Joe Biden

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, today I am introducing, along with Senator Boxer, a bill to authorize the Broadcasting Board of Governors to make available to a private entity archival materials from the Africa Division of the Voice of America. This bill is also being introduced today in the other body by Representative Cynthia McKinney, who initiated this proposal and asked me to introduce the Senate version of the bill. The bill authorizes the Broadcasting Board of Governors to make available to the Institute for Media Development, a non-profit organization, archival materials of the Africa Division of the Voice of America (VOA). These materials, currently stored at the VOA in analog form, will be put into modern digital form and made available to scholars through the University of California, Los Angeles, and any other institution of higher learning approved by the Board. I believe this is a very useful public-private partnership that will result in a positive benefit to scholars of African studies. As I am sure my colleagues are aware, the Voice of America is not broadcast in the United States. Programs which may be of interest to students and scholars of African politics, history, literature and foreign policy are often inaccessible. Moreover, there is no systematic means, much less the funds, to make such archival material available. And once the programs are aired, there is no guarantee that the analog tape on which they are recorded will be preserved. History may literally be lost, if news shows and interviews with prominent figures in various African countries are not preserved. Storing these recordings in a central archive should prove invaluable in years to come. There will be no cost to the U.S. Government. The bill requires that the government be reimbursed for any expenses it incurs in making such materials available, and for the indemnification of the government in the event that the materials are used in a manner that violates the copyright laws of the United States. I would not anticipate that such copyright violations will occur, because the bill also makes clear that materials made available may be used only for academic and research purposes and may not be used for public or commercial broadcast purposes. I am pleased that the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations has agreed to place this legislation on the agenda of the committee later this week. I hope the Committee, and then the full Senate, will give its approval. I ask unanimous consent that the bill be printed at this point in the Record.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise today to offer my continued endorsement for the Federal Highway Administration's National Scenic Byways Program, and to express my support for the Kennett Pike Preservation Committee's efforts to seek both state and federal scenic byways designation for Route 52, the Kennett Pike, in New Castle County, Delaware. The National Scenic Byways Program recognizes roadways that exhibit outstanding examples of scenic, historic, recreational, cultural, archeological or natural qualities along their routes. The Kennett Pike boasts a number of cultural, scenic, historic and recreational values that I believe make it an excellent candidate for federal designation as a national scenic byway. Originally constructed in the 1700's and named Doe Run, the Kennett Pike maintains much of its original character, despite more than 200 years of steady development in the area. During the Revolutionary War, General George Washington and his troops were thought to have marched along the road, and, during the Civil War, soldiers settled at Camp Brandywine, now the location of an intersection on the Pike. Along its route, not only will you find world renown tourist attractions, including Winterthur Museum, Hagley Museum and Longwood Gardens, but also historic villages, numerous inns, farms, parks and mills. Within the Kennett Pike Corridor, over 30 sites are already listed on the National Register of Historic Places, with many more sites in the corridor also eligible for the historic designation. In addition to its historic and cultural relevance, the Kennett Pike has been designated a greenway by the State of Delaware. A ride along the Pike reveals a beautiful landscape of rolling hills, forests and a state park. The Kennett Pike is truly a gem among the ever increasingly populated suburban landscape of the middle Atlantic region. In the Fall of 1999, the State of Delaware received a grant from the Federal Highway Administration, in the amount of $140,000, to establish a state scenic byways program. A roadway can only be nominated for a national scenic byway designation after it has been designated on the state level. It is my hope that the State will act quickly and implement its scenic byways program, so I can continue my efforts to see that Route 52, the Kennett Pike, is designated the first national scenic byway in the State of Delaware.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, today I am introducing, along with Senator Boxer, a bill to authorize the Broadcasting Board of Governors to make available to a private entity archival materials from the Africa Division of the Voice of America. This bill is also being introduced today in the other body by Representative Cynthia McKinney, who initiated this proposal and asked me to introduce the Senate version of the bill. The bill authorizes the Broadcasting Board of Governors to make available to the Institute for Media Development, a non-profit organization, archival materials of the Africa Division of the Voice of America (VOA). These materials, currently stored at the VOA in analog form, will be put into modern digital form and made available to scholars through the University of California, Los Angeles, and any other institution of higher learning approved by the Board. I believe this is a very useful public-private partnership that will result in a positive benefit to scholars of African studies. As I am sure my colleagues are aware, the Voice of America is not broadcast in the United States. Programs which may be of interest to students and scholars of African politics, history, literature and foreign policy are often inaccessible. Moreover, there is no systematic means, much less the funds, to make such archival material available. And once the programs are aired, there is no guarantee that the analog tape on which they are recorded will be preserved. History may literally be lost, if news shows and interviews with prominent figures in various African countries are not preserved. Storing these recordings in a central archive should prove invaluable in years to come. There will be no cost to the U.S. Government. The bill requires that the government be reimbursed for any expenses it incurs in making such materials available, and for the indemnification of the government in the event that the materials are used in a manner that violates the copyright laws of the United States. I would not anticipate that such copyright violations will occur, because the bill also makes clear that materials made available may be used only for academic and research purposes and may not be used for public or commercial broadcast purposes. I am pleased that the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations has agreed to place this legislation on the agenda of the committee later this week. I hope the Committee, and then the full Senate, will give its approval. I ask unanimous consent that the bill be printed at this point in the Record.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise this morning to speak about an issue that is going to consume, over the next couple years, a fair amount of this body's time. If there were a contest to name a foreign policy issue that just won't go away, national missile defense would surely be a top contender. The United States has been researching, developing, and sometimes deploying ballistic missile defense systems for almost 40 years now. Throughout this period, the issues of whether to deploy such a system and what system to deploy have prompted intense and often partisan debate. That debate continues today. Two events this week argue strongly, however, for a pause in the partisan wrangling that so often accompanies this debate. The first event was Gov. George W. Bush's call on Tuesday for the President of the United States ``not to make a hasty decision, on a political timetable'' regarding amendments to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and deployment of a national missile defense. Anyone on this floor knows that we voted in the last year, assuming that funds are provided and consistent with a policy of continued strategic arms reductions, to deploy a limited national missile defense system ``as soon as technologically feasible,'' and the majority of the Senate voted for that. There has been a bit of a rush, to use the expression we use on the floor, to take steps by the end of this year to ``pour concrete in Alaska.'' That is a euphemism for saying we have to put certain radars up in Alaska in order to meet the timetable to erect by 2005 a limited national missile defense that will defend against, theoretically at least, weapons that may or are likely to be deployed by the North Koreans. Ninety-nine percent of the American people don't even know what we are talking about because we have not yet debated it, and it is going to cost $30 billion at the low end, probably a lot more. They have not heard that number before. What has happened is that we have been in a headlong rush to be in a position to be able to deploy that system in time to meet the looming threat from North Korea. Now Governor Bush comes along, the putative candidate for President of the United States in the Republican Party, and says: Don't make a hasty decision, Mr. President, on a political timetable. Well, really, we are on a political timetable. What is moving this national missile defense proposal forward as rapidly as it has are the likely events in North Korea over the next 5 to 7 years and a political timetable on the part of some of my Republican friends. Fortunately, Governor Bush has stepped in and said: Let's slow all this down; let's think about this. I think we should listen to him. A second event is Secretary of State Albright's journey to Florence, Italy, where she is making the case for national missile defense to our increasingly nervous allies, who oppose this notion of a limited national missile defense. What shall we make of Governor Bush's stance on national missile defense? He proposes a missile defense to defend not only the United States but also our allies. That is a different proposal from that which we have been legislating on for the past 2 years. He also proposes not only to defend against missiles from so-called rogue states, such as North Korea, Iran, and Iraq--which has been the rationale offered as to why we have to move so rapidly toward a national missile defense--but also to protect against accidental launches from anywhere in the world. If we are to defend our allies as well as ourselves, then we are going to have to build a much larger missile defense system than the one being proposed by the Pentagon and the one we have been debating in the Congress for the past year and a half. If we are to defend against accidental launches from any country rather than only attacks from a specific state, then we cannot rely upon the sort of land-based or sea- based boost-phase system that I and others have been supporting as a means of reconciling defense with deterrence, which is different from the system proposed by the Pentagon. Governor Bush stated properly that ``deterrence remains the first line of defense against nuclear attack.'' I assume that means he believes the ABM Treaty is essential, as it is a vital building block in that first line of defense against nuclear attack. Governor Bush promised, properly, that if he were elected President, he would consult with our allies as he developed specific missile defense plans. I, too, have been suggesting, to my Senate colleagues and in high-level meetings, that we had better darn well understand what our allies think about this. My good friend, Senator Kyl, who is one of the brighter fellows here and who strongly supports national missile defense, said we should not let what our allies have to say affect what we do. I don't think it is that simple. Governor Bush now comes along and says he wants to make sure we consult with our allies. That is what he would do first after becoming President. This is clearly something we would want to have already done that before we decided to deploy any such system. The push to deploy a system, without working out something with our allies, has not come to fruition yet. But Governor Bush points out another flaw in the argument for proceeding rapidly. He also acknowledges the need to convince Russia that the United States' missile defenses would not be aimed at Russia. Governor Bush indicated a willingness to lower U.S. force levels-- although he confuses me. He says ``lower U.S. force levels below the START II levels.'' We have already basically agreed to that in the START III framework that was set in 1997. Is he talking about lowering U.S. nuclear force levels below the 2,000-to-2,500 figure proposed at Helsinki? Or is the suggestion that we lower them only to that level? He was a little unclear in how he stated that, and he leaves me a little unclear--indeed, totally unclear--as to what he means. Governor Bush also suggests that there is a need to move nuclear forces off the hair-trigger alert they are on. I agree. I think he is absolutely right about that. Indeed, Governor Bush stated that ``the United States should be willing to lead by example'' in this area. At the same time, however, Governor Bush spoke approvingly of ``laser technology'' and of ``a space-based system.'' Now, this will surely strike others as it did me--as an allusion to Reagan's support for the ``Star Wars'' system of the 1980s, a notion that has been pretty soundly rejected up until now. It will raise legitimate fears, it seems to me, that a missile defense system deployed by the United States, whatever its size at first, would be enlarged to threaten the deterrent capacity of China, and eventually that of Russia. Would Governor Bush withdraw from the ABM Treaty in order to ``fully explore these options?'' To fully explore the options of laser systems, of space-based systems--does that mean he is going to withdraw from the treaty he seems to imply is the building block upon which our deterrence rests? Or would he defer any decision on deployment until we were certain that the proposed system would successfully meet all of his criteria? His decision in that regard could determine whether his proposal prompted allied support or made them conclude that the United States was choosing missile defense foolishly or recklessly. Admittedly, this was just a press conference, and Governor Bush has not had a chance to flesh this out. But the bottom line is that he is saying: Whoa, slow up, there are a lot of things we haven't answered. We should not keep this on a political timetable. I wonder whether Governor Bush thought through all the implications of his missile defense proposals. How would he assure Russia that the United States would not seek to substitute defense for deterrence--an assurance he says is necessary? How would he avoid an arms race between Chinese missiles and American defenses? Or between China and India? Or then between India and Pakistan? My own view is that the risk of a nuclear arms race in Asia would be the most dangerous consequence of deploying a national missile defense that was not limited to defending against the missiles of specific target states. I fear that such an arms race would be terribly costly and would destabilize China's relations with its neighbors, and that the resulting instability would lead to Japan, Taiwan, or South Korea building nuclear weapons. They have the capacity to do that, and I truly believe they might, if an Asian arms race were to occur as a result of our missile defense deployment. Last week, the Los Angeles Times reported that a U.S. intelligence official warned ``that construction of a national missile defense could trigger a wave of destabilizing events around the world and possibly endanger relations with European allies.'' Possible consequences reportedly include China fielding hundreds more missiles, putting MIRVed warheads on its missiles--which it does not have now--and adding countermeasures. We all know that they are measures added to a ballistic missile in order to fool any defensive system. The missile puts out a lot of little things--anything from balloons to what most people would think would be just like little pieces of metal. It is a lot more complicated than that, but the effect is to fool the defensive system as to which object has the nuclear warhead. That is what we mean by countermeasures. They are not hard to field. They haven't yet been fielded by China to any significant degree, to the best of our knowledge. But a U.S. intelligence official foresees China adding countermeasures to frustrate U.S. defenses and, in the words of that intelligence official, ``selling countermeasures for sure'' to countries such as North Korea, Iran and Iraq. This is precisely the sort of concern I have been raising for the last several months. I went to a defense conference in Germany with many of the people in the Senate, in the House, and in the Defense Department, as well as the defense establishments from all our allied nations--even some who are not members of NATO. I raised that very question there. No one had an answer, I might add, when I raised the question among all the defense experts. Everybody is prepared to give an estimate of what the North Koreans are likely to do in terms of building not only nuclear capability, but also the capability to have a missile with a third stage that could reach the continental United States, that could not only carry a nuclear warhead, but also be used in chemical or biological warfare. I asked: Can anybody give an estimate to the President as to what the Chinese would likely do if we deployed a national missile defense system? They now have fewer than two dozen intercontinental ballistic missiles. That seems to be a pretty good thing to me. I would not like to see China go to 200, or 400, or 800, or 1,000, which is fully within their capacity. I would not like them to do what the L.A. Times reports that a U.S. intelligence official raises as a possibility. I would not like to see them MIRV their warheads. I would not like to see them have more sophisticated nuclear weapons. I kind of like it where they are. Now, I also raised the question, Has anybody calculated or laid out for the President of the United States what the likely scenario is if China were to significantly increase their arsenal? What would happen in India? What would happen in Pakistan? Has anybody raised this possibility of that being of concern to the Japanese? Well, the truth is, no one had an answer. I even went to a high-level meeting in the Defense Department a couple of months ago, with the Secretary of Defense, other high officials, and those in charge of developing this system. I raised the same question again before the Foreign Relations Committee, on which the occupant of the Chair sits. I asked specifically--and he may have been there--the Director of the CIA if they had done such a study. Apparently, one is underway. Apparently, people are beginning to focus on the other side of this equation. The fundamental rationale for our strategic doctrine is to guard Americans from harm, as best we can, to guarantee the security of those young Senate pages sitting up there and their children and grandchildren. Are we better off with a missile defense system as contemplated and an arms race in Asia, if that were to occur? Or are we better off with the risk that might come from North Korea, if they developed a third stage that could reach the United States and we relied instead upon deterrence? I have not made that final judgment in my own mind. But I know one thing. We don't have enough information now to make a final judgment. All this leads me to conclude that the risks inherent in doing without a national missile defense at this moment might be less than the risk we would accept in building either the Pentagon's proposed missile defense or the sort of defenses that Gov. George Bush has proposed. Brent Scowcroft, former National Security Adviser in the Ford and Bush administrations, is also allegedly concerned. The Los Angeles Times reported that he called the scenario of an Asian nuclear arms race ``plausible'' and warned: ``We ought to think whether we want the Chinese to change their very minimalist strategy.'' I know I don't want China to change their minimalist strategy. I believe anybody who thinks we can affect that outcome would not want China to change its minimalist strategy. I say this--speaking for myself, and clearly not for Brent Scowcroft--not merely because of the added threat that it would pose to the United States of America, but also because of what that would most assuredly cause to happen in India, and what that almost assuredly would cause to happen in Pakistan, and elsewhere. Can anyone in this Chamber suggest to me that if China were to change in a robust fashion their nuclear strategy, that officials are going to sit in Tokyo, and say: You know, let's not worry about this; this is not a problem; we have the American nuclear umbrella? As much as I love our Japanese friends and allies, the last thing I want to see come out of this debate that we are going to have in the next weeks and months, and hopefully next year or so, is a nuclear Japan. I hope General Scowcroft, who is a senior adviser to Governor Bush, will encourage his very important pupil to think carefully about this. Just as I have concerns regarding Gov. Bush's position on national missile defense, so do I have concerns regarding the Pentagon's proposed system and the hurried pace at which a deployment decision is being forced upon the President. Some of my concerns are those of a supporter of arms control, but others relate to the apparent shortcomings of the system the Pentagon proposes. Renowned scientists and former defense officials have said that a land-based missile defense aimed at incoming warheads cannot do the job. The current National Intelligence Estimate on the foreign missile threat to the United States warns: We assess that countries developing ballistic missiles would also develop various responses to US theater and national defenses. Russia and China each have developed numerous countermeasures and probably are willing to sell the requisite technologies. Many countries, such as North Korea, Iran, and Iraq probably would rely initially on readily available technology--including separating RVs, spin-stabilized RVs, RV reorientation, radar absorbing material . . ., booster fragmentation, low-power jammers, chaff, and simple (balloon) decoys--to develop penetration aids and countermeasures. These countries could develop countermeasures based on these technologies by the time they flight test their missiles. Decades ago, when missile defense research began during the Cold War, the goal was not a perfect defense. Rather, the idea was that by limiting our casualties--both in human lives and in retaliatory forces--a missile defense would buttress our ability to fight and win a nuclear war. Missile defense supporters saw such an imperfect national missile defense as a contributor to deterrence, even though the Nixon administration eventually concluded that it was better to bar such defenses than to engage in an arms race involving both offensive and defensive weapons. Modern proposals for a limited national missile defense are very different, however. They are aimed at deterring countries that would have no hope of defeating the United States in a nuclear war, but would seek to deter or to punish us by building a capability to destroy one or more American cities. To defend against those threats, one's defense must be perfect. Merely limiting the destruction will not suffice. I wonder whether the operational effectiveness of the Pentagon's proposed missile defense will really be sufficient. If a system can kill each warhead 95 percent of the time, then the odds are 1 in 3 that an 8-warhead attack will get at least one warhead through and destroy a U.S. city. If the system can kill each warhead 98 percent of the time, there will still be a 1-in-3 chance that an attack with 21 warheads will get at least one bomb through. In the days when the Presiding Officer and I were younger men, there used to be a bumper sticker that people would put on their car: ``One nuclear bomb can ruin your day''--one warhead getting through. If the objective is to deter against any of these rogue states, a missile defense must be perfect. Missile defense supporters cite the need to avoid being blackmailed by North Korea or Iraq. But I find it hard to see how a national missile defense will give us freedom of action in Korea or the Middle East, if there is still one chance in 3, or even one chance in 5, that a modest attack will wipe out a whole American city. In light of that reality, it is equally hard to understand the Pentagon's commitment to the proposed system, except as the product of bureaucratic inertia and political pressure to deploy the first system it could find. When the Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on missile defense last year, I asked all our witnesses--both supporters and opponents of national missile defense--whether they would support a system limited to that which the Pentagon proposes. Not one of them, proponent or opponent, was prepared to do so. Two commissions chaired by Gen. Larry Welch, former Chief of Staff of the Air Force, have criticized the testing program for the Pentagon's national missile defense system. The term ``rush to failure'' has become part of our everyday vocabulary. We should be equally attentive to Gen. Welch's warning that we are unprepared to determine the ``deployment readiness'' of national missile defense, despite the name of the Defense Department's forthcoming review. The Pentagon's director of operational test and evaluation has voiced similar concerns regarding the limits of our national missile defense testing program. His concerns were seconded last month by the American Physical Society, which warned: A decision on whether or not to deploy the NMD is scheduled for the next few months. The tests that have been conducted or are planned for the period fall far short of those required to provide confidence in the ``technical feasibility'' called for in last year's NMD deployment legislation. The American Physical Society is the premier professional group for physicists in this country. They take no stand on national missile defense itself. They deserve our bi-partisan attention. In recent weeks, former senior officials have counseled delay. Listen to President Reagan's former National Security Advisor, Robert McFarlane: ``Still more work is needed before a decision on deployment is made.'' Listen to President Carter's former National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski: The bottom line is that at this stage there is no urgent strategic need for a largely domestically driven decision regarding the deployment of the national missile defense. The issue should be left to the next president--to be resolved after consensus is reached with our allies both in Europe and in the Far East, after more credible evidence becomes available regarding the technical feasibility and probable costs of the national missile defense, and after compelling intelligence estimates are aired regarding the origin, scale and timing of likely new threats to the United States and its allies. In a forthcoming article, former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown writes: ``deployment of the present NMD system should be deferred.'' He is joined in that recommendation by two former Deputy Secretaries of Defense, John Deutch and John White. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger says: ``In the light of recent ambiguous test results and imminent electoral preoccupations, it would be desirable to delay a final technical judgment until a new administration is in place.'' As we all know, the motivations behind these bi-partisan recommendations are often very divergent. Many Republicans fear that President Clinton will purposely strike a deal with Russia to limit U.S. missile defenses to an ineffective system, hoping that such a deal will make it politically untenable for a Republican president, were one to be elected, to go beyond it. I do not share those fears. The Administration has made clear to Russians and Republicans alike that its proposed ABM Treaty protocol would be only a first step. My fear is rather that the President will be sandwiched: between Russia, which doubts both our intent to deploy a missile defense system and our willingness to limit it; and Republicans, who have tried to make this a partisan campaign issue and have even urged Russian officials not to negotiate with the President of the United States of America. My fear is that the President--in order to show Russia that he is serious, and under pressure from Republicans accusing the Administration of being ``soft'' on the issue--will order the Defense Department to proceed with the deployment of a system that all of us know is the wrong one to build. The time has come to set our fears aside. The fact is that, whatever our views on the wisdom of putting our trust in a national missile defense, many of us oppose the system proposed by the Pentagon. Whatever our views on the larger issues, many of us would be content if the President were to defer both a deployment decision and the choice of a missile defense architecture, and let his successor grapple with those issues. It is also a fact, however, that the President has been under political pressure to proceed with deployment, despite the technical and strategic concerns that many of us share. If missile defense supporters maintain that pressure, they increase the risk that a poor system will be deployed, rather than one that meets our country's needs by any rational measure. I therefore call on the two major presidential campaigns--that of Gov. Bush and that of Vice President Gore--to agree not to seek partisan advantage if the President defers a missile defense deployment decision. I call on all of us in the Congress to give the President the freedom of action to make his decision without political sniping. I also call on both campaigns to agree that negotiations for a path- breaking START III agreement should continue. Gov. Bush stated that he would: . . . ask the Secretary of Defense to conduct an assessment of our nuclear force posture and determine how best to meet our security needs . . . [and] pursue the lowest possible number consistent with our national security. He added that ``the United States should remove as many weapons as possible from high alert, high-trigger status, another unnecessary vestige of Cold War confrontation.'' There is no reason to defer these two ideas until next year. The Joint Chiefs of Staff has said that it cannot go below the Helsinki target of 2,000 to 2,500 warheads for a START III agreement unless the President changes the nuclear targeting guidance. Gov. Bush has implied that he would seek the Pentagon's advice on alternatives to that guidance, however, and President Clinton should do the same. In summary, the longest-lasting foreign policy debate is not likely to be settled any time soon. There is widespread agreement, however, that we should not let this debate lead us into unwise decisions. With goodwill on both sides, we have an opportunity to suspend the partisan wrangling and let our current and future leaders make their decisions in a rational way. Let us all work together to achieve that shared objective.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, there is a new drug on the scene--Ecstasy, a synthetic stimulant and hallucinogen. It belongs to a group of drugs referred to as ``club drugs'' because they are associated with all-night dance parties known as ``raves.'' There is a widespread misconception that Ecstasy is not a dangerous drug--that it is ``no big deal.'' I am here to tell you that Ecstasy is a very big deal. The drug depletes the brain of serotonin, the chemical responsible for mood, thought, and memory. Studies show that Ecstasy use can reduce serotonin levels by up to 90 percent for at least two weeks after use and can cause brain damage. If that isn't a big deal, I don't know what is. A few months ago we got a significant warning sign that Ecstasy use is becoming a real problem. The University of Michigan's Monitoring the Future survey, a national survey measuring drug use among students, reported that while overall levels of drug use had not increased, past month use of Ecstasy among high school seniors increased more than 66 percent. The survey showed that nearly six percent of high school seniors have used Ecstasy in the past year. This may sound like a small number, so let me put it in perspective--it is just slightly less than the percentage of seniors who used cocaine and it is five times the number of seniors who used heroin. And with the supply of Ecstasy increasing as rapidly as it is, the number of kids using this drug is only likely to increase. By April of this year, the Customs Service had already seized 4 million Ecstasy pills--greater than the total amount seized in all of 1999 and more than five times the amount seized in all of 1998. Though New York is the East Coast hub for this drug, it is spreading quickly throughout the country. Last July, in my home state of Delaware, law enforcement officials seized 900 Ecstasy pills in Rehoboth Beach. There are also reports of an Ecstasy problem in Newark among students at the University of Delaware. We need to address this problem now, before it gets any worse. That is why I am pleased to join Senators Graham, Grassley and Thomas to introduce the ``Ecstasy Anti-Proliferation Act of 2000'' today. The legislation takes the steps--both in terms of law enforcement and prevention--to address this problem in a serious way before it gets any worse. The legislation directs the federal Sentencing Commission to increase the recommended penalties for manufacturing, importing, exporting or trafficking Ecstasy. Though Ecstasy is a Schedule I drug--and therefore subject to the most stringent federal penalties--not all Schedule I drugs are treated the same in our sentencing guidelines. For example, selling a kilogram of marijuana is not as serious an offense as selling a kilogram of heroin. The sentencing guidelines differentiate between the severity of drugs--as they should. But the current sentencing guidelines do not recognize how dangerous Ecstasy really is. Under current federal sentencing guidelines, one gram of Ecstasy is treated like 35 grams of marijuana. Under the ``Ecstasy Anti- Proliferation Act'', one gram of Ecstasy would be treated like 2 kilograms of marijuana. This would make the penalties for Ecstasy similar to those for methamphetamine. The legislation also authorizes a major prevention campaign in schools, communities and over the airwaves to make sure that everyone-- kids, adults, parents, teachers, cops, clergy, etc. --know just how dangerous this drug really is. We need to dispel the myth that Ecstasy is not a dangerous drug because, as I stated earlier, this is a substance that can cause brain damage and can even result in death. We need to spread the message so that kids know the risk involved with taking Ecstasy, what it can do to their bodies, their brains, their futures. Adults also need to be taught about this drug--what it looks like, what someone high on Ecstasy looks like, and what to do if they discover that someone they know is using it. Mr. President, I have come to the floor of the United States Senate on numerous occasions to state what I view as the most effective way to prevent a drug epidemic. My philosophy is simple: the best time to crack down on a drug with uncompromising enforcement pressure is before the abuse of the drug has become rampant. The advantages of doing so are clear--there are fewer pushers trafficking in the drug and, most important, fewer lives and fewer families will have suffered from the abuse of the drug. It is clear that Ecstasy use is on the rise. Now is the time to act before Ecstasy use becomes our next drug epidemic. I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this legislation and passing it quickly so that we can address the escalating problem of Ecstasy use before it gets any worse.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, there is a new drug on the scene--Ecstasy, a synthetic stimulant and hallucinogen. It belongs to a group of drugs referred to as ``club drugs'' because they are associated with all-night dance parties known as ``raves.'' There is a widespread misconception that Ecstasy is not a dangerous drug--that it is ``no big deal.'' I am here to tell you that Ecstasy is a very big deal. The drug depletes the brain of serotonin, the chemical responsible for mood, thought, and memory. Studies show that Ecstasy use can reduce serotonin levels by up to 90 percent for at least two weeks after use and can cause brain damage. If that isn't a big deal, I don't know what is. A few months ago we got a significant warning sign that Ecstasy use is becoming a real problem. The University of Michigan's Monitoring the Future survey, a national survey measuring drug use among students, reported that while overall levels of drug use had not increased, past month use of Ecstasy among high school seniors increased more than 66 percent. The survey showed that nearly six percent of high school seniors have used Ecstasy in the past year. This may sound like a small number, so let me put it in perspective--it is just slightly less than the percentage of seniors who used cocaine and it is five times the number of seniors who used heroin. And with the supply of Ecstasy increasing as rapidly as it is, the number of kids using this drug is only likely to increase. By April of this year, the Customs Service had already seized 4 million Ecstasy pills--greater than the total amount seized in all of 1999 and more than five times the amount seized in all of 1998. Though New York is the East Coast hub for this drug, it is spreading quickly throughout the country. Last July, in my home state of Delaware, law enforcement officials seized 900 Ecstasy pills in Rehoboth Beach. There are also reports of an Ecstasy problem in Newark among students at the University of Delaware. We need to address this problem now, before it gets any worse. That is why I am pleased to join Senators Graham, Grassley and Thomas to introduce the ``Ecstasy Anti-Proliferation Act of 2000'' today. The legislation takes the steps--both in terms of law enforcement and prevention--to address this problem in a serious way before it gets any worse. The legislation directs the federal Sentencing Commission to increase the recommended penalties for manufacturing, importing, exporting or trafficking Ecstasy. Though Ecstasy is a Schedule I drug--and therefore subject to the most stringent federal penalties--not all Schedule I drugs are treated the same in our sentencing guidelines. For example, selling a kilogram of marijuana is not as serious an offense as selling a kilogram of heroin. The sentencing guidelines differentiate between the severity of drugs--as they should. But the current sentencing guidelines do not recognize how dangerous Ecstasy really is. Under current federal sentencing guidelines, one gram of Ecstasy is treated like 35 grams of marijuana. Under the ``Ecstasy Anti- Proliferation Act'', one gram of Ecstasy would be treated like 2 kilograms of marijuana. This would make the penalties for Ecstasy similar to those for methamphetamine. The legislation also authorizes a major prevention campaign in schools, communities and over the airwaves to make sure that everyone-- kids, adults, parents, teachers, cops, clergy, etc. --know just how dangerous this drug really is. We need to dispel the myth that Ecstasy is not a dangerous drug because, as I stated earlier, this is a substance that can cause brain damage and can even result in death. We need to spread the message so that kids know the risk involved with taking Ecstasy, what it can do to their bodies, their brains, their futures. Adults also need to be taught about this drug--what it looks like, what someone high on Ecstasy looks like, and what to do if they discover that someone they know is using it. Mr. President, I have come to the floor of the United States Senate on numerous occasions to state what I view as the most effective way to prevent a drug epidemic. My philosophy is simple: the best time to crack down on a drug with uncompromising enforcement pressure is before the abuse of the drug has become rampant. The advantages of doing so are clear--there are fewer pushers trafficking in the drug and, most important, fewer lives and fewer families will have suffered from the abuse of the drug. It is clear that Ecstasy use is on the rise. Now is the time to act before Ecstasy use becomes our next drug epidemic. I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this legislation and passing it quickly so that we can address the escalating problem of Ecstasy use before it gets any worse.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will respond. What the Senator has written in the legislation I would characterize as having tried to do something after the horse is out of the barn. Here is the deal. I am not suggesting there will be any hostilities before the U.S. forces leave. I am not suggesting there will be hostilities as the U.S. forces leave. If I were Milosevic, the KLA, or anybody else, I would have garlands and roses strewn along the road as they were on their way out. I would be throwing them bouquets. I would be giving them chocolates and cigarettes as they left. I would not do a thing. I would wait until they were gone. That is No. 1. No. 2, when they go, I predict to you that you will see in the councils of Europe an overwhelming discussion about whether or not the Europeans will stay, and in what numbers. At that point, if there is hostility, if Mr. Milosevic moves on Mitrovica to annex the top of the state, or if there is a movement in Montenegro to topple the Government, is the Senator saying to me that automatically authorizes the President of the United States to send whatever forces he wishes back in?

Mr. BIDEN. If I may respond, unless I misunderstand still, that is a distinction with little difference. If I understand the way the legislation reads, the President will submit a report to Congress saying, I want to stay.

Mr. BIDEN. I am asking for clarification.

Mr. BIDEN. No.

Mr. BIDEN. Once the President does that, then in order for the troops to stay, both the House and the Senate have to affirmatively vote to have them stay; correct?

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I see my distinguished colleague, Senator Byrd, on the floor. I ask Senator Byrd a question, if he is willing. Is it his understanding that if we withdraw these forces and war erupts again in Kosovo, the President needs no Congressional authorization and he is preauthorized to use whatever force is necessary to bring peace and stability back to Kosovo? Is that the Senator's understanding?

Mr. BIDEN. Then the Senator is saying there is no damage or war, there is no American being killed now, but we are going to pull the Americans out; but if there is war and carnage, again we will put them back in?

Mr. BIDEN. Is the Byrd request to amend his language part of this unanimous consent?

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, parliamentary inquiry.

Mr. BIDEN. I respect that.

Mr. BIDEN. I thank the Senator. Let me rephrase my assertion. The Congress, as of whatever the operative date--and right now the operative date is in July 2001--the Congress does not vote to stay in Kosovo; then the troops must be withdrawn. Now, that is a distinction with a technical, legal difference. What I respectfully suggest is, it will fall on deaf ears in every European capital. I respectfully suggest, if my friends think it is so dangerous or imprudent for us to be there now, if there is a constitutional requirement for us to have to vote on it, then why are we shirking the responsibility of not voting right now? Because if there is a constitutional responsibility, it is not delayed for a year. It either exists or it does not exist. If it exists, the obligation exists today to vote. And my friends want the next Congress to vote in the year 2001. It is illogical to suggest, with all due respect, that there is a constitutional requirement for Congress to vote for these troops to stay but we don't have to do it for a year. The implication is, he doesn't have the authority now. So that takes care of the constitutional argument. There is obviously no serious constitutional argument, for if there were, we have to vote now, I assume, unless someone responds to the contrary that I am correct. Look, folks, thank God that not a single American was killed in the entire war. Thank God, an American hasn't been killed yet, although it is possible. Thank God, there are not 800,000 people displaced and they are back in their homes. Thank God, the ethnic cleansing has stopped. I ask the rhetorical question, if the Lord Almighty came down and sat in the well and said, ``I promise you all that, if you keep 5,600 troops in Kosovo for the next 10 years, there will be no carnage, there will be no death and destruction of American forces,'' would anybody here say that is too high a price to pay? Would anybody say that? Would anybody vote and say, Lord, no, we are stretched too thin? I can pick an awful lot of places where I would like to take 5,600 troops out if we are stretched too thin other than Kosovo. Talk about a place where we are doing some good in what we are not allowing to happen! I think this is one heck of a gamble. The logic escapes me. I may be slow. I have not been here as long as some, but I have been here 28 years. I pay a lot of attention to this. I try my best. And the logic escapes me. If there is a constitutional requirement, it exists today. It exists tonight. It existed yesterday. It doesn't automatically click into effect in July of 2001. If we are stretched too thin, if that is the problem, let's pick 5,600 troops from a place where they are serving a function, but none nearly as important as the one they are serving now. And if we expect to be and intend to be a major force in Europe and NATO, let's understand that it will not happen without our participation to the degree of 13 percent of the forces in Europe. We asked the Europeans to do the lion's share after Milosevic yielded. They are doing the lion's share, on average over 80 percent and as high as 87 percent in the four categories. So if anybody thinks that does not make sense, let us vote now. Can anybody seriously say that the anxiety level, at a minimum, in European capitals, the anxiety level in the frontline states, the anxiety level for our troops, the anxiety level for the total military, is not somewhat heightened by the fact that it will require, no matter how we get to it, an affirmative vote of the Congress in July of next year to have those troops stay? I will end where I began and reserve the remainder of my time, if I have any. I will end where I began. It seems to me this is a basic, legitimate debate on what is in the naked self-interest of the United States of America. It is a fundamental foreign policy debate. Do you think stability in the Balkans can be maintained without U.S. forces there? If you do not, do you think that stability in the Balkans is necessary for stability in the rest of Europe? If you do not, do you think the United States is negatively impacted by either outcome? While I strongly support trying to move the supplemental funding needed by our military and the important military construction projects included in this bill, Section 2410 would do damage to Kosovo and to the United States of America, despite the best intentions of its authors. Section 2410 is premised on an inaccurate understanding of the facts, and then gets worse, as it abdicates U.S. leadership of NATO and gives comfort to Slobodan Milosevic. There are two aspects to Section 2410. The first would require a joint Congressional resolution authorizing continued deployment of American troops in KFOR after July 1, 2001. The second aspect would require that the Europeans are meeting certain requirements for burdensharing in Kosovo. If the President could not make that certification by July 15, 2000, then thereafter funds would only be allowed to be used for withdrawal of U.S. forces from Kosovo, unless Congress authorized their continued deployment by joint resolution. If Congress failed to enact such a joint resolution, no funding could be obligated to continue the deployment of United States military personnel in Kosovo. In that case, the President would be required to submit to Congress, not later than August 15, 2000, a report on a plan for the withdrawal of United States military personnel from Kosovo. Mr. President, the question of whether Congress must, as a constitutional matter, authorize the deployment of U.S. forces in the Kosovo peacekeeping mission is a close one. I yield to no Senator in my defense of the constitutional powers of Congress on matters of war and peace. In my view, Congress has not only the power to declare war, but also to authorize all uses of force. I have consistently resisted arguments by Presidents--Democrats and Republicans alike--that the Commander-in-Chief power provides unfettered authority to use force against foreign countries. In this circumstance, however, I would argue that Congressional authorization for the deployment of U.S. peacekeeping forces in Kosovo is unnecessary. The deployment of peacekeepers, in a situation such as we now have, is not war, or even a use of force. It falls far short of both. Unlike the deployment of U.S. forces to Lebanon in the early 1980's, there is no significant threat of hostilities from a foreign army or from guerilla forces. Rather, the only threat to U.S. forces comes from a handful of lightly-armed thugs in both the Serbian and ethnic Albanian communities in Kosovo. In that sense, the deployment is truly a peacekeeping or police action. Undoubtedly, Congress has the power to authorize the deployment to Kosovo--or to set limits on that deployment. Congress could, as the Byrd-Warner amendment clearly contemplates, cut off the funds, or circumscribe the mission of the troops. But merely because Congress has the power to do so, does not mean that it is wise to exercise that power in this circumstance, in this manner. Mr. President, I would have no objection to a resolution authorizing the deployment of U.S. forces. Let us have that debate. But I do not believe we should do so under the Sword of Damocles, with the threat of a funding cut-off that implies the United States is abandoning its friends and allies in Europe. Mr. President, as I mentioned earlier, the second aspect of Section 2410 would codify burdensharing with our allies. The bill would decrease by twenty-five percent the aid contributions by the United States to Kosovo unless the President certified to the Congress that the European Commission, the member states of the European Union, and European members of NATO were meeting certain targets for assistance expenditures and provision of civilian police in Kosovo. Specifically, the President would have to certify before July 15, 2000 that the Europeans have: First, obligated or contracted at least thirty-three percent of the amount of the assistance that the aforementioned organizations and countries committed to provide for 1999 and 2000 for reconstruction in Kosovo; Second, obligated or contracted for at least seventy-five percent of the amount of humanitarian assistance to which they committed for 1999 and 2000; Third, provided at least seventy-five percent of the amount of assistance to which they committed for the Kosovo Consolidated Budget for 1999 and 2000; and Fourth, deployed at least seventy-five percent of the number of police, including special police, which they pledged to the United Nations international police force for Kosovo. Mr. President, because the United States carried the vast majority of the military burden in last year's air campaign against Yugoslavia, it is now the Europeans' turn to provide most of the peacekeepers and the reconstruction money to win the peace in Kosovo. Our allies agree with this formulation. Furthermore, Mr. President, this is precisely what has already happened, and continues to happen. Finally--after decades of criticizing and cajoling--we finally have before us an example of successful burden sharing in NATO and the United Nations. What is the share of the burden that our NATO allies and other countries are currently bearing? The European Commission has already responded to this proposed legislation by providing a considerable amount of data on assistance programs that it administers. These data show that the European Union meets or surpasses the criteria of the legislation. Regarding individual countries, the European Commission is in the process of collecting data from the fifteen members states of the European Union, each of which has unique budgeting procedures and fiscal years. Utilizing data from the United Nations, however, we can already see that, in the aggregate, our European partners are providing the majority of assistance to Kosovo. If we look at troop strength, our NATO allies have 40,000 troops on the ground in Kosovo. We have 5,600. That is, the United States is providing only thirteen percent of KFOR's troop strength. If we look at the UNMIK Consolidated Budget, the Europeans and others are right now funding about eighty-seven percent of that. Our part, again, comprises only thirteen percent of the total. So the benchmark laid out in Section 2410 has already been exceeded. How about the International Police? They are civilian police officers, sent from U.N. member states all over the world, to relieve KFOR troops of non-military, law-and-order functions in Kosovo. That is the plan. We all support it. Fully eighty-eight percent of the pledges for civilian police for Kosovo have come from outside the U.S., and eighty-seven percent of all police officers pledged have already been deployed. Now let's look at Reconstruction Funding. Concerning Europe's financial contributions to the reconstruction of Kosovo, Section 2410 focuses on the speed with which it delivers its assistance. When the United States commits funding for large-scale reconstruction initiatives, sometimes the U.S. itself does not hit the benchmark set here--thirty-three percent obligated or contracted--for a year or two. Last, let's look at Humanitarian Relief. In the spring of this year, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees announced that humanitarian disaster in Kosovo had been averted. The much-feared winter had come and gone. It was time for the international community to switch from a relief role to a reconstruction role. Nevertheless, Section 2410 insists that the Europeans continue to funnel money into humanitarian relief, when the need is no longer pressing. This is counterproductive micro-managing from thousands of miles away. Mr. President, the United States is not paying a disproportionate price in the international effort to secure the peace in Kosovo--not in terms of the number of peacekeeping troops, not in terms of the number of civilian police, not in terms of reconstruction and humanitarian aid. Mr. President, Section 2410 also is inconsistent. It is really a ``heads I win, tails you lose!'' for the Europeans. The benchmarks in the first part of Section 2410 demand that the Europeans pay more and/or faster and supply the bulk of the troops and police in Kosovo. In the second part, though, the Congress mandates-- irrespective of the Europeans' performance on the benchmarks--the enactment of a joint resolution to authorize the continued deployment of U.S. ground combat troops. The message to Europe boils down to this: pay first, and then we'll see. Aside from these internal contradictions in the legislation, Section 2410 would do serious harm to our geopolitical interests, not only in the Balkans, but in all of Europe. If the mandated burdensharing could not be certified in every detail, the legislation would have one hundred percent of ground troops in Kosovo supplied by NATO allies and other non-American powers, leaving our contribution at zero with one exception: KFOR would remain under the ultimate control of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, U.S. General Joseph Ralston. That would be quite a deal for us, but one which I doubt that our allies would support for long. We all know that there are elements in NATO who argue for the need for Europe to have its own ``army,'' independent of NATO. To date, the outline of the European Security and Defense Policy, or ESDP as it is called, has conformed to our wishes. It would only go into action if the alliance as a whole chose not to be involved. If the U.S. Congress were to compel the President of the United States to unilaterally withdraw all U.S. combat troops from the NATO force in Kosovo, you can rest assured that the Europeans would get the message that the ESDP is the wave of the future, not NATO. I can hear the grumbling all over Western Europe: ``The French are right. We'd better have our own army, because we can't count on the U.S. in NATO any more.'' Do we really want this happen? I don't think so. Irrespective of these considerations, I would ask the authors of this section whether they really want to allow American military decisions to be made by other countries, in this case the Europeans? That would be an abdication of responsibility that should horrify any Member of this chamber. Finally, Mr. President, let us consider the dynamic that Section 2410 would set in motion. First of all, let's consider what it would mean in Serbia and Kosovo, on the ground. Make no mistake about it: the result of this bill, unless Section 2410 is eliminated, will be a U.S. withdrawal from Kosovo. What Milosevic could not win on the battlefield, he would be handed by Congressional trepidation. If the indicted war criminal Milosevic knew that the U.S. Congress was serious about abandoning Kosovo, his temptation to make mischief there would be dramatically increased. If percentage point differences in contributions made at conference tables would be enough to force the U.S. military out of Kosovo, then imagine what would be the effect of a few U.S. soldiers wounded or killed by Serbian commandos! Moreover, consideration of this amendment comes at a time of increasing weakness of Milosevic. Last night his goons occupied television station Studio B and independent radio station B2-92, and padlocked the doors of other independent media offices. An opposition leader declared that Milosevic's government had ``imposed an informal state of emergency.'' Is this the time that we want to give Milosevic even the slightest bit of comfort? Does the U.S. military support Section 2410? No. Secretary of Defense Cohen has said so, directly to its authors. Those who might support the amendment in the alleged interest of staving off the ``hollowing out'' of our military readiness should ask of the Department of Defense: is Section 2410 a good idea for the U.S. military overall? The answer is an unambiguous ``no!'' It would harm--not help--the readiness of our armed forces for the rest of this fiscal year. If the President were unable to certify the meeting of the benchmarks, most of the supplemental funding for the Department of Defense would be unavailable. That would, therefore, mean that the Military Services' accounts for maintenance and operation would not be replenished, since they are currently being used to cover essential costs in Kosovo. More broadly, the simple fact is that establishing security in the Balkans is squarely in the national interest of the United States. This country has a web of economic, political, security, cultural, and human ties to Europe that is unmatched with any other part of the world. Thanks to the patient, sustained, bipartisan policy of stationing millions of American troops in Western Europe for more than a half- century and through our nuclear guarantee, the western half of the continent was able to democratize, heal old wounds, and eventually prosper. But, Mr. President, the stability of Western Europe would be severely threatened if war were to re-erupt in the Balkans--as it surely would if Western forces would withdraw. A study by the General Accounting Office released yesterday made that clear. Last year we got a taste of the massive refugee flows that war would unleash. And some of those refugees would wind up in Western Europe--in fact, many already have. Mr. President, the United States is the unquestioned leader of NATO, and I believe it must remain the unquestioned leader. I do not think that a leader can lead from the sidelines. To restrict our future participation in KFOR, or SFOR, to providing logistical and intelligence support would indicate to our allies that we were beginning a more general withdrawal from the continent. The symbolism would be unmistakable. Incidentally, who would try to fill the vacuum left by the departure of American troops from Kosovo? I urge my colleagues to recall that the Russians desperately wanted their own sector of Kosovo last summer. My guess is that they would have their hand up in an instant to volunteer to replace us. I do not want this legislation to be the first step in reversing the most successful element in American foreign policy in the last fifty- five years. Mr. President, Section 2410 is an idea whose time not only has not yet come--it is an idea whose time, I fervently hope, will never come. We won the war last year, and now our allies are carrying the lion's share of the burden of winning the peace. We are on the right track. To rashly withdraw would invite further aggression by the Serbian dictator and gravely undermine the North Atlantic Alliance, the lynchpin of our trans-Atlantic ties. Instead of pursuing this self-destructive course, I urge my colleagues to consider the approach taken by my friend from Ohio, Senator Voinovich. His resolution, S.Res. 272, which advocates a coherent strategy for furthering American interests in the Balkans, was passed overwhelmingly by the Foreign Relations Committee last month. It was passed by the full Senate just two weeks ago, on May second. The Voinovich resolution advocates continued involvement in Kosovo and elsewhere in the Balkans, not the precipitous disengagement called for in Section 2410. It expresses the sense of the Senate that the United States should remain actively engaged in southeastern Europe, continue to oppose Slobodan Milosevic, support the democratic opposition in Serbia, and fully implement the Stability Pact. This is the course the United States is currently taking, and this is the course we should pursue with renewed vigor in the future. It will not be an easy struggle; nothing worth accomplishing ever is. We will not achieve lasting stability in the Balkans overnight-- certainly we cannot expect to have achieved it less than a year after the end of the air war. But rashly to conclude that we should no longer be part of the solution would be totally out of character for the United States of America. We are the leader of NATO. We are the indispensable factor in the European security architecture. We dare not sacrifice this position out of momentary frustration and impatience. So, let's get this straight. If you believe that stability in the Balkans is not important to the U.S. and our own naked national interest, then vote with my good friends Senators Byrd and Warner. But, if you think, as I do, that it is virtually impossible to have chaos in the Balkans, affecting, if not engulfing, the likes of Bosnia- Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia, Albania, Romania, Bulgaria, even Greece and Turkey, while simultaneously maintaining stability in the rest of Europe, and at the same time developing a mature relationship with the countries of the former Soviet Union--then, to paraphrase Thomas Jefferson, who said ``If you expect to be both ignorant and free, you are expecting what never was and never will be,'' I say that if you are expecting chaos in the Balkans and stability in the rest of Europe, you are expecting what never was and never will be. I thank the Chair and yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN. That is not my question, with all due respect.

Mr. BIDEN. I got that, Mr. President. Let me rephrase it. The President of the United States, President Gore or President Bush, and whatever operative date it ends up being, October or July, sends a report to the Congress and says: I wish the 5,600 troops to remain in Kosovo. That is the first part. He has done that. He says: I want them to stay. What happens if the Senate says: We are not even going to vote on it? Can the troops stay?

Mr. BIDEN. That is not an assumption. An assumption is if I said ``when the Senate fails to act.'' I did not say that. I said ``if'' the Senate fails to act. It is a question, not an assumption. Now, if the Senate fails to act--does not vote one way or another-- are the troops allowed to stay, or must they come home?

Mr. BIDEN. I withdraw the question.

Mr. BIDEN. I understand the Senator from Virginia thinks that. I wonder whether the Senator from West Virginia thinks that.

Mr. BIDEN. That is correct. I acknowledge that.

Mr. BIDEN. I am delighted to yield to the Senator.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, today I rise with great sadness. On Monday, May 15, 2000, Harry L. Gardner, Sr.--a quiet giant in the long history of Delaware civil rights--died. He was a man whose very presence, literally, brought calm to the most difficult, seemingly intractable problems of race at the height of the civil rights movement in Delaware. When citizens first heard that the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King had been assassinated in April of 1968, what was once a cauldron of mounting tension between disillusioned African-Americans and Whites exploded into a series of violent and destructive acts--on both sides-- reflective of unrest, resentment, and downright anger. As you may know, of the many inner-cities ravaged by full-scale rioting and violence during this time period, Wilmington, Delaware--my hometown--was the only urban area where the National Guard occupied the city for an extended period of time. Indeed, for nine months, police officers and guardsmen patrolled the streets of Wilmington in an effort to bring order to what was seen by many in the mainstream as chaos. As a young attorney, continually advocating for equity and social justice for African-Americans and other minorities, I saw things quite differently than many of my mainstream counterparts. There were reasons for my own view: my Mom and Dad, who taught many lessons about the importance of equality, liberty and justice for all citizens; the people of East Side and East Lake, predominantly African- American communities where I spent a few summers life-guarding for neighborhood children; and African-American leaders like Harry L. Gardner, who taught me to believe that if I could not change the world and the view of race relations, there was no reason that I could not set a standard by which I lived my own life and became an example for others. This was, in fact, the beauty of Harry Gardner. For 35 years, I had the pleasure of knowing a man whose deep respect for people engendered a deep respect for him. During the period of National Guard occupation, Harry was one of a very select group of people who were allowed to talk to rioters during racial disturbances. He was depended upon by city officials and neighborhood residents both to help in diffusing threatening situations and to continue to articulate the very legitimate concerns of African-American people. Though quite a difficult tightrope to walk, Harry made it look easy. In no small part, it was his ability to touch the heart of diverse groups of people and find common ground that, in effect, saved the city. This, however, is just a portion Harry Gardner's legacy. While a career officer at the Ferris School, a juvenile correctional facility for adolescent boys, Harry founded Northeast Civic Alliance, chaired the Wilmington Police & Community Advisory Council and the Wilmington Fire & Community Council and helped start and maintain a group home for troubled youth. Yet, having said all of this, Harry received few accolades for his many faithful years of service. He was self-effacing, and traded in recognition and reward for diligent, undaunted self sacrifice for the voiceless in our community. We may all know a Harry Gardner in our respective communities. A man who changed the way we think through living a reality of public service that surpassed rhetoric and funadmentally changed the way people from all different backgrounds see themselves and interact with each other. Dr. W.E.B. DuBois, the famed sociologist and civil rights scholar, once said, ``peace will be my applause.'' Harry, today, we in the Senate--and so many others back home-- are all clapping loudly for your life and for its resounding impact in Wilmington and throughout the State of Delaware. Your presence will be missed, but your lessons will remain in our hearts forever.