Joe Biden

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, the Senate has already spoken on the important question of U.S. support for a stronger International Monetary Fund. Following the essential leadership of Senator Stevens, along with my colleague on the foreign relations committee, Senator Hagel, we went on record in March, by vote of 84 to 16, to provide full funding for U.S. participation in the IMF. At that time, we also declined to place unworkable conditions on that funding. As international lender of last resort, the IMF is right now part of our last line of defense against an economic chain reaction that could turn the financial turmoil on the front pages of today's newspapers into a real global crisis. Mr. President, as I have said before, the IMF is certainly not a perfect institution. But I have not stopped going to my doctor because I think the health care system needs reform. The Kyl amendment guarantees indefinite delay in the availability of the U.S. contribution to the basic reserves of the IMF, and in turn throws into doubt the participation of other nations who look to us for leadership. This amendment would require that the IMF change its basic rules for providing emergency financial support--essentially a change in its bylaws--before the U.S. contribution can go forward. Those rule changes themselves may well make sense--in fact, the IMF already makes such conditions part of the requirements for its loans. But the requirement that the IMF must first formally adopt reforms in the conditions on countries that receive its funds--conditions, I might add, that we here in the United States could not meet in every case outselves--is a formula for deadlock and indefinite delay. This is the opposite what is required of us at this crucial period. As the leading economy in the world, we have a special obligation to support this international instutution--that we created, I might add-- charged with maintaining stability in international financial markets. The amendment now before us is a formula for delay, at the very time when we must act to restore confidence so lacking those markets. I urge my colleagues to vote against the Kyl amendment. Mr. President, one of the most able Senators in terms of his willingness to reason on this floor is the Senator from Arizona, Senator Kyl. I listened to what he just said about his amendment. He says: Look, all we are doing is going to require the IMF to do what the President says they should have to do anyway before we lend money. By implication, don't throw good money after bad, and so on and so forth. What we are doing here is, if we adopt the Kyl amendment, it guarantees, in my view, an indefinite delay in the ability of the U.S. contribution to the basic reserve of the IMF and throws in doubt the participation of other nations who look to us for leadership. Right now it is a really simple deal. If we come up with our $18 billion commitment in total, roughly, what happens is, we control the outcome. No loan can be made. It needs an 85 percent vote. I think we have 18 percent control. Why go ahead and throw sand in the gears here now knowing that we are going to, by fiat, in the minds of other nations, amend the way in which the IMF runs now without consultation or agreement by the other participants who make up 82 percent of the Fund, guaranteeing that this thing comes to a screeching halt? If in fact the Senator believes the President is right, then he has to assume the President is not going to instruct the U.S. representative at the IMF to vote for releasing dollars without the commitments being met. But what you do now if you adopt the Kyl amendment is as good as not coming up with the $18 billion, because the other nations say: Hey, look, you once again are unilaterally changing the basic rule for providing emergency support, essentially a change in the bylaws of the IMF. Where I come from, that is not how you usually get cooperation. You don't unilaterally tell the French and the Brits and everyone else this is the way it is going to be. You already have that power. You have the power. Without the U.S. vote, nothing goes. Bingo. Nothing goes. It seems to me the way to do this is, let's deal, as my friend from Nebraska has been often the lone voice in pointing out with this international financial crisis, and still have a little bit of confidence. This isn't going to fix the thing. This is just going to do in a shot--like a shot of adrenaline, a shot of confidence, we are stepping up to the plate. We are not backing away from an international obligation, as we see it, for our own safety's sake. Then, if we want to sit down with our partners in the IMF and say, ``Look, it is time to change the bylaws,'' that is a different deal. But let's not do unilaterally what is going to, in my view, in my opinion, get a response from the other 82 percent of the voting block out there saying, ``Hey, U.S., you don't call it. You don't unilaterally change the rules.'' You can in effect unilaterally change the rules by voting no. You can sit in those meetings and say, ``Look, we ain't voting for this deal unless the following conditions are met.'' I respectfully suggest--and I realize my time is probably up--that we should oppose the Kyl amendment. I yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN. I ask my friend if he would be willing--does he have any time to yield?

Mr. BIDEN. I didn't want to take all that time. Will the Senator yield me 4 minutes?

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. I concur. (At the request of Mr. McConnell, the following statement was ordered to be printed in the Record.)

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, as we say in this body, I would like to associate myself with the remarks of all those who have spoken and make a slightly different point--not as well as my colleagues have spoken. You know, I don't think a Senator can be measured merely in terms of the number of votes he or she has cast. It is a reflection of their sense of responsibility and the exercise of their duty. But there is something special about that fellow sitting over there from South Carolina. I have been here 26 years with the Senator from South Carolina, and for 16 of those I got to sit as either the ranking member or chairman of the Judiciary Committee right next to Strom. I think it is fair to say that a lot of people thought we were strange bedfellows because everybody could tell that we truly liked one another. People would ask me, ``Why do you like Strom Thurmond so much? You disagree with him on so many things.'' I would say, ``I'll tell you why.'' There are two reasons, and it is a measure, in my view, of what makes him a great Senator. No. 1, he is here to get things done. He is not here to stop things. He is here to get things done. He is a legislator. I remember when I first took over as the chairman of the committee, I went to Strom and said, ``Strom, I would like to make a deal with you. There is a lot we disagree on and some we agree on. Let's put aside what we disagree on and focus on the things we agree on.'' He looked at me, and he finally said, ``OK.'' He stood up and put his hand out, and from that point on, as much as we may disagree, there wasn't anything we have ever had a cross word on. One of my most memorable occasions was when he and I went down to the White House to try to convince President Reagan to sign a crime bill. President Reagan was in the beginning of his second term. We sat in that Cabinet room. We were on one side of the table and William French Smith, Ed Meese, and someone else was on the other side. The President walked in and sat down between Strom and me. We made our pitch as to why he should sign onto the Thurmond-Biden crime bill back then. The President looked like he was getting convinced, like maybe he was going to come our way. This is absolutely a true story. With that, Ed Meese stood up and said, ``Mr. President, it's time to go.'' The President wanted to hear what Strom had to say a little longer, but Ed Meese said, ``Mr. President, it's time to go.'' The President was sitting down and then decided it was time to go. He had his arms like this, and he went to get up, and Strom reached over and put his hand on the President's arm and pulled him back down in the seat and he said, ``Mr. President, the one thing you got to know about Washington is that when you get as old as I am, you want to get things done, you have to compromise.'' Who in the Lord's name could have possibly told Ronald Reagan that-- he was almost as old as Strom and had been around as long--and smile and make the President laugh? He not only got away with it, he talked the President into his position. That is a remarkable ability. This man can say and do things that if any of the rest of us ever did them, we would be long gone. But do you know why it works? It is because people know where his heart is. People know what his objective is. People know that he is doing what he is doing not for political purposes but because he really believes it. If you will allow another point of personal privilege here. I remember a very tough time in my career. I was chairman of a committee and there were wild accusations being made about me. I was foolish enough to be trying to run for President of the United States. It was before a very contentious hearing on a Supreme Court Justice. He and I disagreed on whether the justice should be a Justice. I called a meeting of the entire committee off of the committee room in the back and I said, ``Gentlemen''--there were all men on the committee at the time--I said, ``Gentlemen, if these accusations relevant to me are getting in the way of the ability to conduct this committee, I am willing to step down as chairman.'' Before the last syllable got out of my mouth, Strom Thurmond stood up in that meeting and said, ``That's ridiculous. You stay as chairman. We all have confidence in you.'' I said, ``Don't you want me to explain?'' He said, ``There is no need to explain. I know you.'' I will never forget that. I can't think of many other men or women who would, having a significant political advantage at that moment, not only not take advantage, but stand by me--stand by me. And so I think the thing that makes his 15,000 votes matter so much is that everybody knows they matter to him. They matter to him. I will close by saying--and I apologize for being so personal, but I think it is the measure of this man, at least in my view. My daughter is 17 years old. She has, like all of us in here who have served in the U.S. Senate for a long time, had the great honor and opportunity to meet kings and princes and presidents and significant political figures. She, like all of our children, pays the price for having a father or mother who is a Senator or who holds high public office. But they also have the advantage of meeting these people as well. She has had scores of pictures taken. To this day, my beautiful 17-year-old daughter has one picture of a public figure in her bedroom on her dresser that has been there for 9 years, and it is a picture of Senator Strom Thurmond handing her a key chain behind his desk in his office. I didn't ask her to keep that. I kind of wish she would put a Democrat's picture in there. I didn't even make the bureau. But Strom Thurmond is there. I think the reason is because all the time my wife Jill was carrying her, Strom would, every third day, ask me during a hearing what was going on and give me all kinds of advice about what I should and should not do. My wife and I were in the delivery room and were just handed our beautiful baby girl, and a doctor walked around the corner with a cell phone and said, ``There's a call for you, Senator.'' We were literally in the delivery room. I thought, my God, war must have been declared. I grabbed the phone, thinking it was the most incredible and unusual thing to hand me a phone in the delivery room. I say to my friend from West Virginia that he is not going to be surprised to hear this. ``Joe, Strom. Congratulations.'' How in the Lord's name he knew at that moment is beyond me. But everything with him is personal. It is personal in that he gives. It is personal in that he gives. It is not personal that he holds a grudge. It is not personal that he takes advantage. It is personal. Politics is personal. Those votes meant something, and the way he has conducted himself in this body makes me very, very, very proud to say I serve with him and very proud to think that he likes me. It has been a pleasure serving with you. I just hope you do what you did for me on your 90th birthday. I had the great honor to be one of the four speakers at your 90th birthday. But, you old devil, you never told me Richard Nixon was going to be the other speaker when I showed up. It was me, President Nixon, Bob Dole, and a Presbyterian minister, whom I don't remember; he used to work in the Nixon White House. I just ask for one favor. On your 100th birthday, as you are running for your next term of office, I volunteer to be one of the 500 people, assuming I am still around, who will be happy to stand up and speak for you on your 100th birthday, because I want to be around on your 110th after you finish your next term and a half. I congratulate you, Senator, not on the 15,000 votes, but it is the way you cast them, the way you talked about them, the way you dared about them that makes you unique among all of us in this Chamber. I yield the floor. Mr. CONRAD addressed the Chair.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, tomorrow is an important day for all who honor the valor and sacrifice Americans made in World War II. Tomorrow, the history of America's war in the Pacific is brought full circle. The U.S.S. Missouri, the ship on which the United States formally accepted Japan's surrender, will be permanently berthed at Pearl Harbor, the site of America's entry into the war against Japan following a devastating surprise attack. It is appropriate that in this same week I, along with my colleagues, Senators Roth, Thurmond, Inouye, Stevens, Hollings, Ford, Durbin, Specter, Helms, Cochran, and Faircloth, seek to close the circle for the two commanders at Pearl Harbor fifty-seven years ago, Admiral Husband Kimmel and General Walter Short. Today, we are introducing a resolution that seeks long overdue justice for these two fine officers. Now some of you will ask ``why now?'' The answer is not just because we are honoring the service and sacrifice of Americans who served in the Pacific campaign by permanently berthing the Missouri at Pearl Harbor. It is more basic than that--there can be no statute of limitations for restoring honor and dignity to men who spent their lives devoted to America's service and yet were unfairly treated. When it comes to serving truth and justice, the time must always be ``now''. I hope that most of you will read this resolution. The majority of the text details the historic case on behalf of Admiral Kimmel and General Short and expresses Congress's opinion that both officers performed their duty competently. Most importantly, it requests that the President submit the names of Kimmel and Short to the Senate for posthumous advancements on the retirement lists to their highest held wartime rank. Mr. President, this action would not require any form of compensation. Instead, it would acknowledge, once and for all, that these two officers were not treated fairly by the U.S. government and it would uphold the military tradition that responsible officers take the blame for their failures. I will address these points in more detail and will review some of the evidence regarding the soundness of Kimmel and Short's military decisions. First, I want to discuss the treatment of Kimmel and Short and who bore responsibility. Like most Americans, Admiral Kimmel and General Short requested a fair and open hearing of their case, a court martial. They were denied their request. After lifetimes of honorable service to this nation and the defense of its values, they were denied the most basic form of justice--a hearing. Let me review some of the facts. On December 18, 1941, a mere 11 days after Pearl Harbor, the Roberts Commission was formed to determine whether derelictions of duty or errors of judgment by Kimmel and Short contributed to the success of the Japanese attack. This Commission concluded that both commanders had been derelict in their duty and the President ordered the immediate public release of these findings. Several facts about the Roberts Commission force us to question its conclusions. First, Kimmel and Short were denied the right to counsel and were not allowed to be present when witnesses were questioned. They were then explicitly told that the Commission was a fact-finding body and would not be passing judgment on their performance. When the findings accusing them of a serious offense were released, they immediately requested a court-martial. That request was refused. It is difficult to imagine a fair review of the evidence given the rules of procedure followed by the Commission. I also think that it is important to note the timing here. It would be difficult to provide a fair hearing in the charged atmosphere immediately following America's entry into the war in the Pacific. In fact, Kimmel and Short were the objects of public vilification. The Commission was not immune to this pressure. One Commission member, for example, Admiral Standley, expressed strong reservations about the Commission's findings, later characterizing them as a ``travesty of justice''. He did sign the Report, however, because of concerns that doing otherwise might adversely affect the war effort. As you will see, the war effort played an important role in how Kimmel and Short were treated. The Roberts Commission was the only investigative body that found these two officers derelict in their duty. In 1944 an Army Board investigated General Short's actions at Pearl Harbor. The conclusions of that investigation placed blame on General Marshall, the Chief of Staff of the Army at the time of Pearl Harbor and in 1944. This report was sequestered and kept secret from the public on the grounds that it would be detrimental to the war effort. That same year, a Naval Court of Inquiry investigated Admiral Kimmel's actions at Pearl Harbor. The Naval Court's conclusions were divided into two sections in order to protect information indicating that America had the ability to decode and intercept Japanese messages. The first and longer section, therefore, was classified ``top secret.'' The second section was written to be unclassified and completely exonerated Admiral Kimmel and recognized that Admiral Stark bore some of the blame for Pearl Harbor because of his failure to provide Kimmel with critical information available in Washington. Then Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal instructed the Court that it had to classify both sections ``secret'' and not release any findings to the public. I won't go any further with this discussion of history, again I urge my colleagues to read the resolution. I hope that I have made my point that these officers were not treated fairly and that there is good reason to question where the blame for Pearl Harbor should lie. The whole story was re-evaluated in 1995 at the request of Senator Thurmond by Under Secretary for Defense Edwin Dorn. In his report, Dorn concluded that responsibility for the disaster at Pearl Harbor should be broadly shared. I agree. Where Dorn's conclusions differ from mine and my cosponsors, is that he also found that ``the official treatment of Admiral Kimmel and General Short was substantively temperate and procedurally proper.'' I disagree. These officers were publicly vilified and never given a chance to clear their names. If we lived in a closed society, fearful of the truth, then there would be no need for the President to take any action today. But we don't. We live in an open society. Eventually, we are able to declassify documents and evaluate our past based on at least a good portion of the whole story. One of our greatest strengths as a nation comes from our ability to honor truth and the lessons of our past. Like most people, I can accept that there was a good case for the need to protect our intelligence capabilities during the war. I cannot accept that there is a reason for continuing to deny the culpability of others in Washington at the expense of these two officers' reputations 57 years later. Continuing to falsely scapegoat two dedicated and competent officers dishonors the military tradition of taking responsibility for failure. The historic message sent is that the truth will be suppressed to protect some responsible parties and distorted to sacrifice others. One point I want to make here is that we are not seeking to place blame. This is not a witch-hunt aimed at those superior officers who were advanced in rank and continued to serve, despite being implicated in the losses at Pearl Harbor. I think the historic record has become quite clear that blame should be shared. The unfortunate reality is that Admiral Kimmel and General Short were blamed entirely and forced into early retirement. After the war, in 1947, they were singled out as the only eligible officers from World War II not advanced to their highest held wartime ranks on the retirement lists, under the Officer Personnel Act of 1947. By failing to advance them, the government and the Departments of the Navy and Army perpetuate the myth that these two officers bear a unique and disproportionate part of the blame. The government that denied these officers a fair hearing and suppressed findings favorable to their case while releasing hostile information owes them an official apology. That's what this resolution calls for. The last point that I want to make deals with the military situation at Pearl Harbor. It is legitimate to ask whether Admiral Kimmel and General Short, as commanding officers, properly deployed their forces. I think reasonable people may disagree on this point. I have been struck by the number of qualified individuals who believe the commanders properly deployed based on the intelligence available to them. I will ask to enter this partial list of flag officers into the Record. Among those listed is Vice Admiral Richardson, a distinguished naval commander, who wrote an entire report refuting the conclusions of the Dorn Report. My colleagues will also see the names of four Chiefs of Naval Operations and the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Thomas Moorer. It was Admiral Moorer who observed that, ``If Nelson and Napoleon had been in command at Pearl Harbor, the results would have been the same.'' In conclusion, Mr. President, I believe this case is unique and demands our attention. As we honor those who served in World War II by permanently berthing the U.S.S. Missouri in Pearl Harbor, we must also honor the ideals for which they fought. High among those American ideals is upholding truth and justice. Those ideals give us the strength to admit and, where possible, correct our errors. I urge my colleagues to support this resolution and move one step closer to justice for Admiral Kimmel and General Short. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent a partial list of flag officers be printed in the Record.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will not take much of the Senate's time. I think this debate is about the easiest debate the Senate can face. There is one simple reason to support the Specter amendment, of which I am a cosponsor, and the U.S. contribution to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Preparatory Commission. It is real simple. It is in the national security interest of the United States. I reiterate what the Senator from Pennsylvania said. This is true whether or not you favor the test ban treaty or oppose it. Most of the funding requested for the Preparatory Commission is to be devoted to capital expenditures on the international monitoring system, the ability to monitor. Improving our nuclear test monitoring capabilities is clearly of benefit to the United States--again, whether you are for or against this treaty--as well as to the benefit of the world community. The recent nuclear weapons tests in India and Pakistan are a stark reminder of the importance of monitoring. The international monitoring system should improve the seismic monitoring of nuclear tests in India and Pakistan by nearly a full order of magnitude. That will lower the threshold of detectable yields by a factor between 5 and 10, depending on the test-site geology. So if the detection threshold is a yield of 200 tons today, it would be 20 to 40 tons a few years from now. Let me say that again. If the threshold at which we can detect today is 200 tons, if this monitoring system is improved, as we fully expect it would be assuming we fund our part, it would reduce that to be able to detect 20 to 40 tons--but only if we pay our contribution. The international monitoring system will also provide these improved monitoring capabilities in a more cost-effective manner than we can achieve them unilaterally. Countries other than the United States will bear roughly 75 percent of the costs. Where I come from, that is a pretty good deal. We pay three-quarters less than we would have to pay in order to be able to get 5 times the accuracy in terms of information, as much as 10 times the resolution we need to know if anybody has set off a nuclear test. In addition, some of the improvement is literally unattainable through U.S.-sponsored monitoring alone, as some of the international monitoring sites will be in countries that refuse to contribute to a U.S. unilateral monitoring system. The Preparatory Commission, Mr. President, is investing--is investing--now in an international monitoring system, even though the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty might not come into force for some years. There are two important reasons to support this. First, if we do consent to U.S. ratification of the treaty, we will want to be able to verify compliance as soon as the treaty enters into force. Any delay in funding the international monitoring system would translate into a delay in achieving the needed verification capabilities. Second, the improved monitoring achieved through new or upgraded sensor sites will contribute to U.S.--and world--monitoring capabilities as soon as they are in place, not just after the treaty enters into force. U.S. agencies need to monitor possible nuclear weapons tests worldwide whether or not we ratify the treaty. Even so, opponents of ratification should support this funding. What would we do if we were here on the floor and said, ``You know, there's going to be no test ban treaty. We just want to know what's going on in the rest of the world. We want to know. And guess what? A whole bunch of nations will join in with us to increase the capability of monitoring a test by roughly tenfold, a minimum of fivefold. And all we have to do is contribute, in this case, one-quarter of the cost''? Would we conclude not to do that? Would we sit here and say, ``No, no, no, we don't want to know; we don't want to pay 25 percent of the cost to increase our ability to detect testing that is up to 10 times more sensitive than what our capability now is''? What are we talking about here? I mean, what rationale can there possibly be? I suspect my friends will say, ``Well, you know, if we go ahead and do this, then we're on a slippery slope to ratifying that God awful treaty.'' I think it is a good treaty, but that is the best argument you can come up with unless you say, ``We don't want to know. We don't want to know whether or not a nation is detonating a nuclear device that is in the 20 to 40 ton range. We're satisfied knowing all they can do is under 200 tons. Once they get above that, that is when we'll pay attention to it.'' Mr. President, in sum, the international monitoring system will make a real contribution to U.S. monitoring capabilities. That contribution will be much less expensive than sustaining those sites unilaterally. And it will come on line as soon as the equipment is installed. Lest anybody have to be reminded, we live in a very dangerous world. The proliferation of nuclear weapons is occurring and it is a real risk. It seems to me, Mr. President, again, whether or not you are for the test ban treaty, the national interests requires these monitoring investments. So I strongly urge--strongly urge--all of my colleagues to support this amendment. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will not take any more of the Senate's time. I learned a long time ago from a former chairman named Russell Long that when you are about to accept something, let it be accepted. I rise to cosponsor an amendment that codifies the so-called outer wall of sanctions on the government of Serbia-Montenegro. Mr. President, as we know, for the last decade Slobodan Milosevic has pursued his mad dream of a Greater Serbia. The result has been hundreds of thousands dead, millions made homeless, and centuries-old Serbian culture eradicated from sections of the former Yugoslavia. And Milosevic is continuing his murderous policies in Kosovo, while playing games with us in Bosnia and frustrating democratic reforms in Serbia. The amendment that Senator Smith, Senator D'Amato, Senator Johnson, and I are proposing codifies five categories of sanctions. First, the Secretary of the Treasury is to instruct the U.S. executive directors of the international financial institutions to work in opposition to and vote against, any extension by these institutions of any financial or technical assistance or grants of any kind to the government of Serbia. Montenegro's reformist government is exempted from these sanctions. Second, the Secretary of State is to instruct the U.S. Ambassador to the OSCE--the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe--not to join any consensus to allow the participation of Serbia-Montenegro in the OSCE. Third, the Secretary of State is to instruct the Representative to the United Nations to vote against any resolution in the U.N. Security Council to admit Serbia-Montenegro to the U.N. Fourth, the U.S. is to oppose the extension of the Partnership for Peace program to Serbia-Montenegro. Fifth, the U.S. is to oppose the extension of membership in the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative to Serbia-Montenegro. How might Milosevic avoid these sanctions? The amendment would drop these sanctions if the President certifies that Serbia-Montenegro has taken five steps. First, Serbian representatives must be negotiating in good faith with the other successor states of the former Yugoslavia on the division of assets and liabilities and other succession issues. Second, the government of Serbia-Montenegro must be complying fully with its obligations as a signatory to the Dayton Accords. Third, the government of Serbia-Montenegro must be cooperating fully with, and providing unrestricted access to, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Fourth, the government of Serbia-Montenegro must be implementing internal democratic reforms, including progress in the rule of law and independent media. In this regard it is worth noting that the government of the Republic of Montenegro is already in compliance. Fifth, the government of Serbia-Montenegro must meet the requirements on Kosovo enumerated elsewhere in this Act. Mr. President, Slobodan Milosevic has jerked this country around long enough. This amendment makes clear to him what he has to do in order to have the outer wall of sanctions removed. The ball is squarely in his court. I urge my colleagues to vote for this amendment. I thank the Chair and yield the floor. Mr. President, I compliment my friend from Oregon in leading the way on this. I think the balance here is real. I think it is very important. I think it is totally consistent with the direction we have been going in the way the Senate should act relevant to the sanctions and the exceptions we grant the President for other reasons relating to other than that very high bar of the national security test. I compliment him. I thank him for the modification. I yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, tomorrow is an important day for all who honor the valor and sacrifice Americans made in World War II. Tomorrow, the history of America's war in the Pacific is brought full circle. The U.S.S. Missouri, the ship on which the United States formally accepted Japan's surrender, will be permanently berthed at Pearl Harbor, the site of America's entry into the war against Japan following a devastating surprise attack. It is appropriate that in this same week I, along with my colleagues, Senators Roth, Thurmond, Inouye, Stevens, Hollings, Ford, Durbin, Specter, Helms, Cochran, and Faircloth, seek to close the circle for the two commanders at Pearl Harbor fifty-seven years ago, Admiral Husband Kimmel and General Walter Short. Today, we are introducing a resolution that seeks long overdue justice for these two fine officers. Now some of you will ask ``why now?'' The answer is not just because we are honoring the service and sacrifice of Americans who served in the Pacific campaign by permanently berthing the Missouri at Pearl Harbor. It is more basic than that--there can be no statute of limitations for restoring honor and dignity to men who spent their lives devoted to America's service and yet were unfairly treated. When it comes to serving truth and justice, the time must always be ``now''. I hope that most of you will read this resolution. The majority of the text details the historic case on behalf of Admiral Kimmel and General Short and expresses Congress's opinion that both officers performed their duty competently. Most importantly, it requests that the President submit the names of Kimmel and Short to the Senate for posthumous advancements on the retirement lists to their highest held wartime rank. Mr. President, this action would not require any form of compensation. Instead, it would acknowledge, once and for all, that these two officers were not treated fairly by the U.S. government and it would uphold the military tradition that responsible officers take the blame for their failures. I will address these points in more detail and will review some of the evidence regarding the soundness of Kimmel and Short's military decisions. First, I want to discuss the treatment of Kimmel and Short and who bore responsibility. Like most Americans, Admiral Kimmel and General Short requested a fair and open hearing of their case, a court martial. They were denied their request. After lifetimes of honorable service to this nation and the defense of its values, they were denied the most basic form of justice--a hearing. Let me review some of the facts. On December 18, 1941, a mere 11 days after Pearl Harbor, the Roberts Commission was formed to determine whether derelictions of duty or errors of judgment by Kimmel and Short contributed to the success of the Japanese attack. This Commission concluded that both commanders had been derelict in their duty and the President ordered the immediate public release of these findings. Several facts about the Roberts Commission force us to question its conclusions. First, Kimmel and Short were denied the right to counsel and were not allowed to be present when witnesses were questioned. They were then explicitly told that the Commission was a fact-finding body and would not be passing judgment on their performance. When the findings accusing them of a serious offense were released, they immediately requested a court-martial. That request was refused. It is difficult to imagine a fair review of the evidence given the rules of procedure followed by the Commission. I also think that it is important to note the timing here. It would be difficult to provide a fair hearing in the charged atmosphere immediately following America's entry into the war in the Pacific. In fact, Kimmel and Short were the objects of public vilification. The Commission was not immune to this pressure. One Commission member, for example, Admiral Standley, expressed strong reservations about the Commission's findings, later characterizing them as a ``travesty of justice''. He did sign the Report, however, because of concerns that doing otherwise might adversely affect the war effort. As you will see, the war effort played an important role in how Kimmel and Short were treated. The Roberts Commission was the only investigative body that found these two officers derelict in their duty. In 1944 an Army Board investigated General Short's actions at Pearl Harbor. The conclusions of that investigation placed blame on General Marshall, the Chief of Staff of the Army at the time of Pearl Harbor and in 1944. This report was sequestered and kept secret from the public on the grounds that it would be detrimental to the war effort. That same year, a Naval Court of Inquiry investigated Admiral Kimmel's actions at Pearl Harbor. The Naval Court's conclusions were divided into two sections in order to protect information indicating that America had the ability to decode and intercept Japanese messages. The first and longer section, therefore, was classified ``top secret.'' The second section was written to be unclassified and completely exonerated Admiral Kimmel and recognized that Admiral Stark bore some of the blame for Pearl Harbor because of his failure to provide Kimmel with critical information available in Washington. Then Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal instructed the Court that it had to classify both sections ``secret'' and not release any findings to the public. I won't go any further with this discussion of history, again I urge my colleagues to read the resolution. I hope that I have made my point that these officers were not treated fairly and that there is good reason to question where the blame for Pearl Harbor should lie. The whole story was re-evaluated in 1995 at the request of Senator Thurmond by Under Secretary for Defense Edwin Dorn. In his report, Dorn concluded that responsibility for the disaster at Pearl Harbor should be broadly shared. I agree. Where Dorn's conclusions differ from mine and my cosponsors, is that he also found that ``the official treatment of Admiral Kimmel and General Short was substantively temperate and procedurally proper.'' I disagree. These officers were publicly vilified and never given a chance to clear their names. If we lived in a closed society, fearful of the truth, then there would be no need for the President to take any action today. But we don't. We live in an open society. Eventually, we are able to declassify documents and evaluate our past based on at least a good portion of the whole story. One of our greatest strengths as a nation comes from our ability to honor truth and the lessons of our past. Like most people, I can accept that there was a good case for the need to protect our intelligence capabilities during the war. I cannot accept that there is a reason for continuing to deny the culpability of others in Washington at the expense of these two officers' reputations 57 years later. Continuing to falsely scapegoat two dedicated and competent officers dishonors the military tradition of taking responsibility for failure. The historic message sent is that the truth will be suppressed to protect some responsible parties and distorted to sacrifice others. One point I want to make here is that we are not seeking to place blame. This is not a witch-hunt aimed at those superior officers who were advanced in rank and continued to serve, despite being implicated in the losses at Pearl Harbor. I think the historic record has become quite clear that blame should be shared. The unfortunate reality is that Admiral Kimmel and General Short were blamed entirely and forced into early retirement. After the war, in 1947, they were singled out as the only eligible officers from World War II not advanced to their highest held wartime ranks on the retirement lists, under the Officer Personnel Act of 1947. By failing to advance them, the government and the Departments of the Navy and Army perpetuate the myth that these two officers bear a unique and disproportionate part of the blame. The government that denied these officers a fair hearing and suppressed findings favorable to their case while releasing hostile information owes them an official apology. That's what this resolution calls for. The last point that I want to make deals with the military situation at Pearl Harbor. It is legitimate to ask whether Admiral Kimmel and General Short, as commanding officers, properly deployed their forces. I think reasonable people may disagree on this point. I have been struck by the number of qualified individuals who believe the commanders properly deployed based on the intelligence available to them. I will ask to enter this partial list of flag officers into the Record. Among those listed is Vice Admiral Richardson, a distinguished naval commander, who wrote an entire report refuting the conclusions of the Dorn Report. My colleagues will also see the names of four Chiefs of Naval Operations and the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Thomas Moorer. It was Admiral Moorer who observed that, ``If Nelson and Napoleon had been in command at Pearl Harbor, the results would have been the same.'' In conclusion, Mr. President, I believe this case is unique and demands our attention. As we honor those who served in World War II by permanently berthing the U.S.S. Missouri in Pearl Harbor, we must also honor the ideals for which they fought. High among those American ideals is upholding truth and justice. Those ideals give us the strength to admit and, where possible, correct our errors. I urge my colleagues to support this resolution and move one step closer to justice for Admiral Kimmel and General Short. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent a partial list of flag officers be printed in the Record.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. BIDEN. Thank you very much. Mr. President, I am going to support the Durbin amendment, and I admire what he is attempting to do and respect his effort. I am not, quite frankly, certain it will have its intended effect. I strongly agree with the views expressed by my friend from Illinois, that what I call the ``monarchist'' view of the war power has become the prevalent view at the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue, and it does not matter whether it is a Democratic President or a Republican President. And the original framework of the war power clause envisioned by the Founding Fathers, I think, has been greatly undermined over the last several decades. On the question of war power, I believe the Constitution is as clear as it is plain. Article I, section 8, provides that the Congress has the power ``to declare War, [and] grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal . . . .'' Article II, section 2, provides, ``The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.'' To be sure, the Commander in Chief ensures that the President has the sole power to direct U.S. military forces in combat. But that power-- except in very few limited instances--derives totally from congressional authority. It is not the power to move from a state of peace to a state of war. It is a power, once the state of war is in play, to command the forces, but not to change the state. Until that authority is granted, the President has no inherent power to send forces to war--except, as I said, in certain very limited circumstances, such as to repel sudden attacks or to protect the safety and security of Americans abroad. On this point, the writings of Alexander Hamilton, a very strong defender, as the Presiding Officer knows, of Presidential power, is very instructive. In Federalist No. 69, Hamilton emphasized that the President's power as Commander in Chief would be ``much inferior'' to that of the British King, amounting to ``nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces.'' During the cold war, and during the nuclear age, the thesis arose that, at a time when the fate of the planet itself appeared to rest on two men thousands of miles apart, Congress had little choice, or so it was claimed, but to cede tremendous authority to the Executive. Unfortunately, despite the end of the cold war, the view that the President had this authority has continued to survive--and flourish-- under Presidents of both political parties. On the eve of the gulf war, President Bush insisted that he did not need congressional authorization to send half a million men and women into combat with Iraq. I insisted at that time we hold hearings on that subject and there be a resolution concluding whether or not he had that power. More recently, President Clinton asserted sweeping theories about his power to deploy forces to Haiti and to begin offensive military action against Iraq. I believe we need to remedy this constitutional imbalance. Accordingly, I have offered in the past, and I have drafted, comprehensive legislation called the Use of Force Act, which is designed to replace the War Powers Resolution. The Durbin amendment is far shorter and more direct in its approach. And although I support it, as I said, I am skeptical that it will achieve its total desired effect. The Durbin amendment would bar the use of appropriated funds for ``offensive military operations'' by Armed Forces ``except in accordance with Article I, section 8 of the Constitution.'' I believe the Constitution already says that, that we need not redeclare that. But I think it is valuable to do it if it sends a message that we are going to be looking a whole lot closer. In my view, the President may not use force, except in certain limited circumstances, without the authorization of the Congress, period. The war power is not limited to a formal declaration of war--of which we have had only five in our history. The Founding Fathers had little interest, it seems, in the ceremonial aspects of war. The real issue was congressional authorization of war. As Hamilton noted in Federalist 25, the ``ceremony of a formal denunciation of war has of late fallen into disuse.'' Obviously, the founders were not talking about a circumstance where the only circumstance that the Congress could impact on whether we use force or not is with a formal declaration of war. Even in 1789--to quote Hamilton--ceremonial declarations of war had fallen into disuse, so obviously that is not what they were talking about alone. The conclusion that Congress has the power to authorize all uses of force is buttressed by the inclusion in the war clause of the power to grant letters of marque and reprisal. An anachronism today, I acknowledge, letters of marque and reprisal were, though, in the 18th century, their version of limited war. Even back then, for a President to engage in limited war, he needed the authorization of the U.S. Congress. The vehicle was issuing letters of marque and reprisal. I understand that the administration has expressed its strong opposition to this provision and is threatening to veto it. I have called the administration and indicated they are being foolish in even making that threat, with all due respect. It is merely an institutional instinct that does not surprise me, but I am somewhat surprised by the volume of the objection. The Durbin amendment, if enacted, may have one salutary effect: It could force the President and his advisors to pause before continuing to make broad assertions of Presidential war power. If even that result is achieved, the enactment of the Durbin amendment will be a positive development in restoring the constitutional imbalance. Mr. President, I will not take the time now, but I will, at the appropriate time, reintroduce the Use of Force Act that I have in previously attempted to have passed, working with a number of constitutional scholars who have written extensively in this area. Let me conclude in the 30 seconds I have left to again compliment the Senator from Illinois. It is time the Congress, with the changed world, reassert its rightful role in the conduct of the use of force, and, now that the world has changed, the old saw about the need for this emergency power--the Congress being less relevant in that regard-- should be put to bed once and for all. I thank him for his effort and I yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I am asking only to go until 10 of the hour.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent, since there is no one seeking to speak, to speak for 7 minutes in support of the Durbin amendment.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, today I introduce legislation designed to provide a framework for joint congressional-executive decision-making about the most solemn decision that a nation can make: to send men and women to fight and die for their country. Entitled the ``Use of Force Act,'' the legislation would replace the war powers resolution of 1973 with a new mechanism that, I hope, will be more effective than the existing statute. Enacted nearly a quarter century ago, over the veto of President Nixon, the war powers resolution has enjoyed an unhappy fate--scorned by Presidents who questioned its constitutionality, and ignored by a Congress too timid to exercise its constitutional duty. That was not, of course, the intent of its framers, who sought to improve executive-congressional cooperation on questions involving the use of force--and to remedy a dangerous constitutional imbalance. This imbalance resulted from what I call the ``monarchist'' view of the war power--the thesis that the President holds nearly unlimited power to direct American forces into action. The thesis is largely a product of the cold war and the nuclear age: the view that, at a time when the fate of the planet itself appeared to rest with two men thousands of miles apart, Congress had little choice, or so it was claimed but to cede tremendous authority to the executive. This thesis first emerged in 1950, when President Truman sent forces to Korea without congressional authorization. It peaked twenty years later, in 1970, when President Nixon sent U.S. forces into Cambodia-- also without congressional authorization, but this time accompanied by sweeping assertions of autonomous Presidential power. President Nixon's theory was so extreme that it prompted the Senate to begin a search--a search led by Republican Jacob Javits and strongly supported by a conservative Democrat, John Stennis of Mississippi--for some means of rectifying the constitutional imbalance. That search culminated in the war powers resolution. Unfortunately, the war powers resolution has failed to fulfill its objective. If anything, the monarchist view has become more deeply ingrained with the passage of time. This trend was been on display throughout this decade. Before the gulf war, for example, with half a million American forces standing ready in Saudi Arabia--a situation clearly requiring congressional authorization--President Bush still refused to concede that he required an act of Congress before using force. Only at the last minute, and only grudgingly, did President Bush seek congressional support. Even then, he continued to assert that he sought only support, refusing to concede that congressional authorization was a legal necessity. Several years ago, the notion of broad executive power was claimed on the eve of a proposed invasion of Haiti--an invasion that, thankfully, was averted by a last-minute diplomatic initiative. In 1994, officials of the Clinton administration characterized the Haiti operation as a mere ``police action''--a semantic dodge designed to avoid congressional authorization--and a demonstration that the monarchist view prevails in the White House, without regard to political party. And, most recently, the Clinton administration asserted that it had all the authority it needed to initiate a military attack against Iraq--though it never publicly elaborated on this supposed authority. In this case, the question was not clear-cut--as it was in 1991. But two things emerged in the debate that reinforce the need for this legislation. First, it demonstrated that the executive instinct to find ``sufficient legal authority'' to use force is undiluted. Second, it demonstrated that Congress often lacks the institutional will to carry out its responsibilities under the war power. Although there was strong consensus that a strong response was required to Saddam Hussein's resistance to U.N. inspections, there was no consensus in this body about whether Congress itself should authorize military action. Lacking such a consensus, Congress did nothing. Congress' responsibilities could not be clearer. Article one, section eight, clause eleven of the Constitution grants to Congress the power ``to declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal and to make rules concerning captures on land and water.'' To the President, the Constitution provides in article two, section two the role of ``Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.'' It may fairly be said that, with regard to many constitutional provisions, the Framers' intent was ambiguous. But on the war power, both the contemporaneous evidence and the early construction of these clauses do not leave much room for doubt. The original draft of the Constitution would have given to Congress the power to ``make war.'' At the Constitutional Convention, a motion was made to change this to ``declare war.'' The reason for the change is instructive. At the Convention, James Madison and Elbridge Gerry argued for the amendment solely in order to permit the President the power ``to repel sudden attacks.'' Just one delegate, Pierce Butler of South Carolina, suggested that the President should be given the power to initiate war. The rationale for vesting the power to launch war in Congress was simple. The Framers' views were dominated by their experience with the British King, who had unfettered power to start wars. Such powers the Framers were determined to deny the President. Even Alexander Hamilton, a staunch advocate of Presidential power, emphasized that the President's power as Commander in Chief would be ``much inferior'' to the British King, amounting to ``nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces,'' while that of the British King ``extends to declaring of war and to the raising and regulating of fleets and armies--all which, by [the U.S.] Constitution, would appertain to the legislature.'' It is frequently contended by those who favor vast Presidential powers that Congress was granted only the ceremonial power to declare war. But the Framers had little interest, it seems, in the ceremonial aspects of war. The real issue was congressional authorization of war. As Hamilton noted in Federalist twenty-five, the ``ceremony of a formal denunciation of war has of late fallen into disuse.'' The conclusion that Congress was given the power to initiate all wars, except to repel attacks on the United States, is also strengthened in view of the second part of the war clause: the power to ``grant letters of marque and reprisal.'' An anachronism today, letters of marque and reprisal were licenses issued by governments empowering agents to seize enemy ships or take action on land short of all-out war. In essence, it was an eighteenth century version of what we now regarded as ``limited war'' or ``police actions.'' The framers undoubtedly knew that reprisals, or ``imperfect war,'' could lead to an all-out war. England, for example, had fought five wars between 1652 and 1756 which were preceded by public naval reprisals. Surely, those who met at Philadelphia--all learned men--knew and understood this history. Given this, the only logical conclusion is that the framers intended to grant to Congress the power to initiate all hostilities, even limited wars. In sum, to accept the proposition that the war power is merely ceremonial, or applies only to ``big wars,'' is to read much of the war clause out of the Constitution. Such a reading is supported neither by the plain language of the text, or the original intent of the framers. Any doubt about the wisdom of relying on this interpretation of the intent of the framers is dispelled in view of the actions of early Presidents, early Congresses, and early Supreme Court decisions. Our earliest Presidents were extremely cautious about encroaching on Congress' power under the war clause. For example, in 1793, the first President, George Washington, stated that offensive operations against an indian tribe, the Creek Nation, depended on congressional action: ``The Constitution vests the power of declaring war with Congress; therefore no offensive expedition of importance can be undertaken until after they have deliberated upon the subject, and authorized such a measure.'' During the Presidency of John Adams, the United States engaged in an undeclared naval war with France. But it bears emphasis that these military engagements were clearly authorized by Congress by a series of incremental statutes. The naval war with France also yielded three important Supreme Court decisions regarding the scope of the war power. In 1799, Congress authorized the President to intercept any U.S. vessels headed to France. President Adams subsequently ordered the Navy to seize any ships traveling to or from France. The Supreme Court declared the seizure of a U.S. vessel traveling from France to be illegal--thus ruling that Congress had the power not only to authorize limited war, and but also to limit Presidential power to take military action. The court ruled in two other cases bearing on the question of limited war. Wars, the Court said, even if ``imperfect,'' are nonetheless wars. In still another case, Chief Justice Marshall opined that ``the whole powers of war [are] by the Constitution . . . vested in Congress . . . [which] may authorize general hostilities . . . or partial war.'' These precedents, and the historical record of actions taken by other early Presidents, have significantly more bearing on the meaning of the war clause than the modern era. As Chief Justice Warren once wrote, ``The precedential value of [prior practice] tends to increase in proportion to the proximity'' to the constitutional convention. Unfortunately, this constitutional history seems largely forgotten, and the doctrine of Presidential power that arose during the cold war remains in vogue. To accept the status quo requires us to believe that the constitutional imbalance serves our nation well. But it can hardly be said that it does. As matters now stand, Congress is denied its proper role in sharing in the decision to commit American troops, and the President is deprived of the consensus to help carry this policy through. I believe that only by establishing an effective war powers mechanism can we ensure that both of these goals are met. The question then is this: How to revise the war powers resolution in a manner that gains bipartisan support--and support of the executive? In the past two decades, a premise has gained wide acceptance that the war powers resolution is fatally flawed. Indeed, there are flaws in the resolution but they need not have been fatal. In 1988, determining that a review of the war powers resolution was in order, the Foreign Relations Committee established a special subcommittee to assume the task. As chairman of the subcommittee, I conducted extensive hearings. Over the course of two months, the subcommittee heard from many distinguished witnesses: former President Ford, former Secretaries of State and Defense, former Joint Chiefs of Staff, former Members of Congress who drafted the war powers resolution, and many constitutional scholars. At the end of that process, I wrote a law review article describing how the war powers resolution might be thoroughly rewritten to overcome its actual and perceived liabilities. That effort provided the foundation for the legislation I introduced in the 104th Congress, and that I reintroduce today. The bill has many elements; I will briefly summarize it. First, the bill replaces the war powers resolution with a new version. But I should make clear that I retain its central element: a time-clock mechanism that limits the President's power to use force abroad. That mechanism, it bears emphasis, was found to be unambiguously constitutional in a 1980 opinion issued by the Office of Legal Counsel at the Department of Justice. It is often asserted that the time-clock provisions is ``unworkable,'' or that it invites our adversaries to make a conflict so painful in the short run so as to induce timidity in the Congress. But with or without a war powers law, American willingness to undertake sustained hostilities will always be subject to democratic pressures. A statutory mechanism is simply a means of delineating procedure. And the procedure set forth in this legislation assures that if the President wants an early congressional vote on a use of force abroad, his congressional supporters can produce it. Recent history tells us, of course, that the American people, as well as Congress, rally around the flag--and the Commander-in-Chief--in the early moments of a military deployment. Second, my bill defuses the specter that a ``timid Congress'' can simply sit on its hands and permit the authority for a deployment to expire. First, it establishes elaborate expedited procedures designed to ensure that a vote will occur. And it explicitly defeats the ``timid Congress'' specter by granting to the President the authority he has sought if these procedures nonetheless fail to produce a vote. Thus, if the President requests authority for a sustained use of force--one outside the realm of emergency--and Congress fails to vote, the President's authority is extended indefinitely. Third, the legislation delineates what I call the ``going in'' authorities for the President to use force. One fundamental weakness of the war powers resolution is that it fails to acknowledge powers that most scholars agree are inherent Presidential powers: to repel an armed attack upon the United States or its Armed Forces, or to rescue Americans abroad. My legislation corrects this deficiency by enumerating five instances where the President may use force: (1) To repel attack on U.S. territory or U.S. forces; (2) To deal with urgent situations threatening supreme U.S. interests; (3) To extricate imperiled U.S. citizens; (4) To forestall or retaliate against specific acts of terrorism; (5) To defend against substantial threats to international sea lanes or airspace; It may be that no such enumeration can be exhaustive. But the circumstances set forth would have sanctioned virtually every use of force by the United States since World War Two. This concession of authority is circumscribed by the maintenance of the time-clock provision. After sixty days have passed, the President's authority would expire, unless one of three conditions had been met: (1) Congress has declared war or enacted specific statutory authorization; (2) The President has requested authority for an extended use of force but Congress has failed to act on that request, notwithstanding the expedited procedures established by this act: (3) The President has certified the existence of an emergency threatening the supreme national interests of the United States. The legislation also affirms the importance of consultation between the President and Congress and establishes a new means to facilitate it. To overcome the common complaint that Presidents must contend with ``535 Secretaries of State,'' the bill establishes a congressional leadership group with whom the President is mandated to consult on the use of force. Another infirmity of the war powers resolution is that it fails to define ``hostilities.'' Thus, Presidents frequently engaged in a verbal gymnastics of insisting that ``hostilities'' were not ``imminent''-- even when hundreds of thousands of troops were positioned in the Arabian desert opposite Saddam's legions. Therefore, the legislation includes a more precise definition of what constitutes a ``use of force.'' Finally, to make the statutory mechanism complete, the use of force act provides a means for judicial review. Because I share the reluctance of many of my colleagues to inject the judiciary into decisions that should be made by the political branches, this provision is extremely limited. It empowers a three-judge panel to decide only whether the time-clock mechanism has been triggered. The bill contains a provision granting standing to Members of Congress, a door that the Supreme Court appears to have largely closed in the case of Raines versus Byrd--the line-item veto challenge brought by the senior Senator from West Virginia. I believe, notwithstanding the holding of that case, that a Member of Congress would suffer the concrete injury necessary to satisfy the standing requirement under article three of the Constitution. The reason is this: The failure of the President to submit a use of force report would harm the ability of a Member of Congress to exercise a power clearly reposed in Congress under article one, section eight. That injury, I believe, should suffice in clearing the high hurdle on standing which the Court imposed in the Byrd case. No private individual can bring such a suit; if a Member of Congress cannot, then no one can. I have no illusions that enacting this legislation will be easy. But I am determined to try. The status quo--with Presidents asserting broad executive power, and Congress often content to surrender its constitutional powers--does not serve the American people well. More fundamentally, it does not serve the men and women who risk their lives to defend our interests. For that, ultimately, must be the test of any war powers law. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the section-by-section analysis be included in the Record.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, no less an authority than Alan Greenspan recently pronounced our economy in the best shape he has seen in his professional life. Unemployment, inflation, and interest rates are low; incomes, investment, and optimism remain high. Clearly, Mr. President, now is the time to worry. Now is the time to worry, Mr. President, because these are exactly the circumstances that breed overconfidence and complacency. Pride, Mr. President, goeth before the fall. Mr. President, we enjoy this excellent economic performance because we have got our own house in order--we have gone through a painful period of restructuring that has made our economy more efficient, and we have taken the tough steps to balance our federal budget. So our factories and businesses are operating efficiently, our workers are earning more, and our sound government finances are helping to keep interest rates down. What could go wrong? Well, what if the markets for this new, more productive economy were not there? What if international investors pull their money out of some of our major trading partners? What if those countries stop buying our products and services? What if they can't pay back their loans, and American investments there lose money instead of sending profits back home? Unfortunately, that is just what is happening now, and instead of acting quickly to limit the threat of these developments, the majority in the House of Representatives has chosen to play a dangerous game of chicken with international financial markets. Mr. President, the Senate went on record in March, by an overwhelming vote of 84 to 16, in favor of full funding of U.S. participation in the International Monetary Fund. But those funds were dropped by the House in Conference. I am pleased to see that Chairman Stevens, who, along with my colleague Senator Hagel on the Foreign Relations Committee has shown real leadership on this issue, has taken a second crack at the problem by including this funding on the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill. Unfortunately, we will not act on that bill until after the August recess. But just last week, the House pulled its version of the Foreign Ops bill from further consideration because of their internal squabbling over funding for the IMF. I fear that those squabbles may mask an even more cynical motive--to hold the IMF, and by extension global financial stability, hostage to increase their bargaining leverage on unrelated issues at the end of the legislative session this fall. Mr. President, I want to stress what is at stake while the majority in the House dithers. The financial crisis that began a year ago in Asia has not gone away--it continues to fester, and threatens to spread. Indeed, with the resources of the IMF already stretched thin, we may be entering the most critical phase of this threat to the global economy. If the worst case happens, Mr. President, we will have no place to hide, no matter how well things have been going for us lately. Just look at the risks. Japan is the keystone of the Asian economy--it could pull that already fragile region into a real depression if current trends are not quickly and dramatically reversed. That's why the recent elections there were so important, and why international investors are watching closely to see if Japan has the political muscle to overhaul its financial system and restore growth at the same time. That is a lot to ask, and much hangs on the outcome, including the health of important markets for American exports throughout Asia. Mr. President, in May our trade deficit soared to $15.8 billion, as exports to Asia dropped by 21 percent compared to a year ago. Still, our friends in the House suggest that we wait until the fall to see if things get worse. Russia presents an additional threat to our economic and security interests. Despite the announcement of a new IMF package, the Moscow stock market index has dropped 24 percent. An economically foundering Russia, facing political collapse, opens a Pandora's box of issues for stability in Europe and around the world. On top of all this, other countries, including South Africa, Ukraine, and Malaysia, are lined up in the IMF's waiting room. But because of the severity of the Asian crisis, the IMF's resources are so low that international investors must now have real fear that it will not be able to provide further support to its current clients, or support any additional countries now on the brink. This will add uncertainty to an already shaky situation, and can only make further panic more likely. Mr. President, the distinguished Senator from Maryland, Senator Sarbanes, recently warned those who think we can do without the IMF that they are ``playing with fire.'' He's right. They have decided, for short-term political reasons--some as small as their own fight over the Speaker's job--that they are willing to fiddle while the international economy burns. The IMF is not a perfect institution, Mr. President, but right now it is the only fire insurance we have got. By delaying indefinitely the funding for the IMF, these gamblers are taking deadly risks with our own economy, an economy that has taken years of sacrifice to restore to health. They are squandering our ability to lead economically and politically in a time of international crisis in exchange for some short-term political gains. It is time to cease this recklessness, Mr. President. It's time to provide the IMF with the funds it needs, and remove short-sighted bickering and self-serving calculations in the U.S. Congress from the list of threats to our own economy.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. President. It is a truism that despite the end of the Cold War, we live in a dangerous world. The ultimate danger we face, perhaps, is that nuclear weapons will be obtained--or even used--by unstable countries or terrorist groups. We must undertake a range of activities to reduce that danger. There is no magic bullet. No single program or initiative will rid the world of the threat of nuclear cataclysm at the hands of a new or unstable nuclear power. Rather, we need a coherent strategy with many elements--a strategy designed to reduce both the supply of nuclear weapons technology to would-be nuclear powers and the regional tensions that fuel their demand for those weapons. I would like to spend a few minutes today talking about one piece of that strategy that this body can implement: We can and should give our advice and consent to ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test- Ban Treaty. And we should do that promptly. In her speech on the 35th anniversary of John F. Kennedy's American University speech, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright called for U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. Noting the recent Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, she said that ratification was needed ``now, more than ever.'' Senator Specter and I have also called for ratification now, both in floor statements and by drafting a resolution calling for expeditious Senate consideration of the Test-Ban Treaty. Why is the Test-Ban so crucial? Because it is directly related to the global bargain that is the heart of the global nonproliferation regime. Other countries will give up their ambition to acquire nuclear weapons, but only if the declared nuclear powers honestly seek to end their nuclear advantage. We have to keep up our side of the bargain--and that means ratifying and adhering to the comprehensive test ban--or the non- nuclear weapons states will not feel bound to theirs. One lesson of this decade's nuclear developments in India, Pakistan, Iraq and North Korea is that very basic nuclear weapon design information is no longer a tightly held secret. The technology required to produce nuclear weapons remains expensive and complex, but it is well within the reach of literally scores of countries. To keep countries from producing what scores of them could produce, you need more than pressure or sanctions. You must constantly maintain their consent to remain non-nuclear weapons states. Ideally, we would maintain that consent by removing the security concerns that propel countries to seek nuclear weapons. But that is terribly difficult, be it in Kashmir or the Middle East, in the Balkans or the Korean Peninsula or the Taiwan Straits. In the world of today and of the foreseeable future, peace does not reign. Nuclear non-proliferation will not prevail in this world either, unless we convince states that nuclear weapons are not the key to survival, to status or to power. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty is not merely emblematic of the nuclear powers' commitment to the non-nuclear weapons states. It also will put a cap on the development of new classes of nuclear weapons by the nuclear powers. The test-ban treaty will also limit the ability of any non-nuclear weapons state to develop sophisticated nuclear weapons or to gain confidence in more primitive nuclear weapons if it were to illegally acquire or produce them. If you can't test your weapon, you are very unlikely to rely upon it as an instrument of war. These are important reassurances to the non-nuclear nations of the world. They are why those countries agreed to foreswear all nuclear tests and to accept intrusive on-site inspection if a suspicion arose that they might have tested a nuclear device. Will the Test-Ban Treaty also gradually reduce a country's confidence in the reliability of its nuclear weapons over the next 30 or 50 years, as some of its opponents assert? If so, that is actually reassuring to the non-nuclear weapons states, for it gives them hope of the eventual realization of that ``cessation of the nuclear arms race'' encouraged by Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. So even the cloud that most frightens test-ban opponents has a silver lining: it helps keep the rest of the world on board the non-proliferation bandwagon. Now it is true, Mr. President, that some countries have never accepted the world non-proliferation bargain. The so-called ``threshold states'' of India, Pakistan and Israel all viewed nuclear weapons as essential to their national security, and India denounced the Non- Proliferation Treaty because it did not require immediate nuclear disarmament. Still other countries, like Iran, Iraq and North Korea, signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty but maintained covert nuclear weapons programs. But the vast majority of the world's states, including many prospective nuclear powers, have gone along with this bargain. And it is vital to our national security that we maintain their adherence to the world non-proliferation regime. They must not become ``threshold states,'' let alone actually test nuclear weapons. So, how will we maintain the adherence of the world's non-nuclear weapons states to the nuclear proliferation regime? The Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests are a direct challenge to that regime. The regime--and the countries who support it--can only meet that challenge if the United States leads the way. On one level, we are already doing that. We have imposed severe sanctions on both India and Pakistan, and both of their economies are at risk. We have adjusted our sanctions to limit their effect upon innocent populations, and we are working to give the President the flexibility to lift them in return for serious steps by India and Pakistan toward capping their arms race and addressing their differences. On the world-wide level, however, our record is mixed. Some countries have joined us in imposing sanctions on India and Pakistan. We have also been joined in strong statements by countries ranging from Japan to Russia and China. Statements and resolutions by the G-8, the Organization of American States, the Conference on Disarmament, and the United Nations Security Council have rightly condemned India and Pakistan's nuclear tests and called upon them to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to refrain from actual deployment of their weapons, to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and to move toward a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir dispute. But the world is acutely aware of our failure to persuade more countries to impose sanctions, and also of our own failure, so far, to ratify the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty. Until we ratify this Treaty, the nuclear hard-liners in India and Pakistan will be able to cite U.S. hypocrisy as one more reason to reject the nuclear non-proliferation regime. And until we ratify the Treaty, the rest of the world will find it easier to reject U.S. calls for diplomatic and economic measures to pressure India and Pakistan. We must keep our part of that non-proliferation bargain, if we are to maintain U.S. leadership on non-proliferation, keep the rest of the world on board, and influence India and Pakistan. The truth is that we have little choice. If we fail to keep faith with the non-nuclear states because we cannot even ratify the Test-Ban Treaty, then we will also fail to keep them from developing nuclear weapons of their own. And in that case, Mr. President, we might as well prepare for a world of at least 15 or 20 nuclear weapon states, rather than the 5 or 7 or 8 we have today. That is the stark reality we face. the fate of the test-ban treaty But we need not fail, Mr. President. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test- Ban Treaty is a very sensible treaty that is clearly in our national interest. It binds the rest of the world to refrain from nuclear testing, just as we have bound our own government for the last 6 years. The Test-Ban Treaty forces us to rely upon so-called ``stockpile stewardship'' to maintain the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons, but we are in a better position economically and scientifically to do that than is any other country in the world. Treaty verification will require our attention and our resources, but those are resources that we would have to spend anyway in order to monitor world-wide nuclear weapons programs. Indeed, the International Monitoring System under the Treaty may save us money, as we will pay only a quarter of those costs for monitoring resources that otherwise we might well have to finance in full. But we do have a problem. We have been unable to hold hearings on this treaty in the Foreign Relations Committee, even though committees with lesser roles have held them. And the Majority Leader has said that he will not bring this treaty to the floor. Why is that, Mr. President? I know that my good friends the chairman and the majority leader have raised arguments against the Treaty, but they seem curiously unwilling to make those arguments in the context of a proper committee or floor debate on a resolution of ratification. Could they be afraid of losing? Could they be afraid that, once the pros and cons are laid out with a resolution of ratification before us, two thirds of this body will support ratification? Perhaps; I know that I think the Treaty can readily get that support. For the arguments in favor of ratification look pretty strong. The conditions that the President has asked us to attach to a resolution of ratification will assure that we maintain our weapons and the ability to test them, and that he will consider every year whether we must withdraw from the Treaty and resume testing to maintain nuclear deterrence. I also know, Mr. President, that the American people overwhelmingly support ratification of the Test-Ban Treaty. A nation-wide poll in mid- May, after the Indian tests, found 73 percent in favor of ratification and only 16 percent against it. Later polls in 5 states--with 7 Republican senators--found support for the Treaty ranging from 79 percent to 86 percent. The May poll also found that the American people knew there was a risk that other countries would try to cheat, so the public is not supporting ratification because they wear rose-colored glasses. The people are pretty level-headed on this issue, as on so many others. They know that no treaty is perfect. They also know that this Treaty, on balance, is good for America. So perhaps those who block the Senate from fulfilling its Constitutional duty regarding this Treaty are doing that because they know the people overwhelmingly support this Treaty, and they know that ratification would pass. Perhaps they just don't like arms control treaties. Perhaps they would rather rely only upon American military might, including nuclear weapons tests. Perhaps they want a nation-wide ballistic missile defense and figure that then it won't matter how many countries have nuclear weapons. Perhaps they figure our weapons will keep us safe, even if we let the rest of the world fall into the abyss of nuclear war. I don't share that view, Mr. President. I believe we can keep non- proliferation on track. I believe that we can maintain nuclear deterrence without engaging in nuclear testing, and that the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty is a small price for keeping the non- nuclear states with us on an issue where the fate of the world is truly at stake. I cannot force a resolution of ratification on this Treaty through the Foreign Relations Committee and onto the floor of this body. But the American people want us to ratify this Treaty. They are absolutely right to want that. I will remind my colleagues--however often I must--of their duty under the U.S. Constitution and to our national security. I will make sure that the American people know who stands with them in that vital quest. My colleague, the senior Senator from Pennsylvania, and I have drafted a resolution calling for expeditious consideration of this Treaty. So far, we have been joined by 34 of our colleagues as co- sponsors of that resolution. We know that many others support us quietly, Mr. President, but hesitate to part company with their leaders. We are confident, however, that as more of them reflect on what is at stake, and on the need for continued U.S. leadership in nuclear non-proliferation, they will realize that they will do their leaders a favor by helping the Senate to do what is so clearly in the national interest. The Senate will give its advice and consent to ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. The only question is when. The world is a dangerous place, Mr. President, and we must no underestimate the challenges our country faces. But the spirit of America lies in our ability to rise to those challenges and overcome them. The immediate challenge of non-proliferation is to bring forth a resolution of ratification on a useful treaty, Mr. President. We should show more of that American spirit in our approach to that task.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I failed to ask that Senator Feinstein of California be added as a cosponsor to the Hutchinson amendment. I ask unanimous consent she be added.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 10 seconds.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I particularly want to thank my friend from Arkansas for adding the prohibition, the ability to deny visas to those countries that engage in the heinous practice of engaging in female genital mutilation. I am not one who thinks we should be erecting sanctions all over the world, but there are certain things that are so, so contrary to our basic values--forced abortion, forced sterilization, mutilation of body parts--that I think that it is appropriate that we use sanctions in those circumstances. I also ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Connecticut, Senator Lieberman, be added as a cosponsor.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will be very brief. I want to thank the Senator from Arkansas. He has been a gentleman. His amendment is, I think, a good amendment and I thank him for considering some of the suggestions that I and a few others had. I ask unanimous consent that Senator Levin of Michigan, Senator Kerry of Massachusetts and Senator Biden of Delaware be added as cosponsors.

Mr. BIDEN. Reserving the right to object, why didn't the Senator just leave it at 5:30 the way you had it? I think the Senator from Michigan may be willing to take, say, a minute.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, a lot of us withheld speaking against this amendment, and I hope that maybe just the Senator from West Virginia, Mr. Byrd, would speak and then all those who already spoke refrain from speaking again so people such as me don't feel compelled to stand up and respond. We are trying to get this done. Because the Senator from Arizona was kind enough to withhold his motion to table, I hope we could agree that after the Senator from West Virginia speaks, and maybe the Senator from Texas takes a couple minutes to close out, we then let the Senator move. It would be helpful.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I also ask unanimous consent the Senator from Virginia, Mr. Robb, be added as a cosponsor.

Mr. BIDEN. I realize I have a few more minutes, but in order to accommodate this bill moving along, again, I close by thanking the Senator from Arkansas for accommodating some of the changes that he has for his amendment. I yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, today I introduce legislation designed to provide a framework for joint congressional-executive decision-making about the most solemn decision that a nation can make: to send men and women to fight and die for their country. Entitled the ``Use of Force Act,'' the legislation would replace the war powers resolution of 1973 with a new mechanism that, I hope, will be more effective than the existing statute. Enacted nearly a quarter century ago, over the veto of President Nixon, the war powers resolution has enjoyed an unhappy fate--scorned by Presidents who questioned its constitutionality, and ignored by a Congress too timid to exercise its constitutional duty. That was not, of course, the intent of its framers, who sought to improve executive-congressional cooperation on questions involving the use of force--and to remedy a dangerous constitutional imbalance. This imbalance resulted from what I call the ``monarchist'' view of the war power--the thesis that the President holds nearly unlimited power to direct American forces into action. The thesis is largely a product of the cold war and the nuclear age: the view that, at a time when the fate of the planet itself appeared to rest with two men thousands of miles apart, Congress had little choice, or so it was claimed but to cede tremendous authority to the executive. This thesis first emerged in 1950, when President Truman sent forces to Korea without congressional authorization. It peaked twenty years later, in 1970, when President Nixon sent U.S. forces into Cambodia-- also without congressional authorization, but this time accompanied by sweeping assertions of autonomous Presidential power. President Nixon's theory was so extreme that it prompted the Senate to begin a search--a search led by Republican Jacob Javits and strongly supported by a conservative Democrat, John Stennis of Mississippi--for some means of rectifying the constitutional imbalance. That search culminated in the war powers resolution. Unfortunately, the war powers resolution has failed to fulfill its objective. If anything, the monarchist view has become more deeply ingrained with the passage of time. This trend was been on display throughout this decade. Before the gulf war, for example, with half a million American forces standing ready in Saudi Arabia--a situation clearly requiring congressional authorization--President Bush still refused to concede that he required an act of Congress before using force. Only at the last minute, and only grudgingly, did President Bush seek congressional support. Even then, he continued to assert that he sought only support, refusing to concede that congressional authorization was a legal necessity. Several years ago, the notion of broad executive power was claimed on the eve of a proposed invasion of Haiti--an invasion that, thankfully, was averted by a last-minute diplomatic initiative. In 1994, officials of the Clinton administration characterized the Haiti operation as a mere ``police action''--a semantic dodge designed to avoid congressional authorization--and a demonstration that the monarchist view prevails in the White House, without regard to political party. And, most recently, the Clinton administration asserted that it had all the authority it needed to initiate a military attack against Iraq--though it never publicly elaborated on this supposed authority. In this case, the question was not clear-cut--as it was in 1991. But two things emerged in the debate that reinforce the need for this legislation. First, it demonstrated that the executive instinct to find ``sufficient legal authority'' to use force is undiluted. Second, it demonstrated that Congress often lacks the institutional will to carry out its responsibilities under the war power. Although there was strong consensus that a strong response was required to Saddam Hussein's resistance to U.N. inspections, there was no consensus in this body about whether Congress itself should authorize military action. Lacking such a consensus, Congress did nothing. Congress' responsibilities could not be clearer. Article one, section eight, clause eleven of the Constitution grants to Congress the power ``to declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal and to make rules concerning captures on land and water.'' To the President, the Constitution provides in article two, section two the role of ``Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.'' It may fairly be said that, with regard to many constitutional provisions, the Framers' intent was ambiguous. But on the war power, both the contemporaneous evidence and the early construction of these clauses do not leave much room for doubt. The original draft of the Constitution would have given to Congress the power to ``make war.'' At the Constitutional Convention, a motion was made to change this to ``declare war.'' The reason for the change is instructive. At the Convention, James Madison and Elbridge Gerry argued for the amendment solely in order to permit the President the power ``to repel sudden attacks.'' Just one delegate, Pierce Butler of South Carolina, suggested that the President should be given the power to initiate war. The rationale for vesting the power to launch war in Congress was simple. The Framers' views were dominated by their experience with the British King, who had unfettered power to start wars. Such powers the Framers were determined to deny the President. Even Alexander Hamilton, a staunch advocate of Presidential power, emphasized that the President's power as Commander in Chief would be ``much inferior'' to the British King, amounting to ``nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces,'' while that of the British King ``extends to declaring of war and to the raising and regulating of fleets and armies--all which, by [the U.S.] Constitution, would appertain to the legislature.'' It is frequently contended by those who favor vast Presidential powers that Congress was granted only the ceremonial power to declare war. But the Framers had little interest, it seems, in the ceremonial aspects of war. The real issue was congressional authorization of war. As Hamilton noted in Federalist twenty-five, the ``ceremony of a formal denunciation of war has of late fallen into disuse.'' The conclusion that Congress was given the power to initiate all wars, except to repel attacks on the United States, is also strengthened in view of the second part of the war clause: the power to ``grant letters of marque and reprisal.'' An anachronism today, letters of marque and reprisal were licenses issued by governments empowering agents to seize enemy ships or take action on land short of all-out war. In essence, it was an eighteenth century version of what we now regarded as ``limited war'' or ``police actions.'' The framers undoubtedly knew that reprisals, or ``imperfect war,'' could lead to an all-out war. England, for example, had fought five wars between 1652 and 1756 which were preceded by public naval reprisals. Surely, those who met at Philadelphia--all learned men--knew and understood this history. Given this, the only logical conclusion is that the framers intended to grant to Congress the power to initiate all hostilities, even limited wars. In sum, to accept the proposition that the war power is merely ceremonial, or applies only to ``big wars,'' is to read much of the war clause out of the Constitution. Such a reading is supported neither by the plain language of the text, or the original intent of the framers. Any doubt about the wisdom of relying on this interpretation of the intent of the framers is dispelled in view of the actions of early Presidents, early Congresses, and early Supreme Court decisions. Our earliest Presidents were extremely cautious about encroaching on Congress' power under the war clause. For example, in 1793, the first President, George Washington, stated that offensive operations against an indian tribe, the Creek Nation, depended on congressional action: ``The Constitution vests the power of declaring war with Congress; therefore no offensive expedition of importance can be undertaken until after they have deliberated upon the subject, and authorized such a measure.'' During the Presidency of John Adams, the United States engaged in an undeclared naval war with France. But it bears emphasis that these military engagements were clearly authorized by Congress by a series of incremental statutes. The naval war with France also yielded three important Supreme Court decisions regarding the scope of the war power. In 1799, Congress authorized the President to intercept any U.S. vessels headed to France. President Adams subsequently ordered the Navy to seize any ships traveling to or from France. The Supreme Court declared the seizure of a U.S. vessel traveling from France to be illegal--thus ruling that Congress had the power not only to authorize limited war, and but also to limit Presidential power to take military action. The court ruled in two other cases bearing on the question of limited war. Wars, the Court said, even if ``imperfect,'' are nonetheless wars. In still another case, Chief Justice Marshall opined that ``the whole powers of war [are] by the Constitution . . . vested in Congress . . . [which] may authorize general hostilities . . . or partial war.'' These precedents, and the historical record of actions taken by other early Presidents, have significantly more bearing on the meaning of the war clause than the modern era. As Chief Justice Warren once wrote, ``The precedential value of [prior practice] tends to increase in proportion to the proximity'' to the constitutional convention. Unfortunately, this constitutional history seems largely forgotten, and the doctrine of Presidential power that arose during the cold war remains in vogue. To accept the status quo requires us to believe that the constitutional imbalance serves our nation well. But it can hardly be said that it does. As matters now stand, Congress is denied its proper role in sharing in the decision to commit American troops, and the President is deprived of the consensus to help carry this policy through. I believe that only by establishing an effective war powers mechanism can we ensure that both of these goals are met. The question then is this: How to revise the war powers resolution in a manner that gains bipartisan support--and support of the executive? In the past two decades, a premise has gained wide acceptance that the war powers resolution is fatally flawed. Indeed, there are flaws in the resolution but they need not have been fatal. In 1988, determining that a review of the war powers resolution was in order, the Foreign Relations Committee established a special subcommittee to assume the task. As chairman of the subcommittee, I conducted extensive hearings. Over the course of two months, the subcommittee heard from many distinguished witnesses: former President Ford, former Secretaries of State and Defense, former Joint Chiefs of Staff, former Members of Congress who drafted the war powers resolution, and many constitutional scholars. At the end of that process, I wrote a law review article describing how the war powers resolution might be thoroughly rewritten to overcome its actual and perceived liabilities. That effort provided the foundation for the legislation I introduced in the 104th Congress, and that I reintroduce today. The bill has many elements; I will briefly summarize it. First, the bill replaces the war powers resolution with a new version. But I should make clear that I retain its central element: a time-clock mechanism that limits the President's power to use force abroad. That mechanism, it bears emphasis, was found to be unambiguously constitutional in a 1980 opinion issued by the Office of Legal Counsel at the Department of Justice. It is often asserted that the time-clock provisions is ``unworkable,'' or that it invites our adversaries to make a conflict so painful in the short run so as to induce timidity in the Congress. But with or without a war powers law, American willingness to undertake sustained hostilities will always be subject to democratic pressures. A statutory mechanism is simply a means of delineating procedure. And the procedure set forth in this legislation assures that if the President wants an early congressional vote on a use of force abroad, his congressional supporters can produce it. Recent history tells us, of course, that the American people, as well as Congress, rally around the flag--and the Commander-in-Chief--in the early moments of a military deployment. Second, my bill defuses the specter that a ``timid Congress'' can simply sit on its hands and permit the authority for a deployment to expire. First, it establishes elaborate expedited procedures designed to ensure that a vote will occur. And it explicitly defeats the ``timid Congress'' specter by granting to the President the authority he has sought if these procedures nonetheless fail to produce a vote. Thus, if the President requests authority for a sustained use of force--one outside the realm of emergency--and Congress fails to vote, the President's authority is extended indefinitely. Third, the legislation delineates what I call the ``going in'' authorities for the President to use force. One fundamental weakness of the war powers resolution is that it fails to acknowledge powers that most scholars agree are inherent Presidential powers: to repel an armed attack upon the United States or its Armed Forces, or to rescue Americans abroad. My legislation corrects this deficiency by enumerating five instances where the President may use force: (1) To repel attack on U.S. territory or U.S. forces; (2) To deal with urgent situations threatening supreme U.S. interests; (3) To extricate imperiled U.S. citizens; (4) To forestall or retaliate against specific acts of terrorism; (5) To defend against substantial threats to international sea lanes or airspace; It may be that no such enumeration can be exhaustive. But the circumstances set forth would have sanctioned virtually every use of force by the United States since World War Two. This concession of authority is circumscribed by the maintenance of the time-clock provision. After sixty days have passed, the President's authority would expire, unless one of three conditions had been met: (1) Congress has declared war or enacted specific statutory authorization; (2) The President has requested authority for an extended use of force but Congress has failed to act on that request, notwithstanding the expedited procedures established by this act: (3) The President has certified the existence of an emergency threatening the supreme national interests of the United States. The legislation also affirms the importance of consultation between the President and Congress and establishes a new means to facilitate it. To overcome the common complaint that Presidents must contend with ``535 Secretaries of State,'' the bill establishes a congressional leadership group with whom the President is mandated to consult on the use of force. Another infirmity of the war powers resolution is that it fails to define ``hostilities.'' Thus, Presidents frequently engaged in a verbal gymnastics of insisting that ``hostilities'' were not ``imminent''-- even when hundreds of thousands of troops were positioned in the Arabian desert opposite Saddam's legions. Therefore, the legislation includes a more precise definition of what constitutes a ``use of force.'' Finally, to make the statutory mechanism complete, the use of force act provides a means for judicial review. Because I share the reluctance of many of my colleagues to inject the judiciary into decisions that should be made by the political branches, this provision is extremely limited. It empowers a three-judge panel to decide only whether the time-clock mechanism has been triggered. The bill contains a provision granting standing to Members of Congress, a door that the Supreme Court appears to have largely closed in the case of Raines versus Byrd--the line-item veto challenge brought by the senior Senator from West Virginia. I believe, notwithstanding the holding of that case, that a Member of Congress would suffer the concrete injury necessary to satisfy the standing requirement under article three of the Constitution. The reason is this: The failure of the President to submit a use of force report would harm the ability of a Member of Congress to exercise a power clearly reposed in Congress under article one, section eight. That injury, I believe, should suffice in clearing the high hurdle on standing which the Court imposed in the Byrd case. No private individual can bring such a suit; if a Member of Congress cannot, then no one can. I have no illusions that enacting this legislation will be easy. But I am determined to try. The status quo--with Presidents asserting broad executive power, and Congress often content to surrender its constitutional powers--does not serve the American people well. More fundamentally, it does not serve the men and women who risk their lives to defend our interests. For that, ultimately, must be the test of any war powers law. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the section-by-section analysis be included in the Record.