Kit Bond

Mr. BOND

Mr. BOND. Mr. President, our intelligence community should never be forced to question whether our priority is protecting America's safety or protecting the privacy of terrorists. This bill makes clear to intelligence professionals that keeping our Nation safe is their highest responsibility and assures they have the tools needed to get the job done. That is why I am so pleased to join with my colleagues, Senators Lieberman and Sessions, in reauthorizing three FISA provisions--lone wolf, wiretap, and section 215--which would otherwise expire. This legislation we have introduced today, without change, reauthorizes these three national vital security tools for 4 more years. While I believe each of these tools should be made permanent and Congress plays a dangerous game with national security every time we impose arbitrary sunsets, it is essential that the community's ability to collect lifesaving foreign intelligence should continue unimpeded. Our bill also makes conforming changes to the disclosure requirements for national security letters in light of the Second Circuit's decision last year. These issues are so critical and so urgent to our well-being and security as a nation, nothing else will matter, even the current health care debate, if we fail in national security. I have spoken before on this floor about the need for President Obama to make a decision about Afghanistan. I will not repeat those points today. But as our military, intelligence, and law enforcement professionals defend the United States and its allies in Washington, there is an effort afoot to make this fight much harder than it needs to be. The U.S. PATRIOT Act and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act were passed overwhelmingly in the aftermath of the September 11 terror attacks. For years, terrorism was treated as a law enforcement matter. Our Nation responded to terrorist attack after terrorist attack, to the deaths of our servicemembers and embassy personnel, with indictments and arrest warrants. As Congress failed to give our intelligence operators the tools they needed to act quickly, our terrorist enemies became even more emboldened and determined to strike our homeland. September 11 was a wake-up call. Our driving mission appropriately, after that, became prevention and disruption of terrorist attacks at home against our troops overseas and against our allies. That is why the legislation we passed provided the necessary tools. In 2005, the PATRIOT Act was reauthorized with minor changes, but three FISA provisions remained subject to sunset. Here is an opportunity for us to reauthorize these three vital provisions. There is little disagreement among people who know that these provisions should and must be reauthorized. FBI Director Mueller testified before the Judiciary Committee that each is important to the FBI's work in national security and criminal investigation. But because of the enhanced information sharing rules and procedures, other community entities, such as the Counterterrorism Center, are often dependent upon information collected under these authorities. Their loss would adversely impact their ability to analyze and share important national intelligence information. As an example, if the FBI obtains a court order under FISA for a roving wiretap targeting a terrorist subject in New York, foreign intelligence information obtained there may be shared with the CIA, enabling them in turn to target associates overseas. Events over the past few months underscore the importance of giving the FBI and other agencies all the tools and authorities they need to stay ahead. From the disrupted terror plots in New York and Colorado to those in Illinois, Texas, and North Carolina, we have seen firsthand why the FBI must have the flexibility to get the information they need as quickly as possible to prevent these attacks. The benefit of our intelligence collection authorities, however, does not just benefit our own citizens. Just as overseas terror threats may impact our safety, threats posed by some within our country do not always end here. We learned two men in Chicago were conspiring with associates to commit terrorist attacks in Denmark. This case is a good example of how FISA authorities can save lives in allied countries. There is a belief among some that as long as the intelligence community eventually gets the information it needs, time is not of the essence. That is not true. Timing was everything, whether it was introducing an undercover agent to a target at the right moment or conducting surveillance at the right time. No intelligence collector is going to say that getting the same information 3 weeks later is good enough. I cannot comment on specific tools that were used in foiling all of these plots. We know both from public and classified testimony and information that the tools provided that we are authorizing today have been invaluable to our efforts to stay ahead of the terrorists. As I mentioned earlier, the FBI's ability to obtain a roving wiretap under FISA will end this year unless Congress acts. According to Director Mueller, the FBI has used the authority 140 times in the past 5 years. The ability to track terrorists even when they repeatedly use and dump their cell phones to avoid interception is, as Director Mueller testified, ``tremendously important.'' He also noted with all the new technology, it is nothing for a target to buy four or five cell phones and use them in quick succession. I couldn't agree more. Our enemies know our laws better than some of us do. They understand the hoops and hurdles government must clear to catch up or stay ahead. Roving wiretap authority sends a clear message that the time-honored trick of frequently changing a cell phone will not work like it used to. Obtaining a roving wiretap requires, first and foremost, that the FBI establish probable cause that the target is an agent of a foreign power. Some critics of this provision claim it allows the FBI to avoid meeting this standard as surveillance moves from phone to phone. That is not true. Each wiretap application is approved by a FISA Court judge. If a target changes his cell phone and the FBI moves to surveil the new phone, the court is notified. All of the protections for U.S. person information that apply to any other FISA wiretap also apply to roving wiretaps. In short, while the authority is a tremendous asset for the FBI, it poses no additional civil liberties concerns. It should be renewed. On business records, over the past 5 years, a rallying cry against these measures has centered on section 215, allowing the FBI to obtain business records such as hotel information or travel records upon a showing of the requisite burden of proof to a FISA Court judge. We have heard time and again the FBI is using this authority to spy on people's reading habits at the local library. This is simply highly charged rhetoric not supported by facts. While the FBI has used section 215 more than 250 times in the past 5 years, no library records have been obtained. But we do know that terrorists and their associates have used library Internet access to communicate with each other and, in the appropriate case, the FBI must have the ability to obtain any relevant records relating to that usage. Congress should not pass any legislation that would allow terrorists to use libraries or any other public facility as a safe haven for their illegal activities. If we did that, guess where all the terrorists would congregate. Do you want them all in your libraries? I don't think so. The inspector general of the Department of Justice conducted several audits of the FBI's use of section 215 and found no abuse of authority. These audits also considered the time it takes for the FBI to obtain a 215 order. The Director has testified that business records sought by terrorism investigations by the FBI are ``absolutely essential to identifying other persons who may be involved in terrorist activities.'' The records obtained under this authority are no different from what the FBI could obtain in a criminal investigation using grand jury subpoena authority. There is rarely any delay in obtaining a grand jury subpoena. DOJ should strive to ensure that section 215 court orders are obtained in a timely and expedient manner. Given the vital information that can be obtained, I have asked the DOJ to take steps necessary to minimize future delays. As with roving wiretap authority, I believe section 215 has adequate measures already built in to ensure that the private interests of U.S. persons are protected. I have not heard any reasonable critique of this authority, and I believe it should be authorized without changes, without delay. The sole expiring provision that has not been used by the FBI is the lone wolf definition of an agent of a foreign power, prompting some critics to demand its repeal. Under this definition, the FBI can obtain a FISA Act search or electronic surveillance against a non-U.S. person who is not readily identifiable with a particular foreign power. We all should be familiar with the story of Zacarias Moussaoui, the 9/11 coconspirator who was identified prior to the 9/11 attacks. But the FBI could not connect him with a particular terrorist organization and, therefore, did not submit a formal request for a FISA search order. We know Moussaoui was ultimately convicted in the Eastern District of Virginia and is now serving a life sentence for his part in the 9/11 conspiracy. If FISA had included a lone wolf provision, the FBI could have searched his belongings and possibly gained advanced intelligence about the 9/11 plot. Once again, Director Mueller has emphasized in his recent testimony that the FBI must retain the ability to target an individual who cannot be specifically tied to a particular foreign power. The Director specifically cited the Moussaoui case as a prime example. We should never again take the risk that another Moussaoui will be identified by the FBI but escape scrutiny to prevent an attack because he could not be tied to a specific terrorist organization. I see the ``lone wolf'' provision as a necessary tool that will only need to be used in limited circumstances. It is kind of like those ``in case of emergency, break glass'' boxes that cover certain fire alarms and equipment. We need to keep these tools available for the rare situations where they would be needed. As I mentioned earlier, the Senate Judiciary Committee reported a PATRIOT Act reauthorization bill that makes a number of changes to section 215 authorities and other national security tools. I believe the Judiciary bill is deeply flawed, and I hope my colleagues will listen carefully and support our bill instead. There will be ample time down the road to lay out in detail all my objections to the Judiciary bill, but let me just make a few key points. I disagree strongly that there should be a first time ever sunset for national security letters. It is irresponsible to risk letting the law revert back to pre-9/11 status, where NSLs were largely underutilized because the burden of proof and approval levels were too high for an investigative tool. The so-called abuses that are so often cited were actually related to something called exigent letters. Exigent letters are essentially a request to third parties, usually phone companies or Internet service providers, for immediate access to records, contingent upon a promise to provide a grand jury subpoena or a national security letter promptly. It is important to understand that these exigent letters are not national security letters or grand jury subpoenas. While there is statutory authority for carriers to voluntarily provide the FBI with the contents of the communication if the carrier has a good-faith belief that an emergency involving death or serious physical injury requires disclosure of the communication without delay, the DOJ IG found that these exigent letter requests were issued on a routine, rather than an exigent, basis. Interestingly, the people relying on the now corrected exigent letter problem to justify their proposed restrictions on NSLs are not calling for similar restrictions to be placed on grand jury subpoenas. They know better than to try that because there would be immediate and overwhelming objections from the Department of Justice and nearly every U.S. attorney in the country. We cannot go back to pre-9/11 days, when national security investigative techniques were significantly more difficult to use than ordinary criminal investigative techniques. Setting aside the problems with the exigent letters, I have said, time and time again, that the errors identified by the DOJ IG were almost exclusively administrative. The FBI has acted quickly to correct these errors, and we should not respond by hamstringing their investigations. I also disagree with requiring minimization procedures for both pen registers/trap-and-trace devices and NSLs. The FBI has been clear about the operational harm that will likely result if minimization procedures are required for the type of preliminary data, such as telephone toll records, obtained by these tools. Aside from the basic problem of how the FBI would even go about minimizing this type of information, I do not see why it is necessary. We certainly would never impose these types of restrictions on grand jury subpoenas or other types of administrative subpoenas. Supporters claim we need minimization procedures to protect U.S. persons, but they conveniently overlook the fact that the records we are talking about here are in the hands of third parties and are not entitled to the same type of protections that other information is subject to. The constitutional protections were discussed in Smith v. Maryland, and the Supreme Court held we simply do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to these sorts of third-party records. Ironically, because the FBI cannot tell from the type of information obtained by these tools if someone is a U.S. person, they would actually have to do more investigation and be more intrusive before figuring out whether the information should be minimized. Finally, I have significant concerns about the change the Judiciary Committee bill makes to the notification period for sneak-and-peak search warrants--down from 30 to 7 days. These warrants, which are approved by a court upon a finding of probable cause, are an important tool in drug and certain terrorism cases. We know from the FBI--and I am sure if we asked the DEA, they would agree--that 7 days is not enough time before giving a target notice that a search was carried out. In a terrorism investigation, likely involving many overseas associates and evidence, it is unreasonable to have to disclose the investigation within a week, when other activities connected to that may be just beginning to be collected. Depending on the type of information recovered from a search, testing and analysis may not even be done within 7 days. Are we going to risk blowing these investigations because of a random conclusion that 30 days is too long? I understand the government can ask for more time after the 7 days, but we do not have unlimited resources. We should not make our law enforcement agencies jump through more hoops when a court has already found that a search is proper in the first place. I have other concerns about this bill, including the wisdom of a separate standard for library records, which I view as an even greater invitation for terrorists to use libraries to communicate with each other, and new reporting and auditing requirements. I have to wonder what additional administrative burdens these requirements will put on the FBI at the same time they are trying to focus on preventing and disrupting further attacks on our Nation. Because of the significant operational concerns raised by the Judiciary Committee's bill, I believe that it should not be considered by the full Senate until the Intelligence Committee--as a whole--has had the opportunity to consider its implications for our national security, after hearing from Director Mueller about the impact of this entire bill on FBI operations. There are many issues about the Judiciary bill--both classified and unclassified--that need to be addressed. The best venue in which to do that is the Intelligence Committee. Don't forget that three of the five crossover members from the Intelligence Committee voted against the Judiciary Committee bill. I would hardly call that a ringing endorsement. I believe full consideration by the Intelligence Committee would greatly improve the measures we will be acting on, on the floor. Unfortunately, my efforts to give the Intelligence Committee the opportunity to weigh in on the Judiciary bill have thus far been unsuccessful. But at the same time, we cannot risk letting these crucial authorities lapse. For that reason, I have decided to cosponsor the legislation we are introducing today because, under this bill, I can categorically state it will have no provision that will have an adverse impact on intelligence community activities or operations. It is not insignificant, in my opinion, that the bill we are introducing today is cosponsored by the chairman of the Homeland Security Committee, the ranking member of the Judiciary Committee, and by me, as vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee. Each of these committees has a role to play in safeguarding our domestic security. Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Sessions, and I all understand the stakes in failing to reauthorize these expiring provisions are high. The stakes in adding new and flawed provisions or creating unreasonable burdens are just as high. It serves no legitimate purpose to give the FBI or any other law enforcement or intelligence agency tools that are rendered ineffective because Congress imposes arbitrary conditions without fully appreciating their ramifications. The sponsorship of this legislation is also noteworthy because it sends a clear and loud message that giving our law enforcement intelligence professionals the authorities and tools they need to keep the country safe is not and should not be a partisan issue. In the last Congress, we saw firsthand the negative impact of partisanship and pandering to extreme special interests. The FISA Amendments Act was supported by a strong bipartisan margin out of the Senate Intelligence Committee. Unfortunately, as the bill wound its way through the Senate and eventually the House, it became a political football. As a result, we came too close for comfort to losing the intelligence collection authorities we had worked hard to preserve. I am hopeful we can avoid similar partisanship and political interests to take over what should be a straightforward legislative process. The surest way of doing that is to pass the bill we introduce today. For years, we have hammered away at the notion that there should be walls between criminal and national security investigations. We have embraced the idea that the same tools that are used to capture drug dealers and child molesters should be available to track terrorists and spies. While the idea has been generally accepted, the execution has been lacking. Our laws still impose unnecessary divisions between administrative and grand jury subpoena authority and national security letters. Those divisions are exacerbated by the Judiciary Committee bill, which imposes new unheard of requirements on national security letters and the FISA pen register/ trap-and-trace information. Over the past 8 years, Congress has placed heavy demands on the FBI to be a full participant in the intelligence community. While the transportation has not been without some hiccups, they have come a long way since the days leading up to 9/11, when the word ``FISA'' was foreign to much of the rank and file FBI. Now is not the time to saddle them with additional administrative burdens or to impose conditions on the use of certain tools so drastic they become useless. There are so many current and clear-cut examples of domestic terror threats before us. I have to wonder why anyone thinks this would be a good time to experiment with the vital authorities used to keep us safe. The legislation we are introducing today will ensure our intelligence and law enforcement professionals can continue doing what they do best, without any additional restrictions. Our Nation has been fortunate not to have suffered a sequel to the 9/11 attacks. Some may call it luck, but much of the credit goes to the dedicated work of our intelligence and law enforcement professionals and the availability of these tools that we are reauthorizing in this bill. We owe our thanks to the personnel who use them. We also owe them the recognition that their jobs are as difficult as they are, and we should not be taking any steps that will make their profound responsibility to protect this country any more difficult. That is why I urge my colleagues to support this measure. I thank my cosponsor and our lead sponsor. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. BOND

Mr. BOND. Mr. President, our intelligence community should never be forced to question whether our priority is protecting America's safety or protecting the privacy of terrorists. This bill makes clear to intelligence professionals that keeping our Nation safe is their highest responsibility and assures they have the tools needed to get the job done. That is why I am so pleased to join with my colleagues, Senators Lieberman and Sessions, in reauthorizing three FISA provisions--lone wolf, wiretap, and section 215--which would otherwise expire. This legislation we have introduced today, without change, reauthorizes these three national vital security tools for 4 more years. While I believe each of these tools should be made permanent and Congress plays a dangerous game with national security every time we impose arbitrary sunsets, it is essential that the community's ability to collect lifesaving foreign intelligence should continue unimpeded. Our bill also makes conforming changes to the disclosure requirements for national security letters in light of the Second Circuit's decision last year. These issues are so critical and so urgent to our well-being and security as a nation, nothing else will matter, even the current health care debate, if we fail in national security. I have spoken before on this floor about the need for President Obama to make a decision about Afghanistan. I will not repeat those points today. But as our military, intelligence, and law enforcement professionals defend the United States and its allies in Washington, there is an effort afoot to make this fight much harder than it needs to be. The U.S. PATRIOT Act and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act were passed overwhelmingly in the aftermath of the September 11 terror attacks. For years, terrorism was treated as a law enforcement matter. Our Nation responded to terrorist attack after terrorist attack, to the deaths of our servicemembers and embassy personnel, with indictments and arrest warrants. As Congress failed to give our intelligence operators the tools they needed to act quickly, our terrorist enemies became even more emboldened and determined to strike our homeland. September 11 was a wake-up call. Our driving mission appropriately, after that, became prevention and disruption of terrorist attacks at home against our troops overseas and against our allies. That is why the legislation we passed provided the necessary tools. In 2005, the PATRIOT Act was reauthorized with minor changes, but three FISA provisions remained subject to sunset. Here is an opportunity for us to reauthorize these three vital provisions. There is little disagreement among people who know that these provisions should and must be reauthorized. FBI Director Mueller testified before the Judiciary Committee that each is important to the FBI's work in national security and criminal investigation. But because of the enhanced information sharing rules and procedures, other community entities, such as the Counterterrorism Center, are often dependent upon information collected under these authorities. Their loss would adversely impact their ability to analyze and share important national intelligence information. As an example, if the FBI obtains a court order under FISA for a roving wiretap targeting a terrorist subject in New York, foreign intelligence information obtained there may be shared with the CIA, enabling them in turn to target associates overseas. Events over the past few months underscore the importance of giving the FBI and other agencies all the tools and authorities they need to stay ahead. From the disrupted terror plots in New York and Colorado to those in Illinois, Texas, and North Carolina, we have seen firsthand why the FBI must have the flexibility to get the information they need as quickly as possible to prevent these attacks. The benefit of our intelligence collection authorities, however, does not just benefit our own citizens. Just as overseas terror threats may impact our safety, threats posed by some within our country do not always end here. We learned two men in Chicago were conspiring with associates to commit terrorist attacks in Denmark. This case is a good example of how FISA authorities can save lives in allied countries. There is a belief among some that as long as the intelligence community eventually gets the information it needs, time is not of the essence. That is not true. Timing was everything, whether it was introducing an undercover agent to a target at the right moment or conducting surveillance at the right time. No intelligence collector is going to say that getting the same information 3 weeks later is good enough. I cannot comment on specific tools that were used in foiling all of these plots. We know both from public and classified testimony and information that the tools provided that we are authorizing today have been invaluable to our efforts to stay ahead of the terrorists. As I mentioned earlier, the FBI's ability to obtain a roving wiretap under FISA will end this year unless Congress acts. According to Director Mueller, the FBI has used the authority 140 times in the past 5 years. The ability to track terrorists even when they repeatedly use and dump their cell phones to avoid interception is, as Director Mueller testified, ``tremendously important.'' He also noted with all the new technology, it is nothing for a target to buy four or five cell phones and use them in quick succession. I couldn't agree more. Our enemies know our laws better than some of us do. They understand the hoops and hurdles government must clear to catch up or stay ahead. Roving wiretap authority sends a clear message that the time-honored trick of frequently changing a cell phone will not work like it used to. Obtaining a roving wiretap requires, first and foremost, that the FBI establish probable cause that the target is an agent of a foreign power. Some critics of this provision claim it allows the FBI to avoid meeting this standard as surveillance moves from phone to phone. That is not true. Each wiretap application is approved by a FISA Court judge. If a target changes his cell phone and the FBI moves to surveil the new phone, the court is notified. All of the protections for U.S. person information that apply to any other FISA wiretap also apply to roving wiretaps. In short, while the authority is a tremendous asset for the FBI, it poses no additional civil liberties concerns. It should be renewed. On business records, over the past 5 years, a rallying cry against these measures has centered on section 215, allowing the FBI to obtain business records such as hotel information or travel records upon a showing of the requisite burden of proof to a FISA Court judge. We have heard time and again the FBI is using this authority to spy on people's reading habits at the local library. This is simply highly charged rhetoric not supported by facts. While the FBI has used section 215 more than 250 times in the past 5 years, no library records have been obtained. But we do know that terrorists and their associates have used library Internet access to communicate with each other and, in the appropriate case, the FBI must have the ability to obtain any relevant records relating to that usage. Congress should not pass any legislation that would allow terrorists to use libraries or any other public facility as a safe haven for their illegal activities. If we did that, guess where all the terrorists would congregate. Do you want them all in your libraries? I don't think so. The inspector general of the Department of Justice conducted several audits of the FBI's use of section 215 and found no abuse of authority. These audits also considered the time it takes for the FBI to obtain a 215 order. The Director has testified that business records sought by terrorism investigations by the FBI are ``absolutely essential to identifying other persons who may be involved in terrorist activities.'' The records obtained under this authority are no different from what the FBI could obtain in a criminal investigation using grand jury subpoena authority. There is rarely any delay in obtaining a grand jury subpoena. DOJ should strive to ensure that section 215 court orders are obtained in a timely and expedient manner. Given the vital information that can be obtained, I have asked the DOJ to take steps necessary to minimize future delays. As with roving wiretap authority, I believe section 215 has adequate measures already built in to ensure that the private interests of U.S. persons are protected. I have not heard any reasonable critique of this authority, and I believe it should be authorized without changes, without delay. The sole expiring provision that has not been used by the FBI is the lone wolf definition of an agent of a foreign power, prompting some critics to demand its repeal. Under this definition, the FBI can obtain a FISA Act search or electronic surveillance against a non-U.S. person who is not readily identifiable with a particular foreign power. We all should be familiar with the story of Zacarias Moussaoui, the 9/11 coconspirator who was identified prior to the 9/11 attacks. But the FBI could not connect him with a particular terrorist organization and, therefore, did not submit a formal request for a FISA search order. We know Moussaoui was ultimately convicted in the Eastern District of Virginia and is now serving a life sentence for his part in the 9/11 conspiracy. If FISA had included a lone wolf provision, the FBI could have searched his belongings and possibly gained advanced intelligence about the 9/11 plot. Once again, Director Mueller has emphasized in his recent testimony that the FBI must retain the ability to target an individual who cannot be specifically tied to a particular foreign power. The Director specifically cited the Moussaoui case as a prime example. We should never again take the risk that another Moussaoui will be identified by the FBI but escape scrutiny to prevent an attack because he could not be tied to a specific terrorist organization. I see the ``lone wolf'' provision as a necessary tool that will only need to be used in limited circumstances. It is kind of like those ``in case of emergency, break glass'' boxes that cover certain fire alarms and equipment. We need to keep these tools available for the rare situations where they would be needed. As I mentioned earlier, the Senate Judiciary Committee reported a PATRIOT Act reauthorization bill that makes a number of changes to section 215 authorities and other national security tools. I believe the Judiciary bill is deeply flawed, and I hope my colleagues will listen carefully and support our bill instead. There will be ample time down the road to lay out in detail all my objections to the Judiciary bill, but let me just make a few key points. I disagree strongly that there should be a first time ever sunset for national security letters. It is irresponsible to risk letting the law revert back to pre-9/11 status, where NSLs were largely underutilized because the burden of proof and approval levels were too high for an investigative tool. The so-called abuses that are so often cited were actually related to something called exigent letters. Exigent letters are essentially a request to third parties, usually phone companies or Internet service providers, for immediate access to records, contingent upon a promise to provide a grand jury subpoena or a national security letter promptly. It is important to understand that these exigent letters are not national security letters or grand jury subpoenas. While there is statutory authority for carriers to voluntarily provide the FBI with the contents of the communication if the carrier has a good-faith belief that an emergency involving death or serious physical injury requires disclosure of the communication without delay, the DOJ IG found that these exigent letter requests were issued on a routine, rather than an exigent, basis. Interestingly, the people relying on the now corrected exigent letter problem to justify their proposed restrictions on NSLs are not calling for similar restrictions to be placed on grand jury subpoenas. They know better than to try that because there would be immediate and overwhelming objections from the Department of Justice and nearly every U.S. attorney in the country. We cannot go back to pre-9/11 days, when national security investigative techniques were significantly more difficult to use than ordinary criminal investigative techniques. Setting aside the problems with the exigent letters, I have said, time and time again, that the errors identified by the DOJ IG were almost exclusively administrative. The FBI has acted quickly to correct these errors, and we should not respond by hamstringing their investigations. I also disagree with requiring minimization procedures for both pen registers/trap-and-trace devices and NSLs. The FBI has been clear about the operational harm that will likely result if minimization procedures are required for the type of preliminary data, such as telephone toll records, obtained by these tools. Aside from the basic problem of how the FBI would even go about minimizing this type of information, I do not see why it is necessary. We certainly would never impose these types of restrictions on grand jury subpoenas or other types of administrative subpoenas. Supporters claim we need minimization procedures to protect U.S. persons, but they conveniently overlook the fact that the records we are talking about here are in the hands of third parties and are not entitled to the same type of protections that other information is subject to. The constitutional protections were discussed in Smith v. Maryland, and the Supreme Court held we simply do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to these sorts of third-party records. Ironically, because the FBI cannot tell from the type of information obtained by these tools if someone is a U.S. person, they would actually have to do more investigation and be more intrusive before figuring out whether the information should be minimized. Finally, I have significant concerns about the change the Judiciary Committee bill makes to the notification period for sneak-and-peak search warrants--down from 30 to 7 days. These warrants, which are approved by a court upon a finding of probable cause, are an important tool in drug and certain terrorism cases. We know from the FBI--and I am sure if we asked the DEA, they would agree--that 7 days is not enough time before giving a target notice that a search was carried out. In a terrorism investigation, likely involving many overseas associates and evidence, it is unreasonable to have to disclose the investigation within a week, when other activities connected to that may be just beginning to be collected. Depending on the type of information recovered from a search, testing and analysis may not even be done within 7 days. Are we going to risk blowing these investigations because of a random conclusion that 30 days is too long? I understand the government can ask for more time after the 7 days, but we do not have unlimited resources. We should not make our law enforcement agencies jump through more hoops when a court has already found that a search is proper in the first place. I have other concerns about this bill, including the wisdom of a separate standard for library records, which I view as an even greater invitation for terrorists to use libraries to communicate with each other, and new reporting and auditing requirements. I have to wonder what additional administrative burdens these requirements will put on the FBI at the same time they are trying to focus on preventing and disrupting further attacks on our Nation. Because of the significant operational concerns raised by the Judiciary Committee's bill, I believe that it should not be considered by the full Senate until the Intelligence Committee--as a whole--has had the opportunity to consider its implications for our national security, after hearing from Director Mueller about the impact of this entire bill on FBI operations. There are many issues about the Judiciary bill--both classified and unclassified--that need to be addressed. The best venue in which to do that is the Intelligence Committee. Don't forget that three of the five crossover members from the Intelligence Committee voted against the Judiciary Committee bill. I would hardly call that a ringing endorsement. I believe full consideration by the Intelligence Committee would greatly improve the measures we will be acting on, on the floor. Unfortunately, my efforts to give the Intelligence Committee the opportunity to weigh in on the Judiciary bill have thus far been unsuccessful. But at the same time, we cannot risk letting these crucial authorities lapse. For that reason, I have decided to cosponsor the legislation we are introducing today because, under this bill, I can categorically state it will have no provision that will have an adverse impact on intelligence community activities or operations. It is not insignificant, in my opinion, that the bill we are introducing today is cosponsored by the chairman of the Homeland Security Committee, the ranking member of the Judiciary Committee, and by me, as vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee. Each of these committees has a role to play in safeguarding our domestic security. Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Sessions, and I all understand the stakes in failing to reauthorize these expiring provisions are high. The stakes in adding new and flawed provisions or creating unreasonable burdens are just as high. It serves no legitimate purpose to give the FBI or any other law enforcement or intelligence agency tools that are rendered ineffective because Congress imposes arbitrary conditions without fully appreciating their ramifications. The sponsorship of this legislation is also noteworthy because it sends a clear and loud message that giving our law enforcement intelligence professionals the authorities and tools they need to keep the country safe is not and should not be a partisan issue. In the last Congress, we saw firsthand the negative impact of partisanship and pandering to extreme special interests. The FISA Amendments Act was supported by a strong bipartisan margin out of the Senate Intelligence Committee. Unfortunately, as the bill wound its way through the Senate and eventually the House, it became a political football. As a result, we came too close for comfort to losing the intelligence collection authorities we had worked hard to preserve. I am hopeful we can avoid similar partisanship and political interests to take over what should be a straightforward legislative process. The surest way of doing that is to pass the bill we introduce today. For years, we have hammered away at the notion that there should be walls between criminal and national security investigations. We have embraced the idea that the same tools that are used to capture drug dealers and child molesters should be available to track terrorists and spies. While the idea has been generally accepted, the execution has been lacking. Our laws still impose unnecessary divisions between administrative and grand jury subpoena authority and national security letters. Those divisions are exacerbated by the Judiciary Committee bill, which imposes new unheard of requirements on national security letters and the FISA pen register/ trap-and-trace information. Over the past 8 years, Congress has placed heavy demands on the FBI to be a full participant in the intelligence community. While the transportation has not been without some hiccups, they have come a long way since the days leading up to 9/11, when the word ``FISA'' was foreign to much of the rank and file FBI. Now is not the time to saddle them with additional administrative burdens or to impose conditions on the use of certain tools so drastic they become useless. There are so many current and clear-cut examples of domestic terror threats before us. I have to wonder why anyone thinks this would be a good time to experiment with the vital authorities used to keep us safe. The legislation we are introducing today will ensure our intelligence and law enforcement professionals can continue doing what they do best, without any additional restrictions. Our Nation has been fortunate not to have suffered a sequel to the 9/11 attacks. Some may call it luck, but much of the credit goes to the dedicated work of our intelligence and law enforcement professionals and the availability of these tools that we are reauthorizing in this bill. We owe our thanks to the personnel who use them. We also owe them the recognition that their jobs are as difficult as they are, and we should not be taking any steps that will make their profound responsibility to protect this country any more difficult. That is why I urge my colleagues to support this measure. I thank my cosponsor and our lead sponsor. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. BOND

Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I rise today to renew my call for President Obama to give full support to his top military commander in Afghanistan, GEN Stanley McChrystal. Several weeks ago, I stood in this Chamber and made the case for our Congress and the American people to hear directly, and as soon as possible, from General McChrystal to ensure that political motivations here in Washington do not override the vital needs of our commanders and troops on the ground. I was concerned then, as I am now, that continued wavering by the administration and others in Washington could unravel the hard work by our military and intelligence professionals on the battlefields of Afghanistan. As the ``friendly'' death toll continues to rise in Afghanistan, political indecision here in Washington persists. We have heard no firm commitment from the administration to the fully resourced counterinsurgency strategy the President forcefully outlined last spring. I came to the floor and I supported the President's counterinsurgency strategy fully; and with General McChrystal's recent report to implement that strategy to deal with the situation in Afghanistan, I fully supported President Obama's statements in March. But instead of commitment, the past few weeks have brought a flurry of internal debate in the administration and in the media about the basic tenets of the strategy and assessment--counterinsurgency versus counterterrorism; clear, build and hold, or fire and fall back; more troops versus fewer strategy; crafting a strategy or crafting a strategic message. In what must be a historic first, it appears I am more supportive of the President's own strategy than the President is. Amidst this indecision, our Afghan people, our NATO, ISAF, regional allies, and our own troops wait. The Afghans wait to hear if the United States will continue to stand beside them in spite of the growing threats of the insurgent violence of the resurgent Taliban control. Our allies wait to see if they were wrong to put trust and confidence in the U.S. leadership in the region. Our military forces and brave civilians who serve in Afghanistan under constant stress and mortal danger wait to see if their sacrifices and those of their fallen comrades will have been in vain. We have heard excuse after excuse, constant attempts to justify delay. Over the past week, another red herring was floated by some officials--we have to wait until the dispute surrounding the Afghan elections are resolved. This red herring--and those people peddling it as an excuse--has missed a truth even more applicable to the mountains and villages, and our towns and cities here in America--all politics is local, and so is the security that the Afghan people need. While we would all like to see a pristine election in Afghanistan-- something we still haven't accomplished 100 percent in our own Nation-- the Taliban is not waiting for election results as they continue to kill our troops and attack the people of Afghanistan and gain momentum. Security in Afghanistan will not come from Kabul. It will have to be built village by village and valley by valley. That is what the counterinsurgency strategy is designed to do. Even if the naysayers continue to ignore this important truth about security in Afghanistan, yesterday's announcement that a run-off election will now be held on November 7 has made that red herring of an excuse gone and useless. In light of this electoral process in Afghanistan and the progress that has been made, what are we hearing from the White House? As though this decision seemed something to be applauded, the administration continues to proclaim its indecision. Today, the White House press secretary said, ``It's possible,'' but there are no guarantees that a decision may be made before the election--17 days from now. More people killed, more progress for the Taliban, more wondering and hesitancy by the Afghans we are trying to serve. It is a simple question: Will we support President Obama's commanding general, Stan McChrystal, or not? I have heard some pundits opine that delaying a few more weeks won't make any difference because it will take some time for troops to get there anyway. Using that logic, no decisions need to be made for months. But it is pretty clear postponing any decision simply postpones the date of actual engagement. And even the right strategy won't work if it is not implemented on time. We are losing time, and it can never be recovered. It certainly won't work if it is never acknowledged as our strategy. Defense Secretary Gates waved a red flag recently, noting that the United States cannot wait for questions surrounding the legitimacy of the Afghan Government to be resolved before a decision on General McChrystal's troop request is made. He understands what I believe is a simple truth: The longer we wait, the stronger and more determined the enemy gets. Read the papers. Violence is up this season over last. Violence is up this year over the last. The Taliban continues to gain influence in parts of Afghanistan. We keep fighting with what we have, but the insurgents keep getting stronger. We cannot and must not wait any longer for a decision. It comes down to this: Delay leads to defeat, not victory. Our commanders in the field--the real experts who see firsthand what is required for victory--have asked for more boots on the ground, and there is no reason not to give them those troops now. While politicians and pundits debate here, the enemy is building strength and establishing even greater control over Afghanistan, the Afghan people, and future generations of potential terrorists. While we talk here, American heroes and our ISAF and Afghan allies are dying in increasing numbers in the barren regions of Afghanistan. In a war where winning hearts and minds is critical, delay in Washington is a public diplomacy disaster in Afghanistan and abroad. It advertises our lack of resolve to our allies and the people of Afghanistan. The Afghan people have been disappointed by the United States before. Now they need to know with certainty that the United States will not abandon them again in this fight against terrorism. Our allies, who are at this very moment being urged by the Secretary of Defense to contribute to the Afghan campaign, need to know that we will remain by their sides to defeat this enemy together. Instead, the message we are sending is one of absurdity. Imagine this diplomatic sales job: We send a diplomat out and say: ``Friends in Afghanistan, we would like to keep fighting the good fight against the terrorists and insurgents, but we haven't yet decided how strong our commitment is.'' I would like to see that message sell. And to our allies around the world: ``We would really like for you to contribute more troops and resources for this fight, but we need a few more weeks to decide what our contributions will be.'' That message isn't going to work either. I strongly doubt this new brand of public diplomacy will sell for much in the streets of Kabul or the villages of Nangarhar. What this message does tell the people of Afghanistan and the key Shura leaders across the country is: Don't trust the Americans, and instead look to the Taliban as the most likely force for the future in Afghanistan. A disaster. Perhaps even more troubling is the message this wavering sends to our terrorist enemies. If they simply wait us out, we will go home in defeat. While the administration dithers, the terrorists have honed their own message of hatred and extremism. Radical Islamic terrorists have staged suicide attacks for maximum publicity, propagandized their message on the Internet, and convinced their fellow terrorists-at-arms that they will defeat the international community. In the years leading up to the 9/11 attacks, al-Qaida--operating under the Taliban control in Afghanistan--was emboldened by our lukewarm response to their attacks and provocations. Failing to commit to victory now will only embolden these enemies of freedom that much more to stage more attacks. Let there be no doubt, from all that I have read and all that I have learned in my travels to the region, and heard here, if we fail now, if the Taliban returns to power in Afghanistan, the price we pay in the future will be far greater than any price General McChrystal is asking us to pay now. We have to decide which price we are going to pay. The stakes are high. General McChrystal's strategic assessment makes clear the situation in Afghanistan is deteriorating and the Taliban is gaining momentum. The causes of this deterioration have been debated by my colleagues countless times over the past several years. Pointing fingers for past judgments or even past mistakes, however, does nothing to solve the problems of today in Afghanistan. For this reason, I was disappointed to learn yesterday of the House majority leader's criticism of Members of Congress who are calling on President Obama to make a decision now. Well, I am one of them. The majority leader, in trying to justify the administration's wavering, accused Republicans of abandoning their focus for the past 7 years. I don't happen to think that is true. But whatever your opinion on the matter is, it is simply no longer relevant. The actions of one administration do not justify handing victory to terrorists through the indecisiveness of another administration. The battle before us in the Afghan/Pakistan region is today. General McChrystal has laid out an implementation of the winning strategy for Afghanistan, which the President set out, and the President's decision is simple: Do we implement it or not? The answer should be simple. By announcing publicly his unequivocal support for General McChrystal's request, agreeing to send the troops that are needed, the President can send a message of firm resolve to our enemies and to our allies. He can give our commanders on the ground--the same military experts he chose for this mission--the resources they have requested. He can create a strategic communications plan that tells our enemies, our allies, and the American people of our intentions for the region. The last point is particularly important. We are at a crossroads in Pakistan. We can take the road of expedience and continue to listen to Pakistani officials, who claim they have no control over the Taliban, have no idea where Mullah Omar is, and have only limited capability to decrease terrorist safe havens in their country or we can take the better path and encourage our Pakistani allies to reclaim their national sovereignty in the tribal areas and provide the stability and security that is the right of a people to expect from their government. I believe I speak for many of my colleagues when I say we should expect more from our allies to whom we give so much. But they need to hear that we are serious about our mission there as well. Pakistan has the right to be concerned when the United States appears to be faltering in its determination to remain in the fight. We failed in this region in the past, so we should not be surprised if our continued wavering instills heightened insecurity. I have spoken in this Chamber before about the importance of including Pakistan in our efforts to defeat terrorism in the region. Afghanistan and Pakistan are inextricably linked. More aggressive action may become a good thing in Pakistan, but such action should be in addition to, not as a substitute for, giving our troops in Afghanistan all the resources they need. While denying al-Qaida and Taliban militants sanctuary in the border regions of Pakistan is critical, a fire-and- fall-back-only approach focusing on one part of this regional conflict will ultimately hand victory to the world's most violent and feared terrorists--the same terrorists whom our Nation witnessed firsthand attack so brutally, violently, and with such deadly force on September 11. We have seen polls that signal wavering support among the American people for this war in Afghanistan. But I have faith in the American people. They are resilient, they are proud of their country, and they understand the price of doing nothing. They are determined the sacrifices of their sons and daughters, husbands, wives, and children serving in Afghanistan will not be in vain. We owe them no less. I call on President Obama to end this indecision and to show the American people and our allies the same resolve and determination I heard in his words of last spring. It is time for him to speak out, to make the decision, explain why it is important, and to carry that message not just to Americans but to allies and enemies throughout the world. Last spring he said: Our spirit is stronger and cannot be broken; you cannot outlast us, and we will defeat you. General McChrystal has said we must act quickly to defeat the terrorists and insurgents. Now is the time for President Obama to support his commanders on the ground and silence the pessimistic political winds whispering defeat in Washington. Mr. President, I yield the floor. I suggest the absence of a quorum, and I ask unanimous consent that the time during the quorum be charged equally to both sides.

Mr. BOND

Mr. BOND. Mr. President, it has come to my attention that my name was incorrectly added next to the line item ``St. John's Bayou and New Madrid Floodway'' Project in the conference Report of the fiscal year 2010 Energy and Water Resources Development Appropriations Act. I ask that the Record reflect that this is a mistake. I did not make a request for funding for this project and my name should not be attached to this project.

Mr. BOND

Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I rise today to express my support for the amendment, introduced by Senator Barrasso, to strike the funding for the Central Intelligence Agency's Center on Climate Change and National Security. Climate change and the role of the intelligence community has been the subject of many lively discussions before the Select Committee on Intelligence. As the vice chairman of this committee, I have worked with the chairman, Senator Dianne Feinstein, to resolve many issues of importance to the intelligence community. Unfortunately, on this issue of climate change, I have and will continue to disagree respectfully with the chairman. I recognize that many Members on both sides of the aisle have strong beliefs about global climate change, its causes, and its possible consequences. Regardless of how you come down on this issue, however, our intelligence agencies are not the appropriate venue for dealing with it. Members who support the creation of this center at CIA have cited the national security implications of global climate change. I agree that global climate change could have national and global security implications and that elements of the U.S. Government and private sector should be studying it, but the intelligence community is not one of those elements. Other government entities, such as the Environmental Protection Agency and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, are far better suited to study this issue. The intelligence community is not a think tank. Its job, put simply, is to steal secrets and provide analysis of those secrets. There are no secrets to steal or to analyze when studying current weather patterns and estimating the geopolitical effects of an event 20 or more years in the future as this new CIA center would be asked to do. The Senate Intelligence Committee is constantly reminded by various commissions, and the intelligence community itself, that our Nation's intelligence analysts are overtasked, overworked, and do not have adequate time to devote to long-term assessments, even on the important countries and issues they currently cover on a daily basis, such as terrorism, proliferation, Iran, Iraq, and China. To those who support this center, I would ask a simple question: As we face continued threats in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran, which analysts are going to be pulled from their current responsibilities to analyze the implications of climate change? Adequately covering all of the geopolitical implications of global climate change would require analysis on dozens of countries by analysts who are familiar with some or all of those countries. In short, it would require drawing on a substantial part of our analytic corp. Can we really afford to have these analysts redirected from their current responsibilities to work on global climate change, especially when our nation is at war? I strongly doubt that terrorist leaders or rogue nations will stop plotting against us while our analysts take time off to ponder the potential implications of global climate change. Through my many discussions with Senator Feinstein, I am familiar with the motivation for this center. While I will vote in favor of Senator Barrasso's amendment, I would be willing to work with Senator Feinstein and others to find alternative avenues to obtain the information being sought through this center. The bottom line is this--at a time when our Nation is fighting wars on two fronts, terrorists continue to plot attacks on our homeland, and the threat of proliferation grows, we cannot afford for our overtaxed intelligence agencies to take time off to ponder climate change.

Mr. BOND. I move to lay that motion upon the table. The motion to lay upon the table was agreed to. Amendment No. 2596

Mr. BOND. Mr. President, the January report of the Governmental Accountability Office said the Air Force had a couple of major challenges in sustaining the air sovereignty alert capabilities; that is, the air structure that keeps our homeland safe. They say the Air Force has not developed plans because it is focused on other priorities. Retiring these planes would result in a lack of aircraft to meet the vital ASA mission. And 16 of the 18 sites across the Nation are manned by Air National Guard. Senator Leahy and I, as cochairs, have introduced this amendment, which is supported by the Guard, which says that we do not retire any more fourth-generation aircraft until the Secretary tells the Congress how it is going to ensure the capability of the ASA mission.

Mr. BOND. Mr. President, there may be a request for a vote on this side. There is objection on this side to having a voice vote. I ask for the yeas and nays.

Mr. BOND. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. Amendment No. 2616, as Modified

Mr. BOND

Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I have two things to do. First, there is an amendment from the Senator from Oklahoma on the National Guard REA accounts. I think the amendment would miss the point and make a faulty assumption that the National Guard/Reserve equipment accounts do not go through a process. The Secretary of Defense and service chiefs already review the unfunded list that the NGREA funds are put toward. The Air National Guard and Army National Guard, working closely with their major command counterparts, have been able to use these funds on critical capability requirements by leading with funding for integration and procurement of various weapons systems capabilities. The Army and the Air Force are responsible for equipping their Reserve components, and they do so within budgetary constraints. We know historically that the Air National Guard has been equipped at a level significantly lower than the Active components and, constitutionally, the Congress has the explicit power to provide for equipping the militia. Even in recent history the Air National Guard's equipment requirements are placed in the supplemental or in the outyears, which often do not survive. Congress has traditionally understood that the Army cannot meet the Reserve component's equipment requirements. The National Guard has a Federal ``wartime'' mission as an operational Reserve and, in order to ensure that the Reserve component, specifically the Guard, can meet both its Federal and domestic missions, Congress provides the NGREA. After Katrina, the Guard had only 33 percent of the homeland equipment needed to respond to its State emergency response mission. The Guard primarily focuses its NGREA procurements on critical dual-use items that support both the Chief and the National Guard Bureaus' ``Essential 10'' capabilities--their overseas military responsibility-- and the Governors. The funding provides for the modernization, unfunded MTOE equipment requirements, and items of equipment that are not managed by the Army G4 or G8. With all that said, I hope my colleagues will continue to recognize that investments in our citizen soldiers and airmen provide the best bang for the taxpayers' hard-earned dollars and, further, that the funds in the National Guard and Reserve equipment account are subject to an internal process review by the Secretary of Defense and respective Guard Chiefs. Mr. President, I also will ask to call up another amendment that I have. I believe it is at the desk. This is an amendment on behalf of the citizen airmen in the Air National Guard. At present, the Air Force possesses sufficient numbers of fighter aircraft to accomplish its national military strategy objective which, as its first priority, is the defense of the homeland. However, even with an aggressive strategy to reflow legacy aircraft to Air Guard units, the Air Guard will experience a significant drawdown of fighters as existing fighters reach the end of their service life. Unfortunately, this is the result of year after year of failing to recapitalize our fighter fleet. This is due to cost growth and production delays of the so-called fifth generation aircraft that have resulted in reduced purchases of aircraft and chronic delivery delays which threaten to put a tremendous bathtub in the available craft needed by the Air Guard for its mission. Most of us all know what happens when the pot shrinks in the Pentagon. The Guard gets the short end of the stick. The Air Force must recapitalize its older fighter force, the F-15s and F-16s. Fifth generation aircraft investment, proposed investment, is crowding out other Air Force priorities with limited resources when we have to have the resources now for work that the Guard is continuing to do. Of the F-16s in the Air National Guard, 80 percent will begin to reach the end of their service life in less than 8 years. The net result is the Air Guard is facing a major gap between when the jets are retired and when aircraft to replace them are available. That is the fighter gap. The result is units would not be capable of supporting the Air Sovereignty Alert; that means defending the skies of the Homeland. Currently, the Guard covers series 16 of 18 sites where units stand alert 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 52 weeks a year. Recapitalizing the Air National Guard and modernizing must occur proportionally and in parallel with the total Air Force; otherwise, mission gaps, such as the all-important Air Sovereignty Alert, will come down and the absence of necessary aircraft will leave many units eviscerated. There is no program or plan that prevents the fighter gap from occurring. I was very pleased to hear the Air Force Chief of Staff, GEN Norton Schwartz, announce at the National Guard Association his intent to work with the Guard to develop a preservation strategy. The strategy is being developed. At the time, it will be presented to the Air Force, the Guard, and the Adjutant Generals in November. Senator Leahy and I have continued to endorse the procurement of 4.5- generation aircraft to address the shortfall. I believe we will have to consider purchasing more F-16s, F-15s or F/ A-18s that are relevant to the current and foreseeable war on terror, are cost-effective, and are available to bridge the Guard through the fifth generation. The Air Guard absolutely needs to be a part of the fifth-generation missions but not at the expense of the vast majority of units it would lose due to a lack or delay in follow on. We do not need to accept a smaller Air Force, particularly when it is not based on thoughtful analysis but based on the need to cut budgets and cost growth in the procurement of the new planes that are so far behind schedule, underperformance, and overbudget. We will see too many units shut down. That is why Senator Leahy and I have offered an amendment to restrict the retirement of the current generation aircraft until the Secretary reports to the Congressional Defense Committees a detailed plan on how the Secretary of the Air Force will fill the force structure, a description of the follow-on missions, an explanation of the criteria for selecting the bases, a plan for the reassignment of regular and Reserve Air Force personnel, and an estimate of the cost avoidance to be achieved by the retirement of such tactical air. Many of the efforts we have had to wage over the last few years have been the result of the Guard getting shut out of key decisions on resources and equipment. America's oldest fighting force is now more relevant than ever. In today's world, the need for a National Guard is greater than ever before. The Guard has experienced and capable fighting units. There is no program or plan that prevents this fighter gap from occurring. Unless we pass this amendment, the issue remains unresolved. This amendment will prevent the loss of any additional force structure until we get the information needed. I ask unanimous consent to set aside the pending amendment and call up this amendment.

Mr. BOND. I yield the floor.

Mr. BOND

Mr. BOND. Mr. President, there is no doubt that there may be things in the Defense budget that you could characterize expensive, overbudget, and behind schedule programs. But the C-17 aircraft is not one of them, which is why it is so bewildering--and disappointing--that some of this Chamber's well-known budget hawks are opposed to a model procurement program and a boon for the taxpayers. While the most important concern, of course, is for our warfighter and national security--which I will go into in more detail in a moment--let me address what seems like the primary concern for some of my colleagues: the budget. Investing in the C-17 is actually a better use of taxpayer dollars than the obsolete and unreliable C-5A. C-17s are planes we need and can afford. The Government Accountability Office has found it would take seven rehabbed and remanufactured C-5As, at a cost of $924 million to the taxpayer, to equal the capability of just one new C-17. They have to have that airlift. Right now, the C-5A is part of it. But it cannot continue as it is. You can get a C-17 for a lot less than you can remanufacture and rehab one of the old C-5As, and that doesn't even work so good. My biggest concern, of course, is national security. Some of my colleagues have attacked the C-17 as a special interest item. I agree. Investing in the C-17 is in the special interest of our warfighters and it is critical to our national security interests and it gives us the heavy lift air mobility we require these days. The C-17 is a proven, combat-tested airlift capability that is essential to the fight we are in right now, and it has been a workhorse in Iraq and Afghanistan. As some of my colleagues have mentioned, we are at war. I couldn't agree more that this is our primary concern, which is, again, why the C-17 is so important. With the war in Afghanistan heating up and the war in Iraq continuing, our airlift needs are only growing. The Congressional Research Service has indicated that the C-17 was designed to fly 1,000 hours per year over 30 years. But as our overseas commitments have grown, some aircraft have even reached 2,400 flying hours in a single year. My colleague from Arizona pointed out that equipment is being worn out quickly in Iraq and Afghanistan. That is no doubt true. But one key piece of our equipment there is our heavy airlift capability. The heavy usage, in addition to the growth of the Army and Marine Corps, the logistics difficulty of getting supplies into Afghanistan, and the need for increased humanitarian/smart power missions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere in the world are all reasons why I urge my Senate colleagues to support the provision in the bill that would add the long lead time purchase we need right now to make sure we can continue to purchase the C-17s as the needs develop. Some opponents may argue that the Department of Defense and the President don't want more, that they have enough C-17s and C-5s to do the job. However, with a 50-percent readiness level, a per hour operating cost of $29,000, and 40 maintenance man-hours per 1 hour of flight, the C-5A represents ineffective and costly iron. By replacing these obsolete, ineffective, and costly C-5As with new C-17s, which this Congress has allowed the Department of Defense to do by lifting a truly special legislative interest prohibition, saying in the past they could not retire them, we could save money, provide a more reliable capability for our warfighter, and preserve industrial capability for the future. I have talked about the importance of investing in our airlift capability for our warfighter and our efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. But as America's only large airlift production line, the C-17 production line, if ended, would put at risk our Nation's long-term security. Eliminating the only large airlift production line in the United States would demonstrate a lack of understanding and appreciation for the skill sets and efforts needed to build these aircraft. Without a follow-on program, and because we have already shrunk our aerospace defense industrial base to such a low level, once these skilled workers, the engineers, designers, and their expertise are gone, we do not get them back. If we lose the skilled engineers, designers, and dedicated workers, we could be forced to turn to Europe or Russia for our future large airlift needs. More and more, this national talent and industrial workforce, which manufactures the critical and unique equipment that helps us fight and win our wars, is being eviscerated. Without additional funding, our aerospace engineering, design, and manufacturing base will atrophy. This will put at risk our competitiveness on the global market, our ability to address future airlift requirements, and put at risk 30,000 American jobs stretched across 43 States. This isn't about preserving jobs in tough economic times, although I believe the administration certainly missed a big opportunity in the stimulus bill to recommend stimulating the economy in defense production. They didn't put a single dollar in defense production needs, which is where we have tremendous needs. The C-17 addresses a shortsighted decision on the part of the administration. That decision took for granted the capacity and innovation of our defense industrial base, but we cannot afford to let that wither because their proposal put out of work the people who have designed these aircraft. We have found, in the past, when we have shut down acquisition lines, the skilled engineers leave. One example is they went to work at Disney. That is great. That is good work, but it is not protecting our national defense. After the draconian defense cuts during the Clinton administration, the arsenal of democracy consolidated and shrank to a point where any further consolidation will result in an irreversible loss in competition, innovation, and industrial capacity. C-17 production will shut down in 2010 without these 10 aircraft, and restarting production would be incredibly difficult and expensive-- according to the GAO, up to $1 billion. The GAO study further noted that ``careful planning is needed to ensure the C-17 production line is not ended prematurely and later restarted at substantial cost.'' Additionally, the GAO found that ``both the manufacturer and Air Force agree that shutting down and restarting production would not be feasible or cost-effective.'' Keeping the C-17 line open is critical not only for our national defense but for thousands of American workers who rely on this aircraft for their livelihood. With the waning demand for commercial aircraft and a lull in military fighter jet production, it is more critical than ever to maintain the aerospace industrial base that runs the only remaining wide-body assembly line in the United States. I urge my colleagues to exercise their constitutional authority and not go along with what I believe will be shown very shortly, if we make the decision, to have been very shortsighted. This is a decision that we, in our constitutional responsibility, can and must make. We cannot afford disastrous defense cuts coming out of the OMB, which is why we fought and won the effort in committee earlier. It is critical--and that colleagues join with me in supporting the managers on the floor to fight a shortsighted attempt to eviscerate our warfighter's airlift capability and our Nation's industrial base. Both are critical elements for the long-term security and future of our country. I urge my colleagues to join me in opposing the McCain amendment. I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. BOND

Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that my military fellow, LTC John Moreth, be granted floor privileges for the duration of the consideration of H.R. 3326 on the floor.

Mr. BOND

Mr. BOND. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. BOND. Madam President, are we in morning business?

Mr. BOND

Mr. BOND. Madam President, I rise today to call for the testimony before Congress of our top military commanders in Afghanistan, GEN Stanley McChrystal and General Petraeus. Congress and the American people need to hear directly and as soon as possible from the generals to ensure that political motivations in Washington do not override the vital needs of our commanders and our troops on the ground. Ordinarily, I don't like the idea of calling generals away from their duties in theater but, unfortunately, in the often surreal world of Washington politics, all the hard work by our military and intelligence professionals on the battlefield in Afghanistan can be undone very quickly. Unfortunately, the latest verbal wavering by the administration and some of my colleagues in Congress can do just that. Last November, when I sent my report, the Roadmap to Success in South Asia, to then President-elect Obama and his national security team, I outlined the importance of messaging to our overall success in Afghanistan and Pakistan. For too long, the United States has flailed about with an uncoordinated communication plan. In other words, we have been off message. Unfortunately, the enemy has continued to hone its own message. Radical Islamic terrorists have staged suicide attacks for maximum publicity, propagandizing their message on the Internet, and convinced their fellow terrorists-at-arms that they will defeat the international community. Negative and indecisive comments by the President, broadcast worldwide, have now given the enemy a big win in the public information battle. On CNN, the President questioned: ``Are we pursuing the right strategy?'' On NBC's ``Meet the Press,'' the President's words were even more disturbing, signaling a lack of confidence in his earlier strategy. The President said: If an expanded counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan contributes to the goal of defeating al-Qaida, then we will move forward. But, if it doesn't, then I'm not interested in just being in Afghanistan for the sake of being in Afghanistan or saving face or . . . sending a message that America is here for the duration. Comments such as these call into doubt America's commitment to Afghanistan. They give hope to the terrorists--hope that America's resolve is not real, and that they only need to wait us out to win the war. The people of Afghanistan get the message that we are leaving soon. The implied message is that you better work with the Taliban and al- Qaida, because they will be here after America leaves. This is a public bonanza in diplomacy for our terrorist enemies. At the same time, these comments have done a great disservice to our men and women serving in harm's way. These heroes need our country's unwavering support, not vacillation because of political pressures. President Obama's recent comments present a stark and dangerous contrast to his earlier resolve--resolve that I applauded on this floor and publicly and proudly supported. When President Obama commissioned General McChrystal's assessment of the situation in Afghanistan, I believed that he was genuinely interested in receiving the general's expert, on-the-ground perspective and his informed opinion of what strategic and tactical changes would be required for success. Unfortunately, it now appears that the President has developed a sudden case of buyer's remorse. It seems increasingly clear to me the Obama administration is inclined to reject the counterinsurgency strategy recently recommended by General McChrystal and endorsed by the head of the U.S. Central Command, GEN David Petraeus and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ADM Mike Mullen. In a bewildering twist, this is the same counterinsurgency strategy the President himself endorsed this past March. I have been a strong and vocal supporter of the administration's new strategy in Afghanistan, so I was particularly disappointed by the President's suggestion this past Sunday that he is reconsidering the American commitment to the war in Afghanistan. I am also deeply disturbed by press reports that Defense Secretary Gates will delay sending General McChrystal's troop request to the White House because the White House is not ready to receive it. Given the President's resolve this spring, I am somewhat puzzled by the strange treatment of General McChrystal's assessment and troop request. Unnecessary delay is not our friend in this war. The clearest reason for this delay seems to be that the President is considering not granting General McChrystal's request. Instead, we are now hearing that he may push for a more aggressive covert war against al-Qaida leadership in Pakistan. We all want to eliminate the al-Qaida leadership that plotted and planned the attacks that claimed more than 3,000 American lives on September 11. And depending on the details, more aggressive action in Pakistan may be a good thing. But such action should be in addition to, not a substitute for, giving our troops in Afghanistan all the resources and supporting personnel they need to succeed. While denying al-Qaida and Taliban militants sanctuary in the border regions of Pakistan is critical, a counterterrorism-only approach, focusing on one part of this regional conflict, will ultimately hand victory to the world's most violent and feared terrorists. This type of counterterrorism-only approach failed us in Iraq and it has failed us in Afghanistan for the last 7 years. I have consistently called for--and President Obama had promised--a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy designed to meet a set of clearly defined goals for the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. The Obama administration has rightly characterized the problem as involving both of these two countries. But right now, we have a plan only for one country. I am not suggesting it is General McChrystal's job to set that wider. As directed by the President and by our NATO allies whom he represents as commander of ISAF, the general has laid out a good strategy for success in Afghanistan and that strategy includes a request for more boots on the ground. I understand there is a lot of hand-wringing in Washington right now over Afghanistan. We saw the same reaction over sending more troops into Iraq 2 years ago. The political courage shown by the White House and Congress back then proved to be successful. Today, we must marshal the same courage and give General McChrystal what he needs to get the job done. Amid the reports of wavering and hand-wringing, an important question comes into mind: What has changed? During the campaign and after his inauguration, the President spoke repeatedly about the importance of winning the war in Afghanistan. For example, on March 27, 2009, when he rolled out his comprehensive new strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan, the President declared that: To succeed, we and our friends and allies must reverse the Taliban's games and promote a more capable and accountable Afghan government. Our troops have fought bravely against a ruthless enemy. Our civilians have made great sacrifices. Our allies have borne a heavy burden. Afghans have suffered and sacrificed for their future. But for six years, Afghanistan has been denied the resources that it demands because of the war in Iraq. Now, we must make a commitment that can accomplish our goals. I was heartened by these words. I agreed with the President on the need for a fully resourced counterinsurgency campaign and a solid commitment to ensure the security of the Afghan people and our own vital interests. I applauded his recognition of winning this war when he told our veterans, the VFW, this past August: Those who attacked America on 9/11 are plotting to do so again. If left unchecked, the Taliban insurgency will be an even larger safe haven from which al-Qaida would plot to kill more Americans. So this is not only a war worth fighting; this is fundamental to the defense of our people. But our troops in the field have now been waiting over 6 months for the President to follow through on his promises. As General McChrystal's recently leaked assessment points out, time is of the essence, and we cannot afford more stalling by the administration on this vital national security issue. The general said the next 9 to 12 months are critical and that is why we need a decision now. I call on the President to heed his own words from this past weekend. Let's ignore the politics of the moment and finish the job in Afghanistan. I recognize we have not yet seen any official numbers associated with General McChrystal's troop request, but I am very encouraged by the general's emphasis on putting more of an Afghan face on operations. I believe our ultimate success depends on our ability to hand responsibility for security over to Afghans. I was also gratified to see the report's strong emphasis on the importance of ``smart power'' to achieving success. While the assessment does not actually use the term, the concept is woven into the core of the report. General McChrystal and others have been clear that traditional kinetic military efforts alone will not achieve the success we need. Success will be attainable only if we maximize the ability of nonmilitary agencies of the United States Government to work through Afghan institutions to achieve stability, reconstruction, and the rule of law. As I have said repeatedly on the floor, the efforts by the National Guard, led by my own Missouri National Guard, to bring agricultural experts, including full-time farmers who also serve as trained military soldiers, who have gone into Nangarhar Province and in 1 year transformed the agriculture of Afghanistan so they could make a greater profit from raising legitimate crops and taking Afghanistan and Nangarhar Province from the No. 2 poppy-producing province in the nation down to almost zero poppy production. Six more National Guards from different States are there now. More are coming. Two weeks ago, I challenged all of the Nation's National Guard and their commanders at their meeting in Nashville to commit to send a National Guard unit from every State to an appropriate province where they can help, and they can make a difference. That is part of smart power. They need to bring the economic resources and the structures and the information and experience we have, protected by soldiers and airmen of the National Guard who can defend themselves and those they are protecting. That is smart power. In the McChrystal report, the Afghan Defense Minister rejected the popular myth that Afghanistan is a graveyard of empires and we are destined to fail there. I couldn't agree more. As General McChrystal affirmed in his report: ``While the situation is serious, success is still achievable.'' The Obama administration and Congress must each do its own part to give our troops the resources and time they need to make that success a reality. Let's not snatch a defeat from the jaws of victory in Afghanistan just because a few pundits are pedaling political pessimism in Washington. All the experts, including General McChrystal, agree we need a properly resourced counterinsurgency strategy, and we need it now. It is time to listen to our commanders on the ground, not the ever-changing political winds whispering defeat in Washington. Madam President, I thank the Chair, I yield the floor, and I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. BOND

Mr. BOND. Mr. President, through the Chair, I thank my colleague from South Dakota, Senator Thune, for allowing me to speak for a minute. We agreed to do that rather than to offer amendments that I intended to propose to this bill. I want to make sure everybody understands a concern that Senator Thune, many others, and I have; that is, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's potential efforts to push through back-door carbon regulations which they cannot achieve legislatively on the Senate floor. EPA, over the next several years, may attempt to impose trillions of dollars in new energy taxes that will kill millions of jobs. Of course they will say that is not their intent. They want to control climate. But that will be the impact of regulations they could issue over the next few years to control carbon emissions. Experts have told us the House-passed Waxman-Markey legislation would kill 2.4 million American jobs and impose new energy taxes on the American people. Even President Obama has previously confirmed that under his plan for carbon emission mandates, electricity prices will ``necessarily skyrocket.'' ``Necessarily skyrocket''. Those are the President's words. In the EPW Committee, I presented information from the Missouri University Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute which determined that the Waxman-Markey legislation would raise farm production for an average family-run commercial production farmer who grows corn and soybeans by about $11,000 in 2020 and rising to over $30,000 by 2050. In this time of suffering, when so many people are out of work and so many family budgets are stretched thin, I cannot, in good conscience, stand by and remain quiet when there is a potential that such new energy taxes would be imposed on American families, farmers, and workers. It is no wonder the Senate is pausing before we jump off the cliff. Senators, especially from manufacturing and the coal-dependent heartland where I am from, know how much this bill will punish the Midwest, South, and Great Plains. This spring, EPA began the process to start limiting carbon emissions through regulations, and they will do it through expensive plant-by-plant command-and-control regulations, not a cap-and-trade system. Some say we could limit this problem by not regulating small emitters. But that is no different than Waxman-Markey, which already exempts small emitters. Thus, similar to Waxman-Markey's national energy tax, regulations that exempt small emitters would still impose a national energy tax and kill millions of jobs. Every family will be hit by higher electricity prices when they go after the large electricity- producing companies. They will face more money for heating, more money for gasoline, more money for diesel fuel--if you are on the farm--more money for almost everything they buy that is produced with energy, which is just about everything that is not in the IT world, although there will be costs there too. Businesses will face large increases in backdoor costs put on them by higher prices they must pay, even if they fall below the threshold. These costs, the backdoor impact of these costs, will be felt on families, on workers who can lose their jobs. That is why I proposed two amendments to prevent EPA from imposing backdoor carbon regulations when they result in lost American jobs or raise costs unacceptably for farmers. I was gratified when the Senate earlier passed a version of my jobs amendment during the budget debate. But the leaders on the majority side stripped the job protection out of the bill, leaving workers vulnerable again. They again, during this debate, will not allow us to protect workers from job-killing carbon proposals, but we will continue to educate the American people on how much they will suffer under proposed carbon legislation and regulation. I have to add one last word about my friends and majority colleagues, Senators Kerry and Boxer. There continue to be reports that their bill will not include, in writing, before anybody votes on it, crucial sections on how they would distribute their program carbon allowances. This, regrettably, would hide, not only from us but from the American people, the true costs of the energy tax they propose to impose. If my Senator friends from Massachusetts and California believe truly in what they are doing, they should not hide the provisions from us. They should give us the time and the American people the time they need to determine the bill's impact. With millions of jobs on the line and trillions of dollars in tax increases at stake, the American people deserve no less. I call on my colleagues to stand for the suffering people of America who are burdened already by energy costs and could pay much more. I call on people who may be affected to let their Members of Congress know how they feel. Nobody is going to put out a mandate saying we cannot encourage them to speak. Nobody, no czar is going to come down and say: You cannot express your opinion. I have expressed mine. I have found a lot of people--almost everybody I talk to who raised the subject in my State of Missouri agrees. I yield the floor.

Mr. BOND

Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I rise today to increase awareness of a debilitating and ultimately fatal disease that right now, more than 5 million Americans and 35 million people worldwide live with-- Alzheimer's. Today is World Alzheimer's Day, a day when the individuals and families affected by this devastating disease around the globe unite to increase understanding about the disease and its impact. Unfortunately, as this disease continues to steal an ever growing number of memories and ultimately lives, this global recognition continues to grow in importance. According to new data released in the 2009 World Alzheimer Report, the 35 million people worldwide suffering from Alzheimer's and dementia is a startling 10 percent increase over the 2005 number. This devastating number is only expected to grow. In fact, according to the newly released report, the number of people with Alzheimer's is expected to nearly double every 20 years, to 65.7 million in 2030 and 115.4 million in 2050. For too many years the millions of Americans living with this disease and their families suffered silently in a nation that misunderstood the tragedy of Alzheimer's and dementia. In 1994, the courage of one family changed the public face of Alzheimer's when in a letter to the American people Ronald Reagan announced he was one of the millions of Americans living with the disease. With this selfless act, the former President and his wife Nancy increased the public awareness of Alzheimer's and increased the awareness of the need for research into its causes and prevention. Public awareness is a key part of the fight against this disease, which is why I thank actor David Hyde Pierce for being a vocal champion in the fight against Alzheimer's and Lisa Genova who wrote the moving book, ``Still Alice,'' about a brilliant woman blindsided by the disease. In 2004 Senator Mikulski and I first introduced legislation in honor of Ronald Reagan, who took public awareness of Alzheimer's to the national stage. This legislation--a living tribute to the courage of our 40th President-- made a Federal commitment to increase research for Alzheimer's and increase assistance to Alzheimer patients and their families. Today, Senator Mikulski and I are still leading the fight in the Senate to pass this critical legislation. This year we reintroduced the Alzheimer's Breakthrough Act. This bipartisan legislation strengthens our nation's commitment to Alzheimer's research and to finding cures and treatments for this devastating disease. This legislation doubles funding for Alzheimer's research at the National Institutes of Health, NIH, to $2 billion and makes Alzheimer's research a priority at NIH. The bill also provides support for families by providing caregivers with the vital resources and tools to assist them. We can't afford to wait another 5 years to pass this bill. After all, in this country, someone develops Alzheimer's every 70 seconds. Experts estimate Alzheimer's could affect as many as 10 million baby boomers as they age. And in my State of Missouri, there will be as many as 110,000 people age 65 and older who will have Alzheimer's disease by 2010. I urge my colleagues in the Senate to join me and Senator Mikulski in our fight against this terrible disease and cosponsor the Alzheimer's Breakthrough Act. I also ask that today you keep all those who have lost loved ones to Alzheimer's, all those living with Alzheimer's and all those carrying on the fight against Alzheimer's in your thoughts.

Mr. BOND

Mr. BOND. Madam President, the real kudos and plaudits go to my colleague, the chair, Senator Murray, for having worked this through. It is also a very interesting and challenging measure. But this year, we have advanced a bill, we have had lots of amendments, we have adopted some on strong bipartisan votes. I think this is a great tribute to the way she has worked with us closely on the committee and with the cooperation of all parties on the floor. This is a bill in which many people have good ideas, and, as I said, we voted on and took a few of them. But I join Senator Murray in thanking her staff: Alex Keenan, Meaghan McCarthy, Rachel Milberg, Joanne Waszczak and Travis Lumpkin for their work. They have worked very closely with us. Thanks for the hard work on my side to Ellen Beares and Jon Kamarck. The staff contributed. And also the work of the newest member of our team who came in at a time when we were badly understaffed, Dedra Goodman. But a very special thanks to Matt McCardle for his leadership and masterful management on the floor. This was due to a lot of unforeseen circumstances. There were lots of times when he had to carry the load, and he also did it with good humor. When I was frazzled and confused about where things may be going, Matt had it under control, and he did a truly outstanding job. Again, I thank our colleagues for allowing us to proceed with this bill. We did not plan on being here this the eighth day, having started last Thursday. But we are very optimistic that this bill can emerge from conference as a freestanding bill and be adopted by this body. I do not want to see this wind up in an ``ominous'' appropriations bill that does not reflect the hard work that went into it. When our work goes into what they call an omnibus, what I call an ``ominous,'' appropriations bill, strange things happen to it. We hope we can work this bill and keep it together as crafted. It is a critical piece of legislation. It has vitally important safety needs for transportation, particularly in aviation. It continues, although not as robustly as I would like, the development of more transportation infrastructure. There are badly needed elements in the housing part of the bill. We have to continue housing for those people who have assisted housing, public housing authorities, particularly in this economic downturn, when so many people are feeling the pinch, special needs from the disabled, the elderly, to veterans, who have particularly been well served by the veterans assisted in supportive housing that we have provided. But also, as I have warned many times before, the FHA program is a high-risk program that could subject us to billions of dollars being thrown on the taxpayers' credit card. And this bill provides resources for HUD to get up the IT systems it needs, to get the people in place. It provides for more oversight. It provides increases for the inspector general to doublecheck to make sure the predatory lending which inflicted the entire economy does not transport itself into FHA- supported housing. So we do have some more amendments. And we look forward to working on those this afternoon. We thank all our colleagues for letting us come this far. We hope to get it passed and get these badly needed appropriations enacted into law.

Mr. BOND

Mr. BOND. Madam President, nobody has advised us of objections on our side.

Mr. BOND. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. amendment no. 2359

Mr. BOND. I ask for the yeas and nays.

Mr. BOND. Madam President, I urge all Members to return promptly. I know several Members on both sides have other commitments. If we are going to make those, we need to keep those 10 minute votes to at least 15 minutes. Thanks. amendment no. 2410

Mr. BOND. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. Amendment No. 2403, as Modified