Joe Biden

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, that has been cleared on the Democratic side.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. I yield 13 minutes to the Senator from Ohio.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Montana.

Mr. BIDEN. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from South Dakota.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from North Dakota.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I believe I have 6 minutes remaining under my control.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield just over 4 then to the Senator from Connecticut.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield 8 minutes to the Senator from Oregon.

Mr. BIDEN. I yield myself 2 minutes. Mr. President, I have not spoken. I am not going to take much time because Senators whose States which have very, very important interests in passage of this bill should be given time. I would like to begin by thanking Senator Murray. She has been the spearhead of this effort. I, quite frankly, wish we had done something broader. The Senator from Kentucky and I thought we had worked out something more along the lines that my friend from Nebraska was just talking about, a broader approach to dealing with not just merely agriculture, which is obviously very important, but I just say to my colleagues, hopefully the Senator from Kentucky and I will be back on the floor in the not-too-distant future with a proposal for a more rational policy relating to sanctions generally, not just as they relate to Pakistan and not just as they relate to agriculture. Mr. President, I am pleased to join the Senator from Kentucky in presenting this legislation. As our colleagues know, just before the Fourth of July recess, the majority and minority leaders formed a bipartisan Task Force on Sanctions Policy. The Senator from Kentucky was named the chairman, the Senator from Delaware the co-chairman. The task force was given two tasks; first, to make recommendations to the Senate leadership, by July 15, related to the existing sanctions against India and Pakistan. And second, to make recommendations, by September 1, on sanctions policy generally. These are tight deadlines, but with the support of the leadership, the chairman and I are determined to try to meet them. The situation with regard to Pakistan and India is our first challenge. Two months ago, the security situation in South Asia changed, and changed utterly, to borrow a phrase from Yeats. The explosion of nuclear devices, first by India, then by Pakistan, brought two nations into the so-called club of countries which acknowledge that the possess nuclear weapons. The testing by both countries was promptly--and properly--condemned by the United States and the international community. But the United States went further than most countries, because under the Glenn amendment, enacted in 1994, the President was required to impose sanctions on both governments. The sanctions imposed by the Glenn amendment are as severe as they are sweeping. They require the termination of all assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act--with certain exceptions such as narcotics assistance and humanitarian aid--the termination of all military sales and financing, the termination of all licenses for the exports of items on the U.S. Munitions List, and the termination of all credits or credit guarantees provided by the U.S. government. Additionally, the law requires the United States to oppose the extension of loans by international financial institutions like the World Bank, and requires the U.S. government to prohibit private U.S. banks from making loans or credits for the purpose of purchasing food or other agricultural commodities. The Glenn amendment provides little flexibility. Once imposed, there is no authority for the President to waive the law. His hands are completely tied. I voted for the Glenn amendment in 1994, which was part of the State Department Authorization Act that year. But when viewed in the context of Pakistan's and India's decision to test, I have to conclude that while our approach worked for many years, it is no longer working. It didn't stop them from testing, and the lack of flexibility in the law provides little incentive for India and Pakistan to take positive steps now. All this is not to suggest that sanctions should never be applied. I have voted for many sanctions laws in the past, and even authored a few. In this instance, sanctions were clearly appropriate, both as a strong condemnation of the governments in Delhi and Islamabad and to deter other countries which might seek a nuclear weapon. What I am second-guessing is the decision of Congress not to provide more flexibility to the President. I am a strong defender of congressional power, and I believe Congress is well within its constitutional authority to impose sanctions for foreign policy reasons. But the President is charged with the conduct of diplomacy. And any statute which provides little or no discretion for the President necessarily interferes with his ability to perform that task. The task in this case is already difficult enough: the President faces the considerable challenge of convincing the two governments to constrain their nuclear weapons programs and avoid further escalation of tensions in the region. The inflexibility in the Glenn amendment deprives the President of tools that he might use to advance these objectives. In imposing sanctions, we must also pause before applying sanctions unilaterally. The weight of the historical evidence suggests that we are more likely to advance our objectives if we can gain the cooperation of our major allies. Moreover, unilateral sanctions may impose a greater cost on our economic interests than they do on the targeted country. In the case of India and Pakistan, we are therefore faced with two questions: should we reconsider some of the unilateral sanctions set forth in the Glenn amendment? And should we give the President some flexibility in order to advance his diplomatic objectives in the region? I answer both questions in the affirmative and, I believe, so does the chairman. However, the bill we are now considering is limited only to removing one unilateral sanction: The bill before us would provide a permanent exemption under the Glenn amendment for U.S. government credits to support the purchase of food or other agriculture commodities. This provision is identical to the provision sponsored by Senators Murray and Gorton which was added to the Agriculture appropriations bill during its consideration by the Committee on Appropriations. The exemption for Commodity Credit Corporation--or CCC credits--is consistent with the approach of the Glenn amendment, which permits loans by private banks for the purchase of food and other agricultural commodities. This matter is of some urgency, because there is an important sale offer to be made by Pakistan in the coming days. Wheat farmers in the Pacific Northwest provide a significant portion of Parkistan's wheat market, and they rightly fear that they could lose that market if the CCC credits are not available. I have long believed that we should not force U.S. farmers to bear the burden of foreign policy sanctions, so I am pleased to support this measure. But I remain hopeful that in the coming weeks, we can devise a means to provide the President flexibility with the remaining sanctions now in place against india and Pakistan. I do not mean to suggest that we should repeal these sanctions. At this stage, just a few weeks after the nuclear tests in the region, and with the President's diplomatic efforts still at an early stage, it is premature to contemplate a complete repeal or blanket waiver of the provisions in the Glenn amendment. But we should attempt, before we adjourn for the year, to give the President some latitude in order to assist his efforts to negotiate with the two countries. We should not underestimate the enormity of the task before the President. Helping to construct a new security framework in South Asia may take considerable time, given the complexity of the situation and the deep- seated antagonism between the countries of the region. I hope that our colleagues will give the administration the support that it needs in the months ahead. In closing, I would like to thank the chairman of the task force, Senator McConnell, for his gracious acceptance of the job and for helping point us in this direction. I would also like to thank the majority and minority leaders for their confidence in selecting us to lead the task force, and for their support for this initial legislation. I urge my colleagues to support it. Mr. President, with the permission of my friend, may I yield now, even though it will be two Democrats in a row, to my friend from North Dakota, Mr. Dorgan, for 10 minutes.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I must object. I object because what the majority leader proposes is to add a very significant piece of substantive drug legislation relating to the crack-powder cocaine sentencing issues. I note that the Judiciary Committee has not reported this legislation. This legislation is subject to significant debate. For example, the costs of the most recent proposal offered by Senators Abraham and Allard are very significant. According to the Justice Department--the 5-year cost estimate to our federal prison budget is more than $790 million. The 10-year estimate-- more than $1.9 billion. This is just one example of the significant policy implications of this proposal. Frankly, the Judiciary Committee must be given the opportunity to report this legislation before we debate this on the floor. In contrast, we have fully debated the drug director legislation introduced last summer. The Judiciary Committee has debated it, the committee held hearings, the committee developed a bipartisan re- authorization bill, the committee reported the bill last November, since then we have worked with Senator McCain and the Armed Services Committee to work out their issues with this bill. The bottom lines--we have a bipartisan, fully debated, bill; and we need to get the drug director's office re-authorized. There are many particular, specific drug policy issues to debate. Crack-cocaine is just one of them. Youth drug abuse, youth violence, drug interdiction, and many more all need to be debated. But, let's keep our eye on the ball, and let's re-authorize General McCaffrey's office. The General needs our support.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise to support passage of S.2073, legislation to authorize specific funding for the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children. I am pleased to join Senator Hatch and others in sponsoring this legislation. I would also note that this legislation makes the same important change in law that I originally proposed as an amendment during the Judiciary Committee's mark-up of S. 10, legislation concerning juvenile justice issues. My amendment was accepted by Chairman Hatch and agreed to by all members of the Committee. So, I am particularly happy that the full Senate is today passing this legislation in another form. It is my hope that the House will also act to pass this bill.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I am pleased to join my friend from Connecticut, as well as Senators Hagel and Roberts, in introducing the ``Sanctions Rationalization Act of 1998.'' The bill establishes a means for the President to delay, suspend, or terminate certain unilateral economic sanctions, or a portion thereof, if doing so is important to U.S. national interests. The bill also provides a means for Congress to overturn any such decision, and provides for expedited procedures within the House and Senate for consideration of a resolution to reverse a Presidential decision. I have become increasingly concerned that Congress' efforts to impose sanctions is unduly hampering the President's ability to conduct U.S. foreign policy. To say this is not to suggest that Congress has exceeded its authority in the foreign affairs area. Under the Constitution, both Congress and the President have considerable foreign policy powers. As Professor Edward Corwin, a noted authority on the Presidency, once wrote, the Constitutional design on foreign policy tenders an ``invitation to struggle.'' Indeed, Congress has several powers under the Constitution in the foreign affairs area. It has, among other things, the power of the purse, the power to declare war, the power to raise and support the military, and the power to regulate foreign commerce. Congress is well within its power to impose sanctions against foreign governments. And in many instances, sanctions--or the embarrassment to the foreign government which flows from their imposition--have had a positive effect in advancing U.S. policy. But what Congress cannot do is to conduct the daily business of diplomacy. Only the President can undertake negotiations with foreign governments and leaders. And any law which limits the ability of the United States to engage with foreign nations necessarily limits the options available to the President as he seeks diplomatic solutions to foreign policy problems. Foreign policy, however, usually involves a complex mosaic of interests, and requires use of a wide range of diplomatic instruments. Moreover, foreign policy is not static--constantly changing circumstances often require calibrations in policy. The imposition of statutory sanctions, in many cases, serves to undermine the ability of the President to balance the competing interests and to respond to changes on the ground overseas. In sum, statutory sanctions are often a blunt instrument, when the situation at hand may call for an instrument which the President can fine-tune. The most significant part of this legislation, in my view, is that it gives the President the power to calibrate sanctions once imposed--that is, to adjust or modify the application of a sanction as the situation may warrant. Accordingly, he can use the authority in this bill to try to induce the desired action by the foreign government by lifting or modifying a sanction progressively. The bill does not allow the President to terminate those measures that are imposed on a multilateral basis, including obligations under resolutions of the United Nations Security Council, nonproliferation and export control arrangements like the Australia Group, the Nuclear Supplier's Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, and the Wassenaar Arrangement. The bill also does not allow the President to terminate those measures taken under treaty obligations, such as those under the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Biological Weapons Convention. Further, the bill does not apply to several types of measures, including foreign military financing, export controls and restrictions under the Arms Export Control Act, any measure taken pursuant to section 307 of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991, any measure to restrict imports of products and services in order to protect domestic health or safety, any measure to enforce a federal criminal law, and any retaliatory trade measure authorized under our trade statutes or international trade agreements. In proposing this legislation, I do not envisage that the authority granted to the President would be employed casually. Instead, like analogous waiver authority in the Foreign Assistance Act--section 614 of that Act--I expect that this power would be used only when absolutely necessary, only after careful consideration in the Executive Branch, and only after careful consultation with the appropriate committees of Congress. And in cases where the President does abuse the authority this bill grants him, Congress would still have the power to reverse the President's decision, and resolutions to do so will be entitled to expedited procedures which would ensure their prompt consideration. I wish to emphasize that I do not regard this bill as a final product. Rather, it is a work in progress. This is a complicated subject; defining what constitutes a ``sanction'' is a difficult undertaking, as is drafting the necessary exclusions. Accordingly, I welcome contributions from our colleagues, the Executive Branch, and non-governmental organizations. Of course, this is not the only legislation on this subject. Our colleagues, Senator Lugar, and Representative Hamilton, have made an important contribution in promoting the debate on this subject in introducing their sanctions reform legislation. The Majority and Minority Leaders plan to appoint a special task force to review the issue, and I am certain that legislative proposals will emerge from those discussions. In closing, I should state that I am under no illusion that passing this legislation will be easy. It may be that we cannot reach a consensus on acceptable legislation in the remaining months of the 105th Congress. What is important now is that the Executive and the Congress have initiated a dialog, on a bipartisan basis, on a subject of considerable importance to our national interests. I look forward to engaging in that debate in the weeks and months ahead.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I want to say a few words about the admirable work of the Senate Armed Services Committee. For the past two years, we have had budget agreements that have forced the Committee to make tough choices with shrinking resources. Under the able leadership of Chairman Thurmond and the Ranking Member, Senator Levin, the Committee has once again enhanced the quality of life for our brave men and women in uniform and have invested in programs vital to our future fighting forces. As the Ranking Member on the Foreign Relations Committee, I am constantly reminded of how vital a strong military is to protecting American interests and security around the world. I have said it before and I'll say it again, for diplomacy to be effective, not only must it be adequately funded, it must also be backed by a strong military and superior intelligence activities. But, Mr. President, before I say any more about this bill, I want to say a word or two about Chairman Thurmond. His service to this nation has been truly remarkable. From the beaches of Normandy to the halls of the U.S. Senate, he has shown an outstanding dedication and commitment to doing the work of this nation. He and I worked together on the Judiciary Committee for 12 years--he was Chairman for the first 6 years and I was Chairman for the last 6. Then, as now, he has been a leader by example. He is one of the most remarkable individuals I have ever had the privilege of working with. We are not merely colleagues, we are friends. He has served on the Armed Services Committee for 40 years, the last 4 of which he has been its Chairman. This is his last year as Chairman, so I want to say now what deep respect I have for the Senior Senator from South Carolina's military expertise and for the able manner in which he has worked with Senator Levin to keep our military strong. The Committee, the Senate, and the American people have gained from Senator Thurmond's leadership and his willingness to work with Senators from both parties to put America's national security interests ahead of partisan interests. This bill is an example of that. It includes a 3.1 percent pay raise for military personnel. It also includes an important increase in hazardous duty incentive pay for mid- and senior level air crew personnel. I thank my colleagues for joining me in addressing that concern and showing these experienced personnel that we value their unique and vital contribution to America's national interest. In addition, there is an important $12 million increase in C-5 airlift squadrons research and development. This money is critically needed by the Air Force to examine the needs of these crucial aircraft as new technology becomes available to improve their performance. As many already know, the C-5 is capable of carrying more cargo than any other aircraft in our military. It has supported military operations from Vietnam to Desert Storm to the current operations in Bosnia and the Persian Gulf. I applaud the Committee's foresight in providing the money necessary to maintain these planes at peak performance levels. Mr. President, I also want to take a minute to talk about the health care demonstration programs in this bill. With the growth in the number of retired military personnel, the rising costs of health care in general, and the closing of military bases, great strains have been placed on military medical facilities. This, in turn, has placed in some jeopardy the idea of guaranteeing high quality health care to our military retirees. Last year, Congress recognized this growing problem, and we took a step in fixing it. Last year's Defense Authorization bill included a demonstration project on Medicare subvention--where Medicare reimburses military medical facilities for the treatment of retirees who are also eligible for Medicare. I am pleased that the Dover Air Force Base in Delaware has been selected as one of the six sites for this national demonstration project. Again, this was a first step. But, there are other ways that might help us to fulfil our commitment to military retirees. And, so I strongly support the three additional health care demonstration projects in this bill--one to allow military retirees to participate in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program once they reach age 65; one to allow retirees to continue their eligibility for TRICARE and not have to switch to Medicare when they turn 65; and one to allow military retirees who are also eligible for Medicare to continue to participate in the Department of Defense's mail order pharmacy program. Providing health care is an obligation we owe to our military retirees. It is a promise we made--but a promise that is now in jeopardy. The health care demonstration projects in this bill will not solve the problem we face. They are, after all, only demonstrations. But, hopefully, they--along with last year's Medicare subvention demonstration project--will help point the way to a solution so we can ensure that the federal government upholds its commitment to the men and women who so bravely served our country. Mr. President, this bill includes an amendment that I joined with four colleagues in voting against yesterday. It was a compromise Sense of Congress resolution offered by Senator Levin, Senator Coats, and Senator Thurmond, regarding budgeting for continued participation of United States forces in NATO operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The three cosponsors deserve credit for their hard work in having crafted what was, in the main, a very well thought out amendment. It contained several positive elements. And their compromise amendment was far preferable, in my opinion, to another amendment on U.S. forces in Bosnia, which Senator Hutchison and Senator Byrd were considering introducing. Nonetheless, I voted against the compromise amendment, and I would like briefly to explain the reasoning behind my vote. First, I agree with the amendment's intent to keep the pressure on our European allies to constitute the bulk of ground forces in the Stabilization Force, known popularly as SFOR. I want to clarify, however, that non-American forces already make up approximately three- quarters of the SFOR total. Second, I am in complete agreement with the amendment's not giving a date-certain for the withdrawal of United States ground combat forces from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Such a date-certain would constitute the worst kind of micro-management of military affairs by the Congress, and would quite likely endanger the lives of American troops on the ground. My principal reason for voting against the compromise amendment is that I do not agree that our goal should be a withdrawal of all United States ground combat forces from Bosnia and Herzegovina as long as a NATO-led stabilization force remains in that country. To be perfectly candid, Mr. President, I believe that such a move would serve to undermine American leadership in NATO. Even Combined Joint Task Forces, commonly known by their CJTF acronym, should, unless there are exceptional circumstances, have a U.S. ground combat force component. While American air, naval, command and control, logistical, and intelligence support, and even a ready reserve over-the-horizon force in the region would be vital to any future mission, the participation of some American combat ground forces will remain a vital bona fide of U.S. commitment to Alliance operations. In other words, for the United States to retain control of NATO-led operations, we must be present in all components of missions, including on the ground. This would apply to any follow-on force in Bosnia, whether it is NATO-led or is a CJTF with the Western European Union. Let me pose a question to my colleagues. If the Bosnia ground operation becomes a purely European affair, do they not think that pretty soon some of our European allies will begin to question whether an American should continue to serve as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR)? I for one think the answer is yes. The compromise amendment, against which I voted, may, I fear, begin to set in motion a process that will severely erode American leadership in NATO. Lest anyone thinks that my fears are far-fetched, I would remind my colleagues that France has already called for a European to take over command of Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) in Naples and that initially the French were supported by several other European allies. Keeping a contingent of U.S. ground combat troops in all NATO and NATO-led missions is a powerful symbol of American leadership and is recognized as such by allies and potential foes alike. We should think long and hard before advocating a change in that policy. Mr. President, I will conclude where I began. I compliment the managers of this bill and the Armed Services Committee for providing a bill that continues to strengthen our nation's national security. It enhances the quality of life of our loyal and dedicated men and women in uniform. It addresses important weapons systems needs and takes steps toward finding the best way to meet our health care obligations. While I disagree with the Bosnia provision added for the reasons I've already mentioned, I think this bill gives America the strong military it needs to support our diplomatic work and to promote our national security interests.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I support the amendment by the Senator from Arkansas regarding Radio Free Asia. The amendment is virtually identical to the text of H.R. 2232 as reported by the Committee on Foreign Relations on May 19. As the author of the legislation which created Radio Free Asia (RFA) in 1994, I strongly support its efforts to broadcast truth and information to the people living under dictatorial rule in China and elsewhere in Asia. RFA began broadcasts in 1996 on a shoestring budget of roughly $10 million a year. This bill authorizes, in Fiscal Years 1998 and 1999, a significant increase in funding for Radio Free Asia, and provides additional funds for the transmission capability needed to broadcast the programming. It is consistent with the funding levels in S. 903, the State Department authorization bill approved by the Senate over a year ago. Modeled on Radio Free Europe, this organization was conceived in order to broadcast news and information about internal events in China and the other non-democratic states of East Asia. Radio Free Asia thus acts as a ``surrogate'' service, acting as a local media--making available information to the Chinese people which is otherwise unavailable because of the tight control that the dictatorship in Beijing retains on the media in China. As the State Department's Annual Human Rights report noted, the Chinese government and the Communist Party ``continue to control tightly print and broadcast media and use them to propagate the current ideological line.'' Radio Free Asia is designed to overcome these restrictions on press freedom. The leaders of the new democracies in Eastern Europe have all testified to the importance of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty during the Cold War. No tribute has been more eloquent than that of Lech Walesa, former President of Poland, who said ``How fortunate that the Iron Curtain could not be raised so high as to block radio transmission. The truth seeped in, unseen by border guards . . . . between the barbed wire. It provided impossible to stop, impossible to silence.'' Radio Free Asia is not, as some cynics have asserted, a propaganda service. Although funding by the U.S. government, it is a private corporation. Its funding is provided by the Broadcasting Board of Governors, a government entity which has considerable autonomy in its role of supervising U.S. government-sponsored broadcasting. In short, Radio Free Asia is a legitimate news organization, staffed by legitimate journalists. Its President is Richard Richter, a former network news executive, who has insisted on the highest journalistic standards. The Vice-President for Programming, Daniel Southerland, is also an experience reporter who formerly served as the Beijing bureau chief for the Washington Post. In the short time that Radio Free Asia has been on the air, they have assembled a very talented and dedicated staff which is committed to honest journalism. The exiling of prominent dissidents by the Beijing government has been a boon to Radio Free Asia. Wei Jingsheng and Wang Dan, both recently exiled by China, have signed on to provide regular commentary. Radio Free Asia thus provides a platform for voices of democracy--a platform that is, unfortunately, unavailable to these men inside China. China and the other nations to which RFA broadcasts have not been thrilled with the honor. Since last year, the Chinese have attempted to jam Radio Free Asia broadcasts. And this week, the Beijing government rescinded visas it had previously issued for three RFA reporters who had sought to accompany President Clinton on his trip to China. The decision by China to rescind the visas is deeply regrettable. Had it admitted the journalists, the Chinese government would have provided a manifest demonstration that it had turned a corner--that it is willing to open up its system to greater pluralism and scrutiny. China wants to be a great power. But Great Powers do not obstruct the flow of information into and out of the country. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that everyone has the right to ``seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.'' If China is to be a modern nation, it should adhere to this universal standard. There is, however, some good news lurking in the decision of the Chinese government to block the visas for RFA reporters: China must be worried about the effect of RFA's broadcasts. In other words, the broadcasts are getting through--despite the efforts to jam it--and people are listening. Information is subversive of tyranny, as are western investment and exchanges, and the Communist government in China apparently recognizes that Radio Free Asia threatened its attempts to control news and information. Mr. President, Radio Free Asia is an important instrument to advance U.S. policy of promoting democratic values in China and elsewhere in Asia. This amendment is a modest, but important, step to ensure that it has the tools to do the job.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I want to thank the managers of this bill, the senior Senators from South Carolina and Michigan, for their willingness to work with me on non-proliferation issues and to accept two amendments that I proposed in this regard. There is a critical need to guard against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or related technology from the former Soviet Union, and I am very pleased that my colleagues share that concern. There is no more critical national security issue than how well we handle the threat of holocaust posed by weapons of mass destruction. The potential for such horrific destruction may well have been increased by the end of the Cold War and the breakdown of superpower control over other countries. And a failure to contain the risk of such holocausts would dwarf any other foreign policy successes or failures. War between the United States and Russia is no longer a realistic threat, despite the size of our nuclear arsenals. The use of weapons of mass destruction by other countries, or even by terrorist groups, is a real threat, however, and there is a real risk that former Soviet materials or technology will be the engine of proliferation to other countries or groups. No great power is as active as the United States in trying to prevent proliferation. Nobody has as many programs as we do to detect proliferation activities, to stop them, to pressure illegal buyers and sellers, to develop military weapons and tactics for operations against sites with weapons of mass destruction, and to assist the former Soviet states, in particular, in safeguarding and destroying dangerous material and in reorienting their military industry to the civilian economy. But the fact is, Mr. President, that we are failing to do all that we can to stop proliferation. In particular, we are failing to reach most of the highly-trained scientists and technicians who developed weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles for the former Soviet Union. Well over a hundred thousand such skilled personnel served the Soviet death machine at its peak. Anywhere from ten to fifty thousand personnel still have skills that a rogue state or terrorist group would like to obtain, and are underpaid or unemployed today. How can we remedy these failings? One way is to support and fully fund our existing programs of non-proliferation assistance to the former Soviet Union. I am pleased to say that the managers of this bill agree with that judgment. Thus, they have accepted a Bingaman amendment that I co-sponsored, to restore the few cuts in these programs that had been adopted in committee mark-up. The managers of this bill have also accepted an amendment that I sponsored, to make available an additional $15 million for the Energy Department's Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program and $30 million for the new ``nuclear cities'' initiative endorsed at the last meeting of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission three months ago. This amendment parallels one to the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act that Senator Domenici and I sponsored last week. I am confident that it will result in these two important programs being able to move forward effectively, rather than being a threat to each other's existence. As I noted on the floor last week, Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (or IPP) is a program that creates employment opportunities for former Soviet arms specialists by helping them develop their ideas for commercially viable goods and services. As an idea reaches fruition, IPP brings the arms specialists into joint ventures with outside investors, who gradually take over the funding. For example, thanks to IPP, a U.S. firm is working with Ukrainian scientists to develop and market a device for decontaminating liquids. This device will enable the Ukrainian dairy industry to produce fresh milk despite the lingering effects of the Chernobyl reactor meltdown. IPP had a slow start. It's hard to come up with really viable commercial ventures, to find investors, and to make sure they can invest safely. But IPP has begun to take off. As of this April 15, projects had achieved completely commercial funding and 77 had found major private co-funding. We all have chosen wisely today, to maintain IPP's funding stream and to encourage the many weapons specialists in the former Soviet Union who are searching for new careers in the civilian economy. The ``nuclear cities'' initiative is a more specialized effort to improve employment opportunities for Russian personnel from their nuclear weapons labs and manufacturing facilities. This initiative, too, will focus on finding commercially viable projects and bringing in outside investors. The challenge is to find projects that can work at these somewhat isolated cities, which are more or less the Russian equivalent of Los Alamos. When the United States funds the ``nuclear cities'' initiative, it gets two benefits. First, Russia's Minister of Atomic Energy has announced that he will downsize their nuclear weapons establishment. And second, by providing civilian job opportunities for some of the personnel who are let go, we will help protect against Russian weapons specialists accepting offers from states like Iran, Iraq, or Libya. One problem in any program that depends upon developing commercially viable products and services is that foreign investors are wary of putting their funds in ventures that may fail because of confiscatory taxes, local corruption or the difficulty of enforcing contracts. As a result, many otherwise marketable ideas may go without the funding they need to get off the ground and become engines of employment. The senior Senator from Indiana and I sent a letter to the Vice President recently to suggest that a high-level commission or advisory committee be formed, with senior U.S. industrialists among its members, to survey investment opportunities in the ``nuclear cities'' and similar areas. This commission would also work with Russian officials on improving the climate for international investment, so that an enlarging civilian economy in Russia can provide new careers for more former arms experts. Fifty years ago, a commission to set up the Marshall Plan--led by an industrialist, the CEO of Studebaker--was able to convince Western Europe to take bold steps in economic coordination. In a similar manner, perhaps practical help from U.S. industrialists today can galvanize Russian officials to take the steps that are needed for international investment to jump-start their economic engines. Even with such a commission, however, even if we maintain the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program, and even if we add the ``nuclear cities'' initiative, there is no way that commercially viable ventures can employ all the tens of thousands of Russian personnel who have worked on weapons of mass destruction. At some point, Mr. President, we have to ask whether it is not in our national security interest to provide broader assistance. That is why I proposed the other amendment that the managers of this bill have accepted, to require the Secretary of Defense to report to Congress on this issue. Specifically, that report will tell us: (1) how many former Soviet personnel are at risk of being candidates for recruitment by rogue states; (2) how many can be employed in commercially viable enterprises; (3) how many additional personnel could be employed if we were to subsidize socially useful employment that could not attract outside investment; and (4) what the costs and benefits would be of a 10-year program of such subsidized employment. I am confident that the Department of Defense will find a significant gap between the number of Russian arms experts who are at risk and the number who can be reached by programs that focus upon commercially viable ventures. We have much less information, however, regarding either the potential or the costs of a program that would provide broader assistance. The Department of Defense report required by this amendment, which would be prepared in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Energy, will thus make a significant contribution to the ability of Congress to make sensible policy decisions in this field. The task of assisting the transition of the former Soviet Union from totalitarianism to democracy, from a command economy to a market economy, and from militarism to more peaceful pursuits is indeed daunting. We need many programs, for no single effort will achieve all of this. There will be disappointments along with successes. But the stakes are so high that we dare not flinch from the challenge to assist that transition. Likewise, we dare not cease our efforts to ensure that former Soviet arms experts refrain from selling their expertise to those who would misuse it. Today's actions are not the end of this demand upon our attention and our resources. But we can take heart from the fact that they are measured steps in the right direction. With luck, we will come up with the needed programs and resources in time to prevent weapons of mass destruction from becoming a larger factor in the next century than they have been in our own. amendment no. 3036 (Purpose: To require a study on effective deployment of theater missle defense systems in the Asia-Pacific) region On page 268, between lines 8 and 9, insert the following:

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will, believe it or not, take only 1 minute. I compliment the Senator from Georgia. I am going to vote with him. I told him when he first introduced this legislation I would support it. In the meantime, it picked up some other amendments, Gorton and Ashcroft, and I announced at the time I voted against it with Ashcroft and Gorton as part of it, that if it came out of conference as it was originally constructed, I could support it. I thank him for his fairness, the way he has dealt with this, the openness in the way he has dealt with this, and I compliment him on bringing back to this body a piece of legislation that I and I believe probably another half dozen or more Democrats will be able to support. So I thank him very much for his courtesy.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise to speak about an indispensable group of people in our military. Mid- and senior level enlisted air crew men and women are critical to America's military and need to be properly compensated for their valuable service. Last year's Defense Authorization bill included a provision to adjust hazardous duty incentive pay upward by $50 for E-1 to E-3 enlisted air crew personnel and upward by $25 for E-4 air crew personnel. All other enlisted personnel and officers eligible for hazardous duty incentive pay also received an upward adjustment. Unfortunately, E-5 to E-9 air crew personnel were not included in this adjustment. My amendment provides that $40 increase in hazardous duty incentive pay for the E-5 to E-9 air crew personnel and adds $15 to the increase given to E-4 air crew personnel as of this year. I thank the managers of this bill, Senator Thurmond and Senator Levin, for their support of this important amendment and for their unflagging efforts every year to help the dedicated men and women in our armed services. It is crucial that we show our appreciation for America's dedicated mid- and senior level enlisted personnel. They provide vital experience in all of the military's flying missions. They are also in demand in the private sector. Commercial airlines are willing to pay for well- trained and experienced flight crews. One look at the missions being flown by U.S. armed forces, from Bosnia to the Persian Gulf to the Korean Peninsula, shows how indispensable experienced air crews are to the defense of U.S. national interests. We cannot afford to keep losing these seasoned professionals. My amendment is one step toward addressing the problem now--letting these experienced aircrew personnel know that as our armed forces continue to work at a high operations tempo we value their unique and indispensable contribution to America's national interests. I yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. BIDEN. I thank the President.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. I thank the Senator. grand prairie region, arkansas

Mr. BIDEN. I thank my friend. Mr. President, recently in the newly passed highway bill, TEA-21, the Secretary of the Army was directed to transfer the right, title and interest of the St. Georges Bridge in Delaware, to the State of Delaware. The transfer is necessary to facilitate a retransfer of the bridge to a private entity for the purposes of demonstrating the effectiveness of large-scale composites technology. If the transfer is completed within 180 days the Secretary is directed to provide $10,000,000 to the State for rehabilitating the bridge. I rise to ask the Senator from Nevada, in his capacity as Ranking member of the Subcommittee, to seek his commitment in working with me and the Army Corps of Engineers to ensure that this transfer and the $10 million payment occurs as authorized.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senators from New Mexico and Nevada for including an idea that I proposed in the managers' amendment to the energy and water appropriations bill. I am confident that together we will lessen the risk that former Soviet scientists will help any rogue state to build nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. This amendment does two things. First, it earmarks an additional $15 million for the Department of Energy's Initiative for Proliferation Prevention, or IPP, program which was unfairly cut from the President's budget request. And second, it earmarks start-up funds for the ``nuclear cities'' initiative that was endorsed by both Vice President Al Gore and Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin. Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention, or IPP, is a program that creates employment opportunities for former Soviet arms specialists by helping them develop their ideas for commercially viable goods and services. As an idea reaches fruition, IPP brings the arms specialists into joint ventures with outside investors, who gradually take over the funding. For example, thanks to IPP, a U.S. firm is working with Ukrainian scientists to develop and market a device for decontaminating liquids. This device will enable the Ukrainian dairy industry to produce fresh milk despite the lingering effects of the Chernobyl reactor meltdown. IPP had a slow start. It is hard to come up with really viable commercial ventures, to find investors, and to make sure they can invest safely. The executive branch thought that IPP had unspent funds from past years. So they cut its budget by 50 percent--down from $30 million to $15 million. But IPP has begun to take off. As of this April, 15 projects had achieved completely commercial funding and 77 had found major private cofunding. As a result, IPP does not have unobligated funds lying around. Now is not the time to cut the IPP program. Rather, we should encourage IPP and the many weapons specialists in the former Soviet Union who are searching for new careers in the civilian economy, by maintaining IPP's funding stream. The ``nuclear cities'' initiative is an effort to improve employment opportunities for Russian personnel from their nuclear weapons labs and manufacturing facilities. This initiative, too, will focus on finding commercially viable projects and bringing in outside investors. The challenge is to find projects that can work at these somewhat isolated cities, which are more or less the Russian equivalent of Los Alamos. When we fun the ``nuclear cities'' initiative, we get two benefits. First, Russia's Minister of Atomic Energy has announced that they will downsize their nuclear weapons establishment. And second, by providing civilian job opportunities for the personnel who are let go, we will help protect against Russian weapons specialists going off to work for programs in states like Iran, Iraq or Libya. The ``nuclear cities'' initiative was developed by a group of U.S. and Russian specialists, and was endorsed at the last meeting of the Gore-Chernomyrdin commission. Later this spring, Energy Secretary Pena and Russian Atomic Energy Minister Adamov also endorsed it. According to the group that developed this new initiative, it can usefully spend up to $30 million in fiscal year 1999. I don't know how much the executive branch will want to devote to ``nuclear cities,'' but my amendment gives them the opportunity to fund a realistic program. By earmarking funds both for the ''nuclear cities'' initiative and for the IPP program, moreover, we make sure that the price of the new initiative will not be the death an existing program. If there is clear overlap between the IPP program and the ``nuclear cities'' initiative, such overlap should be eliminated. But I have the distinct impression that there are excellent IPP projects that will have nothing to do with Russia's ``nuclear cities,'' and such projects should not be sacrificed. Once again, I thank and congratulate the senior Senator from New Mexico and the senior Senator from Nevada. They have given us a fine example of bipartisan cooperation and effectiveness.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I am wondering if the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee will engage in a colloquy with me regarding the St. Georges Bridge in my State of Delaware.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, President Clinton, as he prepares to depart for China, carries with him an obligation, which I am sure he will fulfill, to do his best to advance U.S. core interests with Beijing and to communicate the values of the American people directly to the Chinese people. But what is also at stake, I think, is that there is a concomitant responsibility on the part of the U.S. Senate and the U.S. Congress to adhere to a practice that has been in place for the 25 years that I have been in the U.S. Senate; that is, when a President is abroad, for the Congress to refrain, if only temporarily, from acting on matters that would affect the country which the President is visiting. There were a number of times when President Reagan was President, when President Nixon was President, when President Ford was President, and when President Bush was President that I had sharp disagreements with their foreign policy initiatives. But never once did I, nor can I remember any of us in either the Republican or the Democratic Party, vote on legislation that would directly affect and impact upon the relationship of the United States and the country which the President was visiting. So I ask my Republican friends, in the spirit of bipartisanship in the conduct of American foreign policy, to refrain from offering amendments to the DOD bill, if it comes up, that are designed to sanction and/or publicly criticize China at the very moment the President of the United States will be in China. I hope that we could return to that period in our relationship when both parties adhered to that practice. There is a list of at least 12--maybe as many as 20--China sanction amendments, some of which may very well be justified, that would be attached to, or attempted to be attached to, the defense bill, which I am told is likely to come up on Tuesday of next week. I make a personal plea to my colleagues to return to the practice that has been honored here on the floor of the U.S. Senate of not engaging in legislative action that impacts upon, or can impact upon, the relationship with the country where the President of the United States, be he a Republican or Democrat, is presently in place. I will be sending a letter to all of my colleagues asking that they do that. But to continue, Mr. President, the President's mission is not going to be an easy one any more than the first time President Nixon went to China, or President Bush, or any other President who has engaged China. It comes amid a sometimes rancorous debate over China policy in this country, and the debate is totally appropriate, I might add. I am not suggesting there should not be a very serious debate, and I have no doubt, because of the consequences of the actions we will take as a Nation, it will likely get rancorous at some point. I have myself asked this Congress to move into special secret session, a rare occurrence, not so many years ago to debate the extension of most-favored-nation status to China. I did so because of my concerns about Chinese proliferation activities, proliferation of missile and/or nuclear technology. And so I am not suggesting the debate will not be heated, and I am not suggesting it should not be thorough. I am not suggesting that it will not have political ramifications. That is all appropriate, normal and reasonable. But the President's mission is going to be made more difficult as a consequence of the debate that is underway. There is no clear consensus in America, nor, in my view, no clear consensus in the Senate, on how to best advance American interests in the Far East. The Governments of China and the United States will not always see eye to eye, and while the people of the United States and the people of China have much in common--a love of family, a thirst for knowledge, and perhaps most importantly, a desire to see our children and grandchildren live in a world more peaceful and prosperous than our own--we also have profound differences that cannot be overlooked. In his incisive history, entitled, ``The Search for Modern China,'' Yale historian and prominent Chinese scholar Jonathan Spence writes that China is not yet truly a modern nation.'' Spence defines a modern country as ``one that is both integrated and receptive, fairly sure of its own identity, yet able to join others on equal terms in a quest for new markets, new technologies and new ideas.'' He concludes that the ``search'' for modern China is an ongoing act. I think Spence is right, and the United States cannot afford to be a spectator in this drama. We need to be active on the world's stage, engaging China as it undergoes a period of extraordinary change. What do we want? What is in our national interest? Good China policy begins with a clear articulation of U.S. interests, beamed directly to the highest levels of the Chinese Government. There is virtually no debate in this country over our long-term objectives. Our interests are plain. We seek a more prosperous, open and democratic China, at peace with its neighbors, and respectful of international norms in the area of nonproliferation, human rights and trade. There is considerable debate, however, about how best to achieve those objectives and whether they can all be achieved simultaneously or whether we will put one ahead of the other during this transition period. There are some who are convinced that the best way to persuade China's leaders to bring their domestic and foreign policies in line with U.S. expectations is to punish them for each and every misdeed--as perceived by us. This punitive approach, one which I think occasionally is appropriate, is well represented by a raft of Chinese bills passed by the House of Representatives last fall, many of which have been introduced as amendments that I have referenced earlier to the Defense Authorization Act. Let me say that I share many of the concerns of my colleagues about the administration's handling of China policy. As I said on the Senate floor at this time last year, engagement is not a policy. Engagement is a means to an end. It is the substance of the engagement that matters. But a ``big stick'' approach to China can hardly be called engagement any more than yielding to China on every issue can be called engagement. This confrontational approach, or the ``big stick'' approach, flows from the absurd notion that China is unchanging and it will only behave responsibly when it is forced to do so. I respectfully suggest and favor a more balanced approach. Obviously, I am being subjective in characterizing my approach as more balanced. And it is not really my approach; many share the same view I am about to articulate--a balanced approach that relies upon spelling out the rules of the road to China, inviting them to abide by them, and then monitoring their compliance with their pledges to us and the rest of the international community. China aspires to be a great power. I welcome that aspiration because great powers live up to the great power obligation in the areas of nonproliferation, human rights and trade. China has undergone an extraordinary change over the past 25 years, opening to the outside world and dramatically transforming its economic institutions and the tenor of its political discourse. China has evidenced increasing accommodation to international norms. They have done so, for the most part, because they recognize their own interests dictate greater integration with the global economic markets and security regimes. We should encourage this trend, but we should not hesitate to communicate our concerns both publicly and privately when we think they deviate. For instance, we should not hesitate to criticize China for its human rights violations. We should publicly encourage China to sign the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and to incorporate its spirit directly into Chinese law. I was very disappointed when the President decided not to condemn China for human rights violations before the United Nations Human Rights Commission in Geneva. If we are not going to criticize China's human rights violations in front of an international body specifically created to safeguard human rights standards, where are we willing to voice our concerns? I am also disappointed that China continues to jam Radio Free Asia. With the support of my colleagues in the Senate and the House, I introduced legislation several years ago which created Radio Free Asia. RFA broadcasts reliable news directly to the people of China and Tibet, empowering them to hold their government accountable for its actions. But RFA is being jammed by the Chinese Government. I hope that President Clinton, when he travels to China, will tune in RFA, and if he can't find it on the radio, he should explain to his Chinese hosts that great powers do not restrict access of their people to information. We can also do more to promote the rule of law in China, bringing the Chinese to this country to see how a truly independent judiciary functions and sending Americans to China to teach them how to create similar institutions there. The administration has requested $5 million for the Asia Foundation to launch a rule of law initiative in China. I support this initiative. When all else fails, the United States should not hesitate to punish China by using carefully targeted multilateral sanctions. But this should be a last resort, not a reflex. A wise man on the Foreign Relations Committee, the Senator from Indiana, has pointed out the dangers of an over reliance on ill-defined unilateral sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy. We have an important role to play in the search for modern China. We can help it to its destination of modernization, or we can throw obstacles in its path. The upcoming summit presents an opportunity for the United States and China to try to bridge some of our differences, a chance to transform the issues from points of contention to examples of cooperation. We should not expect the world from a single summit. But we can make some progress. Perhaps no issue at the summit will be more important than that of nonproliferation. I said at the outset that we know clearly what our objectives should be for our policy, where we want a modern China to go. We don't have any misunderstanding of what we would like to see: China at peace with its neighbors, respecting international norms in the areas of nonproliferation, open trade, and human rights. But at some point, as my dad would say, if everything is equally a high priority, then nothing is a priority. I believe that there is no more important issue at this moment in the history and our relationship with China than nonproliferation. The spread of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them represents a clear and present danger to the security of both the United States and China. We need Chinese cooperation if we are to find ways to promote stability in south Asia, the Korean peninsula, and the Middle East. China's historic track record in this area has been poor. Indeed, Pakistan probably would not possess the nuclear capacity it demonstrated late last month were it not for the Chinese assistance over the past decades. China cannot escape some responsibility for exacerbating south Asian tensions by engaging in policies that were seen as threatening to India's security. But more recently, China appears to have undergone a sea change in its attitude. China has joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention. China has also agreed to be bound by some, but not all, of the terms of the Missile Technology Control Regime prior to it joining that regime. And, while China's export laws still fall short of international norms, particularly in the area of missile technology, China has been responsive to the administration's interests where we have clearly articulated them. Last fall, President Clinton secured a commitment from China not to extend any new cooperation to Iran's nuclear program. China has also pledged to halt all cruise missile exports to Iran in direct response to the urging of the U.S. Government. Moreover, China's initial response to nuclear tests on the subcontinent has been constructive thus far. China has avoided taking any steps which might exacerbate tensions or fuel a regional arms race. There is more, however, that China as a great power should do. As a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, China should join in an international diplomatic effort designed to identify the source of tensions in south Asia and foster dialog between India and Pakistan and between India and China. China should lead by example, by promoting greater transparency in arms exports, defense expenditures, and military exercises. China, in my view, should join the Missile Technology Control Regime and agree to bring its export controls on dual-use items and missile- related technologies up to international standards. In addition, it should join the Nuclear Suppliers Group and develop comprehensive controls on all nuclear-related technologies. Taken together, these steps would not only contribute significantly to peace and stability in south Asia, they would also serve the interests of global nonproliferation. The administration has accomplished much in the last 6 years: from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to the Chemical Weapons Convention, et cetera. I asked, today, Assistant Secretary Roth, who testified before the Foreign Relations Committee, why that occurred. Was it merely the persuasiveness of the U.S. President? Was it because of the sticks as well as carrots that we have offered? Or, as this emerging modern power goes through a transformation, is it because they are finally determining on their own that it is in their own interest not to proliferate? I cannot fathom how, as a political leader sitting in Beijing, I could conclude that the ability of Pakistan to launch a nuclear weapon on the back of a missile that I had provided to them could possibly enhance my security. I cannot understand how anyone in Beijing could conclude that an arms race between India and Pakistan, and the prospect of what we would call theater nuclear weapons being engaged, could possibly do anything other than damage my security as a Chinese leader. I cannot imagine how they could reach that conclusion. But they have, in the past, reached similar conclusions. But I think what we are beginning to see, and it is presumptuous of me to say this about another country, but I think we are beginning to see the political maturation of a country. It is in its nascent stages, but they are coming to some of these conclusions, not merely because of what we do, not merely because of our urging, but because they begin to see it in their own naked self-interest. The only thing I have observed that causes China, in the recent past, to act against their own naked self-interest is if they are put in a position of being told they must do this or that. So, although sanctions are appropriate in some circumstances, and stating our view of what constitutes great power behavior is always appropriate, the idea that sanctions are always appropriate when we disagree with China is very mistaken and counterproductive. The stakes are high. Our success or failure in integrating China more fully into the community of nations, our success or failure at convincing China to live up to the international norms of behavior in the area of nonproliferation, our success or failure in helping to shape the emergence of modern China as a great power, will have profound effect, not only on the future of east Asia and south Asia, not only on the future of Europe, but on the entire world. Mr. President, about 25 years ago Fox Butterfield, the New York Times bureau chief in Beijing, published a book entitled ``China: Alive in the Bitter Sea.'' In it, Mr. Butterfield gave a moving account of the efforts of ordinary Chinese people to live under the often brutal authoritarian regime that existed at the time. Today there remains much injustice in China, and the struggle of ordinary people to exercise their universally acknowledged human rights is fought with peril. The outcome of that struggle will be central to the future of the ``middle kingdom.'' But the changes over the past 25 years have been so profound that those returning to China today for the first time since Deng Xiaoping opened the doors--and I went with Senators Javits and Church and others back in those early years of engagement--those who have gone back barely recognize China to be the same country. Engagement, engagement with a purpose, can bring about changes we seek in China, including in areas of vital importance to our national security, but only if we are both patient and principled. If we are swayed from our course by those who believe conflict with China is inevitable, or if we are lulled into a false sense of security by those who stand on this floor and confidently predict that China will automatically transform itself into a Jeffersonian democracy as it modernizes, then we will miss out on an opportunity to fulfill our role, as small as it may be, in the search for a modern China. Mr. President, to conclude, the stakes are high. This is no time for the U.S. Senate--in this significant summer, at this moment when, if China concludes it wishes to devalue its currency, the situation in Asia could become much, much worse, when at the very moment when China is acting responsibly vis-a-vis Korea, we cause it to change its course of action; if at this moment we insist upon all of our agenda being met, we can do irreparable harm to our interests. I yield the floor, Mr. President, with a final plea to my colleagues: Please, please, on this critical matter of the security interest of the United States of America, please revert to the tradition that has been time honored in this body. While a President of the United States is meeting with a head of state of another country, do not engage in activities, justified or not, that will sanction the country with which the President is at that moment negotiating. That is inappropriate behavior, in my opinion. That is not only partisanship, but it is against the naked self-interest of the United States, and I think it is reprehensible conduct. I am confident my colleagues will ultimately do the right thing. We have plenty of time to act on, and I may even vote for, some of the proposals relating to the sanctioning of China that are contemplated in the upcoming bill. But, please look at America's interest first, look at the longstanding tradition of bipartisanship on this issue, and allow the President to conduct this major foreign policy foray on his own terms until he returns. I yield the floor. I suggest the absence of a quorum.