Kit Bond

Mr. BOND

Mr. BOND. In fact, it was such a traumatic experience to have Mr. Wilson's wife identified that I saw their pictures in the paper. They posed for Vanity Fair in front of the White House. It must have been a crushing blow to them to have her identity publicly disclosed. So they had to get on the cover and make 30 appearances? And I trust his book sales are going well. Maybe he will even have a movie contract. Anybody who reads the Kerry Web site, listens to his interviews, or goes to a movie should know that his whole thesis is a fraud and a hoax. Regrettably, that is merely a continuation of a plan that we have seen implemented by opponents of President Bush and Vice President Cheney. I joined the Intelligence Committee in January of 2003 because I realized that intelligence is absolutely critical in the war on terrorism. We cannot stop terrorism by retaliating against suicide bombers. We cannot prosecute them. We cannot find enough to identify them, much less prosecute them. So I joined the Intelligence Committee. Clearly, we used to have a history that politics stops at the water's edge. Well, I understood that politics stopped at the entrance to the Intelligence Committee, but it has not been that way. There are those in the Intelligence Committee on the other side who want to use the Intelligence Committee as a vehicle not to improve our intelligence, not to find out what the weaknesses are and how to build a stronger case, but to attack the President. That is what this November 2003 minority staff memo says: Here are our options under the rules and we have identified the best approach. Our plan is as follows: One, pull the majority along as far as we can on issues that may lead to major new disclosures regarding improper or questionable conduct by the administration. And they certainly they have done it. Two, essentially prepare Democratic additional views to attach to any interim or final reports, and we intend to take full advantage of it. They have done that, and either today or tomorrow I will discuss the politicization in those views. They also go on to say: We will identify the most exaggerated claims and contrast them with the intelligence estimates that have since been declassified. Well, tough luck, guys. There were no exaggerated claims, nothing to contrast with the intelligence estimates. In fact, the big claim that they make that the administration was pressuring analysts to change their conclusion has been debunked. It has been debunked thoroughly and repeatedly throughout, and I have described this on the floor numerous times. The conclusions are there was no pressure to change conclusions on weapons of mass destruction or on terrorism. We found in the conclusions that the Vice President's visits and questions to CIA were not only not pressuring to change the views but were expected. One of the problems we find is that there is not enough questioning by policy users. By the way, one of the things they are attacking and one of the things that some of my colleagues have attacked is the office of Doug Feith, special policy--a two- or three-man operation-- had a Defense Intelligence Agency analyst working with him. They reviewed for the Department of Defense the Secretary of Defense, the intelligence estimates they had, and they questioned them. That is what they should have done. Somehow this office is being called unlawful by one of my colleagues. How bizarre. That is so far beyond the pale it is bizarre to say it is unlawful for a DIA agent working for the Secretary of Defense to question the CIA. Come on, gang. We need the CIA and the DIA to interact, get rid of group think, challenge those assessments. Unfortunately, this attack on Doug Feith in the Office of Special Projects has heavy overtones of anti-Semitism. We can see the charges. They talk about the ``neocons'' who are warping our intelligence. Unfortunately, that is their code word for Jewish public servants, and I believe that is an unacceptable way to go about challenging policy. It is not a fruitful endeavor. Going back to the political memo of 2003, as I said, they wanted to contrast the views. They also said: Once we identify solid leads the majority does not want to pursue, we could attract more coverage and have greater credibility in that contact than one in which we simply launch an independent investigation based on principled but vague notions regarding the ``use'' of intelligence. Well, they are doing that because they are saying they want to go back and investigate Doug Feith's office. They had no findings of anything that Mr. Feith did was illegal, unlawful, or unwarranted pressure, but they are choosing to attack him because he represents the ``neocons.'' I think my colleagues get what I mean. They go on to say: In the meantime, even without a specifically authorized independent investigation, we continue to act independently when we encounter foot-dragging on the part of the majority. They say, in summary, that intelligence issues are clearly secondary to the public's concern regarding the insurgency in Iraq. Yet we have an important role to play in revealing the misleading, if not flagrantly dishonest, methods and motives of the senior administration officials who made the case for a unilateral preemptive war. The approach outlined above seems to offer the best prospect for exposing the administration's dubious motives and methods. That was the game plan that some of my colleagues took into this investigation of pre-Iraq war intelligence. That is deeply disappointing--disgusting, I would say--to say this is the game plan being played out on the floor to politicize intelligence. Their conclusions about ``misleading,'' about ``pressure,'' unfortunately, are not supported by the facts. There was exhaustive examination and interviews. Chairman Roberts invited in anybody who claimed to know about improper pressure on the analysts and nobody could come forward with anything. Nobody could come forward with any. No wrongdoing by Doug Feith, but they are still going at it. My colleagues on the other side of the aisle are not troubled by an absence of fact. They have a political jihad. They have their crusade. They have sold, to too many people, the base canard that President Bush and Vice President Cheney were not telling the truth when, in fact, the whole basis of that charge was a fraud and a hoax. As my colleague from Georgia said, we need to improve the intelligence operations. We have a lot of work to do. But we also have some work to do in the Congress, and that is to get over attempting to use the Intelligence Committee and the intelligence community as a political weapon to attack our opponents. I yield the floor. Exhibit 1 [From the Wall Street Journal, July 20, 2004] Mr. Wilson's Defense After U.S. and British intelligence reports exposed his falsehoods in the last 10 days, Joe Wilson is finally defending himself. We're therefore glad to return to this story one more time, because there are some larger lessons here about the law, and for the Beltway media and Bush White House. Mr. Wilson's defense, in essence, is that the ``Republican- written'' Senate Intelligence Committee report is a partisan hatchet job. We could forgive people for being taken in by this, considering the way the Committee's ranking Democrat, Jay Rockefeller, has been spinning it over the past week. But the fact is that the three most damning conclusions are contained not in Chairman Pat Roberts's ``Additional Views,'' but in the main body of the report approved by Mr. Rockefeller and seven other Democrats. Number one: The winner of last year's Award for Truth Telling from the Nation magazine foundation didn't tell the truth when he wrote that his wife, CIA officer Valerie Plame, ``had nothing to do with'' his selection for the Niger mission. Mr. Wilson is now pretending there is some kind of important distinction between whether she ``recommended'' or ``proposed'' him for the trip. Mr. Wilson had been denying any involvement at all on Ms. Plame's part, in order to suggest that her identity was disclosed by a still-unknown Administration official out of pure malice. If instead an Administration official cited nepotism truthfully in order to explain the oddity of Mr. Wilson's selection for the Niger mission, then there was no underlying crime. Motive is crucial under the controlling statute. The 1982 Intelligence Identities Protection Act was written in the wake of the Philip Agee scandal to protect the CIA from deliberate subversion, not to protect the identities of agents and their spouses who choose to enter into a national political debate. In short, the entire leak probe now looks like a familiar Beltway case of criminalizing political differences. Special Prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald should fold up his tent. Number two: Joe Wilson didn't tell the truth about how he supposedly came to realize that it was ``highly doubtful'' there was anything to the story he'd been sent to Niger to investigate. He told everyone that he'd recognized as obvious forgeries the documents purporting to show an Iraq-Niger uranium deal. But the forged documents to which he referred didn't reach U.S. intelligence until eight months after his trip. Mr. Wilson has said that he ``misspoke''--multiple times, apparently--on this issue. Number three: Joe Wilson was also not telling the truth when he said that his final report to the CIA had ``debunked'' the Niger story. The Senate Intelligence report--again, the bipartisan portion of it--says Mr. Wilson's debrief was interpreted as providing ``some confirmation of foreign government service reporting'' that Iraq had sought uranium in Niger. That's because Niger's former Prime Minister had told Mr. Wilson he interpreted a 1999 visit from an Iraqi trade delegation as showing an interest in uranium. This is a remarkable record of falsehood. We'll let our readers judge if they think Mr. Wilson was deliberately wrong, and therefore can be said to have ``lied.'' We certainly know what critics would say if President Bush had been caught saying such things. But in any event, we'd think that the news outlets that broadcast Mr. Wilson's story over the past year would want to retrace their own missteps. Mr. Wilson made three separate appearances on NBC's ``Meet the Press,'' according to the Weekly Standard. New York Times columnist Nick Kristof first brought the still anonymous Niger envoy to public attention in May 2003, so he too must feel burned by his source. Alone among major sellers of the Wilson story, the Washington Post has done an admirable job so far of correcting the record. Also remarkable is that the views of former CIA employee Larry Johnson continue to be cited anywhere on this and related issues. Mr. Johnson was certain last October that the disclosure of Ms. Plame's identity was a purely ``political attack,'' now disproven. He is also a friend of Ms. Plame and the author of a summer 2001 op-ed titled ``The Declining Terrorist Threat.'' You'd think reporters would at least quote him with a political warning label. The final canard advanced by Mr. Wilson's defenders is that our own recent editorials and other criticism was somehow ``orchestrated.'' Well, by whom? Certainly not by the same White House that has been all too silent about this entire episode, in large part because it prematurely apologized last year for the ``16 words'' in a State of the Union address that have now been declared ``well-founded'' by Lord Butler's inquiry in Britain. If Mr. Bush ends up losing the election over Iraq, it won't be because he oversold the case for war but because he's sometimes appeared to have lost confidence in the cause.

Mr. BOND

Mr. BOND. Madam President, reserving the right to object, we have had an energy bill pending that has been filibustered by our colleagues on the other side. We are not in a position where one Senator, unfortunately, can pass a bill. There may be many bills I would like to pass. We do not pass bills in this manner. We should get on with passing an energy bill. And, therefore, I object.

Mr. BOND

Mr. BOND. Madam President, I come to the Senate floor once again this week to talk about the Intelligence Committee report and what we know and what we have learned about the intelligence prior to this body authorizing the President to go into Iraq. We have seen over the past year a concerted effort by outside groups, partisan attack machines, and even Members of this body going after the credibility and attacking the President and Vice President, sometimes personally. We have seen breathless media coverage of every word of those who profess to be nonpartisan but who prove to be anything but nonpartisan. We have seen headlines alleging all types of wrongdoings. We have heard accusations of lying and misleading repeated as if they were the simple, obvious truth. Now, after the Senate Intelligence Committee spent a year painstakingly reviewing these accusations, attacks, and smears, we can set the record straight, while only hoping that the media will devote at least some of the same attention to the facts as they did to the accusations and unfounded allegations. Yes, we found there were significant problems with the intelligence mechanisms, the lack of human intelligence, the failure to share information, the wall that had been built between intelligence agencies, and that we need to correct with appropriations and legislation. That is what I hope the Intelligence Committee can do. But we also need to correct the outright inaccuracies and political attacks. Let's just review an example. First, let me take the interesting story of the initially anonymous former Ambassador, one Joe Wilson. As we point out in the additional views of Chairman Roberts, which Senator Hatch and I signed, Joe Wilson went on a media blitz with his allegations, appearing on more than 30 television shows in order to tell anyone and everyone that the President lied to the American people and that he was the ``patriot'' who debunked the claim of what he called in his book ``the 16-word lie.'' Joe Wilson states on the ``John Kerry for President'' Web site: The President misled the Nation in his State of the Union Address. Then there was an ABC news story in which ABC said: A former Ambassador told ABC news that almost a year before Bush's speech he informed the CIA that the information was not credible. The Ambassador, who asked not to be identified, said the CIA asked him in February 2002 to investigate reports that Iraq was trying to buy uranium from Niger. After spending 8 days in the west-central African nation, the Ambassador said he told the CIA the information about uranium was ``bogus and unrealistic.'' That is pretty hard hitting. This was a CNN headline: Diplomat: U.S. knew Uranium Report Was False. Then Joe Wilson did Internet interviews. In one on Buzzflash, he said: I urged the Government to come clean with this story that was patently not true. Then he went on Meet the Press and stated that he believed he had ``effectively debunked the Niger arms uranium sale.'' Andrea Mitchell asked him: Were they not properly briefed on the fact that you had the previous February been there and that it wasn't true? Wilson said: No. No. In actual fact, in my judgment, I have not seen the estimate either, but there were reports based upon my trip that were submitted to the appropriate officials. The question was asked of the CIA by the office of the Vice President. The office of the Vice President, I am absolutely convinced, received the very specific response to the question it asked and that response was based upon my trip out there. Well, now we have the facts, Madam President. The facts don't square with the claims. We not only have the Senate committee report, but yesterday we had Lord Butler's report investigating the intelligence obtained by British intelligence services that was shared with the U.S. and cited in the President's State of the Union Address. The Butler report states at paragraph 499: We conclude that, on the basis of the intelligence estimates at the time, covering both Niger and the Democratic Republic of Congo, the statements on Iraqi attempts to buy uranium from Africa in the Government's dossier, and by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons, were well founded. By extension, we conclude also that the statement in President Bush's State of the Union Address of January 28, 2003, ``The British Government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa,'' was well founded. That is what they said after looking at all the evidence. Paragraph 503 of the Butler report goes into detail and says: From our examination of the intelligence and other material on Iraqi attempts to buy uranium from Africa, we have concluded that: A. It is accepted by all parties that Iraqi officials visited Niger in 1999. B. The British Government had intelligence from several different sources indicating that this visit was for the purpose of acquiring uranium. Since uranium constitutes almost three-quarters of Niger's exports, the intelligence was credible. C. The evidence was not conclusive that Iraq actually purchased, as opposed to having sought, uranium and the British Government did not claim this. D. The forged documents were not available to the British Government at the time its assessment was made, and so the fact of the forgery does not undermine it. Well, that is the first pitch. Facts 1, Joe Wilson 0. What does the Senate Intelligence Committee say? On page 44 of our report, it says: When the former Ambassador spoke to Committee staff, his description of his findings differed from the DO intelligence report and his account of information provided to him by the CIA differed from the CIA official accounts. . . . . . . The former Ambassador said he discussed with his CIA contacts which names and signatures should have appeared on any documentation of a legitimate uranium transaction. In fact, the intelligence report made no mention of the alleged Iraq-Niger deal or signatures that should have appeared on any documentation of such a deal. Then we went on to page 45: The former Ambassador [Wilson] also told Committee staff that he was the source of a Washington Post article (``CIA Did Not Share Doubt on Iraq Data: Bush Used Report of Uranium Bid''), which said, ``Among the Envoy's conclusions was that the documents may have been forged because `the dates were wrong and the names were wrong.' '' Committee staff asked how the former Ambassador could have come to the conclusion that the ``dates were wrong and the names were wrong'' when he had never seen the CIA reports and had no knowledge of what names and dates were in the reports. The former Ambassador [Joe Wilson] said that he may have ``misspoken'' to the reporter when he said he concluded that the documents were ``forged.'' He also said he may have become confused about his own recollection after the International Atomic Energy Agency reported in March 2003 that the names and dates on the documents were not correct and may have thought he had seen the names himself. Second pitch: Facts 2, Joe Wilson 0. Joe Wilson said in his book about how he was selected for the trip to Niger that his wife ``Valerie had nothing to do with the matter. . . . She definitely had not proposed that I make the trip. A Time Magazine article stated that Wilson ``angrily said his wife had nothing to do with his trip to Africa.'' ``That is bull [expletive]. That is absolutely not the case.'' Page 39 of our report looks into the facts. Facts can come back to bite you when you make all kinds of charges. That conclusion was: Interviews and documents provided to the Committee indicated that his wife, a CPD employee, suggested his name for the trip. The CPD reports officer told the Committee staff that the former Ambassador's wife ``offered up his name'' and a memorandum to the Deputy Chief of the CPD on February 12, 2002, from the former Ambassador's wife says, ``My husband has good relations with both the PM and the former Minister of Mines (not to mention lots of French contacts) both of whom could shed light on this sort of activity.'' The report also states: On February 19, 2002, CPD hosted a meeting with the former Ambassador, intelligence analysts from both the CIA and INR, and several individuals from the DO's Africa and CPD divisions. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the merits of the former Ambassador traveling to Niger. An INR analyst's notes indicated that the meeting was ``apparently convened by [the former Ambassador's] wife who had the idea to dispatch [him] to use his contacts to sort out the Iraq- Niger uranium issue.'' The former Ambassador's wife told Committee staff she only attended the meeting to introduce her husband and left after about 3 minutes. Third pitch: Facts 3, Wilson 0. Three strikes and you are out--and you should be. Let me add a couple of other things. This is from the additional views of Chairman Roberts. These are findings that the staff made that were not accepted by our Democratic colleagues for inclusion in the final reports. The former Ambassador's public comments suggested that the Vice President had been briefed, but that is not correct. While the CIA responded to the Vice President's request for the agency's analysis, they never provided the information gathered by the former Ambassador. The former ambassador, on ``Meet the Press,'' said he was absolutely convinced the Vice President received the specific response based on his trip. The former ambassador was speaking on the basis of what he believed should have happened based on his Government experience, but he had no knowledge that it did happen. These and other comments from the ambassador about his report debunking the Niger-Iraq uranium story were incorrect and has led to a distortion in the press and the public's understanding of the facts surrounding the Niger-Iraq uranium story. The committee staff found that for most analysts, the former ambassador's report lent more credibility, not less, to the reported Niger-Iraq uranium deal. When we looked into it, not only was the trip by Joe Wilson to drink mint tea with his friends in Niger not a debunking of the British intelligence that Iraq had sought uranium from Africa, but he did include things that suggested that it was even more likely. Why did he go off on such a tangent? In an interview with the committee staff, Joe Wilson was asked how he knew some of the things he was stating publicly with such confidence. On at least two occasions, according to the committee staff report, he admitted he had no direct knowledge to support some of his claims, and that he was drawing on either unrelated past experience or no information at all. For example, when he was asked how he knew that the intelligence community had rejected the possibility of a Niger uranium deal, as he wrote in his book, he told committee staff that his assertion may have involved ``a little literary flair.'' ``A little literary flair,'' when you charge the Vice President of lying based on information you had that was insufficient, inaccurate, and did not relate to the basic underlying information the British Government intelligence service provided? I think ``a little literary flair'' is not accurate. It is a fraud and a hoax. His statements were fraud. They were a hoax. I have talked before about the people who owe some apologies for the assertions they have made about the President and Vice President. Let me add Joe Wilson as one who owes the Vice President a public apology-- a public apology--for the unfounded, unbased accusations he made with just ``a little literary flair.'' I think he owes the Vice President one, but I guess I will not hold my breath waiting until he provides it. Unfortunately, that has been the practice. We have seen too often in too many places grand charges made and covered in the news media, and the committee goes back and we search and we search and we search to find what were the actual facts. Democratic friends said the administration pressured analysts to change it or they influenced the views of the analysts. Chairman Roberts pursued every angle, invited everybody, pursued everyone, over 200, I think 240 interviews, and we came up with some conclusions. Conclusion No. 83--and this is unanimously agreed to by Republicans and Democrats on the Senate Intelligence Committee: The committee did not find any evidence that administration officials attempted to coerce, influence or pressure analysts to change their judgments related to Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capabilities. Conclusion 84: The committee found no evidence that the Vice President's visits to the Central Intelligence Agency were attempts to pressure analysts, were perceived as intended to pressure analysts by those who participated in the briefings on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs, or did pressure analysts to change their assessments. I read an op-ed piece by one of my colleagues saying the administration did not do a good enough job of checking up on the analysis by the intelligence agencies. And in another breath, another one of my colleagues said they asked too many questions. Madam President, let me tell you something I have learned as one new to the workings of the intelligence field. A good intelligence analyst puts forth his best or her best judgment on what to conclude from the often sketchy, incomplete facts they have before them and the reports that have to be evaluated, and they expect to be questioned. They want to know that the policymakers who are using that information have the best sense of what they know. And the Vice President, who was diligent--he was doing due diligence--went over and questioned them time and time again. Did he tell them to change their analysis? Did he tell them what judgment they wanted? No. What he told them was what the intelligence community knew they had to do, and that was to do their very best job to get it right. There has been a lot of criticism of how the intelligence agency analyzed it. But we have lots of good people who work very hard. There are structures in place that have kept them from sharing. They did not have the information they needed. But to the best of their ability, they gave the Vice President what they thought was the best analysis. The report also found in conclusion No. 1--most important: The committee found no evidence that the IC's-- Intelligence community's-- mischaracterizations or exaggeration of the intelligence on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities was the result of political pressure. Conclusion No. 11: No analyst questioned by the committee stated that the questions were unreasonable, or that they were encouraged by the questioning to alter their conclusions regarding Iraq's link to al-Qaida. That is, the link to terrorism. As I said before, all of the charges, all of the outline of the Democrats' secret memo of November 2003 on how they were going to use the Intelligence Committee to attack the President, to influence the election have been debunked. A lot of apologies are owed for the baseless charges that have been made against the President, the Vice President, the Department of Defense, and particularly Douglas Feith, who is attempting to serve the Secretary of Defense by asking questions and trying to get the best he could out of the intelligence community for the decisionmaking in the Department of Defense. I hope, I trust--maybe I am gullible, but I trust now we can move beyond this and recognize that the intelligence that the administration had, the same intelligence that this body had when we approved going into Iraq, the same intelligence the world had when they said that Saddam Hussein was a bad guy and U.N. Resolution 1441 said that we need him to disarm, that was the best information we had at the time. When we look back on it, we were absolutely dead right to go into Iraq to depose Saddam Hussein. As David Kay said after he finished, Iraq was a far more dangerous place than we knew. It had the capability, it had the equipment, it had the scientists ready to turn out weapons of mass destruction, chemical and biological, to turn over to terrorist groups. Let us hope and pray they were not able to turn over any. The world is safer, the Iraqi people are safer, and the United States is safer because of the bold leadership of President Bush and Vice President Cheney and our magnificent men and women in the military who are putting their lives at risk in Afghanistan and Iraq. We remember them and thank them in our prayers, and we also offer our best wishes and support for the Iraqi people to regain a decent country out of the mess that Saddam Hussein left. I thank the Chair and yield the floor.

Mr. BOND

Mr. BOND. Madam President, I compliment my colleague from Maine for being a true champion and leader for assuring good home health care access to our seniors, disabled, and others who need specialized care. As she has done in Maine, I have done in Missouri and found that access to home health care is critically important. It is, No. 1, convenient, easier, more friendly, and more compassionate for the patients. No. 2, all of the statistics we have seen show home health care is more effective to treat people. They get well better. Finally, it makes sense economically. When cuts in Medicare shut down a home health care agency in one rural county in northwest Missouri, 40 patients who had been treated for an average of $400,000 a year were forced to go to institutionalized care. Only 30 of them showed up. I hate to guess what happened to the other 10. Their cost for 1 year--it was $400,000--became $1.4 million. It was a terrible tragedy in human. terms, in health terms, and in economic terms. I am proud to join my colleague from Maine.

Mr. BOND

Mr. BOND. Madam President, I compliment my colleague from Maine for being a true champion and leader for assuring good home health care access to our seniors, disabled, and others who need specialized care. As she has done in Maine, I have done in Missouri and found that access to home health care is critically important. It is, No. 1, convenient, easier, more friendly, and more compassionate for the patients. No. 2, all of the statistics we have seen show home health care is more effective to treat people. They get well better. Finally, it makes sense economically. When cuts in Medicare shut down a home health care agency in one rural county in northwest Missouri, 40 patients who had been treated for an average of $400,000 a year were forced to go to institutionalized care. Only 30 of them showed up. I hate to guess what happened to the other 10. Their cost for 1 year--it was $400,000--became $1.4 million. It was a terrible tragedy in human. terms, in health terms, and in economic terms. I am proud to join my colleague from Maine.

Mr. BOND

Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I rise to talk about the intelligence we had prior to going into Iraq and the decision that was made overwhelmingly--by I believe 77 votes in this body--to authorize the use of force against Iraq. Today we have received the copy of the Butler report in Great Britain talking about their intelligence failures as well. Lord Butler examined the intelligence the British Government had and found there were problems in their intelligence as well. But they did an in-depth assessment of what they knew then and what they know now. I thought it was very interesting, since yesterday on this floor a question had been raised about the statement President Bush made in his address to a joint session of both Houses of Congress that Saddam Hussein had sought uranium from Africa. Conclusion No. 499 in the Butler report is as follows: We conclude that, on the basis of intelligence assessments at the time, covering both Niger and the Democratic Republic of Congo, the statements on Iraqi attempts to buy uranium from Africa in the Government's dossier and by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons, were well-founded. By extension, we also conclude that the statement in President Bush's State of the Union Address of 28 January, 2003, that the British Government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa was well-founded. In other words, an examination by the committee, headed by Lord Butler, to examine intelligence produced by the British Intelligence Service was accurate, that Iraq was seeking uranium from Africa as part of its nuclear weapons program. So much for the charges by many--some in this body--that there was no basis for this statement that President Bush made, based on British intelligence that Iraq was seeking uranium from Africa and that it was not well-founded. It was. And on that, we now have a conclusion from Lord Butler that was the case. I think the issue was more fully discussed, obviously, in the conclusions of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and in the separate opinion, separate findings produced by Chairman Roberts, to which I and other members of the committee signed off. Today, as I came to work, I heard on the radio a very regrettable and unfortunate opinion piece by a writer from the Washington Post, saying that, obviously, President Bush should not have gone into Iraq, saying in effect that taking down Saddam Hussein was wrong. He was telling our troops, who are on the ground risking their lives--and too many who have given up their lives--we are fighting in vain. That is absolute nonsense. It is regrettable that we have forgotten during a time of war that, generally, politics stops at the water's edge. As I have mentioned before on the floor, there seems to be a concerted effort by our friends in the other party to contend that, because the intelligence was not as good as it should have been, we should not have gone in and deposed the murderous tyrant who had not only slaughtered tens of thousands of his own people, the Kurds, invaded Kuwait, and threatened Saudi Arabia, but also provided a harbor for terrorists such as al-Qaida and Abu al-Zarqawi's group. I have had the opportunity to talk to some of the young men and women who have put their lives on the line in Iraq. I would trust their judgment far more than I would trust a political hatchet job by a writer who is trying to score political points against the President and the Vice President. Let me go back to a couple of conclusions from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Conclusion 92, on page 345, says: The CIA's examination of contacts, training, and safe haven and operational cooperation as indicators of a possible Iraq/ al-Qaida relationship was a reasonable and objective approach to the question. Conclusion 95, on page 347, says: The CIA's assessment on safe haven that--that al-Qaida or associated operatives were present in Baghdad and northeastern Iraq in an area under Kurdish control--was reasonable. In other words, judgments were reasonable that this was a country harboring terrorists. Thinking back, do you know what the President said? He said that we are going to carry the war to the terrorists. We are going to go after them where they hide, where they take refuge. We wiped them out in Afghanistan and we had to go into Iraq where they were also gaining safe haven. To say we are not significantly safer in the United States, or people around the world, our allies, and free people are not safer as a result of deposing Saddam Hussein is pure nonsense. Unfortunately, we are at war with the terrorists. The terrorists were in Iraq. They had access to the weapons of mass destruction that Saddam Hussein had produced in the past and was willing to produce in the future. Over the last few days, we all have heard briefings on recent increased threats in the United States. Today, had we not acted in Iraq, we would be even more at risk to the possibility of terror, and the likelihood that those terrorist attacks would have included chemical or biological weapons would have been far greater. Our examination of what happened, what was going on in Iraq, conducted after the war found there were significant production capabilities for chemical and biological weapons in Iraq. There were terrorists there who were seeking to gain access to these weapons. Did we find large stockpiles? No. Did we expect to find large stockpiles? No. At best, they said the amount of chemical and biological weapons would be less than would fill a swimming pool. But the problem with these chemical and biological weapons, whether they be ricin, sarin gas, anthrax, or smallpox, very small amounts can cause significant death, damage, and destruction to the United States. The potential to kill people with these deadly biological and chemical weapons was terrific, and we are safer because we took him out. Do we know if we have captured all of the weapons of mass destruction that he produced? No. We cannot know that. We will find out more, I believe, as the Iraqi Government takes steps, through its own security forces, to go after the known and suspected terrorists, to find where they are. We have heard reports about chemical and biological weapons being dispersed. We cannot confirm where they are. We only hope and pray they are not in the hands of terrorists who have made their way to the United States. But only time will tell. Conclusion 97, which is on page 348 of the Intelligence Committee report, concluded: The CIA's judgment that Saddam Hussein, if sufficiently desperate, might employ terrorists with global reach--al- Qaida--to conduct terrorist attacks in the event of war, was reasonable. And of course it was reasonable; after all, we already knew Saddam Hussein was supporting terrorists such as the Arab Liberation Front, and he was offering money to the families of suicide bombers, particularly Hamas. We know he had the ability to turn his manufacturing capabilities, with the scientists he had, into the production of chemical and biological weapons. We know how tragic the terrorist attack of 9/11 was on our soil. We lost over 3,000 people. They used unconventional weapons--airplanes loaded with fuel--to cause those deaths. I tremor to think about what could happen if chemical or biological weapons were used in large areas where unsuspecting civilians are gathered in the United States. After what happened on 9/11, we had many investigations saying why didn't we put all of those elements together? They were very fragmentary. We had walls that prevented us from sharing that information among our intelligence agencies. It would have been almost impossible, even in hindsight, to connect all the dots and know what was going to happen on 9/11. After that, intelligence analysts were under great pressure to try to identify potential attacks on the United States, or the potential use by terrorists of weapons of mass destruction and they overstated many of those conclusions. But what we know from our own experience is that Saddam Hussein consistently engaged in a pattern of denial and deception. He made it very difficult to find out what he was doing. We know from his actions what a deadly, murderous terrorist he was. By removing the Saddam Hussein regime, we eliminated yet another front from which terrorists could operate safely; most importantly, we eliminated the possibility that Saddam's weapons programs in the future could be leveraged by terrorists who seek to destroy us. Finding huge stockpiles of weapons was not the objective of going into Iraq. The failure to do so should not be taken as a measure of the lack of success in Iraq. Prime Minister Tony Blair today said, on receiving the Butler report, that we were right to go into Iraq. He has been a steadfast ally, and we commend him. We also have the interim report of the Iraqi Survey Group. We spent a long time listening to Dr. David Kay in our closed sessions, but he has issued an interim report that we can quote. That interim report noted finding ``dozens of WMD-related program activities and significant amounts of equipment that Iraq concealed from the United Nations during the Inspections that began in late 2002.'' Some of these included, for example: A clandestine network of laboratories and safehouses within the Iraqi Intelligence Service that contained equipment subject to U.N. monitoring and suitable for continuing CBW research. That is chemical and biological weapons research. A prison laboratory complex, possibly used in human testing of BW agents, that Iraqi officials working to prepare for U.N. inspections were explicitly ordered not to declare to the U.N.

Mr. BOND. Mr. President, is there any time remaining on our side?

Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I ask for 1 more minute to conclude.

Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I will do the best I can with the time remaining to conclude. Dr. David Kay said he thought ``it was absolutely prudent'' going into Iraq. He went on to say: In fact, I think at the end of the inspection process, we'll paint a picture of Iraq that was far more dangerous than even we thought it was before the war. It was a system collapsing. It was a country that had the capability in weapons of mass destruction areas and in which terrorists, like ants to honey, were going after it. I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor.

Mr. BOND

Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I thank the deputy majority leader for his excellent comments. As a member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, I congratulate him on his very thorough and thoughtful discussion of the work of the Intelligence Committee. Last week, as we all recall, the committee released a remarkable report unanimously supported by the Democrat and Republican members of the committee. However, despite the findings of fact, which took a year of interviews by staff of over 200 people reviewing 15,000 documents, the campaign continues to attempt to politicize this process perfectly consistent with the political strategy memo uncovered last November designed by minority staff to show how the Intelligence Committee could be manipulated in order to hamper the President and his administration during the election year. The fact this is a time of war is apparently insufficient justification for leaving politics at the water's edge. No rule of law should ever stifle honest debate, discourse, or dissent in this country, but somewhere public leaders can recognize self-discipline can be a benefit to our troops and our Nation. I saw a report recently that in the 1944 election, as Republican candidate Thomas Dewey was set to blame President Roosevelt for what transpired at Pearl Harbor, General Marshall appealed to Dewey, arguing that the Nation should be united against the real enemy. Dewey acted on behalf of the country. I guess times were different then. In this country, we need to make sure our service men and women understand that while we can have our debate, we can demonstrate more disdain for the enemy than we have for the opposition party. Since Friday, we have heard the suggestions that the efforts of our troops to depose Saddam Hussein and set the long-term stage for peace and democracy in the most dangerous region in the world was not--yes, not--warranted. Besides being wrong, what kind of horrible message is this to send our troops and their families, not to mention the enemy, whose only hope is to win in Washington what they cannot win from our troops on the battlefield? If it is the will of this body that we cut and run, then let's debate and vote on it. Maybe we need a sense-of-the-Senate resolution, in any case, to send a message to our troops and the enemy that we intend to see this through. If we agree on it, as I believe we do, we should let our troops do what they are doing, and we should spend our time supporting their efforts, not retracting from their mission. Of course, we should be focused on the need to provide better intelligence, but some of us have been saying that since the 1970s when our intelligence collection was destroyed. Some of us had said that when we failed to predict the Iraqi Army would amass on the Kuwaiti border and when intelligence failed to predict they would cross over and overtake Kuwait and threaten Saudi Arabia. Some of us said that when we learned the estimates of Saddam Hussein's nuclear capability were not 5 to 10 years in the future but less than 1 year. All we need to know about the quality of intelligence in the region is to know we did not have one single agent on the ground. As said in today's editorial in Investor's Business Daily, intelligence spending was cut, the number of spies sharply dropped, so sharply, in fact, that after 9/11 the CIA had to create a 5-year plan to undo the damage. During President Clinton's two terms, the number of spies fell an estimated 20 percent, the budget tumbled by some estimates as much as 30 percent--it is classified--spy satellites got taken down, experienced analysts got fired. Well, much has been said of the pressure that policymakers allegedly put on the intelligence community to get hard answers to important questions. We just heard that repeated in the Chamber. They are talking about pressure to change the analysis. Let's go back to what the bipartisan committee unanimously concluded. Conclusion No. 11. Several of the allegations of pressure on the intelligence community analysts involved repeated questioning. The committee-- That is the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence-- believes that the intelligence community analysts should expect difficult and repeated questions regarding threat information. Just as the post-9/11 environment lowered the intelligence community's reporting threshold, it has also affected the intensity with which policymakers will review and question threat information. With respect to the Vice President, conclusion No. 84: The committee found no evidence that the Vice President's visits to the Central Intelligence Agency were attempts to pressure analysts, were perceived as intended to pressure analysts by those who participated in the briefings on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs or did pressure analysts to change their conclusions. Conclusion No. 102: The committee found that none of the analysts or other people interviewed by the committee said they were pressured to change their conclusions related to Iraq's links to terrorism. Now, talking to the people who work in the intelligence community, they are expected to get tough questions. They need to be able to defend what they have produced, and a good policymaker will challenge them not to change the evidence, and there was no evidence--zip, zero, none--of pressure to change. I ought to mention Ambassador Wilson's name was raised. The committee also found that his so-called review was inadequate and did not conclusively determine that there was not an effort--in fact, some analysts were led to conclude from what he brought back that it was more likely that Iraq was trying to get uranium from Africa, and I would refer my colleagues to Chairman Roberts' additional views. The partisan suggestions continue nevertheless, as administration officials are accused of making the same charges against Saddam's regime as the Senators themselves made in 1998 and during the debate for war which was overwhelmingly adopted in 2002. Candidates accuse our President and Vice President of having little swing with our so-called allies. Yet somehow they must have had enough swing to intimidate the English, French, Swiss, German, U.N. and Russian intelligence agencies to fall for the same WMD charge. This notion did not survive investigative scrutiny, and it does not survive common sense. Furthermore, it is a gross insult to analysts in the intelligence community to suggest they conform their views to the pleasure of policymakers. Again, I would draw the attention of my colleagues to yesterday's Wall Street Journal editorial on this subject, which says something that I said in the Chamber last Friday. A few apologies would seem to be in order. I think apologies are owed to the Vice President and to the administration. And yet we are still continuing to hear the same misguided, unsubstantiated charges made. Some Senators trying to win the White House away are criticizing the President for looking at the same intelligence they did and coming to the same conclusion they did. Is political victory more important than victory in Iraq? Has political victory become so important that some believe it necessary to divide America with this blame game while their sons and daughters are risking their lives abroad? If we are going to blame someone, I recommend we all agree to start with Saddam and bin Laden. Have we forgotten who the real enemy of peace, democracy, and humanity really is? Recall what President Clinton said who saw the intelligence in 1998. President Clinton said: The fact is that so long as Saddam remains in power, he threatens the well-being of his people, the peace of this region, the security of the world. The best way to end that threat once and for all is with the new Iraqi Government, a government ready to live in peace with its neighbors, a government that respects the rights of its people. Saddam will strike again at his neighbors and he will make war on his own people, and mark my words, he will develop weapons of mass destruction. He will deploy them and he will use them. My colleague, the deputy majority leader from Kentucky, has already pointed out the words of the Senators in this body, and I agree with him and I endorse that reference. But as we focus to the point of obsession on intelligence--and we must make it better if we are to stop future acts of terror--we cannot leave behind our own personal intelligence. We do not exist to swallow whole what the intelligence community feeds us. Sometimes they are wrong, sometimes lazy, but most of the time they work tirelessly under dangerous conditions and are dead right, and other times their guesses, which is much of what intelligence is all about, may not be as good as ours. But in the case of Saddam, who in this body needed a CIA report to understand that the man and his despicable sons set to lead Iraq through the first half of the new century? Ordinary citizens need not have a security clearance but need only to have watched or read the news over the previous 20 years. What don't we know about this man's evil intention, his hatred for the U.S., his willingness not only to pursue but use weapons of mass destruction? Is his track record of insanity meaningless? By the time a crazed maniac invades two foreign countries, defies repeatedly the mandates of the U.N., fires missiles at Israel, fires missiles at our patrol aircraft, pays suicide bombers to blow up innocent women and children, not only builds and stockpiles weapons of mass destruction but uses them, fills mass graves by the tens of thousands, attempts to assassinate our former President, and suggests that perhaps his only regret in 1990 was not waiting a few more months so he would have the nuclear capability to confront our troops, what else do we really need to know about this man? Do we really need the CIA to introduce Saddam to the Senate? Can it be true that there is this signal that unless WMD are found, Saddam is somehow acquitted? Look at the thousands and thousands of people he killed with the WMD. In retrospect, many things are more clear, including that we would have been better off taking care of him in 1991, but in post-9/11 could we really afford to trust him, to let him continue to fester indefinitely? Were we prepared to wait until the threat was imminent? President Bush said we can't wait until the threat is imminent, meaning to wait until the threat is executed which is too late. We didn't know his invasion of Kuwait was imminent until we saw his tanks through the dust of the Kuwaiti desert. We knew bin Laden was a threat but the threat did not appear imminent until after the USS Cole was bombed, after the embassies were bombed, after the towers were dropped, killing 3,000 innocent Americans. While it may be lost on some perhaps in this body, but in our national news media, the burdens of leadership are not lost on this President. While no one else may see the irony, President Bush does. He sees a 9/11 commission asking: Why didn't the administration act on sketchy intelligence at the very same time some on the other side are asking why did the administration act on sketchy intelligence? The first investigation answers the second to anyone sitting in the hottest political seat in America. Meanwhile, the hottest job abroad is being faithfully executed by our soldiers, marines, airmen, and civilian support personnel. I am proud my son is a marine who expects to get his turn to serve in the sandbox. I want him to return safely, but I want him to win, and I want our troops abroad to win, and I want them to know that America is behind them and to know that addressing the most dangerous nation in the most dangerous region of the world makes this world safer because it will if Washington will let it. Winning the real war on terror is more important than winning the political war for the White House. We want to win the war on terror and we must. The continued charges of pressure and misinformation are totally off the mark based on what the Intelligence Committee found. There is no question that we are better off. The region is safer, the Iraqi people are much safer, and we in the United States are much safer because we have deposed Saddam Hussein, because we have enacted the PATRIOT Act, because we have pursued very vigorously the war on terror. We ought to be strengthening that war, supporting our troops, supporting our agencies here at home and not trying to phony up charges of pressure to win political points. I ask unanimous consent that two editorials, one from the Wall Street Journal and one from Investor's Business Daily, be printed in the Record.

Mr. BOND. I yield the floor.

Mr. BOND

Mr. BOND. I thank the Senator.

Mr. BOND

Mr. BOND. Madam President, I understand we will be going back and forth. I wondered, because I have a time schedule, if I might ask unanimous consent that after the Senator from Vermont speaks--might I ask how long he plans to speak?

Mr. BOND. Might I ask that I be recognized for 5 minutes and then the previous order, which was for the Senator from Texas and the Senator from Alabama to be recognized.

Mr. BOND. I ask unanimous consent to make such a request.

Mr. BOND. Following the Senator from Vermont.

Mr. BOND

Mr. BOND. Madam President, I am very pleased to announce that today, about 90 minutes ago, the report of the Select Committee on Intelligence on the pre-Iraq war has finally been released. We were bound not to talk about it until it was released at 10:30 today. Our staff has done an excellent job reviewing 15,000 documents and 200 witnesses, going back time and again to get the facts straight. We came up with the unanimous conclusions that I think this body and our friends around the country, including the media, ought to pay attention to what is actually in that report. Some of my colleagues spent yesterday talking about the report and putting their spin on it. I have been very distressed that the spin had nothing to do with the facts that are actually in the report. It is a lengthy report. For the benefit of my colleagues who have not been on the Intelligence Committee, let me tell you a couple of things that were in the report. First, the intelligence used by the President, the Vice President, the chairman, and ranking member of the Intelligence Committee, the chairman and ranking member of the Armed Services Committee, along with the rest of us, was the intelligence given to them by the CIA. This was intelligence given to them through three administrations. On the basis of that, on the floor the statement was made on September 19, 2002: We begin with the common belief that Saddam Hussein is a tyrant and a threat to the peace and stability of the region. He has ignored the mandate of the United Nations and is building weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivering them. Senator Levin stated that. On October 10, 2002: There is unmistakable evidence that Saddam Hussein is working aggressively to develop nuclear weapons and will likely have nuclear weapons within the next 5 years. We also should remember we have always underestimated the progress Saddam has made in the development of weapons of mass destruction. Senator Jay Rockefeller stated that. These were conclusions that came from the best intelligence we had available, that other intelligence agencies had available. Actually, if you look at it, Iraqi Survey Group leader David Kay, when he came back to the United States, said we know that Iraq was a far more dangerous place, even than we had learned from our intelligence because of other things that were going on that were not fully reported. We identified problems in this report. There was no human intelligence, which you absolutely need. There was faulty analysis in sharing of information among the various agencies. Some analysts did not fully qualify the information that was not confirmed. But despite the breathless headlines, despite the political charges that are being made on the other side of the aisle, no one was pressured to change judgments or reach specific judgments. In fact, the committee interviewed over 200 people, searching, searching, and searching for those who might be pressured. Chairman Roberts asked repeatedly, publicly and in hearings, that anybody who had information on pressure to change conclusions, come forward. Nobody did. They chased rabbits all through every brush pile that could be imagined. Anybody who had an idea of pressure was challenged. Do you know what they found? There was tremendous pressure on the analysts because they had not put together the right information prior to 9/11. They felt pressure, but they all said it was pressure to get it right. They said it is the job of the intelligence community to respond to the most searching questions of the people, the policymakers who use it. Let me cite three conclusions from the report, which I think are very important on intelligence. From page 284: conclusion 83: The committee did not find any evidence that administration officials attempted to coerce, influence, or pressure analysts to change their judgments related to Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capabilities. Page 285, conclusion 84: The committee found no evidence that the Vice President's visits to the Central Intelligence Agency were attempts to pressure analysts, were perceived as intended to pressure analysts by those who participated in the briefings of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs, or did pressure analysts to change their assessments. On page 359, conclusion 102: The committee found that none of the analysts or other people interviewed by the committee said they were pressured to change their conclusions related to Iraq's links to terrorism. After 9/11, analysts were under tremendous pressure to make correct assessments to avoid missing a credible threat and to avoid an intelligence failure. These are the findings upon which we unanimously agreed. I think the Vice President and others who have been politically maligned are entitled to an apology. Do you know what this all comes back to? This comes back to a plan that we learned about on November 6, 2003. I have in my mind a FOX News report on this memo from a Democratic staffer. Nobody has denied it. In fact, they are playing their plays out of that game book now. It talks about: No. 1: Pull the majority along as far as we can on issues that may lead to major new disclosures. . . . No. 2: Assiduously prepare Democratic ``additional views'' to attach to any interim or final reports. . . . No. 3: We will identify the most exaggerated claims and contrast them with the intelligence estimates that have since been declassified. Our additional views will also, among other things, castigate the majority for seeking to limit the scope of the inquiry. That is exactly what the game plan is that they are following. When you look at the conclusion, the summary of that memo, it says: Intelligence issues are clearly secondary to the public's concern regarding the insurgency in Iraq. Yet, we have an important role to play in revealing the misleading--if not flagrantly dishonest methods and motives--of senior administration officials who made the case for a unilateral, preemptive war. The approach outlined above seems to offer the best prospects for exposing the administration's dubious motives and methods. I ask unanimous consent that be printed in the Record following my statement.

Mr. BOND. To sum it up, we are at war with terrorists. The terrorists were in Iraq. They had access to the weapons of mass destruction that Saddam Hussein had produced in the past and were willing to produce in the future. We have received increased briefings on recent threats in the United States. The greatest danger we fear is that Saddam Hussein, had we not taken him out, would be supplying those terrorists with chemical and biological weapons. Our troops remain under fire, but some on this floor and some commentators I have heard seem to be more interested in politicizing the problems in the Intelligence Committee rather than getting at the root of the problem. I hope we can put these partisan charges aside because there is much work to do to improve the gathering, the analysis, and the dissemination of intelligence. For the good of this country, we need to put behind us this partisan effort to fingerpoint and make accusations that have been explicitly disabused and disavowed by this intelligence report. I commend the staff of the Intelligence Committee. I thank the many thousands of dedicated people in the intelligence community who are doing their best, under difficult circumstances, to get information under systems that were not adequate for the needs at the time. We need to build a system where we get human intelligence, where we analyze it better, and where we share it among agencies that we have not done adequately in the past. I thank my colleagues from Texas and Alabama for their courtesy. Exhibit 1 Raw Data: Dem Memo on Iraq Intel [From FOX News, Nov. 6, 2003] We have carefully reviewed our options under the rules and believe we have identified the best approach. Our plan is as follows: (1) Pull the majority along as far as we can on issues that may lead to major new disclosures regarding improper or questionable conduct by administration officials. We are having some success in that regard. For example, in addition to the president's State of the Union speech, the chairman has agreed to look at the activities of the Office of the Secretary of Defense as well as Secretary Bolton's office at the State Department. The fact that the chairman supports our investigations into these offices and co-signs our requests for information is helpful and potentially crucial. We don't know what we will find but our prospects for getting the access we seek is far greater when we have the backing of the majority. (Note: we can verbally mention some of the intriguing leads we are pursuing.) (2) Assiduously prepare Democratic ``additional views'' to attach to any interim or final reports the committee may release. Committee rules provide this opportunity and we intend to take full advantage of it. In that regard, we have already compiled all the public statements on Iraq made by senior administration officials. We will identify the most exaggerated claims and contrast them with the intelligence estimates that have since been declassified. Our additional views will also, among other things, castigate the majority for seeking to limit the scope of the inquiry. The Democrats will then be in a strong position to reopen the question of establishing an independent commission (i.e. the Corzine amendment). (3) Prepare to launch an independent investigation when it becomes clear we have exhausted the opportunity to usefully collaborate with the majority. We can pull the trigger on an independent investigation at any time--but we can only do so once. The best time to do so will probably be next year either: (A) After we have already released our additional views on an interim report--thereby providing as many as three opportunities to make our case to the public: (1) additional views on the interim report; (2) announcement of our independent investigation; and (3) additional views on the final investigation; or (B) Once we identify solid leads the majority does not want to pursue. We could attract more coverage and have greater credibility in that context than one in which we simply launch an independent investigation based on principled but vague notions regarding the ``use'' of intelligence. In the meantime, even without a specifically authorized independent investigation, we continue to act independently when we encounter foot-dragging on the part of the majority. For example, the FBI Niger investigation was done solely at the request of the vice chairman; we have independently submitted written questions to DoD; and we are preparing further independent requests for information. summary Intelligence issues are clearly secondary to the public's concern regarding the insurgency in Iraq. Yet, we have an important role to play in the revealing the misleading--if not flagrantly dishonest methods and motives--of the senior administration officials who made the case for a unilateral, preemptive war. The approach outline above seems to offer the best prospect for exposing the administration's dubious motives and methods.

Mr. BOND

Mr. BOND. Madam President, on behalf of the manager of the nomination, the Senator from Indiana, I yield myself 5 minutes.

Mr. BOND. Madam President, it is a privilege to rise today to commend to this body the confirmation of an individual whom I have had the honor of calling a colleague for over 30 years, and someone Members of this body have known for a long time. That is our good friend, former Senator John C. Danforth. There was something very delicious about the fact that the clerk noted he will become Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. That kind of sums it up. Jack Danforth is an outstanding individual who will be having great responsibilities serving the United States as Ambassador at the United Nations. Most of us who are familiar with Jack know of his many accomplishments and attributes. But there is one quality that always comes to mind when you ask people what do you know about or what do you think about when you think of Jack Danforth? The people who have worked with him and have had an opportunity to watch him would say one word: integrity. This is a man of great integrity, as well as dedication and compassion, and even a dry sense of humor, when appropriate. Senator Danforth was born in St. Louis County and graduated from St. Louis Country Day High School. He graduated from Princeton University in 1958, and then Yale University Law School and Divinity School in 1963. He was admitted to practice in New York in 1963, and that same year he was ordained as part of the clergy of the Episcopal Church. As we all recently saw, he participated in the services honoring our late, great President Ronald Reagan. I have been to many services conducted by Rev. John C. Danforth. One that particularly affected this body was the memorial service for our late colleague, John Heinz, the Senator from Pennsylvania. I can tell you, when we went to Pittsburgh for those services, there were many very deeply hurt and troubled Senators. There is not much one would think could be said, but Jack Danforth was able to bring us together and give us hope and help lighten the burden of that loss. In addition, obviously, to being a clergyman, Jack began his political career in 1969, serving as Attorney General of Missouri, using his legal background. I had the privilege to serve as an assistant attorney general under him and was grateful for the opportunity to be there, to learn the high standards he set and demanded not only for himself but for everybody who worked for him. In the Senate, to which he was elected in 1976, he served as chairman of the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation. He served on the Finance Committee and undertook many important responsibilities. He was a leader in the passage of the civil rights legislation that was enacted by the Congress. He went back to Missouri to resume the practice of law in St. Louis. Really, I think he went back to spend more time with his wonderful wife Sally, who is a tremendous friend to many of us who have a chance to know her, and his grandchildren, and also to watch Cardinal baseball. Jack was called upon by President Bush to broker peace in the civil war in Sudan that had claimed some 2 million lives. He worked tirelessly and committed himself to improving the lives of others. He demonstrated once again to the U.S.--and this time to the world--his ability to understand and simplify complex political problems. About 2 weeks ago, he called me at my home in Missouri and said: The President asked me to take on another assignment. I said: Jack, I hope it is not as dangerous an assignment as Sudan. He said: No, he asked me to be representative to the United Nations. I said: I think that may be less dangerous, I am not sure. We certainly hope it will be. But I told him I could not think of someone who is better able to serve the United States. When our reputation and status in the world is being questioned--I happen to think unfairly and incorrectly--it is a matter of fact that we need a man of Jack Danforth's fairness and integrity to represent us in the U.N., to reach out to other nations. He will know when to assert our Nation's sovereignty and how to do so with a spirit of humbleness and cooperation, as he has shown me. I ask this body to confirm him unanimously. I suggest the absence of a quorum and ask that the time be charged equally to both sides.

Mr. BOND

Mr. BOND. Mr. President, it is well recognized that mail sent from families and loved ones to U.S. forces based overseas has a tangible effect on troop morale. Concomitantly, mail that is delayed unnecessarily undermines morale and furthermore endangers the ability of absentee military voters to have their votes counted. Additionally, voting assistance programs that are ineffective undermine the ability of the absentee military voter to cast a vote. In an effort to improve these respective programs I have encouraged the Department of Defense to evaluate the effectiveness of the Military Postal Service Agency and the Voting Assistance Program to determine if these programs are sufficient in scope to resolve the problems that have been identified repeatedly in past reports and audits.

Mr. BOND

Mr. BOND. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. BOND

Mr. BOND. Mr. President, it is a pleasure to speak in support of a distinguished Missourian, my good friend Duane Benton, to serve on the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Judge Benton is a respected jurist and committed public servant. I am very pleased the Senate is taking action on Judge Benton for this important position. The Members voting on this nomination, after reviewing his many accomplishments, will find Judge Benton to have an impressive record of public service and an exemplary judicial record and conclude that he will make an excellent addition to the federal judiciary. Judge Benton currently serves on the Supreme Court of the State of Missouri. Judge Benton was appointed to the court in 1991, and also has served as its chief judge. Judge Benton has earned a reputation as a judge with a distinguished intellect who has a skill for uniting his colleagues on difficult questions. His work ethic, approach and reasoning are highly regarded by the lawyers of Missouri. In addition to his service on the judiciary, Judge Benton brings an impressive breadth of experience to this position. His experience coupled with his judicial record give him a command of a wide range of legal matters. Judge Benton is a Certified Public Accountant--the only CPA serving on any supreme court in the United States. Judge Benton was Missouri's chief tax expert, serving as director of the Missouri Department of Revenue. Judge Benton was member of the United States Navy, serving as a judge advocate for a number of years. Judge Benton earned his degree at Northwestern University; his law degree at Yale University School of Law, where he also served as editor of the Yale Law Journal; a Masters of Business Administration at Memphis State University and a Masters of Law at the University of Virginia. Judge Benton has also found time to be active in the communities in which he has lived. While his activities are too numerous to name, he has given his time from coaching baseball to serving on the Board of Regents for Central Missouri State University. He retired from the U.S. Naval Reserve as a captain, after 30 years of active and reserve duty. He is a Vietnam veteran, a member of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the American Legion, the Navy League, the Vietnam Veterans of America and the Missouri Military Advisory Committee. The U.S. Court of Appeals is truly the second most important court in the land. Nearly every Federal case ends up before the court in some manner. Its decisions impact every aspect of society. To these positions, I believe it is imperative that the President nominate people of distinguished intellect and character with a breadth of legal experience. This standard has been far surpassed with the nomination of Judge Benton. With his knowledge and experience, he will make an outstanding addition to the Federal judiciary.

Mr. BOND

Mr. BOND. Mr. President, today I would like to recognize Mr. William Greenblatt, a man whose accomplishments are a true testament to what a business and community leader should be, as he celebrates his fiftieth birthday on June 9, 2004. Mr. Greenblatt began his career providing photography services for commercial, industrial, public relations and non-profit organizations including the City of St. Louis, Make-A-Wish Foundation, United Way, and American Heart Association. He also serves as the St. Louis Fire Department's photographer recreating fire scene construction and investigations as well as documenting training and incidents. During Mr. Greenblatt's career, he has had the honor of being the official photographer for many of Missouri's most prominent Federal, State, and local politicians, as well as St. Louis artists Nelly and Toya. In addition to his services at United Press International, he has contributed to numerous publications such as the Chicago Tribune, Los Angeles Times, Newsweek Magazine, New York Times, and the Washington Post. Mr. Greenblatt has dedicated both his professional and personal life to the betterment of his community. He has served on several non-profit boards as well as being a member of several professional organizations including the St. Louis Regional Chamber and Growth Association, St. Louis Journalism Review Board of Editorial Advisors, Urban League of Metropolitan St. Louis, and the James S. McDonnell Board of Directors. Throughout his service, Mr. Greenblatt has been honored with several achievements including placing in the Baseball Hall of Fame Photo Contest, Certificate of Appreciation from the City of St. Louis Emergency Management Agency, Outstanding Citizen Award. Mr. Greenblatt has a distinguished record of service in his public and private life. I would like to thank him for his dedication to his profession as well as his contributions to the St. Louis Community. On behalf of Missouri, I wish him a happy 50th birthday.

Mr. BOND

Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I call up amendment No. 3384 and ask unanimous consent to incorporate the modifications that are at the desk.