Joe Biden

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. I am happy to respond to a question.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I would be delighted to do that, but I want to warn anybody who comes to the floor, I came to the floor to deliver what I thought to be, if not enlightened, a comprehensive rationale for why I think we should act. I am happy to stay here as long as possible, and I am happy to delay giving that speech, but as long as the Senator realizes that when we finish our discussion, it is going to take me 20 to 25 minutes to deliver this speech. One of the arguments here that no one has laid out sufficiently--I am not sure I am capable of it--is why we should do what the President is seeking to do, why we should do what NATO has voted to do, and why we should be either for or against doing that. We did discuss here a very important subject about whether or not it is constitutionally permissible to use force absent congressional consent. All I am suggesting is that the President and those of us who support the use of airpower in conjunction with NATO should lay out why that action is in America's interest. What are the costs, what are the risks, what are the benefits, and why should we do it? Those who disagree with our position should lay out in one place, where people can go to the Record, why they think we should not do that. There are legitimate arguments in opposition beyond the constitutional arguments in opposition to the use of force in Kosovo. As long as the Senator understands that, I am happy to yield for questions. I do not want to keep him here to have to listen to my speech. When we conclude this colloquy, if I do not lose the floor, I will be delivering that speech. I am happy to yield for a question.

Mr. BIDEN. As a matter of fact, I am about to come to that quote. President Bush's warning was contained in a letter delivered to Milosevic and General Panic, the commander of the Yugoslavian Army. The New York Times and the Associated Press quoted Bush's letter as saying: ``In the event of conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian action, the United States will be prepared to employ military force against the Serbians in Kosovo and in Serbia proper. Let me read it again: ``In the event of conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian action, the United States will be prepared to employ military force against the Serbians in Kosovo and in Serbia proper.'' Perhaps because of this Christmas warning, Milosevic refrained from an all-out military assault on the Kosovars, contenting himself with the legal repression that I described earlier. The Kosovars waited in vain for the West to help. They hoped that their plight would be placed on the agenda of the Dayton peace negotiations in November of 1995, but having been warned by Milosevic that he would walk out if Kosovo were brought up, the West, under this President, President Clinton, and our NATO allies, restricted the talks to Bosnia and Herzegovina. So, finally, in late 1996, armed Kosovar resistance began on a small scale under the loosely organized Kosovo Liberation Army, abbreviated UCK in Albanian, but as KLA in the West. Gradually, the KLA escalated to larger attacks by February of 1998. Let me review the bidding again here, and I will get the letter, or the news accounts quoting the letter, if I can, for my friend from Alaska, and I will enter it into the Record. Now, what happened? In 1989, this genocidal leader of Yugoslavia, named Milosevic, had seized power and attempted to consolidate Serbs throughout the former Yugoslavia. He made a speech on the 600th anniversary of Blackbirds Field near Pristina to enrage and bring up the blood of every Serbian living in the region. It worked very well in Bosnia. It got them going in Bosnia and, as well, in Kosovo. Then he, under the Serb Constitution, by most accounts, unconstitutionally amended the Constitution, taking away the autonomy that Tito had granted to Kosovo in 1974. But even when that was done, the Albanian Serbs did not use force or violence. They were headed by a guy named Dr. Rugova, who said they would, by nonviolent means, attempt to reestablish their societal institutions, allowing them their dignity and their right to work. In the meantime, Milosevic comes in and he heads down from Belgrade and the orders are essentially: fire them all. Fire them all. All of the civil service jobs were eliminated, all of the schools were shut down, the language was not allowed, and so on. Still, the Kosovars did not use force. Still, they attempted, through peaceful means, to regain their autonomy. And with the help of President Bush--I can only surmise this, I can't read Milosevic's mind, but knowing what a coward he is, based on what he has done in the past, I expect that the Christmas warning by President Bush kept him from using the force he wanted to. Dr. Rugova came to me and others and said, ``Get us into Dayton. While this is being discussed, get us on the agenda.'' We made a mistake, in my view. We said, ``No; you are not on the agenda; this is just about Bosnia. This is about Bosnia and nothing else.'' And so when peaceful means began to fail, and had clearly failed in late 1996, seven years later, the Kosovar resistance called the Kosovo Liberation Army--the UCK or the KLA, whatever you would like to call it--began to engage in larger attacks, a la the IRA. Milosevic then saw an opportunity. Having been humiliated in his aggressive wars against Slovenia in the spring of 1991, and Croatia in the summer of 1995, and having seen the Bosnian Serb puppets routed in the fall of 1995 and forced to accept a compromise settlement in Dayton, the Yugoslav dictator needed another crisis to divert the Serbian people's attention from the massive failure of his authoritarian, Communist economic and political policies. So what did he do? He did what is often done. He found a common enemy. He appealed to this naked, rabid nationalism and used the suppression of the KLA as a justification, as his vehicle, attempting in the process to drive the ethnic Albanian population out of large areas of Kosovo. What have been the results? To date, approximately 2,000 Kosovar Albanians and Serbian civilians have been killed. More than 400,000 Kosovar Albanians have been driven from their homes, including tens of thousands during the past 10 days. Thousands of homes in hundreds of villages in Kosovo have been razed to the ground. One-quarter of Kosovo's livestock has been slaughtered and 10 percent of its arable land burned. A food blockade has been imposed upon large segments of the Kosovar population. The world has taken note of this. The United Nations Security Council has passed two important resolutions--Nos. 1160 and 1199--in 1998, decrying the repression and calling for an end to it. Milosevic publicly agreed to the U.N. demands and has cynically continued his state terrorism. Mr. President, why should we be surprised by this? We saw it repeated and repeated in Bosnia, until we had the nerve to act. What is at stake for the United States in all of this? In the interest of time, I will come back to the floor at a more appropriate time to enlarge upon this. But I will say that our entire policy in Europe since the end of World War II has been to promote stability through the spread of democracy. In order to create the security conditions for this development in Western Europe, we created NATO in 1949, and for 50 years this alliance has provided an umbrella under which our allies have survived and prospered. Since the end of the Cold War, it has been our policy to extend this zone of stability eastward in Europe by three methods. First, we have agreed to a well-conceived, measured enlargement of NATO, which has already brought Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into the alliance. Second, NATO has entered into partnerships with many countries in the region, which in time will probably yield additional alliance members, which also in the short run has created productive relationships with a great power like Russia. Third--and here is where Kosovo comes in--we have determined to oppose directly the aggressive policies of demagogues like Milosevic who are trying to foment ethnic and religious hatred. We know, as NATO knows, that its credibility is on the line in Kosovo. We have warned Milosevic countless times to halt his fascist aggression. We have cooperated with our NATO allies, and with Russia, in fashioning a fair interim settlement for Kosovo. We know that if Milosevic's scorched-earth policy of ``ethnic cleansing'' is allowed to continue, the inevitable result will be a massive tide of refugees, which would destabilize fragile democracies in Macedonia and Albania. We also know that Milosevic is itching for the excuse to overthrow the democratic and reformist government of Montenegro, which is a direct challenge to his authoritarian communist rule in Yugoslavia. We also know that the ultimate nightmare--which is not impossible by any means--is a widening of the hostilities to include NATO members Greece and Turkey, who have different interests in this outcome. Mr. President, the national interests of the United States are directly threatened by the continued aggressive actions of the Yugoslav Government in Kosovo. For that reason, Mr. President, I think we should do what I said earlier, which is, introduce a resolution authorizing air operations, in conjunction with the Activation Order voted on by the North Atlantic Council of NATO. I urge my colleagues to support that resolution. I thank the Chair and yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN. No; it is not a quote; it is a paraphrase.

Mr. BIDEN. Yes.

Mr. BIDEN. Thank you. Mr. President, let me begin my more formal remarks by referring to the concluding remarks I made on this floor on October 14, 1998, immediately after the agreement between Ambassador Holbrooke and the President of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic, was made public. I said at that time: [W]e must never again allow racist thugs like Milosevic to carry out their outrages while the alliance dawdles. Referring to the just concluded agreement, I further stated: [W]e must brook no more opposition from Milosevic on its implementation. To use a domestic American term, we must adopt a policy of ``zero tolerance'' with [this] Yugoslav bully. Many of us had hoped that the mistakes that enabled the Bosnian horrors to take place would teach us a lesson. Unfortunately, we have repeated many of those errors and have thereby allowed Milosevic and his storm troopers to repeat their atrocities in Kosovo. Twice is enough. There must not be a third time. I do not cite that to suggest any air of erudition, Mr. President. I cite that to say my position--right or wrong--has been consistent since the day this agreement has been signed. Mr. President, from the bottom of my heart, I regret to report that there has been a third time. There have been more massacres, have been violations of the agreement, and both the massacres and the violations are continuing as we speak; indeed, as I speak at this moment. Let's look at the disgraceful record. Everybody forgets that we are operating in the context of Holbrooke- Milosevic agreement, an agreement that has been signed on by our allies and our friends. The President has been saying for the last month and a half that if Milosevic does not sign on to an agreement, assuming that the Kosovars do sign on, we will bomb. For an unusual thing, NATO already acted. NATO got together and debated this issue. And NATO members all voted unanimously to use airpower if in fact one side or the other did not--did not--agree. So what happened here is, there is an agreement. The context of this whole debate is that agreement in 1998. Immediately following the Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement, machinery was set in place to prevent a recurrence of massacres that had already occurred in Kosovo and in Bosnia the previous years and to move toward an interim agreement on the future status of Kosovo. On October 25, 1998, the Yugoslav Government and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization fleshed out the Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement, authorizing exact numbers--exact numbers--of troops, the so-called VJ, and Serbian Interior Police, so-called MUPs, who are a bunch of thugs, would be able to be in Kosovo province. The agreement also specified the garrisons to which they were to be restricted. That was signed by NATO and Milosevic, and a cease-fire took effect, monitored by unarmed NATO aircraft, and international compliance verifiers were allowed into Kosovo. Like his ideological model earlier in this century, Milosevic has treated most of this agreement as a ``scrap of paper.'' The Yugoslav Government has flagrantly violated the limits stipulated in the October agreement. Rather than the 12,500 regular army troops and the 6,500 special police called for--a total of 19,000--there are presently 40,000 Yugoslav soldiers and Serbian special police forces in the province of Kosovo, in clear violation of the agreement. As for the cease-fire called for--it is a total joke. Milosevic was afraid to refuse entry of the international verifiers or to shoot down NATO planes. So as a result, we have a documented ongoing pattern of warfare, both against units of the Kosovo Liberation Army, but especially against Kosovar civilians. There have been countless massacres, but the most widely publicized one was perpetrated by the Serbs on January 15, 1999, in the village of Racak. There 45 Kosovar Albanian civilians--women and children--were slaughtered. The Serbs, of course, asserted that they all had been KLA fighters who had either been killed in combat or shot while fleeing. Unfortunately for the Serbs, a Finnish-led team of forensic experts that examined the bodies reported unequivocally that the victims had been forced to kneel and had been executed by being riddled with small- arms fire. They got down on their knees. These bullet wounds were in the back of their heads. They were executed, just like they did in Bosnia, just like Hitler did in World War II. Just yesterday, Mr. President, 10 Kosovars were massacred by Serbs in the village of Srbica. During the past 10 days, the Yugoslav Army and the Serbian special forces have gone on the offensive, seizing the high ground above roads and railroads, moving in their most modern weaponry, including M-72 and M-84 tanks, and conducting a search and destroy mission against Kosovar villages suspected of harboring KLA sympathizers. The net result is a new flood of refugees so great that their number is now approaching 450,000--450,000 the number reached last fall. I might remind my colleagues, the only difference was, last fall when it reached that number, folks were able to flee to the mountains because they were not full of snow, they were able to hide. One of the reasons for the urgency that was being argued in the negotiations by Mr. Holbrooke was--and we all seem to agree--was that winter was coming and all these folks would die. Well, it is winter there now. Mr. President, the tragic events of Kosovo have a clear historical causality which I will summarize now. Kosovo is considered by Serbs to be the heartland of their civilization. There, in the year 1389, on the so-called Blackbirds Field near present-day Pristina, the medieval Serbian knights were defeated by the Ottoman Turks, which led to more than five centuries of Turkish domination of the Balkans. It was a courageous fight. They saved Christianity and the rest of Europe, but the bottom line was, they lost. And the bottom line was that the Balkans for 500 years were dominated by Turkey and many parts became Moslem. The Albanians, however, also claim Kosovo as their own and, in fact, can trace their habitation there even further back than the south Slavs, the Serbs. As a result of the policies of the Communist dictator of the former Yugoslavia, Marshal Tito--whom I had the interesting pleasure of having lunch with in his private residence in Split, Yugoslavia, with now deceased Ambassador Averell Harriman, one of the most interesting encounters I ever had in my career--the former Yugoslavian dictator, Marshal Tito. In 1974, the Kosovar Albanians were granted the status of an autonomous region within the Republic of Serbia because of this history. Basically, the Albanians were allowed local control, while border security and foreign relations remained under the control of Belgrade. In the next 15 years, the percentage of Serbs in the Kosovo population dropped from approximately one-quarter to less than one- tenth. At the time this agreement was reached--this autonomy was granted by Tito in 1974--one out of four people living in the province of Kosovo were Serbs; three out of four were Albanians living within Serbia. They were basically Moslem, and the others were Orthodox Christians. Since that time, it has become 10-1; only 1 in 10 are Serbs. Now, this has occurred for several reasons: A much higher birth rate among the Kosovar Albanians than among local Serbs; ``buyouts'' of many Serbian homesteads by Kosovars, some of whom earned hard currency abroad; and some harassment of Serbs by Kosovars, although nothing approaching the ethnic cleansing that is now being carried out by the Serbs. Meanwhile, in Serbia proper, an ambitious young Communist politician named Slobodan Milosevic engineered a coup against the communist leadership of Serbia. He needed a vehicle to consolidate his power, and the time-honored vehicle used by most rogues is rabid nationalism. He needed to be able to spread his newly consolidated power to the Serb- inhabited regions of Yugoslavia outside of Serbia. So in a famous speech in 1989--he would have done proud any demagogue who has ever arrived on the political scene, and I am not referring to anyone here, I am referring to those folks who don't make it usually--in 1989, on the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Blackbirds Field, to which I earlier referred, Milosevic traveled to Kosovo and delivered a rabble- rousing speech in which he promised that no Serb would ever be pushed around by anyone again anywhere in the world, notwithstanding the fact that it was a hard case to make that that was happening. On March 23, 1989, without the consent of the people of Kosovo, Milosevic amended the Constitution of Yugoslavia, revoking the autonomous status that they had had for roughly the past 15 years. The following year, the parliament and the government of Kosovo were abolished by further unlawful amendments to the Constitution of Yugoslavia. A thoroughgoing purge of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo followed. Thousands of hard-working citizens were summarily fired from their civil service positions, and the Serbian Government denied funding to basic institutions of Kosovo society. It is absolutely necessary to note the reaction of the Kosovars to these massive violations of their human and civil rights. What was that reaction initially? Under the leadership of Dr. Rugova, the Kosovars-- and he is a Kosovar--the Kosovars set up a parallel, unofficial system of governance. They set up schools, hospitals, and other institutions that make society run. Mr. President, under Dr. Rugova's leadership, the Kosovars held to a policy of nonviolence for nearly seven years. I do not know any other example elsewhere of such self-restraint anywhere in recent years. The United States recognized that Kosovo was a tinderbox that could explode at any time. For that reason, former President George Bush sent a warning to Mr. Milosevic at Christmas 1992, the so-called Christmas warning. Keep in mind, the Kosovars had not used violence; they were still peacefully trying to piece together their society. On Christmas of 1992, the three Senators in this Chamber at the moment were all here at the time--not in the Chamber--and President Bush, a Republican President, issued the Christmas warning that said the United States was prepared to intervene militarily if Serbia attacked the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I did not mean to misrepresent. I have great respect for the Senator. I know he was Secretary of the Navy. He also is more informed in a personal sense about this--not, I am reluctant to say, not the issue; I think I am as informed as he is, or quite frankly, as anybody on the floor--but in terms of all that goes into a young man's or woman's head as they are about to take off the deck of that carrier or off that piece of concrete, or whatever the mission. But let me suggest that I will lay out for you why I personally am willing to do something that I am not happy about doing; and that is, vote to support asking the brave young women and men of our military, in this case the fliers--Navy, Marine, Air Force--to risk their lives. And it is a real risk. There is a probability someone is going to get hurt.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, in response to the Senator's question, for technical purposes, I agree with him 100 percent. I am an admirer of the Senator from Virginia, in no small part because he was in combat, because he was in the military and because he knows, I suspect, what it feels like sitting there, figuratively speaking, strapped in waiting for an order. I am always very reluctant to argue a position that may get somebody killed, may get somebody maimed, may get someone put in a prison camp. And men like Senator Kerrey, a Congressional Medal of Honor winner, and Senator McCain, who argued against my position for years on Bosnia--not Kosovo; Bosnia--when men who are brave like that, men like Danny Inouye, Senator Chafee, and Senator Hollings, my seatmate, when they have questions about this, I take it very, very seriously.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, the Senator should take as much time as the Senator wants.

Mr. BIDEN. I thank the Senator. I will respond----

Mr. BIDEN. I think so.

Mr. BIDEN. Sure.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, you can tell the Senator from Pennsylvania and I are friends because I am happy to have his extended questions, because his questions always shed light on the subject. I agree with everything he said so far. Let me be specific. When there is a Republican President, the Republicans argue the President doesn't need congressional authority. When there is a Democratic President, all of a sudden the Democrats support the President's unilateral war-making power. Let me give you the argument that could be made by scholars as to why the President has the constitutional authority to act absent our approval. They would argue that our actions in Kosovo are not an act of war. But as the Senator knows, the war clause does not require an act of war; it requires a use of force, a use of force that constitutes an offensive action. They would argue that this is defensive in nature. Presidents do that all the time. Remember why President Reagan invaded Grenada. To save medical students. That was the reason. That was the thin reed upon which he held his entire rationale, because everyone acknowledges that if it is an emergency or it is to defend American citizens and their property, it could be done. In Kosovo, the argument could be made that there are U.S. personnel on the ground who would be in harm's way. If we do not take action, the roughly 40,000 Serbian troops near Pristina could threaten the small number of American forces in Macedonia. I can picture the argument being put together by the President's legal counsel. Because the Americans forces in Macedonia are now in jeopardy, there was a requirement to act to save them. There also could be an argument made that airpower would be used for the purpose of protecting American personnel in Belgrade. The President could argue that Milosevic, with a long history of genocidal acts and acts of brutality, is about to move on American personnel. That is the nature of the argument that could be made. There is also an argument, which I think is totally specious, that this qualifies as an emergency. The Founding Fathers, in this Senator's view, clearly contemplated emergency situations where the President would have to use force. That is why they gave Congress the power to ``declare'' war rather than ``make'' war. They did not want to tie the President's hands in the context of an emergency. Another argument being made, which is not accurate but is made all the time by people justifying Presidential action in an area of making war or using force, is that there are 200 years of precedent. They will list hundreds of times where American forces were used without prior congressional authorization. It is a specious argument, in my view, but it is one that has credibility only as a consequence of its repetition. That is the other argument that will be used. People will cite Libya. Did the President have a right to go in? I found Senator Hutchison's rendition of history fascinating, because her memory of Reagan and my memory of Reagan were fundamentally different. I don't mean it critically. I mean it factually. She said Reagan never put American forces in harm's way. Well, hell, they flew all the way from England, all the way across the Iberian Peninsula, and bombed the living devil out of Libya. Was that a declaration of war? Most Senators said it basically worked. It cowed the Libyan dictator for a while, and no American got hurt. I cite that not to be critical of anything President Reagan did, but to point out that we often hear the precedence argument used. They say the Congress didn't do anything then. Therefore, that makes it constitutional. Yet there is a seamless fabric to the Constitution. Action, no matter how often repeated, cannot make an unconstitutional undertaking constitutional. That argument has been put forward by this administration and at least six other Presidents. I might point out that the Lott proposal, the very thing we are going to vote on, may also be unconstitutional. It bars Defense Department funds for the purpose of conducting military operations by the Armed Forces of the United States. The only exceptions to the funding restrictions are (1) intelligence activities, including surveillance; (2) the provision of logistics support; and (3) any measure necessary to defend U.S. Armed Forces against immediate threat. Note that this third exception would give the President the excuse I just mentioned. So the Lott proposal is flawed in two respects. First, as a constitutional matter, it is unnecessary. The Constitution already bars offensive military action by the President unless it is congressionally authorized. If Congress adopts the Lott amendment, it would imply that the President has carte blanche to take offensive action anywhere unless Congress makes a specific statement to the contrary. We are telling the President he can't do something that the Constitution already says he can't do. Then we build in exceptions, exceptions that give him authority beyond what, in my view and the view of most constitutional scholars, he is entitled to as a matter of constitutional law. Let me repeat the exceptions he builds. The amendment provides for providing intelligence activities. As the Senator knows, that can involve U.S. personnel. They may be all sitting up in Rhein-Main Air Force Base, or sitting in Italy. They may be on AWACS aircraft at a distance that can't be shot down. I do not know. It also could include spotters. It can include people on the ground. It could include U.S. military aircraft flying in Kosovo airspace, but not participating in the actual strikes. Secondly, it provides for a provision of logistical support. That could include logistical support in the theater. If I were the President's lawyer on this one, I would say, Mr. President, don't worry about this sucker passing. You are OK. You can work this one out. You don't have to fight Congress on whether using force is constitutional. With this amendment, you can do what you want. Thirdly, it excludes any measure necessary to defend forces against an immediate threat. Well, I guarantee you the argument will be made that once NATO decides to move, all those forces in Macedonia are in harm's way. Not only there, but American forces a little bit across the Drina River in Bosnia would also be in harm's way. I guarantee you that the argument will be made, if this were to become law, that the Lott amendment gives the President the authority to bomb and use force.

Mr. BIDEN. I could be wrong, but that is my reading of it.

Mr. BIDEN. I sure will.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, let me be precise. It is legally permissible but unwise. Let me explain what I mean. I think the reason for the cloture vote is not because the majority leader expects anyone to filibuster. It is a tool that he has learned and has sharpened and honed very well to gain control and maintain control of the agenda and provide for the inability of anyone to amend whatever he wishes us to vote on. That is what this is about. This has nothing to do with anyone filibustering. Indeed, I have not heard a single person suggest a filibuster. It has to do with the leader using, skillfully, as he does, the tools to be able to control the agenda of the Senate and determine what we will vote on, how long we will debate, and if we will debate. If the Lott-Smith amendment prevails and is attached to the supplemental, I predict that the entire supplemental will fail. If that happens we will never have any action on Kosovo or the supplemental for the near term. That is my guess. There is some confusion in the House, because they thought, as the President thought, that there would be an agreement between the Kosovars and the Serbs as a consequence of the meetings in France. They concluded that they should debate whether or not we would place American forces on the ground, as offered by the President, if there was a peace agreement. But there is no peace agreement. So someone introduced an amendment-- a freestanding bill on the House side--thinking they could pass a prohibition on the use of any American forces to implement any peace agreement signed. That was voted down. Again, the public and a lot of our colleagues are not adequately informed on this. The headlines when the House voted were: House Supports Use of American Forces In Kosovo. That is not quite true. The House said it would permit a deployment in a permissive environment. Now we are going to vote in the Senate on something completely different, something that may produce a very ambiguous result. The Lott-Smith amendment bars all funding for the purpose of conducting military operations by Armed Forces of the United States in Serbia and Montenegro. What does that mean? Does that mean that, under our Constitution, if this passes with the supermajority necessary to overcome a sure presidential veto, that airstrikes are not permissible because bombs cost money and they are going to be dropped on parts of Serbia? I suspect it does. Rather than take such an ambiguous vote, we should not shirk our responsibility here.

Mr. BIDEN. I think that is appropriate.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will respond by saying two things. I will answer the second part of his question first, which is very easy. Clearly, his hand would be strengthened if he had one. Second, the first part of the question: Would President support it? I also said in my statement to the President and our colleagues that I believe the Congress should--should--be confronted with a specific piece of legislation authorizing the use of force. I think it is constitutionally wise and politically necessary that be done. Mr. President, such a congressional vote will spark the very debate on this floor that I think is needed to further inform the American public about what is at stake. By the way, I called the White House after we had our meeting with the President and reiterated that I hoped he would send up a resolution. He did not. So I wrote one. I was prepared to attempt to amend Senator Hutchison's amendment. But, in the meantime, as is his prerogative, the majority leader came in and offered a second-degree amendment to Senator Hutchison's. So I now have no ability to amend her amendment. I am told that we are going to vote on cloture. If we get cloture-- and I hope we will get cloture--then there will be an up-or-down vote on the Lott-Smith amendment. That amendment says that the President can't take any action in Yugoslavia until funds are authorized. I would prefer having an up-or-down vote on that notion. My resolution says, ``The President is authorized to use the United States Armed Forces for the purposes of conducting air operations and missile strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro, pursuant to a decision of the North Atlantic Council Treaty Organization in order to achieve the objectives in section 2.'' Through my resolution, I want us to step right up to our constitutional task of deciding whether or not to authorize the use of force. I am the guy, by the way, who, in a very contentious meeting with President Bush, insisted that we have hearings in the Foreign Relations Committee on a resolution for the use of force in the Persian Gulf war. I believe that is a congressional prerogative. One might argue that the President doesn't need congressional authorization. I think he does. In my view, a President is always better equipped and better advised to go into a risky operation if the American people know what is at stake. My experience, Mr. President, is that Senators and Congressmen do not like to be counted. Keep in mind that I have been here for six Presidents. We in Congress don't like to be counted on issues of war and peace--Democrats or Republicans--because if, in fact, the risky business the President wishes to undertake succeeds, we all want to be able to say, ``Good idea, Mr. President. I was with you.'' If it fails, Congress wants the luxury of saying, ``I told him. He never should have done that. Bad idea.'' I came out of the so-called Vietnam war generation. The only thing most everybody in my generation can agree on is that a foreign policy of this great nation cannot be sustained very long without the informed consent of the American people.

Mr. BIDEN. I will take that as a compliment.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will be happy to respond. I think the Senator and I agree that there has hardly been any public knowledge or discussion of Kosovo. One of the reasons I am speaking on this matter is that I feel obliged to lay out the background on this issue: what is going on, what is at stake, why we must act, and the consequences of our action. I agree with what is implicit in the Senator's question: The American public has not been given sufficient facts to allow them to be informed as to whether or not the course of action the President wants to take is, in fact, wise. I was telling my staff as I walked over here that, this weekend, I came out of a 5 o'clock mass, and a friend of mine--a very informed fellow, who is, I think, a supporter--pulled me aside on the steps of the church and said, ``Joe, look, you may be right, and I tend to trust your judgment in foreign policy; but I have tried my best to read everything I could.'' I listened, and he used this phrase: ``I listen to MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour every night, and I am waiting to hear somebody explain to me this deal in Kosovo. I know you spent a lot of time, Joe, on the Bosnia thing, but isn't this different? Explain it to me.'' Then, the Wednesday before, I was at a St. Patrick's Day function where we raised money for a fund in the name of a deceased mayor, and a very intelligent fellow, a graduate of Annapolis named Healy, a premiere builder in our State, said, ``Joe, I'm a Republican''--I hope I am not going to get him in trouble--``but I've been liking you for a while. Joe, for God's sake, don't go down this bombing route.'' Then I started to explain some things to him and didn't change his mind, but he said, ``I didn't know that.'' These are two illustrations, and I think you could probably canvas the gallery here and ask them how much they have heard about Kosovo and what do they know, and whether they believe what we are apparently about to undertake makes any sense. The very sure answer to your short question is that, no, the public is not sufficiently informed. At our recent meeting at the White House, you will recall that I, and I think the Senator from Pennsylvania and others, stood up repeatedly and said, ``Mr. President, ultimately, you must educate the public.'' The President told us that in his first news conference he was going to lead with Kosovo. But I have said to him and to the national security adviser, as well, that I believe the President has to address the Nation. I think the President should go on television at prime time, and take a half hour and literally, with a map and a pointer, sit there and say: This is Kosovo, this is why it is important, this is what happens if we don't act. When we act, if we do, we think we will bring about the following result. American forces probably will be killed, but possibly not. None were in Bosnia, but this is a much more sophisticated air defense system in possession of the VJ. They are much more sophisticated militarily than we faced anywhere with a bombing campaign in Bosnia, and it is possible that American forces will be hurt.

Mr. BIDEN. I thank my friend. I want to begin by saying to Senator Hutchison, I think she is performing a valuable service. This debate needs to be undertaken. She and I have had very different views on the Balkans from the very outset. She, along with a majority of my colleagues, 3, 4, 5, 6 years ago, told me that bombing would not work in Bosnia and we should not be involved in Bosnia and they asked, ``Why are we getting involved?'' They were legitimate, real questions. And she could have turned out to be as right, though I think she and others have proved to be wrong. No one knew then. I could not answer some of those questions then. I could not answer in 1992, when I came back from Bosnia and there was the report about what was happening in death camps, about the support of Milosevic across the Drina, with the VJ involved with the Serbs in Bosnia. I could not prove or convince people that there were massive massacres that had taken place and would be taking place. I could not convince anyone--either NATO or the President initially--that the longer we waited, the more the situation would deteriorate, and the harder it would be to put back together. But the question I was always asked then is the one I am asked now as a vocal supporter of using force, along with NATO, to bomb Milosevic; and that is, people say to me now, ``Well, Biden, tell me what the last step is. You tell me the first step now. Tell me what the last step is. You've got to have an end game here, Biden. If you're talking to the President of committing to a lift-and-strike policy in Bosnia''--that was 6 years ago, or more than that now, 7 years ago--``you've got to be able to tell us, if you lift the embargo and you engage in airstrikes, what happens?'' The following are the contingencies--if you list them, they are all reasonable questions. I say to my friend, the Presiding Officer and former Governor of Ohio, the truth of the matter is the world has changed so fundamentally that this calculus of what the last step will be is no longer relevant, especially if we try to answer it before the first step is taken. It leads to a policy of paralysis. I remember arguing then with a man I had great admiration for then and do now, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Colin Powell. I remember him making the argument that unless we could submit front-end to put 300,000 troops in Bosnia, then we shouldn't put anybody in there. My argument was then and it is now that that thinking is an absolute policy for paralysis. I guarantee you that the world we are entering in the 21st century doesn't lend itself to that kind of calculus. When there were two superpowers and we decided whether or not to go into Czechoslovakia when the Prague Spring was crushed, or when we decided whether or not we were going to invade the counteroffensive in Hungary when the Russian tanks rolled in, the calculus then was pretty clear. We could say if we responded, then there was a likely probability the Soviet Union would respond to our response, and there would be a likely possibility this would lead to World War III. It was a reasonable calculus. We could do a cost-benefit analysis and ask if the cost of involvement was worth the possible payoff. And we do this balance, this calculus. We did this under Democrats and Republicans for 50 years and did it pretty darn well. Indeed, we won the cold war. We are dealing with a different world now. We are not dealing with a group of people who are essentially cautious, who are part of a great empire, and who had scores of divisions along the Fulda Gap ready to roll into Western Europe if, in fact, war broke out. We are dealing now with a group of tin-armed dictators--malevolent, dangerous dictators. In Iraq we are dealing with a man named Saddam Hussein. I heard when I urged, along with others, that we should bomb Saddam Hussein, ``If you bomb Saddam Hussein, what is the second, third, fourth and fifth step you are likely to take?'' We couldn't say then because these guys don't operate under the same rational basis that we do. They are cunning. They are smart. But they have fewer cards to play, and their cards are less obvious. I approach things a little differently these days. I have been a Senator for 27 years, and I have been involved in foreign policy, deeply involved, for the bulk of that time here. I approach it this way now: Do we know what will happen if there is inaction? What happens if we don't act? In Iraq, if we don't act, we know for certain Saddam Hussein acquires weapons of mass destruction. We know this because he has used poison gas before. We know he has used chemical weapons. We know he has invaded other countries. We know that he has been willing to sacrifice tens of thousands of his people in a war with Iran. So we know where this guy is likely to go if we do nothing. We have a different calculus now. In a superpower world, the calculus involved fairly cautious actors. We did not have Russian troops invading Latin America. We did not have Russian troops, in the wake of the Cuban missile crisis, storming into Cuba. We did not have Russians looking for opportunities to have a Russian soldier confronting an American soldier. It was a pretty cautious group of folks we dealt with. Dangerous, bad, an evil empire, but pretty cautious. How about today? What is the downside of not acting? I will argue in a moment that it is immense. It is immense and it is clear, as clear as anything you can prognosticate in international affairs. We must remember that we are a European power. Whenever I am asked why we would consider keeping 4,000-7,000 troops in Bosnia to protect 100,000 people from being massacred, I respond by saying that for 54 years we have kept as many as 365,000 troops in Europe to prevent the subjugation of people. We now have 100,000 soldiers currently deployed in that theater. Why is the idea of using 2,000-4,000 of them to keep people of Kosovo from being subjugated and massacred such a radical intellectual breakthrough? Were the United States of America not deeply involved in the affairs of Europe, how many in this Chamber think Europe would be able to avoid the instability that has characterized it for 300 years? Who is going to step to the fore? France? England? Germany? They are all great nations, all great allies, but they suffer from disabilities we do not. They have lived on the continent for an eternity. They have old and deep animosities and differences and allegiances. All of Europe has a history of dealing with Serbs and Moslems, Albanians, Kosovars, Bosniacs, Croats, and it affects significantly their latitude. What might happen were America to leave? Ask the French whether they would like to see us pull up stakes and leave Europe, bring the boys and the women home. Ask anyone who has spent a lot of time dealing with European affairs what happens if the United States disengages. As a student of history and a participant in history, I ask whether America has ever been able to keep its distance from an unstable Europe. Lucky Lindbergh thought it was a good idea. A lot of other people who were more deeply involved in the conduct of foreign affairs thought it was a good idea. This questions represents an historic isolationism versus internationalism debate we have had in this country for over 200 years. Internationalists are characterized as adventuresome by their critics, and isolationists are characterized as narrow and self-interested by their critics. But it is a healthy, long- term debate. My friend asks whether or not I would be happy to yield for questions. I am always happy to yield for questions from the Senator from Pennsylvania. I am not always able to answer them, but if he has a question, I am happy to yield.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. I think the way that the Senator phrased it, I can understand how he arrives at this issue as he does. I would argue that it is a distinction without much of a difference. For example, the distinguished chairman talks about extermination justifying our action but relocation not. Historically, that is a distinction without a difference in terms of genocide. Historically, that is a distinction without a difference. In Bosnia, it was a distinction without a difference. This guy has a track record. The track record is clear. The track record is documented. The track record is obvious. So it is not a significant leap from President Bush's letter, which said: If they move against the Kosovars. We could argue, and President Bush could enlighten us what he meant by that, but the truth of the matter is he has moved against the Kosovars, and he is moving as we speak against the Kosovars. And a half-million people up in the mountains is a pretty big deal. Second, with regard to this notion of forcing a peace agreement on someone by saying, ``If you don't sign, we will in fact bomb,'' that would make sense, I would argue, if in fact we were arguing about a border dispute, if we are arguing about whether or not they were to pay reparations, if we were arguing about whether or not they are going to sell oil or whatever. It is not about that. It is about genocide and ethnic cleansing. The whole purpose of the agreement, the only reason why the rest of Europe--of NATO--agrees with us that there is a need for force on the ground in Kosovo, is to prevent--prevent--prevent ethnic cleansing; prevent the systematic isolation of Albanians, Moslem Kosovars, Moslem Serbs. So I understand the technical point the chairman is making. I do not understand the practical difference. This agreement that was signed onto relates to a framework that will assure the international community that this thug is not going to engage in the genocide he already has, the ethnic cleansing he has been promoting since 1989, and the thing for which we have a tribunal in the Hague. His military leadership, his puppets, are on the indictment list of the people engaged in this. I acknowledge that it has not reached the proportions it did in Bosnia. I acknowledge that 43 men and women forced to kneel down and have guns pointed to the backs of their heads and have their brains blown out is not enough to say it is genocide countrywide. But it sure is enough, in my view anyway, to get the tickler file moving a little bit and saying: Wait a minute, what happened after that when they did that in Bosnia? What happened after that when the intercepted communications we have between Milosevic and Karadzic and others in Bosnia said, ``Go get them, boys.'' Do we wait for Srebrenica to recur in Pristina? Do we wait for that? What the international community said, I say to my friend from Alaska--international? Let me be more precise. The contact group in NATO--they said, ``We do not. We learned a lesson here. We are not going to wait until he does that in Kosovo. We are going to work out an agreement.'' So they went outside Paris in some fancy old castle and they sat down and negotiated. And the idiot KLA, like the IRA, scuttled it initially because they threatened the Kosovar negotiators who were up there negotiating this agreement. But keep in mind the purpose of the negotiation. The only reason to put international forces on the ground in Kosovo--the only reason, none other--is to guarantee personnel and institutions that will prevent Milosevic from being able to do what President Bush was worried he would do and threatened him that, if he did do it, he would use force. So there is a distinction, I acknowledge, between preemptively making this case based upon recent historical record and waiting until it happens. But I will just say only one thing to my friend, who has forgotten more--and I mean this sincerely--he has forgotten more about our national defenses, has forgotten more about the conduct of war and the way to pursue it, than I am going to learn; and I acknowledge that. I mean that sincerely. But the one thing I am prepared to bet--prepared to bet my career on it --is if we do not act, I will bet my colleagues anything they wish to, within two years--within I think eight months, by the time the snows fall next winter--there will be genocide, documented, on a large scale, in Kosovo. My only argument is I think NATO is correct and the President is correct. I believe President Bush was correct in saying that we are going to stop you from doing that. The mechanism picked by the community, by NATO, was this peace agreement. That is the purpose of it. It was not to extract from Milosevic money, commitment, borders--anything else. It was to say: We are setting these folks in place to guarantee that you keep your promise that you are not going to eliminate these folks. I understand the difference. I have enormous respect for my friend from Alaska, but that is the basis upon which the Senator from Delaware believes we should act, knowing full well what he says. I do not say it lightly, and never having been in combat myself, as my friend from Alaska has been, I want him to know I do not say lightly risk these young women and men. Because it is a risk. He was there in the room. We were both there with the President. I indicated that I thought the President, based on the intelligence community reports and also based upon the briefings I have received from the military, that it is probable--not possible, probable--that some American flier is going to lose his or her life. So I do not say it lightly, but I think it is balanced off against whether or not we set a chain reaction in place, again, where we watch genocide. Either we have to act at a higher price or don't act and see it spread. I thank my colleague for his time. I know he has other business he wants to get to.

Mr. BIDEN. May I respond, Mr. President?

Mr. BIDEN. I am. I yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN. If the Senator will yield, I agree with you.