Joe Biden

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, before I speak on what I came over to the floor to discuss today, I would like to respond in 60 seconds to the Senator from Iowa. I don't think the stimulus bill is about partisanship. The stimulus bill is about whether we are going to take care of workers and displaced people because of the economy or whether we are going to reward corporate entities that are not going to reinvest instantly in the economy and stimulate the economy. How can we stimulate the economy if what we are going to be ``spending'' through either tax expenditures or direct expenditures doesn't spend out for 2 years or more? This is about fairness. The stimulus package I have seen so far is not remotely bipartisan and is in fact a serious mistake, based on what I know, unless there is some iteration in the last 12 hours of which I am unaware.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise today to take issue with Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's comments yesterday in Brussels, in which he called for reducing NATO forces in Bosnia by one-third by the end of next year. I find Secretary Rumsfeld's proposal both faulty in its logic, and dangerous in its implications. Mr. Rumsfeld based his suggestion upon the allegation that the size of the NATO mission in Bosnia, known as SFOR, is ``putting an increasing strain on both our forces and our resources when they face growing demands from critical missions in the war on terrorism.'' From this assertion, one might think that the United States and NATO have massive numbers of troops in Bosnia. In fact, SFOR's strength is now about 18,400 troops. The U.S. contingent is only 3,100. According to the Pentagon's new Quadrennial Defense Review, we must be able to ``swiftly defeat aggression in overlapping major conflicts while preserving the option of decisive victory, including regime change or occupation and conduct a limited number of smaller-scale contingency operations.'' By any calculation, therefore, we should have plenty of troops and materiel to handle the smaller-scale operation in Bosnia and still meet our commitments elsewhere in the war on terrorism. In short, Secretary Rumsfeld's argument that Bosnia is a serious drain on our war-fighting capabilities simply doesn't wash. I should also point out that we have already greatly reduced the size of the NATO-led operation in Bosnia. The current level of 18,400 troops is down from an original 60,000. The 3,100 Americans are down from an original 20,000. Moreover, why should we quit a game in the fourth quarter when we're winning? Bosnia and Herzegovina still has many problems, but even the harshest critic of our policy there must admit that significant progress has been made since the Dayton Accords were signed six years ago. For example, there non-nationalist, multi-ethnic coalitions now govern both the Federation and the national parliaments. All of the political, economic, and social progress has been made possible by the umbrella of SFOR. But the victory is not complete. In that context, I'm rather surprised that Secretary Rumsfeld juxtaposed Bosnia with the war on terrorism, because al-Qaeda is known to have cells in Bosnia. The Saudi Arabian who co-starred with Osama bin Laden in the grotesque video from Afghanistan, which nauseated the civilized world, had previously fought with the mujahedin in Bosnia. Mr. President, extirpating al-Qaeda from Bosnia is reason enough to keep the three thousand American troops there. I have been to Bosnia nearly every year since the outbreak of hostilities in 1992. I have talked with most of the leading politicians of all ethnic groups. I have visited the headquarters of the combined Muslim-Croat Federation Army outside Sarajevo and reviewed the troops there. I have met with local officials from Banja Luka and Brcko in the north to Mostar in the south. No one, Mr. President, no one - - thinks that the current peace and progress in Bosnia could survive a premature withdrawal of NATO, especially American, troops. Rather than setting an artificial date for withdrawal of NATO forces from Bosnia, we should concentrate on finishing the job, and then withdraw victoriously. Moreover, the United States is sending a totally confusing message to the world, friends and foes alike. The same week that we reopen our embassy in Kabul, and James Dobbins, our envoy to Afghanistan, declares that we are there to stay, we announce that we will leave Bosnia within twelve months! How seriously can Afghans take Mr. Dobbins' declaration? Can the Afghans possibly think that we will stay the course there when we won't do it in the Balkans? Or are we perhaps planning to transfer some American troops from Bosnia to peacekeeping duty in Afghanistan? I don't think so. Secretary Rumsfeld and others in the Administration frequently declare that peacekeeping duty is a poor use of the American military. Unfortunately, however, the Administration's mantra runs afoul of the so-called Strategic Concept, the document which guides overall NATO strategy. The Strategic Concept lists ethnic and religious conflicts like Bosnia among the greatest threats to the Alliance. If we're going to opt out of NATO peace enforcing missions, and we're going to exclude NATO from our anti-terrorist military campaigns as we have done in Afghanistan, then what does that tell our allies about our commitment to NATO? I suppose we'll agree to keep an American general as Supreme Allied Commander Europe. Unfortunately, Secretary Rumsfeld's arbitrary deadline-setting in Bosnia fits right into the Administration's announcement that we will withdraw unilaterally from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Russia, a decision whose folly I criticized on this floor less than a week ago. This administration's foreign and defense policy is driven by ideology, not by a realistic threat assessment. A stable Europe is the precondition for our pursuing terrorists in Central Asia, the Far East, or the Middle East. Since we continue to preach ``in together, out together'' in the Balkans, what will we do if our European NATO partners point out twelve months from now--as is likely to be the case--that there is still need for SFOR to remain in Bosnia? In that case the administration's theory will collide with the hard facts of reality. Whether reality or ideology will win out will be more than an academic question. The future, both of the Balkans, and of NATO, may depend on the answer. The American people should recognize the risky gamble that Mr. Rumsfeld's rigid ideology asks us to embark upon. I thank the Chair and yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise to point out that while the attention of the world is now rightly focused on Afghanistan and the war against terrorism there, we should not forget that a large part of the oil and gas consumed by the United States and the rest of the industrialized world comes from the conflict-ridden Middle East. In addition to addressing the issue of energy independence through new domestic sources of supply, conservation, and the development of renewable energy resources, it is imperative for us to be thinking abut the best possible way of protecting the security of alternative sources of oil and gas outside the United States. The Caspian Sea is also on Russia's doorstep, and we should encourage development that will foster positive political as well as economic relations with the world's second largest oil exporter. Russia's recent refusal to follow OPEC's lead in slashing production is one more example of its ability to play a positive role on world oil markets, and the recently opened $2.5 billion Caspian oil pipeline, Russia's largest joint investment to date, and one in which U.S. firms hold more than a one-third interest, is an example of the kind of project that will encourage Moscow to continue to look westward. Akezhan Kazhegeldin, an economist, businessman, and former prime minister of oil-rich Kazakhstan, has written a thoughtful article on these subjects that appeared in the Russian journal Vremya Novostei on October 15, 2001. In his article, Dr. Kazhegeldin states that oil and gas from Kazakhstan and the other energy producing nations of the former Soviet Union could provide an important backup source of energy, complementing what now comes from the Persian Gulf countries. Moreover, referring to the debate surrounding the route of future, additional pipelines carrying oil to consuming countries, Dr. Kazhegeldin asserts that there is no reason for the West and Russia to be at loggerheads now that the Cold War is over. He goes on to describe how the West and Russia could, in his view, work together on a comprehensive pipeline solution that would benefit everyone. Some of Dr. Kazhegeldin's ideas will undoubtedly elicit healthy debate. I urge my colleagues to read his provocative article, and I ask that the text be printed in the Record. The article follows. [From Vremya Novostei, Oct. 15, 2001] ``Global Arc of Stability: The way Russia and the Caspian Can Make the World Stable'' (By Akezhan Kazhegeldin) The September 11 tragic events and launching of the Afghan campaign, seen as the first stage in ``the global war against terror'', have changed the world dramatically. Protection of peaceful citizens from possible terror acts appears as just a tip of the huge pyramid of new problems. We are facing an acute and more global problem, the problem of ensuring the industrial world's economic safety. The supply of the developed nations' energy, above all, oil and gas, is a critical and vulnerable element in the world's economic relations. A great part of the developed oil fields are concentrated in the highly insecure and conflict-ridden Middle Eastern region, which makes the threat of oil blockade and energy crisis for the industrial countries, the main oil and gas consumers, a perpetual nightmare. Unpredictable dictators are no less dangerous than terrorist groups. Should the interests of both in the region coincide, the rest of the world would find itself in an impasse. Even if everything goes very well and the antiterrorist campaign ends quickly, the community of industrial countries will have to make sure that the threat of energy blackmail is ruled out in principle. In the global energy system, it is necessary to use reserve and back-up methods in order to ensure safety. Caspian oil reserves can play a major role here. For the past decade, politicians and journalists have been debating about the problem of Caspian oil perhaps more heatedly than the industry professionals. It has almost been made into a stake in the new Great Game, the U.S-Russian rivalry over the control of the region and its riches. This confrontation has become the legacy of the old ``bloc'' model of the world. Wayne Merry, a former U.S. State Department and Pentagon official, now a senior associate at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, describes its sources: ``. . . Washington concentrated its efforts on one great strategic project to assure US primacy in the region. . . . The idea was to bypass existing pipelines in Russia, squeeze out Iran, bring energy supplies from the Caspian region to a transhipment point in a NATO country, and thereby assure the independent futures of the producing and transit countries.'' Understandably, Moscow clearly saw the threat to its interests and resisted U.S. plans. However, both sides played their parts by force of habit, without their usual passion. The reason is that the interests of Russia and the West (not only the U.S.) in the region are actually not conflicting. Some regional leaders tried to artificially keep alive the conflict between them as they hoped to secure foreign support for their authoritarian regimes. Now that many old patterns have been left behind in the 20th century for good, the common interests of the industrial and democratic countries allow them to work out joint approaches to ensure their energy independence. Owing to this, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have a historic opportunity to become stable partners of both Russia and the West, and to be integrated into the world economy. Naturally, this integration should entail bringing their political systems in line with the international democratic and market economy standards. ``A glance at other post- colonial regions in Africa and Asia shows that the first generation of `Big Man' leaders often does as much harm to their countries as did the departing imperial powers, creating a painful legacy for future generations to sort out,'' concludes Wayne Merry. ``American long-term interests in Central Asia are best served by seeking to engage tomorrow's leaders and assuring that, when the region's energy reserves do become important to the outside world, these leaders will look to the United States as a friend and not as yet another external exploiter.'' Setting aside the controversial definition of the Central Asian countries as post-colonial ones, one should admit that the time when the region's energy reserves do become important to the outside world is nearing. Though geological exploration of the Caspian shelf is far from being completed, and many experts are not inclined to share the fanciful expectations of ``dozens of new Kuwaits'', it is clear that the region's oil and gas reserves are extremely large. However, energy projects can't become global automatically, thanks only to rich oilfields. Stable export routes are required to deliver oil and gas to the global markets. Even all the reserves of the Caspian states put together won't make the Caspian project global. It is necessary to select and develop the routes to transport oil and gas to the global markets--to the consumers in Europe, U.S., and Asian countries. The most politically and economically viable option is to transport the Caspian ``big oil'' up to the north, into Russia and further on into Eastern and Western Europe, to the consumers and transshipment ports. Economically, this option seems much more attractive, since the construction is to take place on a plain, in populated areas with a developed infrastructure. Russia's European region has enough qualified manpower and electricity for oil pumping. Russian plants produce pipes and other equipment. Stability in Russia and the neighboring countries guarantees safety of the route and its uninterrupted operation. If chosen, the Russian option would mean turning the energy flow from south to north. It will permit the in-depth integration of Russia and Central Asia into a united Europe and simultaneously charge Europe and Russia with a common political mission of ensuring energy independence for the industrial countries. It will allow oil-producing countries of the Caspian region to play a major role in the global energy market. Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and--in the long term, Turkmenistan, could, along with the North Sea oil producing countries, become a real alternative to OPEC and get significant political benefits. The main advantage of the northern export route for Caspian oil consists in the availability of a branched pipeline network in Russia. It is much easier and cheaper to improve and develop the existing system than to construct a new one. I mean the pipelines owned by the Transneft company and the recently constructed CPC line from Western Kazakhstan to the Black Sea. The CPC alone cannot provide exporters with access to the global market. For natural reasons, the Bosporus and Dardanelles have a limited carrying capacity. The Black Sea ecosystem is vulnerable, as this sea is warm and almost closed. Turkey has already announced its intention to limit the number of giant tankers passing through its straits. Instead of forcing Turkey to agree by means of political pressure, we should respect its fundamental interests and seek other solutions in addition to the CPC capacities. The pipeline would enable Russia to solve several of its specific problems. For instance, to strengthen the special status of the Kaliningrad region as Russia's outpost in Western Europe. If the pipeline goes via the Kaliningrad region, the region could not only solve some of its economic problems, but also get additional security guarantees in case of NATO's expansion to the East. A place of its own in the EU economy would be the best guarantee for the region. In any case, with any combination of routes, Russia would be the main player in a Caspian-European project. Moreover, Russia should initiate its realization. Technological and economic calculations will give optimal solutions. However, political will and vision are still primary considerations. History teaches us that it is they rather than mathematical and economic calculations that have brought into existence such giant projects as the Suez and Panama Canals that formed the global markets of those days. Looking into the future and putting aside the required political decisions, I would like to stress that the Russian route could give an incredibly promising opportunity of opening up global markets for Eurasian oil and gas. This opportunity includes building an oil-carrier port in the Murmansk region on the Barents Sea. The non-freezing, deep- sea port would become the gateway to the global market for Caspian, Siberian and, prospectively, for Timanoperchersk oil as well, as the northern oil will require outlets to world markets. In the Murmansk region, some former military ports can reportedly be used right now by tankers. From there, they can quickly and safely reach not only Western European ports, but also the U.S. and Canada's eastern coast. If gas-liquefying installations are built there, it would be hard to imagine a more natural route for a pipeline which will transport gas from the Russian polar regions and the Arctic Ocean's shelf. In addition to the oil pipeline, a parallel gas pipeline should be built to provide Kazakh and Turkmen gas access to global markets that will not compete with the existing Russian gas routes to Western Europe. Constructing gas and oil pipelines simultaneously will make it possible to significantly cut capital expenditures and make transportation for long distances economically viable. By the way, the length of this route can be compared to the gas export line running from Tyumen's north to Western Europe. Today's situation on the gas market is such that the Central Asian countries will long sit on their riches waiting for investors hindered by the lack of access to global markets. I am speaking not only about the Turkmen gas. The share of gas in the Caspian hydrocarbon reserves can be much higher than those suggested by the most optimistic forecasts. On the one hand, Caspian gas should be available when the industrial world needs it badly. On the other hand, Caspian gas won't be a rival for Russian gas and a source of contention between Russia and its neighbors in Central Asia. Where the two huge pipelines run side by side, where a joint exploitation system exists, one will naturally expect to have a transcontinental highway and info-highway--a powerful communication line originating from Europe and going further to the south. These prospects are both exciting and distant. However, they should be taken into account when addressing today's problems. No doubt, the global economy does have enough investment resources for such a large-scale project. The U.S. Congress has given $40 billion for primary measures to safeguard national security. Much less investment is needed to ensure energy security of the industrial states. Especially as it is much more reasonable and profitable to invest in crisis prevention than in recovering from them. A pipeline bridge between the Caspian region and Western Europe, Central Asia and the world's oceans will help solve the problem of the globalization of Eurasian energy resources. It could become a basis for an ``arc of stability'' in Europe. It not only shifts the so-called arc of tension running close to Russia from the Balkans via the Caucasus, Central Asia, Iran, and Afghanistan, but will also exclude the Caspian states--the critical link--from this chain. When involved in the global economy, these countries could turn into strongholds of stability in a part of Asia that today poses major threats to the world.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, 9 months ago I stood before this body as a proud cosponsor of the Retired Pay Restoration Act of 2001. This bill, which I also cosponsored in the last Congress, seeks to redress a major inequity that has resulted in a serious slight to the dedicated men and women who have selflessly served our Nation. It is an injustice that has puzzled me for decades. Current law bans so-called ``concurrent receipt'' of VA disability compensation and military retired pay, so that the amount of any VA disability payment to a military retiree is subtracted from the monthly retirement check. The obvious flaw of this rule is clear to the vast majority of the members of this body and to most members of the House. In its original form, this legislation garnered 78 cosponsors in the Senate and a whopping 378 members in the House. It seems that this was something that should have made it through the Conference Committee process without much question. But, unfortunately, what we saw emerge from conference was a real disappointment to me, to many Members of this body, and most of all, to our brave men and women--both those who have served in the past and those who continue to serve and continue to face the risk of disability. Here was an opportunity--a real chance to address a serious inequity and we let it fall by the way side. What message are we sending to our Armed Services? This incongruity only hurts those men and women who have devoted the majority of their working lives to our Nation because it only affects military retirees. If a soldier retires from the service after 20 years and has sustained a service-connected disability along the way, then their VA disability payments are subtracted from their military pensions. It makes no sense that those in uniform who suffer a service-connected disability end up being penalized for deciding to remain in the military, while those who chose to leave the military receive their disability payments along with any pension they may receive from an additional employer. The longer you serve in the military, the more you are penalized. Does this make sense? It doesn't to me. They surely have earned both. We have been fighting this fight now for too long. Year after year, it is brought to the floor and year after year Senators stand up and sing its praises. Now more than ever, Americans are painfully aware of what the sacrifices of our Armed Forces mean to us all. The horrific attacks upon our country on September 11 and the recent 60th anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbor have made us all appreciate the millions of Americans who have selflessly served our nation and continue to protect our freedoms today. When our troops eventually return from serving in Afghanistan, undoubtedly there will be some among them who will find themselves penalized by our inability to correct this wrong. I am frustrated that even in this time when the importance of our troops is more evident than ever, we continue to shortchange our veterans. So here we are--poised to send a vastly reduced version of legislation that had huge bipartisan support in Congress to the President for signature. It is my hope the minor concessions made under the Department of Defense authorization conference report will serve as a stepping-stone for future improvements. But still, how many more military retirees must see their VA disability payments reduce their retirement benefits before more meaningful changes are made and this inequality is ended? We have troops in the field as I speak, putting their safety on the line to protect our way of life, and passage of this Defense Authorization bill is vital to our military operations. So it is important that this bill be passed. But, I want to put my colleagues and this administration on notice, this isn't the last battle in this war. One day those who put their lives at risk by wearing the uniform of this country, and who become disabled from their service, won't be punished for their duty. This is an unfairness that should have been corrected years ago, and an unfairness that will continue to plague those who offered their lives for the freedom we all enjoy. There is too much at stake here and I am not going to give up the fight to enact full concurrent receipt until we get this corrected.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, today I am introducing legislation, along with Senators Sessions, Cleland, Cochran, and Dayton that simply ensures that personnel serving in Korea get the same tax benefits as personnel serving in other forward deployed areas of the world such as Kuwait and the Balkans. I am hoping that this legislation can be added to the economic stimulus package, but if not, I want to make other Senators aware of the need to take this action for the brave men and women serving in Korea. We cannot fix all of the quality of life problems in Korea overnight, but we can at least provide basic equity in the tax treatment of military personnel who serve there so that they get the same benefits those in Kuwait and the Balkans get. Let me share with my colleagues some of the facts that led us to decide that this tax equity is needed and is needed now. While we have representatives of every service in Korea, the bulk of our force is from the Army. Seventeen percent of the entire Army is stationed in, on orders to, or returning from the Republic of Korea at any given time. That's about 37,000 soldiers. Unlike most Army postings, which tend to be for six months, ninety- six percent of those stationed in Korea are there for at least one year of unaccompanied duty. In some Army specialities, personnel are asked to serve for far more than one unaccompanied, year-long tour in Korea, which encourages experienced personnel to leave the Army. Duty tours in Korea involve longer separations from family, under worse quality of life conditions than almost any other overseas Army post, in a military zone that is clearly hostile, for less pay. This is a serious moral issue. Let me give you an example, a typical E-5 will make $5,136 less, $2,292 in Federal taxes that must be paid and not getting the $2,844 separation ration if sent to Korea rather than the Balkans. Our men and women in the military do not serve to become rich, but people notice and morale suffers when one assignment means working in poor conditions for a year and taking a $5,000 pay-cut. When I say the conditions are poor, I want people to know that I am not exaggerating. The quality of life in Korea is recognized as substantially lower than other overseas posts and far lower than within the United States. Consider that orders for Korea have the highest command declination rate and the highest ``no show'' rate in the Army. Even worse, look at the housing situation. Only ten percent of the command sponsored service members serving in Korea can be housed, and that housing is generally substandard. Compare this to seventy-two percent of forces deployed to Japan and seventy-four percent of forces in Europe having housing available. Let me explain what I mean by substandard housing in Korea. The same Quonset huts built in the 1950s as temporary structures are still being used in 2001 to house troops today. Those huts are being shared by 4 or more personnel, often at a level of Sergeant or higher, which is well below standard quarters for such rank. I visited those Quonset huts when I traveled to Korea in August. I saw the sand bags they have to put out when it rains to prevent major flooding. I witnessed the cramped living quarters; even worse than my freshman college dorm room. I have heard that when winter comes, and Korean winters are famous for their severity, these buildings are much like living in an igloo. Our troops make the best of this deplorable situation, but they deserve some relief. These are the men and women on whom we rely to deter North Korean aggression on a peninsula that is still technically in a state of war. Because the tour of duty is unaccompanied for ninety-six percent of the service members there, most of the approximately 21,000 married military personnel in Korea are forced to maintain 2 households. The substandard accommodations available force significant out-of-pocket expenses for basic items like food for both households, phone access, transportation, and other items basic to other posts. The Command estimates that $3,000 to $5,000 per year are spent by deployed personnel on these ``hidden costs.'' Any family that has had to budget knows that this is a significant economic burden at a time when these families are already enduring a year of separation. It is no wonder that the Army has trouble filling billets in Korea. If you combine the tax disparity and the ``hidden costs'', a mid-level E-5 will make $8,000 to $10,000 less if deployed to Korea versus the Balkans or Kuwait. This is unacceptable, and it is something that we can fix now. The command estimates that granting pay equity would cost approximately $85 million a year. That is surely the least we owe the fine men and women serving in Korea today.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, today I am introducing legislation, along with Senators Sessions, Cleland, Cochran, and Dayton that simply ensures that personnel serving in Korea get the same tax benefits as personnel serving in other forward deployed areas of the world such as Kuwait and the Balkans. I am hoping that this legislation can be added to the economic stimulus package, but if not, I want to make other Senators aware of the need to take this action for the brave men and women serving in Korea. We cannot fix all of the quality of life problems in Korea overnight, but we can at least provide basic equity in the tax treatment of military personnel who serve there so that they get the same benefits those in Kuwait and the Balkans get. Let me share with my colleagues some of the facts that led us to decide that this tax equity is needed and is needed now. While we have representatives of every service in Korea, the bulk of our force is from the Army. Seventeen percent of the entire Army is stationed in, on orders to, or returning from the Republic of Korea at any given time. That's about 37,000 soldiers. Unlike most Army postings, which tend to be for six months, ninety- six percent of those stationed in Korea are there for at least one year of unaccompanied duty. In some Army specialities, personnel are asked to serve for far more than one unaccompanied, year-long tour in Korea, which encourages experienced personnel to leave the Army. Duty tours in Korea involve longer separations from family, under worse quality of life conditions than almost any other overseas Army post, in a military zone that is clearly hostile, for less pay. This is a serious moral issue. Let me give you an example, a typical E-5 will make $5,136 less, $2,292 in Federal taxes that must be paid and not getting the $2,844 separation ration if sent to Korea rather than the Balkans. Our men and women in the military do not serve to become rich, but people notice and morale suffers when one assignment means working in poor conditions for a year and taking a $5,000 pay-cut. When I say the conditions are poor, I want people to know that I am not exaggerating. The quality of life in Korea is recognized as substantially lower than other overseas posts and far lower than within the United States. Consider that orders for Korea have the highest command declination rate and the highest ``no show'' rate in the Army. Even worse, look at the housing situation. Only ten percent of the command sponsored service members serving in Korea can be housed, and that housing is generally substandard. Compare this to seventy-two percent of forces deployed to Japan and seventy-four percent of forces in Europe having housing available. Let me explain what I mean by substandard housing in Korea. The same Quonset huts built in the 1950s as temporary structures are still being used in 2001 to house troops today. Those huts are being shared by 4 or more personnel, often at a level of Sergeant or higher, which is well below standard quarters for such rank. I visited those Quonset huts when I traveled to Korea in August. I saw the sand bags they have to put out when it rains to prevent major flooding. I witnessed the cramped living quarters; even worse than my freshman college dorm room. I have heard that when winter comes, and Korean winters are famous for their severity, these buildings are much like living in an igloo. Our troops make the best of this deplorable situation, but they deserve some relief. These are the men and women on whom we rely to deter North Korean aggression on a peninsula that is still technically in a state of war. Because the tour of duty is unaccompanied for ninety-six percent of the service members there, most of the approximately 21,000 married military personnel in Korea are forced to maintain 2 households. The substandard accommodations available force significant out-of-pocket expenses for basic items like food for both households, phone access, transportation, and other items basic to other posts. The Command estimates that $3,000 to $5,000 per year are spent by deployed personnel on these ``hidden costs.'' Any family that has had to budget knows that this is a significant economic burden at a time when these families are already enduring a year of separation. It is no wonder that the Army has trouble filling billets in Korea. If you combine the tax disparity and the ``hidden costs'', a mid-level E-5 will make $8,000 to $10,000 less if deployed to Korea versus the Balkans or Kuwait. This is unacceptable, and it is something that we can fix now. The command estimates that granting pay equity would cost approximately $85 million a year. That is surely the least we owe the fine men and women serving in Korea today.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator yield briefly for a unanimous consent request?

Mr. BIDEN. I ask unanimous consent that at the cessation of the Senator's 15 minutes I be recognized to proceed for up to 15 minutes as in morning business, unless the managers of the bill have some business relating to the bill.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, parliamentary inquiry: Am I able to proceed for 15 minutes as in morning business?

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise this morning to speak to a decision that I am told and have read is about to be made by the President--a very significant decision and, I think, an incredibly dangerous one--to serve notice that the United States of America is going to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. Under the treaty, as you know, a President is able to give notice 6 months in advance of the intention to withdraw. Mr. President, we live in tumultuous times. The transition from the old cold war alignments to new patterns of conflict and cooperation is picking up speed. This transition is not quiet, but noisy and violent. For 3 months now, it has been propelled by a new war. In the modern world, high technology and rapid communications and transportation put our own country and our own people on the front lines of that war. We are on the cutting edge of revolutionary developments in everything from medicine to military affairs. We are also on the receiving end of everything from anthrax to the attacks of September 11--and we will remain vulnerable in the years to come. The question is: how vulnerable? How shall we deal with this accelerated and violent transition? How well is the Administration dealing with it? And is their primary answer--withdrawing from ABM and building a star wars system--at all responsive to our vulnerabilities? We can find some answers in both the experience of the last 3 months and the President's speech yesterday at the Citadel. Wars are chaotic events, but they impose a discipline upon us. We must focus on the highest-priority challenges. We must use our resources wisely, rather than trying to satisfy every whim. We must seek out and work with allies, rather than pretending that we can be utterly self-reliant. How well have we done? In the short run, very well indeed. Our people and institutions rose to the occasion on September 11 and in the weeks that followed. We took care, and continue to take care, of our victims and their families. We resolved to rebuild. We brought force to bear in Afghanistan, and used diplomacy in neighboring states and among local factions, to prevail. We have also gained vital support from countries around the world, although we have been slow to involve them on the ground. We have shared intelligence and gained important law enforcement actions in Europe in the Middle East, and in Asia. We have begun to take action to combat bioterrorism. At home, we have learned some lessons the hard way and we have accepted the need to do more. We are stepping up vaccine production. But we have yet to take the major actions that are needed to improve our public health capabilities at home--or our disease surveillance capabilities overseas, to give us advance notice of epidemics or potential biological weapons. Neither have we moved decisively to find new, useful careers for the thousands of biological warfare specialists in Russia who might otherwise sell their goods their technology or their capabilities to Iran or Iraq, to Libya, or to well-funded terrorists. This is no longer a matter for just those of us who have intelligence briefings to know--and we have known this for a long time. Now the world knows that rogue states and terrorists have, in fact, attempted to buy nuclear weapons, biological weapons, and chemical weapons. The President recognizes the problem of bioterrorism, and listed it in his speech yesterday. At the Crawford summit, President Putin and he promised more cooperation to combat bioterrorism. So far, however, there has been a great deal more talk than action. Al-Qaida's eager quest for weapons of mass destruction has, in my view, highlighted and brought home to every American the importance of nonproliferation, of closing down the candy store, so to speak, where all these radical wackos go to shop. The President understands this. In his speech yesterday, after talking about the need to modernize our military, he said: America's next priority to prevent mass terror is to protect against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them. . . . Working with other countries, we will strengthen nonproliferation treaties and toughen export controls. Together we must keep the world's most dangerous technology out of the hands of the world's most dangerous people. That is correct and well-phrased rhetoric. It gives nonproliferation a high priority. It recognizes the importance of international treaties. But where, Mr. President, are the actions to match that rhetoric? The President offers only a new effort ``to develop a comprehensive strategy on proliferation,'' something he has been promising for over a year. Meanwhile, just last week, the United States of America singlehandedly brought to an abrupt and confusing halt the Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference that is held every 5 years. Why? Because the administration was determined not to allow any forum for the negotiation of an agreement to strengthen that convention. This was diplomacy as provocation, in my view, and it was and is a self-defeating approach. It undermined our efforts to achieve agreement on proposals we made earlier in the conference, such as to address the need for countries to enact legislation making Biological Weapons Convention violations a crime. We asked that it be made a crime to violate the convention. We proposed that, but then we shut down the conference, killing even our own proposal, because we did not want any further discussion or a possible new agreement. The President may understand the need to work with other countries, but some people under his authority do not seem to get it. For that matter, where are the actions to promote nonproliferation across the board? The White House review of our programs in the former Soviet Union has been limping along for over 10 months. But when the fiscal year 2002 budget was presented, we were told the funds for Nunn-Lugar were being reduced. Those are the funds we use to send American personnel to Russia to dismantle their nuclear weapons delivery systems their strategic bombers and missiles. We were told that the cut was not permanent, that the reason was they were reviewing whether or not the money was being well spent. While they are reviewing, those nuclear-tipped missiles sit there, and the inability of the Russians to dismantle them because of lack of money or capability still exists. Thus, we got promises of new efforts, but in the fiscal year 2002 budget there is actually a cut in these programs. The Department of Defense has left so many funds unspent that the appropriators tried to cut the Nunn-Lugar program just to get the Pentagon's attention. Nonproliferation is, thus, our No. 2 priority, but the engine is still in first gear. The same is true of our supposed top priority: modernizing our military. The vaunted rethinking process in the Defense Department has yet to produce much that is new, and the fine performance of our forces in Afghanistan owes more to strategy and equipment developed in the Gulf War and the ``revolution in military affairs'' of the last decade than it does to anything new this year. If you want action with your rhetoric, go down to the No. 3 priority in the President's speech: missile defense. Even there, however, the action is more diplomatic, or rather undiplomatic. If news reports are correct--and I know they are, based on my conversation today with the Secretary of State--the President will shortly announce his intention to withdraw in 6 months' time from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972. Russia will not like that. Some here will say: So what? What does it matter what Russia likes or does not like? But none of our allies likes it either. And China, I predict, will respond with an arms buildup, increasing tensions in South Asia, causing India and Pakistan to reconsider whether to increase their nuclear capability and, as strong as it sounds, in the near term--meaning in the next several years--this will cause the Japanese to begin a debate about whether or not they should be a nuclear power in an increasingly dangerous neighborhood. All of that is against our national interest. But the President will invoke Article XV of the ABM Treaty, which allows a party to withdraw ``if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interest.'' In my view, invoking this clause is a bit of a stretch, to say the least. No new enemy has fielded an ICBM missile, which is the only missile our national missile defense is intended to stop. Tactical missile defense is not barred by the ABM Treaty, and Russia has said it would even amend the treaty to permit an expanded United States testing program. So where is the jeopardy to our supreme interest? The administration has said it wants to conduct tests that would breach the ABM Treaty, but the head of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization in the Pentagon told Congress earlier this year that no breach was needed to do all the tests that were needed and scheduled. Informed scientists say the features added to the test program that might breach the treaty, which the Defense Department presented to the Armed Services Committee several months ago, are far from necessary, especially at this time. Phil Coyle, the former chief of testing for the Pentagon, says we can conduct several years of needed testing without having to breach the treaty's terms. The administration wants to build an Alaska test bed with several missile silos at Fort Greely that it says could be used for an emergency deployment. But the new interceptor missile for the missile defense will not be ready yet. The so-called ``kill vehicle,'' the thing that separates from the interceptor missile and hits the incoming warhead, will not have been tested against realistic targets yet. And the radars supporting this system, the battle management capabilities, are pointed at Russia, so they will not even see a North Korean missile as it flies into southern California, following the scenario cited by those who try to justify building a limited missile defense system. So where is the real action on missile defense? Is the announcement of our intent to withdraw from the ABM Treaty a real action, or is it a White House Christmas present for the right wing, who dislike arms control under any circumstances and see this season of success in Afghanistan, unity on foreign policy, and Christmas as a propitious moment to make this announcement? Is now the time for unilateral moves--now, while we are still building coalitions for a changed world in which old enemies can reduce their differences, at a minimum on the margins, and maybe even work together out of their own self-interest? We are in a time of great risk. But there is also great opportunity. Despite the horrors visited upon us on September 11, the truth is we were attacked by the weakest of enemies. Al-Qaida is a group that no civilized state can tolerate. It was sheltered by a regime with almost no international legitimacy and little support, even in its own land. Its goals and methods were so extreme as to be an object lesson to the world on why we must oppose all international terrorism. Many of its members and supporters, lacking in Afghanistan the popular support that in other wars have enabled guerillas to blend into the landscape, were left to fight an armed conflict in which our side could readily prevail, as we have done. Meanwhile, the vast majority of countries, including some longtime adversaries, have lined on up on our side. Their cooperation has been and will remain important in our war effort, in the war against terrorism. The war has also opened doors that have been shut for many years. Opportunities have expanded for cooperation on issues of mutual concern. As the President said yesterday at the Citadel: All at once, a new threat to civilization is erasing old lines of rivalry and resentment between nations. Russia and America are building a new cooperative relationship. We must seize the opportunity that this war has afforded us. Clausewitz long ago explained that triumph in war lies not so much in winning battles, but in following up on your victories. The same is true in the broader arena of international politics. We must follow up on the cooperation of the moment and turn it into a realignment of forces for decades to come--so that our grandchildren and great- grandchildren can look back on the 21st century and say that it did not replicate the carnage of the 20th century. How many Presidents get that opportunity? How many times does a nation have that potential? Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty will not make nonproliferation, which should be our highest priority and which combats our clearest danger, any easier to achieve. I find that especially worrisome. A year ago we were on the verge of a deal with North Korea to end that country's long-range ballistic missile program and its sales of missiles and missile technology. Now we seem far away from such a deal, pursuing instead a missile defense that will be lucky to defend against a first-generation attack, let alone one with simple countermeasures, until the year 2010 or much later. What good will a missile defense in Alaska do, if North Korea threatens Japan or sells to countries that would attack our allies in Europe, or sells to terrorist groups that would put a nuclear weapon in the hull of a rusty tanker coming up the Delaware River or into New York Harbor or San Francisco Bay? How does withdrawal from the ABM Treaty help defend against those much more realistic, near-term threats? What expenditures of money are we going to engage in? How are we going to deal with what Senator Baker, our Ambassador to Japan and former Republican leader, said is the single most urgent unmet threat that America faces, made real by the knowledge that al-Qaida was trying to purchase a nuclear capability? We must corral the fissile material and nuclear material in Russia as well as their chemical weapons. The Baker-Cutler report laid out clearly for us a specific program that would cost $30 billion over the next 8 to 10 years, to shut down one department--the nuclear department--of the candy store that everyone is shopping in. Senator Lugar actually went to a facility with the Russian military that housed chemical weapons. He describes it as a clapboard building with windows and a padlock on the door, although its security has been improved with our help. He could fit three Howitzer shells in his briefcase. Those shells could do incredible damage to America. How does withdrawal from the ABM Treaty defend against any of that? Which is more likely--an ICBM attack from a nation that does not now possess the capability, with a return address on it, knowing that certain annihilation would follow if one engaged in the attack; or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction technology and weaponry, so it can be used surreptitiously? If you walk away from a treaty with Russia, will that make Russia more inclined to stop its assistance to the Iranian missile program? Or will Russia be more attempted to continue that assistance? Russia has now stated, in a change from what they implied would happen after Crawford, that expansion of NATO, particularly to include the Baltic States, is not something they can likely tolerate--not that we should let that influence our decisions on NATO enlargement. Which do we gain more by--expanding NATO to the Baltic States, or scuttling the ABM Treaty with no immediate promises of gaining a real ability to protect against any of our genuine and immediate threats? If we end the ABM Treaty, will Russia stop nuclear deals of the sort that led us to sanction Russian institutions, or will it cozy up to Iran's illegal nuclear weapons program? The President made nonproliferation the No. 2 priority yesterday and missile defense No. 3. I truly fear, however, that his impending actions on that third priority will torpedo his actions on his No. 2 priority. If that should occur, we and our allies will surely be the losers. So far, the administration's conduct in the war on terrorism has shown discipline, perseverance, the ability to forge international consensus, and the flexibility to assume roles in the Middle East and in Afghanistan that the administration had hoped it could avoid. In this regard, the American people have been well served, and I compliment the President. The war is only 3 months old, however, and the new patterns of cooperation and support are young and fragile. We should nourish them and build on them. This is not the time to throw brickbats in Geneva or to thumb our noses at treaties. We read in Ecclesiastes: A time to tear down and a time to build up. In Afghanistan and elsewhere, we are rightfully and wonderfully tearing down the Taliban and al-Qaida. But if our victories are to be lasting and give lasting benefit, we must simultaneously build up the structures of international cooperation and nonproliferation. The opportunities afforded by a war will not last forever. Today the doors to international cooperation and American leadership are wide open. But if we slam them shut too often, we will lose our chance to restructure the world and we will be condemned to repeat the experience of the last century, rather than move beyond it. I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I am pleased to see that after a delay of several months, the House has acted on the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2001, of which I am a co-sponsor, and that we can finally send this bill to the President for his signature. The Foreign Relations committee reported this bill in July, and it passed the Senate by unanimous consent on August 1. Since then, the situation in Zimbabwe has deteriorated rapidly. Respect for human rights and the rule of law have been systematically subverted by Zimbabwe's ruling party, and indeed by President Robert Mugabe himself. President Mugabe has supported the invasion of farms by so called ``war veterans,'' he has intimated judges, harassed the free press, forbidden international monitors to observe next year's presidential elections and packed the supreme court with cronies in a misguided attempt to give his actions a patina of legitimacy. Under Mugabe's leadership the economy of Zimbabwe has been driven into the ground. The deployment of troops to the Democratic Republic of Congo was an expensive ill thought fiasco which has cost millions. The illegal farm invasions have resulted in the loss of income from the country's major cash crop. Unsound fiscal policies have resulted in a suspension of aid from the international Monetary Fund, inflation is soaring, international investment has dried up and unemployment is on the rise. The World Food Program has had to start a food distribution program in a country that should be exporting food to its neighbors. That in itself is bad enough. Worse, however, is the fact that the Zimbabwean government has stated that private relief agencies are prohibited from delivering food to the needy. Only the government can distribute food. Given the current political climate this can mean only one thing: the government will attempt to coopt the population by giving food in exchange for votes in the upcoming presidential elections. The bill itself is very straightforward. It offers money for a credible program of land reform, and plans for U.S. support for bi- lateral and multi-lateral debt relief if the President certifies to Congress that rule of law has been restored in Zimbabwe, including subordination of law enforcement organizations to the civilian government, that conditions for free and fair elections exist, that a credible program of land reform has been put in place, and that the government of Zimbabwe is adhering to agreements to withdraw its troops from the Democratic Republic of Congo. No new sanctions are imposed on the government, but the legislation does very wisely ask the administration to look into personal sanctions for high level members of the Zimbabwean government and their families, such as travel bans and visa restrictions. The actions undertaken in the last two years by Robert Mugabe can be characterized as nothing more, or less, than a shameless power grab. According to news reports current polls show that the leading opposition party has more support than Mugabe. No doubt this will cause an even more heinous crackdown on political opponents in the lead up to the elections. While I sincerely hope that Mugabe comes to his senses and allows for the presence of international observers during the upcoming presidential elections, I doubt that he will. Perhaps passage of this bill will send a signal to the government of Zimbabwe that the United States is serious about its position on the rule of law, human rights and democracy. The tragedy that has unfolded in what was once a stable prosperous country must not be ignored.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, on October 13, 2001, as part of Comcast's nationwide Day of Service, and in conjunction with Greater DC Cares, several hundred Comcast employees from the Washington, DC area volunteered to clean, landscape, and paint Anacostia Senior High School. In the wake of the tragedy of September 11, the Comcast Foundation has contributed $100 to disaster relief efforts in New York City and at the Pentagon for every employee and family member who participated in the clean-up. Comcast and every participating employee should be commended for their outstanding dedication and commitment to improving their community. Nationwide, more than five thousand Comcast employees from twenty-six States volunteered their time on Comcast Cares Day. Though it may have been the work of only one corporation and one group of employees, Comcast's community service and the volunteer spirit of its employees represents the best of America. The best of America can also be seen in other places around our country. Since September 11, Americans have risen to the occasion to aid their fellow citizen. In every city and town across America, individuals have taken the lead in community efforts like the one at Anacostia Senior High School. In my home State of Delaware, corporations such as Daimler-Chrysler, MBNA Bank and the DuPont Corporation have lent a helping hand to assist those in need. Furthermore, fire companies, school children, and individuals from all walks of life have come together providing assistance and comfort to the victims of the horrible September 11 attack. Not to overstate the case, but there seems to be a renewed spirit of community in America where, not long ago, we seemed more divided by differences than united by common concerns and shared values. Corporations like Comcast and their employees have heard the call. They have pulled together and responded where there is a need and, in the District of Columbia, Anacostia Senior High School was the place. It was not the work that was done there on October 13, or the time and sweat of all those who volunteered, that should inspire us the most, but the overriding sense that all of us working together can make a difference in our communities. After the tragedy of September 11, Americans responded when we saw the courage and dedication of New York police, firemen, and emergency workers. From their example have come story after story of corporations like Comcast reaching out, taking a lead in their communities, and making a difference. Comcast, The Comcast Foundation, and the dedicated employees who participated in making a difference at Anacostia Senior High School should be commended by all of us in the United States Senate who know how much we can accomplish when we work together. Yet, this sense of corporate responsibility is not new for the Comcast Corporation. Comcast always has been an active participant in the communities it serves. Whether it is their support of the Boys and Girls Clubs of America, the Red Cross, or the Easter Seals, Comcast has insisted on excellence not only in all aspects of its operation, but in its record of public service. This is a testament to the leadership of its founder and Chairman, Ralph Roberts, President, Brian Roberts, and Vice President, Joe Waz. These men serve as role-models in their communities and are true heroes in every sense of the word. If we learned anything from September 11 it was that the will and resolve of the American people cannot be shaken by those who would use terror as a weapon and religion as a shield. We are strongest and at our best when we are defending American values and the bedrock principles of democracy. If anything changed on September 11 it was a renewed determination for all of us to reach out where and when we can, and to recognize that we are much more united by our common concerns and shared values than divided by our individual differences. Companies like Comcast have recognized a community need, reached out, and made a difference, and they deserve the recognition of a grateful Nation.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, on December 20, 1941, the 112th Observation Squadron of the Ohio National Guard arrived in Dover, DE, to begin conducting anti-submarine patrols. It was the first military unit to serve at what is now known as the Dover Air Force Base. The history of the Base actually goes back 2 years further, to 1939, when in response to the Nazi invasion of Poland, the Civilian Aviation Administration, CAA, offered State and local governments on both coasts financial help to build municipal airports. The CAA offered to build one airfield in each of Delaware's three counties; the State did not pursue the offer, but New Castle and Sussex Counties accepted. Kent County passed the issue to the city of Dover, our State capital, and the Dover leaders agreed and purchased the land for a new airfield, in what has been hailed many times since as ``the best investment the city ever made.'' In addition to the anti-submarine mission during World War II, Dover's airfield was used, once the Corps of Engineers had done some of its magic, to train fighter squadrons and then, in 1944, as the site for classified air-launched rocket tests, experiments that led to the use of air-to-surface rockets in both the European and the Pacific Theaters. After the war, the airfield was placed on caretaker status, and although it remained inactive for the rest of the 1940s, the name was officially changed to Dover Air Force Base in January 13, 1948. Control of the Base was transferred to the Ninth Air Force in February 1949. In February 1951, the Dover Air Force Base was reactivated and put under the jurisdiction of the Air Defense Command, ADC, with different fighter squadrons using the airfield over the course of the next 7 years. The foundation for a permanent mission was laid when, recognizing Dover's strategic location, the Military Air Transport Service, MATS, assumed control and began, with an appropriation from Congress, to transform the Base into the East Coast embarkation point and foreign clearing base. Four units of the Atlantic Division were organized at Dover: the 1607th Air Base Group, the 1607th Air Base Squadron, the 1607th Maintenance and Supply Squadron, and the 1607th Medical Group. In November 1953, the first two transport squadrons were assigned, forming the core of the 1607th Air Transport Wing, and in December of that year, the Secretary of the Air Force designated the Dover Air Force Base as a permanent military installation. In 1955, the Aerial Port Mortuary responsibilities were transferred to Dover, and many Americans have become familiar with the Base for its prominence and exceptional service in fulfilling that duty. To offer an incomplete list, the Port Mortuary has received the remains of casualties of the war in Vietnam, a number of plane and helicopter crashes involving military personnel, the mass suicide in Guyana, the attack on the Marine barracks in Beirut, the Challenger explosion, the USS Stark, Pan Am 103, the USS Iowa, the Khobar Towers bombing, the 1998 bombing in Kenya, and most recently, victims of the September 11 attack on the Pentagon. From the mid-1950s to the mid-Sixties, to offer another incomplete list, Dover Air Force Base participated in Project Ice Cube to construct a Defense Early Warning Network in Northern Canada; the airlift to help combat a polio outbreak in Argentina; Operation Good Hope to Jordan; the Amigo Airlift in response to a devastating earthquake in Chile; an airlift of relief supplies to Honduras after Hurricane Hattie; the airlift of United Nations peace-keepers to the Belgian Congo; the Cuban Missile Crisis; the relief airlift following the Great Alaskan Earthquake; and the delivery of supplies to Guadeloupe Island after Hurricane Cleo, as well as supporting the deepening involvement in Vietnam. In January 1966, a reorganization led to the designation of the Military Airlift Command and the activation of the 436th Military Airlift Wing to assume command of the Base. The 436th, by the way, has its own proud history, going back to the famed 436th Troop Carrier Group, TCG, which participated in just about every major European campaign of World War II, from Normandy to Operation Market Garden to Bastogne to Operation Varsity. In 1968, the 912th Military Airlift Group, Associate, along with the 326th Military Airlift, the 912th Support, and the 912th Material Squadrons, were activated at Dover, giving the Base a total of four active and one reserve military airlift squadrons. In 1973, the 512th Military Airlift Wing, A, which is now the 512th Airlift Wing, A, was activated as a replacement to the 912th and its subordinates; the 512th AW remains a key part of Dover's mission. From 1971 to 1973, the transition was undertaken to make Dover home to the first all C-5 equipped wing in the Air Force. During the Vietnam war, Dover aircrews participated in, among others, Operation Blue Light in January 1966 and Operation Eagle Thrust in 1967, an incredibly ambitious military airlift into a combat zone for which Dover personnel received their first Air Force Outstanding Unit Award. Among other most notable missions in which Dover crews have participated are Operation Nickel Grass, during which Dover's C-5s flew 71 missions, more than 2,000 hours, delivering more than 5,000 tons of cargo. That operation is considered by many to have been the first real test of the C-5 aircraft. Dover crews also successfully dropped and test-fired a Minuteman I ICBM in 1974, and delivered a 40-ton superconducting magnet to Moscow in 1977 as part of a joint energy research program. The mission to Moscow earned the crew the Mackay Trophy for the most meritorious flight of the year. Missions to Zaire and, in the cause of joint verification, another to the Soviet Union also earned Mackay Trophies for Dover captains and crews. Dover crews helped evacuate Americans from Iran in 1978, and supported the Marine operation in Lebanon in 1983-84. Dover's C-5s flew 27 missions in the invasion on Grenada also in 1983, and assisted with the clean-up after the Valdez oil spill in 1989. Eighteen missions were flown by Dover crews in Operation Just Cause in Panama, and in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the Persian Gulf War, Dover's C-5s logged more than 30,000 flying hours. Since then, Dover crews have flown in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia; in Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in Operations Desert Thunder and Desert Fox in 1998; and in Operation Allied Force against the military structure of Slobodan Milosevic. Among recent humanitarian missions have been the airlift to Central America following Hurricane Mitch; Joint Task Force Shining Hope to aid Kosovar refugees; airlifts to Turkey following the earthquakes of 1999; the 436 AW also responded to the earthquake that same year in Taiwan; and Operation Atlas Response in Mozambique after the devastating flooding there last year. And, of course, there is Operation Enduring Freedom, our common cause in which our military men and women bear so much of the burden, the risk and the sacrifice. Our prayers and thanks are with them every day, including the 200 men and women from the 512 Air Reserve Wing who have been activated. I would also note that the 436th Airlift Wing received its 13th Air Force Outstanding Unity Award in October. I share this history with my colleagues and with the Nation today, not only because the 60th anniversary of the Dover Air Force Base represents our proud military tradition so well, but also because the history of the Dover Air Force Base is very much a part of the history of Delaware. We do not merely co-exist with the Base; it is a part of our State family, a part of our community of friends and neighbors. And so we are especially proud, and so very grateful to those who have served. Congratulations to Colonel Scott Wuesthoff, the current Commander of the 436th Airlift Wing, to Colonel Bruce Davis, who just assumed command of the 512th Airlift Wing, and to all personnel who serve out of Dover, on the 60th anniversary of the Air Force Base, with the respect and thanks of your neighbors in Delaware, and of all your fellow citizens.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. I have no objection.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will be brief. The Senator from Minnesota is the major player in this effort. The Senator from Delaware is not. This is, in a sense, a real Minnesota tradition of progressive politics. The two guys who jumped out on this first and responded immediately were the two Senators from Minnesota. I have experienced the same exact thing in the State of Delaware as I go around and see the guardsmen. One of the reasons the distinction was made in the past between whether a President called up the Guard or a Governor called up the Guard was the nature of the incident for which the Guard had to be called up in those circumstances. When the President called up the Guard, it was usually--not always--relating to a national defense issue. When Governors called up the Guard, it was for hurricanes and floods and very worthy and worthwhile and important things to our constituents. Let's make it real clear: This is not a hurricane. This is not a flood. This is not a natural disaster. This is an unnatural disaster called a war. The reason my guardsmen in Delaware were called up and all of our guardsmen are called up now is for a war. This is a war. Here we are on December 7, 60 years after Pearl Harbor, and where are we? We are once again faced with what we were faced with then. This is the first time since then American soil has been struck. What is the most likely place where the next terrible tragedy will occur if our enemies have their way? In America. The reason the Guard is on the border, at the airports, and throughout our communities is as if there were a foreign army marching on us. That is what this is about. The Soldiers' and Sailors Act was designed to take that into effect. I compliment both my colleagues. I am flattered they let me be one of the cosponsors. They deserve a great deal of credit for calling this to our attention. I will be surprised if they don't get 100 votes. I compliment them for their foresight.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I appreciate my colleague from Connecticut allowing me to stand up and speak for a brief moment before he responds. He has an amendment. I say to my friend from Georgia and my friend from North Carolina, whom I respect immensely, this is an idea whose time has not come. Here we are with a 28-page amendment before the Senate that we have not read, that is occurring at the very moment, as my friend from Georgia says, when American special forces are eating dust in Afghanistan, at a time when we were relying upon the cooperation of an alliance and a NATO and non-NATO forces that have agreed to support us in that effort, at a time when we are holding a coalition together, along with many Members who have supported this International Criminal Court, and we are going to try to change their minds about how we should amend the language of the Criminal Court to make it a reasonable thing we could in fact theoretically be a part of, to come along and tell them: By the way, if you already have signed onto this Court, but unless you decide--as one piece of the amendment requires--that unless you agree ahead of time that you would never under any circumstances abide by this Court as it relates to the transfer of an American person accused of a crime, we are in effect dissing you: We ain't going to work with you anymore. It seems to me a pretty bad moment to be making that claim at this time. As my friend from Georgia pointed out, we want some options. We have plenty of time between now and the next several months to do what we are supposed to do. This was referred to the Foreign Relations Committee. It was introduced and referred to the committee by my distinguished colleague, the ranking member, former chairman, Senator Helms, when he was chairman. He held no hearings on it this year after it was introduced. Since it has been in my committee--some version of this, not the same thing--there has been no request for me to hold hearings on this legislation. Here we are on a Friday afternoon about to pass--I hope--a significant bill, and a 27-page amendment is dropped on our desk that is the most far-reaching and consequential extension of an argument against this Court that I have ever heard. It may make sense. Theoretically, it can make sense. But if you are ever going to pick a moment not to do this, it would be at this very moment when we have just--I have been a major party to this--literally broken the arms of the Serbs to make sure they send Milosevic to a criminal court. We have broken the legs of everyone we can--figuratively speaking-- diplomatically to get Saddam Hussein before a criminal court, an international court. We have asked them to all step up to the plate and try to bring to trial terrorists and people we are after--the bin Ladens--whom we don't want to try in this country. It seems to me to come along, and say, but, by the way, if you have signed onto any of this stuff that we don't like, we are not only going to see to it that we don't cooperate with you, but we are limiting our relationship with you, as I read this--that is a pretty big deal. I wonder how Mr. Blair is thinking, that at this moment when we are putting pressure, or Mr. Schroeder, who risked his entire government with a vote of no confidence--he survived by I think two votes, and I will have the Record correct me if I am wrong about the number of votes--but barely survived in order to commit German forces to fight next to American special forces on the ground--who strongly supports this, and say, by the way, you are our enemy if you signed onto this Court. Give me a break. Let us have regular order, as they say around here. We have plenty of time. I promise you I will hold hearings on this. But don't ask us to digest 27 pages of the most far-reaching application of an objection-- by the way, in the Commerce, Justice, and State appropriations bill we already passed legislation of the distinguished Senator from Idaho barring cooperation with this Court. It still takes 13 more nations to sign on before the Court comes into effect. We have time. Let us do this in an orderly way. I commit to you that at the earliest moment--if you want to pick a date, I will give a date--I will come back during recess and hold hearings. Let us get some serious people in here giving serious input. Just possibly, you people have missed something. Just possibly, you have inadvertently made a mistake in how broad this is, which may harm American troops. I do not know that it does. But I have been around here long enough to know that my mother's expression is a correct one: Often the road to hell is paved with good intentions. I have no doubt about the intentions. But I have some concern that you may have paved the road to hell a little bit for the very American personnel we are trying to save. I really ask you in a more sober moment, even before we get on to the debate--I don't want to discourage my friend from Connecticut either-- to sort of stand down here. I promise you I will set hearings. I will hold the hearings. I will not attempt in any way to delay reporting out legislation on this subject. Let us do this in the normal legislative way. I thank my colleagues. I appreciate their intent. I know there is not a single Senator who doesn't share this concern. The last thing we want is an American tried before a kangaroo court. I respectfully suggest that we are sending some sort of silly signals right now to the world. We are asking the world to join us. We are asking the world to participate with us. We are asking the world to try bad guys who have committed crimes against humanity, and yet we are setting up military tribunals and blanket, broad, broad pieces of legislation such as this that we really haven't had hearings on, haven't thought through, haven't debated, and haven't refined. I do not know that I am against this. Russell Long once said to me after I said to him, ``But, Mr. Chairman, I am not sure about this piece of legislation,'' ``Joe, let me tell you something. Around this place, when in doubt, vote no.'' I am in doubt. I don't know how you cannot be in doubt. This is 27 pages long, and we are going to do this in the next 15 minutes. I think it is a mistake. I yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, among the images of September 11th that we will never forget, are the pictures of the firefighters rushing into the buildings to help, as everyone else who was able was trying to get out to safety. At that moment, without discussion or explanation, an appreciation for the extraordinary service and leading citizenship of firefighters became a prominent and, I hope, permanent feature of our collective consciousness. In my State of Delaware, we have a rich heritage of local fire companies serving our communities, a tradition of neighbors helping neighbors. And I rise today to honor one of those local departments, the Carlisle Fire Company, which serves the City of Milford, Delaware and which will celebrate its 200th anniversary in 2002. Originally founded under charter from the State Legislature, as, simply, a ``Fire Fighting Organization,'' the company began its service in the spring of 1802, a full 90 years before the first water mains and fire hydrants were installed in Milford. A hand drawn hook-and-ladder was acquired, and was stored along with other equipment at a building owned by Mrs. Angeline Marshall, appropriately, on Water Street. In 1915, the department reincorporated as the Milford Fire Company, and that same year, there was a 10-day fund drive which raised money to purchase a triple combination fire truck Milford's Truck No. 1. A second name change followed in 1918, to honor Paris T. Carlisle, a Milford resident and member and officer of the Fire Company, who was killed in France during World War I. In 1921, the Company broke ground to build its first fire station, and in 1923, after another successful fundraising drive, Truck No. 2 was purchased and Truck No. 1 refitted to better serve the community. Ground was broken for the current fire hall on Northwest Front Street in 1977, and as the folks in Milford will tell you with well-earned pride, they paid off and burned the mortgage in 1990. At about the same time, ambulance service was added. From that hall on Front Street, the Carlisle Fire Company responds to more than 1,800 calls per year. With an active Ladies Auxiliary, founded in 1963 with Peggy Jester as its first president, and a Junior Member program, created by then-Chief Marvin Hitch in 1973, the Company is truly a center of community life in Milford. And it also has a special place in our statewide firefighting community; the Delaware Volunteer Firemen's Association (DVFA) was organized in Milford in February of 1921, and the first president was Charles E. Varney, who was also president of the Carlisle Fire Company. The Company has continued its leadership in statewide programs ever since. It is my privilege to share some of the history and hopefully some of the spirit of the Carlisle Fire Company with my colleagues and with our fellow citizens today. We honor the Company's 200th anniversary, and the extraordinary commitment and service that it represents, with gratitude to local firefighters, our neighbors who are there when we need them most. Congratulations to President Francis Morris and Fire Chief Kevin Twilley, and to all the officers, members and friends of the Carlisle Fire Company again, with great respect and with thanks.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I am pleased to present to the Senate two multilateral conventions, negotiated within the UN system, to combat two specific aspects of international terrorism. The treaties, the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, and the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, will provide important tools to the President in the global campaign against terrorism. The two treaties are similar in approach: they require parties to criminalize the proscribed behavor--engaging in international terrorist bombings and fund raising for international terrorism--and to either extradite an alleged offender to another nation that has jurisdiction to prosecute or to submit the case for prosecution. The conventions have received increasing support from the nations of the world. In the last several weeks, many nations have signed or ratified the treaties. For example, when the Committee on Foreign Relations held a hearing on the treaties in late October, 58 countries had signed the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, but just four had become parties to it. As of today, according to the web page of the United Nations, 125 countries have signed the Convention, and 15 have become party to it. It will enter into force when 22 nations become party to it, so the Senate's action today will be an important step in helping bring the Convention closer to entry into force. I applaud and support the global campaign against terrorism that President Bush has waged to date. If we have learned anything about foreign policy since September 11, it is the global leadership and multilateral cooperation are essential to combating the terrorist networks. If we want to use air power in Afghanistan, we need over- flight rights from countries around the region. If we want Al-Qaeda cells to be investigated and arrested, we need our foreign partners to join us in the effort. If we want bank accounts of Osama bin Laden and his cohorts frozen, we need the assistance of foreign governments and foreign bankers. In short, we cannot wage this campaign by ourselves. I am pleased that the administration strongly supports these conventions. They will provide additional weapons in the terrorism campaign. They set international standards--which we will expect foreign nations to embrace and enforce. The International Convention on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism will be of particular importance in our continuing effort to squeeze the financial lifeblood out of the international terrorism networks. Despite this support for multilateral approaches, I find puzzling the Administration's failure to seize the initiative in other contexts, especially at this time when so many countries are lining up on our side in the present conflict. The vicissitudes of the war on terrorism also present opportunities to the United States, if only we will seize them. For example, we all know that rogue states and terrorists are trying to obtain biological weapons. In response to this challenge, the Administration--which earlier scuttled a draft compliance protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention--proposes that countries enact national legislation criminalizng violations of the BWC, improve bilateral extradition agreements, and adopt strict standards for access to dangerous pathogens. But as recently as earlier this week, at the BWC Review Conference held every five years, the U.S. delegation was resisting the idea of a protocol calling on countries to take those actions. It is a mystery to me why the Administration cannot see the virtue of global adherence to a set of standards in the fight to prevent biological terrorism. Mr. President, the Committee on Foreign Relations recommended, by a unanimous voice vote, that the Senate advise and consent to the two treaties now before the body. I am pleased that my colleagues have given their strong support to these conventions.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise today in opposition to the pending amendment and pledge my continued support for the protection of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge from oil drilling. As most of my fellow Senators will attest, preserving the Alaska wilderness was one of the highest priorities of my friend and former colleague from Delaware, Bill Roth, and I was proud to join him in this fight. Alaska's coastal plain is one of our Nation's last areas of unspoiled wilderness and it must be protected from oil development and all the activity that comes with it. This practically untouched region is home to a wide variety of wildlife, such as polar bears, caribou, and hundreds of species of birds, and there is great concern that development of the area will threaten this fragile habitat. I urge my colleagues to understand the consequences of permanently altering such pristine landscape when at this point in time, the amount of oil that would be economically developed is speculative at best. I do not believe that we should risk potentially irreversible impact on this rich environment for the sake of uncertain oil recovery. The most recent petroleum assessment report, conducted by the United States Geological Survey in 1998, estimated that there was between 3 billion and 16 billion barrels of oil in the area. But while the numbers alone are promising, the issue is how much oil is economically recoverable. At a market price of $24 per barrel, the United States Geological Survey estimates a 95-percent chance that 2.0 billion barrels or more would be economically recoverable and a 5-percent chance that 9.4 billion barrels or more would be economically recoverable. In addition, the best estimates are that if we authorized drilling today, oil from ANWR will not be available for at least 7 to 12 years. Leasing agreements, geologic characteristics and transportation constraints will most certainly affect development rates and production levels. Assuming the best case scenario--peak production of oil at an increased development rate--the most promising production rate is 750,000 barrels per day. To put this in perspective, the United States consumes about 19 million barrels of oil and refined petroleum products a day. In the first 9 months of 2001, the United States imported 1.77 million barrels of oil per day from Canada, 1.73 million barrels of oil per day from Saudi Arabia, 1.58 million barrels of oil per day from Venezuela and 1.37 million barrels a day from Mexico. Despite the fact that I stand here today in opposition to drilling in ANWR, I do recognize the importance of our country moving forward with a thorough review of our energy policy and I look forward to our discussions in the early part of next year. Our energy policy should be comprehensive and balanced. In addition to examining our options for increasing production of fossil fuels and stabilizing our supplies, we need to explore viable conservation initiatives, make important investments into the research and development of renewable and alternative energy sources, and consider adapting our regulatory and tax structures to help achieve these goals. I know that we can modify our energy polices without undermining our longtime environmental objectives.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, it is with tremendous pride that I rise today to salute the Rotary Club of Wilmington, DE, for its leadership in the worldwide initiative of Rotary International to establish eight Centers for International Studies in Peace and Conflict Resolution. Recently, the Chairman of the International Rotary Foundation, Luis Giay, visited Delaware and presented an award to the Wilmington Rotary Club for being among the very first Rotary Clubs in the world to raise, sua sponte, $50,000 for the International Studies in Peace and Conflict Resolution project. The funds will be used to pay the two-year tuition costs for a graduate student to attend one of the newly-formed Rotary Peace Centers. In this time of war and strife, my colleagues might find it interesting to learn more about these new Centers. The goals of the Rotary Peace Centers are: Mediation, Conflict Resolution, and Peace where there is war; understanding where there is disharmony; food security where there is hunger; health Care where there is disease; education where there is illiteracy; conservation where there is environmental degradation; sustainable Economic Development where there is poverty. As Rotary's major educational priority in the 21st Century, the Rotary Centers for International Studies will provide opportunities for our next generation of leaders and scholars to focus on dealing effectively with obstacles to international cooperation and peace. Educating such promising future leaders will help Rotary fulfill its long-standing mission to promote global peace and understanding. The Rotary Centers have partnered with some of the leading universities in the world. The eight Rotary Peace Centers are located at: Duke University and the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill in North Carolina; the University of California-Berkeley in California; Sciences Po in Paris, France; the University of Bradford in West Yorkshire, England; the University of Queensland in Brisbane, Queensland, Australia; the International Christian University in Tokyo, Japan; and, Universidad del Salvador in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Like most big ideas, the fundraising initiative grew from a seed, in this case a seed planted by a small group of Wilmington Rotarians. Past Presidents Joe Melloy and Bruce Beardwood knew that with the Wilmington Rotary Club's 86-year history of service that its members would want to be pioneers in the Rotary Peace Center project. Wilmington Rotarians then set out to meet the $50,000 goal. They held a very successful silent auction to raise nearly half of the money. Generous, individual contributions put them over the top. Even more impressive, the Wilmington Rotary Club then challenged the other 43 Clubs and 2,000 Rotarians in the Rotary District that encompasses Delaware and the Eastern Shore of Maryland to raise money for the Rotary Centers for International Studies. I am proud to say, challenge issued, challenge met. I think it is appropriate and important to publicly recognize the efforts of the Rotary Club of Wilmington to do its part to help make our world a better, safer place to live. Not only is the Wilmington Rotary Delaware's oldest and largest Rotary Club with about 250 members, it continues to be among the leading Rotary Clubs in the United States. Its leadership as a pioneer Club for the Rotary Centers for Peace and International Studies is a great example of the Rotary tradition of service and of the part each one of us can play in advancing the goal of world peace. To the members of the Rotary Club of Wilmington, congratulations and thank you.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, we in Delaware, and especially those of us associated with the University of Delaware, engaged in a very proud celebration this fall, when on November 10, Harold ``Tubby'' Raymond won his 300th game as head coach of the University's Fightin' Blue Hens football team. The win put Coach Raymond into some very elite company, as he became the ninth ranked college coach in all-time wins, fifth among active coaches, second among division I-AA coaches, and one of only four coaches in the 300-wins club to have won all of his games at one school. Coach Raymond came to the University of Delaware in 1954; to put that in perspective, it means that he had already been coaching at Delaware, as an assistant in football and head coach in baseball, for six years when I arrived on campus as a college freshman. With apologies to my New England colleagues, we stole Tubby from the University of Maine, where he had coached with his fellow University of Michigan alumnus and later College Football Hall of Famer, Dave Nelson. If you've ever seen the University of Delaware football helmets, you know that Coaches Nelson and Raymond never forgot their Michigan roots. After serving as Dave Nelson's backfield coach for 12 years, Tubby Raymond took over the head coaching job in 1966, leading that first team to a 6-3 record and the first of three Middle Atlantic Conference University Division championships. In his 36-year career as Delaware's head coach, Tubby has gone on to win three national championships, including back-to-back titles in 1971 and '72, and has led Delaware to the national playoffs a total of 16 times, five in Division II and 11 in Division I-AA. His teams have earned 14 Lambert Cup eastern college championships, and have won six Atlantic 10/Yankee Conference titles, five Boardwalk Bowls and nine ECAC ``Team of the Year'' Awards. Tubby Raymond's career record stands at 300-119-3, a winning percentage of .714. He is one of only two college division coaches ever to win consecutive American Coaches Association Coach of the Year Awards. He was named NCAA Division II Coach of the Year by ABC Sports and Chevrolet in 1979, following his third national championship season. He is all told, a seven-time honoree as AFCA College Division District II, now I-AA Region I, Coach of the Year; and he has been twice named as the New York Writers Association ECAC I-AA Coach of the Year. In 1998, Coach Raymond received the Vince Lombardi Foundation Lifetime Achievement Award, and in 2000, he was recognized by Sports Illustrated as one of Delaware's top 10 sports figures of the 20th Century. Most incredibly of all, all the records and championships and statistics, as phenomenal as they are, don't tell the full story of Tubby Raymond's stature and influence on his players, the University, his sport or our State as a whole. Coach Raymond is a leader far beyond the walls of Delaware Stadium; he is respected, admired and beloved by his fellow Delawareans, even those who like to call their own plays from the stands, and even by rival coaches and opposing players. He is an institution, in a word, a legend; in fact, I would say that Tubby Raymond defines the standard of ``living legend'' in my State. To top it off, Tubby is a good golfer, though like most of us not as good as he would like to be, and he is also an artist of considerable renown. One of the many ways Tubby expresses his bond to his players has been by painting a portrait of a senior member of the team each week of the season through most of his career. Other Raymond originals have benefited charity auctions and decorated Delaware football media guides. In fact, Tubby's artistic talents have attracted only slightly less national attention than his coaching skills; his paintings have been featured on Good Morning America, NBC Nightly News, Sports Illustrated, CNN and Fox Sports. To save the best for last, Tubby Raymond is a family man. He lives with his wife, Diane, and daughter, Michelle, and is also the proud father of three grown children from his first marriage to Sue Raymond, who died in 1990. His son, Chris, is a former coach made good as an officer with J.P. Morgan; his daughter, Debbie, is a psychologist; and his son, David, became well known himself to sports fans as the Phillie Phanatic, mascot of the Philadelphia Phillies, and now owns Raymond Entertainment. It is my privilege to share Delaware's pride in Harold ``Tubby'' Raymond with the Senate and with the Nation today. He is a legendary coach, an inspiring leader, a good friend and a remarkable human being, and to put it simply, we love him.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, today I am pleased to join Senator Lugar in introducing legislation to create the National Commission on Threats to the Homeland and United States National Security. Two months ago, in barbaric attacks in New York and Washington that we will never forget, the world changed before our eyes. In an instant, the fight against terrorism became our top national security priority. That new reality requires us to undertake a thorough review of our national security priorities. That effort is underway across the executive branch and in several committees of Congress. President Bush acted decisively to create the Office of Homeland Security and in naming Governor Ridge to be its head. Congress acted quickly to tighten aviation security and to give federal law enforcement new tools to counter terrorism. These measures are just initial steps in what will surely be a major reorientation of the ship of state. As we begin to reorient our government, I believe we must engage in a thorough assessment of the range of threats that we face and the priorities which we should accord such threats in our national security strategy. Terrorism is undoubtedly the major threat to the United States. In that regard, we must have a full understanding of the types of terrorist threats we face and of their relative probability. This week, the continuous reports of anthrax being discovered in various parts of the country, including here in the Senate, have focused the country on the threat of bioterrorism. Unfortunately, this is not the only threat we face. Terrorists proved their deadly ability to turn airplanes into weapons of mass destruction. They have used truck and car bombs in the past. And we know that terrorist organizations are seeking materials necessary for the production of chemical or nuclear weapons. What we need to know is the priority we should accord those threats. That is the purpose of this proposed commission. There are, to be sure, other threats that remain to our territory and to our national security interests. Russian weapons of mass destruction stockpiles and expertise pose the risk of accidental war or of proliferation to rogue states and terrorist groups. Ballistic missiles in developing countries can threaten U.S. forces overseas and could someday threaten our homeland. And international narcotics trafficking continues to threaten many countries, including ours. Terrorism is not the only threat. But after September 11 it is clearly the preeminent threat. The proposed National Commission on Threats to the Homeland and United States National Security will not seek to reinvent the wheel. Rather, it would build on the work of several recent blue-ribbon commissions which have assessed various threats, both collectively and individually, to U.S. national security. In seeking the creation of this new commission, neither Senator Lugar nor I wish to discredit this earlier work and the ideas that flowed from it. Instead, we seek to use that work as a foundation in constructing a comprehensive threat assessment and a resulting U.S. national security strategy. It is therefore instructive to quickly review the major findings of some of these earlier commissions and hearings. Perhaps the best-known is the U.S. Commission on National Security/ 21st Century, better known as the Hart-Rudman Commission after its two cochairs, former Senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman. In its final report, issued in 2001, the Hart-Rudman Commission offered a chilling prediction borne out only months later: ``States, terrorists, and other disaffected groups will acquire weapons of mass destruction and mass disruption, and some will use them. Americans will likely die on American soil, possibly in large numbers.'' The Hart-Rudman Commission urged making the security of the American homeland the primary national security mission of the U.S. government and called for the creation of a National Homeland Security Agency to coordinate these efforts. Two commissions have focused on the specific threat of international terrorism and dealing with the consequences of a terrorist attack with a weapon of mass destruction, WMD. The National Commission on Terrorism, chaired by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, recommended a series of measures to expand the authorities of U.S. intelligence and law enforcement, steps now under consideration in the anti-terrorism legislation before Congress. It also urged the United States to use all the instruments at its disposal, diplomatic, financial, economic, and military, in targeting states that sponsor international terrorism. The Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, better known as the Gilmore Commission after its chair, Virginia Governor James Gilmore, focused on the need to develop a national strategy of domestic preparedness to respond to any act of WMD terrorism. This commission also called for the creation of a central office within the White House to coordinate federal efforts, which closely resembles what President Bush has decided to do in appointing Governor Ridge to a new ``homeland czar'' position. The Russia Task Force of the Secretary of Energy's Advisory Board, better known as ``the Baker-Cutler Task Force'' after its co-chairs, former Senator Howard Baker and former White House Counsel Lloyd Cutler, looked at the particular threat posed by unsecured nuclear weapons and fissile material in the former Soviet Union. This task force declared the deteriorating situation as ``the most urgent unmet national security threat facing the United States today'' and called for spending approximately $30 billion over the next 8 to 10 years to adequately secure these weapons and related materials. Finally, with the emergence of several anthrax cases in several locations in the United States, the threat has become all too real. The Committee on Foreign Relations held a hearing on this subject the week before the September 11 attacks. Former Senator Sam Nunn, now heading the Nuclear Threat Initiative, Dr. D.A. Henderson, the architect of the international campaign to eradicate smallpox in the 1970s, and other experts testified on the nature of the threat and what we can do in response. As they made clear, a mass destruction bioterrorism attack is a low-probability event with high consequences. The right answer is not panic, but rather the foresight to implement a set of commonsense measures to strengthen our public health system, including our emergency care capabilities and our vaccine stockpiles, to handle a bioterrorist attack if and when it occurs. The Commission that we envision would, I repeat, build on the fine work done by the foregoing panels. It would assess the current threat, in light of the attacks on September 11, and in light of the assessments and analyses performed by government agencies and the panels I have just discussed. The commission would be a small group, just six distinguished Americans with experience at the highest levels of national security, law enforcement, and public safety. It is my hope that the commissioners chosen for this task would include former cabinet secretaries, and even former Presidents. The bill we introduce requires two reports, an interim report to be produced within 180 days of enactment of the legislation and a final report to be produced by September 11, 2002, one year after the attacks on our country. The reports should provide a roadmap for our national security strategy, what the major threats are, the likelihood such threats will result in attacks on the United States, the potential damage to the United States or U.S. interests, and the current U.S. capabilities to counter and respond to such threats. From this assessment we can build a national security strategy for the coming decades. I appreciate the support and assistance of the Senator from Indiana in developing this legislation. I urge my colleagues to support it. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record. There being no objection,the bill was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, today I am pleased to join Senator Lugar in introducing legislation to create the National Commission on Threats to the Homeland and United States National Security. Two months ago, in barbaric attacks in New York and Washington that we will never forget, the world changed before our eyes. In an instant, the fight against terrorism became our top national security priority. That new reality requires us to undertake a thorough review of our national security priorities. That effort is underway across the executive branch and in several committees of Congress. President Bush acted decisively to create the Office of Homeland Security and in naming Governor Ridge to be its head. Congress acted quickly to tighten aviation security and to give federal law enforcement new tools to counter terrorism. These measures are just initial steps in what will surely be a major reorientation of the ship of state. As we begin to reorient our government, I believe we must engage in a thorough assessment of the range of threats that we face and the priorities which we should accord such threats in our national security strategy. Terrorism is undoubtedly the major threat to the United States. In that regard, we must have a full understanding of the types of terrorist threats we face and of their relative probability. This week, the continuous reports of anthrax being discovered in various parts of the country, including here in the Senate, have focused the country on the threat of bioterrorism. Unfortunately, this is not the only threat we face. Terrorists proved their deadly ability to turn airplanes into weapons of mass destruction. They have used truck and car bombs in the past. And we know that terrorist organizations are seeking materials necessary for the production of chemical or nuclear weapons. What we need to know is the priority we should accord those threats. That is the purpose of this proposed commission. There are, to be sure, other threats that remain to our territory and to our national security interests. Russian weapons of mass destruction stockpiles and expertise pose the risk of accidental war or of proliferation to rogue states and terrorist groups. Ballistic missiles in developing countries can threaten U.S. forces overseas and could someday threaten our homeland. And international narcotics trafficking continues to threaten many countries, including ours. Terrorism is not the only threat. But after September 11 it is clearly the preeminent threat. The proposed National Commission on Threats to the Homeland and United States National Security will not seek to reinvent the wheel. Rather, it would build on the work of several recent blue-ribbon commissions which have assessed various threats, both collectively and individually, to U.S. national security. In seeking the creation of this new commission, neither Senator Lugar nor I wish to discredit this earlier work and the ideas that flowed from it. Instead, we seek to use that work as a foundation in constructing a comprehensive threat assessment and a resulting U.S. national security strategy. It is therefore instructive to quickly review the major findings of some of these earlier commissions and hearings. Perhaps the best-known is the U.S. Commission on National Security/ 21st Century, better known as the Hart-Rudman Commission after its two cochairs, former Senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman. In its final report, issued in 2001, the Hart-Rudman Commission offered a chilling prediction borne out only months later: ``States, terrorists, and other disaffected groups will acquire weapons of mass destruction and mass disruption, and some will use them. Americans will likely die on American soil, possibly in large numbers.'' The Hart-Rudman Commission urged making the security of the American homeland the primary national security mission of the U.S. government and called for the creation of a National Homeland Security Agency to coordinate these efforts. Two commissions have focused on the specific threat of international terrorism and dealing with the consequences of a terrorist attack with a weapon of mass destruction, WMD. The National Commission on Terrorism, chaired by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, recommended a series of measures to expand the authorities of U.S. intelligence and law enforcement, steps now under consideration in the anti-terrorism legislation before Congress. It also urged the United States to use all the instruments at its disposal, diplomatic, financial, economic, and military, in targeting states that sponsor international terrorism. The Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, better known as the Gilmore Commission after its chair, Virginia Governor James Gilmore, focused on the need to develop a national strategy of domestic preparedness to respond to any act of WMD terrorism. This commission also called for the creation of a central office within the White House to coordinate federal efforts, which closely resembles what President Bush has decided to do in appointing Governor Ridge to a new ``homeland czar'' position. The Russia Task Force of the Secretary of Energy's Advisory Board, better known as ``the Baker-Cutler Task Force'' after its co-chairs, former Senator Howard Baker and former White House Counsel Lloyd Cutler, looked at the particular threat posed by unsecured nuclear weapons and fissile material in the former Soviet Union. This task force declared the deteriorating situation as ``the most urgent unmet national security threat facing the United States today'' and called for spending approximately $30 billion over the next 8 to 10 years to adequately secure these weapons and related materials. Finally, with the emergence of several anthrax cases in several locations in the United States, the threat has become all too real. The Committee on Foreign Relations held a hearing on this subject the week before the September 11 attacks. Former Senator Sam Nunn, now heading the Nuclear Threat Initiative, Dr. D.A. Henderson, the architect of the international campaign to eradicate smallpox in the 1970s, and other experts testified on the nature of the threat and what we can do in response. As they made clear, a mass destruction bioterrorism attack is a low-probability event with high consequences. The right answer is not panic, but rather the foresight to implement a set of commonsense measures to strengthen our public health system, including our emergency care capabilities and our vaccine stockpiles, to handle a bioterrorist attack if and when it occurs. The Commission that we envision would, I repeat, build on the fine work done by the foregoing panels. It would assess the current threat, in light of the attacks on September 11, and in light of the assessments and analyses performed by government agencies and the panels I have just discussed. The commission would be a small group, just six distinguished Americans with experience at the highest levels of national security, law enforcement, and public safety. It is my hope that the commissioners chosen for this task would include former cabinet secretaries, and even former Presidents. The bill we introduce requires two reports, an interim report to be produced within 180 days of enactment of the legislation and a final report to be produced by September 11, 2002, one year after the attacks on our country. The reports should provide a roadmap for our national security strategy, what the major threats are, the likelihood such threats will result in attacks on the United States, the potential damage to the United States or U.S. interests, and the current U.S. capabilities to counter and respond to such threats. From this assessment we can build a national security strategy for the coming decades. I appreciate the support and assistance of the Senator from Indiana in developing this legislation. I urge my colleagues to support it. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record. There being no objection,the bill was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I am proud to be an original cosponsor of the Bioterrorism Preparedness Act, a comprehensive package of measures to improve our Nation's capability to respond to a future biological weapons attack against the United States. This bill, introduced by Senators Kennedy and Frist, would authorize $3.25 billion in funding for fiscal year 2002, a substantial boost in resources for the measures outlined in the bill. I applaud Senators Kennedy and Frist for coming together in a bipartisan spirit and putting forth a bill that takes the first important step towards truly protecting our Nation against future acts of bioterrorism. When Sam Nunn testified in early September before the Foreign Relations Committee on the threat posed by biological weapons, he was very clear, bioterrorism is a direct threat to the national security of the United States and we need to invest the necessary resources to counter this threat accordingly. As troubling as the recent spate of anthrax by mail attacks was, we were very fortunate that this was a comparatively small-scale attack. Seventeen Americans contracted inhalation or cutaneous anthrax; unfortunately, four individuals died. The next time a biological weapons attack occurs, we may not be so fortunate in dealing with a small number of victims who emerge over a period of weeks. Instead, we may face thousands of victims flooding local emergency rooms and overwhelming our hospitals in a matter of hours. Let's be real here, the anthrax attacks, as small-scale as they have been, have greatly stressed our national public health infrastructure. One out of every eight Centers for Disease Control employees at their headquarters in Atlanta is working on the current anthrax outbreak, forcing the CDC to sideline other essential core activities for the time being. Folks, what we have just been through is small potatoes compared to what we potentially will face. Plain and simple, we can't afford to be so underprepared in the future. Among Sam Nunn's recommendations for countering biological terrorism, he declared, ``We need to recognize the central role of public health and medicine in this effort and engage these professionals fully as partners on the national security team.'' There are many good things in this bill, ranging from the expansion of the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile to efforts to enhance food safety, but I am especially please that the Bioterrorism Preparedness Act provides direct grants to improve the public health infrastructure at the State and local level. Our doctors, nurses, emergency medical technicians, and other public health personnel are our eyes and ears on the ground for detecting a biological weapons attack. We can't afford not to do everything we can to make sure they have the necessary tools and resources in containing any BW attack. This bill goes a long way towards fulfilling that core commitment. So I strongly support the Bioterrorism Preparedness Act and I look forward to its early passage and entry into law before the Congress adjourns for the year. But I am deeply concerned that the bill ignores the international aspects to any effective response to potential bioterrorism. As chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, I know that we cannot address the threat of bioterrorism within the borders of the United States alone. Let me be clear, a biological weapons attack need not originate in the United States to pose a threat to our Nation. A dangerous pathogen deliberately released anywhere in the world can quickly spread to the United States in a matter of days, if not hours. The scope and frequency of international trade, travel, and migration patterns offer unlimited opportunities for pathogens to spread across national borders and even to move from one continent to another. Therefore, we need to view all infectious disease epidemics, wherever they occur, as a potential threat to all nations. It is for this reason that Senator Helms, the distinguished ranking member on the Foreign Relations Committee, and I worked together in seeking to insert provisions in this bill to enhance global disease monitoring and surveillance. With Senator Kennedy's strong backing, we wanted to ensure the full availability of information, i.e. disease characteristics, pathogen strains, transmission patterns, on infectious epidemics overseas that may provide clues indicating possible illegal biological weapons use or research. Even if an infectious disease outbreak occurs naturally, improved monitoring and surveillance can help contain the epidemic and tip off scientists and public health professionals to new diseases that may be used as biological weapons in the future. The World Health Organization, WHO, established a formal worldwide network last year, called the Global Alert and Response Network, to monitor and track infectious disease outbreaks in every region of the world. The WHO has done an impressive job so far working on a shoestring budget. But this global network is only as good as its components, individual nations. Many developing nations simply do not possess the personnel, laboratory equipment or public health infrastructure to track disease patterns and detect traditional and emerging pathogens. In fact, these nations often just seek to keep up in treating those who have already fallen ill. Doctors and nurses in many developing countries only treat a small fraction of the patients who may be ill with a specific infectious disease--in effect, they are only witnessing the tip of a potentially much larger iceberg. According to the National Intelligence Council, governments in developing countries in Africa and Asia have established rudimentary or no systems at all for disease surveillance, response or prevention. For example, in 1994, an outbreak of plague occurred in India, resulting in 56 deaths and billions of dollars of economic damage as trade and travel with India ground to a halt. The plague outbreak was so severe because Indian authorities did not catch the epidemic in its early stages. Authorities had ignored or failed to respond to routine complaints of flea infestation, a sure warning signal for plague. Owing to the lack of resources, developing nations are the weak spots in global disease monitoring and surveillance. Without shoring up these nations' capabilities to detect and contain disease outbreaks, we are leaving the entire world vulnerable to either a deliberate biological weapons attack or an especially virulent naturally occurring epidemic. Therefore, Senator Helms and I worked together in proposing language for this bill to authorize $150 million in fiscal year 02 and fiscal year 03 to strengthen the capabilities of individual nations in the developing world to detect, diagnose, and contain infectious disease epidemics. The proposed title would have helped train entry-level public health professionals from developing countries and provide grants for the acquisition of modern laboratory and communications equipment essential to any effective disease surveillance network. Upon first glance, $150 million is chump change in a bill that authorizes more than $3 billion. But I have been assured by public health experts that $150 million alone can go a long ways in making sure that developing countries acquire the basic disease surveillance and monitoring capabilities to effectively contribute to the WHO's global network. The bottom line is that these provisions would have offered an inexpensive, commonsense solution to a problem of global proportions. I was greatly disappointed, therefore, when the White House weighed in late in the negotiations and expressed its strong insistence that the language Senator Helms and I worked out should be dropped from this bill. While administration officials assured me that they liked our ideas, they asserted any bioterrorism bill passed this year should only include those provisions that carry a domestic focus and meet the test of urgency. Let me respond to those arguments. It is extremely short-sighted to draw artificial boundaries between ``domestic'' and ``international'' responses to bioterrorism. I have already pointed out that pathogens deliberately released in an attack anywhere in the world can quickly spread to the United States if we are unable to contain the epidemic at its source. The National Intelligence Council has concluded that infectious diseases are a real threat to U.S. national security. To ignore the international arena in favor of domestic solutions alone is profoundly misguided. As for urgency, I can think of few things more urgent than taking the necessary steps to respond to bioterrorism in a global context. Americans have been repeatedly warned by their government leaders to expect other terrorist attacks in the near future; we cannot limit ourselves to thinking these attacks will occur in a conventional form or location. Just this fall, the WHO has had to respond to natural outbreaks of hemorrhagic fever in Pakistan and yellow fever in the Ivory Coast. An effective global disease surveillance network cannot come into existence soon enough. I therefore intend to offer an amendment, when this bill comes to the floor later this year, to re-insert the provisions to enhance the capabilities of developing nations to track, diagnose, and contain disease outbreaks resulting from both BW attacks and naturally occurring epidemics. It is not my intention to slow down this overall bill or raise any obstacles; on the contrary, I want to see comprehensive bioterrorism legislation reach the President's desk this year. But we cannot address the full scope of the threat posed by biological weapons without including the international component of the solution. Let me close with an excerpt of testimony from the Foreign Relations Committee hearing on bioterrorism in September from Dr. D.A. Henderson, the man who spearheaded the international campaign to eradicate smallpox in the 1970s. Today, he is the director of the newly-formed Office of Emergency Preparedness in the Department of Health and Human Services, which has the mandate to help organize the Federal Government's response to future bioterrorist attacks. Dr. Henderson was very clear on the value of global disease surveillance: ``In cooperation with the WHO and other countries, we need to strengthen greatly our intelligence gathering capability. A focus on international surveillance and on scientist-to-scientist communication will be necessary if we are to have an early warning about the possible development and production of biological weapons by rogue nations or groups.'' I am hopeful that a majority of my colleagues will recognize we cannot leave the rest of the world to fend for itself in combating biological weapons and infectious diseases in general if we are to ensure America's security as well.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I compliment the distinguished leader--and he is still my leader--the chairman of the Appropriations Committee, Senator Byrd, on his speech and his remembrance relative to Thanksgiving. I also rise to compliment him on his speech that I only heard in my office relating to strategic doctrine and strategic weapons. Quite frankly, I am a little embarrassed. I thought he was going to make the Thanksgiving speech first. I wished to be here for his comments on what is going on now in Crawford, TX, with President Bush and President Putin. Today, I think we all agree we have an opportunity to reach a reasonable agreement with the Russians on the three most significant strategic issues of our day: missile defense, strategic arms reductions, and nonproliferation. Senator Byrd and I and others have had a chance to meet with Mr. Putin in a larger group. Based on private discussions with him and on reports of what he has said in his meetings with President Bush, it seems as though genuine progress has been made in the summit this week between President Bush and President Putin. I respectfully suggest--and I believe the President would probably agree--that much more needs to be done. It seems to me that, in conjunction with what Senator Byrd said earlier, it is vital for us to continue to make progress, and it is equally vital that the United States refrain from actions that would make further agreements on these vital issues difficult, if not impossible. President Bush has made clear--in the ten months since he has been President--his determination to proceed on the development of a limited missile defense system, despite any limitations in the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972. Now, we have had very conflicting accounts from his representatives in the administration before the Intelligence Committee, the Armed Services Committee, and the Foreign Relations Committee as to whether or not they were ``prepared to break out of the ABM treaty'' based on planned testing, or needed testing, to further determine the feasibility of a limited missile defense. But one thing has come through consistently: President Bush has stated his determination to do whatever it takes to develop a limited missile defense. Obviously, Russian officials have heard him, and they understand his determination to proceed. But--and it is a big but--President Putin, in his discussion with some of us Senators and in his public statements, has made it clear that he still considers the ABM Treaty a critical element in the agreements that govern strategic relations between the United States and his country. President Bush and President Putin seem to have achieved a personal rapport over the last 6 months that bolsters President Putin's confidence that we mean no harm to Russia. I have said before, somewhat facetiously but only somewhat, that as a student of history--although not to the extent of my friend from West Virginia, and I mean that seriously--I cannot think of any Russian leader, other than a tsar Peter the Great, who looked further west than this gentleman, Mr. Putin, seems to be looking. He seems to have made a very fundamental and significant decision that the future of his country lies in the West. He has taken some political chances at home. How significant they are, we do not know, but nonetheless, he has, to use the vernacular, stiffed both the browns and the reds, the nationalists and the former Communists, in making such a dramatic statement about his intentions to live and thrive in the West. He has even dismantled Russia's listening post in Cuba as a demonstration of the lack of feeling of hostility toward the United States. I will say that President Bush has succeeded in communicating to the President of Russia that we mean no harm; that the Cold War is over. In fact, Secretary Powell said in Asia that the post-Cold War is also over. This is the opportunity for a fundamental new beginning. But the beginning does not necessarily mean the end, and clearly to Putin it does not mean the end, to the ABM Treaty. President Putin appears to have internalized President Bush's assertion that he is not an enemy and that Russia is not an enemy--but President Putin is still unwilling to bend the ABM Treaty. He is willing, however, to let the United States proceed with the testing and development of missile defense, so long as the ABM Treaty remains in force. That seems to me to be a sensible arrangement. The part that gets difficult is the part to which the Senator from West Virginia spoke. If, in fact, we are, in practical terms, about to amend the ABM Treaty--this is a government with equal branches--that is something about which we in the Senate get to have a say. We should be in on that deal, as Russell Long used to say. That is a deal we should be in on. I am very happy the President appears not to be intent at this moment on withdrawing from the ABM Treaty, which I think would be a tragic mistake--not only substantively as it relates to arms control but diplomatically as it relates to our relations around the world. I am anxious to hear what the President has in mind, however, in terms of how, in effect, to ratify--not in the constitutional sense, necessarily--but how to ratify whatever agreement he reaches with Mr. Putin. If I am not mistaken, my friend from West Virginia said that President Bush said--and I recall President Bush saying this, but I am paraphrasing--we can do this on a handshake. Handshakes are great--and I admire and I trust the President's resolve and I trust his sense of honor and I believe he means what he says and will stick to it when he shakes hands. I am even prepared to acknowledge that is probably true with President Putin as well--but a handshake is not the stuff upon which these kinds of agreements should rest ultimately. The goal of our policy should not be to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, as some continue to urge. I think they miss the point. The goal should be to maximize our national security interests rather than to win some debating point over the relevance of arms control agreements in this post-cold-war era. With regard to strategic weapons, President Bush announced this week that the United States will reduce its force level over the next 10 years to somewhere between 1,700 and 2,200 deployed warheads. The devil is in the details--for example, ``deployed warheads.'' To date, I have not gotten an explanation of what is going to happen with ``all the other warheads,''--roughly 4,000 additional warheads, not just ours, but the Russians' as well, because President Putin promised to do the same thing, to cut his forces as well. I assume--and this is a little premature--but I assume he is also talking about ``deployed'' nuclear weapons, as opposed to all the nuclear weapons in your possession. That is excellent progress as far as it goes, Mr. President, and I do not mean to sound as if I am trying to rain on the President's parade. I think what he is doing is very helpful. Now, though, it seems to me-- and obviously to the chairman of the Appropriations Committee-- Presidents Bush and Putin should agree on a means by which they can verify that each country is complying with its promise. Even if the Lord Almighty came down and stood in the well of the Senate and said: I guarantee to all you Senators and all America and all the world that both Putin and Bush will keep their agreements, that would not be quite good enough for me. God willing, Presidents Bush and Putin will remain healthy, and I am sure President Bush expects to remain in power for 4 years beyond his term. But it may be that he will not be President in 3 years, and Mr. Putin may not be President in 3 years. For great countries to have such fundamental decisions rest upon personal assurances between two honorable men is not sufficient--not because the men are not honorable, not because they are not intent on keeping their promises, but because they are not immortal; they are not going to be around forever. It seems to me they should make sure, whatever each side is promising, that it is able to be determined with some objectivity. This would avoid significant misunderstandings of the sort that, I remind my colleagues, have plagued us in the past regarding the Russian promises on tactical nuclear weapons made a decade ago. U.S. force planners benefit from predictability in Russian strategic forces. The more we know about what is going on in the Russian nuclear force posture, the easier it is to determine how we should deal with them, how we should counter them. With a handshake, all we know is what President Putin says to the press or in private to President Bush. That is all we know. With a written agreement, we have specific commitments. U.S.-Russian relations will benefit from knowing what each has promised--and what we and they have not promised. I go back to the promises made by both Presidents Gorbachev and Yeltsin. In fact, what happened was that Gorbachev and Yeltsin made an agreement they intended to keep, and they may, in fact, have kept it. In January of this year, I remind my colleagues, some of our friends who do not like arms control agreements and were much less trusting of Russia than they seem to be today raised questions over whether Russia had violated its 1991 and 1992 promises to cut back on tactical nuclear weapons. That was an issue before this body in the beginning of this year, discussed in this town among the nuclear theologians, discussed in this town among those interested in strategic doctrine and strategic weapons. Had the Russians kept their promise? Part of the problem was that people were not sure what Gorbachev or Yeltsin had actually promised to do. That was part of the problem. Verification obviously helps. Without a formal agreement of some sort, however, generally one does not get verification. The allegation in January of 2001 was that Russia was storing nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad and people wanted to inspect those sites. We heard some concern from my friends, saying the Russians have these missiles hidden in barns and they took them out of silos but they have them on rail, and on and on, trying to demonstrate a short 8 months ago that we cannot trust the Russians. It caused a bit of a furor because one of the arguments concerning why we should do away with the ABM Treaty was that we ought to do away with this treaty because the Russians do not keep these treaties, and Lord only knows what they are doing, and we have to build this national missile defense. That was only in January of this year. But when people suggested that we inspect those sites--because we thought, as some asserted, they had stored nuclear weapons there--there were no grounds to request the inspection, let alone demand one, because there was no agreement attendant to the promise of Gorbachev and Yeltsin to, in fact, allow for verification. Why do I bring this up? To say the Russians cannot be trusted? No. What happens is that when there is doubt about issues such as nuclear weapons, people always err on the side of the worst case because we almost cannot afford not to--because if we are wrong, we are, no pun intended, dead wrong; we are really wrong. So what happened as a consequence of the January dispute about whether or not they had kept their 1991 promise? What happened was it bred mistrust. Remember all the articles that occurred in January and February and March and actually began during the last campaign? This administration got off to an incredibly rocky start with Russia. The President has made that right, and I compliment him for it, but now we have stalled. We have sort of stumbled through 9 months of lost opportunity. The point is, when there is no independent means to verify--when a new President comes into office, the next President, whoever that is-- how does he or she judge whether or not the commitment is being kept? I promise he or she will be buffeted on every side by those within the Defense Department, the intelligence community and the think-tanks who are whispering in his or her ear saying: Hey, they are not keeping the deal. The same problems can and do occur regarding strategic weapons. How will we know if Russia has reduced its weapons numbers? Will it remove them from launchers and silos, or only say that certain weapons are no longer operational? How will we know? That was the basis of a big debate not too long ago, I remind my friend--although I do not have to remind my friend--from West Virginia. That was the basis of a big debate. How are we going to know? What is Russia really promising to do? The only misunderstanding that is worse than one that was intended is one that was unintended. Maybe they are going to be keeping their word, but how will we know? I promise, there will be many voices questioning whether the Russians are keeping the agreement, and if there is no independent means to verify it, our questioning then breeds distrust as to whether or not the Americans really are looking for a way out: Are they really with us? Did they really mean to enter into this? What is Russia really promising to do? That, I hope, will be made clear, because even that is in question. It is not wise to make assertions that you will reduce weapons to between 1,700 and 2,200. I guarantee there will be people in this Chamber saying the Russians really said they would be down to 1,700 by such and such a date, and there are 2,200. I might add, what is going to happen to those warheads that are not deployed? For that matter, how will Russia or the American people know if the United States reduces its arms? What are we promising to do? Are we promising to destroy the weapons, as the START agreements require us to do, such that when we get the force numbers down, we get rid of the rest? Or are we only promising we will decommission them in the sense that we will put them in a barn, we will put them in a hangar, able to be reloaded, but we are not going to have them on station and targeted somewhere? Will Russia change its training doctrine in the absence of a formal treaty? I remind people when Gorbachev and Yeltsin agreed with the first President Bush to reduce tactical nuclear weapons, they said that without a formal agreement they could not change Russian training. What does that have to do with anything? Rather than deciding they were going to act as if they had decommissioned the weapons, which they said they had, what did they do? They continued to train Russian forces to make war with the weapons they said were no longer deployed. So what then happened? I am sure my colleagues from West Virginia and Montana and I must have attended intelligence meetings where we would be told the following: They said they had decommissioned these weapons, but yet look at the manual; their doctrine still says they are going to plan to use them. So that must mean they have not decommissioned them. How do we know? And yet Gorbachev and Yeltsin had said at the start, without a verifiable agreement we are not going to change our manual because we may have to pull those suckers out of storage and use them if you guys turn out not to keep your side of the deal. What will we do? Will we, too, train our troops to make war with weapons we say are no longer deployed? Will other countries take heart because we have fewer deployed weapons, or will they look at our total stockpile and say that our reductions are a sham? Again, I have no doubt that President Bush will keep his word and do the right thing, but we cannot, in my view, expect other countries to have as much trust in us as we have in ourselves. I will never forget the first time I was sent by the man who is now the chairman of the Appropriations Committee, and who was then the leader of the U.S. Senate--he may remember--asked me as a relatively young Senator in 1979, when the SALT II agreement was under consideration, to lead a group of new Senators who were uncertain about whether or not they were for this new arms control agreement. It was in the face of this scare that the Russians had bases in Cuba, and we were trying to push the treaty through. The Carter administration wanted it. I led a delegation of 10 or 12 Senators--great Senators who are no longer in the Senate, Bradley, Boren, Pryor, and a number of others, because they were just elected that year. We sat down with Leonid Brezhnev, who was the Russian President at the time. Brezhnev came into their Cabinet room. We were all on one side, and Brezhnev and Kosygin on the other side, and it opened the following way: He welcomed us. We had contemporaneous translation. Brezhnev looked at me, and he said: ``Let's get two things straight, Senator. The first thing is, when I was your age I had an important job.'' He went on to tell me his job, along with Kosygin, was to supply Leningrad in the siege of Leningrad, making it clear ``you are a young man, Senator.'' He wanted me to know he had been important for a long time. I got the message. The second thing he said, and this is literally what he said: ``Let's agree that we do not trust each other, and we have good reason not to trust each other.'' He went on to say: ``You Americans believe, with every fiber of your being, that you would never use nuclear weapons.'' You believe you would never use them against us first. But I hope you understand why we think you might. Then he went on to say: ``You are the only nation in the history of mankind that has ever used nuclear weapons. You used them against civilian populations.'' He quickly added: ``I am not second-guessing that, but you used them. So you have to understand we might think you might use them again.'' A point well taken. No matter how well intended either side is, we cannot expect other nations to trust our resolve as much as we trust our resolve. So if we want others to trust us and we want to be able to trust Russia in the years to come, we should remember Ronald Reagan's advice: Trust but verify. I am encouraged by President Bush's statement, following his force reductions announcement: If we need to write it down on a piece of paper, I would be glad to do that. He should. I hope he will. I also hope that piece of paper comes our way for us to take a look at. A new START III treaty would not be difficult to draft. It would ensure not only rigorous verification but also proper respect for the constitutional role of the Senate regarding international agreements. There are also grounds for hope regarding the problem of proliferation and Russia's relations with Iraq and Iran. For the first time, Russians are saying there is no longer a strategic rationale for putting trade above nonproliferation in Russia's relations with Iran and Iraq. The question now is money. It is not a question of Russia's place in the world. That place is clearly with us in the West and in opposition to proliferation. We and our allies can provide the money that Russia needs to maintain economic growth and well-being, in return for new Russian policies and actions that refrain from proliferating weapons in that part of the world. We can offer Russia debt relief on its Soviet-era obligations to the United States and other countries. Russia could use a significant proportion of the proceeds of that debt relief on non-proliferation programs to secure its sensitive materials and to provide new, civilian careers for its many weapons scientists who could otherwise become prey to offers from rogue states or terrorist groups. Senator Lugar of Indiana and I have encouraged the Administration to consider this option. We also have legislation to authorize such debt relief, which the Foreign Relations Committee has approved unanimously. The U.N. could authorize a major increase in the Iraqi Oil for Food program--which would revitalize Iraq's oil production infrastructure-- in return for devoting the proceeds to payment of Iraq's foreign debt, especially its debt to Russia. That would free Russia to pursue the issue of United Nations inspections on the basis of strategic concerns alone. Senators Domenici and Lugar propose that we provide loan guarantees to Russia in return for Russia reducing its fissile material stockpiles. Missile defense, strategic arms and non-proliferation affect not only Russia and the United States, but the future of the whole world. The opportunities for U.S.-Russian cooperation--if we seize them--hold the promise of a transformed world in which international cooperation is the norm, with Russia and the United States leading the way. But we must seize those opportunities. And we must not waste those opportunities by engaging in purely ideological actions, like withdrawing from the ABM Treaty when there is no rational need to do that. I conclude by saying that I compliment my friend from West Virginia who is, as usual, the first person to come to the floor and speak to this issue. It is vitally important. I hope the President and the administration listen to his advice. I think he is dead right.