Joe Biden

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate go into a period of morning business for the purpose of my making a statement on an unrelated issue.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will not object, but it is a fascinating place.

Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator yield me 30 seconds?

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, it is clear that the tobacco companies have no shame. My question for this body is: Have we no shame? What are we about to do? Nothing will happen to protect our children when this goes down. Have we no shame at all?

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, I am a little confused.

Mr. BIDEN. It is my understanding that the majority leader some 7, 6, 5, 10 days ago, told us that this bill would go nowhere unless we added a Republican provision relating to the marriage penalty. And now he is telling us that it violates the budget because we passed on this floor what he asked us to do. I want to tell you, I find that incredibly fascinating. I don't find it unusual, I find it fascinating. I have to get this straight. Here is my question, and I will not object if I get an answer: Is one of the reasons why the Republican leader will argue that this is a violation of the budget agreement the fact that this bill now contains a tax expenditure of tens of billions of dollars to correct the marriage penalty, which all the Republicans voted for and told us we had to have? Is that one of the reasons why we violate the Budget Act? I ask that as a question of my friend.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I rise at this moment to deplore the ongoing, brutal Serbian repression of the people of Kosovo and to lay out principles for American policy to deal with the crisis. Analysts have known for years that the Serbian province of Kosovo is a potential tinderbox for the entire southern Balkans. Approximately ninety percent of Kosovo's population is ethnic Albanian, known as Kosovars. Because of emigration to--not from--to other parts of Serbia and because of a low birth rate, ethnic Serbs now constitutute only about 7 percent of the province's population, down from a quarter of the population in the early 1970's. Kosovo is revered, as you know, Madam President, by Serbs as the cradle of their culture. Near the provincial capital Pristina lies Kosovo Plain, the site of the epic battle of June 28, 1389 in which medieval Serb knights and other Europeans were defeated by the Ottoman Turks, who remained in control of much of the Balkans into this century. Many of the holiest monasteries of the Serbian Orthodox Church lie within Kosovo's borders. The ethnic Albanians also have long historical ties to Kosovo, tracing, in fact, their origins to the Illyrians who inhabited the area in ancient times. Senator Byrd often talks of this heritage when he recites, as he does better than anyone, the history of Rome and its impact on the region. In 1974, Yugoslav President Tito made Kosovo, along with Vojvodina in the north, an autonomous region within Serbia. After Tito's death as the old Yugoslav Federation was beginning to disintegrate, an ambitious, demagogic Serbian politician named Slobodan Milosevic used Serbian nationalism and resentment of the Kosovo Albanians as a springboard to national power. In 1989, Milosevic abrogated Kosovo's constitutional autonomy, concurrently launching a purge of ethnic Albanians from the province's civil service and curtailing government funding for public institutions, including the schools. In response, the Kosovars, led by Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, a Sorbonne- educated intellectual, set up a shadow government and began a campaign of non-violent resistance to the Serbian oppression. The Kosovars set up and ran a system of public schools and maintained other public services. Rugova advocated attaining independence for Kosovo through Gandhian tactics. For most of this decade he was able to keep the lid on popular resentment and prevent violence. Rugova's position began to be undermined when the Kosovo Question was left off the agenda at the Dayton Peace talks in November 1995. Younger Kosovars increasingly began to ask why they should hold fast to nonviolence when the Bosnian Serbs were rewarded for their violence and brutality with their own quasi-state within Bosnia. In 1996 the beginnings of armed resistance to the Serbs appeared. A clandestine group calling itself the Kosova Liberation Army--KLA in English acronym or UCK in the Albanian acronym--carried out isolated attacks on Serbian police. By this past winter the frequency of KLA attacks increased, and Milosevic decided to respond. In late February his special police units, backed up by the Yugoslav Army, stormed into the Drenica area, killing and mutilating civilians who they said were harboring KLA militants. Some of you will remember, some of the people listening will remember, that's the circumstance in which the Yugoslav authorities would not allow the international community to examine the bodies. They rapidly buried them in mass graves and would not let outsiders come in and see what they had done. But, Madam President, it is essential not to fall into the trap that some have done by making false parallels to Milosevic's vicious military repression. These people, either for want of logic or perhaps as Serbian apologists, assert that Milosevic's storm troopers were only doing what any state would do against rebels. But, Madam President, if Milosevic had not robbed Kosovo of its legal autonomy, had not closed its schools and other institutions, and had not summarily brutalized and fired thousands of Kosovars, the armed resistance never would have materialized. Just yesterday in Moscow, Milosevic refused to deal with the KLA saying, ``I see no reason to conduct negotiations with terrorists.'' I will return to these prospects for negotiations in a minute, but let me just respond to Milosevic's comment by saying that acting just as he did in Croatia and Bosnia, as he is acting in Kosovo, I ask the rhetorical question: Who is the terrorist? Milosevic is a terrorist and a war criminal. He has demonstrated that over the past 5 to 6 years in Bosnia, and he is revealing it again in Kosovo. Since the February and early March massacres by his troops, Milosevic has diddled the Western world, utilizing his classic ``bait-and- switch'' tactics. First, he agreed to negotiate with Dr. Rugova and, thereby, earned from the United States an ill-advised postponement of a ban on foreign investments in Serbia. While talking, but not seriously negotiating with Rugova, Milosevic was busy setting in motion the next step in his state of terrorism. Late last month, his notorious special police sealed off western Kosovo and began a murderous campaign of ethnic cleansing, driving some 65,000 refugees into neighboring Albania and others into Montenegro. After killing hundreds and burning entire towns to the ground, Milosevic's forces have reportedly even resorted to strafing fleeing refugees from Yugoslav helicopters. One would hope that the West has learned something from its pathetic temporizing in Bosnia earlier in this decade. Perhaps we have, but maybe we have not. The so-called Contact Group, made up of the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, and Russia, has met regularly to try to hammer out a unified policy on Kosovo before it spins out of control. In spite of the fact that it operates by consensus, which means the ``lowest common denominator,'' the Contact Group has agreed upon economic sanctions which, given time, will worsen the already catastrophic conditions of the Serbian economy. But, Madam President, time is of the essence. Not only are thousands of innocent civilians--most of them Kosovars, but also some ethnic Serbs--being killed or driven from their homes, but the continuing fighting threatens the stability of neighboring Albania and also of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which itself has restive ethnic Albanians who constitute between one-quarter and one-third of its population. Maintaining the integrity of Macedonia--a fragile democracy with a Slavic leadership genuinely committed to interethnic reconciliation-- must be the cornerstone of U.S. policy. Above all, however, is the stark obvious fact that everyone should have learned from Bosnia, and that is, Slobodan Milosevic will only react to superior force being employed against him. He will not react otherwise. Lest anyone forget, while economic sanctions against Yugoslavia may have modified Milosevic's position in Bosnia, it was only the use of American airpower for 3 weeks in the fall of 1995 that brought Milosevic and his Bosnian Serb puppets to the bargaining table in Dayton. So now, Madam President, we, once again, are faced with an unpalatable fact that force may have to be employed in order to prevent the need for even greater force later. But there is no decision more difficult than considering whether to send American troops into action. I have been a Senator for 25 years. I started here when the Vietnam war was still underway, and I am here today. I find the single most intimidating decision that need be made by any of us is when we vote, as we have in the past, to put American forces in harm's way, and Kosovo is no exception. Let me outline some of the basic principles that have to be part of that decision, outline whether or not that the decision, although difficult, will have to be made. First, I believe that, except for those who prefer to withdraw to a ``Fortress America'' posture, no one doubts the strategic importance of the south Balkans to the United States. Second, before we embark upon any military or political action, we must have our goals firmly established. Third, I also believe that most of my colleagues will agree that NATO remains the cornerstone of American policy in Europe and should be the vehicle by which we act in Kosovo. Fourth, it goes without saying that a primary concern in any military planning is to minimize the risk of American lives while ensuring the success of the mission. With these principles in mind, let me examine our options in the Kosovo crisis now. The United States has declared itself against independence for Kosovo, thereby putting itself at odds with the Kosovar leadership and people, the very ones who are currently being brutalized. Madam President, I agree with the position our nation is taking. Whatever one may think of a broader decision made at the beginning of the 20th century as the Turks were pushed out of most of the Balkans, the ethnographic mix of the area simply precludes homogenous states, except through ethnic cleansing, which we must oppose. To put it bluntly, I would use force to stop massacres of innocent civilians. I would use force to prevent cross-border invasions. I would use peacekeepers backed up by force to guarantee the rights of minorities. But I would not risk American lives in a cause of a ``greater Albania'' which would probably destroy the Macedonian state and set off a chain reaction of incalculable proportions in the south Balkans. On the other hand, I cannot imagine asking the Kosovars to accept a return to the pre-1989 autonomy with Serbia. If Milosevic could summarily revoke the autonomy one time, he can do it again. Therefore, my own preference as a political goal would be giving Kosovo full republic status within the Yugoslav federation, on an equal footing with Serbia and Montenegro. Perhaps we would also have to have republic status for other parts of Serbia. I recognize there are problems with such a solution. Milosevic will be dead set against it, since a Kosovo Republic would ipso facto consign Serbia to a minority role in the upper house of the Yugoslav Parliament and probably mean the end of Milosevic's quasi-dictatorial rule. My response is that we and the Kosovars and the democratic leadership of Montenegro and the remaining democrats in Serbia should look at the probable outcome as an opportunity, not a problem. Both Dr. Rugova and the KLA have insisted upon independence for Kosovo, but if they keep in mind the scenario I just outlined, they might, in the course of negotiations, agree to a ``third republic'' or ``fourth republic'' compromise. But how about Milosevic? It is clear to me that only one principle continues to guide his policy, and that is clinging to power. In fact, since he took power in Serbia, Milosevic has been a dismal failure at everything, except staying in power. His wars of aggression in pursuit of a goal of a ``greater Serbia'' have resulted in the extinguishing of hundreds of years of Serbian culture in the Krajina and in Slavonia, and hundreds of thousands of Serbian refugees, and in the impoverishment of most Bosnian Serbs, and all this at a cost of over 300,000 persons killed. Meanwhile, under Milosevic's stewardship Serbia itself has plummeted from having been one of the wealthiest countries of Central and Eastern Europe to a near basket-case. But Milosevic clings to power. And it is, I regret to have to repeat, only the use of countervailing policy and force, power, that will remove Milosevic. And this is the central point. While there is no panacea for the Balkan ills, the necessary precondition for restoration of peace is a democratic government in Belgrade that is prepared to coexist with the non-Serb peoples of the area. In order to move events in that direction the Clinton administration has wisely supported the democratic reformist regime in Montenegro--of which Milo Djukanovic is the president--which is already posing a serious challenge to Milosevic within the Yugoslav parliament. We must now apply all necessary pressure on Milosevic in Kosovo. The Contact Group has issued four demands: a cessation of fighting; the unconditional withdrawal of Serbian special police forces and Yugoslav Army forces from Kosovo; a return of refugees; and unlimited access for international monitors. Milosevic's statement on Tuesday in Moscow after his talks with Russian President Yeltsin did not go far enough. He refused to withdraw his troops or to talk with the KLA--two conditions the Contact Group is asking for. Milosevic's usual half-way tactics must not dilute the West's resolve to force him to meet all the demands. NATO has already tasked its military experts to come up with military options for moving against the Serbs and Milosevic. Reportedly, nine preliminary options have been submitted. They range from stationing troops along Kosovo's borders, to imposing a new ``no- fly zone'' and a ``weapons-exclusion zone'' over part of Yugoslavia, to air strikes, and even ground invasions. In this planning, the possible political ramifications of any military action are, I am sure, being factored in by this administration. In the immediate future, though, the NATO military planners will flesh out the details of these options. So, I think it would be imprudent for me or for any other Senator to second-guess the NATO military planners who have the relevant expertise and are in possession of the vital intelligence data needed to make a judgment. What I can say is that the use of force must remain on the table, and that, if at all possible, it must be exercised through NATO. Within NATO, however, there exists a serious problem. It does not revolve so much around whether or not to use force; for most of our European allies seem to have learned from our Bosnian experience that the use of force in Kosovo may well be necessary. The dispute is rather over the question of whether approval by the U.N. Security Council is necessary before NATO acts outside the territory of its members. The United States has always maintained that it is not. As recently as our expansion vote on NATO we insisted that that is not a neessary precondition. A U.N. Security Council mandate is not a necessary precondition to use NATO forces. This is a position reinforced, as I said, by the U.S. Senate in the Resolution of Ratification of NATO enlargement overwhelmingly passed on April 30 of this year. Most--perhaps all--of our European NATO allies, including the British, assert that U.N. approval is necessary. Madam President, this difference of opinion strikes at the heart of the Alliance, for if the European allies' position wins out, the Russians--and even the Chinese--will have a veto power over NATO action in Central and Eastern Europe. This is precisely where Bosnia and Kosovo-like ethnic conflicts are likely to pose the biggest threats to regional security in the coming decades. As much as I support the U.N., I, for one, am not about to yield to the Security Council, the Russians, and the Chinese the decision of whether or not we are able to protect the interests of Europe--requiring their approval ahead of time. We must make clear to our European allies, and to the Russians, that while we prefer to act within NATO, we see Kosovo as a vital national security interest of the United States and, hence, are prepared to act alone if necessary. This is an unpleasant exercise, but it is preferable to face it now, rather than to postpone the issue. In fact, it would be good to resolve this intra-alliance dispute in the newest revision of NATO's Strategic Concept, which is now being discussed. Finally, Madam President, I believe it is absolutely essential for the United States immediately to make contact with the Kosovo Liberation Army. A withdrawal of Serbian special forces and Yugoslav Army troops, or a NATO bombing campaign, must not be done unless the KLA first agrees to a ceasefire. For I must repeat--the object of U.S. policy is not only to stop the movement toward a greater Serbia on the part of Mr. Milosevic, but it is also not to become a tool for a greater Albania in the South Balkans. It is to halt the fighting and then to start serious negotiations involving all the parties. I have already made clear my preferred political solution, but the outcome is for the parties to thrash out. We are approaching the moment of truth in Kosovo. As usual, the indispensible element in solving the crisis is the active involvement of the United States, just as it was in Bosnia. As the U.S. Government continues its negotiations with its allies and its Contact Group partners, and as NATO military planners continue to refine possible military options, I urge my colleagues to recognize the gravity of the situation and to make clear their support for resolute American leadership. Madam President, I yield the floor. Mr. HARKIN addressed the Chair.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I ask to proceed as in morning business.

Mr. BIDEN. David was not alone, nor was my colleague with the sling. He had a force behind him of noble tobacco merchants who stood shoulder to shoulder making sure that their ultimate threat was, if they didn't get a bill they wanted, they were going to continue to advertise. Isn't that kind of fascinating. These no-good sons of guns talking about how they care about the health of America. Much of the criticism this bill had leveled at it I agree with. I agree with much of the criticism. But the idea that at the end of the day--at the end of the day--we are going to have no bill and these young pages sitting here in front of me, their peer group is going to end up, every single day, being lured by specifically teenage-based advertising done by companies that lied straight out, right through their teeth, about what they have been doing. These companies are going to continue to consciously-- consciously--attempt to addict them to nicotine, a conscious effort where they will spend tens of millions of dollars this year, next year, and the following years in advertising to addict them--addict them--and they are going to do it. Notwithstanding the fact I had criticisms with some parts of this bill, at the end of the day, they win. They win big, and our children lose. Our children lose. And so David in this case had some cruise missiles. They were all paid for by big tobacco --big tobacco, period. I am not talking about tobacco farmers. They grow it. They get a small piece of this action. They don't do the advertising. I am talking about the tobacco executives. And so it is going to be business as usual. But mark my words--let me end with this--the tobacco companies, from the advertising they have been out with now about how bad this bill is, if they are serious, I ask them in good conscience, for the health of the Nation--which they have now finally had to acknowledge has been put in peril by their action--I ask them publicly: voluntarily refrain from advertising, voluntarily refrain from advertising in any way that appeals to our children --if they have one ounce of moral fiber in them. We don't need a bill. They can take care of this if they have any decency. Just voluntarily stop. No Government, no tax, no nothing. They know what they are doing to our children, and they are intending to do it. So if they want to solve the problem, it is real simple. Voluntarily stop. As was said years ago in a committee by a witness to a former Senator named McCarthy--at one point the witness looked up and said, ``Have you no decency, sir?'' My question to the tobacco executives of America today is, Have you no decency? If you do, stop, stop luring our children. I yield to my friend from Kentucky, and then later I am going to come back and ask to speak to Kosovo.

Mr. BIDEN. No, I know he wasn't. But I just want to point out that in that case David had several hundred--

Mr. BIDEN. I would be delighted to yield.

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I was about to ask that we move into morning business to speak. My friend from Kentucky wants to speak on this matter, and I will in 10 seconds yield to him. I say to my friend from Texas, it is always a joy to listen to him. The fairy tales he remembers always warm my heart. But I think he sometimes gets it mixed up. I think the Goliath here was the tobacco companies with their millions of dollars, and in the health care fight it was the insurance companies with their millions of dollars. I have no doubt my friend, with a small sling and a small stone, with his skill could take down Goliath, but in this case he had a few cruise missiles. The cruise missiles were the $40 million the tobacco companies are spending on advertising to kill this bill and the $14 billion that Harry and Louise spent on television to kill health care reform. I don't doubt his prowess, but I acknowledge he probably had a little bit of help. It was a nuclear bomb in that little sling that David had, and it was worth tens of millions of dollars. It works every time in this town, and I just find it absolutely fascinating.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, last night I was not present to vote on the two motions to table because I was in Wilmington attending the high school graduation ceremony of my godson and nephew, Cuffe Owens. When I left the Senate yesterday, it was not clear that any votes would take place later in the evening and I did not anticipate that I would miss any votes. Nonetheless, after consultation with my colleagues, I left with the belief that, If these votes were ordered, my absence would not affect the outcome, and it did not. Had I been present, I would have voted to table the Gramm amendment, and against tabling the Daschle amendment.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I yield myself such time as I may consume, up to the time I have allotted to me. I was asked by someone yesterday after a meeting at the White House on this issue, What did I think about this sanctions act? And I said: ``Good act, bad timing.'' Good act, bad timing. The extent to which this act that we are about to vote on, this sanctions bill, is of value is a little like nuclear weapons: Their value is in their nonuse; their value is in their threat of use. The administration has made significant progress over the 6 months we gave them with the threat of this bill in place. It has had the best of all worlds. It has allowed those in Russia who very desperately want to cut off this program and this relationship with Iran the ability to say, ``we must do this or we will lose much more than we will gain,'' without having to put themselves in a position politically in their own country in which they appear to be publicly buckling to the pressure applied by the United States. So, although I have no disagreement with the principle of H.R. 2709, the Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act of 1997, and I have no doubt that it addresses an urgent concern we cannot ignore, I have a great deal of doubt about whether we should be voting for it now and sending it to the President now. Madam President, to state the obvious, the cold war is over. One of the great wonders of it is that the world was spared any use of nuclear weapons during that cold war, and almost--almost--any use of chemical or biological weapons. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them, however, could bring about the very holocaust that we have managed to avoid over the past 50 years. So, everyone here is united in one objective: to stop, inhibit, curtail the proliferation of weapons or the means of delivering those weapons. How do we best do that? Is the best way to do that, relative to Iran's missile program, to impose these sanctions now? Will this bill, by its passage, finally turn off the last few drops of water coming out of that spigot? Or will it enhance the prospect that the cooperation with Iran--which began years ago and has continued in diminishing amounts up to now--will be increased, reversing the momentum of the last 6 months? It seems to me, as rational persons--and we all are, obviously, on this--we have to examine that question. For me, the instinct to punish Russia for what they did in the past is overtaken by my fear that the proliferation will increase. To the extent that I have a disagreement with my friend from Connecticut or my friend from Arizona, two of the brightest people in this body, it relates to how I come down on that question. One or another country may think it needs these weapons to protect it from its neighbors or gain the attention of the great powers. The fact is, however, that weapons of mass destruction threaten us all, especially when the countries that seek them are ruled by murderous despots or inflamed by ethnic or ideological causes. Today, two sets of neighboring countries--India and Pakistan, and Iran and Iraq--pose the greatest threat that weapons of mass destruction might actually be used. India and Pakistan have to be restrained from using such weapons against each other. I was reminded by someone today, we are talking about a response time of 3 minutes--3 minutes; a pretty short leash, quite a hair trigger--when we are talking about Pakistan and India. The same would apply to Iraq and Iran, who have managed over the last decades to kill hundreds of thousands of each other's citizens. So these two sets of neighbors-- India and Pakistan, Iran and Iraq--it seems to me, are most likely to get the world in trouble. Iran and Iraq have to be prevented from obtaining such weapons and from using them, not only against each other but also against the whole Middle East region, if not the world. Some foreign entities, notably Russia, have continued to assist Iran's ballistic missile program intended to give Iran long-range ability to deliver weapons of mass destruction. This assistance must stop, and it must stop now. Since early last year, U.S. officials from the Clinton administration, including the President and the Vice President, have raised the matter with their Russian counterparts, Yeltsin, Chernomyrdin, and Kiriyenko. They have all agreed it is hardly in Russia's interests to give Iran the capacity to fire long-range missiles with weapons of mass destruction. Special envoys Frank Wisner and Robert Gallucci have worked with Russian Space Agency chief Yuri Koptev to help Russia determine what it must do to stem this assistance. Let us get a little background here, because we all kind of mentioned it. Here you have a former empire that has crumbled around the ears of Russian leaders. They are left with a number of the old apparatchiks in charge of huge, bureaucratic entities, departments, who have, off and on for the last 9 years, been free agents to some degree or another. The idea that Yeltsin has his finger on, and knowledge about, and the ability to control every one of his disparate agencies out there is, I think we would all acknowledge, not nearly, nearly a reality. So, since early last year, American officials have been working very hard, pressuring, cajoling, and educating the Russian leadership as to why this is against the Russian leaders' own interests and how to gain control, how to gain control of their own entities. There is an irony here. If we said to our constituents that there is this outfit in Russia that doesn't control what is happening in a department in one of the six nuclear cities in Russia, or doesn't have control over a department in Moscow, they would say: ``Wait a minute, isn't this the same outfit that ruled with the iron fist, so that they would be able to not only have a command economy, but to command everything?'' But the fact is, the Russian leaders do not have that ability any more. And they do not know how to gain it. So I start off with the proposition that this is a very different circumstance than if we were dealing with the U.S.S.R. and this program were going on. If I were to have turned to even Gorbachev, or any of his predecessors, and said, ``you are transferring this technology to Iran,'' and had them say, ``we didn't know that, or were unaware of the extent of it,'' having been here 25 years and dealt with them on that issue for 15 years, I would have said unequivocally on this floor, ``that is flatout a lie; they cannot not know that.'' But it is clear that, although much was known in some quarters, a lot was not known. So you actually have the Russian leadership saying, ``How do we set up export controls? How do we gain control? You have been doing this. How do you all do it?'' --we have not done it perfectly, by the way, but--``How do you do it?'' The fact is that troubling aspects of the Russian assistance to Iran program continue to this very day. I know that. All of us on this floor have gotten a briefing. We know that. And with each passing day, Iran comes closer to obtaining the ability to have long-range missiles that can rain down chemical or biological destruction on Israel, Saudi Arabia, and U.S. Armed Forces in the region, and, obviously, to understate it, that is a real problem. So, what do you do about this? The executive branch, in my view, has made real progress, important progress, that this bill before us, I believe, will sacrifice. Let me give you a few examples. Last year, Russia expelled an Iranian Embassy employee who was involved in seeking assistance for Iran's missile program. Russia's Federal Security Service, the FSB, says that Russia also deported a member of an Iranian military delegation. The FSB adds, in a statement of May 15, that two officials at a Russian research center were arrested, convicted, and sentenced to prison for trying to ``enter into an agreement with a foreign firm to design homing electronic devices for missiles.'' They also foiled an effort by Iran's SANAM industry group, to get missile parts from a Russian firm, NPO Trud. The FSB statement also adds that, ``All the activities of the SANAM group on the territory of Russia have been terminated and prohibited.'' On January 22, Russia issued Order No. 57 establishing what are called ``catch-all controls'' over the export of any material or technology that might contribute to Iran's programs to develop weapons of mass destruction or long-range missiles. Last week, Russia promulgated implementing directives for that order requiring that each entity involved in high-tech material or technology exports set up a review committee to screen proposals and specifying ``red flags'' that would require referral of proposals to high-level officials for approval. Those ``red flags'' are precisely the sort of criteria that we would want Russia to use. For example, they name certain Iranian entities that are automatically suspect no matter what they want to buy. That is a take-no-chances approach that suggests the seriousness on the part of Russia. The pace of diplomacy is slow, Madam President, and so is the pace of Russian bureaucracy, and so is the pace of putting together a Russian Government that can control Russia. I understand and share the frustration that my colleagues feel in this regard. But, as the kids say, let's get real. When was the last time we turned Russian policy completely around, and how long did it take? When we didn't like the Soviet Union deploying SS-20 intermediate- range missiles in the European theater, we had to build and deploy Pershing missiles in response before they would sign the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. The process took 10 years. It took a similar period of time for the Soviet Union, later Russia, to admit it was violating the ABM Treaty in building a large phased-array radar near Krasnoyarsk. And there are a lot of other examples of how long this takes. My colleagues will say the assistance continues, that these institutions and firms are just looking for ways to get around Order No. 57, and that there are still bureaucracies that oppose Yeltsin and Kiriyenko on this issue; and I will reply, ``Yup, you're right, that's exactly what has happened.'' What on Earth does anybody expect? Do my colleagues expect Russian officials to be grateful when we catch them doing something stupid and call them on it? Do they expect the institutes, that cannot pay for their personnel, or their factories that pay their workers in goods to barter on the market, to be happy when we tell them that they have to turn down hard currency from Iran? Look, we have a satellite industry that is apoplectic today--an American satellite industry that is apoplectic today--because the House took action and the Senate may take action curtailing their ability to launch these satellites into space from other launch systems around the world. Why? They are going to lose billions of dollars. Mark my word, you are going to start hearing from their employees saying, ``What have you done to my job?'' Right? We all know that. We shouldn't yield to the company or the employee if it is against the national interest, but we are going to hear it. What would happen, do you think, if all of a sudden we were to say, ``By the way, stop doing'' such and such, which is the only thing that allows you to make any money at all, to even be given goods you can barter on the street to keep your apartment? I don't say this by way of justifying anything Russia is doing, but there is a report from an organization I have great respect for, the American Jewish Committee. The American Jewish Committee had a report written called ``The Russian Connection: Russia, Iran, the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.'' It is a very good report. I recommend it to everyone. They point to an article that was written in Russia about missile specialists who worked in Iran during the past few years. It says that specialists were recruited by Iranians in collaboration with the Federal Security Service--which is now going to be part of stopping this. Then the article goes on to say that the policy of assisting the missile program began in 1994, when the then-chief of Yeltsin's bodyguard service was involved in export policymaking, and that it was done--for what? For hard currency, for money. Now we have convinced Yeltsin and a new government in Russia--which is probably the most pro-American government that has existed in the last 90 years in Russia, maybe in Russian history--we have them taking all these steps to cut this off. OK? So far, so good. The American Jewish Committee report points out that the reason they did this was for money. Now we go ahead and we cut off any money that we are going to send these Russian entities in existing bilateral arrangements we have. What do we think Russian leaders are going to do? Are they going to say, ``You know, we now lost the American support that we, the new Government in Russia, want, and we don't want to be selling this missile technology anyway because it is against our interest, so at least we could have told the folks in those departments that there was something coming, but the Americans are going to cut off that money, we're not going to get that, but, by the way, still don't follow through on this Iranian program?'' It is lose-lose. They not only lose the money that encouraged them to enter into these arrangements in 1994, because of our efforts to stop it and because they were not quick enough and thorough enough in stopping it, they have now lost any other aid they have. Again, I am not approaching this from an ideological point of view. I am not approaching this from a point of view of who is right or who is wrong, whether they did the right thing or the wrong thing. I am trying to approach this from a practical point of view: How do we assure that what was going on doesn't continue? How do we stop proliferation? This same report published by the American Jewish Committee makes a very, very important point in a section entitled ``American Policy Options.'' It says: The United States faces tough choices in addressing the issue of Russian-Iranian missile cooperation. Both the Clinton administration and its critics confront the fact that American leverage is probably limited. Then it goes on to say: However, the threat of sanctions will not in itself be sufficient. The threat of missile proliferation is serious enough to warrant offering improved carrots. Let's get this straight. Everybody has kind of figured this out-- let's review the bidding. The Russians were bad guys. They sold technologies to people who were even worse guys. The combination of that is against the interests of the United States, and particularly against the interests of Israel. We have to turn it around and stop it. We went ahead, and after the last couple years--with great pressure during this year, thanks to congressional leadership having the sanctions sitting out on the table--convinced Yeltsin, and now the friendliest government that ever existed in Russian history toward the United States, the two new young guys in positions of power, not only that it is against their interests, but also that they better stop. And there is some evidence they are stopping it. They are finding where at least some of the technology leaks are and they are turning them off. And now here we are after they had begun the process saying, ``Aha, but you did do it.'' Of course they did it. And what we're going to do is to say, ``we're going to cut your water off from this end of the spigot. We're going to cut it off.'' And if the objective is America's interest and indirectly Israel's interest, which is an American interest, how does that make sense? Let me add one other dimension here. I said: ``This is a good act, bad timing.'' Let us review the bidding and what is going on in the Asian subcontinent right now. Regarding India and Pakistan, we are breaking our neck, some of us on this floor personally, the President, Democrats, Republicans, pleading, cajoling, doing everything we can with Pakistan not to up the ante. We are doing everything we can to take an Indian Government that has overstepped its bounds against its good judgment, in my view, and say, ``Tone down what you're doing.'' We are trying to put a lid on this. So what are we doing? Some of us, as well as the administration, are doing everything from picking up the phone and calling Sharif in Pakistan, to saying, through the administration, to Yeltsin, ``You, Yeltsin, have a relationship with India. Call them. Tell them. Cooperate with us.'' Every Republican and Democrat who has any contact in China is trying to get China to put pressure on Pakistan. And in the middle of this gigantic effort, that is literally worldwide, at a moment when every nation in the world, particularly the nuclear powers, fully understands the potential consequence of Pakistan's nuclear testing now and India's heated rhetoric--now, when all this is going on--what are we doing? In fairness to the leader, this was under a unanimous consent agreement, and put off from back in November, but what are we doing? We are coming along invoking a sanction potentially that is going to make it more difficult by anybody's standard to get worldwide cooperation. Who are the nations that can most influence Pakistan or most influence India right now, beyond the United States? I will bet that if we ask all the staff in the back who are experts on this--whether they are for these sanctions or against them--I bet that if we asked everybody in this Chamber, and I put a list on the board saying, ``Which are the most likely countries to be able to influence Pakistan,'' and put Russia, France, Germany, England and China--I bet you would all pass the test and say, ``China.'' And why would you say that? Because China has been selling them missile technology. Now, I wonder who would have the most influence on India. The answer is Russia, for similar reasons. So thus it seems to me, Madam President, that this is a good idea at a very bad moment. We also have a new government in Russia. We have two young people-- and every analyst to whom I have spoken, conservative or liberal, Democrat or Republican, or who has testified before the committee or spoken to my staff has said, ``These two new guys are keepers. They're the best shot we have.'' They are the best shot we have. Now they have gone out and put their new, fragile reputations on the line in that new government, and said, with regard to assistance to Iran's missile program, ``Shut it down.'' And the first bit of reward we are going to give them is sanctions against entities in their country. Now, look, some former President, whom I will not name, once said, ``Life is not fair.'' I am not suggesting to anybody that it would not be fair to impose these sanctions. By any measure, it is fair, because they did not play by the rules. They broke the agreements. So it is fair; but is it smart? Is it in our interests? Is it a good idea? In my humble opinion, the answer is no, it is not smart, it is not a good idea, it is not in our interest. The sanctions we mandate will be resented and they will be resisted and, in my sincere view, they will fail where diplomacy is succeeding. Some aspects of this bill seem calculated to anger Russia rather than to secure compliance. One is the ``credible evidence'' standard for sanctions. According to the report on this bill, the standard is meant to require sanctions when information is merely ``sufficiently believable as to raise a serious question * * * as to whether a foreign person may have transferred or attempted to transfer'' sanctionable items of technology. This is kind of the ``shoot first, ask questions later'' approach to international relations. This is cold-war posturing in a warmer environment, with the friendliest government we have ever had an opportunity to work with, and it will likely fail. Fortunately, our action today is not the end of the process. The President is very likely--very likely--to veto this bill. And if we have the amendment of the Senator from Michigan accepted, which I expect it to be, we will have to go back to conference. And I say to you, Madam President, and to my colleagues, that I hope Russian officials and firms that follow this debate will hear the message my colleagues are sending. If Russian assistance to the Iranian missile program does not cease within a matter of weeks, I truly believe that this body will override the President's veto and set in stone this counterproductive sanctions bill. I also say to my friends who believe that this sanctions bill is warranted on the merits, if you just do it based on weighing the scales, that you are giving up nothing by delaying here. Can anyone show me that there has not been real progress over the last 6 months? So if in 2 weeks or 6 weeks or 8 weeks this progress has not continued, this sanctions bill can be brought back up. But to pass it now, I honestly believe, will be counterproductive. Russia's legal and administrative actions so far, while insufficient, show their good intent. There is also a strong foundation on which to build. But the edifice of enforcement must be built quickly. Only speedy Russian action is likely to avert the sanctions regime mandated in this bill. In closing, let me note my deep objection to the other body's insistence upon attaching the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act to this measure. This is a practice that has to stop. It is irresponsible, absolutely irresponsible, in my view. Combining the two bills, the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act and the Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act, both of which should be sent over here-- I am not suggesting that they shouldn't do that--to tie them together in the hope that it will force the President to sign the bill is holding hostages that relate to our national interest as Americans. They did the same thing with the IMF. They did the same thing with the United Nations arrearages by attaching abortion language. Each of these issues warrants debate, but not tied to one another. Attaching the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act to this bill serves merely to delay for many months and to put at risk a bill that is important to our national interests. That was an irresponsible action, in my view, that ill-befits a coequal branch of government, the House of Representatives. Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation--at Last Mr. President, title two of the measure that we are passing today-- the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1997--deserves some attention. Final passage of this bill is long overdue. Its enactment, despite its flaws, will serve the national interest in very real ways. U.S. ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention last year was not easily achieved. In the end, however, all the Democrats in this body and most of our Republican colleagues joined to fashion a 74-26 majority for ratification. Nearly one year ago, this body passed the implementation bill that is once again before us. Final passage of that act will serve our national interest in several ways. First, it will enable the U.S. Government to require industry to comply with the data declaration provisions of the convention. In addition, this law will provide protection to confidential business information that U.S. firms may be required to submit. The filing of a complete national data declaration will finally put our country in compliance with this convention. That is no small matter. Until then, the United States cannot exercise effective leadership in the organization for the prevention of chemical weapons-- the implementing body for the convention. And make no mistake: It will be U.S. leadership that guides the organization toward effective verification and enforcement of compliance with this convention. The United States has a tremendous stake in enforcement of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Our interests are world-wide, and U.S. troops are often stationed in far-flung locations. Wherever U.S. forces go, they will be far safer if chemical weapons are removed as a military threat. In its first half year since entering into force, the Chemical Weapons Convention has already had some successes. China, India, and several other countries have admitted for the first time to having chemical weapons programs. The weapons and weapons facilities that they declared have been inspected and will eventually be destroyed. The information that they have provided will enhance our ability, moreover, to monitor their chemical establishments and to search out any suspicious activities. The Chemical Weapons Convention has also taken some important steps toward universality. Both India and Pakistan have joined; China has joined; Russia has joined; and even Iran has joined. The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act embodies compromises between treaty supporters and treaty opponents. I supported this compromise bill last year because it was important then--as it is now--to facilitate U.S. compliance with the convention. I support it today for that reason and because the administration has assured us that it is more important to enact this measure than to spend more time correcting the faults in it. Let me make clear, however, that I still have very serious concerns about the impact of some of this bill's provisions on implementation of the convention. In particular, I do not believe we should be granting the President discretionary authority to deny an inspection based on national security grounds, as would be done by section 237. By signing and ratifying this treaty, the United States--with the advice and consent of 74 members of this body--agreed to allow certain inspections, subject to our constitutional requirements. With few exceptions, denial of a duly authorized inspection would violate the convention. Even if the President never exercises this authority, the mere inclusion of this provision in the legislation will encourage other countries to deny inspections on national security grounds. If we should enact the so-called ``national security exception,'' we can be sure that China, Iran, and other countries will seize upon the precedent we set and use it to undermine the effectiveness of the verification regime. I have similar concerns regarding section 253, which would exempt from reporting and routine inspection requirements unscheduled discrete organic chemicals that are coincidental byproducts and are not isolated or captured for use or sale. While waste streams are not, in themselves, a threat to the object and purpose of the chemical weapons convention regime, monitoring of such streams does afford one of the most convenient and non-intrusive means of determining whether a facility is worthy of concern in the first place. I am also troubled by: The broad compensation scheme in section 213 that does not even require a plaintiff to prove its case by a preponderance of the evidence in order to receive taxpayer funded compensation for the loss of trade secrets; and the limitation in sections 212 and 238 on the Government's power to require contractors to submit to inspections. Finally, I regret that this legislation does not undo the damage to our national security that I fear will be caused by condition 18 to the resolution of ratification for the convention. That condition provides that no chemical sample taken by the international inspectors may be removed from the United States for analysis. While it may offer some further protection to U.S. manufacturers against possible industrial espionage, it also opens a huge loophole for countries that may violate this convention. I firmly believe that the convention's provisions and the other conditions to our resolution of ratification provide sufficient protection for the confidential business information of U.S. firms. Indeed, insistence upon U.S.-based analysis of U.S. samples will actually make it easier for foreign spies to obtain that information, by effectively specifying the laboratories for them to target. And I dread the stain upon our collective conscience if a future violator of this treaty should ever make use of the exemption we are carving out, and then use those illegal chemical weapons against U.S. forces or innocent civilians. Opponents of the convention insisted upon condition 18, arguing that no good would ever come from on-site inspections anyway. I hope and believe that they will come to realize the error of their ways and will accept the need to make this treaty as effective an instrument as possible. Strict verification is crucial to making sure that Iran, China, and other countries with undeclared or formerly undeclared chemical weapons programs are given as little an opportunity as possible to hide illegal weapons stocks or production. That said, however, final passage of this act is still an important accomplishment. By facilitating U.S. compliance and leadership, it opens the door to further success in the campaign to rid the world of one of its most heinous inventions. Mr. President, I now close with a statement that addresses the ``carrots'' that the American Jewish Committee report calls for and that sets forth some proposals in that area. Non-Proliferation: An Ounce of Prevention Is Not Enough As we near the end of the 1990's, there can be no doubt that future historians will highlight this time as the decade in which the Cold War was ended and the Soviet Union was dissolved. Even so far-reaching an action as the enlargement of NATO, to which this body recently gave its consent, will be seen largely as an outgrowth of the cataclysmic changes in Moscow that upended the bipolar structure of post-World War II international relations. How else will historians characterize this decade? Will we be seen as having turned to peace? Or will historians say that we turned merely to further war in a new context? The Good Friday Agreement offers hope for peace in Northern Ireland. The Oslo Agreement and related efforts in the Middle East offer hope for peace in that region as well, despite the many obstacles that still litter that path. The Dayton Accords offer similar hope for Bosnia and, indeed, for the Balkans as a whole. The wars and massacres in Africa are another matter. We are trying to create new structures to prevent or control such conflict, but our failure to avert millions of deaths in central Africa will lead future generations to remark on how poorly we had learned the lessons of the first holocaust. The Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction The final judgment on this decade may well hinge, however, on how we handle the threat of other holocausts--those made possible by weapons of mass destruction. The potential for such horrific acts may well have been increased by the end of the Cold War. And a failure to contain that risk could radically alter the judgment of history, assuming that anyone survives to write it. Weapons of mass destruction pre-date the Cold War. In the 1760's, England used primitive biological warfare to kill American Indians in Pontiac's Rebellion. Chemical weapons were used in World War I. And the two atomic bombs that helped to end World War II demonstrated mankind's ability to bring about the apocalypse in the blink of an eye. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union amassed by far the largest stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction ever seen. Experts will argue over whether the use of all those weapons would have caused a ``nuclear winter'' that would end all human existence. There is little doubt, however, that the resulting human, economic and environmental devastation would have destroyed our modern civilization. The great irony of the Cold War, however, was that the tight leadership of two blocs by the United States and the Soviet Union kept nearly all of this Armageddon arsenal under their firm control. There were a few cases in which chemical weapons were used. By and large, however, the terror of ``Mutually Assured Destruction'' kept the nations of the world inline and prevented any descent into the abyss of all-out war. The end of the Cold War has reduced dramatically the risk of a nuclear holocaust sparked by war between the United States and Russia. Strategic arms reductions under the START Treaty have begun the process of stepping back from the brink. Russia will eventually ratify START II, and I think we can look forward, in the coming years, at least to START III as well. The CFE Treaty continues to regulate conventional weapons in Europe, moreover, so as to limit the risk of hostilities that could spark a larger conflict. There has also been progress on chemical and biological weapons. Russia has joined us as a State Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention and will destroy at least 40,000 metric tons of chemical agent. President Yeltsin admitted that Russia had violated the Biological Weapons Convention and ordered an end to Russia s offensive biological weapons program. We still lack confidence that Russia is not hiding some illegal chemical or biological weapons or weapons capabilities, but the trend is toward a day in which no massive capability of that sort will remain. The greatest risk that is not yet contained is that some other country, or even a terrorist group, might use these horrendous weapons. While such countries and groups are unlikely to unleash a holocaust, the scale of destruction they could cause would still be astounding-- and our own cities or bases could well be their targets. Rogue states and criminals have tried to get Russian and former Soviet nuclear weapons material and technology during this decade, although with little success. Countries such as Iraq, Iran and Syria have had better success gaining Russian and/or Chinese chemical weapons technology and material (including equipment and precursor chemicals), biological weapons material (including production equipment), and ballistic missiles or missile technology. These transfers of weapons and technology have taken a toll on regional stability. India and Pakistan now threaten each other with ballistic missiles, and India's recent nuclear tests could lead Pakistan to test as well. It was hard enough to maintain the ``balance of terror'' between the United States and the Soviet Union. Can India and Pakistan maintain that balance without descending into war, with their history of border wars and bloody terrorist incidents? I hope they can avoid a regional holocaust; but clearly, the risk of that is real. Russia, China, North Korea, and various Western companies have contributed to India and Pakistan's missile and nuclear weapon programs. There has been a profit motive in those deals, as well as supposed security interests on the part of China and Russia. But how valuable are company profits, or foreign exchange for North Korea, if the result is nuclear war? Where is the security for China if radioactive clouds should pass over its territory as its neighbors descend into chaos? The same questions apply to those who would assist Iran or Iraq to develop weapons of mass destruction. Will the paltry profits in assisting Iran's ballistic missile programs really matter if Iran can attack Russia and its neighbors with chemical weapons? Do the Russians really think that Saddam Hussein can be trusted with fermenters that could be used to produce biological weapons? Will China really benefit if its assistance to Iran should put weapons of mass destruction in the hands of a regime that sympathizes less with Beijing than with Islamic ethnic groups in western China? Russia and China are both great powers. But you have to wonder, sometimes, what they are thinking. And you really have to wonder when North Korea will realize that ballistic missile exports to unstable countries won't do much for a people already reduced to eating tree bark. An Ounce of Prevention Is Not Enough What should the United States be doing to stop the spread of long- range missiles and weapons of mass destruction? The short answer is: a lot more than we're doing now. I don t say that to denigrate current U.S. programs or the U.S. commitment to non-proliferation. No great power is as active as we in trying to prevent proliferation. Nobody has as many programs as we do to detect proliferation activities, to stop them, to pressure illegal buyers and sellers, to develop military weapons and tactics for operations against sites with weapons of mass destruction, and to assist the former Soviet states, in particular, in safeguarding and destroying dangerous material and in reorienting their military industry to the civilian economy. We spend over $600 million a year on the assistance programs alone. But the fact is, my friends, that we are failing to do all that we can to stop proliferation. Some of our failures are understandable. No intelligence system can detect everything, and we risk the loss of sensitive sources whenever we demarche a supplier country or let classified information leak to the press. U.S. diplomacy cannot move every supplier to stop every unwise shipment, and economic sanctions are a tool that succeeds only occasionally. India's recent nuclear tests, in the face of U.S. law that forced the President to impose multiple sanctions, underscore the difficulty of stopping a state once it has substantial indigenous capabilities. What ought to embarrass us, however, is that we are failing also to take actions that we know are workable. Thus, we combined the threat of sanctions with a promise of economic incentives to freeze North Korea's nuclear weapons program. Can we not offer similar multi-national incentives to North Korea to stop exporting ballistic missile equipment and technology? Won't that be cheaper than battling No Dong missiles around the world? Similarly, we are failing to reach most of the highly-trained scientists and technicians who developed weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles for the former Soviet Union. And that is no small problem! There are well over a hundred thousand such skilled personnel who served the Soviet death machine at its peak. Anywhere from ten to fifty thousand personnel still have skills that a rogue state or terrorist group would like to obtain, and are underpaid or unemployed today. That is not just a problem for those personnel. That is a powderkeg just waiting to explode! What should we be doing about this? We should plug the holes in our current non-proliferation assistance programs. We should endorse and build on the ``nuclear cities'' initiative that Vice President Gore and then-Prime Minister Chernomyrdin began in March. We should make a special effort to assist Russia's biological warfare specialists who want to cease working with dangerous pathogens. And we should consider outright subsidies to keep Russian arms experts busy on socially useful projects. Improving Existing Programs What are the holes in our current non-proliferation assistance programs? Several non-proliferation assistance programs are managed by the Departments of State, Defense and Energy. They provide vital assistance to help safeguard Russian nuclear weapons material, to dismantle Ukrainian long-range bombers, to support projects that could provide commercial job opportunities for former weapons specialists, and occasionally for a one-time operation like purchasing Kazakhstan's nuclear material or Moldova's bombers. One program that supports commercial initiatives in the former Soviet Union is the Department of Energy's Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (or IPP). The President's proposed Fiscal Year 1999 budget would reduce that program's budget from $30 million to only $15 million. This is a short-sighted step at precisely the wrong time. Under its new program manager, IPP is finally bringing projects to the point of commercialization. Fifteen projects have achieved completely commercial funding and 77 now have major private co-funding. If the IPP budget for FY 1999 is reduced by $15 million, IPP will have to cut back its new projects to find socially useful employment for Russian chemical and biological weapons experts. Those weapons are well within the reach of rogue states, as UNSCOM has documented in Iraq. Do we really want to leave hundreds or thousands of Russian experts underemployed, and thus vulnerable to offers from the likes of Iran, Iraq, or Libya? We must not cut back one of the few programs to combat the risk that Russian experts will sell critical material or expertise to those states. Given its important objective and the increasing success of the IPP program, restoring the $15 million cut is truly the least we can do. Another important non-proliferation tool is the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund, which is managed by the State Department. This fund has been used for several urgent and sensitive non-proliferation operations over the years, including the purchase of unsecured highly enriched uranium from Kazakhstan. The flexibility that it affords policy makers to take advantage of non-proliferation opportunities is a vital resource. Recent operations have taken their toll, however, on the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund's reserve. The Fund had a $12 million reserve at the beginning of Fiscal Year 1997, but only about $4 million by the beginning of FY 1998. Annual appropriations of $15 million, while welcome, give the Fund insufficient flexibility to truly fulfill its mission. We need to increase our investment in the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund, either by establishing a higher annual funding level or at least by replenishing the Fund's reserve. Our nation has received good value from the Fund in the past, and we should do what it takes to keep the Fund healthy. A third important program is the Energy Department's Material Protection, Control and Accounting (or MPC & A) program, which has been upgrading security at Russia's nuclear sites. This program uses a lab- to-lab approach that builds trust and cooperation. It has forged ties with every single Russian nuclear facility of concern. This program not only improves security, but also encourages transparency regarding Russian operations and helps to build ties that can lead to projects under other non-proliferation assistance programs. The time is ripe to apply the same lab-to-lab approach to Russia's chemical weapons sites. Russia has declared some 40,000 metric tons of chemical weapons stocks that must be destroyed under the Chemical Weapons Convention. Physical security for those toxic chemicals is only rudimentary: guards, fences, and single-key padlocks that are sometimes falling apart. While a rogue state might have to steal and transport a ton of this material to gain a militarily useful amount, a terrorist group could wreak havoc with much smaller quantities. We should encourage the MPC & A program to help Russia slam the door on that risk. A $10 million start in Fiscal Year 1999 would be money well invested. I have written to the Armed Services Committee and the relevant appropriations subcommittees regarding these programs, which I hope will be addressed in their bills. If they are not, I will work with other concerned colleagues to raise these issues on the floor. Weaning Russians Away from Biological Weapons Revelations regarding Iraq's biological weapons, along with defector accounts of Russia's massive biological weapons program, are making their mark on our psyche. We are beginning to accept that, whether U.S. military planners wanted biological weapons or not, other countries and terrorist groups might be all too happy to try them out. Thousands of Russian scientists and technicians have biological weapons experience, and a rogue state assisted by such personnel could cause unspeakable harm. The National Academy of Sciences, using Nunn-Lugar money from the Department of Defense, is working with the International Science and Technology Center in Moscow--a multi-country program managed by the State Department--to support cooperative research projects with Russia's civilian biological weapons experts. This is an interesting program which encourages those experts to find socially useful outlets for their biological weapons expertise. But the National Academy's program also keeps these experts working with dangerous pathogens, rather than applying their skills in less dangerous areas of work. So if you're a Russian biological weapons expert who wants to get out of that nasty business, you may find yourself unemployed--or recruited by rogues. But if you want to stay on the fringes of it, the United States will help you. Does that make sense? I don't think so, although it's true that this program will give us useful windows into the work of these personnel-- and perhaps some lines into Russia's Ministry of Defense labs that we fear may be engaged in illegal biological weapons work--for about $8 million per year. Don't blame the National Academy of Sciences, however, or even the Department of Defense. The original 1996 contract between those organizations called for the Nunn-Lugar money to be used ``to support the conversion of former Soviet BW research personnel to work on international public health issues.'' But that changed after we passed a law to prevent Nunn-Lugar money from being used for defense conversion. That law is section 1503 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997. I suppose it was adopted because defense conversion is difficult and costly. That's true. But here we are, with a law that lets us keep several hundred experts working with diseases that Russia developed as weapons. But it won't let us help those experts--or a few thousand others who used to work on those weapons--to move into really useful work on the many other diseases that afflict mankind. We can understand why that law was adopted. But as Mr. Bumble says (in Charles Dickens's ``The Pickwick Papers''), sometimes ``the law is a ass, an idiot.'' That law needs to be changed, to allow the National Academy's original concept to go forward. We need a much larger program to encourage Russia's biological weapons experts to apply their knowledge in safer areas of research and development, as well as the small program for those Russian experts who continue to work with dangerous pathogens. I will introduce legislation to remove any legal roadblock and create that larger program. The ``Nuclear Cities'' Initiative On April 27, the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy announced plans to sharply reduce the number of institutions involved in nuclear weapons research and production. The cuts will begin this year, and in five to seven years Russia may close a dozen nuclear weapons research and production facilities. This is big news. The Russian Federation is finally admitting-- publicly--that its nuclear establishment is far too large. From the standpoint of our strategic arms relationship with Russia, downsizing of the ``nuclear cities'' is a welcome step. But what will become of the scientists and technicians who do not stay in the downsized Russian nuclear establishment? There are over 100,000 personnel in those ``nuclear cities.'' Let's say that 25,000 stay with the consolidated Russian labs, and that only a quarter of the rest have skills that a rogue state or terrorist group would like to buy. That would still leave 20,000 underpaid or unemployed experts on the market. What will be done to reduce the risks posed by that large pool of desperate people? One answer is the Nuclear Cities Initiative. In March, Vice President Gore and then-Prime Minister Chernomyrdin agreed to develop a new initiative for Russia's vast complex of ``nuclear cities,'' each the equivalent of our Los Alamos or Oak Ridge National Laboratories. Last month, Energy Secretary Pena and Russia's new Minister of Atomic Energy, Yevgeny Adamov, signed an agreement to begin this initiative. The ``Nuclear Cities Initiative'' is a major step that deserves our wholehearted support. It would include business training for Russian personnel and a major effort to find commercially viable projects to provide jobs for former nuclear weapons experts. Fiscal Year 1999 funding of $30 million, say, would get that initiative off to a good start and might be matched by some of the money that Russia receives for its weapons-grade material sold to the United States. But I doubt that even this initiative will be enough. For one thing, the obstacles to finding commercial funding for viable civilian projects are really substantial. Personnel in the ``nuclear cities'' were isolated for decades from even the Soviet Russian economy, to say nothing of market economics. Russian legal and political structures are still unresponsive, moreover, to the needs of foreign investors. Russian officials often ask for an ``investment conference'' to put them directly in touch with prospective investors. I propose a more useful jump- start of the commercialization process: a presidential commission with substantial representation from U.S. industry. Most U.S. firms will not yet risk real money on new technology from Russia's isolated laboratories. But 50 years ago, an automobile company president showed Western Europe how to recover from World War II. Our high-tech industrialists might best be able to get Russia to create an inviting business climate. Beyond Commercialization Finally, we must ask ourselves whether our current non-proliferation programs are ``penny wise and pound foolish.'' Does it really make sense to bar funding for defense conversion, except in programs that find commercial sponsors? Maybe there will never be enough commercial sponsors to employ Russia's experts in ballistic missiles or weapons of mass destruction. That is a real possibility. So, do we just walk away? Do we tell them to pack their bags and move to Iraq, Iran, or Libya? The law also bars using Nunn-Lugar funds for environmental clean-up efforts in the former Soviet Union. Such funds should not be used simply for environmental objectives. But what if that's the safest way to use the talents of nuclear, chemical or biological arms experts? Why isn't any socially useful employment of those personnel worth subsidizing, in order to keep them inside their own countries and away from their original areas of expertise? The key to this puzzle is the word ``subsidizing.'' Is that what we want to do? Not ideally. But is it a reasonable approach when others do not suffice? Or is it our primary objective to make Russia's weapons experts adapt to a capitalist economy, even if the result is to leave some of them poverty-stricken and prey to offers from less squeamish countries? I am not afraid to subsidize Russian arms experts, if that's what it takes to keep them out of their old trades. We spend billions of dollars on defense. We're already looking at over $700 million in non- proliferation assistance requested for next year. That may employ 10,000 or 12,000 people. (Much of the money goes for equipment used in weapons security or dismantlement.) Why not add another $250 million per year--with Russia putting up some funds as well--to employ another 20,000 or more Russian specialists on unrelated projects, so long as they help their country and stay away from weapons work? Does that sound too much like welfare? Call it welfare, if you wish. But ten years of that welfare will purchase a lot of security for us. Those will be ten years of dramatically reduced risk that the fallout from the collapse of the Soviet Union will be radioactive. They will be ten years in which many Russian experts will retire and no longer be of concern, ten years for the Russian economy to recover and employ the rest of its skilled scientists and technicians, ten years for diplomats to solve some of the conflicts that tempt countries to amass and use weapons of mass destruction. Increased investment in non-proliferation assistance will not solve all our proliferation worries. But it will help--at a cost that we can afford. I plan to introduce legislation to do this. Let me make clear that the deficiencies in our non-proliferation programs do not reflect a lack of vision on the part of Congress or the executive branch. Rather, they stem from the daunting and multi-faceted nature of the challenge we face. Helping Russia to reduce and reorient its vast defense complex is an unprecedented activity. The task requires multiple efforts; what works for missile dismantlement under the START Treaty may not be appropriate to chemical weapons destruction or to offering new careers to biological weapons experts. We have had to start with small steps, moreover, and for good reasons. First, each program can succeed only once it gains the trust and cooperation of former Soviet experts and bureaucracies. Second, a massive effort could become unbearably costly. And third, we must make sure that our programs support reorientation of defense facilities, rather than unwittingly underwriting the development or export of weapons of mass destruction. So we must see what works, adapt, and build upon the successes. To truly succeed, however, we must not be afraid of building something big. We should seek international participation and financing. But even the most expensive programs, if well conceived and executed, will be bargains compared to the cost of even a single war in which weapons of mass destruction were used against our troops or our cities. Let me return, then, to the question I posed at the beginning: How will historians characterize this decade? Indeed, how will historians characterize the efforts of this body? Will we be seen as having seized the opportunity of this decade? Or will historians say that we were still too enamored with weapons, too cheap to pay the price of peace? In the coming weeks and months, we will have a chance to put our money where our hopes are. I call on my colleagues to join together in taking at least the little steps, and perhaps some big ones as well, toward a more comprehensive program of non-proliferation assistance. We will not only feel good doing that, we will do some good, as well.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield the remainder of my time. We are prepared to vote.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, my friend from Michigan has 90 minutes on his amendment. I wonder, in order that we can--we have been able to allocate time and I want to make sure that everyone who speaks to our position gets a chance to--whether or not he would be willing to yield off the 90 minutes 4 minutes to our friend from North Carolina.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will, in a moment, yield back the time I have left. Mr. President, I will conclude by suggesting, again, I think this is the wrong time to do this. I think it has its greatest value held in abeyance, as long as significant progress is being made. I am fearful if this is signed into law by the President, in the near term it is going to have the exact opposite impact. But in the interests of accommodating people's schedules--although I am not sure how much we are going to accommodate because I am told there will be insistence there be a vote on the highway bill, and if that is true, we are not being able to accommodate anybody's time. But I am delighted to yield the remainder of my time. Actually, Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will yield 5 minutes to the Senator, who disagrees with my position, as well as I will yield time at the appropriate time from our time to my friend from North Carolina as well.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, how much time does my friend need?

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, how much time do I have?

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise to introduce the ``Violence Against Women Act--II.'' I am pleased to be joined by several Senators who are cosponsoring this legislation--including Senators Specter, Boxer, Snowe, Murray, Moseley-Braun, Mikulski, Dodd, Lautenburg, Wellstone, Kennedy, and Durbin. Mr. President, when I introduced the Violence Against Women Act eight years ago--in June, 1990--it was not clear that the Senate would ever even consider this legislation. The fundamental reason--just eight years ago, few thought it either appropriate or necessary for national legislation to confront the problem of domestic violence. From 1990 to 1993, as chairman of the Judiciary Committee, I convened six hearings on the bill, released six reports on the problems of violence against women, convinced the Judiciary Committee to favorably report the bill to the full Senate on three times and had to re- introduce the bill twice. But, it was not until November, 1993--nearly 3 and \1/2\ years after introduction--that the full Senate even considered the Violence Against Women Act. In September, 1994, the Violence Against Women Act became law. But, even passage of the act into law did not end the significant debate on the issue of whether the problem of violence against women merited a national response. As my colleagues will recall, throughout the summer of 1995, the Congress debated whether or not we should actually fund the Violence Against Women Act. Fortunately, by the fall of 1995, the Congress finally reached a consensus--the Federal Government can and should provide resources and leadership in a national effort to end the violence women suffer at the hands of men who profess to love them. That consensus has held to this day. And, at the most practical levels, that consensus has been rewarded: The murder rate for wives, ex-wives and girlfriends at the hands of their ``intimates'' fell to an 19-year low in both 1995 and 1996. Thousands of trained police officers are on the streets arresting abusers before they can victimize again; police officers are working as never before to guide victims toward help; prosecutors have been added to the front-lines to put these abusers where they belong--behind bars; tens of thousands of women have been provided the shelters necessary to protect themselves and their children; battered women are being provided a whole range of support services--counseling, legal help for such matters as getting a ``protection from abuse'' orders; and a new national domestic violence hotline has already answered nearly 200,000 calls for help. Mr. President, our consensus in the Congress reflects a fundamental consensus in our Nation--the time when a woman has to suffer in silence because the criminal who is victimizing her happens to be her husband or boyfriend is over. Today, we must build on this consensus and deliver on its promise-- because for all the strides we have made, there remain far too many women who will go home this evening knowing in the nervous pit of their stomach that there is a better than even chance that they will get the hell beat out of them. I don't know that any of us who have not been in this situation can truly understand what it must be like--an understanding which would, in turn, also help us recognize the tremendous need to take action. Perhaps we can gain a glimmer of such an understanding if we recall our school-boy memory--and every man in this Chamber I know has at least one of these--a memory of sitting in class, dreading the time when the recess bell would ring, because the school bully told you that he was going to beat the daylights out of you on the playground. Imagine feeling that dread every day. Imagine feeling that twist in your guts as an adult. That is what every man in this Senate, this Congress and this Nation must remember as we continue to debate what we can--and what we should--do to combat violence against women. Mr. President, the legislation I am introducing today--the Violence Against Women Act II--has one simple goal: make more women safe. This legislation seeks this goal by building on the original Violence Against Women Act--continuing what is working; seeking improvements to fix those efforts which could work better; and expanding the national fight into those areas where the need is clear, but our efforts have neglected. Beyond describing some of the specifics of the legislation being introduced, I want to make it clear, there are many other ideas and proposals that should be considered before the full Senate debates this legislation. Also, I am sure there are several refinements to improve what is currently in this bill. There are several Senators who are developing these other proposals and refinements--for there are many Senators who are deeply committed to combating violence against women. And, I hope that my colleagues will review this legislation, offer their insights and lend their names as co-sponsors and leaders in the fight against domestic violence. Still, as my colleagues review this legislation, I believe they will find that it offers comprehensive and sensible responses to violence against women. To highlight just some of the specific aspects of this legislation, let me start with what I believe to be the central component of the Violence Against Women Act II--the money, continuing the dollars for cops, prosecutors, judges, shelters, and all the elements which are working. This requires one simple step--continue the violent crime reduction trust fund which the Biden crime bill set up several years ago. This trust fund is due to expire in the year 2000. Let me remind everybody how it is funded. We agreed that we would reduce the number of Federal workers by over 200,000. We reduced them by 271,000. We agreed that the paychecks that were being paid to those Federal workers would be taken and put in the trust fund, and that trust fund would only be used to fight crime, a part of which is to fight domestic violence. That fund, that trust fund, that separate entity's authorization expires in the year 2000. This legislation first and foremost extends it, extends it to the year 2002. And it does not relitigate the balanced budget agreement upon which we agreed last year. It is accommodated within that balanced budget agreement. Beyond this fundamental step, there are four key policy areas addressed in my new legislation. 1. Strengthening law enforcement's tools. 2. Improving services for the victims of violence. 3. Reducing violence against children, not only the frequent and horrible side effects of violence against women but also the wellspring of future generations of abusers because all of the data shows that those who witness abuse, ironically and tragically, tend to become abusers. 4. To bolster the antidomestic violence training and education programs to enlist many more professionals in our fight to deal with violence. Strengthening Law Enforcement On the law enforcement front, the bill introduced today, starts with needed improvements to bolster the inter-state enforcement of ``stay- away'' or protection orders. To give a practical example, let's say a woman from my home State of Delaware gets one of these protection orders against and old boyfriend who has been stalking and beating the heck out of her. Let's also say she works in Pennsylvania. This is the scenario which led the original Violence Against Women Act to call on states to honor the protection orders of other states. We did so because the cops recognize the simple reality--they know what will happen sooner or later if the old boyfriend keeps showing up at the woman's work. And, the cops in Pennsylvania don't want to wait for the worst to happen--they want to nail the guy for violating the protection order, stopping violence before it happens--in other words, community policing. The problem--the cops in Pennsylvania may not know about that there is a valid protection order issued by the State of Delaware. We propose today a few simple fixes: Permitting state and local cops to use their ``pro-arrest'' grants for this information sharing; encouraging states to enter into the cooperative agreements necessary to help interstate enforcement; and calling on the Justice Department to help develop new protocols and disseminate the ``best practices'' of state and local cops. Pretty simple, but all are extremely necessary--and I hope we can all support such common sense measures. I won't go into nearly as much detail in describing the law enforcement initiatives proposed in this bill, but just to ``tick'' some of these off--we propose to: Bolster the resources available for courts to handle domestic violence and sexual assault cases; target the ``date-rape'' drug with the maximum federal penalties; continue funding for police, prosecutors, law enforcement efforts in rural communities, and for anti-stalking initiatives; extend the support of local police ``pro-arrest'' efforts--a program expiring this year; and provide new laws to protect our military support personnel stationed, as well as our female military personnel who may be assaulted off-base--where, too often, lax foreign laws give a ``free-pass'' to their victimizer. Assisting the Victims of Violence Of course, a comprehensive effort to reduce violence against women and lessen its damages must do more than just arrest, convict and imprison abusers--we must also help the victims of violence. This legislation proposes to assist these crime victims in three fundamental ways: Immediate protections from their abuser--such as battered women's shelters; help so that they can have access to the courts and legal assistance necessary to keep their abuser away from them; and removing the ``catch-22s'' that may literally often force women to stay with their abuser--such as the discriminatory insurance policies which could force a mother to choose: turn-in the man who is beating me or keep health insurance for her children. Those are the three general policy goals, but to be more specific, let me outline just how our legislation proposes to boost the protections for the victims of violence: First and foremost, we must build on our successful effort to provide more shelter space for battered women and their children. Senator specter and the appropriations committee has done tremendous work to boost annual funding for shelters to $78 million--enough for about 200,000 battered women and their children. Unfortunately, the unmet need for shelter remains significant. For example, data from six states, which together have about 16% of the Nation's population had to turn away more than 45,000 battered women who were seeking shelter because they simply did not have the space. Extrapolating these figures to the entire nation suggests that about 300,000 battered women and their children are turned away from shelters every year. As I said, the current appropriations for shelter space stands at about $78 million. This legislation boosts this amount to $175 million over the next four years. The additional $100 million over current services will close the ``shelter-gap''--of roughly 300,000 battered women and their children. This will bring us closer to the day when all battered women will have a safe, secure place when they need it most. Of course, we phase in this increase--but, it is clear to us that we must take the basic, fundamental step if we are to protect these victims of violence. As I said, we must also provide women with the assistance necessary so that they can get access to help from our justice system. We do so, in some clear and common sense ways, such as: Re-authorizing the expiring program to provide about $1 million per year for victim/witness counselors in federal court; as Senators Wellstone and Moseley-Braun have recognized, women should not have to chose between showing up at court to make sure her abuser is punished and losing her job--so, this legislation includes their proposal to extend the protections of the Family & Medical Leave Act to the victims of domestic violence; Continuing the national Domestic Violence Hotline (at a cost of about $2 million per year); and Developing a national network of trained, volunteer attorneys who will help each of the nearly 100,000 women who, each year, call the national hotline for help. The other component of our plan to aid the victims of domestic violence is to target what I refer to as the ``catch-22'' problems. Senator Murray has identified one source of just such a ``Catch- 22''--the fact that some insurance companies and plans deny women health, disability, property or life insurance protections because the woman is a victim of domestic violence. In starkest terms, this forces a woman to chose between reporting-- and trying to end--the violence she is suffering or her children's health care. This must end--we must pass Senator Murray's proposal, included in this legislation, to protect the victims from abuse from insurance discrimination. Let me also remind my colleagues that in the original Violence Against Women Act we took bi-partisan action to end another such insidious ``choice.'' In 1994, we worked out provisions so battered immigrant women--whose ability to stay in the country was dependent on their husbands--would not have to chose: stay in America and continue to get beaten or leave their husbands, end the abuse, but have to leave America (perhaps even without their children.) While we had fixed some aspects of this problem in 1994, there remain other aspects of immigration law which leave a woman with just such a horrible, unfair and immoral choice. With Senator Kennedy, we have worked to include in this legislation several of these corrections. I urge my colleagues to support--and even build upon--our efforts to put an end to these real problems. Reducing Violence Against Children A third area where this legislation seeks action is on reducing violence against children. As my colleagues know, households where the wife is beaten are much more likely to also be home to child abuse and neglect. In addition, the research findings are clear--children who witness violence are much more likely to repeat the cycle when they are adults and they have a wife and children. Here, our legislation proposes to continue two long-standing programs-- Resources to serve runaway and homeless youth who are victims of sexual abuse; and The resources provided for Court-Appointed Special Advocates and special child abuse training for court personnel through the Victims of Child Abuse Act (originally co-sponsored by Senator Thurmond and myself in 1990.) The current appropriations for all these programs total about $25 million--we propose to increase that annual amount by about $10 million. Improving Research and Training The remaining area targeted by the Violence Against Women Act--two includes several efforts to help train and educate those already on the front-lines of the battle against violence against women. Senator Boxer has recognized that one of the leading reasons why women enter hospital emergency rooms is because they were beaten at the hands of a man. So, this bill, includes her proposal to increase the number of health professionals who are trained in the identification, treatment and referral of victims of domestic violence and sexual assault. Over the past few years, I have worked with several corporations (including, DuPont, Polaroid, Liz Claiborne, and The Body Shop) who have begun their own workplace initiatives--everything from 24-hour assistance hotlines for their employees, training to help managers better recognize domestic violence, and even comprehensive employee assistance efforts. Helping other companies start or improve--again, on their own initiative-- such anti-violence efforts is the reason this legislation includes a national workplace clearinghouse on violence against women. The clearinghouse will provide technical assistance and help circulate ``best practices'' to companies interested in combating violence against women. Another practical problem out in the field relates to the complex nature of criminal investigations into sexual assault cases. To assist the cops in the field who face these investigations, this legislation calls on the Attorney General to evaluate and recommend standards of training and practice of forensic examinations following sexual assaults. I want to make clear, this legislation does not allow any Federal dictates--but only some assistance to those in the field. Finally, this legislation continues the authorization for rape prevention and education programs. These programs provide public awareness and education efforts to both teach young women how to protect themselves from rape and attack, as well as to help build their self-esteem. Mr. President, I have just offered the most general outline of the contents of the Violence Against Women Act--Two. I urge my colleagues to review this legislation. I am confident they will find this bill a comprehensive and practical response which will help us meet a goal I believe is shared by every member of this Senate--making more women safer.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, are we in morning business?

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I thank the Chair. (The remarks of Mr. Biden pertaining to the introduction of S. 2110 are located in today's Record under ``Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.'')

Mr. BIDEN. I thank the Chair.