Joe Biden

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. There was an issue, and all the Senate and House Members were assembled, and they were about to vote on the floor of the House of Representatives on a resolution relating to whether or not the President would ask for consent to use ground troops. Let me be precise. A resolution was submitted characterized by the Speaker, as we sat there, as one that would say the following, and eventually was voted on. It said: Mr. President, before you introduce ground troops into Kosovo, you must come to us under the Constitution and ask for our permission. And the President--I can say this because he said it publicly. The President said, ``I didn't want to do something no President has acknowledged that he has to do in a debate with Congress.'' And I stood up, and I said, ``Mr. President, let me respectfully suggest you send the following letter to the House,'' because I didn't want the vote to turn into the debacle it did. And I suggested the President say the following: ``Notwithstanding the fact that I am not required to ask permission, I assure you that I will, in fact, ask the permission of the Congress before I use ground troops, if I make that decision.'' That is exactly what I said. And then we got a letter from the President which said essentially that. My purpose was not relating to the Constitution. My purpose was trying to keep the House from doing the thing I found to be imprudent, because I was worried that if they passed the resolution, which in fact they have the authority to do--the Congress--it would send a message to Milosevic and others that we were unwilling to use ground troops if need be. The President was saying, ``I don't want ground troops now.'' So I said, ``The way to settle this, Mr. President, you don't have to give up what you think you're''--you may remember--I said, ``Mr. President, I think you do need authority from the Congress if you're going to send ground troops. But you don't have to give that up. You don't have to give up that legal argument. Say, `Notwithstanding the fact I, the President, don't think I need that, I promise you I will not introduce ground troops before I ask for your permission.' '' That is not a constitutional commitment he is making. It is a personal commitment he is making, as President. And my purpose, I say to my friend from Virginia, was to keep the House from voting on that inappropriate resolution ahead of time, the very inappropriate resolution that the Congress introduced and passed. That is why.

Mr. BIDEN. That is right.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, the best time to target a new drug with uncompromising enforcement pressure is before abuse of that drug has overwhelmed our communities. That is why I introduced legislation in previous Congresses to place tight federal controls on the date rape drug Rohpynol--also known as Roofies--which was becoming known as the Quaalude of the Nineties as its popularity spreads throughout the United States. My bill would have shifted Rohpynol to schedule 1 of the Federal Controlled Substances Act. Rescheduling is important for three simple reasons: First, Federal re-scheduling triggers increases in State drug law penalties, and since we all know that more than 95 percent of all drug cases are prosecuted at the State level, not by the Federal Government, it is vitally important that we re-schedule. Second, Federal re-scheduling to schedule 1 triggers the toughest Federal penalties--up to a year in prison and at least a $1,000 fine for a first offense of simple possession. And, third, re-scheduling has proven to work. In 1984, I worked to reschedule Quaaludes, Congress passed the law, and the Quaalude epidemic was greatly reduced. And, in 1990, I worked to re-schedule steroids, Congress passed the law, and again a drug epidemic that had been on the rise was reversed. Despite evidence of a growing Rohpynol epidemic, some argued that my efforts to reschedule the drug by legislation were premature. Accordingly, I agreed to hold off on legislative action and wait for a Drug Enforcement Administration decision on whether to schedule the drug through the lengthy and cumbersome administrative process. As I predicted, the DEA report on Rohpynol--handed down in November-- correctly concludes that despite the rapid spread of Rohpynol throughout the country, DEA cannot re-schedule Rohpynol by rulemaking at this time. The report notes, however, that Congress is not bound by the bureaucratic re-scheduling process the DEA must follow. Congress can-- and in my view should--pass legislation to reschedule Rohpynol. Sepcifically the report states: ``This inability to reschedule [Rohpynol] administratively * * * does not affect Congress' ability to place [the drug] in schedule 1 through the legislative process''--as we did with Quaaludes in 1984 and Anabolic Steroids in 1990. Let me also note that the DEA report confirmed a number of facts about the extent of the Rohpynol problem: DEA found more than 4,000 documented cases--in 36 States--of sale or possession of the drug, which is not marketed in the United States and must be smuggled in. ``In spite of DEA's inability to reschedule [Rohpynol] through administrative proceedings, DEA remains very concerned about the abuse'' of the drug. ``Middle and high school students have been known to use [Rohpynol] as an alternative to alcohol to achieve an intoxicated state during school hours. [The drug] is much more difficult to detect than alcohol, which produces a characteristic odor.'' ``DEA is extremely concerned about the use of [Rohpynol] in the commission of sexual assaults.'' ``The number of sexual assaults in which [Rohpynol] is used may be underreported''--because the drug's effects often cause rape victims to be unable to remember details of their assaults and because rape crisis centers, hospitals, and law enforcement have only recently become aware that Rohpynol can be used to facilitate sex crimes. Nonetheless, ``DEA is aware of at least 5 individuals who have been convicted of rape in which the evidence suggests that [the Rohypnol drug] was used to incapacitate the victim.'' ``The actual number of sexual assault cases involving [the drug] is not known. It is difficult to obtain evidence that [the Rohypnol drug] was used in an assault.'' I would also note that my efforts to re-schedule this drug have already had beneficial results: The manufacturer of Rohypnol recently announced that it had developed a new formula to minimize the potential for abuse of the drug in sexual assaults. This is an important step. But pills produced under the old Rohypnol formula are still in circulation, and pills made by other manufacturers can still be smuggled in. Furthermore, the new formula will not prevent kids from continuing to ingest this dangerous drug voluntarily for a cheap high. In short, stricter, Federal controls remain necessary; and DEA is powerless to respond to Rohypnol abuse until the problem gets even worse. Therefore, I am reintroducing my bill to re-schedule Rohypnol in schedule 1 of the Controlled Substances Act. I urge my colleagues to support this effort to take action against this dangerous drug now, rather than waiting for the problem to develop into an epidemic. My bill also places ``Special K''--ketamine hydrochloride--a dangerous hallucinogen very similar to PCP, on schedule III of the Controlled Substances Act. Despite Special K's rising popularity as a ``club drug'' of choice among kids, the drug is not even illegal in most States. This has crippled State authorities' ability to fight ketamine abuse. For example, in Federal 1997, two men accused of stealing ketamine from a Ville Platte, Louisiana veterinary clinic and cooking the drug into a powder could not be prosecuted under State drug control laws because ketamine is not listed as a Federal controlled substance. Similarly, a New Jersey youth recently found to be possessing and distributing ketamine could be charged with only a disorderly persons offense. Prosecutors are trying to combat increased Ketamine use by seeking lengthy prison terms for possession of the drugs--like marijuana--that users mix with Ketamine, but if it is just Special K, there's nothing they can do about it. I am convinced that scheduling Ketamine will help our effort to fight the spread of this dangerous drug by triggering increases in State drug law penalties. Without Federal scheduling, many States will not be able to address the Ketamine problem until it is too late and Special K has already infiltrated their communities. Medical professions who use Ketamine--including the American Veterinary Medical Association and the American Association of Nurse Anesthetists--support scheduling, having determined that it will accomplish our goal of ``preventing the diversion and unauthorized use of Ketamine'' while allowing ``continued, responsible use'' of the drug for legitimate purposes. [Letter from Mary Beth Leininger, D.V.M., President of the American Veterinary Medical Association] And the largest manufacturer of Ketamine has concluded that ``moving the product to schedule III classification is in the best interest of the veterinary industry and the public.'' [Letter from E. Thomas Corcoran, President of Fort Dodge Animal Health, a Division of American Home Products Corporation]. Scheduling Ketamine will give State authorities the tools they desperately need to fight its abuse by young people--and end the legal anomaly that leaves those who sell Ketamine to our children beyond the reach of the law--even when they are caught ``red-handed.'' I urge my colleagues to support this legislation. In addition to raising controls on Rohypnol and Ketamine, the legislation I am introducing today would increase the ability of the Attorney General to respond to new drug emergencies in the future. Our Federal drug control laws currently allow the Attorney General limited authority to respond to certain new drugs on an emergency basis--by temporarily subjecting them the strictest Federal control while the extensive administrative procedure for permanent scheduling proceeds. But the Attorney General has not been able to use this authority to respond to the Rohypnol and Special K emergencies--because she does not have authority to--move drugs from one schedule to another, or to schedule drugs that the Food and Drug Administration has allowed companies to research but not to sell. This amendment would grant the administration this important authority by--authorizing the Attorney General to move a scheduled drug--like Rohypnol--to schedule I in an Emergency; by applying emergency rescheduling authority to ``investigational new drugs''--like Special K--that the Food and Drug Administration has approved for research purposes only, but not for marketing. And by providing that a rescheduling drug remains on the temporary schedule until the administrative proceedings reach a final conclusion on whether to schedule. This legislation would give the Attorney General the necessary tools to respond quickly when evidence appears that a drug is being abused. I urge my colleagues to support the bill. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, today I am introducing the New Medicines to Treat Addiction Act of 1999, legislation that builds upon my efforts in previous Congresses to promote research into and development of new medicines to treat the ravages of hard core drug addiction. Since the first call to arms against illegal drugs, we have learned just how insidious hard-core drug addiction is, even as the ravages of substance abuse--on both the addict and the addict's victims--have become ever more apparent. The frustration in dealing with a seemingly intractable national problem is palpable, most noticeably in the heated rhetoric as politicians blame each other for the failure to find a cure. What gets lost underneath the noise is the recognition that we have not done everything we can to fight this problem and that, like all serious ills, we must take incremental steps one at a time, and refuse to be overwhelmed by the big picture. Throughout my tenure as chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, I called for a multifaceted strategy to combat drug abuse. One of the specific steps I advocated was the creation of incentives to encourage the private sector to develop medicines that treat addiction, an area where promising research has not led--as one would normally expect--to production of medicines. The bill I am introducing today, the New Medicines To Treat Addiction Act of 1999, will hopefully change that. It takes focused aim at one segment of the drug-abusing population-- hardcore addicts, namely users of cocaine and heroin--in part because these addicts are so difficult to treat with traditional methods, and in part because this population commits such a large percentage of drug-related crime. In December, 1989, I commissioned a Judiciary Committee report, ``Pharmacotherapy: A Strategy for the 1990's.'' In that report, I posed the question, ``If drug use is an epidemic, are we doing enough to find a medical `cure' for this disease?'' The report gave the answer ``No.'' Unfortunately, now a decade later, the answer remains the same. Developing new medicines for the treatment of addiction should be among our highest medical research priorities as a nation. Until we take this modest step, we cannot claim to have done everything reasonable to address the problem, and we should not become so frustrated that we effectively throw up our hands and do nothing. Recent medical advances have increased the possibility of developing medications to treat drug addiction. These advances include a heightened understanding of the physiologist and psychological characteristics of drug addiction and a greater base of neuroscientific research. One example of this promising research is the recent development of a compound that has been proven to immunize laboratory animals against the effects of cocaine. The compound works like a vaccine by stimulating the immune system to develop an antibody that blocks cocaine from entering the brain. Researchers funded through the National Institute of Drug Abuse believe that this advance may open a whole new avenue for combating addiction. Despite this progress, we still do not have a medication to treat cocaine addiction or drugs to treat many other forms of substance abuse, because the private sector is unsure of the wisdom of making the necessary investment in the production and marketing of such medicines. Privarte industry has not aggressively developed pharmacotherapies for a variety of reasons, including a small customer base, difficulties distributing medication to the target population, and fear of being associated with substance abusers. We need to create financial incentives to encourage pharmaceutical companies to develop and market these treatments. And we need to develop a new partnership between private industry and the public sector in order to encourage the active marketing and distribution of new medicines so they are accessible to all addicts in need of treatment. While pharmacotherapies alone are not a ``magic bullet'' that will solve our national substance abuse problem, they have the potential to fill a gap in current treatment regimens. The disease of addiction occurs for many reasons, including a variety of personal problems which pharmaco therapy cannot address. Still, by providing a treatment regimen for drug abusers who are not helped by traditional methods, pharmacotherapy holds substantial promise for reducing the crime and health crisis that drug abuse is causing in the United States. The New Medicines To Treat Addiction Act of 1999 would encourage and support the development of medicines to treat drug addiction in three ways. It reauthorizes and increases funding for Medications Development Program at the National Institute of Health, which for years has been at the forefront of research into drug addition. The bill also creates two new incentives for private sector companies to undertake the difficult but important task of developing medicines to treat addiction. First, the bill would provide additional patient protections for companies that develop drugs to treat substance abuse. Under the bill, pharmacotherapies could be designated `orphan drugs' and qualify for an exclusive seven-year patent to treat specific addiction. These extraordinary patent rights would greatly enhance the market value of pharmacotherapies and provide a financial reward for companies that invest in the search to cure drug addiction. This provision was contained in a bill introduced by Senator Kennedy and me in 1990, but was never acted on by Congress. Second, the bill would establish a substantial monetary reward for companies that develop drugs to treat cocaine and heroin addiction but shift the responsibility for marketing and distributing such drugs to the government. This approach would create a financial incentive for drug companies to invest in research and development but enable them to avoid any stigma associated with distributing medicine to substance abusers. The bill would require the National Academy of Sciences to develop strict guidelines for evaluating whether a drug effectively treats cocaine or heroin addiction. If a drug meets these guidelines and is approved by the Food and Drug Administration, then the government must purchase the patent rights for the drug from the company that developed it. The purchase rights for the patent rights is established by law: $100 million for a drug to treat cocaine addiction and $50 million for a drug to treat heroin addiction. Once the government has purchased the patent rights, then it is responsible for producing the drug and distributing it to clinics, hospitals, state and local governments, and any other entities qualified to operate drug treatment programs. This joint public/private endeavor will correct the market inefficiencies that have thus far prevented the development of drugs to treat addiction and require the government to take on the responsibilities that industry is unwilling or unable to perform. America's drug problems is reduced each and every time a drug abuser quits his or her habit. Fewer drug addicts mean fewer crimes, fewer hospital admissions, fewer drug-addicted babies and fewer neglected children. The benefits to our country of developing new treatment options such as pharmacotherapies are manifold. Each dollar we spend on advancing options in this area can save us ten or twenty times as much in years to come. The question isn't ``Can we afford to pursue a pharmacotherapy strategy?'' but rather, ``Can we afford not to?'' Congress has long neglected to adopt measures I have proposed to speed the approval of and encourage greater private sector interest in pharmaco therapy. We cannot let another Congress conclude without rectifying our past negligence on this issue. I urge my colleagues to join me in promoting an important, and potentially ground breaking, approach to addressing one of our Nation's most serious domestic challenges. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, today I am introducing the New Medicines to Treat Addiction Act of 1999, legislation that builds upon my efforts in previous Congresses to promote research into and development of new medicines to treat the ravages of hard core drug addiction. Since the first call to arms against illegal drugs, we have learned just how insidious hard-core drug addiction is, even as the ravages of substance abuse--on both the addict and the addict's victims--have become ever more apparent. The frustration in dealing with a seemingly intractable national problem is palpable, most noticeably in the heated rhetoric as politicians blame each other for the failure to find a cure. What gets lost underneath the noise is the recognition that we have not done everything we can to fight this problem and that, like all serious ills, we must take incremental steps one at a time, and refuse to be overwhelmed by the big picture. Throughout my tenure as chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, I called for a multifaceted strategy to combat drug abuse. One of the specific steps I advocated was the creation of incentives to encourage the private sector to develop medicines that treat addiction, an area where promising research has not led--as one would normally expect--to production of medicines. The bill I am introducing today, the New Medicines To Treat Addiction Act of 1999, will hopefully change that. It takes focused aim at one segment of the drug-abusing population-- hardcore addicts, namely users of cocaine and heroin--in part because these addicts are so difficult to treat with traditional methods, and in part because this population commits such a large percentage of drug-related crime. In December, 1989, I commissioned a Judiciary Committee report, ``Pharmacotherapy: A Strategy for the 1990's.'' In that report, I posed the question, ``If drug use is an epidemic, are we doing enough to find a medical `cure' for this disease?'' The report gave the answer ``No.'' Unfortunately, now a decade later, the answer remains the same. Developing new medicines for the treatment of addiction should be among our highest medical research priorities as a nation. Until we take this modest step, we cannot claim to have done everything reasonable to address the problem, and we should not become so frustrated that we effectively throw up our hands and do nothing. Recent medical advances have increased the possibility of developing medications to treat drug addiction. These advances include a heightened understanding of the physiologist and psychological characteristics of drug addiction and a greater base of neuroscientific research. One example of this promising research is the recent development of a compound that has been proven to immunize laboratory animals against the effects of cocaine. The compound works like a vaccine by stimulating the immune system to develop an antibody that blocks cocaine from entering the brain. Researchers funded through the National Institute of Drug Abuse believe that this advance may open a whole new avenue for combating addiction. Despite this progress, we still do not have a medication to treat cocaine addiction or drugs to treat many other forms of substance abuse, because the private sector is unsure of the wisdom of making the necessary investment in the production and marketing of such medicines. Privarte industry has not aggressively developed pharmacotherapies for a variety of reasons, including a small customer base, difficulties distributing medication to the target population, and fear of being associated with substance abusers. We need to create financial incentives to encourage pharmaceutical companies to develop and market these treatments. And we need to develop a new partnership between private industry and the public sector in order to encourage the active marketing and distribution of new medicines so they are accessible to all addicts in need of treatment. While pharmacotherapies alone are not a ``magic bullet'' that will solve our national substance abuse problem, they have the potential to fill a gap in current treatment regimens. The disease of addiction occurs for many reasons, including a variety of personal problems which pharmaco therapy cannot address. Still, by providing a treatment regimen for drug abusers who are not helped by traditional methods, pharmacotherapy holds substantial promise for reducing the crime and health crisis that drug abuse is causing in the United States. The New Medicines To Treat Addiction Act of 1999 would encourage and support the development of medicines to treat drug addiction in three ways. It reauthorizes and increases funding for Medications Development Program at the National Institute of Health, which for years has been at the forefront of research into drug addition. The bill also creates two new incentives for private sector companies to undertake the difficult but important task of developing medicines to treat addiction. First, the bill would provide additional patient protections for companies that develop drugs to treat substance abuse. Under the bill, pharmacotherapies could be designated `orphan drugs' and qualify for an exclusive seven-year patent to treat specific addiction. These extraordinary patent rights would greatly enhance the market value of pharmacotherapies and provide a financial reward for companies that invest in the search to cure drug addiction. This provision was contained in a bill introduced by Senator Kennedy and me in 1990, but was never acted on by Congress. Second, the bill would establish a substantial monetary reward for companies that develop drugs to treat cocaine and heroin addiction but shift the responsibility for marketing and distributing such drugs to the government. This approach would create a financial incentive for drug companies to invest in research and development but enable them to avoid any stigma associated with distributing medicine to substance abusers. The bill would require the National Academy of Sciences to develop strict guidelines for evaluating whether a drug effectively treats cocaine or heroin addiction. If a drug meets these guidelines and is approved by the Food and Drug Administration, then the government must purchase the patent rights for the drug from the company that developed it. The purchase rights for the patent rights is established by law: $100 million for a drug to treat cocaine addiction and $50 million for a drug to treat heroin addiction. Once the government has purchased the patent rights, then it is responsible for producing the drug and distributing it to clinics, hospitals, state and local governments, and any other entities qualified to operate drug treatment programs. This joint public/private endeavor will correct the market inefficiencies that have thus far prevented the development of drugs to treat addiction and require the government to take on the responsibilities that industry is unwilling or unable to perform. America's drug problems is reduced each and every time a drug abuser quits his or her habit. Fewer drug addicts mean fewer crimes, fewer hospital admissions, fewer drug-addicted babies and fewer neglected children. The benefits to our country of developing new treatment options such as pharmacotherapies are manifold. Each dollar we spend on advancing options in this area can save us ten or twenty times as much in years to come. The question isn't ``Can we afford to pursue a pharmacotherapy strategy?'' but rather, ``Can we afford not to?'' Congress has long neglected to adopt measures I have proposed to speed the approval of and encourage greater private sector interest in pharmaco therapy. We cannot let another Congress conclude without rectifying our past negligence on this issue. I urge my colleagues to join me in promoting an important, and potentially ground breaking, approach to addressing one of our Nation's most serious domestic challenges. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, the best time to target a new drug with uncompromising enforcement pressure is before abuse of that drug has overwhelmed our communities. That is why I introduced legislation in previous Congresses to place tight federal controls on the date rape drug Rohpynol--also known as Roofies--which was becoming known as the Quaalude of the Nineties as its popularity spreads throughout the United States. My bill would have shifted Rohpynol to schedule 1 of the Federal Controlled Substances Act. Rescheduling is important for three simple reasons: First, Federal re-scheduling triggers increases in State drug law penalties, and since we all know that more than 95 percent of all drug cases are prosecuted at the State level, not by the Federal Government, it is vitally important that we re-schedule. Second, Federal re-scheduling to schedule 1 triggers the toughest Federal penalties--up to a year in prison and at least a $1,000 fine for a first offense of simple possession. And, third, re-scheduling has proven to work. In 1984, I worked to reschedule Quaaludes, Congress passed the law, and the Quaalude epidemic was greatly reduced. And, in 1990, I worked to re-schedule steroids, Congress passed the law, and again a drug epidemic that had been on the rise was reversed. Despite evidence of a growing Rohpynol epidemic, some argued that my efforts to reschedule the drug by legislation were premature. Accordingly, I agreed to hold off on legislative action and wait for a Drug Enforcement Administration decision on whether to schedule the drug through the lengthy and cumbersome administrative process. As I predicted, the DEA report on Rohpynol--handed down in November-- correctly concludes that despite the rapid spread of Rohpynol throughout the country, DEA cannot re-schedule Rohpynol by rulemaking at this time. The report notes, however, that Congress is not bound by the bureaucratic re-scheduling process the DEA must follow. Congress can-- and in my view should--pass legislation to reschedule Rohpynol. Sepcifically the report states: ``This inability to reschedule [Rohpynol] administratively * * * does not affect Congress' ability to place [the drug] in schedule 1 through the legislative process''--as we did with Quaaludes in 1984 and Anabolic Steroids in 1990. Let me also note that the DEA report confirmed a number of facts about the extent of the Rohpynol problem: DEA found more than 4,000 documented cases--in 36 States--of sale or possession of the drug, which is not marketed in the United States and must be smuggled in. ``In spite of DEA's inability to reschedule [Rohpynol] through administrative proceedings, DEA remains very concerned about the abuse'' of the drug. ``Middle and high school students have been known to use [Rohpynol] as an alternative to alcohol to achieve an intoxicated state during school hours. [The drug] is much more difficult to detect than alcohol, which produces a characteristic odor.'' ``DEA is extremely concerned about the use of [Rohpynol] in the commission of sexual assaults.'' ``The number of sexual assaults in which [Rohpynol] is used may be underreported''--because the drug's effects often cause rape victims to be unable to remember details of their assaults and because rape crisis centers, hospitals, and law enforcement have only recently become aware that Rohpynol can be used to facilitate sex crimes. Nonetheless, ``DEA is aware of at least 5 individuals who have been convicted of rape in which the evidence suggests that [the Rohypnol drug] was used to incapacitate the victim.'' ``The actual number of sexual assault cases involving [the drug] is not known. It is difficult to obtain evidence that [the Rohypnol drug] was used in an assault.'' I would also note that my efforts to re-schedule this drug have already had beneficial results: The manufacturer of Rohypnol recently announced that it had developed a new formula to minimize the potential for abuse of the drug in sexual assaults. This is an important step. But pills produced under the old Rohypnol formula are still in circulation, and pills made by other manufacturers can still be smuggled in. Furthermore, the new formula will not prevent kids from continuing to ingest this dangerous drug voluntarily for a cheap high. In short, stricter, Federal controls remain necessary; and DEA is powerless to respond to Rohypnol abuse until the problem gets even worse. Therefore, I am reintroducing my bill to re-schedule Rohypnol in schedule 1 of the Controlled Substances Act. I urge my colleagues to support this effort to take action against this dangerous drug now, rather than waiting for the problem to develop into an epidemic. My bill also places ``Special K''--ketamine hydrochloride--a dangerous hallucinogen very similar to PCP, on schedule III of the Controlled Substances Act. Despite Special K's rising popularity as a ``club drug'' of choice among kids, the drug is not even illegal in most States. This has crippled State authorities' ability to fight ketamine abuse. For example, in Federal 1997, two men accused of stealing ketamine from a Ville Platte, Louisiana veterinary clinic and cooking the drug into a powder could not be prosecuted under State drug control laws because ketamine is not listed as a Federal controlled substance. Similarly, a New Jersey youth recently found to be possessing and distributing ketamine could be charged with only a disorderly persons offense. Prosecutors are trying to combat increased Ketamine use by seeking lengthy prison terms for possession of the drugs--like marijuana--that users mix with Ketamine, but if it is just Special K, there's nothing they can do about it. I am convinced that scheduling Ketamine will help our effort to fight the spread of this dangerous drug by triggering increases in State drug law penalties. Without Federal scheduling, many States will not be able to address the Ketamine problem until it is too late and Special K has already infiltrated their communities. Medical professions who use Ketamine--including the American Veterinary Medical Association and the American Association of Nurse Anesthetists--support scheduling, having determined that it will accomplish our goal of ``preventing the diversion and unauthorized use of Ketamine'' while allowing ``continued, responsible use'' of the drug for legitimate purposes. [Letter from Mary Beth Leininger, D.V.M., President of the American Veterinary Medical Association] And the largest manufacturer of Ketamine has concluded that ``moving the product to schedule III classification is in the best interest of the veterinary industry and the public.'' [Letter from E. Thomas Corcoran, President of Fort Dodge Animal Health, a Division of American Home Products Corporation]. Scheduling Ketamine will give State authorities the tools they desperately need to fight its abuse by young people--and end the legal anomaly that leaves those who sell Ketamine to our children beyond the reach of the law--even when they are caught ``red-handed.'' I urge my colleagues to support this legislation. In addition to raising controls on Rohypnol and Ketamine, the legislation I am introducing today would increase the ability of the Attorney General to respond to new drug emergencies in the future. Our Federal drug control laws currently allow the Attorney General limited authority to respond to certain new drugs on an emergency basis--by temporarily subjecting them the strictest Federal control while the extensive administrative procedure for permanent scheduling proceeds. But the Attorney General has not been able to use this authority to respond to the Rohypnol and Special K emergencies--because she does not have authority to--move drugs from one schedule to another, or to schedule drugs that the Food and Drug Administration has allowed companies to research but not to sell. This amendment would grant the administration this important authority by--authorizing the Attorney General to move a scheduled drug--like Rohypnol--to schedule I in an Emergency; by applying emergency rescheduling authority to ``investigational new drugs''--like Special K--that the Food and Drug Administration has approved for research purposes only, but not for marketing. And by providing that a rescheduling drug remains on the temporary schedule until the administrative proceedings reach a final conclusion on whether to schedule. This legislation would give the Attorney General the necessary tools to respond quickly when evidence appears that a drug is being abused. I urge my colleagues to support the bill. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, today I want to right a wrong--a small wrong, but a wrong nevertheless. It affects a handful of our diplomats who serve in the world's most dangerous places: Beirut, Bosnia, Kosovo, the unsettled nations of Africa and the former Soviet Union and elsewhere. And unfortunately, as the events of recent weeks prove, the need for Americans--soldiers and diplomats alike--to go in harm's way, is unlikely to abate. Our diplomats, colleagues of those killed last summer in the tragic embassy bombings in Africa, receive an allowance for their service in the most frightening places in the world--a danger allowance. This allowance is not unlike that paid to our military when they are in combat. In fact, in some places, such as Bosnia, where our military and diplomatic personnel serve side by side, both receive a special allowance for their sacrifices. The military justifiably receives this benefit tax-free. But our diplomatic personnel do not. Through an oversight in the Internal Revenue Code, diplomats are taxed on their danger pay, even though they often face similar hardships and dangers. I think that's wrong. I have a bill which would amend the Internal Revenue Code to right this wrong. It affects just a handful of people. But to them it will serve as recognition of the sacrifice they make when they represent the American people in dangerous settings overseas. I urge its quick passage. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill appear in the Record.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, today I want to right a wrong--a small wrong, but a wrong nevertheless. It affects a handful of our diplomats who serve in the world's most dangerous places: Beirut, Bosnia, Kosovo, the unsettled nations of Africa and the former Soviet Union and elsewhere. And unfortunately, as the events of recent weeks prove, the need for Americans--soldiers and diplomats alike--to go in harm's way, is unlikely to abate. Our diplomats, colleagues of those killed last summer in the tragic embassy bombings in Africa, receive an allowance for their service in the most frightening places in the world--a danger allowance. This allowance is not unlike that paid to our military when they are in combat. In fact, in some places, such as Bosnia, where our military and diplomatic personnel serve side by side, both receive a special allowance for their sacrifices. The military justifiably receives this benefit tax-free. But our diplomatic personnel do not. Through an oversight in the Internal Revenue Code, diplomats are taxed on their danger pay, even though they often face similar hardships and dangers. I think that's wrong. I have a bill which would amend the Internal Revenue Code to right this wrong. It affects just a handful of people. But to them it will serve as recognition of the sacrifice they make when they represent the American people in dangerous settings overseas. I urge its quick passage. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill appear in the Record.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I am proud to join today with my colleague, the Senator from Maine, Mrs. Snowe, in introducing a resolution honoring the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) of the United States and commemorating the 100th Anniversary of the founding of the VFW, by declaring September 29, 1999 as Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States Day. Since its inception after the Spanish-American War in 1899, the VFW has dedicated itself and its members to improving twentieth century America. The value of the contributions that members of the VFW and its Ladies Auxiliary have made to their communities and to this nation cannot be overstated. After returning home from foreign service during times of war and armed conflict, these men and women have continued to give of themselves to ensure that this nation protects and maintains the democratic ideals upon which it was founded, and that the veterans and their dependents are cared for. From providing services for veterans and their families, to sponsoring community action and charity projects, the VFW strengthens not only its members, but each and every American as well. On a personal note, I have had the unique pleasure of sharing the floor of the United States Senate with several decorated veterans, as well as enjoying the privilege of having several veterans of American conflicts on my own staff. I've also enjoyed the ongoing opportunity of meeting and working with the very patriotic citizens of Delaware whom this resolution honors. Throughout my entire tenure in the United States Senate, the members of Delaware's VFW have been, for me, a continued source of knowledge, insight, and inspiration. Particularly with the members of our armed forces currently serving in the Balkans in mind, whom I just visited, I offer my humble recognition to all of those who have so bravely and selflessly served America in the past. I sincerely trust that my colleagues will join me in acknowledging the courage, the sacrifice, and, frequently, the sheer bravery of our members of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, whose contributions to this country will be reaped for generations to come. I want to both demonstrate and convey to them my profound gratitude.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise in support of this conference report on the Education Flexibility Partnership Act of 1999. When this so- called ``Ed-Flex'' bill was last before this body, it contained a plan to cut back on the commitment this Congress made last year to help put 100,000 new teachers in our schools. Now that this contentious provision has been removed, I'm pleased this afternoon to support the final passage of this bill and to clear this measure for the President's signature. There's little doubt that education is something that can help set an individual free or consign him or her to a lifetime of uphill battles. And as a Nation, the quality of our educational system can make us a world leader or relegate us to a second-class status. While most education decisions are--and should continue to be--made at the state and local level, the Federal Government has a crucial role to play in helping schools to educate all our children for the high- tech world of the 21st Century. I believe this bill will help us to better reach our goals. All across America, parents, teachers, school boards, students, and policy makers are looking to improve their schools, and the Federal Government has offered help to schools in developing and instituting innovative reforms. In 1994, we took the important step of setting up a demonstration program in six states to allow certain regulations in Federal education programs to be waived if those regulations impede progress on school improvement efforts. We later expanded that demonstration program to twelve states. This legislation we are passing today will allow all states, including Delaware, the same flexibility that was afforded the states in the demonstration program. The Federal dollars will still be spent for the purposes intended, but states will be freed to use the money in the most efficient and creative ways, most responsive to local needs. Importantly, this bill also includes strong provisions to ensure that schools will be held accountable to meet educational goals. In the struggle to improve our education system, this is an important step in promoting new ideas and solutions to better our schools and make the most of our education dollars.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, let me thank the Senator from Connecticut for allowing me to proceed. I will be relatively brief. Unfortunately, I think we are going to have an awful lot to say on this issue for some time to come. I thank Senator McCain. Several weeks ago, Senator McCain and I were on one of these national shows talking about this issue, and we spoke to one another after the show. We agreed on three things--and some of my colleagues assembled here on the floor have reached the same conclusions. First, that the President of the United States, if he were to decide to use ground troops, would need congressional authorization. Second, that we and the President should not ever take anything off the table once we are in a war, in order to be able to successfully prosecute that war. And third, that we consider a resolution that talks about the use of ground force. Senator McCain had a better idea. He said, ``Joe, why don't we do a resolution that suggests the President use whatever means are at his disposal in order to meet the objectives that are stated in the resolution?'' So we came back after the recess with the intention of introducing a resolution. We spoke with the Democratic and Republican leadership here in the Senate. We met with the President in a bipartisan group. And we concluded that it was not the time to press for passage of the resolution. But it is time to lay it before the American people and before the Congress. This is a joint resolution. If passed, it would meet the constitutional requirement of the war clause in the U.S. Constitution. That is the equivalent of a declaration of war. From a constitutional standpoint, in order to use ground forces, I am of the view--and I expect my colleagues will be of the view, whether they do or do not support ground forces, now or in the future--that the Congress should be involved in that decision under our Constitution. So speaking for myself, my first and foremost reason for being the original cosponsor of this amendment with my friend, John McCain, is that I believe it is constitutionally required. Second, I believe very strongly that we should not make an international commitment and then withhold the use of any means at our disposal to reach our publicly stated objectives. This resolution will allow us, as a nation and as an alliance, to fulfill our commitments. So I am proud to be a cosponsor of this resolution. We will have disagreements, as you will hear as this debate goes forward, as to whether or not the President and NATO have appropriately prosecuted this action thus far. I am not suggesting that all of us agree. But that will be part of a debate that takes place here on the floor of the Senate. I, for one, do not have the military experience of John McCain; few in America do. I would not attempt to second-guess whether the military has the capacity to accomplish the objectives as stated by NATO solely through the use of air power. There are men on the floor like Senator Hagel--a war hero himself, a Vietnam veteran--who are better equipped to determine whether or not the military is accurately telling us what they can do. I am prepared to accept for the moment that the military does have that capacity. Thus my sponsorship of this resolution is not for the purpose of making the case that the President and NATO should use ground troops at this moment. Instead, I think the President should be authorized to use those troops, if necessary, in order to prosecute successfully the NATO goals in the Balkans. We must have the flexibility to respond to one of the most serious crises of this century in the Balkans. I just got back from Macedonia and Albania with Ted Stevens and others. I noticed most people in Europe are not using the phrase ``conflict'' anymore; it is a war. This is a war. We should not kid each other about it. This is a war. The fact that there have, thank God, not been any American casualties yet, the fact that ``only'' three Americans have been captured, does not mean this is not a war. This is a war. And to successfully prosecute our aims, people are going to die, including Americans. I think it is almost unbelievable to think that we will meet the objectives stated by NATO without the loss of a single American life. So this is a war, and it is testing Europe and the alliance in a way that we have not faced since the end of World War II. However we choose to label it, this is a war in the Balkans, a war that is being conducted by a war criminal named Slobodan Milosevic, who has caused the greatest human catastrophe in Europe since World War II. At stake are the lives of millions of displaced persons and refugees, the stability of southeastern Europe, and the future of NATO itself. Our goals must be the safe and secure return of all Kosovars to their homes; the withdrawal of all Yugoslav and Serbian Army, police, and paramilitary forces from Kosovo; and permitting the establishment of a NATO-led peacekeeping force in Kosovo, either through a permissive environment or--my phrase--a practically permissible environment, one in which we could go in and the military of Milosevic could not stop us. With the stakes this high, we must give the President the necessary means to achieve our goals. The Constitution, as I said, requires that Congress consider giving such authorization. I have trust and confidence in our military leaders when they say that, at least for the moment, they do not need ground forces to achieve our goals. Nonetheless, they should have the authorization to use all military tools should they conclude otherwise. This resolution would provide that authorization. This resolution also authorizes the President to use other means, which encompasses diplomacy as well as arms. I hope, of course, that a diplomatic solution will be possible without the use of ground forces, but only if the diplomatic solution achieves all of our stated goals. Finally, through this resolution, we are putting Slobodan Milosevic on notice that the United States and NATO allies are deadly serious about doing what it takes to compel him to withdraw his vicious ethnic- cleansers, gang rapists, recently pardoned criminals, ski-masked thugs, and his now corrupted regular army troops from Kosovo. So, let me conclude by saying once again that there will be plenty of time to debate whether or not NATO should have had a full-blown plan on the table for the use of ground forces. I suggest to my colleagues, as I suggested at the NAC in Brussels this past Sunday, that if we had done that, there is overwhelming evidence that several of our allies would not have gone along with even airstrikes. I remind everyone who is listening that the good news is that we are an alliance. The bad news is, we are an alliance. An alliance requires consensus. I respectfully suggest that as hard as it was for the Senators on this floor to convince our colleagues that air power made sense in the first instance, can you imagine what it would have been like if we were standing on the floor today authorizing the President to use all force necessary without 18 other NATO nations agreeing? I respectfully suggest that Democrats and Republicans alike would come to the floor and say: It is not our business alone. We should only do this in conjunction with NATO. So, there is a delicate balancing act, not unlike what Dwight Eisenhower had to deal with in World War II with the French and the British and others. The delicate balancing act involves keeping the alliance together and at the same time not diminishing the capacity to achieve the alliance's ends. The message I would like to see sent to Belgrade today is that America is united, the United States Congress is united, and American citizens are prepared to use whatever force is necessary to stop him. I would also send a message to our allies that we are resolved and we expect them to stay resolved to achieve NATO's stated objectives. If we fail to achieve our stated objectives, I believe that NATO loses its credibility as a credible peacekeeping alternative and a defensive organization in Europe. If that occurs, I believe you will see a repetition of this war in Serbia, in Macedonia, in Albania, in Montenegro, and other parts of the Balkans. Much is at stake. We should not kid the American people. American lives will be lost as this continues. But America's strategic interests and American lives in the long run will be saved if we resolutely pursue the NATO objectives. Mr. President, I again thank my friend from Connecticut. I am proud to join with the Senators on the floor here today, for whom I have deep respect. I realize they have put aside their political considerations in order to pursue this effort. I compliment them for that. I yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the privilege of the floor be granted to an American Political Science Association fellow on the minority staff of the Foreign Relations Committee, David Auerswald, during the pendency of floor debate on Kosovo and the United States use of force when that occurs, and as often as that occurs, on the floor.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, let me thank the Senator from Connecticut for allowing me to proceed. I will be relatively brief. Unfortunately, I think we are going to have an awful lot to say on this issue for some time to come. I thank Senator McCain. Several weeks ago, Senator McCain and I were on one of these national shows talking about this issue, and we spoke to one another after the show. We agreed on three things--and some of my colleagues assembled here on the floor have reached the same conclusions. First, that the President of the United States, if he were to decide to use ground troops, would need congressional authorization. Second, that we and the President should not ever take anything off the table once we are in a war, in order to be able to successfully prosecute that war. And third, that we consider a resolution that talks about the use of ground force. Senator McCain had a better idea. He said, ``Joe, why don't we do a resolution that suggests the President use whatever means are at his disposal in order to meet the objectives that are stated in the resolution?'' So we came back after the recess with the intention of introducing a resolution. We spoke with the Democratic and Republican leadership here in the Senate. We met with the President in a bipartisan group. And we concluded that it was not the time to press for passage of the resolution. But it is time to lay it before the American people and before the Congress. This is a joint resolution. If passed, it would meet the constitutional requirement of the war clause in the U.S. Constitution. That is the equivalent of a declaration of war. From a constitutional standpoint, in order to use ground forces, I am of the view--and I expect my colleagues will be of the view, whether they do or do not support ground forces, now or in the future--that the Congress should be involved in that decision under our Constitution. So speaking for myself, my first and foremost reason for being the original cosponsor of this amendment with my friend, John McCain, is that I believe it is constitutionally required. Second, I believe very strongly that we should not make an international commitment and then withhold the use of any means at our disposal to reach our publicly stated objectives. This resolution will allow us, as a nation and as an alliance, to fulfill our commitments. So I am proud to be a cosponsor of this resolution. We will have disagreements, as you will hear as this debate goes forward, as to whether or not the President and NATO have appropriately prosecuted this action thus far. I am not suggesting that all of us agree. But that will be part of a debate that takes place here on the floor of the Senate. I, for one, do not have the military experience of John McCain; few in America do. I would not attempt to second-guess whether the military has the capacity to accomplish the objectives as stated by NATO solely through the use of air power. There are men on the floor like Senator Hagel--a war hero himself, a Vietnam veteran--who are better equipped to determine whether or not the military is accurately telling us what they can do. I am prepared to accept for the moment that the military does have that capacity. Thus my sponsorship of this resolution is not for the purpose of making the case that the President and NATO should use ground troops at this moment. Instead, I think the President should be authorized to use those troops, if necessary, in order to prosecute successfully the NATO goals in the Balkans. We must have the flexibility to respond to one of the most serious crises of this century in the Balkans. I just got back from Macedonia and Albania with Ted Stevens and others. I noticed most people in Europe are not using the phrase ``conflict'' anymore; it is a war. This is a war. We should not kid each other about it. This is a war. The fact that there have, thank God, not been any American casualties yet, the fact that ``only'' three Americans have been captured, does not mean this is not a war. This is a war. And to successfully prosecute our aims, people are going to die, including Americans. I think it is almost unbelievable to think that we will meet the objectives stated by NATO without the loss of a single American life. So this is a war, and it is testing Europe and the alliance in a way that we have not faced since the end of World War II. However we choose to label it, this is a war in the Balkans, a war that is being conducted by a war criminal named Slobodan Milosevic, who has caused the greatest human catastrophe in Europe since World War II. At stake are the lives of millions of displaced persons and refugees, the stability of southeastern Europe, and the future of NATO itself. Our goals must be the safe and secure return of all Kosovars to their homes; the withdrawal of all Yugoslav and Serbian Army, police, and paramilitary forces from Kosovo; and permitting the establishment of a NATO-led peacekeeping force in Kosovo, either through a permissive environment or--my phrase--a practically permissible environment, one in which we could go in and the military of Milosevic could not stop us. With the stakes this high, we must give the President the necessary means to achieve our goals. The Constitution, as I said, requires that Congress consider giving such authorization. I have trust and confidence in our military leaders when they say that, at least for the moment, they do not need ground forces to achieve our goals. Nonetheless, they should have the authorization to use all military tools should they conclude otherwise. This resolution would provide that authorization. This resolution also authorizes the President to use other means, which encompasses diplomacy as well as arms. I hope, of course, that a diplomatic solution will be possible without the use of ground forces, but only if the diplomatic solution achieves all of our stated goals. Finally, through this resolution, we are putting Slobodan Milosevic on notice that the United States and NATO allies are deadly serious about doing what it takes to compel him to withdraw his vicious ethnic- cleansers, gang rapists, recently pardoned criminals, ski-masked thugs, and his now corrupted regular army troops from Kosovo. So, let me conclude by saying once again that there will be plenty of time to debate whether or not NATO should have had a full-blown plan on the table for the use of ground forces. I suggest to my colleagues, as I suggested at the NAC in Brussels this past Sunday, that if we had done that, there is overwhelming evidence that several of our allies would not have gone along with even airstrikes. I remind everyone who is listening that the good news is that we are an alliance. The bad news is, we are an alliance. An alliance requires consensus. I respectfully suggest that as hard as it was for the Senators on this floor to convince our colleagues that air power made sense in the first instance, can you imagine what it would have been like if we were standing on the floor today authorizing the President to use all force necessary without 18 other NATO nations agreeing? I respectfully suggest that Democrats and Republicans alike would come to the floor and say: It is not our business alone. We should only do this in conjunction with NATO. So, there is a delicate balancing act, not unlike what Dwight Eisenhower had to deal with in World War II with the French and the British and others. The delicate balancing act involves keeping the alliance together and at the same time not diminishing the capacity to achieve the alliance's ends. The message I would like to see sent to Belgrade today is that America is united, the United States Congress is united, and American citizens are prepared to use whatever force is necessary to stop him. I would also send a message to our allies that we are resolved and we expect them to stay resolved to achieve NATO's stated objectives. If we fail to achieve our stated objectives, I believe that NATO loses its credibility as a credible peacekeeping alternative and a defensive organization in Europe. If that occurs, I believe you will see a repetition of this war in Serbia, in Macedonia, in Albania, in Montenegro, and other parts of the Balkans. Much is at stake. We should not kid the American people. American lives will be lost as this continues. But America's strategic interests and American lives in the long run will be saved if we resolutely pursue the NATO objectives. Mr. President, I again thank my friend from Connecticut. I am proud to join with the Senators on the floor here today, for whom I have deep respect. I realize they have put aside their political considerations in order to pursue this effort. I compliment them for that. I yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I and my colleagues--Senators Roth, Kennedy, Durbin, Kerry, Hollings, Landrieu, Helms, Stevens, Specter, Thurmond, Domenici, Kyl, Murkowski, Cochran, Craig, Enzi, Abraham, Smith, Collins, Voinovich, and DeWine--are introducing a resolution that seeks long overdue justice for the two commanders at Pearl Harbor fifty-eight years ago, Admiral Husband Kimmel and General Walter Short. Some will ask, ``why now?'' After all, fifty-eight years have passed. I believe it is more important than ever to take this action now. It is not just the simple truth--that there can be no statute of limitations for restoring honor and dignity to men who spent their lives dedicated to serving America and yet, were unfairly treated. It is also because we have brave men and women in the military today who are fighting one of the most professional and precise battles ever seen against a brutal, genocidal dictator in Kosovo. They know that their cause is just. What too many people do not know is the sacrifice and dedication it takes to be able to do their jobs. The tremendous ability of our pilots, our maintainers, and our support crews is a direct result of their commitment to professional excellence and service and their willingness to defend the values Americans cherish. We owe it to them to defend those same values here at home. When it comes to serving truth and justice, the time must always be ``now.'' When it comes to treating people with fairness and honoring their service, the time must always be ``now.'' This is the second year we are bringing a resolution before our colleagues. We cannot give up because it is important that the Senate understand and act to end the injustice done to these fine officers. Ultimately, it is the President who must take action, but it is important that we send the message that the historical truth matters. At Pearl Harbor, these two officers should not bear all of the blame. If they continue to do so, both our nation and our military lose. Today's military is a testament to our ability to confront and learn from our mistakes, but that can only happen if the record is accurate. Admiral Kimmel and General Short served with selfless dedication and honor. They were in command during a devastating surprise attack. They deserved to be treated as officers who used their best judgement to follow the orders they were given and to meet their command responsibilities. Instead, they were made singular scapegoats for that tragedy for fifty-eight years, without full consideration of the circumstances and options available to them. I hope that most of my colleagues will read this resolution. The majority of the text details the historic case on behalf of Admiral Kimmel and General Short and expresses Congress's opinion that both officers performed their duty competently. Most importantly, it requests that the President submit the names of Kimmel and Short to the Senate for posthumous advancement on the retirement lists to their highest held wartime rank. This action would not require any form of compensation. Instead, it would acknowledge, once and for all, that these two officers were not treated fairly by the U.S. government and it would uphold the military tradition that responsible officers take the blame for their failures, not for the failures of others. Before I go into a more detailed review of the historical case, I also want my colleagues to know that this resolution has the support of various veterans groups, including the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) and the Pearl Harbor Survivors Association. The Delaware VFW passed a resolution in support last June and the national VFW passed a resolution in support in last September. Now, let me review what happened. First, I want to discuss the treatment of Kimmel and Short. Like most Americans, Admiral Kimmel and General Short requested a fair and open hearing of their case, a court martial. They were denied their request. After lifetimes of honorable service to this nation and the defense of its values, they were denied the most basic form of justice--a hearing by their peers. Here are some of the historic facts. On December 18, 1941, a mere 11 days after Pearl Harbor, the Roberts Commission was formed to determine whether derelictions of duty or errors of judgement by Kimmel and Short contributed to the success of the Japanese attack. This commission concluded that both commanders had been derelict in their duty and the President ordered the immediate public release of these findings. The Roberts Commission was the only investigative body that found these two officers derelict in their duty. Several facts about the Roberts Commission force us to question its conclusions. First, Kimmel and Short were denied the right to counsel and were not allowed to be present when witnesses were questioned. They were then explicitly told that the Commission was a fact-finding body and would not be passing judgement on their performance. When the findings accusing them of a serious offense were released, they immediately requested a court-martial. That request was refused. It is difficult to imagine a fair review of the evidence given the rules of procedure followed by the Commission. It is also important to note the timing here. It would be difficult to provide a fair hearing in the charged atmosphere immediately following America's entry into the war in the Pacific. In fact, Kimmel and Short were the objects of public vilification. The Commission was not immune to this pressure. One Commission member, for example, Admiral Standley, expressed strong reservations about the Commission's findings, later characterizing them as a ``travesty of justice''. He did sign the Report, however, because of concerns that doing otherwise might adversely affect the war effort. As you will see, the war effort played an important role in how Kimmel and Short were treated. In 1944, an Army Board investigated General Short's actions at Pearl Harbor. The conclusions of that investigation placed blame of General Marshall, the Chief of Staff of the Army at the time of Pearl Harbor and in 1944. This report was sequestered and kept secret from the public on the groups that it would be detrimental to the war effort. That same year, a Naval Court of Inquiry investigated Admiral Kimmel's actions at Pearl Harbor. The Naval Court's conclusions were divided into two sections in order to protect information indicating that America had the ability to decode and intercept Japanese messages. The first and longer, section therefore, was classified ``top secret''. The second section, was written to be unclassified and completely exonerated Admiral Kimmel and recognized the Admiral Stark bore some of the blame for Pearl Harbor because of his failure to provide Kimmel with critical information available in Washington. Then Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal instructed the Court that it had to classify both sections ``secret'' and not release any findings to the public. The historic record is not flattering to our government. A hastily convened and procedurally flawed Commission released condemning findings to the public, while two thorough military reviews which had opposite conclusions were kept secret. I hope that I have made my point that these officers were not treated fairly and that there is good reason to question where the blame for Pearl Harbor should lie. The whole story was re-evaluated in 1995 at the request of Senator Thurmond by Under Secretary for Defense Edwin Dorn. In his report, Dorn concluded that responsibility for the disaster at Pearl Harbor should be broadly shared. I agree. Where Dorn's conclusions differ from mine and my co-sponsors, is that he also found that he also found that ``the official treatment of Admiral Kimmel and General Short was substantively temperate and procedurally proper.'' I disagree. These officers were publicly vilified and never given a chance to clear their names. If we lived in a closed society, fearful of the truth, then there would be no need for the President to take any action today. But we don't. We live in an open society. Eventually, we are able to declassify documents and evaluate our past based on at least a good portion of the whole story. I believe sincerely that one of our greatest strengths as a nation comes from our ability to honor truth and the lessons of our past. Like many, I accept that there was a real need to protect our intelligence capabilities during the war. What I can not accept, however, is that there is a reason for continuing to deny the culpability of others in Washington at the expense of these two office's reputations fifty-seven years later. Continuing to falsely scapegoat two dedicated and competent officers dishonors the military tradition of taking responsibility for failure. The message that is sent is a travesty to American tradition and honor--that the truth will be suppressed to protect some responsible parties and distorted to sacrifice others. This is not to say that the sponsors of this resolution want to place blame. We are not seeking to place blame in a new quarter. This is not a witch-hunt aimed at those superior officers who were advanced in rank and continued to serve, despite being implicated in the losses at Pearl Harbor. I think the historic record has become quite clear that blame should be shared. The unfortunate reality is that Admiral Kimmel and General Short were blamed entirely and forced into early retirement. After the war, in 1947, they were singled out as the only eligible officers from World War II not advanced to their highest held wartime ranks on the retirement lists, under the Officer Personnel Act of 1947. By failing to advance them, the government and the Departments of the Navy and Army perpetuate the myth that these two officers bear a unique and disproportionate part of the blame. The government that denied these officers a fair hearing and suppressed findings favorable to their case while releasing hostile information owes them an official apology. That's what this resolution calls for. The last point that I want to make deals with the military situation at Pearl Harbor. It is legitimate to ask whether Admiral Kimmel and General Short, as commanding officers, properly deployed their forces. I think reasonable people may disagree on this point. I have been struck by the number of qualified individuals who believe the commanders properly deployed their assets based on the intelligence available to them. I am including this partial list of flag officers into the Record following my statement for my colleagues to review. Among those listed is Vice Admiral Richardson, a distinguished naval commander, who wrote an entire report refuting the conclusions of the Dorn Report. My colleagues will also see the names of four Chiefs of Naval Operations and the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Thomas Moorer. It was Admiral Moorer who observed that, ``If Nelson and Napoleon had been in command at Pearl Harbor, the results would have been the same.'' In conclusion, Mr. President, I believe this case is unique and demands our attention. As we honor those who served in World War II and who serve today in Kosovo, we must also honor the ideals for which they fought. High among those American ideals is upholding truth and justice. Those ideals give us the strength to admit and, where possible, correct our errors. I urge my colleagues to support this resolution and move one step closer to justice for Admiral Kimmel and General Short.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, the amendment I offer to the budget resolution would express the Senate's intention to give high priority to embassy security. As was underscored by the tragic embassy bombings in East Africa last August, our embassies overseas are highly vulnerable to terrorist attack. Following the bombings, the Secretary of State ordered a worldwide review of the current security situation. According to testimony provided by the Department of State to the Committee on Foreign Relations, over 80 percent of U.S. embassies and consulates have less than the required 100-foot setback from the street, and many missions are in desperate need of greater security improvements. As required by law, the Secretary also convened ``Accountability Review Boards'' to examine the bombings. The Boards, chaired by retired Admiral William Crowe, concluded that the United States must-- undertake a comprehensive and long-term strategy for protecting American officials overseas, including sustained funding for enhanced security measures, for long-term costs for increased security personnel, and for a capital building program based on an assessment of requirements to meet the new range of global terrorist threats. This must include substantial budgetary appropriations of approximately $1.4 billion per year maintained over a ten-year period. . .Additional funds for security must be obtained without diverting funds from our major foreign affairs programs. Last fall, Congress provided $1.4 billion in supplemental appropriations to address the security situation. But as the conclusions of the Crowe panels underscored, this was just a down payment. In his budget request, the President requested an additional $300 million in security enhancements in Fiscal Year 2000, and advance appropriations totaling $3 billion from Fiscal 2001 to 2005 for an embassy construction program. I believe this amount is insufficient, a concern echoed by many members of the Committee on Foreign Relations during a hearing held on March 11. We must recognize, as the Crowe panels did, that the kind of money required to enhance embassy security cannot be borne within the current State Department budget. For example, the $1.4 billion in annual spending recommended by the Crowe panels amounts to more than one-third of the operating budget of the Department requested for Fiscal 2000. We are kidding ourselves to suggest that these resources can be found within the existing State Department budget. It should be emphasized that funding for embassy security benefits the entire federal government. Embassies are not merely foreign outposts of the Department of State. They are platforms for the representation of American interests. Everyone should recognize this essential fact: nearly two-thirds of the personnel in our embassies are from departments other than the State Department. They are from all over the government--the Commerce Department, the Agriculture Department, the Department of Defense, even the Federal Aviation Administration. In sum, embassy security is a government-wide imperative, for which the State Department should not bear an undue funding burden. Mr. President, the bottom line is this: security costs money, and we cannot pinch pennies. We send our people overseas to do a job. They are on the front lines of our national defense, representing our interests. It is our duty to do that all that we reasonably can to protect them. And if we fail to protect our embassies, the costs will be not just in lives lost. They will be in wars not prevented, in narcotics trafficking unchecked, and in American jobs lost due to trade opportunities unattained. So I hope my colleagues will recognize the importance of embassy security as a high priority and support my amendment. Amendment No. 204 Withdrawn

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. My understanding of the objective stated by the President is that his objective is to end the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and the persecution of the Albanian minority population in Kosovo and to maintain security and stability in the Balkans as a consequence of slowing up, stopping, or curtailing the ability of Milosevic and the Serbian VJ and the MUP to be able to go in and cause circumstances which provide for the likelihood of a half-million refugees to destabilize the region. The objective at the end of the day: Hopefully, this will bring Milosevic back to the table. Hopefully, he will agree to what all of NATO said they wanted him to agree to, and hopefully that will occur. In the event that it does not occur, the objective will be to degrade his military capability so significantly that he will not be able to impose his will upon Kosovo, as he is doing now.

Mr. BIDEN. I thank the Senator. Does the opposition wish more time?

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts, Senator Kerry.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Michigan.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Connecticut.

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I concur with the Senator from Idaho on that score. I want to say just one more thing. This was a very difficult vote, and I echo the words that were stated by several people here. On these matters--and I give credit to Senator Nickles, who is the No. 2 man on the Republican side--when we were negotiating, I asked him how many votes are for this. He said, ``I did not whip this.'' In our jargon, we know that to mean: ``I did not go out and count votes. This is not a partisan matter. This is something that should be left to the conscience of each Senator.'' The fact of the matter is, when my colleagues came up to me before the vote started and said, ``How many votes do you have?'' I said to them, ``I did not do it.'' I did not know how many votes were here for this resolution, but I thought it was important that the Senate go on record exercising its responsibility in this area. I do not think the President has the authority to use force in this nature without our approval, a concurrent resolution, or any statement by us, assuming the House makes a similar statement, and meets the constitutional criteria that he has the authority. But again I want to make it clear that I respect those who voted against it. There are very strong reasons to vote no. I think the reasons to vote yes are stronger. And no one, particularly the Senator from Delaware, can tell this Senate where this action is going to lead. It is a very tough call. I am confident, in my view, that there is more of a danger in not acting than in acting, both constitutionally and practically. But I just want the record to reflect that everyone in this debate, including the discussion at the White House--the Presiding Officer is younger than the Senator from Delaware, as is the Senator from Louisiana, who is on the floor, is younger than the Senator from Delaware. I came here in 1973 as a Senator. I was 29 years old. I remember one of the things that I resented the most keenly was that at the time, for those of us who opposed the Vietnam war, at least in some quarters on this floor, and at times with the then-sitting President, we were told we were giving, by our opposition, this great deal of help to the North Vietnamese; we were hurting our troops who were overseas; we were basically un-American for objecting to the war. One of the generational changes that has taken place--I want the record to show this--sitting with a number of Senators and Congresspersons--I am guessing the number at 20--in the private residence this morning, the President of the United States said to us assembled he wanted to make one thing clear, that he respected the Congress voting. He knew some who opposed were going to be told that Milosevic is listening and he is going to take some confidence from this; he is going to somehow be emboldened by the opposition. He said, ``I want you to know I think you have an absolute right and obligation, if you believe that way, to object. I will never be one who will tell you that, notwithstanding he is watching this on CNN in Belgrade, that somehow you're undermining our effort. Were we to apply that standard,'' he said, ``we would never be able to debate in this society the important issues.'' So the reason I mention that is not to give particular credit to the President, although in this case he deserves it, but he came from that same generation. I think we have moved to a position here where we have debated, in the last several years, the major contentious issues relating to our peace and security, and that when the debate has been finished, when it has gone on, it has been cordial and it has not been partisan. When it has been finished, there has been unanimity and support of American forces. The same occurred in the gulf. After the gulf, many of us voted no. I was one who voted no. And at the end of the day, we all said, once the Senate spoke, once the President spoke, once the Congress spoke, we would stay the course. So I thank my friend from Idaho who was in opposition, my friend, the Presiding Officer, who had a different view on this to tell you. And I am not being solicitous. It is important for the American people to know we do not always disagree based on our partisan instincts here. The judgments made by every Senator on this floor today were made with their intellect and their heart, on the direction that they thought was in the best interest of the country. I think the right outcome occurred, but I do not in any way--in any way--question the motivation, or am I so certain of my own position that I would be willing to guarantee either of my colleagues that they are wrong. I think they were wrong. I think I am right. But we are approaching this in the way we should, openly and in a nonpartisan way. I want to thank the Republican leadership for proceeding this way and thank my colleagues for the way in which we conducted this debate earlier. I yield the floor. Mr. CRAIG addressed the Chair.

Mr. BIDEN. I yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I referenced earlier the significant help and leadership of the Senator from Virginia, but what I did not mention was the person who carried the ball on this side of the aisle, the Senator from Michigan, Senator Levin. You know that old expression, success has a thousand fathers and mothers and failure is an orphan. Hopefully, I am not going to be praising him and others and it turns out that what we have done tonight is a mistake. I think it is not a mistake. I think it is necessary. I think it is going to make for the possibility of some peace in the region. I want to tell the Senator from Michigan how much a pleasure it is to work with him. I mean with him. As my grandfather used to say, he is the horse that carried the sleigh. He is the guy who maneuvered us through all this to get to the resolution. I personally thank him and tell him how much I enjoyed working with him.

Mr. BIDEN. If the Senator will yield, neither did President Bush; he didn't say I will not do it if you do not do this. Let's get that straight.

Mr. BIDEN. I understand it is, but I want to point out again where he says, ``I ask for your legislative support as we address the crisis in Kosovo.'' I point out I was here, too, during the gulf crisis. I recall we were not even going to hold hearings in the Foreign Relations Committee. I recall the President said he would not send up a request for authority until it was clear that the Congress was going to revolt. Every President, of the six while I have been here, has been reluctant to do so.