Jeff Bingaman

Mr. BINGAMAN

Mr. BINGAMAN. I fully support that view and appreciate his leadership on this important initiative. The Nation's schools and the Nation's students will be the better for it. Mr. President, I yield the floor. ddg-51 advance procurement funding

Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I have been concerned that the extension and improvement of the Troops-to-Teachers program recently authorized in the FY 2000 National Defense Authorization bill, S. 1059, Section 579, might not be funded this year. As my colleagues are well aware, this program will provide excellent assistance to retired military personnel in obtaining teaching credentials to enable them to make the transition from the military to the classroom in an expedited way. Retired military personnel are highly trained professionals, particularly in scientific and technical fields--an area in which the nation's school systems are in dire need of trained professionals. Troops-to-teachers offer stipends to personnel retiring from the military to obtain teaching credentials or vocational instruction certificates needed for primary through secondary schools. It's program by which everyone wins. I am advised that the President's budget requests $18 million in funding for FY 2000 under the jurisdiction of the Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee. Since the Defense Authorization bill would extend Department of Defense management over the program until it transfers responsibility to the Department of Education at a date not later than October 1, 2001, it is essential that the funding be maintained during this period of transition.

Mr. BINGAMAN

Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I rise today to speak about a bill, S. 1093, which I introduced on May 20 of this year for the protection of various historic sites in the Galisteo Basin in my home State of New Mexico. The basin is located in Santa Fe County, NM. As shown on this map--it is very hard for anyone to see this map I understand--this is Santa Fe and the Galisteo Basin is this area south of Santa Fe where the various dots are shown. These dots identify the location of the various historical sites that are talked about in the bill. To understand the importance of these sites, it is important to understand a little history about this basin. When the Spanish Conquistadors arrived in New Mexico in 1598, they found a thriving native pueblo culture with its own unique traditions, its own religion, and its own architecture and art, which was enriched and influenced by an extensive system of trade. The subsequent history of conflict and coexistence between these two cultures--the pueblo Indian culture on the one hand and the Spanish culture--shaped much of the language and the art and cultural world view of the people in my State today. The initial history of cultural interaction in New Mexico encompassed a period of a little over 100 years from 1598 through the pueblo revolt in 1680 and also the period of recolonization by the Spanish in the early 1700s. Among these sites, which are shown on this map and which are discussed in the bill, are examples of both the stone and the adobe architectural styles which typified Native American pueblo communities prior to and during early Spanish colonization, including two of the largest of these ancient towns, San Marcos and San Lazaro Pueblos. Each of these large towns had thousands of rooms at their peak. Also included in these sites are spectacular examples of Native American petroglyph art, as well as historic missions which were constructed as part of the Spaniards' drive to convert the native populace to Catholicism. The 26 archaeological sites addressed in this bill provide a cohesive picture of this crucial nexus of New Mexican history depicting the culture of the pueblo people and illustrating how it was affected by the Spanish settlers. Through these sites, we have an opportunity to truly understand the simultaneous growth and the coexistence of these two cultures. Unfortunately, this is an opportunity we may soon lose. Most of these sites are currently not part of any preservation program, and through weathering, erosion, vandalism, and amateur excavations, they are losing their ability to be interpreted at a later date. This legislation creates a program under the Department of the Interior to preserve these sites and to provide interpretive research in an integrated manner. While many of these sites are on Federal public land, many are privately owned, and there are a few on State trust lands. The vision behind the legislation is that an integrated preservation program at sites on Federal lands could serve as a foundation for archaeological research that could be augmented with voluntary cooperative agreements with State agencies and with private landowners. These agreements will provide landowners with the opportunity for technical and financial assistance to preserve the sites on their property. Where the parties deem it appropriate, the legislation would also allow for the purchase or exchange of property to acquire these very valuable sites. With such a program, we should be able to preserve the history embodied in these sites for future generations. I add that this legislation is supported by the Cochiti Pueblo, which is culturally and historically tied to these sites. I have received a letter from Isaac Herrera, the Governor of Cochiti Pueblo, expressing his support and that of the tribal council for the legislation. Governor Herrera notes that this tribe has already donated $10,000 to the preservation of one of these sites. So this legislation has the support of the pueblo. It also has the support of our State land commissioner, Ray Powell. I conclude by showing some examples from these magnificent sites. The first two charts are from the Comanche Gap site. They are outstanding examples of petroglyph art, of which we have a lot in our State of New Mexico. These are examples of very intricate work that has been done by the pueblo Indians on the rock formations. The next three charts are of the various pueblo sites. The first is Pueblo Blanco. As you can see, the drywash at the top of this picture and the road at the bottom are the types of erosion threats which I mentioned earlier. The next picture is Arroyo Hondo. Again, you have a drywash at the top. This is probably the most extensively excavated of the various sites. The School of American Research in Santa Fe has done a tremendous amount of work to try to interpret and understand this site. Finally is the Pueblo of Colorado which, once again, shows the threat of erosion from the drywashes above the site. So these are examples of what we are trying to preserve through this legislation. I did have a chance this Saturday--2 days ago--to visit the San Marcos site and saw the damage that is being done there by erosion. I also saw the value of preserving the site to show where the Spanish conquistadors came in and built a church right on a part of that pueblo. Trying to understand the interaction of the two cultures at that site is a very worthwhile endeavor. I also particularly thank Jessica Schultz who has been an intern in my office this past year. She has done yeoman work providing research for the bill and helping to get the bill drafted. I feel strongly that it will be a major contribution if we can pass this legislation and make it law. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill that I referred to be printed in the Record.

Mr. BINGAMAN

Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I will speak in just a moment about a bill I have introduced. I, at this point, suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent an intern in my office, Jessica Shultz, be permitted the privilege of the floor for the remainder of the day.

Mr. BINGAMAN

Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. BINGAMAN

Mr. BINGAMAN. As my colleagues may be aware, the Navy had allocated 435 million for procurement of 135 BQM-74 drones in fiscal year 2000. This funding was zeroed out by the Office of the Secretary of Defense prior to submission of the budget request to Congress.

Mr. BINGAMAN. I have been pleased to support the BQM-74. This target drone plays an important role in Navy air-to-air and surface warfare training, representing enemy fighters, bombers, and cruise missiles during live-fire training operations. The Chief of Naval Operations has a requirement that at least 240 of these drones be kept in the active inventory. We have maintained this number in the past, and I hope that the Navy will be able to continue to do so.

Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I thank the manager for that statement. I am certainly not trying to object, but it is a very large unknown quantity since we have not seen the amendment.

Mr. BINGAMAN. Thank you.

Mr. BINGAMAN. I am not intending to take long. I just ask, since we have no time allotted during this time, will the sponsors be available later in the afternoon to answer questions about the amendment, because we have not seen the amendment.

Mr. BINGAMAN. Would the Senator yield for a procedural question?

Mr. BINGAMAN. I thank the Senator from Kansas for that assurance, and promise to work closely with you and the Department of Energy to see that the Nuclear Cities Initiative continues to move forward.

Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I would like to clarify a provision, section 3136(b), of the National Defense Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 2000, concerning the Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI). The Nuclear Cities Initiative is a Department of Energy cooperative effort with Russia to assist Russia in downsizing its nuclear weapons complex. The report accompanying the Defense Bill, Senate Report 106-50, states that Russia has not agreed to close or dismantle weapons-related facilities at the nuclear complexes receiving U.S. technical and financial assistance. As a result, Section 3136 of the Defense Authorization bill contains a provision the would prohibit the obligation or expenditure of funding until the Secretary of Energy certifies to the Congress that Russia has agreed to close some of its facilities engaged in work on weapons of mass destruction. Because of several past interpretations by the Department of Defense of the wording similar to that in section 3136(b), I believe that the wording of this provision would effectively prevent the implementation of the Nuclear Cities Initiative. While I share the goal of Senator Roberts, to ensure that the Russian weapons complex is downsized, I am concerned that the specific certification is unachievable. Russia has publicly committed to shut down or downsize some of its nuclear weapons complexes or related facilities. Even if the certification is achievable, the logistics of the required certification process could delay the program for a very long time. The Nuclear Cities program is just getting started, but has already made some real progress. To stop the funding in fiscal year 2000, particularly since Russian officials have already announced their intent to close some facilities seems to me to be counterproductive. If funding were suspended, program activities would be halted and the cooperative program itself placed in jeopardy. Given the shared concerns that Senator Roberts and I have with respect to prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons technology and information, I would like to ask my esteemed colleague whether that is the intent behind this provision in the bill.

Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I agree that there was substantial bungling by various officials and, clearly, that computer should have been investigated. Maybe we ought to have an amendment out here to reorganize the FBI. Maybe that is the solution to this problem, and we can consider it tonight before we leave town. Clearly, there is no disagreement between Democrats and Republicans about the fact that serious problems exist and they need correcting. The question is, Should we do a major reorganization of the Department of Energy with no hearings, no opportunity for the Secretary of Energy to come forward, and do so here as everyone is trying to rush out to National Airport and fly home? In my view, that is clearly not the responsible way to proceed. Accordingly, we did object to that portion of the amendment. I think that is the right thing to do. After hearings, after consideration and meaningful discussion with the Department and with other experts about how to proceed, we may well find some ways to improve that Department through changes in its organization. If we do find those, I will certainly be the first to support such a proposal. But I do think it is appropriate for us, at this stage, to stay with what we know will help and continue to look for other ways to help in the weeks and days ahead. I yield the floor. Mr. KYL addressed the Chair.

Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, let me respond to a few of the points that have been made. Then I will yield, because I know the Senator from Arizona, who is the prime sponsor on the amendment, is here and wishes to speak. The suggestion that we are leaving without knowing anything about security in our National Laboratories in the Department of Energy is just wrong. I am on the Armed Services Committee. I participated in the drafting of the language that is included in this bill. We have 24 pages in the defense authorization bill which is the best--the best--we could come up with in the Armed Services Committee to deal with this problem of security and put in place more safeguards. We start on page 540, establishing a Commission on Safeguards, Security, and Counterintelligence at Department of Energy Facilities. We go on; that commission is established. We move on to increase the background investigations of certain personnel at the Department of Energy facilities. We move on to requiring a plan for polygraph examinations of certain personnel at the Department of Energy facilities. We then go on to establish civil monetary penalties for violations of the Department of Energy regulations related to safeguarding and security of restricted data. We have a moratorium on lab-to-lab and foreign visitors and assignment programs unless there is a certification made by the head of the FBI, the head of the CIA, the Secretary of Energy himself as to the fact that safeguards are in place. We increase penalties for misuse of restricted data. We establish the Office of Counterintelligence in statute, which is essentially a third of the amendment that the Senator from Arizona is proposing. So two of the three parts of the amendment the Senator from Arizona and my colleague from New Mexico are proposing are included in this amendment. It is just not accurate to say we are leaving here without having done anything. We also provide for increased protection for whistle- blowers in the Department. We provide for investigation and remediation of alleged reprisals for disclosure of certain information to Congress. We provide for notification to Congress of certain security and counterintelligence failures at the Department of Energy facilities. All of these provisions are in the bill the way it now reads. I say again what I said before: Maybe there should be more. I hope very much we will have some hearings in the Armed Services Committee, perhaps on the Energy Committee. I know my colleague from Alaska, the chairman of the Energy Committee, expressed his great concern that we are not moving ahead this afternoon on this. Since we have already had seven hearings on this China espionage issue, we should go ahead and have an eighth hearing, hopefully the week after next, and we should look at this proposal or similar proposals to see what can be done. One other minor item: There has been reference made to the failure to implement the recommendations that Charles Curtis, our former Under Secretary, made with regard to security. I agree, this was a failing. The information was not properly passed from one group of appointed officials to the next group of appointed officials when they came into office. That is a very unfortunate lapse. Under this amendment, Secretary Curtis would have been stripped of any authority over the nuclear weapons program. It would be prohibited for the Secretary of Energy to allow the Under Secretary any authority over that program under this proposal. One of our outstanding Secretaries of Energy, since I have been serving in the Senate, has been Secretary Watkins. He is known for his attention to the detail of management and administration. During the time he was Secretary of Energy, he issued a great many management directives or ``notices,'' as he called them. I have here a notebook containing 37 of these management directives that Secretary Watkins issued. They are all related to the organization and management of the Department of Energy. None of them contain the provisions or anything like the provisions that are contained in here. I hope when we have hearings in the Armed Services Committee, in the Energy Committee, in whatever committee the majority would like to hold hearings, let's call Secretary Watkins, Admiral Watkins, to come and explain to us his view of this proposal. Surely we cannot question his commitment to dealing with safeguards and security and with the problem of Chinese espionage. If some of my colleagues want to imply that Members on the Democratic side are less than concerned, let us call Secretary Watkins and see whether he is less than concerned about some of these issues. I am persuaded that he is very concerned. I am persuaded that all of my colleagues in the Senate, Democrat and Republican, are very concerned. We need to do the right thing. We need to be sure that whatever we legislate helps, rather than hinders, our ability to deal with this problem. I yield the floor at this point and reserve the remainder of my time.

Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator Levin's time be assigned to me.

Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, how much time remains on our side?

Mr. BINGAMAN. So procedurally, we should not be here on a Thursday afternoon, where the very distinguished manager of the bill, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, has said we need to finish this bill in the next hour and a half. We need to leave town. Everyone has their plane reservations. We have to fly out. And by the way, before we leave, let's reorganize the Department of Energy. This is not a responsible way for us to proceed. Accordingly, I do object to the procedure. Let me talk about the substance. My friend from Arizona, who is a prime sponsor on the bill, described the bill fairly accurately when he said, this bill, this provision, the third part of the amendment that I have said is objectionable, the establishment of this Nuclear Security Administration, says this bill creates a stovepipe. That is his exact quote. I agree that that is what happens. Let me use this chart beside me here to describe very briefly how the Department of Energy functions now. The Secretary of Energy is in charge of the Department of Energy. There are, under the Secretary, various subdepartments. We have defense programs. We have environmental management, energy efficiency, nuclear nonproliferation, fossil energy and science. With regard to each of those, the Secretary has established--and much of this has been done by Secretary Richardson in the 6 months he has been there--some crosscutting responsibilities. Some people with crosscutting responsibilities are directly answerable to the Secretary. One is the director of counterintelligence. This was a major step forward, and I think everybody who sat through these hearings would acknowledge that this was a major step forward. This was one of the actions that was taken, really, by Secretary Richardson's predecessor, when Ed Curran, who is the gentleman who has been put in the Office of Director of Counterintelligence, was hired. This was in April of 1998. That individual, the director of counterintelligence, under the administrative procedure now in place, and under the provisions of this bill, has crosscutting responsibility for counterintelligence in each of the parts of the Department of Energy; in fact, in each laboratory. Mr. Curran has testified to various of the committees up here that he will have a person who is responsible to him and who has authority by virtue of his position to demand certain actions on the issue of counterintelligence in each of our National Laboratories. That is as it should be. That is putting accountability into the counterintelligence system. It is a good step forward. That is a step in the right direction. A second crosscutting responsibility is the security czar on security policy. A third is this independent Safety and Security Oversight Office that Secretary Richardson has established. So at the present time there are those three entities that report directly to the Secretary of Energy on these issues related to security. These are the reforms that Secretary Richardson has been trying to put into place. These are the reforms that are called for under Presidential Decision Directive-61, and then additional administrative steps that have been taken by this Secretary of Energy. I believe the system is structured in a way that makes some sense. Let me now show the stovepipe organizational chart, because we have one of those as well. This, as Senator Kyl indicated, is a major change, this third part; the establishment of this Nuclear Security Administration is a major change in the way the Department operates. What essentially is done is you eliminate the defense programs portion of the Department of Energy and you rename that the ``Nuclear Security Administration.'' You put that in the so-called stovepipe. You say there will be no independent counterintelligence authority over how that agency functions. There will be no independent security oversight over how that agency, that independent agency or administration functions. There will be no environmental oversight, through the Department, on that. And there will be no oversight regarding health and safety factors relating to workers. Under that we put all of the facilities that relate to nuclear weapons. One reason why I am particularly concerned, frankly, about this, is that the two National Laboratories in my State would be in this stovepipe. I do not know that that is good for them long term. I have great doubts that that is good for them long term. I really do have doubts as to whether that is a wise course for us to follow. One problem--and I think the Senator from Nevada referred to this--is that under this new arrangement, it makes it very clear with very specific language here; it says the administrator of this new stovepipe agency, who shall report directly to and shall be accountable directly to the Secretary, ``the secretary may not delegate to any department official the duty to supervise the administrator.'' Presumably, what that means is that Secretary Richardson could not ask his Under Secretary, in this case Dr. Moniz, to take on any of the responsibility for supervising what is going on in this so-called stovepipe agency. Regardless of the experience or the qualifications of Secretary Moniz, or any other Under Secretary, Secretary Richardson would have to personally exercise that oversight, or it would not be exercised. That is clearly not a good management arrangement. This stovepipe agency, as it is contemplated in this Nuclear Security Administration, eliminates the ability of the Secretary of the Interior to integrate important work on nuclear weapons with other important scientific work going on in the Department of Energy. I believe very strongly that our laboratories and our nuclear weapons program are strengthened by the interaction that scientists and engineers in that nuclear weapons program have with other scientists and other engineers working elsewhere in the Department of Energy. That would be stopped. That would be much more difficult under this kind of a stovepipe arrangement. There is no prohibition against it happening here, but it is very clear that the head of this Nuclear Security Administration has all authority, and exclusive authority, for what goes on in his department, and there is very little incentive for anyone else to try to put work in those laboratories or interact necessarily with those laboratories on nonnuclear weapons activity. As a result of this, I fear very much--and I know my good friend and colleague from New Mexico, Senator Domenici, who is a cosponsor of this amendment, says he believes that something like this amendment should be adopted by the Senate because it will keep the Congress, ultimately, after we conference with the House, from going even further and taking a step toward shifting some of this nuclear weapons responsibility to the Department of Defense. My fear is somewhat different. My fear is that this is a first and sort of a logical step toward going in that direction, and that if you are going to set up all of this nuclear weapons activity in a stovepipe and it is going to be cordoned off from the rest of the Department of Energy, as is proposed in this bill, I think it is very easy to go from that point to the point of saying let's just cut this loose entirely from the Secretary of Energy and make it responsible to the Secretary of Defense. I think that would be a serious mistake. That is a mistake that our predecessors had the wisdom to avoid. President Truman had the wisdom to avoid that. Those who set up the nuclear weapons program in this country decided early on that it should be in a civilian agency, it should not be in a Department of Defense agency; and, clearly, the closer we move toward making this defense-specific, defense-only, I think we would be making a mistake. Creating the stovepipe, in my view, does threaten the long-term vitality of our laboratories. I believe it threatens the long-term ability to attract people we need to these laboratories, to keep them world-class, cutting-edge scientific institutions. I may be overdramatizing, but my own view is that we have seen the stovepipe model in action. Two years ago, I went to the Soviet Union and visited Chelyabinsk-70, also referred to as Shnezinsk. Shnezinsk is one of the nuclear cities, one of the secret cities. When you go there, you see how stovepipe organizations function. There is nobody there doing any research on solar energy. There is nobody there worrying about environmental problems that might be a result of research or work going on at that facility. There is nobody there interacting with much of anyone. That is one of the big problems. That is why we have the nuclear cities initiative in this bill that we are trying to get going, to help these laboratories in Russia break out of the stovepipe and begin to interact with other elements in the society, with other scientists, and begin to apply their talents to other activities. So I am sure this is well intentioned. I am sure this proposal is well intentioned, and I would like very much to have some hearings and bring in some experts to tell us what they think of this and allow the administration to give us their point of view. I think that is an appropriate course for us to follow. But my initial reaction, after reading it here for the last hour and a half, or 2 hours that I have had this, is that it does not do what the sponsors intend. It does not solve the problem of Chinese espionage. It does create or result in many other unintended consequences that will be long-term adverse to our nuclear weapons program. Mr. President, I have great problems about it. I have a series of questions I was going to raise about it. I see my colleague from New Mexico wishing to speak. Maybe he would like to speak and I could ask him a few questions about this. I yield the floor.

Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I rise to offer an amendment that promises to extend to the Nation's veterans an improved, more accessible way to submit and process claims for benefits and other services. Recently, in my state of New Mexico, complaints about processing claims for veterans benefits reached high volume. Billboards appeared around the city of Albuquerque that the Albuquerque regional office of the Veterans Administration was the ``worst VA office in the country.'' I was very concerned about those charges and looked into the situation. Information provided by the Albuquerque office essentially confirmed the accusations I read on the billboard. Statistics show that the system is broken and needs fixing. Compensation for completed claims in New Mexico takes 301.6 days on average; the nationwide average is 192.9 days. Pension compensation claims average 149.9 days in Albuquerque versus 108.8 days nationwide. ``Cases Pending Over 180 Days'' in Albuquerque are about 31 percent of the total. Nationwide, only about 22 percent fall into that category. The system appears to be broken and the situation is ripe for creative new ways to solve our beleaguered veterans' problems. I recently received a briefing that I thought might go a long way to serving veterans' needs, particularly in rural States such as New Mexico. The proposal suggested that veterans be permitted to use National Guard armories and communications infrastructure to receive counsel on a wide range of veterans problems and programs. As you are aware, National Guard armories are typically used during weekends for exercises and training, but often are underutilized during the week. The proposal suggested that the National Guard and the Veterans Administration coordinate ideas and concerns into a program which could take advantage of the considerable resources already in place at the armories. The wide dispersion or armories, particularly among rural communities, would provide a considerably more convenient venue for receiving veterans services than the long commute to major metropolitan areas such as Albuquerque that is now required. My amendment requires the National Guard in consultation with the Veterans Administration to examine this idea, and to report their findings regarding costs and benefits to the Secretary of Defense, who, having reviewed the report, would submit it and any additional findings to the Congress. I am optimistic that the analysis will show that investing resources in this project would pay major dividends to the veterans community which is experiencing considerable difficulty in settling benefit claims under the current process. I am pleased to introduce this idea to my fellow Senators and appreciate its acceptance as an agreed amendment in this year's defense bill. In title II, t the end of subtitle C, add the following:

Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, let me make some comments, and then I will be prepared to yield the remainder of our time. Perhaps I will not be able to with my colleague from Nevada here. But let me just make a few comments at least, and then return the remainder of the time over to him for any comments he has. I think that trying to characterize this problem which exists in our Department of Energy and in our National Laboratories as this ``administration's problem'' rather than all of our problem is just a rewriting of history. I have a list that, once I have completed my statement, I will offer or ask unanimous consent to add to the Record. It is called ``Security Concerns at America's Nuclear Facilities,'' excerpts from GAO Reports, 1980 through 1993. When you go through this and look at just the titles of these reports, you see that the problems we are debating--the problems of adequate safeguards for nuclear secrets, and for these facilities--have been with us a long time--long before I ever came to the Senate. From a GAO report, March of 1980: Adequate safeguards to prevent the theft or diversion of weapons usable material from commercial nuclear fuel reprocessing plants have not yet been deployed. May, 1986: DOE has insufficient control over nuclear technology exports. March of 1987: DOE reinvestigation of employees has not been timely. August of 1987: Department of Energy needs tighter controls over reprocessing information. December of 1987: DOE needs a more accurate and efficient security clearance program. June of 1989: Better controls needed over weapons-related information and technology. These are the titles of GAO reports. These are all GAO reports that were issued in the 1980s before this administration ever came to town, before this administration was ever heard of. To try to say this is a problem that this administration created and that now, this afternoon, we have to get this problem solved because otherwise we would be in derogation of our duty, I think is just clearly wrong. There are significant improvements in security and safeguards of secure information and classified information in this bill and there are additional safeguards put in place in the Lott amendment which we all agree to. I was at the Armed Services Committee markup. I can say without qualification that the Democrats did not object to the provisions that were offered and that are now included in this bill. I believe that we Democrats--and I was one of them in that committee markup-- substantially improved the provisions which wound up in the final bill. I think we worked with the majority, we tried very hard to be constructive and to come up with proposals that were workable and that were effective in improving security. I think we have done that. I look forward to going through the very same process on this question of reorganization of the Department of Energy. We should consider the provisions in this amendment which relate to reorganization of the Department of Energy and we should do so with hearings. We can have them as soon as the week after next. I am happy to stay next week and have them, if the Senator is suggesting we are trying to leave town without doing our duty to the country. I am happy to have them next week in the committees I serve on. If the Energy Committee and the Armed Services Committee schedule hearings next week, I will be there and I will do all I can to help make whatever legislative provisions we propose out of those committees be constructive and effective in improving the security of our National Laboratories and our Department of Energy, generally, and improving the organization of that Department. It is highly improper, in my view, to try to legislate something here without allowing the Secretary of Energy to testify, without allowing him to give his input into it, and without looking at how other Secretaries of Energy feel about some of these major, far-reaching changes as well. We should do this right. We should do it quickly. We should take whatever action we determine makes sense for the country's good, and we should not play politics with this issue. This is not a Democrat or Republican issue. We are all very concerned about our national security. We are all anxious to do the right thing--Secretary Richardson as much as anyone in this body, and we need to ask his advice. We need to talk to all the experts we can find. I hope we can come up with some good solutions here. I yield the floor.

Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, how much time remains on our side?

Mr. BINGAMAN. I yield the Senator such time as he wants.