry. If I believed the Senator was correct and the Senate is going to be put in a position of rubber-stamping or walking away, I would say you are right, Senator. But I see nothing from the past NATO enlargement round we went through, and I do not anticipate anything in this round, that will preclude a thorough investigation giving all 100 Members of the Senate and the American public an opportunity to make their own judgments about it, whether or not to accept the President's recommendation. When I say President's recommendation, if he doesn't sign on in Prague to the expansion, then there is no expansion. All 18 other nations can sign on, it doesn't matter. If he says no--no. Done. Finished. So that is what I mean when I say the President's recommendation. I have no doubt we are going to have an opportunity to fully explore this. My guess is--I make a prediction, which is a dangerous thing to do. The bulk of the debate on this floor will be why wasn't so-and-so included, as opposed to why did you include such-and-such country. But that remains to be seen. The bottom line is--and I will yield the floor to whomever seeks it--the bottom line is that we will have plenty of opportunity to debate whether or not the named countries--if there are any named countries, and there will be, I believe--whether they warrant the supermajority of the Senate to say: Yes, you are now a member of NATO because you met all the criteria and including the paragraph read from the Secretary of Defense's letter. I further state that the criticisms we can debate in other contexts that the Senator from Virginia raises about NATO aspirants are equally applicable to the original NATO members--that is a different story. I yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, we have the votes to win this anyway, notwithstanding the fact I truly appreciate the Senator's generous offer. I would be happy to try to accommodate him if I could. You cannot amend this.

Mr. BIDEN. The idea of us getting unanimous consent--he can seek unanimous consent. I imagine there are enough people--I don't think that is possible. The bottom line is I understand the Senator. I do not have the same concerns with any of the rhetoric. The rhetoric of George Bush: [a]ll of Europe's new democracies, from the Baltic to the Black Sea and all that lie between, should have the same chance for security and freedom--and the same chance to join the institutions of Europe--as Europe's old democracies have . . . I believe in NATO membership for all of Europe's democracies that seek it and are ready to share the responsibilities that NATO brings . . . [a]s we plan to enlarge NATO, no nation should be used as a pawn in the agenda of others . . . [w]e will not trade away the fate of free European peoples . . . [n]o more Munichs . . . [n]o more Yaltas . . . [a]s we plan the Prague Summit, we should not calculate how little we can get away with, but how much we can do to advance the cause of freedom. That is the most shining rhetoric in here. I am not prepared to support the withdrawal of the President's rhetoric from this legislation.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, it does not commit the United States and Congress to anything, except it communicates----

Mr. BIDEN. It communicates to all of the European aspirants that if they meet the requirements in the eyes of the Senate, and if they are recommended by our President, we will seriously consider their admission to NATO. We, the U.S. Senate, if they meet what each of us individually thinks is the minimum criteria or the maximum criteria, we take it seriously. This is not just a gesture of sending you money to help you move toward democratization to modernize your military. We, like the President, mean it. So if the Senator does not agree with--and I understand--the statement by President Bush, which I happen to agree with, which I fully respect, then he should not support this. I happen to agree with President Bush and the other, as the Senator says, ``rhetoric'' in this piece of legislation. So all it commits the United States to is to say the same thing President Bush said: We believe that all of Europe should be open and free, and that we will consider NATO membership for all European democracies that seek it and are ready to seek the responsibility NATO brings. That is what it commits us to, and that is why I support this. I thank my colleague.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the DNA Sexual Assault Justice Act of 2002, a bill that guarantees prompt justice to victims of sexual assault crimes through DNA technology. 99.9 percent, that is how accurate DNA evidence is. 1 in 30 billion, those are the odds someone else committed a crime if a suspect's DNA matches evidence at the crime scene. 20 or 30 years, that is how long DNA evidence from a crime scene lasts. Just 10 years ago DNA analysis of evidence could have cost thousands of dollars and taken months, now testing one sample costs $40 and can take days. Ten years ago forensic scientists needed blood the size of a bottle cap, now DNA testing can be done on a sample the size of a pinhead. The changes in DNA technology are remarkable, and mark a sea change in how we can fight crime, particularly sexual assault crimes. The FBI tells us that since 1998 the national DNA database has helped put away violent criminals in 4,179 investigations in 32 states. How? By matching the DNA crime evidence to the DNA profiles of offenders. Individual success stories of DNA ``cold hits'' in sexual assault cases makes these numbers all too real. For instance, in Florida, Kellie Green was brutally attached and raped in the laundry room of her apartment complex. Because of lack of funds, her rape kit sat on the shelf for three years until a persistent detective had it analyzed. The evidence matched the profile of a man already incarcerated for beating and raping a women 6 weeks before Kellie. Or take for example a 1996 case in St. Louis where two young girls were abducted from bus stops and raped at opposite ends of the city. The police were unable to identify a suspect. In 1999, the police decided to re-run the DNA testing to develop new leads. In January 2000, the DNA database matched the 1996 case to a 1999 rape case, and police where able to identify the perpetrator. Just days ago, the New York Police Department arrested a man linked to the rape of a woman four years ago. In 1997, a woman was horribly beaten, robbed and raped, there were no suspects. Several months ago,the perpetrator submitted a DNA sample as a condition of probation after serving time for burglary. That DNA sample matched the DNA from the 1997 rape. Crime solved, streets safer. Undoubtedly, DNA matching by comparing evidence gathered at the crime scene with offender samples entered on the national DNA database has proven to be the deciding factor in solving stranger sexual assault cases, it has revolutionized the criminal justice system, and brought closure and justice for victims. In light of the past successes and the future potential of DNA evidence, the reports about the backlog of untested rape kits and other crime scene waiting in police warehouses are simply shocking. Today I am introducing legislation, ``The DNA Sexual Assault Justice Act of 2002'', to strengthen the existing Federal DNA regime as an effective crime fighting tool. My bill addresses five, pressing issues. First, exactly how bad is the backlog of untested rape kits nationwide? A 1999 government report found over 180,000 rape kits were sitting, untested, on the storage shelves of police department and laboratories all across the country. While recent press reports estimate that the number today is approaching 500,000 untested rape kits, I am told that there is no current, accurate numbers of the backlog. Behind every single one of those rape kits is a victim who deserves recognition and justice. Accordingly, my legislation would require the Attorney General to survey every single law enforcement agency in the country to assess the extent of the backlog of rape kits waiting to undergo DNA testing. To combat the problem of rape kit backlogs, it is imperative to know the real numbers, and how best to utilize federal resources. Second, how can existing Federal law be strengthened to make sure that State crime labs have the funds for the critical DNA analysis needed to solve sex assault cases? To fight crime most effectively, we must both test rape kits and enter convicted offender DNA samples into the DNA database. There has been explosive growth in the use of forensic sciences by law enforcement. A government survey found that in 2000 alone, crime labs received 31,000 cases, a 47 percent increase from almost 21,000 cases in 1999. In addition, the labs received 177,000 convicted offender DNA samples, an almost 77 percent increase from 100,242 samples in 1999. All across the country, laboratories report personnel shortages in the face of this overwhelming work. According to this same government survey, on average,there are 6 employees in a state crime lab--a lab that must not only do test DNA for hundreds of cases, but also run forensic tests on blood, footprints or ballistic evidence. The bill I'm introducing would: 1. increase current funding levels to both test rape kits and to process and upload offender samples; and 2. allow local governments to apply directly to the Justice Department for these grants. I thank my colleagues, Senators Kohl and DeWine, who began this effort with the DNA Backlog Elimination At of 2000. Third, what assistance does the FBI need to keep up with the crushing number of DNA samples which need to be tested or stored in the national database? I am told that the current national DNA database, known as the Combined DNA Index, or ``CODIS'', is nearing capacity of convicted offender DNA samples. My bill would provide funds to the FBI to 1. Upgrade the national DNA computer database to handle the huge projections of samples; and 2. process and upload Federal convicted offender DNA samples into the database. Efforts to include more Federal and State convicted offenders in our database just makes plain sense to fight crime. We know that sexual assault is a crime with one of the highest rates of recidivism, and that many sexual assault crimes are committed by those with past convictions for other kinds of crime. Their DNA samples from prior convictions help law enforcement efforts enormously. Fourth, what additional tools are needed to help treat victims of sexual assault? One group that understands the importance of gathering credible DNA evidence are forensic sexual assault nurse examiners, who are sensitive to the trauma of this horrible crime and make sure that patients are not revictimized in the aftermath. These programs should be in each and every emergency room and play an integral role in police departments, bridging the gap between the law and the medicine. Likewise, tapping the power of DNA requires well-trained law enforcement who know how to collect and preserve DNA evidence from the crime scene. Training should be a matter of course for all law enforcement. No rape kit evidence will lead to the perpetrator if the DNA evidence is collected improperly. The DNA Sexual Assault Justice Act would create a new grant program to carry out sexual assault examiner programs and training. And it would train law enforcement personnel in the handling of sexual assault cases, including drug- facilitated assaults, and the collection and use of DNA samples for use as forensic evidence. Fifth, what can be done to ensure that sexual assault offenders who cannot be identified by their victim are nevertheless brought to justice? Profound injustice is done to rape victims when delayed DNA testing leads to a ``cold hit'' after the statute of limitations has expired. For example, Jeri Elster was brutally raped in her California home, and for years the police were unable to solve the crime. Seven years later, DNA from the rape matched a man in jail for an unrelated crime. Yet the rapist was never charged, convicted, or sentenced because California's statute of limitations had expired the previous year. The DNA Sexual Assault Justice Act of 2000 would change current law to authorize Federal ``John Doe/DNA indictments'' that will permit Federal prosecutors to issue an indictment identifying an unknown defendant by his DNA profile within the 5-year statute of limitations. Once outstanding, the DNA indictment would permit prosecution at anytime once there was a DNA ``cold hit'' through the national DNA database system. John De/DNA indictments strike the right balance between encouraging swift and efficient investigations, recognizing the durability and credibility of DNA evidence and preventing an injustice if a cold hit happens years after the crime. The law must catch up with the technology. I started looking at this issue almost two decades ago when I began drafting the Violence Against Women Act. In fact, it is the Violence Against Women Act that provided the first funding to sexual assault nurse examiner programs. The DNA Sexual Justice Act of 2000 is the next step, a way to connect the dots between the extraordinary strides in DNA technology and my commitment to ending violence against women. We must ensure that justice delayed is not justice denied.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, Senator Helms and I are proud to introduce today the Global Pathogen Surveillance Act of 2002. Senator Helms is recovering from his heart surgery and is unable to be here today, but let me note our joint efforts in recognizing the importance of disease surveillance and preparing this bill for introduction. In recent years, we have joined forces on a number of sensible foreign policy initiatives and I am proud that we are doing so once again. I am also especially pleased that Senators Kennedy and Frist, the chairman and ranking member of the Public Health Subcommittee of the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee, have also agreed to be original cosponsors of this bill. This bill authorizes $150 million over the next 2 years to provide assistance to developing nations to improve global disease surveillance to help prevent and contain both biological weapons attacks and naturally occurring infectious disease outbreaks around the world. As the ranking member and chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, respectively, Senator Helms and I recognize all too well that biological weapons are a global threat with no respect for borders. A terrorist group could launch a biological weapons attack in Mexico in the expectation that the epidemic would quickly spread to the United States. A rogue state might experiment with new disease strains in another country, intending later to release them here. A biological weapons threat need not begin in the United States to reach our shores. For that reason, our response to the biological weapons threat cannot be limited to the United States alone. Global disease surveillance, a systematic approach to tracking disease outbreaks as they occur and evolve around the world, is essential to any real international response. This country is making enormous advances on the domestic front in bioterrorism defense. $3 billion has been appropriated for this purpose in FY 2002, including $1.1 billion to improve State and local public health infrastructure. Delaware's share will include $6.7 million from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to improve the public health infrastructure and $548,000 to improve hospital readiness in my State. The House and Senate are currently in conference to reconcile competing versions of a comprehensive bioterrorism bill drafted last fall following the anthrax attacks via the U.S. postal system. Those attacks, which killed five individuals and infected more than twenty people, highlighted our domestic vulnerabilities to a biological weapons attack. We need to further strengthen our Nation's public health system, improve Federal public health laboratories, and fund the necessary research and procurement for vaccines and treatments to respond better to future bioterrorist attacks. As an original co- sponsor of the Senate bill, I know the final package taking shape in conference will achieve those goals and I look forward to its enactment into law. Nevertheless, any effective response to the challenge of biological weapons must also have an international component. Limiting our response to U.S. territory would be shortsighted and doomed to failure. A dangerous pathogen released on another continent can quickly spread to the United States in a matter of days, if not hours. This is the dark side of globalization. International trade, travel, and migration patterns offer unlimited opportunities for pathogens to spread across national borders and to move from one continent to another. Moreover, an overseas epidemic could give us our first warning of a new disease strain that was developed by a country or by terrorists for use as a biological weapon, or that could be used by others for that purpose. We should make no mistake: in today's world, all infectious disease epidemics, wherever they occur and whether they are deliberately engineered or are naturally occurring, are a potential threat to all nations, including the United States. How does disease surveillance fit into all of this? A biological weapons attack succeeds partly through the element of surprise. As Dr. Alan P. Zelicoff of the Sandia National Laboratory testified before the Foreign Relations Committee in March, early warning of a biological weapons attact can prevent illness and death in all but a small fraction of those infected. A cluster of flu-like symptoms in a city or region may be dismissed by individual physicians as just the flu when in fact it may be anthrax, plague, or another biological weapon. Armed with the knowledge, however, that a biological weapons attack has in fact occurred, doctors and nurses can examine their patients in a different light and, in many cases, effectively treat infected individuals. Disease surveillance, a comprehensive reporting system to quickly identify and communicate abnormal patterns of symptoms and illnesses, can quickly alert doctors across a region that a suspicious disease outbreak has occurred. Epidemiological specialists can then investigate and combat the outbreak. And if it's a new disease or strain, we can begin to develop treatments that much earlier. A good surveillance system requires trained epidemiological personnel, adequate laboratory tools for quick diagnosis, and communications equipment to circulate information. Even in the United States today, many States and localities rely on old-fashioned pencil and paper methods of tracking disease patterns. Thankfully, we are addressing those domestic deficiencies through the bioterrorism bill in conference. For example, in Delaware, we are developing the first, comprehensive, state-wide electronic reporting system for infectious diseases. This system will be used as a prototype for other states, and will enable much earlier detection of infectious disease outbreaks, both natural and bioterrorist. I and my congressional colleagues in the delegation have been working for over two years to get this project up and running, and we were successful in obtaining $2.6 million in funding for this project over the past 2 years. I and my colleagues have requested $1.4 million for additional funding in FY 2003, and we are extremely optimistic that this funding will be forthcoming. It is vitally important that we extend these initiatives into the international arena. However, as many developing countries are way behind us in terms of public health resources, laboratories, personnel, and communications, these countries will need help just to get to the starting point we have already reached in this country. An effective disease surveillance system is beneficial even in the absence of biological weapons attacks. Bubonic plague is bubonic plague, whether it is deliberately engineered or naturally occurring. Just as disease surveillance can help contain a biological weapons attack, it can also help contain a naturally occurring outbreak of infectious disease. According to the World Health Organization, 30 new infectious diseases have emerged over the past thirty years; between 1996 and 2001 alone, more than 800 infectious disease outbreaks occurred around the world, on every continent. With better surveillance, we can do a better job of mitigating the consequences of these disease outbreaks. In 2000, the World Health Organization established the first truly global disease surveillance system, the Global Alert and Response Network, to monitor and track infectious disease outbreaks in every region of the world. The WHO has done an impressive job so far with this initiative, working on a shoestring budget. But this global network is only as good as its components, individual nations. Unfortunately, developing nations, those nations most likely to experience rapid disease outbreaks, simply do not possess the trained personnel, the laboratory equipment, or the public health infrastructure to track evolving disease patterns and detect emerging pathogens. According to a report by the National Intelligence Council, developing nations in Africa and Asia have established only rudimentary systems, if any at all, for disease surveillance, response, and prevention. The World Health Organization reports that more than sixty percent of laboratory equipment in developing countries is either outdated or non-functioning. This lack of preparedness can lead to tragic results. In August 1994 in Surat, a city in western India, a surge of complaints on flea infestation and a growing rat population was followed by a cluster of reports on patients exhibiting the symptoms of pneumonic plague. However, authorities were unable to connect the dots until the plague had spread to seven states across India, ultimately killing 56 people and costing the Indian economy $600 million. Had the Indian authorities employed better surveillance tools, they may well have contained the epidemic, limited the loss of life, and surely avoided the panic that led to economically disastrous embargoes on trade and travel. An outbreak of pneumonic plague in India this February was detected more quickly and contained with only a few deaths, and no costly panic. Developing nations are the weak links in any comprehensive global disease surveillance network. Unless we take action to shore up their capabilities to detect and contain disease outbreaks, we leave the entire world vulnerable to a deliberate biological weapons attack or a virulent natural epidemic. It is for these reasons that Senator Helms and I have worked together in recent months to craft the Global Pathogen Surveillance Act of 2002. This bill will authorize $150 million in FY 2003 and FY 2004 to strengthen the disease surveillance capabilities of developing nations. First, the bill seeks to ensure in developing nations a greater number of personnel trained in basic epidemiological techniques. It offers enhanced in-country training for medical and laboratory personnel and the opportunity for select personnel to come to the United States to receive training in our Centers for Disease Control laboratories and Master of Public Health programs in American universities. Second, the bill provides assistance to developing nations to acquire basic laboratory equipment, including items as mundane as microscopes, to facilitate the quick diagnosis of pathogens. Third, the bill enables developing nations to obtain communications equipment to quickly transmit data on disease patterns and pathogen diagnoses, both inside a nation and to regional organizations and the WHO. Again, we're not talking about fancy high-tech equipment, but basics like fax machines and Internet-equipped computers. Finally, the bill gives preference to countries that agree to let experts from the United States or international organizations investigate any suspicious disease outbreaks. If passed, the Global Pathogen Surveillance Act of 2002 will go a long way in ensuring that developing nations acquire the basic disease surveillance capabilities to link up effectively with the WHO's global network. This bill offers an inexpensive and common sense solution to a problem of global proportions, the dual threat of biological weapons and naturally occurring infectious diseases. The funding authorized is only a tiny fraction of what we will spend domestically on bioterrorism defenses, but this investment will pay enormous dividends in terms of our national security. Let me close with an excerpt of testimony from the Foreign Relations Committee hearing last September on bioterrorism. Dr. D.A. Henderson, the man who spearheaded the successful international campaign to eradicate smallpox in the 1970's, recently stepped down from a short- term position as the director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness in the Department of Health and Human Services. In that position, he was vested with the responsibility for helping organize the U.S. government's response to future bioterrorist attacks. Dr. Henderson, who at the time of the hearing was the head of the Johns Hopkins University Center for Civilian Biodefense Strategies, was very clear on the value of global disease surveillance: In cooperation with the WHO and other countries, we need to strengthen greatly our intelligence gathering capability. A focus on international surveillance and on scientist-to- scientist communication will be necessary if we are to have an early warning about the possible development and production of biological weapons by rogue nations or groups. Dr. Henderson is exactly right. We cannot leave the rest of the world to fend for itself in combating biological weapons and infectious diseases if we are to ensure America's security. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the Global Pathogen Surveillance Act of 2002 be printed in the the Record.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, Senator Helms and I are proud to introduce today the Global Pathogen Surveillance Act of 2002. Senator Helms is recovering from his heart surgery and is unable to be here today, but let me note our joint efforts in recognizing the importance of disease surveillance and preparing this bill for introduction. In recent years, we have joined forces on a number of sensible foreign policy initiatives and I am proud that we are doing so once again. I am also especially pleased that Senators Kennedy and Frist, the chairman and ranking member of the Public Health Subcommittee of the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee, have also agreed to be original cosponsors of this bill. This bill authorizes $150 million over the next 2 years to provide assistance to developing nations to improve global disease surveillance to help prevent and contain both biological weapons attacks and naturally occurring infectious disease outbreaks around the world. As the ranking member and chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, respectively, Senator Helms and I recognize all too well that biological weapons are a global threat with no respect for borders. A terrorist group could launch a biological weapons attack in Mexico in the expectation that the epidemic would quickly spread to the United States. A rogue state might experiment with new disease strains in another country, intending later to release them here. A biological weapons threat need not begin in the United States to reach our shores. For that reason, our response to the biological weapons threat cannot be limited to the United States alone. Global disease surveillance, a systematic approach to tracking disease outbreaks as they occur and evolve around the world, is essential to any real international response. This country is making enormous advances on the domestic front in bioterrorism defense. $3 billion has been appropriated for this purpose in FY 2002, including $1.1 billion to improve State and local public health infrastructure. Delaware's share will include $6.7 million from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to improve the public health infrastructure and $548,000 to improve hospital readiness in my State. The House and Senate are currently in conference to reconcile competing versions of a comprehensive bioterrorism bill drafted last fall following the anthrax attacks via the U.S. postal system. Those attacks, which killed five individuals and infected more than twenty people, highlighted our domestic vulnerabilities to a biological weapons attack. We need to further strengthen our Nation's public health system, improve Federal public health laboratories, and fund the necessary research and procurement for vaccines and treatments to respond better to future bioterrorist attacks. As an original co- sponsor of the Senate bill, I know the final package taking shape in conference will achieve those goals and I look forward to its enactment into law. Nevertheless, any effective response to the challenge of biological weapons must also have an international component. Limiting our response to U.S. territory would be shortsighted and doomed to failure. A dangerous pathogen released on another continent can quickly spread to the United States in a matter of days, if not hours. This is the dark side of globalization. International trade, travel, and migration patterns offer unlimited opportunities for pathogens to spread across national borders and to move from one continent to another. Moreover, an overseas epidemic could give us our first warning of a new disease strain that was developed by a country or by terrorists for use as a biological weapon, or that could be used by others for that purpose. We should make no mistake: in today's world, all infectious disease epidemics, wherever they occur and whether they are deliberately engineered or are naturally occurring, are a potential threat to all nations, including the United States. How does disease surveillance fit into all of this? A biological weapons attack succeeds partly through the element of surprise. As Dr. Alan P. Zelicoff of the Sandia National Laboratory testified before the Foreign Relations Committee in March, early warning of a biological weapons attact can prevent illness and death in all but a small fraction of those infected. A cluster of flu-like symptoms in a city or region may be dismissed by individual physicians as just the flu when in fact it may be anthrax, plague, or another biological weapon. Armed with the knowledge, however, that a biological weapons attack has in fact occurred, doctors and nurses can examine their patients in a different light and, in many cases, effectively treat infected individuals. Disease surveillance, a comprehensive reporting system to quickly identify and communicate abnormal patterns of symptoms and illnesses, can quickly alert doctors across a region that a suspicious disease outbreak has occurred. Epidemiological specialists can then investigate and combat the outbreak. And if it's a new disease or strain, we can begin to develop treatments that much earlier. A good surveillance system requires trained epidemiological personnel, adequate laboratory tools for quick diagnosis, and communications equipment to circulate information. Even in the United States today, many States and localities rely on old-fashioned pencil and paper methods of tracking disease patterns. Thankfully, we are addressing those domestic deficiencies through the bioterrorism bill in conference. For example, in Delaware, we are developing the first, comprehensive, state-wide electronic reporting system for infectious diseases. This system will be used as a prototype for other states, and will enable much earlier detection of infectious disease outbreaks, both natural and bioterrorist. I and my congressional colleagues in the delegation have been working for over two years to get this project up and running, and we were successful in obtaining $2.6 million in funding for this project over the past 2 years. I and my colleagues have requested $1.4 million for additional funding in FY 2003, and we are extremely optimistic that this funding will be forthcoming. It is vitally important that we extend these initiatives into the international arena. However, as many developing countries are way behind us in terms of public health resources, laboratories, personnel, and communications, these countries will need help just to get to the starting point we have already reached in this country. An effective disease surveillance system is beneficial even in the absence of biological weapons attacks. Bubonic plague is bubonic plague, whether it is deliberately engineered or naturally occurring. Just as disease surveillance can help contain a biological weapons attack, it can also help contain a naturally occurring outbreak of infectious disease. According to the World Health Organization, 30 new infectious diseases have emerged over the past thirty years; between 1996 and 2001 alone, more than 800 infectious disease outbreaks occurred around the world, on every continent. With better surveillance, we can do a better job of mitigating the consequences of these disease outbreaks. In 2000, the World Health Organization established the first truly global disease surveillance system, the Global Alert and Response Network, to monitor and track infectious disease outbreaks in every region of the world. The WHO has done an impressive job so far with this initiative, working on a shoestring budget. But this global network is only as good as its components, individual nations. Unfortunately, developing nations, those nations most likely to experience rapid disease outbreaks, simply do not possess the trained personnel, the laboratory equipment, or the public health infrastructure to track evolving disease patterns and detect emerging pathogens. According to a report by the National Intelligence Council, developing nations in Africa and Asia have established only rudimentary systems, if any at all, for disease surveillance, response, and prevention. The World Health Organization reports that more than sixty percent of laboratory equipment in developing countries is either outdated or non-functioning. This lack of preparedness can lead to tragic results. In August 1994 in Surat, a city in western India, a surge of complaints on flea infestation and a growing rat population was followed by a cluster of reports on patients exhibiting the symptoms of pneumonic plague. However, authorities were unable to connect the dots until the plague had spread to seven states across India, ultimately killing 56 people and costing the Indian economy $600 million. Had the Indian authorities employed better surveillance tools, they may well have contained the epidemic, limited the loss of life, and surely avoided the panic that led to economically disastrous embargoes on trade and travel. An outbreak of pneumonic plague in India this February was detected more quickly and contained with only a few deaths, and no costly panic. Developing nations are the weak links in any comprehensive global disease surveillance network. Unless we take action to shore up their capabilities to detect and contain disease outbreaks, we leave the entire world vulnerable to a deliberate biological weapons attack or a virulent natural epidemic. It is for these reasons that Senator Helms and I have worked together in recent months to craft the Global Pathogen Surveillance Act of 2002. This bill will authorize $150 million in FY 2003 and FY 2004 to strengthen the disease surveillance capabilities of developing nations. First, the bill seeks to ensure in developing nations a greater number of personnel trained in basic epidemiological techniques. It offers enhanced in-country training for medical and laboratory personnel and the opportunity for select personnel to come to the United States to receive training in our Centers for Disease Control laboratories and Master of Public Health programs in American universities. Second, the bill provides assistance to developing nations to acquire basic laboratory equipment, including items as mundane as microscopes, to facilitate the quick diagnosis of pathogens. Third, the bill enables developing nations to obtain communications equipment to quickly transmit data on disease patterns and pathogen diagnoses, both inside a nation and to regional organizations and the WHO. Again, we're not talking about fancy high-tech equipment, but basics like fax machines and Internet-equipped computers. Finally, the bill gives preference to countries that agree to let experts from the United States or international organizations investigate any suspicious disease outbreaks. If passed, the Global Pathogen Surveillance Act of 2002 will go a long way in ensuring that developing nations acquire the basic disease surveillance capabilities to link up effectively with the WHO's global network. This bill offers an inexpensive and common sense solution to a problem of global proportions, the dual threat of biological weapons and naturally occurring infectious diseases. The funding authorized is only a tiny fraction of what we will spend domestically on bioterrorism defenses, but this investment will pay enormous dividends in terms of our national security. Let me close with an excerpt of testimony from the Foreign Relations Committee hearing last September on bioterrorism. Dr. D.A. Henderson, the man who spearheaded the successful international campaign to eradicate smallpox in the 1970's, recently stepped down from a short- term position as the director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness in the Department of Health and Human Services. In that position, he was vested with the responsibility for helping organize the U.S. government's response to future bioterrorist attacks. Dr. Henderson, who at the time of the hearing was the head of the Johns Hopkins University Center for Civilian Biodefense Strategies, was very clear on the value of global disease surveillance: In cooperation with the WHO and other countries, we need to strengthen greatly our intelligence gathering capability. A focus on international surveillance and on scientist-to- scientist communication will be necessary if we are to have an early warning about the possible development and production of biological weapons by rogue nations or groups. Dr. Henderson is exactly right. We cannot leave the rest of the world to fend for itself in combating biological weapons and infectious diseases if we are to ensure America's security. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the Global Pathogen Surveillance Act of 2002 be printed in the the Record.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to be able to proceed as if in morning business for up to 15 minutes.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, for the past few weeks we have been hearing sensationalist claims of a massacre in the Jenin refugee camp. In recent days, hundreds of reporters and international relief workers have descended on the camp, and not one has verified these claims. In fact, the Washington Times today quotes the senior official in Yasser Arafat's Fatah movement in Jenin as saying that the death toll stands at fifty six. Other reports place the number around fifty one. Even one death is one too many, and there is still considerable excavation work to do in the camp. But it seems apparent that there was no massacre in Jenin. Let me say that again. It seems apparent that there was no massacre in Jenin. There are not 500 civilian dead, as the Palestinians initially claimed. What happened in Jenin was an intense battle fought at close quarters in which 23 Israeli soldiers also lost their lives in Jenin. And the leader of Fatah said today, trying to make the case that they ``won'' the battle, that ``although we lost 56, they lost 23.'' The relatively high number of Israeli casualties is in itself an indicator of what went on in the camp. Had the Israelis chosen, they could have easily sat back and pummeled the camp from afar, and starved the terrorists. Instead, they chose to do things the hard way. They went house to house to house, from booby-trapped house to booby-trapped house to booby-trapped house. In doing so to avoid civilian casualties, they inflicted casualties upon themselves. That is why they went house to house--not to inflict civilian casualties. Were there civilian casualties? Almost certainly there were. But there is a world of difference between the deliberate targeting of civilians and the unintentional and inevitable casualties that were bound to occur in a place such as Jenin where terrorists deliberately hid themselves among civilians. Remember we got a dose of that ourselves during the gulf war. As you recall, Saddam Hussein hid himself and others in the midst of civilian populations in civilian centers. That is the picture I believe will emerge as the facts are examined in the cold light of day--that there was no massacre, and that, although there were civilians killed, the number was relatively small, more in line with the number of Israelis killed--that is, proportionately. And I think the world should understand that. There has been considerable discussion in recent days about a United Nations' factfinding panel assembled by Secretary General Kofi Annan. As of a couple of hours ago, the U.N. officially decided not to send the factfinding mission. But the impression we have heard in the world is that the reason the factfinding mission was not sent is because of Israeli intransigence. U.N. leadership, I believe under Kofi Annan, had the best intentions. But Israel has voiced what I believe to be legitimate concerns about the composition, the procedures, and terms of reference this team was supposed to operate under. Reports indicate that the team is now disbanding. Unfortunately, in my view, the United Nations should have met the legitimate concerns and proceeded with the mission. It is hard to blame Israel for having doubts about the objectivity of a factfinding team. Israel has also voiced concerns over the lack of adequate representation on the U.N. team of counterterrorism and military experts. It argues, in my view, with justification that the events in Jenin must be seen in their proper context. Israel did not invade Jenin on a whim; it did so to destroy the terrorist infrastructure, and only after the Palestinian Authority-- this is an important point--only after the Palestinian Authority, whom the Israelis and the rest of the world equipped with weapons to keep peace and order--only after the Palestinian Authority refused to carry out its obligations to destroy this terrorist infrastructure. According to the Israeli Government, 23 suicide bombers came from Jenin. These 23 were responsible for the deaths of 57 Israelis, and the injury of 1,000 more. Is it fair--and I think it is fair--to ask the U.N. what its officials were saying to the Palestinian Authority about the use of a U.N.-run camp as a launching pad for terrorism? To many Israelis, it appears as if the U.N. turned a blind eye to Palestinian terrorism, while it seems intent on smearing Israel for its legitimate response to that terror. I would suggest a fairer thing to do would be for the U.N. to hold an internal review and ask internally what the U.N. team in Jenin, responsible for Jenin, knew or did not know about the role the Palestinian Authority was playing. What did they know? I am not saying they were complicitous. What did they know? With such a breakdown, wouldn't we be looking if it occurred here? If there was a group in charge of overseeing a particular dilemma within the United States, and something terrible happened, wouldn't we ask ourselves, What did we know about what was going on? Nonetheless, not withstanding this, the Israelis have not rejected the U.N. team. Foreign Minister Peres of Israel, in a letter to Secretary of State Powell, has said the team should ``examine the Palestinian terrorist infrastructure and activity in the camp and emanating from it which necessitated Israel's military actions. In doing so, the team will bear in mind the relevant elements of international law, including the right of self-defense and the obligation to prevent terrorism.'' He goes on to say: [I]n accordance with the fact-finding nature of the team, its work should be submitted as facts only, and not observations. This is a vital concern for Israel in order to avoid abuse and misuse of the work of the Team for political purposes. Peres then goes on to add: Israel understands that requests for interviews with public servants, past or present, or documents, will be made through the government of Israel. While Israel will carefully consider these requests, Israel will have the right to make final determinations regarding availability to the Team. This sovereign discretion is mandated by Israeli law. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the entire text of the letter to Secretary of State Powell be printed in the Record.

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, what is so unreasonable about these requests? Would any other democratic country behave any differently? Indeed, would any Arab country ever be subjected to a similar factfinding investigation in the first place? Perhaps the false cries of massacre coming from Arab circles are a reflection of what they may have come to expect from their own governments. Was there ever a U.N. factfinding team that investigated the Syrian massacre of as many as 20,000 civilians in the city of Hama in 1982? Was the international press corps ever able to conduct their own investigations there as they are now in Jenin? Was there ever a U.N. investigation of the genocidal Anfal campaign launched by Saddam Hussein against the Kurds in the late 1980s? Of course not. There is a double standard when it comes to Israel. And many of those criticizing Israel today know that Israel holds itself to a higher standard than the countries I mentioned. And Israel is saying the U.N. team is welcome as long as it has a fair mandate and agreed-upon terms of reference. If there is to be true factfinding, and not a witch hunt, then what is so unreasonable about Israel's requests? My purpose is not to apologize for Israel. As some of you know--both in the caucus, out of the caucus, here on the floor, and in other fora--I have been very critical of some of Israel's actions. Indeed, many Israelis have raised questions about the military operation in Jenin, including allegations of disproportionate use of force and the denial of medical and humanitarian access. In fact, the leading Israeli newspaper editorialized yesterday that the army should conduct an internal investigation about possible gratuitous vandalism and destruction of property. Did Israel do everything right in Jenin? In all probability, no. Did they engage in a wholesale massacre of innocent civilians? No. How many Arab countries have the capacity for such self-examination? How many Arab countries have a supreme court that would do as the Israeli Supreme Court did to intervene to prevent the Israeli Army from removing bodies in Jenin? We are not talking about some dictatorship or puppet regime. The Israeli Supreme Court--not an international organization--the Israeli Supreme Court intervened and said: Whoa, don't remove those bodies, army. We want to know what the facts are. So to give this presumption that Israel intentionally massacred, and then attempted to cover up, I think is incredibly unfair and will be proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, to be wrong. I believe we have an obligation to examine the facts before we jump to conclusions. Based on reports now coming from Jenin, it appears that far too many reached conclusions before they had the facts. In the end, Madam President, some may choose to cling to myths in order to perpetuate hatred and conflict. Some prefer to live in the realm of fiction rather than deal with cold, hard facts. But the rest of us should not engage in such self-delusion. If my reading of the facts is correct--and it may not be--but if it is correct, then we will, in the coming days, see the Jenin massacre as the massacre that never was. I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.