Joe Biden

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be able to proceed for 2 minutes on this legislation.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be able to proceed for 7 minutes as in morning business.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. I withhold the request suggesting the absence of a quorum.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I want to talk very briefly about the International Monetary Fund and the meeting that took place in Washington yesterday and today and will be taking place this week. The eyes of the world are on Washington this week where the major international financial institutions search for answers to the most serious international economic crisis in years. As the world's most successful economy at the moment, the United States bears, in my view, an unavoidable responsibility, and that responsibility is to lead--lead in a search for answers to this crisis. But as last year's Asian financial turmoil has evolved into a global financial crisis, to my great disappointment, the House of Representatives persists in what I must say--and I realize it is a strong word--in its irresponsible refusal to approve funding for the International Monetary Fund. Twice this year the U.S. Senate has overwhelmingly supported the so- called U.S. quota, our share of a larger capital reserve for the IMF to pull threatened countries back from the brink of economic collapse. And twice this year, the House of Representatives has refused to provide the resources--at no cost to the American taxpayer--that the IMF needs to contain this widening crisis. As President Clinton, Secretary Rubin, and our representatives to the international financial institutions in Washington this week urge their counterparts from the rest of the world to join us in controlling the crisis, the response that we are hearing is: ``Show us the money.'' There was a movie out that won an Academy Award, and in that movie, they said, ``Show me the money.'' We have our Secretary of the Treasury and our President constituting an American plea for the rest of the world to act responsibly, and they are being told, ``Show us the money.'' I want to point out that even if these other countries ante up their share, the IMF cannot take any action, absent us putting in our share, because you need an 85-percent vote. Try as they might, how can we expect our leadership to lead the rest of the world with the albatross of the House's irresponsibility hung squarely around their necks? By failing to provide full funding of our participation in the IMF, we undercut our credibility and our authority, the credibility and the authority of the world's indispensable economic leader, in the most serious international economic crisis, at least of my generation and the Presiding Officer's. Go down to these meetings, Mr. President--and I suggest this to all my colleagues--and the first thing you will hear from both our representatives and their counterparts from around the world is the complaint that the U.S. Congress is holding up one of the key elements they need to construct a response to the current crisis: the funds to protect vulnerable economies from financial collapse. Every State in the Union--from States as far away as Washington and Delaware--every State in the Union has been hit by the decline in our agricultural and manufacturing exports because of the collapse of major markets for American goods around the world. In my own State of Delaware, exports to Asia are down 20 percent compared to last year. That translates into jobs--Delaware jobs. The crisis that began last year in Asia has spiraled around the planet to Russia, a nuclear power facing economic and political collapse, and on to our closest trading partners in Latin America. Mr. President, I do not believe it is an exaggeration to say that without the resources to support Brazil and other countries threatened by the wild swings of international capital flows, countries as important to us as Mexico, our third largest trading partner, could be the next to fall. And yet, in my view--and I realize some may disagree, even those who voted with me on funding of IMF in the Senate--in my view, the House continues to play politics with our obligation to the only international institution in the position to attempt to control the spread of economic meltdown. Once again, I urge my colleagues in the House to come to their senses, to match the Senate in action and provide the U.S. share for the IMF quota increase. Time is running out, Mr. President. I hope what I read in the papers--what we all read in the papers--that the leadership in the House is about to release this money, about to vote for it, is true, because time is running out and there will be a price to pay for inaction. I thank my colleagues. I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President. Today I address an issue of extreme importance to both citizens of the United States, and people around the globe. It is not often that we have the opportunity to help those in other countries and Americans at the same time. I believe that one of these occasions presents itself now. In every area of the world, there are men, women and children in desperate need of food. Some of them are refugees from wars and other forms of political violence. Some of them are displaced because droughts or floods have interfered with their ability to grow food and destroyed their homes. Others are simply too poor to be able to afford the tools and seeds necessary to plant crops. This year has been particularly difficult in a variety of places. Most recently, hurricane Georges has ravaged the Caribbean. Nations such as Haiti, where the population is barely able to feed itself, and the Dominican Republic have been heavily damaged by the storm's onslaught. Countries in Eastern Europe are experiencing food shortages. Winter is coming to Kosovo, where the Serbian Special Police and Yugoslavian army continue a terrorist policy that has destroyed more that three hundred villages, and driven more than 300,000 ethnic Albanians from their homes, with an estimated 50,000 forced into forests and mountains. With good reason, these people are afraid to return to the villages which have been destroyed and vandalized by the Serbian army. They have left the only means they have of supporting themselves behind. As a result, if we in the international community do not help them, they will not be able to feed themselves. Russia faces a sharp decrease in agricultural production, due to drought and other poor weather conditions. Approximately twenty-five percent of farmland was damaged. Consequently, this year's harvest will be Russia's worst in four decades. Collective farms have harvested only a little over half the amount of grain in this year's harvest as they did in 1997. The potato crop, one of Russia's staples, is down significantly due to potato blight. The Asian economic crisis is having a significant impact on the ability of those states to feed themselves. Indonesia, with its current financial turmoil is in need of food. Asian countries which normally import American commodities are unable to do so this year, exacerbating our farmers' woes. The situation in North Korea remains grave. Floods, droughts and other natural disasters in the past four years have left many without the ability to feed themselves. Malnutrition and related diseases are common throughout the land. One million people have died in North Korea over the past two years. Due to climactic conditions and political unrest, there are many in need in Africa. In Sudan alone, experts have indicated that as many as 2.6 million people may go hungry. Mozambique is facing a food crisis which will affect 300,000 people until April of next year. In the northern portions of Sierra Leone, thousands of internally displaced people will face hunger, if not starvation, unless they are provided with aid. Here in the United States we face a challenge of a different sort. Far from suffering from a lack of food, American farmers are producing an abundance. Unfortunately, U.S. agricultural exports are expected to decline 4.6 percent from projected 1998 levels, mainly because of the collapse of global markets. One third of the family farmers in this country may go out of business in the next several years, with net farm income projected to decrease by $7.5 billion in 1998. We have the food. All we are lacking is strong markets to buy what we are producing. Common sense tells us that it is time to bring together our oversupply of domestic agricultural products and the growing international need for food aid. One way to do that is to increase shipments of U.S. agricultural products to countries in need. In July of this year, the President took steps to do just that, creating the Food Aid Initiative. This initiative directs the Department of Agriculture to purchase 80 million bushels of grain for distribution to poor countries overseas. The Secretary of Agriculture announced the first disbursement of wheat and wheat flour under the Initiative to the World Food Program on September 15th. I applaud the Administration's creation of this Initiative. The potential of this program in combination with other U.S. food assistance programs to provide relief to hungry people is great, and I support the President's efforts. However, we can and should do more. To begin with, the list of countries that the administration has targeted through the Initiative should be expanded. Last week I wrote to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Secretary of Agriculture Dan Glickman and Brian Atwood, the Administrator of the Agency of International Development. In those letters, I indicated among other things, that threatened food shortages in Kosovo and Russia must not go unaddressed. Not only must we be sure that more countries are being given much needed food, we must be assured that those who are hungry are actually receiving the food. Unfortunately, in some instances, access to food donations is prevented by people in needy nations who either want the food themselves, wish to profit from victims of famine or wish to control the needy population by denying them life's most basic necessities. In addition to donating to more countries, we should donate more food. According to the United States Department of Agriculture, in the United States today there is a surplus of 6.3 million metric tons or 233 million bushels of wheat. There are several programs through which we can help solve both our domestic and our international problems. The first is the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, commonly referred to as P.L. 480, Food for Peace. This legislation contains three food aid titles. Title One's objective is to make it easier for lesser developed countries to buy American commodities. To this end, commodities are sold to certain countries for US dollars on concessional credit terms. Title Two is the Emergency and Private Assistance Programs. This is where the bulk of our humanitarian donations in the form of food aid come from. This year Title Two was funded at the level that the president requested. Unfortunately, given the number of humanitarian disasters that we are currently facing, this may not be enough. It is my hope that the President will ask for more money for this program. Title Three is the Food for Development Program, under which government to government grants are provided to support the long-term development efforts of those countries that are attempting improve their economic outlooks. The second program through which we can help address the domestic and overseas challenges we are facing is Section 416(b) of the Agricultural Act of 1949. Through Section 416(b), commodities held by the Commodities Credit Corporation can be donated overseas. This is the program through which the President ordered the purchase of $250 million of wheat in July. The Food for Progress Act of 1985 is the third program the United States can utilize to address both the American farm crises and dire international need. Food for Progress provides commodities either purchased with funds from the Commodity Credit Corporation, or through P.L. 480 or Section 416(b), as donations to countries that are committing to the increase of free enterprise practices in their agricultural sectors. I strongly support an aggressive funding of these programs, and have urged the administration to be aggressive in its requests to the Congress as it evaluates the increasing needs overseas and the opportunity to assist our farmers here at home. If we diligently pursue all of our options through current law, I believe that we can help alleviate two very significant and pressing problems. The overabundance of agricultural commodities plaguing American farmers, and the lack of food for starving millions abroad. I urge my colleagues in Congress consider the full range of resources and programs at our disposal to help end the dilemma facing the farmers of our nation. Implementing a solution to this problem will require that we use all of the creativity and energy that we have. Every day brings us closer to real crises not only in our farm economy, but also in countries important to our national interest. Such aid is not only clearly in our interest. It would reflect our highest values by preventing the widespread hunger and suffering of men, women and children who had no hand in the tragedies that have befallen their countries. Again, I urge my colleagues to give this issue prompt and serious attention. I thank the chair and yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for up to 30 minutes as if in morning business.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. As every southern Senator knows, Andrew Johnson came much closer to conviction on the charges of serious misconduct. Although Johnson's impeachment proceedings ostensibly focused on his disregarding the Tenure in Office Act, historians--and not a single southerner does not understand--but historians uniformly agree that the true sources of opposition to President Johnson were policy disagreements and personal animosity. The conflict this time was between Johnson's moderate post-Civil War policies toward the Southern States and the overwhelming Republican majorities in both Chambers. The Republicans feared dilution of their voting strength if the southerners were seated. Johnson's defenders in the Senate were eventually able to hold on to barely enough votes to prevent his conviction. In Professor Raoul Berger's view, ``Johnson's trial serves as a frightening reminder that in the hands of a passion-driven Congress, the process may bring down the very pillars of our constitutional system.'' Yet, if the cases of Tyler and Johnson substantiate the framers' fears, the Nixon situation vindicates the utility of the impeachment procedures. Notice how different the Nixon proceedings were from Tyler's and Johnson's. As the Nixon impeachment process unfolded, there was broad bipartisan consensus each step of the way. I was there at the time. While it would have been foolish to believe that Members of Congress did not worry about the partisan political repercussions of their actions, such factional considerations did not dominate decision making. Political friends and foes of the President agreed that the charges against the President were serious, that they warranted further inquiry and, once there was definitive evidence of serious complicity and wrongdoing, a consensus emerged that impeachment should be invoked. The President resigned after the House Judiciary Committee voted out articles of impeachment by a 28-10 vote. For me, several lessons stand out from our constitutional understanding of the impeachment process and our historical experience with it. Furthermore, I believe that a consensus has developed on several important points. While the founders included impeachment powers in the Constitution, they were concerned by the potential partisan abuse. We should be no less aware of the dangers of partisanship. As we have seen, the process functions best when there is a broad bipartisan consensus behind moving ahead. The country is never well served when either policy disagreements or personal animosities drive the process. Many scholars who have studied the Constitution have concluded that it should be reserved for offenses that are abuses of the public trust or abuses that relate to the public nature of the President's duties. Remember, what is impeachable is not necessarily criminal and what is criminal is not necessarily impeachable. The Senate in particular has wide latitude in determining the outcome of this constitutional process. Just because the House may initiate an impeachment process does not mean that the Senate will conclude that the process with a vote on articles of impeachment was a correct process. It is well within our constitutional responsibilities to consider alternatives to impeachment if we find that circumstances warrant these alternatives. I don't know that they will and I don't know that we will get there, but again, the debate is being waged as to whether or not it is in our constitutional power to consider alternatives. Remember Senator Henry Clay's ``want of confidence.'' There is no one-size-fits-all definition of impeachable offenses, divorced from such practical considerations. The Senate in particular, has an obligation to consider the full range of consequences of removing the President from Office. In recent days, some have suggested that because the Starr Report provides a prima facie case and prima facie evidence of what are arguably impeachable offenses, the House and the Senate have a constitutional responsibility to see the impeachment process through to its conclusion. In my view, the constitutional history that I have sketched here and more shows this position is entirely mistaken. Indeed, if anything, history shows a thoroughly understandable reluctance to have the procedure invoked in the first place. Stopping short of impeachment would not be reaching a solution ``outside the Constitution.'' It would be entirely compatible and consistent with what the Founders contemplated, if that is what we decide. Again, I am not prejudging what we should decide. The 28th Congress hardly violated its constitutional duty when the House decided that, all things considered, terminating impeachment proceedings after cooperation between the Congress and the President improved was a better course of action than proceeding with impeachment based on his past actions, even though it apparently did so for reasons no more laudable than those that initiated the process in the first place. Impeachment was and remains an inherently political process, with all the pitfalls and promises that are thus put into play by politics. Nothing in the document precludes the Congress from seeking means to resolve this or any other putative breach of duty short of removing him from office. In fact, the risky and potentially divisive nature of the impeachment process may counsel in favor of utilizing it only as an absolute last resort where there is no shadow of a doubt that it meets, the criteria of treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdeameanors. Of course, impeachment ought to be used if the breach of duty is serious enough--what the Congress was prepared to do in the case of Richard Nixon was the correct course of action. However, nothing in the constitution precludes the Congress from resolving this conflict in a manner short of impeachment. The critical question--the question with which the country is currently struggling--is whether the President's breaches of conduct and shameful activity, which are now well known and which have been universally condemned, warrant the ultimate political sanction. Are they serious enough to warrant removal from office? In answering that, we need to ask ourselves, What is in the best interests of the United States of America? That is something that the founders contemplated us asking ourselves if and when faced with this question. While I have not decided ultimately what should happen, I do want to suggest that it certainly is constitutionally permissible to consider a middle ground as a resolution of this matter. Such an approach might bring together those of the President's detractors who believe there is a need for some sanction, but are willing to stop short of impeachment, as well as those of the President's supporters who reject impeachment, but are willing to consider that some sanction ought to be implemented. As a country, Mr. President, we have not often faced decisions as stark and potentially momentous as the impeachment of a President of the United States. On the other hand, we would be wise not to overstate such claims. Surely we have faced some moments as stark and serious as this one. We have survived those moments and we will survive this one no matter how we handle it. As my dad always says, and he is going on 85 years of age, I remember over the last 26 years going home and saying, ``Dad, this is a catastrophe,'' and he would look at me and say, ``Joe, this country is so good, it is so strong, it is so solid, that it can stand 4 or 8 years of anybody or anything.'' And he is right. He is right. So I don't want to exaggerate this. Whatever the outcome of the present situation, I'm confident that our form of government and the strength of our country present us not with a constitutional crisis but rather with a constitutional framework and flexibility to deal responsibly with the decisions we face in the coming months. My purpose in rising today is to remind all of us of what that constitutional framework and flexibility mean, what they are. In my closing plea I begin where I started, as a young Senator in April of 1974. This is a time for us to be cautious. This is a time for Members of this body to hold our fire. This is the time to be prepared to exercise our responsibility to be judge and jury after, and only after, all of the facts are presented to us. This is not a constitutional crisis but it is a serious, serious business. I yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, despite this dialog, as I indicated, scholars agree on two important points and a third issue where the weight of history suggests subtle practice. Let me speak to that. As we already have seen, the framers did not intend that the President could be impeached for maladministration alone. Second, a great deal of evidence from outside the convention shows that both the framers and the ratifiers saw ``high crimes and misdemeanors'' as pointing to offenses that are serious, not petty, offenses that are public or political, not private or personal. In 1829, William Rawle authored one of the early commentaries on the Constitution of the United States. In it, Rawle states that ``the legitimate causes of impeachment . . . can only have reference to public character and official duty. He went on to say: In general, those offences which may be committed equally by a private person as a public officer are not-- Emphasis, not-- the subjects of impeachment. In addition, more than 150 years ago, Joseph Story, as my learned colleague who is presiding knows was a lawyer, Joseph Story and his influential commentaries on the Constitution stated that impeachment is ``ordinarily'' a remedy for offenses ``of a political character,'' ``growing out of personal misconduct, or gross neglect, or usurpation, or habitual disregard of the public interests, in the discharge of the duties of political office.'' The public character of the impeachment offense is further reinforced by the limited nature of the remedy for the offense. In the English tradition, which we rejected, impeachments were punishable by fines, imprisonment or even death. In contrast, the American Constitution completely separates the issue of criminal sanctions from the issue of removal from office. Our Constitution states that, ``Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust, or Profit under the United States. * * * '' Article I, section 3, clause 7. The remedy for violations of the public's trust in the performance of one's official duties, in other words, is limited to removal from that office and disqualification from holding further office; remedies that, I might add, correspond nicely to the public nature of the offenses in the first instance. Additional support comes from another commentator, James Wilson, a delegate to the Convention from Pennsylvania. In his lectures on the Constitution, Wilson wrote: In the United States and Pennsylvania, impeachments are confined to political characters, to political crimes and misdemeanors, and to political punishments. All in all, the evidence is quite strong that impeachment was understood as a remedy for abuse of official power, breaches of public trust, or other derelictions of the duties of office. The third point to make about the scope of the impeachment power is this: To be impeachable, an offense does not have to be a breach of the criminal law. The renowned constitutional scholar and personal friend and adviser, the late Phillip Kurland, the leading constitutional scholar of this century, I argue, wrote that: At both the convention that framed the Constitution and at the conventions that ratified it, the essence of an impeachable offense was thought to be breach of trust and not violation of criminal law. And this was in keeping with the primary function of impeachment, removal from office. If you put the notion that an impeachable offense must be a serious breach of an official trust or duty, together with the point that it does not have to be a criminal violation, you reach the conclusion that not all crimes are impeachable, and not every impeachable offense need be a crime. These points provide important anchors for any impeachment inquiry, but they do not resolve all the questions of scope that may arise. Much remains to be worked out, and only to be worked out, in the context of particular circumstances and allegations. As Hamilton explained in Federalist 65 impeachment ``can never be tied down by * * * strict rules, either in the delineation of the offense by the prosecutors or in the construction of it by the judges. * * *'' After all the legal research, we are still left with the realization that the power to convict for impeachment constitutes an ``awful discretion.'' This brings us directly to the Senate's role. To state it bluntly, I believe the role of the U.S. Senate is to resolve all the remaining questions. Let me elaborate. The Senate's role as final interpreter of impeachments was recognized from the beginning of the Republic. For example, to refer again to Joseph Story, after he devoted almost 50 sections of his commentaries to various disputed questions about the impeachment power, he concluded that the final decision on the unresolved issues relating to impeachment ``may be reasonably left to the high tribunal, constituting the court of impeachment.'' I.e., the U.S. Senate, the floor upon which I stand. The court of impeachment, the Senate, similarly was viewed in the Federalist Papers and referred to Senators as the judges of impeachment. Speaking of the Senate as the jury in impeachment trials is perhaps a more common analogy these days as you turn on your television and hear many of us speak. But the judge analogy is a more accurate analogy than the juror analogy. In impeachment trials, the Senate certainly does sit as a finder of fact, as a jury does. But it also sits as a definer of the acceptable standards upon which the President is being judged, as a judge would do. The Senate, in other words, determines not only whether the accused has performed the acts that form the basis for the House of Representatives' articles of impeachment but also whether those actions justify removal from office. So let's lay to rest this idea that if the President--any President-- is impeached by the House of Representatives, and specific articles are alleged of violations, and we find the President violated the very charge that the House has made--that does not mean we must vote for impeachment, for we can reject the grounds upon which the House impeached in the first instance as being not sufficiently sound to meet ``high crimes and misdemeanors.'' There is no question about that, and yet it seems to be a question in the minds of the press. There is no question about that. Once again, we find support for this view from our country's history. In two of the first three impeachments brought forward from the House to the U.S. Senate, the Senate acquitted the accused. In each of the two acquittals, however, the Senate did not disagree with the House on the facts. One case involved a Senator, William Blount, the other an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, Samuel Chase. In neither one was there any question that the individual had done the deeds that formed the basis of the House's articles of impeachment. Yet in each case the Senate concluded that the deeds were not sufficient to constitute valid grounds for impeachment, and so they acquitted. Eventually then, if the current impeachment proceeds, it will fall to the Senate to decide not only the facts but the law and to evaluate whether or not the specific actions of the President are sufficiently serious to warrant being thrown out of office--being convicted. The framers intended that the Senate have as its objective doing what was best for the country, taking context and circumstances fully into account. I should try to be as clear as I can about this point because the media discussions have come close to missing it. It seems to be widely assumed that if the President committed perjury, for example, then he must be impeached, and he must be convicted if the Senate concludes he perjured himself. Conversely, you may think that unless it can be proven that the President committed perjury, or violated some other criminal statute, that impeachment cannot occur. Both sentiments and statements are wrong. Recall what I said earlier: Not all crimes are impeachable offenses and not every impeachable offense need be a crime to throw a President out of office. The Senate, for example, could decline to convict, even if the President had committed perjury, if it concluded that under the circumstances this perjury did not constitute a sufficiently serious breach of duty toward removal of the President. There is no question about that either. On the other hand, the Senate could convict a President of an impeachable offense even if it were not a violation of the criminal law. For instance, if the Senate concluded that the President had committed abuses of power sufficiently grave, it need not find any action to amount to a violation of some criminal statute. Let me give you an example. If there was overwhelming proof that every day the President came to his office, the Oval Office, drunk, that is not a crime, but it is impeachable--it is impeachable-- committing no crime, but is impeachable. Conversely, if the Senate can conclude that the President lied about whether or not he had an affair, they could conclude that did not constitute an impeachable offense warranting expulsion. Now, again I am not prejudging what we should decide, but I think it is very important we understand what latitude and obligations we have. Let me now stand back from the issue of substance and procedure and look at the impeachment mechanism as it has actually functioned in our country's history. The proof of the framers' design, after all, will be in how the mechanism has worked in practice. I am almost finished, Mr. President. As we have seen, the framers worried that impeaching a sitting President would most likely be highly charged with partisan politics and preexisting factions, enlisting, as they said, all of the ``animosities, partialities, and influence and interest'' that inevitably swirl around a sitting President. History shows, Mr. President, they had it right from the get-go. They had it right. And they were right to worry about it. Prior to the case of President Nixon, Presidential impeachment had only been used for partisan purposes. History tells us that John Tyler was an enormously unpopular President, facing a hostile Congress dominated by his arch political enemy, Henry Clay--one of the several people younger than me when he got here. He was an amazing guy. Here he was, a leader in the House of Representatives before he was 25, and he became a U.S. Senator before he was 30. During the impeachment effort of John Tyler, what he was facing, Tyler, was a hostile Congress dominated by the young Henry Clay. After several years of continual clashes, numerous Presidential vetoes, and divisive conflicts with the Senate over appointments, a select committee of the House issued a report recommending a formal impeachment inquiry. President Tyler, not being as dumb as everyone thought, reached out to his political enemies. How did he do that? He signed an important bill raising tariffs, which had been one of the reasons that there was such animosity between him and Henry Clay and his friends. He raised tariffs which he had formerly opposed. And he found other means of cooperation with Congress. In the end, even Henry Clay, speaking from the floor of the U.S. Senate, urged the slowdown on the impeachment proceedings that he had moved to initiate, suggesting instead a lesser action of a ``want of confidence.'' ``Want of confidence''--does it sound familiar? Does it sound at all like the idea of having the President sanctioned in some way other than impeachment? Does it sound like censuring the President? ``Want of confidence.'' So Clay suggested that a ``want of confidence'' vote, rather than a formal impeachment proceeding, might be better. So in early 1843, the resolution to proceed with an impeachment--whether to proceed with the impeachment inquiry, was defeated on the House floor, 127-83. They had already begun the process of inquiry, and along came Tyler, and he said, ``I'll make peace with you.'' In 1868, Andrew Johnson came much closer to conviction on charges of serious misconduct. No southerner will be unaware of--I ask unanimous consent that I be able to proceed for another 10 minutes.

Mr. BIDEN. I ask unanimous consent to proceed for another 15 minutes.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, during the past 26 years as a U.S. Senator, I, like all who sit here, have been confronted with some of the most significant issues that have faced our Nation in the last quarter century--issues ranging from who sits on the highest court of the land, the Supreme Court, to whether or not we should go to war. These and others are, obviously, weighty issues. But none of the decisions has been more awesome, or more daunting, or more compelling than the issue of whether to impeach a sitting President of the United States of America, a responsibility that no Senator will take lightly. As imposing as this undertaking is, I am sad to say that I have had to contemplate this issue twice during my service as a U.S. Senator-- once during the term of President Richard Milhous Nixon, and now. While the circumstances surrounding these two events are starkly different, the consequences are starkly the same. The gravity of removing a sitting President from office is the same today as it was 26 years ago. And 26 years ago as a much younger U.S. Senator, I took to the floor on April 10, 1974, and said the following: In the case of an impeachment trial, the emotions of the American people would be strummed, as a guitar, with every newscast and each edition of the daily paper in communities throughout the country. The incessant demand for news or rumors of news--whatever its basis of legitimacy--would be overwhelming. The consequential impact on the Federal institutions of government would be intense--and not necessarily beneficial. This is why my plea today [that was 1974] is for restraint on the part of all parties involved in the affair. It is somewhat presumptuous for any Senator to quote himself. But I cite it to point out that my views then with a Republican President are the same as my views today with the Democratic U.S. President. It is time for all parties involved in this affair to show restraint. I rise today because I believe that we are not exercising the restraint as we should. Those words that I said 24 years ago have an uncanny ring to them. Furthermore, in 1974, I urged my colleagues in the U.S. Senate during the Watergate period to learn from the story of Alice in Wonderland. I cautioned then that they remember Alice's plight when the Queen declared, ``Sentence first and verdict afterwards.'' But the need for restraint then is even greater now than it was in 1974. The impeachment question then was not as politically charged as it is today. In 1974, we were willing to hear all the evidence before we made any decision. We had men like Howard Baker and Sam Ervin. We had men like Chairman Peter Rodino. We had Democrats and Republicans. I remember a brilliant young Senator from Maine, who was then a Congressman named William Cohen, a Republican, and now our Secretary of Defense. He was a Congressman from Maine. I remember how serious they took the process, how much restraint they showed, and how bipartisan their actions were. Today, I hope for our Nation's sake--not the President's, but for our Nation's sake--that we don't follow the Queen's directive in Alice in Wonderland to ``sentence first and verdict afterwards,'' and that we will make a wise judgment about the fate of the President after deliberate consideration. My legal training combined with more than a quarter of century of experience in the U.S. Senate, a significant part of that as chairman of the Judiciary Committee, has taught me several important lessons. Two of these are lessons that I believe are appropriate now. First is that an orderly society must first care about justice; and, second, all that is constitutionally permissible may not be just or wise. Let me repeat the latter. All that is constitutionally permissible to do may be not wise to do, or may not be just in the doing. It is with these two very important lessons guiding me that I embark upon a very important decision involving our country, our Constitution and our President. The power to overturn and undo a popular election by the people for the first time in our Nation's history must be exercised with great care and with sober deliberation. We should not forget that 47.4 million Americans voted for our President in 1996, and 8.2 million voted for the President's opponent. We should also not forget, as I tell my students in the constitutional law class I teach on separation of powers, that the entire essence of our constitutional system is built upon the notion of the consent of the governed, and when we deign to overturn a decision of the governed, we are on very thin ice. I believe Members of Congress should begin their deliberation with a thorough understanding of the impeachment process. They should understand what the framers of the Constitution intended the standard of impeachment to be. I have heard no discussion of that issue thus far. And, further, how the framers of the Constitution intended the process to work; again, I have heard no discussion of that thus far. Let me say at the outset that what President Clinton did and acknowledged to have done is reprehensible. It was, at a minimum, a horrible lapse in judgment, and it has brought shame upon him personally. It has brought shame upon the Office of the Presidency, and his actions have hurt his family, his friends, his supporters, the causes for which he fights, and the country as a whole. I am confident that he fully understands the gravity of what he has done now. Let me also say that I have made no judgment. I have not made any decision on what I think should happen. I have not come to any conclusion as to consequences the President should face for his shameful behavior, because I believe the oath of office that I have taken on five solemn occasions--four which were right here in the well, and one which was in a hospital in Wilmington, DE--on those five occasions, the oath that I took I believe precludes me, and I will respectfully suggest any other Senator, from prejudging, as I and all other Senators may be required to serve as the Constitution dictates, as judge and juror in what may become the trial of this century. I can only make--and I would respectfully suggest all of us can only make--an assessment after hearing all the evidence, evidence against the President and evidence in support of the President. No one knows, to the best of my knowledge, but the Lord Almighty, how all this will turn out. However, because this is the second time in my career I have had to face this awesome responsibility, I have given this topic a great deal of thought and consideration and would like to explore, with the indulgence of the Presiding Officer, some of the issues that I believe will surely confront responsible Members of Congress and all Americans as we enter this difficult period in our history. Mr. President, the framers of the Constitution who met in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787 considered--and this is a fact little known, at least little spoken to--offering this country a Constitution that did not include the power to impeach the President. Let me reemphasize that. The founders considered not including in our Constitution the power to remove the President from office. After all, they reasoned, any wrongs against the public would be dealt with by turning the President out in the next election. To overturn an election, which I will speak to in a moment, would lend itself to political chicanery. One delegate to the Constitutional Convention, Charles Pinckney of South Carolina, worried that the threat of impeachment would place the President under the thumb of a hostile Congress, thereby weakening the independence of the office and threatening the doctrine upon which our Constitution was built--the separation of powers. According to James Madison's notes, Pinckney called impeachment a ``rod'' that Congress would hold over the President. In being reluctant to include any impeachment power, the framers were not trying to create an imperial Presidency. In fact, what they were worried about was protecting all American citizens against the tyranny of a select group. In their view, the separation of powers constituted one of the most powerful means for protecting individual liberty, because it prevented Government power from being concentrated in any single branch of Government. To make the separation of powers work properly, they reasoned, each branch must be sufficiently strong and independent from the other so that the power of one branch could not be encroached upon by the other. The framers were concerned that any process whereby the legislative branch, the branch they deemed ``the most dangerous,'' could sit in judgment of a President who would be vulnerable to the abuse of partisan faction which, as my friend and Presiding Officer and gifted lawyer knows, was one of the overwhelming, recurring concerns of the founders--partisan politics. They feared that this most dangerous branch could sit in judgment of a President who would be vulnerable to abuse by partisan factions. Federalist No. 65 begins its defense of the impeachment process which ultimately was included by warning of the dangers of the abuse--of the abuse--of the power. It argues, Federalist 65, that is, that impeachment: . . . will seldom fail to agitate the passions of the whole community, and to divide them into parties, more or less friendly or inimical, to the accused. In many cases, it will connect itself with the preexisting factions, and will enlist all their animosities, particularities, influence and interest on one side, or on the other; and in such cases there will always be the greatest danger that the decision will be regulated more by the comparative strength of the parties than by the real demonstration of guilt or innocence. Don't you find it kind of fascinating that the Federalist Papers, which were the 1787-1788-1789 version of advertising to sell the Constitution, don't you think it fascinating, instead of them writing about, warning about the abuse of power by the President requiring impeachment, they wrote about and were concerned about and more debate was conducted about the abuse of power by political factions in the legislative branch to overturn the will of the American people? So the framers were fully aware that the impeachment process could become partisan attacks on the President--charged with animosities generated by all manner of trials, prior struggles and disagreements over executive branch decisions, over policy disputes, over resentment at losing the prior election, and God only knows what else. Federalist No. 65 expresses the view that the use of impeachment to vindicate any of these animosities would actually be an abuse of power. So the power that they were at least equally in part worried about being abused was the partisan power of a legislative body to overturn a decision of the American people--giving too much power to the legislative branch at the expense of the executive branch, thereby diluting the separation of powers doctrine, concentrating it too much in one place and thereby jeopardizing the liberty and freedom of individual Americans. This sentiment that I referred to about the abuse of power by this body and the House is as true today as it was when the Constitution was being written. It was also true when Richard Nixon faced impeachment in 1974. In fact, it would have been wrong for Richard Nixon to have been removed from office based upon a purely partisan vote. No President should be removed from office merely because one party enjoys a commanding lead in either House of Congress. And I would remind my colleagues that when I arrived here in 1973, and when the Nixon hearings were going on in 1974, the Democratic Party--and he was obviously a Republican--enjoyed an overwhelming, commanding plurality of votes. My recollection is there were roughly 64 Democratic Members of the Senate at the time, and a prohibitively large plurality of Democrats in the House of Representatives. In fact, it would have been wrong then, as it would be wrong now, to have removed him based upon the power that was in the hands of one party. No President should be removed merely because one party enjoys a commanding lead in either House of Congress. Yet, while the framers knew that the impeachment process could become partisan, they needed to deal with the strong anti-Federalist factions that jeopardized the possibility of the Constitution being ratified by the requisite number of States. The anti-Federalists strenuously argued that the Federal Government would quickly get out of step with the sentiments of the people and become vulnerable to corruption and intrigue, arrogance and tyranny. These charges proved close to fatal as the ratifying conventions in the States took up the proposed Constitution. It was with this looming danger in mind, of losing the ratification fight, that the Federalists decided to include the impeachment provision in the Constitution. The framers of the Constitution knew that the Constitution would have been even more vulnerable to charges of establishing a government remote from the people if the President were not subject to removal except at the next election. James Madison's notes, again, of the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention, record his observations of the debate, where he said he: . . . thought it indispensable that some provision should be made for defending the community against the incapacity, negligence or perfidy of the chief magistrate, [that is, the President]. The limitation of the period of his service was not a sufficient security. He might lose his capacity after his appointment. He might pervert his administration into a scheme of speculation or oppression. He might betray his trust to foreign powers. So, those concerns, those concerns expressed by Madison about whether or not the President might lose his ability to lead, might ``pervert his administration to a scheme of speculation or oppression, might betray his trust to a foreign power''--they were thought to be sufficient reason to include the power of impeachment in the Constitution. So, in the end, the framers of the Constitution risked the abuse of power by the Congress to gain the advantages of impeachment. Once the decision to include the power of impeachment had been made, the remainder of the debate on the impeachment clause focused on two issues. The first debate, which we do not even talk about, was whether or not to give the power to the Congress to impeach, and weighed the advantages and disadvantages. The disadvantage was, it would lead to partisan bickering and abuse of power by the Congress. But that was outweighed, ultimately, in their minds, by the process that a President could and might subvert the interests of this country to a foreign power or subvert the office to oppress the people or to take advantage of the office in a way that was inappropriate in the minds of the American people. Once that decision was made, though, they then focused on, OK, we are going to include it, but--but--what was supposed to constitute an impeachable offense? Put another way, what was the standard going to be that they expected the Congress to use? And then they said: After we decide that, we have to decide how is impeachment to work? How is the process to be undertaken? And what were the procedures that should be set down as to how to approach such an awesome undertaking? As we shall see, the framers proved unable to separate these two issues entirely. Understanding how they are entwined, however--that is, the question of what constitutes an impeachable offense and how is the mechanism to work--understanding how these two issues are intertwined, I believe, will help us to understand the full implications of the power that the Constitution gives those of us who serve in the Congress. The Constitution provides that the House of Representatives shall have the power to impeach--article I, section 2, clause 5. The framers' decision that the House of Representatives would initiate the charges of impeachment follows the pattern of the English Parliament, where the House of Lords initiates charges of impeachment. Beyond this, the choice--the choice of the House being given this power--must have seemed fairly compelled by two related considerations. The first, already mentioned, was the need to provide the people as a whole with assurances that the Government they were being asked to create would be responsive to the interests and concerns of the people themselves. So what better place to go than the people's house, the House of Representatives? The second reason for the House being given this power to initiate was the framers' substantive understanding of the impeachment power. It was a power to hold accountable Government officers who had, in Hamilton's terms, committed ``an abuse or violation of some public trust,'' thereby committing an injury ``done immediately to the society itself.'' Keep in mind what they are talking about here--at least what Hamilton was talking about--as to what constituted the kind of offense that was contemplated to be impeachable: Something that was an abuse or violation of the public trust and done immediately to the society itself. If the gravamen of an impeachment is the breach of public trust, no branch of the Federal Government could have seemed more appropriate to initiate such a proceeding than the House of Representatives, which was conceived and defended as the Chamber most in tune with the people's sympathies and hence most appropriate to reflect the people's views as to whether the society itself was done immediate harm. The Constitution further provides that the President shall be ``removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.'' Article 2, section 4 of the U.S. Constitution. The Constitution provides that ``the House of Representatives shall . . . have the . . . Power of Impeachment.'' Article I, section 2, clause 5. And the Senate shall remove from office on ``Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.'' This language, the language about what he should be removed for, went through several changes during the summer of 1787. In the initial drafts, the grounds for impeachment--once the debate was over as to whether or not to include impeachment as a power--the initial drafts, the grounds for impeachment, were restricted to treason and bribery alone, period; nothing else--not another single thing. I remind my friends who call themselves strict constructionists--I have run into them over my 26-year career and, as chairman of the Judiciary Committee, have had numerous debates with now Supreme Court Justices, and some who are not Supreme Court Justices, on what is the proper methodology for interpreting the Constitution. Those who view themselves as strict constructionists say the words, if their plain meaning is clear, control. Initially this debate, once impeachment was decided upon as a power that would be granted to the Congress, included impeachable offenses for only two purposes: Treason or bribery. When the matter was brought up on September 8, 1787, George Mason, of Virginia, inquired as to why the grounds should be restricted only to those two provisions. He reasoned that there are other ways the public trust in government can be abused, so why only these two? He argued: Attempts to subvert the Constitution may not be treason as above defined. So, accordingly, he moved to add the word ``maladministration'' as a third ground for impeachment. James Madison objected to Mason's motion, contending that to add ``so vague a term''--the term being maladministration--to add ``so vague a term will be equivalent to a tenure during the pleasure of the Senate.'' Or put another way, if you said ``maladministration,'' the majority party in the House and the Senate could at any time overturn an election by alleging maladministration. So Madison came along and said, ``I understand what you are trying to do, old George, to Mason''--my words, not theirs--``I understand what you are trying to do here; we acknowledge that you can violate the public trust and abuse the office to do injury to the American people other than by treason and bribery.'' But if you read Madison's notes, if you read the debate, as I have, I challenge you to find an interpretation other than essentially what I am giving you here, which is this: ``But, George, if you put maladministration on, it will be subject to too much--too much--abuse. And, George, I acknowledge that something beyond treason and bribery can do harm. But, George, let's be careful what we add.'' They debated it. James Madison objected to the motion, as I said, because it was vague and here, again, we see the worry that impeachment would be misused by the Congress to reduce the independence of the President, allowing partisan factions to interfere at the expense of the larger public good and overturning the election or the consent of the governed being attacked because separation of powers had been reduced. The objection on the part of Madison proved effective, because Mason subsequently withdrew the motion and came up with another phrase, and you know what the phrase was. It said: ''. . .or other high crimes and misdemeanors.'' Obviously, the context in which ``high crimes and misdemeanors'' was entered was to be something a heck of a lot more than maladministration and less than treason or bribery, or at least equal to. What does this phrase mean? It is clear the framers thought it to be limited in scope, but beyond this, constitutional scholars of whom I have inquired and read have been debating the meaning of this phrase from the very early days of the Republic, and there is not a clear consensus. Despite this ongoing dialog and disagreement, though, I believe there are two important points of agreement in the minds of almost all constitutional scholars as to the original understanding of the phrase.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I support the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999. Naming this bill after my good friend Strom Thurmond is a fitting tribute to one of the Senate's greatest defenders of America's military interests. I urge everyone to take a minute to read Section 1, which highlights Senator Thurmond's distinguished record of service and leadership. As always, finding the right compromises to protect our national security while still living within our budget caps has been hard. Recent events in Iraq and Kosovo, and the attack on our embassies in Tanzania and Kenya are stark reminders of why our diplomatic efforts must be supported by a robust military. I compliment the Committee on Armed Services, under the leadership of Chairman Thurmond and Senator Levin, for its dedicated effort to address some of our nation's critical national security needs. While I do not agree with everything in the conference report, on balance I believe this bill does a great deal of good. On the personnel front, I know that all of us are pleased with the 3.6 percent pay raise. We know that our patriotic men and women in uniform do not serve in order to make money, but that doesn't change the needs of their families and themselves for adequate recompense. This is a solid step in the right direction. Along the same lines, I thank the conferees for joining me in supporting an increase in hazardous duty incentive pay for mid- and senior level enlisted aircrew personnel. This necessary increase reflects our commitment to the experienced aircrew personnel without whom our planes could not fly vital missions in Bosnia and Iraq. I was also pleased to see that this bill recognized the increasingly vital role of our Guard and Reserve personnel in the new Total Force. As that old Oldsmobile commercial said, ``this is not your father's'' military. Guard and Reserve personnel are absolutely vital to meeting America's leadership commitments around the world, to protecting communities here at home, and to defending national security. Among other things, this bill authorizes the payment of selective reenlistment bonuses, increased funding for Guard and Reserve training, the restoration of up to 800 military technicians (dual-status), and funds for the Guard's Youth ChalleNGe program and STARBASE program. The conference report continues Congress's effort to address the strains on our ability to provide high quality health care to our military retirees. Both houses of Congress are agreed that more work needs to be done in this area and the demonstration projects included in this year's bill are part of that process. In looking at some of the provisions in this bill that address foreign relations issues, I am less sanguine. As I said when the Senate dealt with this bill, I do not support the Sense of Congress provision that endorses NATO missions with ground forces that would not include any American troops. This is a dangerous precedent that encourages the erosion of American leadership in NATO. This bill also addressed satellite transfers. While we do not want to handicap America's satellite manufacturers and telecommunications firms, the most important consideration must always be to safeguard national security. The changes made in the licensing system appear to make sense, despite their being adopted on the basis of a very incomplete analysis of a complex issue. Transferring licensing authority back to the State Department--the same agency that licensed the controversial Loral satellite launch in February 1996--may help, so long as the State Department is given the resources to do the job right. This conference report permits the Department of State to keep all the fees it collects for registration by the Office of Defense Trade Controls--the office which administers licenses for military exports--a sensible approach that is also contained in the Department of State authorization bill. Now the Commerce, Justice, State appropriations conference must adopt a similar provision; otherwise we will be giving the State Department an unfunded mandate that it will be unable to fulfill. We run the risk of exacerbating the problem of perpetually under funding of our foreign policy tools. One provision addressing foreign policy that I was very pleased to see retained is the amendment that I authored calling for a report on the peaceful employment of former Soviet experts on weapons of mass destruction. The slightly revised provision is now found at section 1309. Section 1309 requires detailed reporting on the former Soviet experts who are at risk of recruitment by a rogue state or terrorist group. I am confident that this language will not require the Department of Defense to produce an impossibly detailed analysis. I am pleased to note that the revised provision will permit the Secretary of Defense to inform Congress of ways to increase the number of former Soviet arms experts whom we assist in their transitions into new occupations. That is a vital national security objective, and it will become even more vital in the coming years as Russia's nuclear establishment is substantially downsized and more of their nuclear weapons experts are left to find new ways to earn a living. In conclusion, Mr. President, the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act is a comprehensive bill that addresses many of our military needs. As I have said, there are some provisions that concern me. But, overall, I believe this bill provides some of the bricks that make up the foundation of our national security policy. It takes important steps to improve the quality of life for our most critical national security asset--our military personnel. My overall concern continues to be that it should not take terrorist attacks to realize that spending more on our first line of defense--our foreign policy--is an equally vital part of our national security policy. sec. 1512

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, after this week, someone very special will be missing from my morning commute from Wilmington. Jon Broscious, one of the Amtrak conductors who has been riding the trains with me for the past 25 years, is beginning a well-earned retirement. The mornings will not be the same without him. Jon is one of those individuals--like so many of the conductors, baggage handlers, flagmen, and attendants I have known who have worked so hard to maintain Amtrak's excellent reputation as an efficient and user-friendly service--who takes a great deal of pride in his work, making the care and comfort of his passengers always his first priority. These are men and women who have long understood that Amtrak's greatest assets are neither its miles of track nor its extensive rolling stock, but the good will of the thousands of Americans who depend upon rail transportation to get to work, to visit their loved ones, and to expand their horizons. For many years, Jon Broscious has earned the good will of countless passengers, some of whom--like myself--see him every day, and others for whom his conscientious service is their one and only contact with America's rail system. He has treated each and every one--whether in club car or in coach--as a first-class passenger. His example is one which all of us would do well to follow. During the twenty-five years that I have been sharing my mornings with Jon, we have learned a great deal about one another's lives and families. He has heard all about my children as they grew up, began to face the challenges of adulthood, embarked on their own careers, and gave me the joy of being a grandfather. And I shared Jon's pride as his son passed the bar and set up his practice in Virginia; anguished with him throughout his son's battle with cancer; and shared his joy when the disease was finally conquered. I'll never forget the time that Jon and his whole family, including his grandchildren, visited with me in my office here in Washington. Though it was my first meeting with many of them, I felt like I knew each one well because Jon had spoken of them so often. Jon and his family have a great many plans for his well-deserved retirement. He has earned the comfort and happiness that he brought to so many others over the years. Along with his colleagues and the many others who ride the trains each morning, I wish him all the best. But the mornings will never be the same. I'll miss you, Jon.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I support the defense appropriations conference report, but I would like to briefly comment on one issue - strategic airlift. As we have learned in places like Kenya, Tanzania, Iraq, and Bosnia, the end of the Cold War has not brought stability to the world. That instability continually threatens our national security interests and has placed a high demand on our military assets. Primary among those assets is strategic airlift. Using our military requires getting troops and equipment and weapons to strategic locations. I am very concerned that we are taking some short-cuts in this bill that directly impact that vital national security capability. In particular, I am concerned that the Senate did not fully fund the President's request for C-5 avionics modernization. Instead, this Conference Report provides only $33.7 million of $47.9 million dollars necessary to increase C-5 safety and reliability. While $33.7 million is a lot of money, we need to do more. The $14.2 million cut delays installation of the Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) by a full-year. Other important modifications are also delayed, including the following: Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System, Global Air Traffic Management, Flight Instrument and Engine Display System, and Automatic Flight Controls. These are the systems that navigate the plane and protect it against various forms of collision. As the skies continue to become more crowded, and as we rely on C-5s to provide airlift in all types of weather and over all kinds of terrain up-to-date avionics are critical. The C-5 has served the nation well in all of our military actions overseas from the Yom Kippur War to current operations in Bosnia and Iraq. In Desert Storm, the C-5 delivered over 38 percent of all America's airlift. It is an absolutely essential part of the Air Force's airlift capacity. A capacity that is more critical than ever as we move to an Expeditionary Aerospace Force. I want to point out here that it is not just me who believes the C-5 is a critical national defense priority. It is one of the Air Force's top priorities. Even now, I know that the Air Force is attempting to cobble together the needed $14.2 million from other accounts. The Air Force should not be put in this position. We should give them the money. We have known for some time that the C-5 needs some modernization work. The Air Force is undertaking a study to determine how best to preserve and protect our strategic airlift. That larger study will look at many things--re-engining the C-5, buying more C-17s, refitting existing commercial airframes, exploring spare parts shortages and maintenance delays--but it will not change the need to modernize the avionics in the short-term. The Air Force is committed to this modernization and deserves our support. Quite simply, the airlift of the United States military rests in the back of the C-5. In a world where threats appear in every corner of the globe, we cannot afford to shortchange the strategic airlift that protects our national security. When we look at addressing readiness shortfalls in the military in a supplemental appropriations bill this year, I hope my colleagues will consider the need to restore $14.2 million to the C-5 Avionics Modernization accounts. The Air Force should know that we share its committment to strategic airlift.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise to take just a minute of the Senate's time to let my colleagues know of an honor that Senator Roth received from the Delaware Chapter of the Multiple Sclerosis Society. In a gala event last night in Wilmington, Delaware, Senator Roth was honored for his achievements as a legislator and for his outstanding contributions to Delaware and to the nation. This was the Multiple Sclerosis Society's first-ever Dinner of Champions, and it is quite an honor for Senator Roth to be one of the first two individuals recognized by the organization. The other individual recognized last evening was Richard Christopher, the President of Patterson-Schwartz Real Estate. He and his company have been sponsors of and participants in the Bike-to-the-Bay fundraising event. The DuPont Company also received an award for its decade-long support of the popular Read-a-thon program. Senator Roth was in excellent company last night. And, fortunately, he was able to be there and accept the award in person. That is, Mr. President, one of the advantages of representing a State that is close to Washington. Senator Roth could both vote here in the Senate and still get back to Wilmington in time to receive the award. I know that was important to him. I thank my colleagues for allowing me to take this brief time. And, I congratulate Senator Roth on his award.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I am pleased to support Montreal Protocol No. 4, which will simplify the rules for cargo and baggage liability in international air traffic. It is important for the Senate to act now, because Protocol No. 4 has already entered into force. Consequently, U.S. carriers and cargo companies are unable to take advantage of these simplified rules, at a significant economic cost. U.S. industry estimates that Protocol No. 4 will save them $1 billion annually. The treaty has been pending in the Senate for over 20 years. It failed to gain support not because it is controversial, but because it has been the victim of misfortune--having been paired, in its submission to the Senate, with Montreal Protocol No. 3, a treaty placing unreasonably low limits on personal liability in international air traffic. I oppose Protocol No. 3, because I believe strongly that limits on personal liability contained in the treaty are an anachronism. Such limits may have been warranted when the underlying Warsaw Convention was drafted in 1929, a time when the airline industry was in its infancy. Now, however, when international air carriers are large corporations with significant financial resources--and thus fully capable of purchasing adequate insurance--there is no justification for such limits. For the past two decades, the aviation industry and the Executive Branch unsuccessfully sought ratification of Protocol No. 3 and No. 4. Only once did the Protocols reach the full Senate floor. In 1983, the Senate voted 50-42 to approve them, far short of the two-thirds necessary for advice and consent to ratification. Recognizing that Protocol No. 3 cannot be approved by the Senate, the industry and the Executive have effectively abandoned the effort, and have requested the Senate to proceed with consideration of Protocol No. 4. The resolution of ratification of Protocol No. 4 will bring a formal end to the misguided effort to approve No. 3: the resolution directs the Secretary of the Senate to return Protocol No. 3 to the President. More importantly, the industry, acting through its association, the International Air Transport Association, has taken steps to waive these personal liability limits. Consequently, most of the leading air carriers have agreed in their contracts with passengers to waive all personal liability limits, and agreed to strict liability up to 100,000 Special Drawing Rights, or about $130,000. These are positive developments, and I commend the airlines for taking these steps. Although not all carriers have waived the liability limits, all of the major U.S. carriers have, as have many of the leading foreign carriers which fly to the United States. I urge the Department of Transportation to make every effort to ensure that all carriers involved in international air traffic which fly within or to or from the United States do so as soon as possible. I hope that these measures, which are based on contract, not on any domestic law or international treaty, will eventually be codified in a new international instrument--an instrument that would firmly establish international norms and provide certainty for carriers and passengers alike. Negotiations toward that end are ongoing under the auspices of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). One sticking point in these negotiations has been the question of a ``fifth jurisdiction.'' Under the current Warsaw Convention, a suit may be brought in any one of four places: the place of incorporation of the carrier, the carrier's principal place of business, the place where the ticket was sold, and the place of the ultimate destination of the passenger. Notably missing from this list is the place where the passenger lives, or, in legal terms, his ``domicile.'' As a practical matter, most Americans will be able to sue in U.S. court under the existing four jurisdictions; but there will be cases in which a passenger buys a ticket overseas on a foreign carrier--which would probably preclude that passenger from bringing a suit in a U.S. court. The Clinton Administration is pressing for inclusion of the fifth jurisdiction in any new international instrument. I commend the Administration for taking this position. Including a fifth jurisdiction should be considered an essential element of any new international agreement on passenger liability. At this point, I would like to call the attention of my colleagues and the Executive Branch to a speech delivered earlier this year by Lee Kreindler regarding these negotiations. Mr. Kreindler, an aviation attorney with over four decades of experience, has provided a helpful guide to the current legal situation in this area and to the ICAO negotiations. I ask unanimous consent that they be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, Montreal Protocol No. 4 is a useful step in modernizing the rules of cargo and baggage in international air traffic. I urge my colleagues to support it. Exhibit 1 Clouds on the Liability Horizon and What We Can Do About Them (By Lee S. Kreindler) I am honored to appear on this symposium, the second straight year in which I have been on your program. After all, as a plaintiff's laywer, I have spent much of the last forty five years bringing legal actions against IATA's members, the international airlines. More important than that, perhaps, I have spent most of that time being highly critical of IATA's role in promoting the Warsaw Convention and its progeny, and in defending and preserving a limit of liability that to me, and all of my clients, has been abhorrent. Now I find myself applauding your monumental efforts, and, particularly the monumental efforts of your distinguished general counsel, Lorne Clark, to put an end to limits of liability in personal injury and death cases. I find that, after all these years, we are in synchronization, pulling together to create a system that will protect the interests of your member carriers' customers, the flying public, and their families, and at the same time preserve the interests of your airline members. To me this is an uplifting and energizing experience. I want IATA's efforts to establish a fair and enforceable system of liability in international air law, as well as my own efforts, to succeed. I have nothing but praise for IATA's courage in leading its member airlines to waive the liability limits of the Warsaw Convention. The IATA Agreement was long and hard in coming, but it was a remarkable achievement given the political and economic realities of the world. You deserve enormous credit for bringing it about. I say that, as your long time adversary, without condition or qualification. You have done a wonderful job, for which the flying public owes you thanks. I think it would be a great mistake, however, to revel in the glory of accomplishment, and ignore problems and threats which could very well bring this brave new dream crashing down. And so my concern now, as a friend, is that the new system, because of its inherent weaknesses, may fail. Indeed, I see clouds on the horizon, and I want to address them with you while there is still time to deal with them, so that, together, we can build a strong and lasting structure that can and will withstand the storms that are sure to come. Problems With the IATA-ATA Agreements and the Resulting System--A Foundation Based on Contract The basic law in international airline liability is still provided by the Warsaw Convention, which was effectively modified in 1966, with respect to transportation involving the United States, to increase the passenger injury and death limitation to $75,000. Onto this convention there have now been engrafted three agreements, the IATA Intercarrier Agreement (IIA), the Agreement on Measures to Implement the IATA Intercarrier Agreement (MIA), and the ATA Intercarrier Agreement, also known as Provisions Implementing the IATA Intercarrier Agreement (IPA), applicable, at least, to those carriers which have signed the agreements. Each of the three agreements, IIA, MIA, and IPA is a private contractual agreement sponsored by either IATA or ATA and signed by individual airlines. Some of these agreements, by some of the signatory airlines, have been incorporated in tariffs, which have been filed with the U.S. Department of Transportation. This does not, however, turn them into ``law.'' They are still private contracts which, by virtue of the tariffs, are incorporated in the airline's conditions of contract. In the first of these agreements, IIA, the signatory airlines agreed to ``take action'' to waive the limitation of liability on recoverable compensatory damages, which, since the Montreal Agreement of 1966 has effectively been $75,000 per passenger on a substantial part of international airline travel, including all transportation involving the United States. In the MIA the signatory carriers agree to implement the IIA by incorporating various provisions in their contracts of carriage and tariffs where necessary. Under the most important provision the carrier agrees that it will not invoke the limitation of liability in Article 22 (1) of the Convention as to any claim of recoverable compensatory damages under Article 17. In order words, each carrier waives the Warsaw limit. The second provision each carrier agrees to in MIA is to not avail itself of any defense under Article 20 (1) of the Convention with respect to claims up to 100,000 SDRs. Article 20 (1), sometimes called the exculpatory clause, provides that the carrier can exculpate itself from liability completely if it can show it took all necessary measures to avoid the damage. Thus, in agreeing to waive this defense up to 100,000 SDRs each carrier has subjected itself to absolute or strict liability up to that amount. In not making this waiver above 100,000 SDRs the carrier has accepted the burden of proving the taking of all necessary measures. Proving that is a virtual impossibility in all cases except terrorist cases, other situations entirely caused by a third party, and possibly clear air turbulence cases. Thus while this provision may not have substantial practical significance the principle of the carrier having the burden of proof regarding its absence of fault has become a precedent which may affect the formulation of a new convention or protocol. Rights of Recourse, Including Indemnity and Contribution The MIA goes on to provide that the signatory airline ``reserves all defenses available under the Convention to any such claim.'' And it adds that ``With respect to third parties, the carrier also reserves all rights of recourse . . . including rights of contribution and indemnity.'' It may be well and good for the signatory airlines to reserve all rights of recourse against a manufacturer, for example, in a contract between itself and other airline, but there is real doubt that this can have any legal and binding effect without the consent of such third party and possibly without the consent of the passenger himself. The fact that this reservation of rights is a creature of private contract, rather than law or legal judgments, is, in my opinion, a fatal flaw in the system in terms of legal enforceability. An impleaded third party, such as a manufacturer, or its insurer, will be free to claim that the airline, or its insurer, which made a payment pursuant to IIA, was a ``volunteer'', and was a collateral source whose payment may not be created to damages owed the passenger or his estate by the manufacturer. It is my understanding that George Tompkins and Lorne Clark have requested the manufacturers to provide a statement of policy that they will not assert a ``volunteer'' defense in the event that an airline settles a claim in excess of the applicable limit of liability in any suit for contribution or indemnity, and it is my further understanding that the request is being favorably considered. However, in my opinion, the problem can't definitively be cured by consent of the third party defendant. Under this system the airline can offer to pay unlimited damages, and it may try to insist that a passenger or passenger's family execute a general release, releasing third parties, but the passenger does not have to accept that. The passenger can sue the airline under the IIA and MIA, as a third party beneficiary, and can maintain a wholly independent action against a negligent manufacturer or air traffic control facility. In other words there is the theoretical possibility here of double recoveries. The passenger can recover on his case against the airline, which is based on the IIA and MIA contracts and then take the position, on his case against the manufacturer, or other third party, that the airline was collateral source for which the manufacturer may not get a credit. For the recourse provisions of IIA, MIA, and IPA to be meaningful the payment of damages by the airline would have to be the result of law and not private contract. This problem of recourse runs through all three of these agreements, and, in my opinion, can be solved only by a new convention or protocol, establishing a legal basis for the payment of unlimited damages by an airline. That is not the only problem presented by IIA agreements. Domicile, ``Subject To Applicable Law'' IIA states as an objective ``that recoverable compensatory damages may be determined and awarded by reference to the law of the domicile of the passenger.'' When one examines the MIA, however, it provides that at the option of the carrier it may include a provision in its conditions of carriage and tariffs that, ``subject to applicable law'', recoverable compensatory damages . . . may be determined by reference to the law of the domicile or permanent residence of the passenger.'' In the IPA there is no option provision. It simply states that ``subject to applicable law, recoverable compensatory damages * * * may be determined by reference to the law of the domicile or permanent residence of the passenger.'' Thus the intent of the drafters, as shown by the language of the three agreements, would appear to have been to apply the law of the passenger's domicile or permanent residence. In actual fact, however, there was no such uniform agreement to apply the law of domicile, and the language can best be explained by the political, or negotiating constraints if any agreement at all was to be achieved. Briefly stated, the United States carriers, with the prodding of the U.S. Department of Transportation, insisted on language applying the law of domicile. To European carriers, however, their law did not apply law of domicile. Generally there courts would apply the law of the place of the accident or the law of the forum. Thus in the face of the language in IIA, pointing to law of domicile, they insisted on language making it clear that would only be at the option of the airline. The U.S. carriers, on the other hand, all signed the IPA, and thereby accepted law of the passenger's domicile on cases against them. The agreements may not do that, however, because the language, ``subject to applicable law'' may dictate some other law! Let's assume, for example, a case brought under the IPA in which the deceased passenger was domiciled in Pennsylvania, which has relatively liberal death damages law. Let's say the airplane crashed into the high seas. When the case is brought in the United States will the Death on the High Seas Act be applied, or the law of Pennsylvania? In the first instance the decision will be up to the airline, or, more likely, the airline's insurer. Let's suppose the airline, faithful to the text of the IIA agreements, makes an offer under Pennsylvania law standards. But let's assume the passenger, or the lawyer for the estate of the passenger, rejects the offer as being insufficient. The matter would then go to court. In court the passenger (or the estate's) lawyer, asserts that the law of Pennsylvania will govern damages, pointing to the IIA Agreements. What position does the airline take in court? And what position will the court take? After all the Death on the High Seas Act is a United States statute. As for the carrier, one might hope it would feel morally bound to accept the law of the domicile of the passenger, but history suggests that economics will determine its position, or, more precisely, its insurer's position. Let's take a similar case under the IPA, where the airplane has crashed over land, as in the Pan Am 103 Lockerbie bombing. Let's assume the action is started in Florida, as, indeed, a significant number of Lockerbie cases were. In those Lockerbie cases the court, stating that it was applying Florida choice of law rules, applied the law of the place of the accident, Scotland. What will the situation be under the Intercarrier Agreements including the IPA? Will the carrier, and the court, enforce the law of the passenger's domicile, or will they apply the law of the place of accident? Again, history suggests that the parties are likely to be motivated by economics. In short, the words, ``subject to applicable law'' are likely to introduce conflict and uncertainty in many cases brought under the IPA. I would respectfully suggest that those words be removed from the IPA Agreement, and that it simply provide that the law of the passenger's domicile will be applied. Successive Carriage Another problem arises by virtue of Article 30 (1) and (2) of the Warsaw Convention which deal with the liability of successive carriers. Article 30 (2) states: ``(2) . . . the passenger or his representative can take action only against the carrier who performed the transportation during which the accident or delay occurred. . . .'' It may turn out, of course, that all carriers sign and adhere to the Intercarrier Agreement, and they will, therefore, all be subject to it. But, given the nature of the world, it is probable that some, or even many, will not sign on. If the second, or third, successive carrier is the one on which the accident happens, it may choose not to waive the limit, despite the claim by the plaintiff that the successive carrier is bound by the original contract of carriage. Then where are we? I understand that carriers now signing the IIA Agreements are limiting their waivers of the limit to accidents occurring on their own part of the carriage, so passengers may still be subject to the limit in other cases. But the injured passenger, or his family if he has been killed, will, nevertheless, argue that the carrier which issued the ticket must be liable for damages without limitation, and that he or his estate is an authorized third party beneficiary. An action will be brought against that carrier for unlimited damages. The Warsaw Convention, which was supposed to have simplified liability rules will be the very cause of the dispute in these cases. If, indeed, waivers of the limit do not apply to successive carriers, then the IATA agreements will be something of a cruel hoax in successive carriage situations and may well inspire intense adverse passenger group reactions. The 5th Jurisdiction Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention permits suit to be brought in any one of four places; the place of incorporation of the carrier, its principal place of business, the place where the contract of carriage was made (i.e. where the ticket was sold), and, finally, the place of ultimate destination of the passenger. Notably absent is the place of the passenger's domicile. In most cases the place of the passenger's domicile will coincide with one of the places suit can be brought anyway, so there is no problem. But there are occasional cases where an American, for example, will buy a ticket while on a trip, away from home. American damages standards are considerably higher than those of other countries, generally, and in that rare case the American passenger, or his family, will be denied the higher American standards. It is generally recognized that the place of domicile is the place which has the greatest interest in the question of damages, and the denial of domicile law is very troubling to parties and governments alike. The United States Government, and particularly the Department of Transportation and Department of State, have taken the position that any new regime of law, in international airline transportation, must provide for suits in ``the 5th Jurisdiction'', i.e., the place of the passenger's domicile. Non American carriers have resisted the proposal, for reasons that baffle me. It seems to me that from the airline's standpoint the point is not worth fighting about, if the carriers can get an otherwise favorable system. There are simply not enough such cases to provide a real stumbling block. The IATA intercarrier agreements do not and cannot solve the problem, and they cannot because of the Warsaw Convention's proscription against changing jurisdictional rules (See Article 32). The United States has gone along with the intercarrier agreements because of the predominant interest in getting the airlines to abandon the limits, notwithstanding their failure to adopt the 5th jurisdiction, but the point remains one of contention for any new convention or protocol. Fault or No Fault? Finally, important lawyers in the United States DOT seem to be locked into an anti-fault mode of thinking on any new system, whether it be based on the intercarrier agreements or a new convention or protocol. This probably goes back to attitudes developed in 1966 at the time of the Montreal Agreement, when State Department lawyers obtained from the airlines and IATA an agreement to accept absolute liability up to a limit of $75,000 as a tradeoff for perpetuation of the Warsaw Convention and its limited liability regime. The DOT has viewed absolute, no-fault, liability as being in the passenger interest. Most passenger groups, however, as well as lawyer groups which customarily represent passengers, view the fault system as a fundamental necessity which is critically important from the safety perspective for the protection of passengers as well as society in general. They point to numerous contributions to airline safety made by tort cases and their examination into both negligence and accident causation. The contribution of the tort system to aviation safety is well recognized, also, by aviation insurers and their lawyers. Sean Gates, a London solicitor and senior partner of Beaumont and Son, one of the leading firms representing aviation underwriters, has expressed himself as strongly opposed to absolute liability for international airlines, both because he is opposed to abandonment of the fault system, and because he doesn't see why airlines alone in our society should be held to be guarantors of safety. Anthony Mednuik, one of the world's leading underwriters, and presently Managing Director of the British Aviation Insurance Group, has similarly expressed himself as strongly opposed to abandoning the fault system. He did so most recently at a large meeting in Amelia Island, Florida, in October, of the Aircraft Builders Council, which consists of both aviation manufacturers and underwriters, and again at an aviation insurance and law symposium in London in November, sponsored by Lloyds of London Press. And George N. Tompkins, Jr. one of the top airline defense lawyers in the United States has recommended the following language to the ICAO Secretariat Study Group, of which he is a member: ``No limit of liability on the recoverable damages mentioned in A above if the passenger/claimant proves negligence or fault on the part of the carrier. This would not impose an undue burden on the passenger/claimant and would serve to preserve the ``Warsaw Convention'' as a fault based system.'' This difference of opinion on the fault system is not a factor affecting the intercarrier agreements since they are already in place and they have been based on strict liability up to 100,000 SDRs and presumptive liability above that amount if the carrier fails to show its complete absence of fault, but it will be a significant factor in the effort to achieve a new convention or protocol. Thus we have a situation where the IATA agreements, however noble their purpose and laudable their execution, provide an insufficient basis for a satisfactory future regime in international air law, and where there is considerable doubt that, on a political level, the problems and differences of fault/no fault, limitations of venue, rights of recourse, and successive carriage, can be overcome, so as to create a reasonable new convention or protocol. The prospect exists that there will be no satisfactory new convention or protocol, and that the intercarrier agreements will fail to provide a workable system. It is uncertain where such an outcome would lead, but one virtual certainty would be complete abandonment of the Warsaw Convention, and the airlines would not be happy about that. So, where do we go from here? The Need to Work Together Everyone involved, from IATA and airlines, to the United States Government and other governments, to passengers' groups and plaintiffs' lawyers, has something to lose from a failure to come up with a satisfactory new liability regime. The obvious answer to the problem is the formulation of a new and widely acceptable convention or protocol which will have the force of law to handle not only airline liability, but rights of recourse, successive carriage, choice of law and adequate venue. The Need for Ratifiability At the excellent Lloyds of London Press Aviation Insurance and Law Symposium in November, in London, Don Horn, Associate General Counsel for International Affairs of the United States Department of Transportation, pointed out the truism that the first requirement for any new convention (or protocol) is that it must be ratifiable. I respectfully suggest that that is a good place to start in our consideration of the new convention or protocol. Whatever we come up with must be ratifiable. It must be ratifiable by the United States, and it must be approval by the international airlines. Excellent preparatory work has been done by the ICAO Study Group and the ICAO Legal Committee. The pattern of a splendid convention or protocol is now clear, and available. In general it has been set forth by the Study Group. It will provide for a two tier liability system, with absolute liability up to the threshold number of 100,000 Special Drawing Rights, and negligence liability above that. It must provide for the addition of the ``fifth jurisdiction.'' In other words, passenger's domicile must be added to the other available venues, place of incorporation of the carrier, place of its principal place of business, and place where the ticket was bought. For those international airlines and insurers who are reluctant to accept the fifth jurisdiction I would point out three things. First, there is an element of compromise inherent in the United States Government acceptance of the two tier concept on fault. The position of the U.S. has been to favor absolute liability across the board. This is not in the airline interest, and in my humble opinion, not in the public interest, but that, as I understand it, has been its position. Acceptance of the two tier system by the United States will have another laudable effect. It will insure support of the new convention or protocol in the United States on the part of passengers', consumers, and lawyers' groups who believe that the fault system is one of society's basic protections. Were the United States to hold out for absolute liability across the board, and were that part of the new Convention or protocol I would expect intense opposition to the new convention or protocol in the United States. The second point is that in terms of cost to airlines or insurers the fifth jurisdiction is deminimus. There are, simply, very few cases where an American domiciliary buys a ticket in another country and cannot sue in the United States under one of the four presently permissible jurisdictions. I have been practicing aviation law for forty five years, and I have probably handled as many airline cases as any other lawyer in the world, and I can only remember one case involving an American passenger where I was unable to sue in the United States because of Article 28. Finally, the overall benefit to airlines, and all others, of having a viable new convention or protocol would be enormous. It would be foolish to jeopardize its chances because of opposition to the fifth jurisdiction. Burden of Proof on the Second Tier As indicated above, the new convention proposed by the Legal Committee of ICAO prescribes a two tier system of liability. There is absolute liability for damage up to 100,000 SDRs and negligence liability above that. In an exercise of indecision, however, the drafters set forth three alternative provisions on who shoulders the burden of proving negligence. The concept of placing the burden on the defendant airline of showing its freedom from fault grows from Article 20 of the Convention which provides that to exculpate itself the airline must show that it took all necessary measures to avoid the damage. Generally speaking, however, it is the plaintiff who has the burden of proving negligence. The concept of providing three alternative suggestions is not sound and will lead to confusion and uncertainty. Obviously, it is to the plaintiff's advantage to place the burden on the defendant, but I don't consider it a make or break matter. Again, it is more important to get the broad outlines of the convention established than to fight about each of its terms. Convention or Protocol? Similary, the question of whether this should be a brand new convention or a protocol to the Warsaw Convention is less important than the substance of the new instrument. People I respect, including Lorne Clark and George Tompkins, who know far more than I do about the politics of enacting a new convention, tell me that it will be much easier to enact a protocol, so, for that reason alone I favor it. I would urge a note of caution, however. The Warsaw Convention has a very bad history and reputation with many people, including me and my clients. For many of them it has ruined their lives. I would eliminate all extolatory language praising the Warsaw Convention, such as the introductory language in the ICAO Legal Committee draft, regardless whether it is new convention or protocol. Simpler and Shorter is better I would suggest that all references to cargo be removed. It is not necessary to include it in the new instrument. In fact, it may be completely resolved by the ratification of Montreal Protocol 4. The simpler and shorter the new instrument is, the better.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise today to express my deep concern about our country's ability to lead at this crucial moment for the international economy. Yesterday, the House of Representatives refused to provide the resources that the International Monetary Fund needs to deal with the most serious international financial crisis in years. What makes this failure even more inexcusable is that our participation in a stronger IMF would not cost American taxpayers a dime. As the President reminded us earlier this week, this is a time when we alone--with the most important economy in the world--are in a position to lead. And two days ago, Treasury Secretary Rubin and Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan told us just how dangerous the current situation really is. At this critical juncture, those who weaken our standing in key international financial institutions are playing a reckless game. By failing to provide the $14.5 billion U.S. ``quota'' increase--our share in an expanded capital reserve for the IMF--the House has increased the threat to our economy from the current international financial turmoil. This is just the kind of situation that can get out of control if no one steps in to steer a course through these troubled times. Right now, the Europeans are turned inward, concerned with the next stage in their economic integration--the introduction of a common currency that puts strict limits on its members' budget and interest rate policies. Japan remains in the grip of a political paralysis that has allowed its financial problems--centered in a banking system that is crumbling from the weight of bad loans--to fester for almost a decade. The Tigers of the Asian financial miracle have been declawed, and with their collapse the world has lost a major engine for growth. And our increasingly important trading partners in Latin America are catching their own version of the Asian flu. They face the threat of a chain of devaluations, budget crunches, and slower growth. Quite literally, Mr. President, we are in a world of hurt. The robust American economy of recent years--with strong job growth, rising incomes, healthy profits, high levels of investment in new technologies--has been the wonder and the envy of the rest of the world. And the fundamentals here, as Treasury Secretary Rubin and Fed Chairman Greenspan have stressed, remain strong. But in recent weeks, we have watched as wild swings in our stock market reveal profound anxiety and uncertainty about the effects of international events on our own country. Those international events have their ultimate origins in the particular circumstances of many different nations as they have entered today's global economy. But they have common threads--chief among them, a trend in those emerging economies toward excessive borrowing from other countries, debt denominated in dollars and other strong currencies. A lot of this international cash flowed into economies whose banking systems lacked fundamental rules for safety, soundness, and just plain honest bookkeeping. As those debt burdens reached unsustainable levels for many important emerging economies, investors were convinced that assets they held in the currencies of those countries were no longer as valuable, and that those countries were no longer in a position to prop up their currencies with shrinking reserves of hard currencies. Once that idea took hold, the flight from those currencies was as swift as it was inevitable. As the agonizing reappraisal of international lending grew to encompass other emerging economies, the currencies of countries as widely dispersed--and as different--as Russia, Venezuela, Brazil, and Argentina have come under increasing pressure. In the case of Russia, that pressure has resulted in the virtual collapse of the ruble and the evaporation of the nascent Russian stock market. What does this all have to do with us, Mr. President? A lot. First, as these emerging markets lose steam, they buy fewer finished goods from us and from other advanced economies, taking a bite out of our export sector, a major component of our recent growth. Facing shrinking markets and low-cost competition from the weakened emerging economies, American firms will no longer enjoy the kind of corporate earnings--or the kind of stock prices--that until just recently lifted Wall Street indexes into the stratosphere. Without those profits and those stock values, our companies will not be able to sustain the level of investment that has been a cornerstone of our recent booming economy. Ultimately, this must lead to lower job growth and thinner pay checks. And the decline in our stock market will affect many individual investors' willingness to continue the level of spending that has been the real backbone of our economy. Another key feature of this global slump is depressed prices for basic commodities like grain and oil. There is no need for me to remind my colleagues here that our farmers now face a serious crisis because of the loss of important export markets. I know I hear from my poultry farmers in Delaware, for whom Russia is a key export market, about their concerns. The latest numbers show that our trade deficit soared by more than 20 percent in the second quarter of this year, and its gives every sign of getting worse before it gets better. Some projections show our exports declining in ways we haven't seen in more than a decade, while we continue to pull in cheap imports from the weakened economies around the world. We are in the middle of a major global economic transformation, Mr. President, and there is much we don't know about the workings of the evolving system of increased trade and increased international investment. But we can see from here that international financial problems--particularly foreign exchange crises--have a strong potential to spread, and that our economy, for all its fundamental strengths, will be hurt more the longer those problems persist. As we survey the wreckage from this global crisis, and consider the very real potential for deeper trouble, we cannot hesitate to use every tool at our disposal to restore confidence to financial markets. The International Monetary Fund is the institution that we created, along with the other major economies, at the end of World War II to inject a measure of stability into the management of international currency markets. Time and events have overtaken the problems for which the IMF was originally created. And while there are important and useful reforms of the IMF included in both House and Senate legislation this session, I am concerned that we are demanding too much of the IMF--expanding its responsibilities instead of focusing its energies where they can do the most good--and too little from such forums as the G-7 and others where the major economies of the world should be seeking a sense of common concern and a coordinated response. But that is a topic for another day, Mr. President. Today, we need look no farther than today's front page to see that the need for an international lender of last resort is essential to the stability of today's financial markets. Only such a lender can step in to keep a country from complete financial and political meltdown when private investment retreats. Only such a lender can work to limit the contagion of a currency collapse to more and more countries. But the vastly increased size of international financial markets now dwarfs the resources of the IMF relative to the problems it confronts. Last year, even before the meltdown in Asia, the IMF--with our agreement--concluded that the size and repercussions of foreign exchange crises in today's world justify an increase in the basic reserves of the IMF, the ``quota'' paid in by each of its 182 members. And we have also agreed, with the other senior members of the IMF, to make available a larger emergency fund, the New Arrangements to Borrow, for use when the quota funds get too low. Today, with the funds already committed to Asia and Russia, the IMF's resources are now dangerously low--so low that they call into question its ability to meet the next major run on an emerging economy's currency. So the rest of the world is looking to us to take the lead in providing those resources to the IMF. Our share of the quota increase would be $14.5 billion; our share of the New Arrangements to Borrow would be $3.5 billion. But while we must go through the appropriations process to make those funds available to the IMF, we get in return an interest bearing asset, so the overall budget effect is a wash. Let me repeat that--there is no budget outlay involved when we meet our commitment to increase the capacity of the IMF to meet international financial crises. And yet, Mr. President, we face the very real threat that the United States will simply flub this chance to maintain its leadership. With the failure of the House to act on the quota, providing only the $3.5 billion for the New Arrangements to borrow, we leave the rest of the world to wonder about our commitment to deal with the very serious problems that afflict our global economy. Here in the Senate, we have been fortunate to have the benefit of real leadership on the issue of IMF funding. Senator Stevens has made use of two opportunities to put the Senate on record in support of full funding for our participation in the IMF. My colleagues on the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Hagel and Senator Sarbanes, have lent their considerable energies and reputations to this effort. There are few opportunities left in this session for us to put this right, Mr. President. The Congress is already seen by the rest of the world as reluctant to take an easy--and, I repeat, costless--step to increase the resources of the one institution we have that is in a position to intervene in this crisis. This can only add to the uncertainty that is at the bottom of the current market unrest. Mr. President, there is every indication that we have a long, hard road between us and the end of the current financial turmoil. I hope that in the few weeks remaining to us this session we will take this one small step to start that journey.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, this is a time of serious political turmoil in the United States. The House of Representatives is currently considering impeachment proceedings. The President of the United States has admitted to serious moral indiscretions. The public is divided on what punishment should be meted out to a President who has performed such despicable and indefensible actions. While the House of Representatives is considering impeachment the Senate is waiting to determine whether it may have to sit in judgment with respect to these actions. Clearly this is a difficult time for the nation domestically. It is a perilous time for the nation internationally. We have four weeks left in this Congress and to date we have failed to address some critical foreign policy issues. Notwithstanding that failure and the political disarray on the domestic front, there should be no disagreement as to the need to face up to these issues. This challenge, and our unfinished business, is the subject of my remarks today. Throughout our nation's history, Americans have understood that no matter what was happening in this country's internal political life, America's survival depends on presenting a strong, united front to the world. Now, in the middle of a domestic political crisis, we must overcome partisan differences to focus on urgent matters in United States foreign policy. Especially now, in the face of major world crises, we must not allow ourselves to be distracted from our task of protecting America's security, leadership, and credibility abroad. With time running short in the Congressional session, the ability to reach out to find the necessary consensus which could permit our country to speak in one voice is threatened by the entire debate over the future of this President. No matter how we feel about the actions of President Clinton and whether impeachment proceedings should begin in the House of Representatives, Bill Clinton is still President of the United States with constitutional responsibilities for the conduct of our foreign policy and national security. We in the Congress share that constitutional responsibility and I call on my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to come together and work closely with the President and his national security team to address these issues together. The security threats facing us are urgent and complex: international terrorism; weapons of mass destruction in Iraq; nuclear weapons programs in India, Pakistan, and North Korea; a fragile Middle East peace; drug trafficking and international crime; the financial crises in Russia and Asia; and impending humanitarian disasters in Kosovo and the Horn of Africa. Russian Economic Crisis The unfolding crisis in Russia, for example, could hold serious threats to the national economic and military security of the United States. An even greater danger than the economic meltdown is the threat of a total collapse of Russia's political system. With the Yeltsin era about to end, the only thing worse than an economically paralyzed Yeltsin government would be a coup d'etat that installed an authoritarian government. It takes little imagination to see the dangers of a new, extremist Russian regime that would have access to thousands of leftover Cold War missiles armed with nuclear warheads. Because of the deep structural problems in Russia's political and economic system, there is very little that the United States can do to turn this situation around quickly. But with thousands of former Soviet nuclear weapons experts out of work and rogue states such as Libya, Iran, and Iraq eager to offer them paychecks, we must keep our eye on the first priority of preventing the collapse of Russian democracy along with the economy if we want to protect our own national security. Kosovo In Kosovo, the Serbian special police are continuing their terrorist policy that has driven more than 300,000 Kosovo Albanians from their homes and into the forests and mountains. With the onset of the Balkan winter only one month away, a humanitarian catastrophe of enormous proportions looms. The West must compel the Serbs to cease military operations at once and provide unrestricted access to international aid organizations. The Administration must immediately formulate a policy on Kosovo and present it to the Congress so we can be united in strong action to address yet another Balkan tragedy. Iraq Sanctions Policy Iraq's decision last month to prevent U.N. inspections reminds us of the continuing threat posed by Saddam Hussein to our national interest. At that time, U.N. weapons inspector Scott Ritter resigned his post because he believed that the U.N. Security Council and the United States were unwilling to use force against Iraq to compel it to cooperate with U.N. weapons inspectors. Ritter's resignation has forced both the Administration and Congress to decide on a clear Iraq policy: do we rely on the immediate, unilateral use of force to back U.N. inspections? Do we seek to maintain consensus on the Security Council before using force? Do we abandon the threat of the use of force and rely on sanctions to contain Iraq? These are tough choices, but we need to make a decision and be prepared to stick with it. And we need to remember that big nations can't bluff. The Middle East Another test of United States leadership abroad is our continued support for the delicate peace process in the Middle East. My recent visit to the Middle East has reconfirmed my belief that both the Israeli and Palestinian leadership are committed to the success of the peace talks. It is important that Congress support the President's intensive efforts to revive a process that has remained stalled for much too long. Continued drift in the peace process benefits no one but the terrorists and extremists. India/Pakistan Equally critical is our support of the Administration's continued diplomatic efforts to de-escalate the nuclear tensions between India and Pakistan. In the wake of their nuclear tests, the President was forced by existing sanctions law to impose sweeping economic penalties against these countries, even though this made resolution of the crisis more difficult. The Senate quickly moved to repeal part of the sanctions law to make exceptions for food and other humanitarian supplies. The Senate Sanctions Task Force, which I co-chair with Senator McConnell, also recommended changes in the existing sanctions regime to give the President flexibility in negotiating with India and Pakistan. The Senate adopted these changes as an amendment to the Agricultural Appropriations bill. We need to complete action on this legislation before we adjourn. These are only some of the foreign policy issues we face together, the Congress and our President, in this dangerous world of borderless threats and transnational security challenges. Our foreign policy initiatives could have tragic consequences--as we've seen in the past--if the President, Congress, and the American people fail to forge a common consensus on our foreign policy goals. As I said at the outset, Bill Clinton is President of the United States. The situation requires a bipartisan effort to address these issues. We have failed thus far in meeting that responsibility with respect to several very specific issues. Working with the President, we must act on these issues before we adjourn. Embassy funding First among these is consideration of emergency embassy security legislation, which the President is expected to submit to the Congress this week. The embassy bombings in East Africa were tragic reminders of the long-term war against terrorism. They were also a reminder that maintaining a strong diplomatic presence around the globe cannot be done on a shoestring budget. I believe the Congress will act quickly on the Administration's request for emergency funding to rebuild the destroyed embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and to meet urgent security needs of our other diplomatic facilities around the world. As the world's leading superpower, we cannot afford to pinch pennies in countering the new breed of international terrorist. Under the leadership of the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Helms, and the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Appropriations Committee, I am confident that this issue will be acted upon in an expeditious and bipartisan manner. Engaging in a debate about whether Congress or the Executive had failed to provide adequate security funding would distract us from working together in a bipartisan manner to provide the funds needed to protect our people serving abroad. IMF Funding America's own economic security may also very well depend on Congress's ability to provide strong international leadership at this critical time for the international economy. The Asian financial crisis has sent shock waves as far as Russia and Latin America. To protect our economy and to keep the crisis from spreading, Congress must act quickly to help replenish its share of the IMF's resources, which now have reached dangerously low levels. But while the Senate has supported full funding for the IMF in a strong bipartisan manner, the House yesterday voted to provide only a fraction of our total share of the IMF's emergency funds. With the outcome of the financial crisis still to be determined, Congress must act decisively before we adjourn to maintain both the financial strength of the IMF and to help end the global economic crisis before our own interests are jeopardized.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent--I have the impression that this is all right with the majority and minority--that I be able to proceed as in morning business to speak on the situation in Russia for up to 30 minutes, or shorter if anyone comes to the floor and wishes to resume the business of the Senate?

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I rise today to discuss the political and economic crisis in Russia, which poses, to state the obvious, a grave threat to the security of the United States and the entire international order. The situation in Moscow is rapidly changing, so by the time I finish these statements today, Lord only knows, something may have happened in the meantime. Things are that fluid. Although the situation is rapidly changing, in the wake of last week's summit, five basic trends seem to be clear. First, the Yeltsin era is about to end. Second, because of structural problems in Russia's political and economic system, there is no short-term fix to Russia's economic crisis. Third, an even greater danger than an economic meltdown is the total collapse of the Russian political system, which would have catastrophic ramifications for the international security system. Fourth, in order to forestall such a collapse, the Yeltsin administration--or perhaps even a transition regime--will almost certainly take some immediate economic measures that will, at least temporarily, set back Russia's progress toward a free market economy. And, fifth, there is very little that the United States can do to affect this grim situation. It is fundamentally a Russian problem with deep cultural roots. Madam President, President Clinton, in my view, was correct in going through with last week's Moscow summit. If he had canceled or postponed the meeting, I think it would have sent signals to the world that the United States had written off the reform effort in Russia which, despite the very serious recent setbacks, has nonetheless achieved a great deal over the past 6\1/2\ years. I might note, parenthetically, that it may have achieved enough to prevent a total reversion to despotism in Russia. But that remains to be seen. Moreover, for all its built-in problems, the summit did produce a few modest agreements. Most important among them, as mentioned by others, was the agreement whereby the United States and Russia will each convert approximately 50 tons of plutonium withdrawn in stages from nuclear military programs into forms unusable for nuclear weapons. The plutonium management and disposition effort will require several billion dollars, but I can think of no joint effort between our two countries that is more worthy of support. As you know, Madam President, because you are well schooled in international relations and have spent a career in the House and the Senate dealing with these issues, the reason that an economy only the size of Holland is having such a profound impact on the rest of the world is because of the military danger that its collapse would cause. If the Russian economy collapses and causes societal and political instability, there are 15,000 nuclear weapons there that could fall into the hands of unreliable and perhaps unstable leaders in a fractured country. So the effort to deal with, for example, taking 50 tons of nuclear-grade material and rendering it incapable of being used in a military context seems to me to be well worth the buy, well worth the effort along the lines of the Nunn-Lugar bill in the destruction of nuclear capacity. Despite this and a few other achievements, though, the summit could not, I regret to say, conceal the terminal condition of the Yeltsin Presidency. Watching film of the summit press conference was a painful exercise, for the Russian President clearly showed his infirmity. This medical condition, together with the nearly total absence of popular support for President Yeltsin and his government, makes a change in the near future seem inevitable. Boris Berezovsky, the most prominent leader of Russia's new industrial tycoons--the power behind the throne--has already indicated in an interview that President Yeltsin's days in office may be numbered. The structural problems in Russia's economy are simply too serious to lend themselves to an easy solution. Many factors have contributed to the sorry state in which the economy now finds itself. The Asian financial crisis forced a general reappraisal of international lending in emerging economies. As investors retreated to safety, doubts about Russia's ability to protect the ruble became a self-fulfilling prophecy. The 50-percent drop in worldwide crude oil prices within the last 18 months severely harmed Russia's hard currency earning capacity, weakening an important support for its currency and its ability to pay international debts. But more fundamentally, Russia has been hamstrung by an inability to create the necessary preconditions for being a player in the international economic system. President Clinton outlined them in his usual lucid way in a speech to students in Moscow. Russia must create a full-fledged rule of law with fair enforcement mechanisms. It must put into place modern taxation and banking systems. Investors, domestic and foreign, must have confidence that they will not have the rules changed in the middle of the game. In return, Russians, especially the large Russian corporations, must pay their taxes so that the Government can get its fiscal house in order and will not have to resort to the printing press to cover its deficits. The Russian ``kleptocracy'' must end. Madam President, I was speaking by telephone with one of the more prominent businessmen in my State about an hour before I came over to the floor. He is in the poultry business. He called to ask me what I thought about the current situation in Russia. He has several million dollars' worth of product in Kaliningrad. They have a rule there that if, in fact, it is not purchased within 90 days, it can be confiscated. So he has to decide whether to keep it there and run the risk of confiscation or get it out of there and try to market it someplace else. In his factory in Delaware he has an equal amount of product with Russian labels, which is poultry to be sent to Russia. He wanted to know what I thought was likely to happen, and so on and so forth. As I talked to him--he is a very bright guy who has been doing business in Russia in earnest now for the last 4 or 5 years--I asked, ``What do they need most?'' He replied, ``I never thought I would say this as a conservative businessman. What they need most is the IRS over there.'' I said, ``Say that again?'' He repeated, ``What they need is the IRS over there.'' The truth of the matter is, one of the reasons their economy is in such horrible shape is that no one is paying their taxes. These are precisely the measures the International Monetary Fund has been urging on the Yeltsin government, but they remain largely unfulfilled. The only thing worse than the Yeltsin government paralyzed by an economic meltdown would be a coup d'etat that installed an authoritarian government. It takes little imagination to contemplate the horrible dangers of a resentful, extremist regime that still possesses thousands of missiles armed with nuclear warheads. Such a scenario, while still unlikely, is not beyond the realm of possibility, especially if Yeltsin's new candidate for Prime Minister, Yevgenii Primakov--who is almost certain to be confirmed by the Duma-- is unable to rapidly stabilize the situation. By tomorrow afternoon, I think Primakov will be confirmed by the Duma. In order to forestall a political catastrophe, I believe the Russian Government in the coming days will take economic steps that may, in the short run, avoid a revolutionary situation but in the long run will make it a heck of a lot harder for them to ever get their economic house in order. These steps will probably include putting an infusion of currency into the economy through a large-scale increase in Government spending to pay the back wages of state employees, including the military, a process which, in fact, seems already to have begun. Moreover, there will likely be some form of wage and price controls, foreign currency restrictions, and renationalization of some industries--all the wrong things to do. But in fairness to the Russians, I wonder if any of us were taking over that Government at this point, we would do anything short of that to avert a civil catastrophe. Such moves, we must realize, would likely doom Russia's chances of receiving the next payment of the $22 billion of the international support package negotiated just a month ago. I believe in the long run Russia's march toward a free-market economy is inevitable, notwithstanding what I said, but some emergency measures may be a necessary short-term detour to avoid the kind of complete calamity that a coup d'etat or popular uprising would bring. I am not predicting either a coup or an uprising, but I believe that the Russian leadership will conclude that is a risk they wish not to take. Unfortunately, there is very little the United States can do right now to influence events in Russia. Despite the deteriorating international economic enviroment and the inevitable mistakes that have occurred as part of well-intentioned assistance efforts, I do not believe that the United States or the West in general should feel that they are responsible for the Russian collapse. As I said on the floor last spring in the course of the Senate debate on NATO enlargement, we have wisely not repeated the mistakes made after World War I with respect to Germany. There is no parallel with Weimar. Rather than imposing staggering reparations on a defeated enemy, the capitalist world has pumped $100 billion in aid, loans, and investments into Russia. Rather than isolating Russia internationally as the victorious allies did with Germany well into the 1920s, we encouraged Moscow and welcomed her into a variety of international organizations. We must confront the inescapable fact that the root causes of Russia's stunning descent into chaos lie in her own history and culture. Centuries of serfdom and submission to foreign conquerors and autocratic tsars hampered the development of political democracy and a civic culture in Russia. Then at the beginning of the 20th century, just when both--that is, a civic culture and a political democracy--were nonetheless beginning to emerge Russia was hit first by World War I and then by the Bolshevik Revolution and civil war. I believe the 7 decades of communism that followed offer the best explanation of the current disarray in Russia. The tangible devastating legacies of communism are well known: millions killed by Stalin's mad collectivization and purges, environmental degradation, and a massive deterioration in public health and life expectancy. There is also a philosophical legacy that bears directly upon today's impasse. Marxism's basic tenet, the class struggle. Some scholars may disagree with me, and I am sure I will hear from them when I say this. The entire political class now vying for power in Russia was taught to believe that economic class determines one's interest, that life is, in essence, a zero-sum game. If you, my opponent, win, that must mean that I lose. Such a mindset stifles mutual trust and makes compromise in the political arena extremely difficult. The result is that democratic Russia has developed relatively few individuals who in the West would be called or could be called a ``loyal opposition.'' Last year on a visit to Moscow, I held lengthy discussions with several of the leaders who have been in the forefront of the opposition to Chernomyrdin. The Communist Party leader Gennadii Zyuganov and the nationalist leader, former general Aleksandr Lebed, both struck me as intelligent, thoughtful men, but distrustful and conniving ones who put self before country. Only Grigorii Yavlinsky, the leader of the Yabloko Party, seemed to be one who might fit into our category of the ``loyal opposition.'' I am told that he may be named First Deputy Prime Minister if Primakov is confirmed as Prime Minister by the Duma. That would be an encouraging sign. We will know by tomorrow or the next day whether that is true. One can argue endlessly about what the United States might or might not have done to avert the current catastrophe. But before we indulge in ``who lost Russia?'' finger-pointing, it is well to look at Poland, where western-style economic shock-therapy was applied, the population suffered but endured, and the country emerged immeasurably strengthened. Lest one thinks this is a communist-era comparison of a giant and a midget, I would point out that Poland's nearly 40 million population is now in the same general league as Russia's, which is down to 147 million from the Soviet Union's 270 million. More importantly, Poland's gross domestic product is approximately one-third of Russia's, so a fair contrast, I believe, can be drawn. Poland's political culture and sense of nationhood were solid enough to support the wrenching, but necessary, economic reforms. Neither was present in Russia. Perhaps the shorter period of communist rule in Poland than in Russia and the sense that communism had been an alien creed imposed upon the country were factors that mitigated the corrosive ideological effects of Marxism. Whatever the ultimate explanation, the sad fact is that Russia's political culture, unlike Poland's, proved unable to provide the underpinning for successful economic reform thus far. The fundamental problem, is not that Russia carried out too many democratic and capitalistic reforms too soon, but rather that it did not carry them out fully. The Russians now bear the principal responsibility for sorting out their colossal problems. The United States should continue to offer encouragement and support. Most importantly, we must keep our eye on the first priority of preventing the collapse of Russian democracy along with their economy. (Mr. COATS assumed the Chair.) Mr. President, you come from an agricultural State, larger but not unlike mine. I suspect in the coming days and weeks, there are going to be people who will agree with me, and maybe others already do, that one of the ways in which we can deal with Russia's problems in a positive way in the near term is by providing significant food aid, because shortly we may see significant shortages of food in Russia on the shelves. The EU is already considering a significant food aid program. Maybe that is one of the things we can do in the short term to help stem the erosion of civic support for democracy in Russia. The point that has to be kept in mind is that we have a clear interest in Russian democracy, along with the emerging prospect of a Russian market economy. But it ultimately rests with the Russians, and they have some very, very tough decisions to make. Mr. President, I yield the floor. Mr. KENNEDY addressed the Chair.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I want to commend to my colleagues the exceptionally thoughtful lead editorial in yesterday morning's Washington Post. It is entitled ``The Test Ban and Arms Control,'' and it makes some cogent points about the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty and a Senate where few objections are raised to the Treaty itself, but most Republicans still cast symbolic votes against it. The Post notes correctly that leading Senate Republicans seem to assume that a national missile defense is the only answer to the problems of nuclear proliferation and the risk of nuclear war. As the Post concludes, however, treaties like the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty ``are capable of serving American requirements well.'' Whatever one's views on national missile defense, those treaties ``would strengthen the American position in the world.'' I would note two areas in which I disagree with the Post editorial. First of all, the Test-Ban Treaty was signed 2 years ago, rather than ``earlier this year.'' The Treaty was submitted to the Senate nearly a full year ago, and has languished because the Republican leadership is afraid to let it come up. I do not accept the Post's pessimistic view, moreover, of the Test- Ban Treaty's chances on the floor. In last week's vote, moderate Republicans could support their Leader without doing any tangible harm. When the Test-Ban Treaty finally comes up for a vote on ratification, however, I am confident that at least 67 members will support it, just as they supported the Chemical Weapons Convention last year. With those two caveats, I strongly urge my colleagues to read Tuesday's Post editorial and I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the Record.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, whatever our views on a nationwide ballistic missile defense, it seems to me that we should reject S. 1873. Were that bill to pass, deploying a national missile defense system could, in my view, break the back of the economy at a moment when we finally have gotten a handle on things. A week ago, General Lyles warned that our current programs are over budget and ``may not be all affordable.'' We spent years getting some budget discipline. We have finally achieved that. We must not throw that all away. This bill would require deployment even without a threat of new strategic missiles; and it would throw taxpayers' money at the first available technology, rather than the best technology. As Dr. Richard L. Garwin warns, the first technology will be vulnerable to missiles with penetration aids, which Russia surely has and others can easily develop. Missile defense is expensive; penetration aids are cheap. This bill will also guarantee what General Welch calls a ``rush to failure.'' Five test failures with the THAAD theater defense system are a reminder of how difficult it is to develop any missile defense. A policy of deploying the first ``technologically possible'' system is almost bound to fail. Finally, this bill does not even permit consideration of the negative consequences of deployment. S. 1873 would destroy the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and thus end any hope of implementing START Two or of achieving START Three. ``Star Wars'' may seem easier than the hard, patient work of reducing great power armaments and stabilizing our forces. But the ``easier'' path can also be the dangerous path. Last week, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed to share real-time data on third-country missile launches, to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war. That is a good, sensible initiative. But what happens if we say we will deploy a national missile defense? We may call it just a defense, but others will see it as a second- strike defense that enables us to mount first-strike nuclear attacks. Russia and China will adopt a hair-trigger, ``launch on warning'' posture to overwhelm that defense, and the risk of nuclear war will rise. Now, some day we may need a nation-wide ballistic missile defense. That is why the Defense Department has the ``3+3'' policy of developing technology that would permit deployment within three years of finding an actual threat on the horizon. Some of my colleagues believe we cannot wait for that. But Iran's missiles will hit the Middle East and parts of Europe. North Korea's missiles will hit Japan and Okinawa. Despite recent missile tests, these countries are several years away from threatening even the far western portions of Alaska and Hawaii, as General Shelton made clear in his letter of August 24. And should a real threat materialize, there are far cheaper alternatives to fielding a national missile defense. So, while sensible policy on ballistic missile defense is perfectly feasible, S. 1873 is not such a sensible policy. Mr. President, the Senate has real work to do. Americans deserve a Patient's Bill of Rights; we can enact campaign finance reform that even the House of Representatives had enough sense to pass; and we must stop the slaughter of our teenagers by Big Tobacco. Let us get back to legislation that meets real, current needs and that will not destroy the balanced budget. Let us reject cloture on the motion to debate S. 1873, and get this Senate back to work.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise today to submit a resolution to designate October 16, 1998 as ``National Mammography Day.'' Since 1993, I have introduced similar measures, and each year the Senate has gone on record in support of the value of mammography by approving this resolution. The American Cancer Society estimates that 178,700 women will be diagnosed with breast cancer in 1998, while 43,500 women will eventually succumb to the disease this year. However, despite these horrifying numbers, the cure for breast cancer continues to allude us. Experts therefore agree that early detection and treatment are a woman's best defenses in the fight against this killer. Mammograms can reveal the presence of small cancers up to 2 years before regular clinical breast examinations or breast self-examinations [BSE], reducing mortality by more than 30 percent. Mr. President, the resolution I am submitting sets aside one day in the midst of ``National Breast Cancer Awareness Month'' to encourage women to receive or sign up for a mammogram. In doing so, we can educate our nation's mothers, sisters, and friends on the importance of early detection through mammography and prevent more women from dying from this disease. I sincerely hope my colleagues will join me in recognizing mammograms as a key element in the fight against breast cancer.