Joe Biden

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, parliamentary inquiry: My friend has kept 5 minutes prior to the vote. Is there any time in opposition prior to the vote?

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I appreciate the Senator's answer. The relevance is lost on me as to how that would affect who we would bring in or not. I understand the value of the strategic concept and why it is important that we should know it. These folks have already applied. Let me point out one last thing. The Bingaman amendment would give sort of a pocket veto to further enlargement of certain countries. The French did not want the Slovenians in this time. But they didn't want to publicly say that they didn't want the Slovenians this time. This is my interpretation. And they said no Slovenians unless Romanians, because it is not very politic in Europe to say you don't want someone in directly. If I were the French or Germans or anyone else, I just don't agree to the new strategic concept. The present one works pretty well--en bloc membership. I just think, Mr. President, this causal relationship being asserted between the strategic concept and new membership is tenuous. In changing the strategic concept, which we know has to follow the guide path of our friend from Arizona, we already know what it must contain for us to sign on to it. I just think it is totally unnecessary. If the Senator is willing, and with the permission of the chairman, I am willing to yield back our time if there is any left, and move on, if my friend from New Mexico is willing to yield back his time.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will ask my friend a question on my time. What is the relevance of whether or not there is a new strategic concept as it relates to whether or not Austria is a new member of NATO? Are you suggesting that if the 16 NATO members now agree--or 19 when we finish tonight--to a change in the strategic concept, that change might or might not influence whether we should let Austria in if they meet all other criteria?

Mr. BIDEN. I have great respect for the Senator from New Mexico. Much of what he says makes sense, but basically what is happening here is we are having a rerun of the Warner amendment. We are basically saying here that before any new members can come in, what has to happen is there has to be a new strategic concept agreed to. Now, if I can make an analogy, that would be like saying my friend from Utah, the Presiding Officer, or of my friend from New Mexico, I am not certain what year their States came into the Union. The only claim to fame Delaware has is we are the very first State in the Union. I shouldn't say the only claim, one of the most notable claims. It would have been a little bit like Delaware, in the Thirteen Original Colonies, and the other States east of the Mississippi saying to you all out West, as long as the constitutional amendment for suffrage is under consideration to amend our document that controls our national affairs, no new States can come into the Union. Nobody is allowed in. As long as we are reconsidering--again, I don't know the years, and I apologize, when your States came into the Union. But as long as we are considering the 17th amendment, whether or not Senators are popularly elected, we are going to put on hold any new State becoming a member of the Union. The 1991--and I don't have it with me--strategic concept was drafted by and agreed to by the 16-member nations after the Berlin Wall came down and after the Soviet Union had disintegrated. The reason I bother to point that out, Mr. President, as my friend from New Hampshire kept saying yesterday--and appropriately--we have to look at the realities of the new world. This new strategic document took into consideration a new reality that there was no Soviet Union, there was no Warsaw Pact, there was a different world. Now, what we said with the leadership of Senator Kyl of Arizona yesterday, by a vote of 90-9, was the following. We said any new strategic concept that is to be agreed to in the future should accommodate the basic fundamental principles that we have adhered to thus far in NATO; and the Senator, with great skill, laid them out in specific form for all of us to see, incorporating the strategic notions that have underpinned NATO and the new reality. So even though there is a consideration at the moment in NATO for an updated strategic concept, that could happen in a week, a year, a month, 5 years, or it could never be agreed to. And by an overwhelming vote in the Senate, 90 percent of us said, Mr. President, before you can agree to any new strategic concept, you have to make sure that what we have laid out here as the fundamental principles to guide that are incorporated in that concept. So I fully appreciate and believe that the Senator from New Mexico is concerned about strategic doctrine and is not using this amendment as a killer amendment to accomplish what Senator Warner was unable to accomplish--that is, a de facto slowdown of any new admissions, an arbitrary judgment made that, without a new doctrine being consummated and another little blue and white book being published, no one can come in. I further point out that the strategic concept of NATO is always under review, formally as well as informally. I assume the Senator's amendment speaks only to the formal review, the formal reconsideration of what that concept should be. Since 1991, NATO has changed internally with the creation of bodies such as the Partnership for Peace, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, NATO-Russian Founding Act, NATO Ukraine Commission, and a more distinct role for the European pillar of this operation has emerged. The European politico-military situation has also changed. There has been significant reduction in the conventional armed forces. Both Warsaw and the Soviet Union are dissolved. NATO subsequently decided, via the ministerial and summit statements, to invite new members. We are doing all these things that we are concerned about already. We sent out a glidepath and a guide book to the administration as to how they must proceed with the next one, and to say until that is all done, no new members, is another way of trying to do in a 15-minute debate what my friend from Virginia and the Senator from Oregon and myself debated against for days. So I respectfully suggest that our friend from Arizona has accommodated any concern about strategic doctrine with the amendment we overwhelmingly adopted, thereby clearing the way, and any justification for suggesting that the doctrine might change so radically that it might affect who we would be willing to bring in. Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.

Mr. BIDEN. I just want to make a point. I may be mistaken, but I think if my colleagues will look at this amendment, it is section (B) that is a sense of the Senate. The sense of the Senate controls language; only section B, a completely separate section is section C. If my colleagues wish to make the title of this sense of the Senate, it would be a different deal.

Mr. BIDEN. I am sorry.

Mr. BIDEN. I yield the remainder of my time to the Senator from Arizona.

Mr. BIDEN. May I ask how much time I have?

Mr. BIDEN. Great. I think that is wonderful.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I have a question. Is the Senator saying that the President of the United States will fully be within the law if, when this passes tonight, if this were attached, if he is in a press conference and says, ``I want to compliment the Senate on expanding NATO, and I want to tell Senator Conrad I'm not certifying anything''--would that be OK legally?

Mr. BIDEN. I am confused then. I am confused. Why is certification--I have never heard of a certification on the part of the President in a sense of the Senate. Explain that to me. Explain how a sense of the Senate requires a formal certification from a President. Like I said, I have been here a while. That is a new one. So you mean the President can say, when we pass this, ``You know, Bingaman and Conrad are good guys, they're my buddies and allies, but I'm not going to pay attention to them; I'm not going to certify anything''? Can he just say, ``I'm not going to certify it''?

Mr. BIDEN. On his time I would be delighted to yield, since I have very limited time.

Mr. BIDEN. Maybe the Senator can help me out. Mr. President, maybe the Senator can help me out. It says, ``Prior to the deposit of the instruments of ratification, the Administration shall certify to the Senate that with regard to [the following],'' and it lists the following nonstrategic nuclear weapons, that ``it is the policy of the United States . . . that discussions toward these ends have been initiated with the Russian Federation.'' All the Russian Federation can say is, ``I'm not going to discuss this with you,'' done, period, over; they have vetoed it. Look, if I am sitting in the Russian Duma, I am going to--and we are all worried about these reactionary nationalists who are the browns and the reds undercutting Yeltsin--I have got a real easy one. I go to Yeltsin and say, I tell you what, you've indicated to us you don't want to expand NATO but there is nothing you can do to stop it. I've got the way to stop it right now. When the President picks up the phone and calls you and says, ``By the way, I want to initiate discussions relative to tactical nuclear weapons,'' tell him, ``No. No.'' Guess what? By definition, no expansion of NATO, because the President cannot deposit these instruments until--until--he can certify to the U.S. Senate that discussions with the Russian Federation have been initiated. Now, call me paranoid, if you would like, but I know what I would do. I am a pretty good politician. The Senator from North Dakota is even a better politician. We are all politicians in here. They are not any different in the Duma. They are no different in the Russian Federation. So I have a real easy one. And by the way, if they had not figured it out, I just told them.

Mr. BIDEN. I am happy to.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I have been here 25 years. The chairman of the full committee knows that there may have been, and there are people who have been, more effective people in pursuing arms control than the Senator from Delaware but none more consistently and more fervently than the Senator from Delaware. This is not the place for this amendment. This is a treaty. This is a treaty. It is a treaty about expanding NATO. One of our colleagues on the Republican side, I was told earlier, had an amendment on the Kyoto environmental treaty saying we could not--I am told; I did not see it; but I am told he had been talked out of it, I believe--that we could not expand NATO unless Kyoto was dealt with. Another one has an amendment that may come up here tonight dealing with--I believe, the distinguished Senator from Oklahoma, at least he was talking about an amendment relating to a position I know the chairman shares, which I do not share, relating to strategic defense initiatives. This is not the place for that. Secondly, I find it absolutely fascinating that some of the very Senators who have come to the floor and said, look, what we want to do here is we want to slow down passage, stop passage, or slow down new members coming in, because we are fearful it is going to offend the Russians or the Russians are going to get upset--a legitimate concern. But then they come along and say, and by the way, before--before--we can deposit these instruments, the Russians have to agree to cut their tactical nuclear weapons, or whatever. Now, that is giving to Russia a veto power over expansion in NATO.

Mr. BIDEN. I am sorry.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. I move to lay it on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I say to my friend from Alaska, I am quite sure I can accept this amendment 2065, but I would like to not do it at the moment. I want to make sure I run the ``traps'' with my counterpart on the Armed Services Committee and to make sure it is right. Secondly, I must tell him, as a former chairman of an authorizing committee and now a ranking member of an authorizing committee, I am heartened and my soul is soaring to hear a chairman of the Appropriations Committee say, ``First get an authorization.'' That is, all by itself, reason to be excited about this.

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. But I am 99 percent certain we agree fully, I say to the Senator from Alaska, in what he is attempting to do, and if he just changed the language ``any NATO expenditure'' and we say ``any U.S. expenditure beyond a common budget affecting any of these three nations requires''--I am not a draftsman--``requires the authorization committee to do it,'' I will accept that.

Mr. BIDEN. If the chairman will withhold for just a minute, I have no objection to agreeing to what you have stated. I would like to, and we have plenty of time to do this, and you have my commitment we will do it if our staffs can make sure that I am not misunderstanding what is being said.

Mr. BIDEN. I will be happy to accept the amendment if the Senator does that.

Mr. BIDEN. I am happy to yield to the Senator.

Mr. BIDEN. I think it is unnecessary, but I have no objection to that amendment. Now, the second amendment, the number of which I am not going to even try to guess, because I will mess it up, but the second amendment is more direct--not more direct--is shorter and straightforward. It says-- do I have a copy of it here? It says: Requirement of payment out of funds specifically authorized. No cost incurred by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in connection with the admission to membership, or participation, in NATO of any country that was not a member of NATO as of March 1, 1998, may be paid out of funds available to any department, agency, or other entity of the United States unless the funds are specifically authorized. * * * Now, the phrase ``no cost incurred by NATO'' by definition, as I understand it, means only one thing, the common budget--the common budget. Now, if the chairman is concerned that we are going to, out of U.S. taxpayers' dollars, spend money on a new NATO admittee, Poland, let us say, that is not part of the common budget by saying, ``You know, NATO has agreed we're going to extend a runway in Warsaw'' or wherever we are going to do it. That is a common budget requirement. NATO must pay for that. It is not the national defense budget of Poland that pays for that. Since all of NATO is going to use it, we all are going to pay for it. On the other hand, if you want to buy F-15 aircraft, we, the United States, will sell them to you under a Foreign Military Sales Act which is subsidized. We will be taking taxpayers' dollars, subsidizing the Polish military, if we sell them under the Foreign Military Sales Act. That is not out of the common budget. Now, if what the chairman is trying to capture is those kinds of expenditures that exceed the common budget, I understand that, and I will support that, requiring a specific authorization. But if he is talking about any common budget expenditures by NATO, I see no distinction, by requiring a specific common budget expenditure that falls under the $10 ceiling, because we will be limited by the first amendment to spending no more than $10 the next year. If, in fact, we require no specific authorization to extend the runway in Germany, and if it is a common budget investment and a NATO investment to extend a runway on German land for a NATO facility, and we don't have to have a specific authorization to do that as long as it doesn't exceed the cap of $10 total spending, then I don't understand why we would have to have a specific authorization to do the same exact thing with an equal member of NATO--assuming Poland is admitted--in Poland. It is not doing anything other than meeting a NATO obligation we will have had to sign on to. Secondly, if I am right--and I may not be, because I may not understand the second amendment--when I read the phrase, ``No cost incurred by NATO in connection with admission of new members''----

Mr. BIDEN. I thank the chairman of the committee for yielding to me. And I say to my friend, the chairman of the Appropriations Committee, I doubt whether, with the exception of two or three other people in this body, there are as many people who know about the defense budget as my friend does. And I want to say at the outset, what I am about to say is--I say this with all sincerity--I am a little bit confused about the two amendments. Let me be very specific. The first amendment--I should get the numbers correct of the amendments. Amendment No.--I think it is 2066-- that is the amendment that speaks to two things, one, a sense of the Senate regarding the common-funded budget or put another way--and I agree with the chairman of the Appropriations Committee that it is--we are instructing the President to negotiate down the percent that we, the United States, contribute to the common budgets of NATO. I think that is appropriate. I think that is necessary. In 1950, the percent of the common budget that the United States paid was roughly 50 percent. And in the only renegotiation that took place, that was cut in half and went down to approximately 25 percent. The Senator knows better than I do, there are three common budgets. They are slightly different in terms of percentages, but essentially it is 25 percent. And it should be lower, in my view. I thank him for making it a sense of the Senate rather than a condition to passage of the treaty. The second part of that amendment states--and I have a little difficulty with it, but I am prepared to accept it on our side--it says--and I quote on page 2, line 19: Annual Limitation On United States Expenditures For NATO. Unless specifically authorized by law, the total amount of expenditures by the United States in any fiscal year beginning on or after October 1, 1998, for payments to the common-funded budgets of NATO shall not exceed the total of all such payments made by the United States in fiscal year 1998. Now, that means, as I understand it, because a lot of our colleagues who do not spend as much time on these issues because of their committee assignments as the Senator from Alaska, the Senator from North Carolina, the Senator from Delaware--we are on committees that have these responsibilities--are somewhat confused, as I am, when we start talking about HCFA and a whole range of issues relating to the Department of Health and Human Services. The common budget of NATO are all those expenditures which all 16 NATO members have to pitch in to pay for. Now, above the common budget, we have in the past, and we will continue in the future, I expect, expend dollars on--military dollars, State Department dollars, Defense Department dollars--on NATO member countries that are not part of a common budget. For example, as the Senator knows better than I do, we have come up with subsidized sales of weapons systems to Greece or to Turkey. We have done the same in terms of cascading down weapons we are no longer using to other NATO countries. They do not fall within the common budget; they are expenditures of American taxpayer dollars on European countries that are members of NATO. The way this amendment I am referring to would work, as I understand it, if in the year 1998 the United States of America spent $10--I am going to make this easy for me--$10 contributing to the common budget of NATO, that is, it represents 25 percent of all the expenditures, and all of NATO spent $40 on the common budget, we spent $10, in the year 1999 or 2000, we would be limited to spending $10 toward the common budget even if the total common budget went up to $110 because we would only be able to spend $10, which would represent a lower percentage than our 25 percent unless the authorizing committees in question specifically authorized the additional expenditures. Is that correct?

Mr. BIDEN

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, several points. One, this is superfluous. In the actual resolution of ratification, we make it clear in paragraph 7 it requires prior consultation by the President before the United States can support even the invitation of any new member, No. 1. No. 2, we have the advise-and-consent requirement. They have to come here and get our votes to begin with. No. 3, this has nothing to do with cost, nothing to do with cost. It doesn't mention cost at all. No. 4, to say now there is an artificial pause is going to put on hold all those actions taking place in other countries to meet the criteria from border disputes to ethnic disputes that exist within those countries that would be necessary to be solved before they could be invited. It is absolutely superfluous, and I would argue it is dangerous in that it will send a signal that there is an artificial pause that really means no one else will be considered. I urge my colleagues to vote against it. It is totally unnecessary.