Joe Biden

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. I ask unanimous consent to proceed in morning business for 15 minutes.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I want to say a few words today about a man who is one of America's finest civil servants and a man who I am proud to call a friend, Jim Kallstrom. Jim Kallstrom had an illustrious career with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (``FBI''), one in which he played a major role in building up the Bureau's counter-terrorism capabilities. Jim Kallstrom led the successful FBI investigations into the World Trade Center bombing and the intended bombing of the Lincoln Tunnel. Those investigations broke the back of one of the most violent terrorist groups ever to operate in this country. Their speedy conclusion also did much to reassure the American public in the wake of the World Trade Center bombing, and they sent a message to terrorists around the world that no person or group can expect to get away with terrorist actions in the United States. Assistant FBI Director for the New York Metropolitan Area, Jim Kallstrom led the Bureau's largest field office. He supervised agents handling many of the FBI's most sensitive criminal, counterintelligence and counterterrorist cases. He was, and is, a vigorous investigator-- truly a cop's cop--and an effective administrator. One of Jim Kallstrom's best known accomplishments--and his most controversial role--was his direction of the investigation of the TWA Flight 800 explosion of July 17, 1996. My colleagues will remember that 230 people died in that crash and that there was immediate and great suspicion that this was the result of a terrorist or criminal act. There was also a recurrent allegation that the U.S. armed forces had accidentally shot down the aircraft and were trying to cover up their role. That allegation was utterly false, but it acquired a life of its own despite the facts. It was, in fact, one of the first cases of a rumor spread and perpetuated by the Internet. In the initial days of this case--as the desperate search for any survivors turned into a continuing and heroic mission to retrieve and identify the hundreds of bodies, and as a raft of local and federal agencies converged to handle a multitude of tasks--Jim Kallstrom stepped in and imposed order on the incipient chaos. Over the coming weeks and months, it was the determination and competence of Jim Kallstrom that reassured the American people and gave us all confidence that no stone would be left unturned in the search for any criminal evidence. In recent weeks, one of my colleagues has raised the possibility that Jim Kallstrom, in the course of pursuing his counterterrorist investigation to the fullest, may have delayed or tried to delay the transmission to the National Transportation Safety Board of a report by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (``BATF'') that concluded that the TWA Flight 800 explosion appeared to be caused by a mechanical flaw in the center fuel tank. Mr. Kallstrom denies that allegation. He insists that he forwarded the BATF report to the National Transportation Safety Board within a few days of receiving it. He admits that he was angry that BATF would issue its conclusions while the counterterrorist and criminal investigation was still ongoing. I do not know whether Mr. Kallstrom delayed transmission of the BATF report, although I note that two FBI officials testified that he did not. What I do know is that Mr. Kallstrom was performing most admirably in a situation fraught with challenges. Let me emphasize those challenges. Millions of Americans drew the initial conclusion that this explosion was caused either by a bomb or by a missile. There was an urgent need not only to conduct a thorough investigation into that possibility, but also to demonstrate to the American people that the United States Government was doing everything humanly possible to bring any perpetrators to justice, while still doing anything humanely possible to meet the needs of hundreds of bereaved families and showing proper respect for the dead. This was no easy task, and no small one, either. Jim Kallstrom assumed those duties and brought the TWA Flight 800 investigation to a successful conclusion. I say ``successful'' very purposely, for the investigation did not fail to uncover any terrorist or criminal act. Rather, it eliminated those possibilities and gave the American people confidence that the explosion was instead a tragic accident. Some have expressed concern that the FBI might have unwittingly delayed necessary action to correct safety flaws in U.S. commercial aircraft. I understand this concern and I would agree that recommendations of the National Transportation Safety Board have not been given sufficient attention by the Federal Aviation Administration. But safety board officials apparently reached the same conclusion as BATF weeks earlier, and they reportedly do not believe that any delay in receiving the BATF report hindered their ability to persuade the FAA to take corrective action. Some people feel that the FBI was too determined to find evidence of a terrorist or criminal act. I don't doubt for a moment that some investigators found Jim Kallstrom rather intimidating in his determination to find any such evidence. The bad news is that Jim Kallstrom is sometimes intimidating. The good news is also that Jim Kallstrom is sometimes intimidating. He gets the job done. He also projects confidence and determination. That is what was needed of the head of the FBI's New York office, and that is what was needed by the head of the TWA Flight 800 investigation. I am sorry if some investigators felt that Jim Kallstrom stepped on their toes. But I am happy as can be that he was the man to whom our nation turned when a conspicuously thorough investigation was needed-- so as to catch and convict the murderers if there were any, and otherwise to give us complete confidence that the Flight 800 explosion was truly an accident. Jim Kallstrom accomplished that feat, and we are all in his debt for his tremendous service to his country.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. I thank the Chair.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I think we owe a debt of gratitude to our colleague from Oklahoma and our colleague from New Hampshire. They are among only a few who will bluntly state why they want out. They are straightforward. The Senator from Oklahoma says this is a way out of Kosovo, just like we should find a way out of Bosnia. They say we have no interest in Yugoslavia. We have no ability to do anything about it. And we have no right. I find this absolutely fascinating. We talk about a sovereign nation being invaded by a horde of 19 democracies who are doing such an injustice to them. Then I hear that one of the reasons we should not be involved is because Yugoslavia is a sovereign country. I cannot remember what their explanation was as to why we should not be involved in Bosnia, where Slobodan Milosevic was crossing the Drina River with these very forces that are cutting off the noses, ears and then cutting the throats of captured men in Kosovo, who are taking their women to the third floor of army barracks for the pleasure of the troops and picking what they believe to be the most attractive of the women who happen to be Moslems. These are the same fellows that crossed the Drina River and invaded another country. I heard the same arguments from you all about how we should not be involved there. So do not let anybody fool you, this is not about sovereignty. The second point I would make is that we have reached the conclusion, straightforwardly, that Slobodan Milosevic's business is his business. What do we have to do with that? Let them work it out. I never thought I would live to see the day when a European leader was herding masses of women and children onto boxcars and trains in the sight of all the world, shipping them off to another border, destroying, as they crossed the border, their licenses, taking their birth certificates, going into the town halls and destroying the property records of those very people. And it is so convenient to say that is not our business. Then I hear another argument. You know, we have commitments around the world. We will not be able to fight a two-front war. But what is the threat to America beyond the nuclear one? And that will not be deterred by American ground forces. I hear my friend from New Hampshire say: Let the Europeans take care of this. Have we not shed enough blood in Europe? But we have to worry about Korea? Why not say let the Asians take care of Korea? There are more of them than us. We have shed enough blood in Asia. Are we protecting the use of American force in Europe so we can use it in Korea? If that is the logic, explain to me why the Japanese and the South Koreans cannot take care of themselves. I find this incredibly selective logic. And, by the way, this so-called failure in Bosnia--what a fascinating notion. Nobody is being killed there now; the raping, the rape camps, the ethnic cleansing have stopped; people are actually living next door to one another again. There are 6,800 American forces there, and that is supposedly too high a price to pay without, thank God--as my mother would say, knock on wood--one American being killed? I am sure glad you guys were not around in 1955 and 1956 and 1957 to say: By the way, all those forces we have in Germany, they are sitting there occupying a country and protecting a country, but their mission must be a failure because if they left, there would be war.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, let me also remind my colleagues that NATO's decisions require unanimity. I know we all know that. We got that unanimity at a recent Washington summit after long and tough negotiations. By appearing to withhold U.S. support for the revised Strategic Concept--and perhaps eventually even blocking its implementation--this amendment, if misread, would put the alliance in great jeopardy. And that could lead to the collapse of NATO, which I am sure is not the goal of my colleague from Kansas. One final comment. I know that my friend from Kansas is strongly opposed to the conduct of the current war in Yugoslavia, and, while disagreeing with him, I respect his views. But, I would remind him and the rest of my colleagues that the 1999 revision of the Strategic Concept is neither the justification for, nor the driving force behind, NATO's bombing campaign or actions in Kosovo. NATO's bombing campaign began a full month before the newest revision of the Strategic Concept was approved at the Washington Summit. To sum up, there are no compelling political or legal arguments for the Roberts amendment. in terms of making this concept subject to treaty amendment. I urge my colleagues to join me in voting against this amendment. I yield the floor. I thank my colleagues.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, one of the things that we sometimes confuse here--I know I do--is what is a political obligation and what is a constitutional obligation. I respectfully suggest that there is no constitutional requirement for the President of the United States--this President or any future President--to submit to the Senate for ratification, as if it were an amendment to a treaty, a Strategic Concept that is a political document. We use the words interchangeably on this floor. A new commitment or obligation, as I said, does not a treaty make. Our Strategic Concept has always been a political, not legal document. Before last month's summit, NATO had revised the Strategic Concept five times in the past and never once had required the Senate's advice and consent. Doing so now would gravely undermine NATO's alliance and our efforts, as well as being a significant overreach in terms of our constitutional authority. Let's not be fooled by the fact that the Roberts-Warner amendment only expresses the sense of the Senate. My concern is that unless we know exactly its dimension, it will be read in other NATO capitals as much more than it is. Just as my friend from Kansas quoted from the headlines and editorials of other newspapers--I might note that they were not governments, but other newspapers--I point out that people in other countries can misread actions taken by a country or group of countries. My concern is that in NATO capitals our actions will be misread. The amendment sets out political criteria in point 1; and then in point 2 transforms them into legally binding ones that would require the Senate's advice and consent. This is a clever use of a non sequitur. NATO's Strategic Concept has always given political guidance to the alliance's members. To that extent, this sixth revision of the Strategic Concept imposes commitments. But contrary to the assertions made by my distinguished friend from Kansas, it in no way changes the fundamental purpose of the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949. We should oppose this amendment for four reasons, but if we are not going to oppose it now that it has been changed from its original amendment, we should at least recognize four important points: One, to suggest that--if it were to be suggested--the Strategic Concept should be treated as an amendment to the treaty would set a terrible precedent and send a horrible signal at a time when we are striving to maintain alliance unity. It would signal our NATO allies that the United States will not implement the new Strategic Concept without formal Senate advice and consent. If we pass this amendment, couldn't the British, French, or Germans say tomorrow that they are going to disregard NATO's operating procedures? Couldn't they say tomorrow that they are no longer going to be bound by their commitment to beef up their military capacity as they committed to in 1991? Given that NATO's decisions require unanimity, and that all 19 NATO member parliaments might then assert that they would have to ratify each and every future change in an operating procedure, we would be building in chaos to the alliance. How could we operate under those circumstances? The second point I want to make is that we should remember that there have been many other changes in the Strategic Concept, as my friend from Michigan has pointed out, and they were never considered the equivalent of a new international treaty. As I mentioned, before this year, NATO's original 1949 Strategic Concept had been revised five other times. Included among those were three fundamental transformations. In 1957, the alliance adopted a new strategy, which would have shocked my friend from Kansas. It was called Massive Retaliation. Talk about a commitment--a commitment that was, I might add, totally consistent with the provisions of the treaty. It was an operating procedure. In 1967, NATO abandoned the doctrine of Massive Retaliation in favor of the doctrine of Flexible Response. And then, in 1991, to continue to make the treaty relevant operationally, NATO recognized that after the end of the Soviet threat, NATO would nonetheless be confronted by a series of new threats to the alliance's security, such as ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes. It altered the Strategic Concept accordingly. These were dramatic changes to alliance strategy, yet not once did the Senate, notwithstanding the fact it was not asleep, believe it had to provide its advice and consent. There was a great deal of discussion about the 1991 Strategic Concept. I participated in it, others participated in it, and it revolved around what was the purpose of NATO and how we were operationally going to function now that the worry was no longer having 50 Soviet divisions coming through the Fulda Gap in Germany--a recognition that the territorial integrity of member states was still threatened, and instead of Soviet divisions rolling through the Fulda Gap with Warsaw Pact allies, there was a different threat, nonetheless real, nonetheless warranting this mutual commitment made to defend the territorial integrity of member states. We discussed it. We debated it. There were those who thought it didn't go far enough. There are those who thought it went too far. But it wasn't that we were asleep and didn't pay attention. In fact, maybe it was because--and I am not being facetious--my friend was in the House where they don't deal with treaties, where it is not their constitutional obligation, and where foreign policy is not the thing they spend the bulk of their time on. But we weren't asleep over here. In fact, the current 1999 version of the Strategic Concept is much more similar to its 1991 predecessor than the 1991 document was to any of its predecessors. My third point is simple. The revised Strategic Concept does not require advice and consent because it is not a treaty. The rules under U.S. law on what constitutes a binding international agreement are set forth in the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, as well as in the State Department regulations implementing the Case-Zablocki Act. Under the Restatement, the key criterion as to whether an international agreement is legally binding is if the parties intend that it be legally binding and governed by international law. (Restatement, Sec. 301(1)). Similarly, the State Department regulations state that the ``parties must intend their undertaking to be legally binding and not merely of political or personal effect.'' (22 Code of Federal Regulations Sec. 181.2(a)(1)). Thus, many agreements that are not binding are essentially political statements. There is a moral and political obligation to comply in such cases, but not a legal one. The most well-known example of such a political statement is the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, negotiated under the Ford administration and credited by most of us as the beginning of the end of the Soviet Union, the most significant political act that began to tear the Berlin Wall down. That was a political statement--commitments we made, but not of treaty scope requiring the advice and consent of the Senate. The second key criterion is whether an international agreement contains language that clearly and specifically describe the obligations that are to be undertaken. An international agreement must have objective criteria for determining the enforceability of the agreement. (22 C.F.R. Sec. 181.2(a)(3)). Another criterion is the form of the agreement. That is, a formal document labeled ``Agreement'' with final clauses about the procedures for entry into force is probably a binding agreement. This is not a central requirement, but it does provide another indication that an agreement is binding. (22 C.F.R. Sec. 181.2(a)(5)). A reading of the Strategic Concept clearly indicates that it is not a binding instrument of which treaties are made. Rather, the Strategic Concept is merely a political statement with which my colleague from Kansas and others disagree. I respect that. I respect their disagreement with the political commitment that was made. But their political disagreement with a political commitment does not cause it to rise to the level of a binding treaty obligation requiring the advice and consent of the Senate, no matter how important each of them may be, no matter how relevant their objectives may be, no matter how enlightened their foreign policy may be. Rather, the Strategic Concept is merely a political statement that outlines NATO's military and political strategy for carrying out the obligations of the North Atlantic Treaty. Nowhere in the Strategic Concept can you find binding obligations upon the members of NATO. For, if that were the case, all of our European allies as of a year ago, with the exception of Great Britain, would have been in violation of their treaty obligations--would have been in violation of their treaty obligations because of the commitments they made to build up--I will not bore the Senate with the details--their military capacity. Yet no one here on the floor has risen to suggest over the past several years, even though we have decried their failure to meet their obligations, that they have violated their treaty obligations. Instead, the language of the Strategic Concept contains general statements about how NATO will carry out its mission. The most important question, as I stated, is the intent of the parties. As the President wrote to the Chairman of the Committee on Armed Services on April 14, ``the Strategic Concept will not contain new commitments or obligations for the United States.'' Of course, the Strategic Concept creates a political commitment. And we take our political commitments seriously. All member states, the United States included, assume political obligations when they take part in the alliance's integrated military planning. That is what target force goals are all about. And, Mr. President, that lies at the heart of burden-sharing, whose importance several of us continually stress to our NATO allies. The 1999 Strategic Concept creates a planning framework for NATO to act collectively to meet new threats if they arise. So I would summarize the key point in this way: the Strategic Concept imposes political obligations to create military capabilities, but it does not impose legal obligations to use those capabilities. My fourth point is that I understand the concern that NATO's core mission--alliance defense--not be altered. It has not been. Our negotiators at last month's NATO summit did exactly what the vast majority of Senators wanted. They consciously incorporated the Senate's concerns that NATO remain a defensive alliance when they negotiated the revised Strategic Concept. The revised Strategic Concept duplicates much of the language contained in the Kyl amendment to the Resolution of Ratification on NATO Enlargement. You all remember the Kyl amendment. We were not asleep at the switch. We were not failing to pay attention. We debated at length--my friend from Virginia, and I, and others--NATO enlargement. It is one of the few areas on which we have disagreed. We debated at length the Kyl amendment. Let me remind my colleagues that the amendment was adopted by the Senate in April of 1998 by a 90-9 vote. Rather than reviewing the specifics of the document, because time does not permit, nor do I think memories have to be refreshed that clearly, because everyone remembers, I ask unanimous consent that I be allowed to enter into the Record a document provided by the Clinton administration that reviews paragraph by paragraph the similarities between the Kyl amendment and the 1999 Strategic Concept.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, will the Senator from Michigan yield me 1 minute?

Mr. BIDEN. Reserving the right to object.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, let me begin by thanking my senior colleague, Senator Roth, for carrying the load on this. As we look forward to Memorial Day observances this weekend, most of us will take time to reflect on the honorable and noble traditions of our military. The amendment sponsored by myself and my good friends Senator Roth, Thurmond, and Kennedy is an effort to make sure Congress does its part to uphold those noble traditions. Just to highlight two or three points: First of all, my friend from Virginia talks about the historical record. The historical record was made at that time when history was least likely to be served in the immediate aftermath of a national tragedy, and a need for an explanation that the country yearned and desired. I am not suggesting those who conducted the original investigation had any benevolent intent. I am suggesting that history is best viewed with a little bit of distance. There was not any distance. I just ask everyone to think about what would happen if something, God forbid, similarly happened today and this Senate, this body, and the administration decided they needed to investigate something immediately. My overwhelming instinct tells me there would be a need to find specific individuals who were responsible in order to satisfy our collective need for an answer. I respectfully suggest that that is what happened here, and I respectfully suggest, as well, that we should not be fearful of the truth and we should not be fearful of going back in this open society of ours and not rewriting history, but setting the facts straight. Ultimately, it is the President who must take action, but it is important that we in the Senate send the message that the historical truth matters and that it is never too late to acknowledge that the government did not treat the two commanding officers at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, fairly. Here's how I see it. Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and General Walter Short were publicly vilified and never given a chance to clear their names. If we lived in a closed society, fearful of the truth, then there would be no need for the President to take action. But we don't. We live in an open society. Eventually, we are able to declassify documents and evaluate our past based on at least a good portion of the whole story. I believe sincerely that one of our greatest strengths as a nation comes from our ability to honor truth and learn the lessons from our past. If we perpetuate the myth that Admiral Kimmel and General Short bear all of the blame for Pearl Harbor then we miss the real story. We fail to look at the readiness shortfalls they were facing--the lack of adequate reconnaissance planes, pilots, spare parts, and maintenance crews. We fail to look at the flawed intelligence model that was used-- the disconnect between what was obtained and what got to the commanders in the field. I mention these things in particular because there are some striking parallels to the problems facing today's military. Today's problems are of a different scope and scale, but it is important to see the parallels so that we can accurately judge our progress and our endemic problems. The historic record is not flattering to our government in the case of the two commanding officers at Pearl Harbor and that is why it is our government's responsibility to acknowledge its mistake. I want to emphasize that point, because it is important. In last night's debate over this amendment, both those for and against it agreed on most of the facts. Where there was disagreement, it seems to me, was in what to do about the facts. I believe we should urge the President to take action, because government action in the past shrouded the truth and scapegoated Kimmel and Short. I know Senator Roth and Senator Thurmond discussed some of the history last night, so I will just briefly review some of the critical parts. In 1941, after lifetimes of honorable service defending this nation and its values, Admiral Kimmel and General Short were denied the most basic form of justice--a hearing by their peers. Instead of a proper court-martial, their ordeal began on December 18th with the Roberts Commission. A mere 11 days after the devastating attack at Pearl Harbor, this Commission was established to determine the facts. In this highly charged atmosphere, the Commission conducted a speedy investigation, lasting little over a month. In the process, they denied both commanders counsel and assured both that they would not be passing judgement on their performance. That assurance was worthless. Instead, the Commission delivered highly judgmental findings and then immediately publicized those findings. The Roberts Commission is the only investigative body to find these two officers derelict in their duty and it was this government that decided to publicize that false conclusion. As one might expect, the two commanders were vilified by a nation at war. Every succeeding investigation was clear in finding that there was no dereliction of duty. The first of these were the 1944 Army Board and Navy Court reviews. Again, it was government action that prevented a truthful record from reaching the public--a decision by the President. The findings of both of these bodies that placed blame on others than Kimmel and Short were sequestered and classified. Fifty-seven years later, such falsehoods and treatment can no longer be justified by the necessities of war. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and Major General Walter Short were not singularly to blame for the disastrous events of Pearl Harbor in 1941. In fact, every investigation of Admiral Kimmel and General Short's conduct highlights significant failings by their superiors. This amendment does not involve any costs, nor does it seek any special honor or award for these two officers. It does not even seek to exonerate them from all responsibility. Instead, it seeks simple fairness and their equal treatment. They are the only two eligible officers from World War II denied advancement on the retirement lists to their highest held wartime ranks. I know my colleague from Virginia is concerned that there may be a long list of junior officers who can make similar claims. It is my understanding that there was a list of officers from World War II eligible for advancement under the Officer Personnel Act of 1947. Admiral Kimmel and General Short were the only officers on that list that were denied advancement on the retirement list. I want to stress again for all my colleagues that this amendment simply sets the record straight--responsibility for Pearl Harbor must be broadly shared. It cannot be broadly shared if we fail to acknowledge the government's historic role in clouding the truth, nor if we continue to perpetuate the myth that Kimmel and Short bear singular responsibility for the tragic losses at Pearl Harbor. These two officers were unjustly stigmatized by our nation's failure to treat them in the same manner with which we treated their peers. To reverse this wrong would be consistent with this nation's sense of military honor and basic fairness. As we honor those who have given their lives to preserve American ideals and national interests this coming Memorial Day, we must not forget two brave officers whose true story remains shrouded and singularly tarnished by official neglect of the truth. We introduced this amendment as S.J. Res. 19 earlier this year and it now has 23 co-sponsors. As I know Senator Roth indicated last night, it has the support of numerous veterans organizations and retired Navy flag officers. These knowledgeable people and about a quarter of the Senate have already spoken up on behalf of justice and fairness. I urge the rest of my colleagues to join us and support this amendment. Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair

Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent for 1 minute.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, this is a rhetorical question. The report suggested that Generals Marshall and Stark were also partially responsible. My point is that the idea that the entirety of the blame, that the children and the children of the children of these two men will live forever thinking that they were the only two people responsible for this, is a historical inaccuracy, unfair, and a blemish that is not warranted to be carried by the two proud families whose names are associated with them. It is as simple as that. Mr. ROTH addressed the Chair.

Mr. BIDEN. Yes.

Mr. BIDEN. There is objection. I would like to reserve the right to object, if you let me explain; otherwise, I will just simply object.

Mr. BIDEN. I reserve the right to object because if, in fact, the Senator wishes to change his amendment, I ask that we consider on line 7 adding the word ``legal,'' because failure to do so rewrites constitutional history here. Presidents make commitments all the time. Commitments and obligations do not a treaty make and do not require a supermajority vote under the Constitution by the Senate to ratify those commitments. I, at least for the time being, object and hope that after we finish this debate, before we vote, my colleague and I can have a few minutes in the well to see whether he will consider amending it to add the word ``legal'' on line 7 of his amendment. So I object.

Mr. BIDEN. Just 1 minute and then afterwards I see others will seek recognition to speak. I want to make it clear, I do not know where the Senator got the impression that there would be no objection. I did not agree to that. What I suggested was that when he asked me whether or not I objected, I asked him to withhold until after I made my talk and asked some questions. Then I would not object. We are getting the ``cart before the horse'' here. I want to make it clear, I may not ultimately object. I just want to have an opportunity to speak to this before he sends his amendment to the desk. Mr. ROBERTS addressed the Chair.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I would, if I may.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I want to take this opportunity today to salute a distinguished servant of the legislative branch of the U.S. Congress in the field of foreign affairs. In June 1999, Dr. Robert Sutter will leave the Congressional Research Service after 22 highly productive years as a source of expertise on China and the Asia-Pacific region. Dr. Sutter is resigning from his current position as a Senior Specialist in Asia and International Politics in the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division of CRS to become the National Intelligence Officer for East Asia, a critical intelligence community assignment. Since 1977, when he first came to work at CRS as a China specialist, Dr. Sutter has provided Members of Congress and their staffs with authoritative, in-depth analysis and policy options covering a broad range of foreign policy issues involving China, East Asia, and the Pacific. It should be a matter of pride to this body to know that Dr. Sutter is well known both here and in the Asia-Pacific region as one of the most authoritative and productive American Asia hands. In his government career to date of over 30 years, Dr. Sutter has held a variety of analytical and supervisory positions including service with the Foreign Broadcast Information Service and temporary details with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Department of State. It is in service to Congress, however, specifically with the Congressional Research Service, that Dr. Sutter has spent most of his distinguished career. I want to make a few comments that illustrate the strengths and great contributions of both the institution and the man himself. The first point to make concerns one of the great institutional strengths that CRS offers to the congressional clients it serves, and which Dr. Sutter's tenure and contributions here epitomize perfectly: institutional memory. Dr. Sutter's first published report at CRS was entitled U.S.-PRC Normalization Arguments and Alternatives. Published first as a CRS Report for general congressional use, on August 3, 1977, it soon became a Committee Print of the House International Relations Committee's Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs. The report and subsequent Committee Print addressed a number of highly controversial issues arising out of President Carter's decision to normalize relations with China. Congressional concern about the consequences of derecognition of the Republic of China, and dissatisfaction with the terms of the agreement negotiated with the People's Republic of China, directly led to the landmark Taiwan Relations Act, which still governs our policy decisions today, and which continues in 1999 to be a factor in debates in this very chamber. Besides Bob Sutter, only 48 Members of Congress serving today, in the 106th Congress, were here in 1977 and 1978 to witness these initial steps of U.S.-China relations. In the more than 20 years since then, both U.S.-China relations and the U.S. Congress itself have undergone tremendous change, both for the better and for worse. Bob Sutter has been an active participant in congressional deliberations on China policy, and in the U.S. national debate over these issues, from normalization of relations, to the Tiananmen Square crackdown, to the recent tragic bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. Dr. Sutter's two decades of service spanned the tenures for four U.S. presidents and some ten Congresses. Despite several shifts of party control in the Senate, and one in the House, Dr. Sutter continued to deliver timely, accurate, objective, and non-partisan analysis. The institutional memory represented by CRS analysts, which Dr. Sutter so perfectly exemplifies, is of incalculable value to the work of the Congress. The second point I want to make concerns Dr. Sutter himself. He has, for one thing, consistently demonstrated an astonishing capacity for work. In 1974 Dr. Sutter received his Ph.D. in History and East Asian Languages from Harvard University, writing his Ph.D. thesis while maintaining a full-time job. Routinely, he has been one of--perhaps the most in terms of sheer output of written work--productive analysts in CRS. In the last 5 years alone, Dr. Sutter has been called on for advice from Members of Congress and their staffs nearly 6,000 times--an average of 1,140 times each year. He has regularly maintained six or more ongoing, continually updated products, and his output of CRS written reports for Congress totals at least 90 since late 1987 alone. As is evident in these products, he excels at providing accurate, succinct, and well-organized analysis of congressional policy choices and their likely consequences. His work always reflects up to date knowledge of issues, usually based on personal research in East Asia and/or close contact with the U.S. private and official community of Asian analysts and scholars. Even more to the point, Dr. Sutter has always understood the powers and special needs of Congress, including its legislative and oversight responsibilities, and our obligation to represent the interests of our constituents. In his research and writing, Dr. Sutter never forgets the unique role of Congress and the importance of reflecting the full range of competing viewpoints. Reflecting his commitment to service and cheerful willingness to assume responsibility, Dr. Sutter has fulfilled a number of roles in the CRS. He has served as Chief of the Foreign Affairs Division in CRS, as well as Chief of the Government Division in CRS, in both cases maintaining a full research work load for Congress in the midst of significant management duties. He has frequently conceived, coordinated, and moderated Asia policy seminars and workshops for Members of Congress and their staffs. He routinely serves on special advisory groups in CRS and the Library of Congress. As a well-known and respected analyst, he has been a sought-after speaker at dozens of foreign policy seminars, panels, and conferences in Washington and around the world. In recent years, he has maintained this outstanding record of productivity for the Congress while managing in his spare time to teach several college courses per year at Washington area universities. He has also found time to write more than a dozen books on foreign policy issues during his tenure at CRS. Finally, Dr. Sutter's simple decency, modesty, engaging manner, and professionalism set a high standard for others and make it a great pleasure to work with him. He cheerfully volunteers for onerous tasks. He is pleasant and good-humored. Moreover, in the midst of the pressured environment of Washington and Capitol Hill, he has always found time to serve as a mentor, counselor, and friend to others, whether they be his own students, younger colleagues, or new congressional staff. And, a fact known only to close friends, he has a record of community service, including Church work and teaching of English to native Spanish speakers, that is nearly as impressive as his professional contribution. Dr. Sutter will be greatly missed, but the loss of his service to the Congress will be partly compensated for by bringing to the Executive branch his knowledge of the Congress and its special role in the making and oversight of U.S. foreign policy. When he comes back to Capitol Hill for one-on-one meetings, briefings, and testimony, he will bring with him a high degree of credibility and a special awareness of congressional needs for information and analysis.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, will the Senator from Michigan yield me 2 minutes?

Mr. BIDEN. If the Senator would yield, I am not suggesting----

Mr. BIDEN. Yes, Mr. President. I think there is. If I may respond. There are several. There is a third and a fourth alternative. One of the alternatives would be, were the resolution merely to say: Mr. President, by concurrent resolution, we believe you do not have the authority to put ground troops in place without our authorization; we expected that you would request of us that authorization before you did, that would create an incredibly difficult political barrier for any President to overcome. It would not be an advance cutoff of funds. I do not recall where we have in advance--in advance of a President taking an action--told him that we would limit the availability of funds for an action he says he has not contemplated undertaking in advance. I think it is a bad way to conduct foreign policy. I think it complicates the circumstance. It sends, at a minimum, a conflicting message. At a minimum, it sends the message to Europe, for example, and our allies, that we, the U.S. Congress, think the President is about to send American forces in when he has not said he wishes to do that. Secondly, it says in advance, to our enemies, that the President cannot send in ground forces unless he undoes an action already taken, giving an overwhelming prejudice to the point of view that the President could never get the support to use ground forces. I understand my friend from Pennsylvania--and I have said this before, and I mean it sincerely, there is no one in this body I respect more than him, but he has indicated that he would be amenable to a consideration of the use of ground forces, if asked. But I suspect that is not how this will be interpreted in not only Belgrade but other parts of the world. I think it will be interpreted as the Senate saying they do not want ground troops to be put in under any circumstances. That is not what he is saying. But that is, I believe, how it will be interpreted. So let me sum up my response to the Senator's question: A, we could, in fact, say to the President: Mr. President, if you are going to use ground forces, come and ask us, with no funds cut off in terms of a resolution. Secondly, we could say to the President: Mr. President, we have your letter in hand. We take you at your word and expect that that is what you would do, memorializing the political context in which this decision was made, which Presidents are loath to attempt to overcome. The bottom line is, the President of the United States can in fact go ahead and disregard this as easily as he could disregard the provisions of the Constitution. If a President were going to decide that he would disregard the constitutional requirement of seeking our authority to use ground forces, I respectfully suggest he would not be at all hesitant to overcome a prohibition in an authorization bill saying no funds authorized here could be used. He could argue that funds that have already been authorized have put force in place, with bullets in their guns, gasoline in their tanks, fuel in their aircraft; that he has the authority to move notwithstanding this prohibition. I understand the intention of my friend from Pennsylvania. I applaud it. I think it is unnecessary in a very complex circumstance and situation in which the President of the United States has indicated he does not intend to do it anyway. And I just think it sends all the wrong messages and is unnecessary and is overly restrictive.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, if I may respond, I think that is a fair question. I think I, quite frankly and bluntly, accomplished that. The way I did that--the Senator was in that same meeting. We were in the same meeting. I think it was the 28th, you said. I do not remember the exact date.

Mr. BIDEN. Surely.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, not only must the President, but he said he would. This amendment is flawed in two respects. First, as a constitutional matter, I believe it is unnecessary. The Constitution already bars offensive military action by the President unless it is congressionally authorized or under his emergency powers. The Senate resolution we adopted only authorizes the use of airpower. If Congress adopts this amendment, it seems to me we will imply the President has carte blanche to take offensive action, and anywhere else unless the Congress makes a specific statement to the contrary in advance. In short, I think it will tender an invitation to Presidents in the future to use force whenever they want unless Congress provides a specific ban in advance. Putting that aside, however, the amendment is flawed because its exceptions are much too narrowly drawn. The amendment purports to bar the use of Armed Forces in response to an attack against Armed Forces. For example, we have thousands of soldiers now in Albania and Macedonia. Let's suppose the Yugoslav forces launch an attack against U.S. forces in Albania or in Macedonia. This amendment would bar the use of ground forces to respond by going into Kosovo. The power to respond against such an attack is clearly within the power of the Commander in Chief. So, too, does the President have the power to launch a preemptive strike against an imminent attack. The U.S. forces do not have to wait until they take the first punch. The second point I will make in this brief amount of time I am taking is that the amendment does not appear to permit the use of U.S. forces in the evacuation of Americans. Most constitutional scholars concede the President has the power to use force in emergency circumstances to protect American citizens facing an imminent and direct threat to their lives. In sum, notwithstanding the fact that my colleague from Pennsylvania is going to amend his own amendment, it does not, in my view, appear to be necessary and it unconstitutionally restricts recognized powers of the President. This comes from a guy--namely me--who has spent the bulk of the last 25 years arguing that the President has to have congressional authority to use force in circumstances such as this, and he does. But to bar funds in advance, before a President even attempts to use ground forces, in the face of him saying he will not use them and in the face of a letter in which he says he will not send them without seeking Congress' authority, seems to me to not only be constitutionally unnecessary but sends an absolutely devastating signal to Mr. Milosevic and others. For example, I, for one, have been encouraging the Secretary of Defense, our National Security Adviser, and the President of the United States to get about the business of prepositioning right now the 50,000 forces they say will be needed in a permissive environment. That is an environment where there is a peace agreement. If tomorrow peace broke out in Yugoslavia, if Mr. Milosevic yielded to the demands of NATO, there would be chaos in Kosovo because there would be no force to put in place in order to ensure the agreement. I worry that an amendment at this moment not only is unnecessary but would send a signal to suggest that we should not even be prepositioning American forces for deployment in a peaceful environment. I think it is unnecessary. I thank the Chair for his indulgence and my colleague for the time. I oppose the amendment.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, the Strategic Concept does not rise to the level of a treaty amendment, and the Senator from Michigan has pointed that out. Therefore, it is a benign amendment, we are told, and in all probability it is. But it is unnecessary. It does mischief. It sends the wrong message. It is a bad idea, notwithstanding the fact that it has been cleaned up to the point that it is clear it does not rise to the level of a treaty requiring a treaty vote on the Strategic Concept. But I agree with the Senator from Arizona. He painstakingly on this floor laid out in the Kyl amendment during the expansion of NATO debate exactly what we asked the President to consider in the Strategic Concept that was being negotiated with our allies. They did that. We voted 90 to 9. This is a bad idea.