Joe Biden

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Yes.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, it was not my intention--I thought the Senator from North Carolina, in effect, acknowledged that I should take the question from the Senator from the State of Pennsylvania. I apologize.

Mr. BIDEN. I thank the Senator for his response. I will raise this when we get to the amendments. I wish to point out there is one other ultimate safeguard. The ultimate safeguard is in the amendment, our last provision, which says, if, in fact, we do not fund the stockpile and that causes the laboratory Directors to say, ``We cannot certify,'' and that means the Secretary of Energy says, ``We cannot certify,'' the President of the United States, upon that determination, must withdraw from the treaty and allow us to begin to test. I am amazed at the arguments that are being made on the other side.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Would my friend yield for a question? From what page of the record was he reading?

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President I will take 1 minute. The President doesn't need any more time; he read it and negotiated it. I don't need any more time; I spent over 100 hours on that. It is my job on the committee of responsibility. The Senator presiding doesn't need more time; he spent hundreds of hours. The Senator from Oklahoma doesn't need more time because he spent hundreds of hours on it. I defy anyone to find five other Members of the Senate who have spent as much time. Usually what happens is we take on the responsibility to inform our colleagues based on our committees because we have more expertise when assigned the job. When it is tax policy, I don't know what the Tax Code says on major changes, but I rely upon the committee headed on the Democratic side by my friend from New York to tell me what is in it from spending hundreds of hours going through the detail. This is a different way to do business. I don't ever remember Members having voted on a treaty without there being a significant report from the relevant committees on the floor. The President doesn't need any more time. I don't need any more time. Senator Byrd says he needs more time, and I don't know anybody more conscientious than Senator Byrd. But the reason for more time is there haven't been any hearings. I yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, let me conclude by pointing out that I find it kind of interesting. The very people who stand up here and say, as I happen to believe, that they have confidence that our scientists in the future are going to be able to shoot out of the sky like a bullet meeting a bullet incoming nuclear weapons over the ocean traveling at multithousand miles per hour and do it with certainty and accuracy-- they have faith in the ability of that to occur, but they don't have faith in the ability of our scientists at the three laboratories, who say they are well on their way to doing that, to be able to say what they need. I find it kind of interesting. I must admit it is a double-edged sword. I find my Democratic colleagues who do not support any national defense initiative--because they say this star wars notion can't work, it is too far out--I do not know how they come and rely so easily upon the likelihood that a $45 billion investment is going to guarantee these supercomputers will function to the degree they are needed to when these weapons reach their shelf life. But let's be fair. You can't have it both ways. I would respectfully submit that the ability to guarantee MIRV nuclear warheads fired in the hundreds or the thousands at the United States could be blown out of the sky with impunity by a missile defense initiative on our part is a mildly greater scientific feat than what the stockpile requires. As someone said: ``The faith of our father''--``the faith of our father''--has always been that if we put our mind to it, if we invest the money, we have the intelligence, the ingenuity, and the know-how to get it done. I would respectfully suggest our three present laboratory Directors and all the doubts they express are primarily related to whether or not safeguard F and funding of $45 billion for the stockpile would be forthcoming. I yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I am going to take about 5 minutes to respond to my friend from Alabama. He may have to catch a plane or something. I hope he will understand that, if he is not on the floor. First of all, I find it fascinating. I think he may want to amend the record--I am being a bit facetious, a little tongue in cheek--amend the record by suggesting that he has greater faith in headline writers and reporters than he does in the transcript I am about to read. I don't know whether he has ever been bitten by a headline. We all know headline writers read--and no one knows this better than my friend from North Carolina--the part of the copy that is given to them, and they get to write the headline they want. Sometimes it bears little resemblance to what happened. I hope we don't put any faith in a headline. I am not suggesting we shouldn't put faith in what is written by reporters sometimes. What was said in this article is accurate, but it is not complete. As my friend from Alabama said, we do not have one voice speaking on this, but we do have one record, one record from the hearing. I have a copy of the record from the hearing conducted in the Armed Services Committee yesterday, page 59. I will read the whole thing. It will take a minute. Senator Levin. Therefore, what you are telling us is that if this safeguard [the Strategic Stockpile Program] and other safeguards are part of this process that you can rely upon, that in your words, Dr. Robinson, you are on board in terms of this treaty; is that correct? Dr. Robinson. I am on board that science-based stockpile stewardship has a much higher chance of success and I will accept it as a substitute. Going on to page 60. Dr. Robinson. As a substitute for requiring yield tests for certification. The tests he is referring to are nuclear tests. Then further on down, Dr. Tarter says: I can only testify to the ability of stockpile stewardship to do the job. It is your job, about the treaty. Senator Levin. Are you able to say that, providing you can rely on safeguard F-- My description: Safeguard F is the safeguard that allows the President to get out of the treaty if the lab Director certifies that he is not able to certify the safety and reliability. Senator Levin. Are you able to say that, providing you can rely on safeguard F and at some point decide that you cannot certify it, that you are willing under that condition to rely on this stewardship program as a substitute for actual testing? Dr. Tarter. Yes. Further down, same page: Dr. Brown. Senator Levin, if the government [the laboratories] provides us with the sustained resources, the answer is yes, and if safeguard F is there, yes. Now I am not suggesting all else that is quoted is not accurate. But it is useful to have a punchline at the end of the quotes. It may be viewed as tortuous; it may be viewed in any way you want. I don't think my friend from Alabama means that because these renowned scientists happen to work for the Federal Government--they also, by the way, are in the employ, if I am not mistaken, of outside laboratories and industries as well, or at least on loan from them--I hope nobody is suggesting--and I am sure he is not--that they would alter their testimony because the President of the United States or the Secretary of Energy takes a position that is consistent with theirs, and that is why they are taking it. I know my friend from Virginia will want to respond to this today, or Tuesday, or whenever he wants to do it. We will have plenty of time. I did not want there to be a hiatus between the comments of my friend from Alabama and my responding. I will conclude, I say to my friend from North Carolina. I think we should be--and believe me, I need this admonition for myself as well--a little careful about some of the words we use, such as ``unilateral disarmament.'' I don't think anybody is arguing we are unilaterally disarming. At any rate, I see my friend from Virginia has come down from on high and I assume wants to respond. I yield the floor. (Mr. Inhofe assumed the Chair.)

Mr. BIDEN. I don't doubt it. I read from page 59 to get the significance? Do you get the significance? That was stated on 50 and 51 and 52. This is 59. After all is said and done, the question was asked: Do you believe with the safeguards you can rely upon the stockpile, the strategic stockpile, approach as opposed to nuclear testing? They said yes. It follows. Page 59 and 60, I am reading from. Maybe there is something after page 61 in the testimony that would undermine what I have just said. I respectfully suggest I am unaware of it if it is. I stand ready to hear it if it has been. It is one of those deals, folks. You have to go to the end. It ``ain't over until the fat lady sings.'' It ain't over until you read the whole transcript. The last thing stated was: We have confidence. Then, after the testimony, after the testimony and after the New York Times article, the Department of Energy and in the name of the three scientists quoted--and I will read it again. ``While there can be no guarantee''--the point he is making on page 50--``that the stockpile remains safe and reliable indefinitely without nuclear testing, we have stated that we are confident that a fully supported and sustained stockpile stewardship program will enable us to continue to maintain America's nuclear deterrent without nuclear testing.'' I yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will pursue this more on Tuesday. I respectfully suggest that argument was based on a fallacy, and that is, the Stockpile Stewardship Program will not stay at zero until it is completed. We began this years ago. It is already working. We already use testing methods that do not require nuclear explosions. The Senator will remember the chart James Schlesinger had with the arrows going up and down, and I quote from Dr. Sig Hecker, the Director of Los Alamos in 1997, whom everybody quotes these days, wrote a letter to the Senator from Arizona and said: . . . there have been several instances since the cessation of nuclear testing in September 1992, where we have found problems . . . for which in the past we would have turned to a nuclear test in the kiloton range to resolve. In the absence of testing, we have used the methodology of [Stockpile Stewardship] to evaluate the problem and suggest fixes if required. This has included more extensive calculations, non-nuclear laboratory experiments, comparison to previous nuclear test data, and the extensive experience of our designers and engineers. Moreover, our assessment has been checked against the rigors of peer review by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. We have examined several problems of this nature during this year's certification cycle. At this time, we have sufficient confidence in our solutions to certify the stockpile without a resumption of nuclear testing. If our confidence in the fixes were not sufficiently high, we would not certify the stockpile. He is no longer the lab Director, but I assume my colleagues all believe him to be an honorable man. When they say testing is not needed at this time--that is, the Directors--I ask my colleagues whether or not they agree with Jim Schlesinger, who said it is not needed at this time and he doubts it will be needed in the future. Let me explain. We are using data from 1,000 past nuclear tests--as my friend says, from nonnuclear subcritical experiments and from high- tech simulations to understand what is happening and what may happen in the weapons stockpile. Four facilities that will not be ready until 2005 are--they are called the National Ignition Facilities--a contained firing facility, dual-access radiographic hydrodynamics test facility, and the Atlas Plus power facilities. These facilities--and this is important--are all logical successors to older, less capable facilities. Our scientists are pushing the envelope but are not engaging in flights of fancy. That is why our labs and the Department of Energy are confident the National Ignition Facility will work, even though it has cost overruns. These facilities will serve several purposes and increase knowledge of basic physics of nuclear weapons. That new knowledge will lead to more accurate and precise computer simulations. The facilities can also be used to test the particular weapons problems. That is why I say our weapons will still be tested, even without full-scale nuclear weapons testing. Another key tool we are developing is this advanced supercomputing accelerated strategic computing initiative, another generation of supercomputers that will be able to synthesize test data from the past, and all of the testing done on weapons components, to provide three- dimensional simulations of all aspects of nuclear weapons and how they react. Already, our scientists and engineers are working with industry and several universities to develop computers that are capable of running more than 3 trillion operations per second. That is a new record level of computing power, and it gives us new safety. Our goal, admittedly, over the next 5 years is for those supercomputers to be able to do 100 trillion operations per second. That is not something we need in our stockpile today. In fact, it represents a 100,000-fold increase in today's computational ability, and everybody says today's computational ability is sufficient to guarantee the stockpile. But when our weapons reach their so-called shelf life, then it is going to be needed, and we anticipate needing that sophisticated modeling. No one thinks that sophisticated modeling is needed now. Finally, I have real questions about my colleagues' concern that the stockpile stewardship cannot work. Our scientists are the best in the world. They know what they are doing. They define scientific challenges that must meet the military performance and reliability standards. After defining these challenges, they believe they can meet them. I believe they know what they are talking about. But I see one problem. The one problem the Stockpile Stewardship Program faces now and in the future is that some may not fund it. That is what our colleagues at the laboratories are talking about. Let me quote and conclude from a news release released today by the Department of Energy. I will submit it for the Record. It is ``For Immediate Release,'' dated October 8, 1999, and is a joint statement by Directors of three nuclear weapons laboratories--I note parenthetically that my guess is they probably read the New York Times article--C. Paul Robinson, Sandia; John C. Browne, Los Alamos; C. Bruce Tarter, Lawrence Livermore National Lab. I will read only from the fourth paragraph: While there can never be a guarantee that the stockpile will remain safe and reliable indefinitely without nuclear testing, we have stated that we are confident that a fully supported and sustained stockpile stewardship program will enable us to continue to maintain America's nuclear deterrent without nuclear testing. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the entire statement be printed in the Record.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. BIDEN. He was at the same dinner as I was with the President of the United States when two present colleagues said: ``Mr. President, I'm sad to say the political process has taken this over. This is about politics.'' The truth of the matter is, politics is implicated in this. No one is suggesting the politics is good or bad on either side, that one side is better than the other. But two of our Republican colleagues at that dinner--the Senator heard them--said the same thing the President said. We are acknowledging reality. We can all pretend here, with all the niceties, that politics has no part in this. Let's be real simple: The honest-to-God truth is, this is similar to the guy who says the emperor has no clothes on who usually gets shot after he acknowledges that.

Mr. BIDEN. I am no child, but I may get shot politically for saying this.

Mr. BIDEN. I am reading from the President's statement on CTBT, October 8, 1999, in Ottawa as reported, a copy of which was made and given to me.

Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator read the whole letter?

Mr. BIDEN. While the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee is assuming his seat, I wish to say to my colleagues, I know of no one else on this side who wishes to speak today. I am anxious to hear what my friend from North Carolina has to say. I will sit here and listen to all of it. And I sincerely am anxious to hear it. But I want my colleagues to know for scheduling purposes, I indicated to Senator Kyl I am going to respond specifically to some of the points he raised because--again, I am not being solicitous--I think he is one of the best lawyers in this place. He knows this area very well. I think each of his points warrants a very specific response. But I will attempt to do that on Tuesday when we are back in. So I want to put people on notice, I am prepared to debate the issue if people wish to, but as far as I am concerned, we do not intend on using any more time today, unless for some reason my colleagues conclude I should. I yield the floor. Mr. SESSIONS addressed the Chair.

Mr. BIDEN. If the Senator will yield, the remainder of that comment was: . . . and to systematically deal with all the issues that are out there and to take whatever time is necessary to do it. With this treaty other nations will find it hard to acquire and to modernize nuclear weapons and we will gain the means to detect and deter. If we don't have the treaty for the United States, we will continue to refrain from testing and giving a green light to every other country in the world to develop and modernize nuclear weapons. I think it is clear what we ought to do but it is also clear we ought not rush to this vote until there has been an appropriate process in the Senate.

Mr. BIDEN. I yield to my friend from New Jersey--how much time would he like?

Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator yield? Is he speaking on his own time?

Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator withhold for a moment? We were going back and forth. I assured the Senator from New Jersey that he would be able to go next. He is not going to take all that long. Since you and I are going to be here, is it appropriate?

Mr. BIDEN. I yield 10 minutes to my friend from New Jersey.

Mr. BIDEN. Why did they ratify the treaty, then, and why did they directly contact us in an extraordinary way through their leadership and say: Please, U.S. Senate, ratify it?

Mr. BIDEN. I yield 15 minutes to the Senator from West Virginia. If he needs more, I am happy to yield as well.

Mr. BIDEN. Again, as usual, my friend from Georgia goes to the heart of the issue. If you put everything else aside, you take all the detail away, you will find at its root--I am not suggesting that everybody who opposes this treaty doesn't believe everything they are saying; they do. But at its root, it comes down to a belief that has been the case in almost all the debates on treaties--and I am not suggesting that everybody has opposed every treaty. But they have argued one final piece, and that is simply that they lack faith in the political will of this country to do whatever is required. That has been the closing and legitimate argument raised. It was raised in START I, START II, SALT I, and SALT II. The issue was whether or not we would so change the political climate that we lull ourselves to sleep. My friend from New Mexico remembers the argument that we would not have the political will to reengage. It is a legitimate argument. I do not give it short shrift. I think it is the single most serious argument against this treaty. I will close by saying, as the kids say, I will put my experts up against your experts. I have more of them, numerically. Mr. President, I think it is our turn. I yield 10 minutes to Senator Bingaman.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I don't see my Republican colleague on the floor. If there is no Republican wishing to speak, with the permission of my friend from Arizona, I yield to Senator Byrd.

Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator yield for a question?