Richard Bryan

Mr. BRYAN

Mr. BRYAN. Mr. President, I make the same request.

Mr. BRYAN. Mr. President, a matter that I would like to clarify with the bill's lead sponsor, Senator Simon, involves two interrelated issues regarding the Commission's study of the role of advertising in promoting gaming. First, unlike the Commission's other areas of study, advertising is a constitutionally protected right of communication between buyers and sellers of legal products. Second, the Federal Government, through the Federal Trade Commission, already exercises broad enforcement and regulatory authority over false and deceptive advertisements in general, including those for gaming. My question to my colleague is whether the Commission will be mindful of the unique first amendment liberties for advertising, and of the FTC's already existing regulatory authority over false and deceptive advertising when the Commission assesses and evaluates the impact of gaming advertisements.

Mr. BRYAN. Mr. President, I would like to register my strong opposition to S. 704, the Gaming Impact Study Commission Act. While this bill is improved over the egregious version that passed the House, I still believe this is a waste of taxpayer's money and has the potential of becoming a witch-hunt instead of a legitimate study. If this turns into a witch-hunt, it could have a chilling effect on leglaized gaming nationwide and have a devasting effect on the economy of my State of Nevada. Advocates of legislation to create a Federal Gambling Study Commission have stated the purpose of the commission is to study the socioeconomic effects of all forms of gambling and to make recommendations to Congress. They consistently emphasize that no one, least of all the legal gaming industry, should fear just a study. While the gaming-entertainment industry has nothing to fear from a fair and unbiased study, anti-gaming groups have tried to skew this study into looking at only one side of the issue and to turn this into a crusade. The argument has been advanced that a Federal commission is needed to look at the impacts of the spread of gaming because State and local governments lack the ability to acquire and act on objective information in the face of well-financed attempts to put casinos or other gaming-entertainment operations in their area. The reason why this premise is false is that even without the assistance of a Federal commission, jurisdiction after jurisdiction has actually decided not to approve an expansion of gaming. No State has approved new casino gaming for several years. For example, 7 of 10 gaming initiatives were defeated in 1994 and no new casino gaming or video poker was approved by a new jurisdiction in 1995. The proposed commission is a Federal solution in search of a nonexistent State problem: States are free to make their own decisions on whether to permit gaming, one way or another. Still others attack legalized gaming as some insidious form of entertainment that must be banned. The fact is today the legalized gaming industry is as legitimate a business as any of the Fortune 500. More than 50 publicly-traded companies, all regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission, own gaming interests. The stocks of these companies are owned by millions of Americans around the country. The gaming-entertainment industry directly and indirectly employs over one million people throughout the United States, paying $6 billion in salaries in 1994 alone. The casino gaming-entertainment industry paid more than $1.4 billion in taxes to State and local governments in 1994 with an estimated $6 to $7 billion more paid by other forms of gaming-entertainment, such as State lotteries, horse and dog racing. Nevada is proud to be the gaming-entertainment capital of the world. Nevada's gaming industry provides 43 percent of the $1.2 billion annually going into the State's general fund. About $215 million from gaming revenues is dedicated to the State's university system and another $400 million goes to kindergarten through grade 12 education programs. None of this is to suggest that the gaming-entertainment industry, like any other major business, particularly one which hosts millions of visitors each year, does not have its share of public issues and challenges to address. The industry, to its credit, is making a serious effort to address concerns about problem gaming. For example, the industry recently made a multi-million dollar commitment to a new national center for responsible gaming which last week chose the Harvard Medical School's division of addiction for a $140,000 grant to study problem gaming. This all leads me back to the question of why we need to spend taxpayers dollars to study gaming. Again, this bill is better than the House version which contains an openended, unrestricted authority for the commission to issue subpoenas. In the House version, there are almost no protections on what could be subpoenaed and what they could do with this information. I do not believe gaming is appropriate for all locations. Each community should weigh the merits and decide if they want gaming, and if they do, what types of gaming and under what conditions do they want it. I am concerned that in certain jurisdictions gaming is not being adequately regulated. Nevada's gaming industry is closely monitored with the State regulatory body employing 375 individuals. Unless the regulation is improved in certain jurisdictions, including Indian casinos, we may see problems down the line. We should make it a priority to improve this regulation. I regret some groups have seized this issue to make a full court press against all gaming. Gaming-entertainment is a legitimate, highly- regulated industry that is being unfairly maligned. It has made significant contributions to the Nation's economy and I am proud of the benefits it has brought Nevada.

Mr. BRYAN

Mr. BRYAN. I yield myself such time as I may need. Mr. President, during the course of the debate on S. 1936, as it has resonated across this Chamber today and earlier, a contention has been advanced that indeed S. 1936 is a much improved form of its predecessor, S. 1271, because it has been asserted that there is the full application of the National Environmental Policy Act, one of these very important pieces of legislation which earlier I had described as an essential part of the environmental protection fabric that protects all Americans. I invite my colleagues to read this bill, as I know they all have or will before casting their vote. Here is what it says about the National Environmental Policy Act, and particularly an environmental impact statement. It provides for an environmental impact statement. So far so good. Then it goes on to say: But the Secretary shall not consider the need for an interim storage facility, shall not consider the time of the initial availability of the interim storage, shall not consider any alternatives to the storage of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste, shall not consider any alternatives to the site of the facility, shall not consider any alternatives to the design of the criteria. Mr. President, that is what an environmental impact statement is all about, to consider the range of options that may be available and to ascertain which of those may be the preferable course of action. So, for it to be contended that the National Environmental Policy Act is protected and provided for in this bill would be equivalent to asserting that the Bill of Rights is fully applicable, however, we have deleted the right of free speech, we have deleted the right of freedom of religion, we have deleted the right of bail, we have deleted the right to counsel. In effect you have nothing, you have absolutely nothing. So that, again, Mr. President, is one of the more compelling arguments that brings every national environmental leader in America to the conclusion that enacting this piece of legislation, S. 1936, would savage the environmental protections which Americans have sought and enjoyed for more than two decades. It would, in effect, preempt State and other Federal laws, such as those depicted behind me on the chart. And it would, in effect, so restrict the Environmental Policy Act as to make those kinds of analyses almost worthless. Let me turn to one other issue, fairly briefly, before I conclude. That is the question of standards. S. 1936, among its more astounding provisions is something that is pretty technical but something that affects the health and safety of every Nevadan. We are talking about the radioactive emissions standards. Those standards are measured, in terms of exposure, in terms of millirems. What this bill provides is for an annual dose of 100 millirems. So 100 millirems is the standard which is set under the provisions of this bill. Now, 100 millirems--Mr. President, the Safe Drinking Water Act provides for a standard of 4 millirems. The EPA has set that standard. For WIPP, that is a facility in New Mexico that receives or is scheduled to receive transuranic waste, that provides for a 15-millirem standard. The National Academy of Sciences, in terms of its range of exposures, recommends 10 to 30 millirems. This piece of legislation has the audacity to say that 100 millirems is the standard for those of us in Nevada. Absolutely outrageous. We have heard earlier in this Congress from our colleagues from New Mexico, who have been concerned about the health and safety of New Mexicans. One can certainly understand that. On the 20th of June of this year, Senator Domenici arose and made the comment: ``What is most important to us,'' referring to himself and his colleague, Senator Bingaman, ``and what is most important to the people of New Mexico is that as this underground facility proceeds,'' referring to the WIPP facility, ``to the point where it may be opened and finally be a repository, that it be subject to the Environmental Protection Agency's most strict requirements with reference to health and safety.'' Let me make that point again. Senator Domenici is absolutely right. What he and his colleague were saying is that before the transuranic waste is received at the WIPP facility in New Mexico, the New Mexico Senators want to be assured, in order to protect the health and safety of their constituents, residents of the State of New Mexico, that the Environmental Protection Agency's most stringent requirements with reference to health and safety be imposed. Now, that strikes me as being very reasonable. Throughout that particular take, the distinguished senior Senator kept emphasizing the importance of leaving those standards in place and giving the EPA the ability to make such determinations. That, I submit, is sound policy. By what standard of logic, by what reasoning process, what kind of analytical, convoluted reasoning would lead to a conclusion that that is the reasonable standard to be applied in New Mexico-- that is, let the EPA set the standard--but somehow in Nevada, which is targeted for high-level nuclear waste, for us, ought to be 100 millirems? That simply makes no sense at all, none, absolutely none, and it is outrageous. Consistent with an evolving pattern of conduct, in 1992, as I was commenting earlier in my speech today, the nuclear utilities in the energy act that was enacted that year, circuitously sought to deprive the EPA of the ability to set the standard in Nevada should it become the recipient of nuclear waste. To refresh the recollection of my colleagues, that energy bill was processed with a number of amendments both in the House and on the floor of the Senate, and not a day of hearing was held with respect to the standards for nuclear waste in Nevada. In the conference, where an attempt is made to reconcile differences between the Senate version and the House version, a provision is inserted that did deprive the EPA of setting the standard--the very thing that Senator Domenici and Senator Bingaman, rightly, and we all agree on the floor, needed for their protection in New Mexico in the transuranic facility. Namely, to make sure that the EPA sets the most stringent standard for health and safety. Now, under the artifice of the conferenced process, the EPA is deprived of jurisdiction. My senior colleague and I pointed that out on the floor. I believe it is fair to say that most every colleague that we talked to agreed with our provision that it was absolutely scandalous that an attempt would be made to deprive the EPA of its ability to exercise its independent judgment to fix that standard. We were locked into a parliamentary situation that was inescapable. The energy bill contained a number of very desirable provisions totally unrelated to the Nevada situation. Because in a conference we were unable to get an amendment to delete that provision, my colleague and I fought valiantly but unsuccessfully in terms of killing that bill. Now, I share that background because the pattern I have described, if you do not like what the scientists you have empowered to make a decision tell you, then you ignore them. That is what occurred that so angered the nuclear utilities, when they were asked, as part of the Nuclear Technical Review Board to make some judgments, and they concluded there was no crisis, no urgency, no need whatever to have interim storage at this time. That was their conclusion. That does not fit with the strategy and the desire of the nuclear utilities, so immediately, in this legislation, S. 1936, they are legislatively spanked, and their jurisdiction authority is restricted. Now we have the National Academy of Sciences. They are inserted in place of the EPA in the 1992 Energy Act and they are instructed to come back with their own report. Mr. President, they did. In a document entitled, ``Technical Bases for Yucca Mountain Standards,'' some of the more eminent scientists of our time: Robert W. Fri, chair, Resources for the Future, Washington, D.C.; John F. Ahearne, Sigma Xi, the Scientific Research Society, Research Triangle Park, N.C.; Jean M. Bahr, University of Wisconsin, Madison; R. Darryl Banks, World Resources Institute, Washington, D.C.; Robert J. Budnitz, Future Resources Associates, Berkeley, CA; Sol Burstein, Wisconsin Electric Power, Milwaukee (retired); Melvin W. Carter, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta (professor emeritus); Charles Fairhurst, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis; Charles McCombie, National Cooperative for the Disposal of Radioactive Waste, Wettingen, Switzerland; Fred M. Phillips, New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology, Socorro; Thomas H. Pigford, University of California, Berkeley, Oakland (professor emeritus); Arthur C. Upton, New Mexico School of Medicine, Santa Fe; Chris G. Whipple, ICF Kaiser Engineers, Oakland, CA; Gilbert F. White, University of Colorado, Boulder; and Susan D. Wiltshire, JK Research Associates, Inc., Beverly, MA. I mention those names so my colleagues and those who are listening to the debate will know there are no Nevadans. These are scientists. Here is what they said in response to the 1992 amendment that was interjected into the conference. Let me make a line-by-line comparison with what we have in S. 1936. My colleagues will note it indicates S. 1271, but S. 1936 makes no change at all. On the left side, Form of Standard, Level of Standard, Who Is To Be Protected--that is the classification. The top, NAS Recommendation, is the product of the scientists whose names I have read. On the far right would be what this piece of legislation does. Form of standard recommended by the National Academy of Sciences is to be risk based. What does S. 1836 provide? Mr. President, 100 millirem a year, set by statute. We talked at some length about that a moment ago. Level of standard: The National Academy says no specific recommendation, but points out internationally recognized consensus is between 5 millirem and 30 millirem a year. Let me just interject that is a standard that is rather universally acclaimed. I believe that every country that has considered that standard, and we will share the names of those countries that have nuclear power in Europe and have adopted a standard that is within that range or even less. Who is to be protected? ``Critical group''--a small, relatively homogenous group whose location and habits are representative of those expected to receive the highest doses. S. 1936 is a much more restricted standard. A person whose physiology, age, general health, agricultural practices, eating habits and social behavior represent the average for persons living in the vicinity of the site. Extremes in social behavior, eating habits or other relevant practices or characteristics shall not be considered. Then the question goes on as to how long must a standard be met, because we are talking about something that is lethal for thousands and thousands of years. I might point out in the recorded history of civilization, no society that we are aware of has ever built or designed anything that has lasted for 10,000 years. It is a marvel to the modern world, as it certainly was to the ancient world, some of the impressive architectural achievements achieved by the ancients--the pyramids, the Colossus of Rhodes, the Hanging Gardens of Babylon, the Parthenon, and many others are all architectural wonders that today even in our sophisticated time, we marvel and admire. But none of those have existed for 10,000 years. So how long a standard must be met is particularly significant to the health and safety of those persons who will be living in that area generations from now. The National Academy of Sciences says, ``The repository should be required to meet a standard during a period of greatest risk''--no scientific basis for limiting the time period to 10,000 years or any other value. What do we have in this piece of legislation? A thousand years. Let me skip and go down to a couple more here. The human intrusion standard. The National Academy of Sciences said, ``No scientific basis for assuming there would be no human intrusion. The performance of the repository having been intruded upon should be assessed using the same analytical methods and assumptions, including those about the biosphere and critical groups used in the assessment or performance for the undisturbed case.'' What does S. 1936 direct? ``The statute instructs the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to assume that human intrusion will not take place.'' As to how to resolve public policy issues raised by the standard, here is the recommendation of the National Academy of Sciences: ``We recommend that resolution of policy issues be done through a rulemaking process that allows opportunity for wide-ranging input from all interested parties.'' You do not have to be an eminent scientist to believe that that is reasonable. That is a process that allows an opportunity for people to be heard, to express a viewpoint. S. 1936 says, ``No public comment allowed.'' So, as you can see, S. 1936 evolved and is part of a pattern that ought to be patently obvious to any observer. Once again, the Congress invites a distinguished scientific group to make its recommendations, and if the recommendations are not to the liking of the nuclear utility industry and not to the liking of the industry because they impose some reasonably stringent standards to protect health and safety, we trash them, we ignore them and say, ``Oops, sorry we asked. We had no idea you would tell us we had to do that to provide the very basic components of health and safety.'' And so, by way of a concluding observation, before yielding to my colleague for him to continue his comments and observations, this bill, from an environmental and public health safety perspective, is an embarrassment, it is a travesty, it is a legislative abomination, it is an assault upon the health and safety and dignity of human life. It applies only to those of us in Nevada, who are targeted to receive this eye-level nuclear waste. By what standard of fairness, by what standard of objectivity can it be defended or justified that one small area in America be set apart, and that it be advocated that the panoply of protections provided under the environmental laws of our country should have no application to them if they in any way conflict with the nuclear utilities' desire to pursue, as embodied in S. 1936? What is the moral justification of rejecting the recommendations of an objective body of scientists, who have said, ``These are the standards that we recommend, in terms of exposure, for those persons who may be living in the vicinity"? They are rejected out of hand and simply ignored. So not only is this, from a public policy point of view, indefensible, not only does it legally deprive Nevadans of their rights and their health and protection, it is morally flawed as well, because it suggests implicitly that somehow those of us who, by birth or choice, have chosen to make our homes in Nevada should be treated separate and apart from other Americans, and our health and safety is less important than those who live in New Mexico or in other States-- all with the singular goal in mind of advancing the interests of the powerful special interest lobby, which is relentless in its purpose, and that is the nuclear utility industry, as they seek to foist their nuclear waste upon those of us in Nevada. I yield the floor.

Mr. BRYAN. I thank the Chair. Mr. President, I want to begin this afternoon by trying to give a graphic example of what it is that we fear if we do not have the adequate safeguards and protections, which, in my view, and in the view of the administration and many of my colleagues, are simply not present in the legislation before us, S. 1936. We frequently speak of nuclear waste in the abstract, as if it is something that is esoteric and scientific, and, indeed, the very description of what constitutes nuclear waste is a bit convoluted. So I want to describe the situation that occurred in the State of the distinguished Senator from Idaho to give you an idea just how lethal and deadly this stuff is. We are not talking now just about something that is kind of distasteful, kind of unpleasant, a little bit risky, something that we do not want any mishap to occur because it would be terribly inconvenient or expensive to clean it up. We are talking about something that is life threatening, something that lasts for tens of thousands of years--tens of thousands of years. A very tragic accident occurred in Idaho Falls in January of 1961. There were three young servicemen who were working on a reactor. Nobody contemplated that there would be a serious problem. They were adjusting some control rods. All of a sudden, the reactor went critical. The alarms were set off. All kinds of security measures were initiated. The emergency response team, such as they were, responded. The search began for the three men who had been working with the reactor. Wearing protective clothing, they entered the facility. What they found was a horrifying situation. I will just talk about one of the three because I think it makes the point. One of the men who was missing was a gentleman by the name of McKinley. Upon looking into the building, they found that he was pinned to the ceiling by a control rod. He was dead. His body was highly contaminated with nuclear waste. The others were found saturated with highly contaminated water from the reactor. Particles of fuel had penetrated their skin resulting in large open wounds due to the blast effect. In trying to extricate these men from their entombment, everything had to be treated as if it were high-level waste because it in fact was high-level waste. So all of the protective gear had to be employed. Even the solemn act of burying, paying last respects to a loved one involved some extraordinary procedures, because as a result of this explosion--an accident; nobody wanted it to happen. Nobody thought it would happen. It had never happened before. How many times have we heard that about an accident? ``It never happened before. We did not think it would occur. We never dreamed this could happen. How in the world could something like this have happened? How could we have foreseen the consequence?'' So this accident that occurred in early 1961 clearly falls within that. But the body of the deceased had itself become high-level nuclear waste. In the cemetery in which he was emplaced, it was encased in 12 inches of poured concrete and placed in 3 feet of packed Earth around it because the remains, decomposed, of that body would remain highly contaminated, dangerous, itself per se high-level nuclear waste, for all intents and purposes to the end of time, for thousands and thousands of years. So when we talk about the dangers of nuclear waste, we are talking about some of the most dangerous stuff in the world, in the history of civilization. When we are talking about strategies to provide for its storage and ultimate disposal, it seems to me that we ought to, when in doubt, err in favor of the most stringent standards. We are not just talking about this generation. Our time here, by nuclear waste deterioration standards, is a finite period of time. We are just kind of a microspeck on that graph of timespan that it takes for high-level nuclear waste to ultimately deteriorate over tens of thousands of years. So when we are asked, why do we fight? We fight because we believe that the health and safety, indeed the very lives, of the citizens of our State are at risk. No Member of this body, whatever his or her political affiliation may be, wherever they place themselves on the ideological scale, from liberal to conservative or in the political center, could live with himself or herself for 1 day if they did not do everything within their power to fight to protect the health and safety of the citizens of that State. My colleague from Nevada and I have undertaken this task because we believe it is a matter of, potentially, life or death for Nevadans under this ill-conceived scheme that is embraced in S. 1936. We have all seen our colleagues on both sides of the political aisle go to the so-called political mat to advance their State's interests. I think all of us, whether we agree or disagree with the proposition, have a good measure of respect for that. People say, ``By golly, Senator X or Senator Y is a great advocate,'' whether it is to secure an additional appropriation for a project that is deemed worthy in that State or whether it is to protect a State from part of these ongoing series of base closures we have experienced in the recent years. We all recognize the nature of that. But what we oppose here today is something that is totally different. This is not to secure an additional appropriation for our State for some project that is near and dear to Nevadans. This is not to prevent the closure of some base in our State. This is something, in my experience as a Member of the U.S. Senate, that is really without peer. As the lawyers would say, this is a case sui generis. I know of nothing like it--nothing like it--because what we simply try to do is to protect the health and safety of our citizens. We believe there is a far broader issue than just the concerns that we have as Nevadans about our own citizens. We believe that there is a major policy flaw in this legislation. I believe that, as Oliver Wendell Holmes once commented, ``A page of history is frequently more instructive than a volume of logic.'' So I think it is somewhat helpful to review a little bit of the history of this. I remember as a youngster, in the dawn of the nuclear age, tritium had been detonated, as a matter of fact, on this very day, 51 years ago, July 16, 1945. I remember that because of the fortuitous circumstance of my own birth. Today happens to be my birthday. So I always remember that. In the aftermath of the success of the Manhattan Project, and what it did to accelerate the end of World War II--and let me just say, parenthetically, not related to this debate, I believe that President Truman's decision was sound. I believe that we spared the lives of hundreds of thousands of Americans and brought that tragic war to a conclusion, as we properly should have. But in the aftermath of that, there was great excitement engendered about the future of nuclear power. What did it portend for America? I was a youngster in grade school. I acknowledged that if there be any academic strengths that I have, it would not lie in the field of science. But how well I recall, as a youngster each week we used to get, as schoolchildren in my time did, a Weekly Reader. It kind of talked about some of the things that were occurring that would transform and change the future. Because even as youngsters in grade school, we understood that we were going to be a part of that future. In the period after World War II, technology was exploding in so many different areas. I recall distinctly that there was talk about nuclear power, too cheap to meter, that there would be some kind of a nuclear thing right outside of everyone's home and the traditional sources of energy would be relegated to the dustbin of history. I remember all of that as a kid. This mentality, this boosterism on behalf of the industry, understandable in its initial phase because nuclear energy was the product of a military necessity in World War II, the Manhattan Project, that mentality continued long after the end of World War II. In that desire to transform nuclear energy into its civilian purpose, no thought, Mr. President, no thought was given to the byproduct, the issue that confronts this Senate on this very day and has for many years--how do we dispose of the high-level nuclear waste, the byproduct, essentially, the spent fuel rods that come from nuclear reactors? It is interesting to note some of the things that were discussed over the years. From 1957 to 1982, various Federal agencies sought to build geologic repositories and the National Academy of Sciences was brought into it. Great debate raged as to whether it should be buried in subseabeds off the coastal shores of our country. At one point, the scientific community was quite excited after the birth of the space age, that somehow we could send this lethal, deadly stuff, put it in space. Somebody thought after a while, that may not be such a good idea because there could be an accident, and if there was an accident, this stuff would be spread all over creation. So wiser heads, cooler heads, more reasoned sober minds concluded that certainly is not a very good idea. So that was rejected. That kind of brings us into the 1960's, when all of a sudden, Kansas, a State that has brought to this Chamber our former distinguished majority leader, that Kansas would be an ideal site. The Atomic Energy Commission, which is the historical progenitor of the Department of Energy, has kind of gone through several iterations over the years, but we are talking about the folks who would be the ancestors to the present occupant of the energy policy arm of our Federal Government, the Atomic Energy Commission said the great place for this is Kansas. They went hell for leather. Kansas was where it was going to be. Indeed, everything was moving along. It was assumed that would be a great site. All of a sudden, somebody realized when they punched bore holes into the repository areas that were being proposed, they penetrated into the aquifer. I think most of us know that the largest aquifer in America, maybe the world for all I know, is the Ogalala Aquifer. It runs, literally, from north to south, from the upper Great Plains in the United States down into the panhandle. Lo and behold, the idea of contaminating an aquifer kind of got people's attention, particularly the good folks in Kansas. Their congressional delegation got energized and they responded and said, ``My God, this cannot be true. This cannot be possible.'' The AEC cannot be serious, having been now advised that we may contaminate an aquifer, they cannot be serious about that. Let me say, entrenched views, bureaucratic inertia, a little bit of the pride of authorship, a scientist saying to those of us who are laymen, ``We know what is best for you, let us make these decisions. We understand you all cannot begin to understand the complexity of this.'' The AEC, the Atomic Energy Commission, did not abandon its choice of Kansas notwithstanding this evidence. Now, if you are not from Nevada that may strike you as astonishing. Here is a public policy body, no question that there are distinguished, very capable scientists in it. One would assume they would act in a rational and responsible manner, that once presented with this kind of evidence it would be all over, and the response would be, ``Ladies and gentlemen, you are right. We ought not to proceed along these lines.'' That did not happen, Mr. President. Only when Kansas' congressional delegation got energized and inserted a clause into the reauthorization bill which blocked further study at the Lyons, KS, site did this come to an end. (Mr. THOMPSON assumed the chair.)

Mr. BRYAN. That is the 1960's into the early 1970's. We heard a lot about the so-called WIPP site, waste isolation pilot project. Sometime in the early 1970's, the former Governor of New Mexico invited the Atomic Energy Commission to study sites in New Mexico for a siting, locating of transuranic nuclear waste. This was at a time when the processing was still considered viable. So the interest was in handling a destination for transuranic waste, and the belief was that a salt dome formation had geologic advantages and we should place the storage there. Over the years, that facility has been much troubled in terms of some of the scientific and technical concerns. My colleagues from that State, one a Republican and one a Democrat, have called to the attention of this body fairly recently their concerns about the levels of radiation, because it would be New Mexicans who would be affected. They did as any colleague worthy of his or her salt would do. They have made, I think, some very persuasive arguments. By and large, the body has yielded to their concerns about those standards. This is not an unfamiliar argument that one hears on the floor of the Senate. Well, 1982 comes around. I remember that year. I was involved in a hotly contested race for Governor of my State. There was a lot of discussion about the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982. We looked at it in Nevada. I must say that we had some skepticism, skepticism born on the experience that we had from an earlier era when Nevada was chosen as the site of atmospheric nuclear tests. We embraced that with naivete, some enthusiasm, some sense of national pride because we were going to be on the cutting edge. This time, now, I am almost ready to get into high school and I am caught up in the community sense that, wow, this is a big deal. Some of the merchants in town actually changed the name of their business to ``atomic'' this or ``atomic'' that. The distinguished occupant of the chair would be too young to recall these years, but we even had an atomic hairdo at that period of time that was somewhat of a fashion sensation of the moment. By the time I got into high school we got so enthusiastic that the cover of our high school annual Wildcat Echo had the nuclear mushroom cloud with all of the colors that are generated with that enormous heat and energy that is brought to focus. Nevadans were told, ``This is absolutely safe.'' We were encouraged to kind of get up in the morning and share the experience in silence. We learned-- even those of us not agile of mind when it comes to things that are mathematics or scientific--that speed of light travels much more rapidly than does the speed of sound, and that if we were careful and got up and watched this--as we did at 5 or 5:30 in the morning--we could see that flash in the sky, set our watch, and wait for the seismic impact. The seismic impact would hit. I mean, we had a small home, but those windows rattled and the doors shook. At that moment, we could calculate, because we knew what the speed of sound was, how far from our home ground zero was. That was kind of a little assignment we were given in school. We were told, ``Do not worry about a thing, this is great.'' Let me just say that the evidence is quite to the contrary. What is particularly disturbing is that there were some people who knew what the evidence was. We now know that some of those scientists that reassured the Bryan family and our neighbors that it was safe were sending their own families out of State when these tests were occurring. We all know, as responsible Members of this body, that today the Senate and the other body appropriates money each year to provide for those poor, innocent victims who were downwind, who were told, ``There is not a thing to worry about,'' who suffer from genetic defects, who suffer from cancer, whose health may be irretrievably lost. We provide for them. So that perspective, I think, is helpful, Mr. President, because having been told not to worry about anything, and decades later being a Member of this Chamber, where I, as well as every Member of this body, appropriate taxpayer dollars to compensate those victims downwind, we are particularly sensitive to the issue of health and safety because, as they say, we have been there. We have a little understanding. Let me get back a little bit to the 1982 act. I looked at the act and I said, you know, this looks like the Congress has done a pretty good job. In 1982, perhaps the rhetoric was a little lower and the institution was less polarized and Americans may have been less cynical, but, by and large, it was still pretty good sport in the early eighties to beat up on the Congress. But I said, you know, this looks pretty fair. The general parameters of the 1982 act have been, in my view, prostituted as a result of some of the legislative changes that have been made. The 1982 act said, look, we will search America and look for the best sites for a geological repository for high-level nuclear waste. We will look at different geological formations. There was great interest in granite, which tends to be located in the northeastern part of the States. We will look at the salt dome formations that were so attractive to those who were looking for the transuranic site. We will look at a formation out in Nevada called ``welded tuff.'' We will search the country and look for the best sites, and then we will study, or as the scientific community calls it, ``characterize'' each of those sites, and send that information to the President of the United States. Then the President will make his decision as to which one. It will be regionally balanced. No one part of the country will bear it all. Recognizing that States did not have the financial resources available to the Federal Government, there was an assurance that the States that were being considered would have funding from the Federal Government so they could engage their own technical people, independent and apart from the Department of Energy, as the agency had become known over the years, having changed from ERDA to the Department of Energy. That seemed pretty fair. That was signed into law, as I recall, by then President Reagan in January 1983. I took the oath of office as Governor in January 1983. Troubled clouds were on the horizon from the very beginning. We had been assured, as a State being considered, that there would be resources available to us to conduct that independent study. That was real important to us. Ours is a small State. It is very important to us. We made the request, as did other States who were being considered, and the Department of Energy stonewalled, refused, rejected, denied, ignored, cut us off. So the States that were being considered filed suit in district court. You do not have to be a Learned Hand to know that when the law specifically provides that there would be this kind of resources available and spelled out in statute that the States that were being considered had a pretty good case. We won in the district court. Then, again, we went back to the Department of Energy and we requested, we cajoled, and the answer was the same. We were ignored, denied, rejected, shut out. So then we went to the circuit court, the higher level in the Federal system. Again, the States that were being considered, all a part of this lawsuit, prevailed again, and still the Department of Energy objected, objected, objected. Finally, we came back to the Congress, as Governors, asking only for what was ours. We were not asking for any pork barrel projects. We were just asking for the money to be able to engage technical people so that we could be satisfied that indeed the science being conducted was untainted, fair, objective, legitimate, and that our people--if the day ever came that we might be selected as one of these three sites--would be protected. To the credit of the Congress, they directed the Department of Energy to release the money. Mr. President, that is not an auspicious beginning--not an auspicious beginning. I may have the sequence slightly out of order. But soon after that, the 1984 campaign began. Lo and behold the incumbent President began assuring the people in the southeastern part of the States that the salt dome formations, which would be looked at, were home free. You did not have to worry about that. That was nothing to be concerned with. So one began to say, wait 1 minute, somebody is ``dealing seconds,'' as we say in Nevada. This is not a fair deal. The premise of the act was to look all over the country and make the decision based on science. Now, here in the context of a political campaign, a region is getting a pass, we are not going to look at you. I must say that that was not only unsettling, it was outrageous, absolutely outrageous. Then all of a sudden the word was that they were not going to look at anything in the Northeast. Congressman Markey, who then chaired a subcommittee, held an oversight hearing sometime. This predates my arrival in the Congress. Lo and behold, after examining documents prepared by the Department of Energy, the internal documents revealed that they were going to abandon any consideration of a site in the northeastern part of the country where granite is situated because the political pressure would be too great. So much for sites. Then former Secretary Harrington, in effect, unilaterally made the determination that no consideration would be given to a need for a second repository. So it was pretty clear that what we would look at is one area of the country to take it all, a repudiation of the basic premise of the act, which is that there should be regional equity, that there should be a shared responsibility, and that science and the geology of the region, not its political clout--in other words, any political operatives--should be the consideration. That went out the window. In 1987, the so-called Screw-Nevada bill was not having a real good relationship with the Department of Energy. Our plight was tooth and nail. They were not amenable to any of our suggestions. They had their own strategy for the study process. In 1987--the original bill was to look throughout the country; look at the different regions; look at the different geology and then come up with three sites to be sent to the President. After their studies characterized the present site, all of a sudden that goes out the window; not done in an up-or-down fashion. Nobody had an opportunity to really get into the merits in terms of offering amendments. This came as part of a reconciliation. So the Screw-Nevada bill, infamous in my own State, infamous by any standard in any State, would look only at Nevada. I frequently hear my colleagues who are great proponents of the nuclear industry--which is certainly their right--exalt their actions in the name of science. This has nothing to do with science. This has everything to do with blatant, naked political power directed against a small State with a very small delegation in the House. We happen to be the victims of that power play. When I say people were enraged in my State, that is a polite euphemism. So much for science. So much for science. It was that action, frankly, that spurred my own interest for the first time to consider becoming a Member of this body. It got worse. The nuclear utilities could see that Nevadans were not going to buy into anything that outrageous. No group of people in any State could accept that kind of treatment. It had nothing to do with science. It had nothing to do with merit. The risks were so great that, indeed, all of these nuclear eggs are in one basket. One kind of thinks of that old Rube Goldberg image where somehow we are going to adjust the rules because all of the expectation, all of the energy, is going to be devoted to making that site work. I will share with my colleagues one of the more outrageous things that the industry did. In September 1991, they commissioned a document called ``The Nevada Initiative.'' Mr. President, this is a lot like the battle plan for Operation Overlord, the invasion of Normandy in 1944. The language is cast in the format of establishing a beachhead and how we can persuade Nevadans to accept this. I mean, it is absolutely outrageous and offensive. It talked about the spending of millions of dollars by the nuclear power industry to persuade Nevadans just how safe this stuff was. I recall one of these ads quite well. We had a former media personality who kind of let us see, when he had his cup of coffee in the morning, him hold up a ceramic pellet out of the spent fuel rod as if you could replace your cream, or if you had something a little stronger in your coffee in the morning, that would be it as well. I mean, it was so absurd that it became a subject of great ridicule and humor by some of the disc jockeys on some of the Nevada radio stations. They identify who enemies are; that is, those who are opposed. I am proud to say that my colleague and I made that list. We are in the hall of fame. They went on to talk about how they could separate and divide us, what their campaign objectives were; in the short term, create the necessary political and public climate to allow further site characterization to proceed within the next 3 years, to build a framework for political media and public awareness. Oh, my. It was quite a document. Key audiences were developed and natural allies; correspondingly, the key opposition. They talk about the need to assemble a media team. Of particular offense to women in my State was the suggestion that the primary target will be women age 25 to 49, a group at the highest statistical potential for affecting polls, if they could be informed, be assured, moved. Media campaign will also target the industry's most sympathetic base, age 35 to 54. They spent millions. The consultants got rich. The airwaves were bombarded. Mr. President, we are not fools. We know when they are trying to blow on by, pull the wool over our eyes. We understand that. So the view in Nevada is, as it has been for more than a decade, we do not trust them. We do not have that great sense of confidence. That is why I think it is so terribly important for us to have that background in mind as my colleague and I continue this discussion as we try to enlighten our colleagues. In that document, ``The Nevada Initiative,'' not much is said about safety; very little. That is the concern we have--safety. Everything is kind of done in the media; how we will hype this, spin this, get all of this together. I mean, it was a shocking performance, in my opinion. Let me just mention one other thing that occurred along the road. I mentioned safety because that is our concern--health and safety. In 1992 we had an energy bill before us. It had great bipartisan support. It was debated extensively in the Senate. Amendments were added, amendments were deleted. At no time was any amendment addressed to reducing health and safety standards at Yucca Mountain. Lo and behold, in the conference--and to those who are listening in this Chamber and who are not familiar with the legislative process, a conference occurs when the Senate version of a bill and the House version of a bill are different and they need to be reconciled. And a conference report is not amendable. So, if you can include it in the conference report, then by and large you have no opportunity to offer an amendment to strike it, to delete it, to remove it. This was what has now become a very familiar pattern, and that is an attempt to dilute, to reduce, to lower the health and safety standards. It sought to deprive the Environmental Protection Agency, the EPA, of its independent authority and judgment as to what health and safety standards ought to be. I think that is pretty outrageous. That is pretty outrageous. We opposed it. Understandably, we had no opportunity to remove it, it was an up-or-down vote on the bill, and the National Academy of Sciences has selected to make those kinds of recommendations. I believe the proponents of this amendment thought the National Academy of Sciences would provide them with what they sought, and that was a standard that would be much lower, much easier to accomplish. Let me just say, to the credit of the National Academy of Sciences, they did not take the bait. They did not take the bait. They recommended risk-based standards, something that the proponents of this strategy did not want. They pointed out that the international consensus, in terms of the millirem exposure rate on an annual basis from artificial sources above the natural background level should range from 5 to 30 millirems a year. I will have much more to say about that later on. They recommended protecting the most at-risk individual, and the use of the critical group for application of the standard. That is a scientific measuring standard that I must say I do not completely understand. But, to the credit of the National Academy of Sciences, that is an accepted standard, an accepted approach. And they recommended that standard apply to a period of greatest risk beyond the 10,000 years--beyond. They further concluded that there is no scientific basis for the assumption that no human intrusion will take place. Finally, they recommended the broadest possible public comments and participation. Those observations are relevant because, in S. 1936, those are ignored. So, that is the history and experience that we have had, that brings us to the point we want to discuss some of the specifics of the bill and some of our concerns. Let me begin with the premise the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board--we have heard that referred to a lot these days. One of the things in the 1987 amendments, those that produced the ill-named ``screw Nevada'' bill, was a technical review board, the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board. I think it is important to understand the context of this. This is not something that was foisted upon this Congress by the Nevada delegation. Congress was seeking advice and guidance on this very complicated issue, and they authorized a technical review board to have some of the most eminent scientists of our time: Dr. John E. Cantlon, chairman, Michigan State University, emeritus; Dr. Clarence R. Allen, California Institute of Technology, emeritus; Mr. John W. Arendt, of John W. Arendt Associates; Dr. Gary D. Brewer, University of Michigan; Dr. Jared L. Cahon, Yale University; Dr. Edward J. Cording, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champagne; Dr. Donald Langmuir, Colorado School of Mines, emeritus; Dr. John J. McKetta, Jr., University of Texas at Austin, emeritus; Dr. Jeffrey J. Wong, California Environmental Protection Agency; Dr. Patrick A. Domenico, Texas A&M University; Dr. Ellis D. Verink, Jr., University of Florida, emeritus; Dr. Dennis L. Price, the Virginia Polytechnic Institute, and State University. These institutions are widely known and respected in America, as are their graduates or their employers, as the case may be. These are among the most eminent men of science. I emphasize the word ``science,'' Mr. President, because we frequently hear invoked on the floor of the Senate: This should all be done as a matter of science; let science prevail. May I say, our experience, from the onset of the 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act, is that science has always taken a back seat and politics, particularly nuclear politics and the desires of the industry, have taken the front seat. Here is what they said. It has been cited before but I think it needs to be mentioned again. After reviewing two dozen technical and nontechnical issues, the board framed this question: Is there an urgent technical need for centralized storage of commercial spent fuel? The answer, in language that even the layman can understand: The Board sees no compelling technical or safety [no technical or safety] reason [none] to move spent fuel to a centralized storage facility for the next few years. That analysis did not please the nuclear industry. They went critical themselves. So, what has occurred, I think, is interesting. It is a side bar, to some extent, to this bill. But in the bill itself, after having created this technical review board, it is interesting to note in the evolution of this piece of legislation there have been many progenitors to S. 1936. The 1987 act that created the nuclear waste technical review board established its function as follows: The board shall evaluate the technical and scientific validity of activities undertaken by the Secretary after the date of enactment of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1987, including site characterization activities and activities relating to the packaging for transportation of high-radioactive-level waste or spent fuel. Follow with me, if you will, Mr. President and my colleagues, the progress of legislation dealing with the issue of high-level nuclear waste in this Congress. In January of 1995, S. 167 was introduced, and it did not change the scope or the responsibility of the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board in any way. On February 23, 1995, H.R. 1020 was introduced in the other body; no changes to the authority and the responsibility of the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board. September 20, 1995, H.R. 20, reported by the House Commerce Committee, unchanged in this respect. And even as recently as September 25, 1995, S. 1271, introduced by our colleague, the senior Senator from Idaho, and which was the bill that was originally on the floor until it was superseded by S. 1936, made no change--no change. In late March 1996, the technical review board issued its report concluding, without equivocation, without reservation, emphatically, that there is no need from a technical or safety perspective at this point to go to an interim storage. Lo and behold, on July 9, 1996, S. 1936 springs into existence, and now we see the responsibilities of the technical review board being limited. You do not really have to be a nuclear physicist to see what is happening there. The very board that the Congress created contains some of the most distinguished, eminent scientists in America, produces a finding which the nuclear utilities do not like. They were apoplectic, because if merit were to be the controlling force of this argument, as my senior colleague, who was a distinguished trial lawyer in our State, has often said, if we could argue this case before a fair and objective jury on the merits, it is not a contest; we win overwhelmingly on the merits. So when this distinguished board created by this Congress reaches a conclusion that is inconsistent with what the utilities want, we spank it: ``You've been a bad boy. We send you to your room, and we limit your authority.'' Mr. President, that is power. That is heady stuff. I can imagine every nuclear utility boardroom in America burned a little extra fuel after the results of this report, because this undermines, destroys, demolishes the argument that there is a necessity for this piece of legislation. But that is not new. If one goes back to July 28, 1980, on the floor of the Senate, a debate occurred with respect to a piece of legislation supported and favored by the nuclear utilities that has such a familiar ring. I believe that I could quote the context of that debate, and the conclusion would be reached that is something that has been said on the floor of the U.S. Senate in just the past few days. Then is now. The nuclear utility industry was trying to engender a hysteria that there would be a brownout, that somehow there would be a shutdown and that parts of our country would be deprived of electrical power. In fact, it was asserted that if this piece of legislation were not enacted, that nuclear utility civilian reactors would have to close down as early as 1983 because they did not have the space or the capacity--it sounds familiar, we heard that argument on the floor today. Sixteen years ago that argument was made: It is an urgent problem, Mr. President. It is urgent because we are running out of reactor space at reactors for the storage of fuel, and if we do not build what we call away-from-reactor storage-- Another name for interim-- and begin that soon, we could begin shutting down civilian nuclear reactors in this country as soon as 1983. Sixteen years ago, nearly two decades, almost a score of years, what have the intervening years established with respect to that claim of hysteria? Not a single nuclear reactor in America in 16 years, as those statements were made, ever closed because of lack of storage space. Today we hear that cry again: ``Reactors will have to shut down; regions of the country will be deprived of power.'' The Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board makes the argument, after examining the evidence, that that is simply not true--is not true. So I think with respect to the argument of necessity, that is that somehow we need to get this all done, this is a red herring. So if the undergirding premise is that this legislation is before us as a matter of national priority, that there is a compelling national interest, that, indeed, there is an urgency in acting, that Heaven forbid, if we do not enact it, some catastrophic thing could occur to the electrical supply power availability in America, we have heard that before. They were saying that 16 years ago, and it simply is not so. There is no need. Now I grant you, for the nuclear utilities, it would be Christmas in July; they would love it. That is what they have wanted for years. They have every right to make that assertion, as does any individual or company in America. But making that claim does not make it true, and making that assertion does not make it right, and the claim and the assertion is blatantly false. There is no emergency. There is no crisis. There is no necessity to act. So this whole framework of crisis, urgency before us, simply does not exist. And we ought to understand that. There is no need to take any action. I have heard it said by my colleagues, who reach a different conclusion than I have on this issue, that this is an important environmental issue. ``We must take action to protect and save the environment. This is the most important environmental issue, the most important environmental votes,'' words to that affect, to paraphrase, to be fair. That has been asserted by our colleagues who are making the arguments on behalf of the nuclear utilities. Let us examine those arguments. The League of Conservation Voters, in responding earlier this year to S. 1271--it is, with respect to the overall policy in terms of how it deals with environmental issues, in my view, no different than S. 1936. We will go into that in a moment. Here is what one of the premier environmental organizations in America says. ``S. 1271''--just insert S. 1936 in its place--``would severely weaken environmental standards for nuclear waste disposal by carving loopholes in the National Environmental Policy Act and the Safe Drinking Water Act in forbidding the Environmental Protection Agency from issuing radiation standards. Centralized interim storage will be not only hazardous, but unnecessary and expensive.'' The League of Conservation Voters. The League of Women Voters, expressing its opposition to S. 167, introduced by one of our colleagues earlier in the session, but essentially incorporating the same concept of interim storage with the environmental laws, in effect, being set aside when they are in conflict, ``We believe that the bill's approach is wrong and that the bill creates more problems than it solves.'' And then the league went on to say, ``We fear that the implementation of S. 167, the Johnston bill, will result in long-term, above-ground storage of highly radioactive materials in an unsafe location.'' They opposed the bill. Mr. ABRAHAM assumed the Chair.

Mr. BRYAN. Mr. President, the Sierra Club is another preeminent environmental organization in the country. The Sierra Club has indicated that the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1996, S. 1271, which is now S. 1936--a bill that threatens the health and safety of hundreds of communities nationwide--will soon come to the Senate floor. ``On behalf of the Sierra Club's half-million members nationwide, I urge you to oppose it.'' And then the Sierra Club goes on to observe: ``There is no technical basis for choosing the Nevada Test Site for an interim storage facility for high-level nuclear waste.'' Another organization that has strongly opposed this is Public Citizen: The Senate may soon vote on S. 1271, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1996. On behalf of our Nationwide membership, I urge you to oppose this misguided bill and to support the filibusters by Senator Bryan and Senator Reid against the measure. U.S. Public Interest Research Group: We are writing to urge your opposition to S. 1271, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1996. S. 1271 is an environmental disaster and should be rejected. S. 1271 would roll back environmental protections, including most of the National Environmental Policy Act, forbidding EPA from setting radiation release standards-- It goes on to observe, ``preempting all State and Federal environmental protection laws.'' Friends of the Earth expresses its opposition to S. 1936: On behalf of the thousands of Friends of the Earth members nationwide, I urge you to oppose 1271. Citizens Action has written to express its opposition. Greenpeace has written to express its opposition. Also opposing this are the Citizens Awareness Network, Military Production Network, Nuclear Information Resource Service, Environmental Action Foundation, Missouri Coalition for the Environment, 20/20 Vision, Native Youth Alliance, Nuclear Waste Citizens Coalition, Prairie Island Coalition, Safe Energy Communication Council, Nuclear Information Resource Service. Mr. President, the point has been asserted on the floor that indeed this is a critical piece of environmental legislation. I agree. It is a disaster. It is a disaster. For a quarter of a century with, by and large, bipartisan support, a system of environmental measures has been enacted into law that has cleaned our air, improved the quality of our water, protected endangered resources in America, and that is why every national environmental organization that I am aware of has indicated its strong opposition to the bill. So when my friends on the other side of this issue argue that this is an important environmental measure--perhaps the most important to be undertaken in this session--and that we need to enact this piece of legislation, S. 1936, because it is important for the environment, there is no evidence by any of the responsible national environmental organizations that share that conclusion. Indeed, their view is quite to the contrary, that this legislation would be a disaster. Now, I want to take you through some of the key provisions of the bill. S. 1936, like S. 1271, emasculates a number of environmental laws. Let me call my colleagues' attention to the provisions that do this. I have heard it asserted on this floor that indeed we need to protect and retain those environmental provisions that currently are the law. S. 1936, in effect, is a rewrite of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982. If this were enacted--and I believe that it will not be, based upon the vote this morning. It is clear that there are enough votes to sustain a Presidential veto. But if it were enacted, this would rewrite the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982. It is claimed that S. 1936 is an improvement over its predecessor, S. 1271, because it has been asserted that indeed we protect those environmental provisions of the law. That is not the case, Mr. President. Section 501, at page 73, makes it pretty clear. It is subtle. Give marks where marks are due to the nuclear utilities. They have crafted this very cleverly. But here is what it says: If the requirements of any law are inconsistent with or duplicative of the requirements of the Atomic Energy Act and this Act, the secretary shall comply only with the requirements of the Atomic Energy Act and this Act in implementing the integrated management system. Mr. President, I know the distinguished occupant of the chair is an able and distinguished scholar, and he need not have this Senator interpret the law for him, and I do not in any way denigrate his ability. But there are millions of people watching this Congress and what we are going to do. There has been, in my judgment, a drumbeat of misguided efforts on the part of the new Congress to simply roll back the protections that have been incorporated in our legislative framework for more than two decades. Twenty-five years ago, probably two-thirds of the rivers, streams, and lakes in America were so polluted that you could not swim in them and you could not fish in them. Air pollution problems were unchecked and growing in seriousness. It is my view that when those who write about our time of the last quarter-century, they will not write favorably about much of what has been done. But one of the great public policy achievements of the 1970's and 1980's is what we have done in the environment. Let me say, giving credit where credit is due, that a Republican President had much to do with that early environmental legislation. Richard Nixon can certainly be faulted--and this Senator does fault him for other conduct unrelated to the environment--but much of what occurred early on enjoyed his very strong support and was bipartisan. Today we have reversed those numbers. Today it is two-thirds of the rivers and streams and lakes in America are once again fishable and swimmable. One can only recall that a television nightly talk show host had a field day when, I believe, the Cuyahoga River in Cleveland caught fire in the late 1960's it was so polluted; the river that courses by the Nation's Capital, the river that George Washington watched from his home on the banks of the Potomac, so polluted you could not swim in it. You could not fish in it. Today you can. None of this is to suggest that those rivers or that our air has returned to a pristine condition, but it is a fair analysis and a sound conclusion that the environment today is much better for our children, and if we do not emasculate those environmental laws it will be much better for our children's children as a result of the actions taken by our predecessors in this institution in enacting those major environmental provisions. So I must say that this Congress does not have a good track record in terms of what some, particularly in the other body, would like to do with the environmental laws. So that is why the National Environmental Policy Act, the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act that we know as the Superfund, the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, Antiquities Act, the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, Archeological Resources Protection Act, the Endangered Species Act, the Safe Drinking Water Act, Farmland Protection Policy Act, Federal Facility Compliance Act, Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, Federal Water Pollution Control Act, National Historic Preservation Act, Noise Control Act of 1972, Toxic Substances Control Act, Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, and the Pollution Prevention Act of 1990, Mr. President, are part of an elaborate and comprehensive framework of environmental laws designed to protect all Americans--all Americans. They are not restricted to any region. No particular area or community is excluded. That is a right to which all Americans are entitled. Here is what this act does. As I was sharing a moment ago, if any requirement of S. 1936 is in conflict with any one of these enactments, any one, this bill directs that they be ignored; that if there is a conflict S. 1936 prevails, wiping out the protection of a whole series of environmental laws. That is one of the reasons the environmental community has advanced such strong opposition. This would be a major public policy disaster, and for the first time we would say in America that some of these environmental laws are not available for the protection of some Americans who happen to live in a particular region of the country. Mr. GRAMS addressed the Chair.

Mr. BRYAN

Mr. BRYAN. Mr. President, I want to address the broad policy implications of S. 1936. I want to emphasis that my comments apply directly to the bill before us, not 1271. There has been some suggestion that 1936 represents improvement over 1271, its predecessor. It is my view that there are some changes but the changes make no policy difference at all. First, I want to make the point again with respect to the necessity for interim storage. My colleague has pointed it out. I want my colleagues who are watching the debate in the office to look at this report entitled ``Disposal and Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel, Finding the Right Balance, a Report to Congress and the Secretary of Energy.'' This is March of this year, 1996. ``The Board sees no compelling technical or safety reason to move spent fuel to a centralized storage facility for the next few years.'' Mr. President, what is occurring is a familiar pattern. This technical review board was created by Congress in 1987 after the original 1982 act. So, if you do not like what you asked for in a report in the nuclear utility industry--and its advocates obviously do not--then you reject the report. But this represents the consensus of scientific opinion as chosen by individuals who have no personal interest in terms of any parochial concerns. Their conclusion emphatically is that there is no need. That is the issue which the letter of the President's Chief of Staff addresses in part, and that is why the Washington Post editorial of this morning makes the contention that this is too important of an agenda to be jammed through the latter part of Congress on the strength of the industry's fabricated claim that it faces an emergency. So no Member of this body ought to be misled that there is some crisis. The only crisis is in the mind of the nuclear power industry which for the last 16 years has tried to engender such a crisis to get interim storage. Second, the reason this is such an abomination in my view is that it effectively emasculates a body of environmental laws which have been enacted over the past quarter of a century. To name but a few: the Safe Drinking Water Act, Clean Water Act, RCRA, Superfund, FLPMA, the National Environmental Policy Act, the Endangered Species Act. I make that contention and invite my colleagues' attention to page 73 of the legislation. It is very clever, I concede that. But this is the language that effectively guts the environmental law of America as it applies to this process: If the requirements of any law [any law] are inconsistent with or duplicative of the requirements of the Atomic Energy Act and this Act, the Secretary shall comply only [only] with the requirements of the Atomic Energy Act and this Act in implementing the integrated management system. So, we clearly, in effect, supersede any provisions in any of the environmental laws that would be in conflict with this current act. The effect of that is to bypass them. It has been asserted in some correspondence that has been circulated that, indeed, there is a requirement for the National Environmental Policy Environmental Impact Statement Review. Let me just, again, specifically invite my colleagues' attention to the language on page 36 of the legislation. Yes, it talks about an environmental impact statement, but then, in a series of restrictions, it emasculates such language by saying: Such Environmental Impact Statement shall not consider the need for the interim storage facility, including . . . the time of the initial availability of the interim storage facility, any alternatives to the storage of spent fuel . . . and any alternatives to the site of the facility. . . . That is the essence of what an environmental impact statement is, to consider other alternatives that might be available. So the effect that would have is to completely emasculate it. Mr. President, how much time remains on our side?

Mr. BRYAN. I yield myself 7 additional minutes and ask the Chair to alert me when there are 3 minutes remaining on our time. Mr. President, another public policy disaster is the statutory provision in this S. 1936 we are debating this morning that provides for a 100-millirem standard for us in Nevada. There is an international consensus that somewhere between 10 and 30 is a reasonable basis. Indeed, the safe drinking water standard is 4 millirems. Our friends from New Mexico, who have been on the floor to discuss WIPP, the transuranic facility in their own State, have a 15-millirem standard, but we would have a 100-millirem standard established by statute. There is no justification for that. I am aware of no considered body of scientific opinion that suggests that, from a sole source, an additional 100 millirems be added. I must say, this is part of an ongoing effort to constantly reduce the levels of health and safety in placing nuclear waste in the State of Nevada. Finally, let me briefly talk about a public policy issue that ought to concern every Member of this Senate. Everybody has talked about balancing the budget, unfunded mandates and unfunded liability. This piece of legislation represents one of the largest unfunded liabilities that would ever be passed by a Congress, because what this legislation effectively does is to shift the financial burden from the nuclear utilities to the American taxpayer. It does so in a very clever and ingenious way. It puts a limitation on the amount of mill tax that can be assessed to the utilities based upon the kilowatt hours produced at 1 mill. In the report to Congress by the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, they make it clear that if interim storage is to be pursued in addition to the permanent repository, that it will require an additional mill levy, in addition to the 1 mill, and currently indicates that, with the permanent repository program alone, there is an unfunded liability of between $3 and $5 billion. So the effect of this legislation is to shift the burden and make a major policy departure from what historically was acknowledged from the time that the 1982 act was passed to the changes in 1987 and all of the iterations in between that. In effect, it is the utilities which ought to bear the financial burden. One can understand why they clearly would like to avoid that burden, but much like our Social Security system today, it is taking in more money than is being paid out, and in the outyears, sometime in the next century, that will reverse. Precisely the same scenario is mandated in S. 1936, because although currently the amount of revenue coming in may be adequate to deal with the permanent repository program alone, as these reactors close--and they are licensed for periods of 40 years-- less money will be coming into the fund at a time when the burdens and responsibility of handling the storage will continue on through an indefinite period of time. So this represents a financial disaster for the country as well. I will just summarize by saying the legislation is not necessary, and those are not the assertions or conclusions of the Senators from Nevada. That is Congress' own Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, the board that was created by an act of Congress in 1987. Second, it effectively guts the environmental laws. A policy of dubious merit, in my judgment, mandates a health and safety standard that no other nation in the world has established. Finally, it would shift the cost from the utilities to the taxpayers, and that is bad news for the American taxpayers. I yield to the distinguished Democratic leader.

Mr. BRYAN

Mr. BRYAN. I am sure the Senator from Alaska is aware that the Senators from Nevada are not trying to do anything that would compromise or jeopardize national defense. The Senators from Nevada, like the Senator from Alaska, have a strong conviction--come from a State in which national defense interests are of paramount consideration, as they are in the State which the Senator so ably represents. We are talking about an appropriations bill that will go into effect October 1 of this year for the next fiscal year, so there is no imminent crisis that we face at the moment. If I might indirectly respond to a question in the statement made by the Senator from Idaho, the Senators from Nevada have tried throughout this afternoon to offer a series of proposals that would allow us to move immediately not only to the defense appropriations bill but to other pieces of legislation that are pending as well. And we would be prepared to do that. I think it is fair to say that some on the other side of the aisle were prepared to accept the proposals the Senators from Nevada were offering, but the Senator from Idaho and others indicated that they would be unprepared to accept the proposal which would move us immediately to the consideration of this bill only if the Senators from Nevada surrendered their parliamentary rights conferred under the rules with respect to a process which might occur if the nuclear waste bill ever went to conference, something at this point we do not know for sure. So I do not believe it is fair to characterize that the Senators from Nevada are unwilling to try to deal with this bill, the Department of Defense bill. We have offered several proposals, and they have been rejected. I regret that because I think that would be the appropriate course of action for us to follow this evening.

Mr. BRYAN. Mr. President, if I might respond to the majority leader, the Senators on the floor currently have an understanding of the rules, as does the Senator from Alaska, and obviously the majority leader. The Senators from Nevada are fighting for their lives. The legislation that is being proposed with respect to interim nuclear waste dumps is without precedent in the history of the country and the history of the Senate. Therefore, to ask the Senators from Nevada to surrender any of the parliamentary rights which this body confers upon us is to ask us to abandon the constituents that we represent. I have not been here as long as my senior colleague, but I know that each of the Senators on the floor are advocates and tenacious supporters of their constituents. We can be no less with our own. So the issue that is all important for us is the interim storage of nuclear waste, and there is no reason why that needs to go forward. The technical review people and scientists tell us there is no reason. It is only the nuclear utility lobby that puts us in this position.

Mr. BRYAN. Mr. President, could I be recognized?

Mr. BRYAN. Will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. BRYAN

Mr. BRYAN. I regret to object.

Mr. BRYAN

Mr. BRYAN. I object.

Mr. BRYAN. I would be happy to state my objection. As you know, the Senators from Nevada have worked with the majority leader, with those on the other side of the aisle who are proponents of this legislation. We have had an exchange of proposals, as the majority leader knows, during the course of this afternoon. The latest proposal that was brought back by the other side of the aisle had a provision in it which had not previously been discussed and was unacceptable, so we could not accept it.

Mr. BRYAN. That is the provision that had not heretofore been discussed, as the majority leader knows, and we had assumed within the parameters of what was being discussed all rights would be reserved under rule XXII, including any options that might be available to us in the event that this legislation moved to conference. So it was on that basis that we interposed our objection.

Mr. BRYAN

Mr. BRYAN. Objection.

Mr. BRYAN

Mr. BRYAN. Objection.

Mr. BRYAN

Mr. BRYAN. What is the nature of the unanimous-consent agreement that is being propounded?

Mr. BRYAN. Will the majority leader yield for a question?

Mr. BRYAN. Would the majority leader yield for a question?

Mr. BRYAN

Mr. BRYAN. Objection.

Mr. BRYAN

Mr. BRYAN. Reserving the right to object. As the request is propounded, we do not get off the Department of Defense appropriations bill; is that correct?

Mr. BRYAN. I have no objection.