Richard Bryan

Mr. BRYAN

Mr. BRYAN. Mr. President, I want to make a point one more time on the issue of transportation. This has often been characterized as an issue of Nevada versus the entire country. As more and more people around the country are aware of the implications for their families and their own security in terms of health and safety, we are beginning to get the attention of the public. Just this past week, the Deseret News in Salt Lake City, UT, strongly supported the President's veto. That publication does not have a long track record of being supportive of this administration and particularly this President. But it indicates the nature of the concern. Here again, take a look at the routes that are involved in the transportation. This will occur around the clock for 25 to 30 years: 30,000 to 100,000 shipments. It is said that, gee, we have had transports before and nothing has happened. That is true; we have had no fatalities as a result, but we have had 58 accidents. I suppose before the disaster of the Challenger we could talk proudly about our space program and the shuttle launches that never had a fatality. It is not a question of what the history has been as to whether or not there has been a fatality. We are talking about something of a magnitude many times greater, and I think our colleagues must look at that. There are many States--43 States and 51 million Americans. But it has been said repeatedly that we have to do something. The deadline has been missed, there is no question. But as I pointed out a moment ago, this Congress bears the responsibility. It politicized the action. Had we let the Nuclear Waste Policy Act unfold as it was originally contemplated back in 1982, we might very well have had the solution to the permanent repository issue. This health and safety standard ought to anger every American watching. It is cynical for a political and a special interest purpose--this is what this bill is all about, special interest legislation--to change a health and safety standard that is designed to protect the Nation. Finally, just a reference that comes up again and again. We were told by someone obliquely that if we don't do something, somehow the waste will pile up and we will not be able to generate nuclear power. Twenty years ago this summer, the same argument was advanced by the distinguished chairman's predecessor--that if we did not get, what was then referred to, away from an active program on line, we would soon have to shut down nuclear reactors around the country. It was not true then, and it is not true now. No reactor waste is exposed because of space. There is dry cask storage available, it is licensed, and approved for up to a period of 100 years. Let's do this right. Let science and not politics prevail. I reserve the remainder of my time.

Mr. BRYAN

Mr. BRYAN. Mr. President, I rise today to recognize the Knights of Columbus of Nevada, which will be celebrating their 90th anniversary on May 10, 2000. The history of the Knights of Columbus stretches back 118 years, when Father Michael J. McGivney founded the fraternal order in New Haven Connecticut on March 29, 1882. Since the order's founding, the Knights of Columbus have promoted the Catholic faith and have practiced the principles of charity, unity and fraternity. When Father McGivney passed away in 1890, there were 5,000 Knights of Columbus located in 57 councils in New England. Today, the Knights of Columbus are the largest Catholic lay fraternal organization in the world and has 1.6 million members in the United States and twelve other nations around the world. Members of the organization and their families donate over $100 million to charities in addition to the 50 million hours of their own time that they volunteer each year. Since May 10, 1910 in the State of Nevada, the Knights of Columbus have been committed to the highest ideals and principles of humanitarianism, and it gives me great pleasure to congratulate them on nine decades of volunteer service that has certainly enhanced and improved the quality of life for all Nevadans. Mr. President, the members of the Knights of Columbus of Nevada, are truly deserving of recognition for their nearly century-long dedication to promoting the teachings of the Catholic Church, and for living those teachings by serving those in need in their community. I hope my colleagues will join me in offering congratulations to the Brother Knights and their families on the occasion of their 90th anniversary, and in wishing them continued success.

Mr. BRYAN

Mr. BRYAN. Mr. President, I am very pleased to join Senators Lincoln Chafee, Paul Sarbanes, and Fred Thompson as an original cosponsor of the State Children's Health Insurance Program Preservation Act of 2000, and I thank Senator Chafee for his leadership on this bill. This important legislation provides that Federal funds allotted to States under the state children's health insurance program for each of fiscal years 1998 and 1999 will remain available to the states through fiscal year 2002. The enactment of the 1997 Balanced Budget Act's state children's health insurance program (CHIP was a seminal event in addressing the problem of uninsured children in this nation. The $24 billion funding reflected the seriousness of the national commitment to ensuring children will have access to health care services. It provided my state of Nevada and the nation with an incredible opportunity to address a most stubborn problem--the increasing number of children who have no health care insurance. States were provided three options to provide child health care services through the federal funding allotments: to expand Medicaid coverage under enhanced Medicaid matching rates; to create or expand separate child health insurance programs; or to use a combination of the two. All options, rightly I believe, require the States to spend some of their own funds as a condition of participating in the program. The choices states face under the CHIP program reflect the flexibility they wanted to tailor these programs, within federal guidelines, to the specific needs of each state to reduce the number of uninsured children. Nevada's CHIP program--``Nevada CheckUp''--was approved by HCFA in August 1998 and began operating in October 1998. The program is separate from the Medicaid program, but the two are coordinated in the application process to ensure those children eligible for Medicaid are enrolled in that program. The Nevada CheckUp program covers applicants up to 200% of the federal poverty level, and children up to age 18. Since its October 1998 beginning, Nevada CheckUp has enrolled over 9,000 children, representing almost 60% of the anticipated total eligible children. But there are approximately 6,000 children in Nevada who thus remain uninsured, who need health care coverage, and who must be found and covered. We can and must do better. It took the state some time to develop its program, create a state plan, get state and federal approval, hire and train the staff and begin the marketing outreach and enrollment activities. In the one and one-half years the program has been operating, the state has learned what has worked successfully, and what has not worked. They are in the process of developing a new marketing plan, which will allow us to reach more uninsured Nevada children. The new proposal will use more media and broadcast tools to target the low income population. The CHIP program is still in its infancy, and states are still learning how best to develop programs to provide children with much- needed health insurance. I am hopeful as this program matures, we will see a most successful effort to cover our nation's children, and ensure their health care needs are met into the next century. Allow the states to keep their federal allotment for an additional two years should provide Nevada, and other States, the opportunity to reach the total number of eligible children, and increase the number of children with health insurance. I sincerely hope Nevada will find the means to make its full match, so our state can draw 100 percent of its available federal funds. Wise use of these Federal funds, with a continued commitment to our children, and with a 100-percent effort by our state will get the job done. Our children simply deserve no less than a fully-funded effort.

Mr. BRYAN

Mr. BRYAN. Mr. President, I am very pleased to join Senators Lincoln Chafee, Paul Sarbanes, and Fred Thompson as an original cosponsor of the State Children's Health Insurance Program Preservation Act of 2000, and I thank Senator Chafee for his leadership on this bill. This important legislation provides that Federal funds allotted to States under the state children's health insurance program for each of fiscal years 1998 and 1999 will remain available to the states through fiscal year 2002. The enactment of the 1997 Balanced Budget Act's state children's health insurance program (CHIP was a seminal event in addressing the problem of uninsured children in this nation. The $24 billion funding reflected the seriousness of the national commitment to ensuring children will have access to health care services. It provided my state of Nevada and the nation with an incredible opportunity to address a most stubborn problem--the increasing number of children who have no health care insurance. States were provided three options to provide child health care services through the federal funding allotments: to expand Medicaid coverage under enhanced Medicaid matching rates; to create or expand separate child health insurance programs; or to use a combination of the two. All options, rightly I believe, require the States to spend some of their own funds as a condition of participating in the program. The choices states face under the CHIP program reflect the flexibility they wanted to tailor these programs, within federal guidelines, to the specific needs of each state to reduce the number of uninsured children. Nevada's CHIP program--``Nevada CheckUp''--was approved by HCFA in August 1998 and began operating in October 1998. The program is separate from the Medicaid program, but the two are coordinated in the application process to ensure those children eligible for Medicaid are enrolled in that program. The Nevada CheckUp program covers applicants up to 200% of the federal poverty level, and children up to age 18. Since its October 1998 beginning, Nevada CheckUp has enrolled over 9,000 children, representing almost 60% of the anticipated total eligible children. But there are approximately 6,000 children in Nevada who thus remain uninsured, who need health care coverage, and who must be found and covered. We can and must do better. It took the state some time to develop its program, create a state plan, get state and federal approval, hire and train the staff and begin the marketing outreach and enrollment activities. In the one and one-half years the program has been operating, the state has learned what has worked successfully, and what has not worked. They are in the process of developing a new marketing plan, which will allow us to reach more uninsured Nevada children. The new proposal will use more media and broadcast tools to target the low income population. The CHIP program is still in its infancy, and states are still learning how best to develop programs to provide children with much- needed health insurance. I am hopeful as this program matures, we will see a most successful effort to cover our nation's children, and ensure their health care needs are met into the next century. Allow the states to keep their federal allotment for an additional two years should provide Nevada, and other States, the opportunity to reach the total number of eligible children, and increase the number of children with health insurance. I sincerely hope Nevada will find the means to make its full match, so our state can draw 100 percent of its available federal funds. Wise use of these Federal funds, with a continued commitment to our children, and with a 100-percent effort by our state will get the job done. Our children simply deserve no less than a fully-funded effort.

Mr. BRYAN

Mr. BRYAN. Mr. President, as Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, it is my great pleasure to congratulate the men and women of the U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office, the National Laboratories, and affiliated contractors who celebrate the 20th anniversary of the Underground Nuclear Weapons Testing Orientation Program this year. This proliferation training course based at the Nevada Test Site has trained over 500 U.S. Government policy makers and analysts from the arms control, intelligence, and defense communities since its inception in 1980. This course provides briefings by subject matter experts from DOE and the Labs, to include an overview of how the U.S. historically conducted atmospheric and underground nuclear weapons tests and effects tests, the basis for diagnostic experiments, the challenges of stockpile stewardship, and the process for executing subcritical experiments. Through lectures, discussion, and orientation visits to underground facilities, control rooms, former ground zeros, equipment yards, and nuclear test artifacts, the course provides hands-on experience that goes to the core of nuclear weapons testing. The course also provides essential information suitable to contrast with foreign nuclear weapons testing programs. The efforts of the DOE staff in Nevada are to be commended. It is their dedication in the planning and execution of this course that will train the next generation of intelligence analysts, collectors, managers, consumers and policy officials with responsibility for nuclear programs, proliferation, arms control, and related disciplines. It is my hope that they will continue this essential training course for many years to come.

Mr. BRYAN

Mr. BRYAN. Mr. President, I express my appreciation to a very distinguished and fair chairman and the ranking member for accommodating this Senator. I rise in strong support of the Senior Citizens' Freedom to Work Act, bipartisan legislation to repeal the Social Security earnings limit. For a number of years, I have joined with my colleague, Senator McCain, in efforts to repeal this unfair penalty. In my judgment, this legislation is long overdue. The earnings limit has unfairly penalized Social Security recipients who have chosen to continue to work and discouraged others from remaining in the workforce and contributing to our country's economic growth. It is confusing to beneficiaries and it is difficult to administer. It is time to repeal the earnings limit and thus allow Social Security recipients who continue to work to do so without a reduction in their benefits. It becomes very clear that the time has come to revoke this unjustified policy when we consider why it was imposed in the first instance. The Social Security earnings test was a Depression-era policy, originating nearly 70 years ago as a mechanism to cope with the high levels of unemployment. Our country now faces a very different dilemma--a tight labor market in many areas, including my own State of Nevada, which makes it difficult to recruit qualified employees. It is simply illogical to prevent those who are willing and able to do so from joining the economy by working in areas that desperately need their talents. While many people choose to retire from their jobs at the traditional age of 65, or earlier, more and more workers want to continue working well into their late sixties and into their seventies. One of the incentives, of course, for working beyond retirement age is the greater financial security that their additional income provides. However, for people between the ages of 65 and 70, the financial benefits of staying in the workforce are diminished by the unjustified earnings limit. Too many seniors, especially those with high medical bills, struggle on their very limited incomes. The last thing they need is a Government-imposed penalty. Currently, for every $3 a worker aged 65 to 70 earns above $17,000, the worker's Social Security benefit check is reduced by $1. That is quite a disincentive to working. At a time when we put great emphasis on all Americans joining the workforce, it makes little sense to discourage employment for a large, experienced, and valuable segment of our population. It is also important to note that the repeal does not adversely affect the long-term financial health of the Social Security trust fund. Eventually, the Social Security Administration would actually save money because it would not have to administer the complicated earnings test. This, then, is a win-win situation for all involved. Seniors can continue to work and earn income without their previously earned Social Security benefits being unfairly reduced while the Government is minimally affected. Our colleagues in the House of Representatives have recently voted unanimously to pass this legislation. It is now our turn to do so, and I hope the Senate will act swiftly to enact this legislation to repeal this unfair penalty. I yield the floor.

Mr. BRYAN

Mr. BRYAN. Reserving my right to object, and I assure my colleague I will not, I wonder if my colleague would be amenable to a unanimous consent request that following the 10 minutes the Senator is requesting, I be permitted 10 minutes as well. I make that request because unless I do so, at 11:30 I might be precluded.

Mr. BRYAN

Mr. BRYAN. I thank the Chair. I hardly know where to begin because so much misinformation has been uttered about this piece of legislation. This is clearly a legislative vessel that is flying under false colors. There is absolutely nothing in this bill that says, look, it is going to be Yucca Mountain as opposed to anything else. That decision, in terms of studying it, has already been made. I regret that, but it doesn't alter the fact that only Yucca Mountain is being considered and that process goes forward. The bill has nothing to do with whether or not Yucca Mountain is going to be the site that is going to be considered and studied over the next few years, absolutely nothing. So vote against this bill. With respect to the compensation issue, we have agreed for more than a decade, and this Senator has personally offered legislation to compensate the utilities. That is not an issue. We agree. This bill would pass by unanimous consent if that was the only provision that was in there. This Senator would be among the first to say that is fair. What this is all about is trying to game the standards. That is what we are talking about. By and large, in its original form, this bill stripped out EPA. Now, games are still being played. Somehow it is suggested that EPA is being unreasonable. EPA has set a standard of 15 millirems, the same one set at WIPP, the transuranic for nuclear waste. In 1982, when the Nuclear Waste Policy Act was enacted, Congress thought EPA ought to be the one to make that determination. Now, is it a fair, reasonable standard? Somehow this crazy myth has been spilled out all over the floor that this is an unreasonable standard. The National Academy of Sciences--and this is not a Nevada-based group; the ``N'' stands for National, not Nevada--has looked at the standards and said, look, the range should be between 2 and 20 millirems, and it is 15. Any Member of this Senate can defend a ``no'' vote on this legislation on the basis that Yucca Mountain is going forward in the study process. Nothing changes that. All we are saying is, in the interest of fairness, don't play politics with the standards. And that is what is occurring. All we are asking is that the health and safety of Nevada be accorded the same protection that the good citizens of New Mexico and every other place in America enjoy. So by moving this into the next year, they are trying to play politics. Do you know what. The very perverse result of all of this is that it is going to result in a further delay, and that would be as a result of this legislation being enacted. I yield the floor and reserve the remainder of my time.

Mr. BRYAN. I thank the Chair. I thank the Senator from New Mexico. Mr. President, let me respond to the map issue. I think the Senator from Alaska characterized it as ``flimflam.'' That is what this legislation is. As recently as yesterday, in requesting the maps, they had none. The only thing they have is these notes right here. I ask unanimous consent that they be printed in the Record.

Mr. BRYAN. Mr. President, there are no maps. That will give you some indication of what a shoddy, moving target this has been as we have tried to debate and expand on it. It is simply indefensible public policy. I urge my colleagues to vote against it.

Mr. BRYAN. If the good Senator would yield for a minute?

Mr. BRYAN. I thank the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts. I wish to respond to the gracious statement by the chairman of the Energy Committee. Although we have had strong differences on this issue, the differences have been professional, not personal. He has been very professional in the way in which he has handled this matter. He has extended us every courtesy. I appreciate that. I think his conduct and deportment reflect the highest traditions of the Senate. I publicly acknowledge that. Even though, in combat, we were forceful in our advocacy, as was he, this is something that is intensely personal to us. The Senator understands that. But I do thank him very much for his graciousness and professionalism. I yield the floor and thank the Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. BRYAN

Mr. BRYAN. Mr. President, might I further inquire?

Mr. BRYAN. I think that is consistent with the understanding we have. I presume that this afternoon it is in order for us to continue to debate the measure, subject to whatever accommodations both sides need to make to permit equal opportunities to be heard.

Mr. BRYAN. Mr. President, I acknowledge that this piece of legislation, as it has worked its way from the committee to the floor, is better than its original form. But the old adage that you can't make a silk purse out of a sow's ear is applicable to this piece of legislation. It represents exceedingly bad policy. I am bemused by my friends who are advocating on behalf of this piece of legislation in that laced throughout their comments is the suggestion that somehow those of us who oppose this legislation are ``playing politics.'' I think it is important, once again, to recite a little of the history. In 1982, when the Nuclear Waste Policy Act was enacted into law, Congress made a judgment. I think it was a sound judgment. Congress concluded that it lacked the expertise to set public health and safety standards. They chose the Environmental Protection Agency, which is responsible generally for setting health and safety standards, as the appropriate agency to serve that function. I think that was a sound policy judgment. It was to use the language I frequently have heard on the floor, responsible. It was good science. It was responsible then and it is responsible now. Had that 1982 piece of legislation gone unchanged, it would have set in motion a chain of events that would, in fact, have at least been, at the outset, predicated upon science and not politics. As I have said before in this Chamber, I think that piece of legislation was a balanced approach. It would search the entire country and look for the best possible geological formations. We would have had regional equity so no one part of the country would bear it all; that three sites could be studied. Once they met the scientific criteria, they would be submitted to the President of the United States. The President would select one. I think that is fair. I think that is balanced. I think it is good science. Let me respond to this issue of politics because I am both bemused and frustrated. The first example of politics is the Department of Energy's own decision to eliminate one particular section of the country from any consideration at all in terms of being considered. That was the Northeast. The Department of Energy, in their internal documents, said: The political resistance will be too strong. We will never be able to get a site established in that part of the country, even though granite may be an acceptable geological material in which to place a repository. What was that? Was that science? Was that responsible? It was politics--not politics played by the Senators from Nevada or the good people of my State but politics by the Agency. As I stated yesterday, in 1984, we had a Presidential election. During the course of that election, the then-incumbent President said: Look, we're going to eliminate the folks in the Southeast. Salt dome formations will not be considered. Was that science? Was that responsible? It was politics--not politics by the Senators representing Nevada at that time, nor politics by the people in our own State. What occurred? In 1987, the law was changed so that only one site would be studied at Yucca Mountain. I have expressed my strong opposition to that. I do not like it. Was it science? Of course not. Was it responsible? Of course not. That was naked politics--naked political aggression visited upon my State. You have heard me characterize that legislation as the ``Screw Nevada Bill,'' as it is known throughout my State. That is politics--politics played by the Senate and the House of Representatives and the President in offering what was originally a balanced piece of legislation. There is not a scientist in the country who would argue that those changes were made in the interest of science or that they could be categorized as anything else other than a political decision. My point is, this process, that was set out in the 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act, is self-executing. It sets forth the process as to how we ultimately make this determination. What has occurred over the years is the injection of politics-- originally on a regional basis and now, as we debate it on the floor, with the nuclear utility industry. I suspect there are very few people who are listening to this debate who can define a millirem or tell us the difference between a millirem and a kilowatt. I confess that I am not a scientist. So let me try to categorize this as best I can in terms of what we are doing. In the location of the transuranic waste storage facility in New Mexico, the Environmental Protection Agency, then as now, is charged with the responsibility of setting a health and safety standard. These are the basic principles involved: A geologic repository designed to isolate radioactive waste from humans and the environment. That is what is occurring at Yucca Mountain. I don't like it, but that is what is occurring. That is going forward. This notion that there is an overriding necessity to enact some new piece of legislation is simply not true. This process continues. Sometime at the end of this year, perhaps, there will be a finalized environmental impact statement, and a couple or 3 years down the road there will be a recommendation for site selection. None of that has occurred at this point. It may occur down the road. It has not yet occurred. No reason to act other than that the nuclear utility industry, in the middle of this ballgame, wants to move the goalposts because they cannot be sure the guaranteed outcome they seek, irrespective of public health and safety--namely, opening the repository at Yucca Mountain--can occur if, indeed, public health and safety considerations are allowed to prevail. So we have essentially a geologic repository designed to isolate radioactive waste. The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant and Yucca Mountain share the same. The possibility of widespread contamination of both food and water sources and the human population likewise is a concern of the WIPP facility and Yucca Mountain. Radiation standards are to be established by the EPA to protect human health and the environment; that is true with WIPP, and those standards had been set at 15 millirems, and Yucca Mountain. So I think the question has to be asked: Why should Yucca Mountain be treated any differently? Is there a scientific reason? The answer is no. It is a political reason: to accommodate a nuclear utility industry which exercises enormous power and influence in the Halls of Congress and, frankly, wants to change the rules of the game in midstream; not to protect public health and safety but to get rid of nuclear waste irrespective of the consequences. We could talk about background radiation and all of that sort of thing forever and ever. I think this is the most important issue: Is the standard that was set for the WIPP fair and reasonable? I assume that it is. There was no controversy attached to that. Nobody said we ought to take the EPA out of that; we ought to put in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. There was no objection to it. It moved forward. Is the EPA being reasonable and responsible and scientific? I think the answer is clearly yes. The 1992 energy bill, which has been referenced in this debate, had inserted a provision which said the National Academy of Sciences needs to take a look at whatever the EPA standard is to see if it is reasonable and within a recommended range. They have done that. Here is what the National Academy of Sciences' recommended range. This is the millirems we are talking about, which simply means the amount of radioactive exposure an individual can have in a given year from this source. What was proposed at WIPP? Fifteen millirems. The EPA proposes 15 millirems at Yucca Mountain. Now, S. 1287 in its original version, not the bill we are now debating, had a 30-millirem standard. What does the National Academy of Sciences say? I confess, I don't know the difference between 2 millirems and 3 millirems. I suspect if my colleagues are as forthright as I am, they couldn't tell the difference either. The point that needs to be made is, the National Academy of Sciences--these are scientists; they are not politicians--says that is a reasonable standard. They say the standard, to be reasonable, could be as little as 2 millirems or as great as 20. That is a reasonable standard. What did the EPA come up with? Fifteen millirems. Why is this debate occurring? It is all about politics--not politics in Nevada but politics by the nuclear power industry because they want a standard that is less protective in terms of public health and safety. That is what this issue is all about: public health and safety. We would not be on the floor debating today if the nuclear power industry was not pushing and driving to weaken that standard the EPA has proposed. That is a fact of life, my friends. Let us talk about the 4-millirem standard for water for a moment. I know my good friend from Alaska is privileged to be from an absolutely magnificently beautiful State. I have been to his State. I love it, perhaps not with the same passion and conviction he does, but it is a gorgeous State. The State of Alaska, unlike the State of Nevada, is fortunate that nature has been more bountiful in terms of the amount of water it has. Nevada is the most arid of the 50 States. Las Vegas, with a metropolitan population of more than 1.3 million, is the most arid of all of the major population centers in America. When we talk about this 4-millirem standard for safe drinking water, it has been suggested that somehow that water would have to be extracted from the aquifer--that is the underground formation in which water is situated--and would be capable of being consumed at that very minute. That is simply not true. All the 4-millirem standard deals with is the amount of radiation. That water may have other contaminants-- arsenic. It may have to be subject to a whole series of processes, whether it is a reverse osmosis process, which sometimes we have to use in southern Nevada, adding chlorine to it, or whatever else might have to be done to make it fit for human consumption. But what we do not want to do is to damage a water resource which a growing State such as Nevada will need in the future. The notion that somehow we can cavalierly dismiss the notion of a standard to protect us in terms of safe drinking water is somewhat outrageous. Perhaps if nature had been more bountiful, we could say maybe that aquifer isn't all that important. Maybe we don't need to be concerned about it because we have water all over the place. In point of fact, Nevada has marvelous geography. It is a State for which I have great passion, and I am eager to return at the conclusion of this year and the end of my term. But the one thing we do not have is a lot of water. I think Mark Twain once hit it right on the head when he came to Nevada as a young man. He came believing there was a position as an assistant to his brother, who was the secretary of state during Nevada's territorial period of time. He wrote a book about those experiences. He talked about water. He said: Whiskey is for drinking, and water is for fighting. In the arid West, water is life itself. Water is a resource that we protect because it is vitally important to us. This aquifer needs the protection, and the EPA, the agency which Congress chose, has said that a 4-millirem standard for safe drinking water is reasonable and is good science. That is science. What is occurring here is a political effort to divert that standard from going into effect. I appreciate the candor of my friend, the chairman of the committee. We want to make sure that the measuring is under a regulation that allows waste to go to Yucca Mountain. That says nothing about health and safety. And as a Nevada Senator, that energizes me. It angers me. It makes me very angry and I don't like the process that has occurred. I do not like the fact that Nevada was designated in a ``screw Nevada bill'' as the only site to be considered. I don't like that. I am opposed to that. But if it is going to occur--and that is the state of the record--that Yucca Mountain is the only place to be studied, why? And by what conceivable rationale, if there is any public morality at all, would we suggest that somehow the people of Nevada ought to be subject to a lower public health and safety standard than our good friends from New Mexico in the WIPP facility--15 millirems and 4 millirems for the safe drinking water? As I have said, is it somehow that Nevadans are subcretins, less human? I am outraged at that suggestion or notion. As offended as I am by the process by which Nevada was selected--by politics, not science-- the ``Screw Nevada Bill''--at least the people in our State, as this process moves forward, ought to be entitled to the basic minimum health and safety standards of the EPA. Let me be clear. The EPA was not established by some left-wing, radical, commie sympathizer group of folks. This agency was brought to life during a Republican administration--the administration of Richard Nixon. In 1982, there was essentially a Republican Senate, and a Republican President made the determination in this piece of legislation--the Nuclear Waste Policy Act--that the Environmental Protection Agency was the appropriate place for the determination to be made in terms of public health and safety standards. So I submit that you don't have to know a lot about millirems, or about aquifers, and you don't have to know a whole lot about this issue to understand that the one agency that is charged by law with providing public health and safety, the Environmental Protection Agency, was charged with that responsibility 18 years ago in this act, and has exercised that responsibility with WIPP, and there was not a murmur--no suggestion--that that was somehow radical, that it was political, not science. We are simply asking for no more and demanding that there be no less protection for us. That is really all you need to know about this argument. It is simply an attempt to reduce those standards. And somehow to suggest that unless we pass this piece of legislation, this process that began back in the early 1980s to locate a permanent repository cannot go forward, that simply is not true. This process continues. We are spending hundreds of millions of dollars studying that Yucca Mountain facility to see whether or not it is suitable, and that is ongoing. That would continue, much to my regret, as I have indicated, if this piece of legislation had never been conceived or seen the light of day. What is involved here is the nuclear utilities. Yes, sure, they would like the American Society for Nuclear Engineers to make the judgment. It doesn't give me, as a citizen, great comfort that crowd is going to be more concerned about my health and safety, that of my children and grandchildren--two of whom live in Nevada--but the EPA has a pretty decent track record, and it was not challenged previously--not challenged. So what this is all about is to kind of bump this standard over into next year. Presidential politics. We know we are going to have a new President, and the hope of the nuclear utility industry is that a new President will say to the nuclear utilities, look, you can have whatever standard you want. I hope and pray to the good Lord that does not occur, but that is what this is all about. It is not necessary. It is not scientific, and it is not responsible to proceed on the course of action that we are asked to follow in this piece of legislation. I appeal to my colleagues in the name of fairness. All we are asking is to have the same measure of protection that is accorded to the good people of New Mexico with respect to their nuclear facility, which the Nevadans will be entitled to if Yucca Mountain is ever determined to be scientifically and suitably situated for the receipt of that waste. That is not an unreasonable premise. It is not an unreasonable request. We are not asking you to repeal the ``Screw Nevada Bill,'' much as I object to the political way in which our State was savaged for it. That is a fight for another day. Having had that piece of legislation shoved down our throat, we certainly ought to be entitled, as human beings who happen to live, as I do, within 90 miles of that site, to the protection of the agency that is charged by law with protecting the health and safety recommendations, and that an independent oversight group, the National Academy of Science, says is within the recommended range. What is wrong with that? The answer is, nothing is wrong with that except the politics that the nuclear industry would visit upon this Chamber and say: Look, you have to help us out; I am not sure we can make that standard. Reduce it, dilute it, kick it over until next year, and maybe we will get a new President who will be less responsive to the concerns of public health and safety. I ask my colleagues, when we vote on this at 11 o'clock tomorrow, to reject this ill-conceived piece of legislation. It will be vetoed by the President and opposed by the EPA, opposed by the Council on Environmental Quality, and by every environmental organization of which I am aware. It is said that this is an important piece of environmental legislation. Let me correct the Record. This is not an important piece of environmental legislation. If this is allowed to occur, this is an environmental travesty. I hope my colleagues will not allow that to occur. I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. BRYAN

Mr. BRYAN. Will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. BRYAN. Mr. President, I inquire of the distinguished majority leader, the Friday draft is the one from which we are working. There have been so many. I just want to be sure. Is this the one marked February 4, 2000, 4:45 p.m.?

Mr. BRYAN. That is consistent with our understanding. I thank the Senator.

Mr. BRYAN

Mr. BRYAN. Mr. President, as is so often the case when it comes to debating the various legislative proposals related to nuclear waste that have been advanced since I have been a Member of the Senate, the issues generate more heat than light. With all due respect to the distinguished chairman of the Senate Energy Committee, much of what he had to say was utterly irrelevant to the situation we confront today. The chairman would have us believe that unless this legislation is enacted, nothing will occur with respect to going forward and siting a high-level nuclear waste repository. Let me be clear. The process that was used to select that site is one to which I am strongly opposed. But in reality, if this legislation never leaves this Chamber--and it is my view it will never become law-- the process by which Yucca Mountain is to be studied--or the scientific term, ``characterized''--goes forward. The time line that has been laid out is that sometime next year there will be a site recommendation; sometime in the year 2002 there will be an application for license; sometime thereafter there will be a construction authorization; and ultimately licensure will be approved if, indeed, all of the scientific questions that have been raised are satisfactorily resolved. That is a process that began its course back in 1983. We continually revert to the history of this process to illuminate those who have not followed it and lived with it as long as I and my fellow Nevadans have, to try to explain the context in which this debate is occurring. In 1983, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act was signed into law by President Reagan. It contemplated--and I must say I think the scientific approach was reasonable--that we would search the Nation; that we would look for various kinds of geological formations in which high-level nuclear waste might be buried; that we would balance the burden, in terms of the storage of the nuclear waste, with some sense of regional equity. Three sites would be studied, or characterized, those three sites would be presented to the President of the United States, and the President would make that decision. I was a newly elected Governor in 1983, and I believe the broad outline of that process, the approach, was reasonable; that is to say, a national search would be conducted, and among the geological formations that were uppermost to be considered were granite formations in the northeastern part of the country, salt dome formations in the Southeast, and in our part of the country the so-called welded tuff. That was a piece of legislation that, by and large, sought to deal with this issue. I think, to use the chairman's terminology, that was a responsible approach. That was an inquiry that, although we in Nevada were apprehensive about it because welded tuff was being considered, nevertheless represented science, it represented a fair approach, and it represented some regional balance and equity. May I say, from that point on, what has occurred with respect to the siting process should be referred to as an antiscience approach. It is blasphemy to discuss any kind of scientific orthodoxy in terms of what has occurred. Let me remind my colleagues what occurred that in no sense of the word could be justified as in the interest of science. Early on, some of my colleagues expressed concern they did not want it to go to the northeastern part of the country. I fully understand that. That had nothing to do with science, everything to do with politics. I have been in the business a while. I understand that. And what occurred? The Department of Energy, in its own internal documentation, unilaterally decided we ought not to look at the Northeast. Was that science? Was that responsible? I think any person who had an associate of arts degree in some area of science would conclude by no standard could that be considered a scientific approach. It was politics. In the 1984 Presidential election, the issue came up as to those salt dome formations in the Southeast. What was said at that time? The President said: Look, not to worry, not to worry; we will not site it in a place where the salt dome formations are. Does that have anything to do with science? Not even to look at it? To, in effect, blind ourselves and say we ought not to look at the salt dome formation? We ought not to look at granite? Of course not. And no sensible person and no scientist worthy of being called a scientist would ever assert for a moment that that had anything to do with science. Was it responsible? Of course not. Was it political? Yes, indeed. Then 1987 comes along, and a bill which shall live forever in the infamy of congressional actions in our own State--the so-called ``Screw Nevada'' bill. Let's call it what it is. Remember, I indicated the original legislation contemplated there would be three sites that would be studied or characterized? What occurred in 1987? In 1987, a decision was made to look only at one site, Yucca Mountain--exclude any other consideration in any other region of the country. Was that science? Was that responsible? You do not have to have a political science degree from Oxford to recognize that is politics--politics, not science. So when I hear this great paean to science and responsibility, I am compelled to revisit the history of this process which has been corrupted and perverted in every stage in the process where science ought to have prevailed. In every instance, it has been politics that prevailed. So if I speak with some energy and if I speak with some anger, it is because we have been victimized, not by a scientific process but by a political process in which Nevada has been victimized, and I strongly object to that as a Nevadan, as a citizen. I hope my colleagues will reflect in a broader sense that what has occurred to us could occur to them in another context. Having said that, the reality in which we deal today is that Yucca Mountain is being considered. This process we have talked about, these milestones, continues forward. So all this talk about nuclear waste piling up and responsibility, we have to do something--hopefully, we will do the responsible thing; hopefully, we will do the scientifically prudent thing. But in no sense is this legislation necessary for this process. I do not like its origin, in terms of the ``Screw Nevada'' bill, but it is going forward. That is, currently, as we are debating on the floor of the Senate, the steady process goes forward. The final environmental impact study is being finalized--not yet final. Sometime late next year, we are going to have a site recommendation and sometime in the year 2002, or thereafter, an application for a license. I say to my friends, no decision has been made at this point that, in fact, Yucca Mountain is suitable. That decision is yet to be made. Hopefully, it will be made not in the political way in which other decisions have been made, but it will be made in a scientific way. The first thing I want to disabuse my colleagues of and those listening is that somehow there is a compelling necessity to have this piece of legislation enacted, that if it is not enacted, somehow this process I have described to you will stop. That simply is not true. From a Nevada perspective, I am not happy with that process, but it is going forward and will continue to go forward. Let me, as a sidebar, try to address the red herring that is raised every time that somehow there is going to be some insurmountable problem in providing onsite storage. That simply is not the case. Those utilities that need to provide additional onsite storage can do so in a manner which is consistent with what the scientific community acknowledges, with a dry cask storage system, will be available. In terms of dealing with the equities, about the ratepayers who have paid a lot of money, yes, they have paid a lot of money. That is not the fault of people in my own State. That is part of a process which has been very difficult, and I must say, rather ineptly handled by the Department of Energy over a number of years. It is true, as the chairman pointed out, that 1998 was promised as the date in which a permanent repository or a waste dump would be opened. We have passed 1998. It is now 2000. That permanent repository, the dump at Yucca Mountain, will not, as I indicated in these guidelines, be available if ever--if ever--for some years to come. Early on, as a new Member in the Senate, I recognized there was an equity argument, that to the extent ratepayers would have to pay for additional storage as a result of the permanent waste dump not being opened in the year 1998, there ought to be some kind of relief and compensation. I introduced legislation that said, in effect, to the extent that such delays occur, if they do, and if, indeed, as a result of those delays additional storage is required, the dry cask storage system is required, that whatever those expenses are ought to be deducted from the amount of money the ratepayers are required to pay into the nuclear waste fund. It strikes me as being fair. That is where we begin to scratch the surface and find out that what is really involved in that kind of discussion is not fairness or equity, but the nuclear energy industry, through the Nuclear Energy Institute, has a very different agenda because, incredibly, they oppose that legislation. Let me repeat that. For those who are listening who are ratepayers in States that have nuclear utilities, I was prepared and remain prepared today and agree with those parts of the bill that provide such compensation to any ratepayer who has been subjected to additional expense as a result of the permanent waste dump not being available ought to be compensated in some way, and the compensation should be reducing the amount of money the ratepayers are required to pay into the nuclear waste fund by an amount equal to the expense they have incurred. That is equity. That is fairness. Let me repeat, that is not what the nuclear industry is all about. They have no interest in that. We have heard a good bit about responsibility and science. What we want is the best science, we are told. I do not believe that is what they want at all. Let me try to frame the issue and let me use the chairman's own words. The chairman has said--and I appreciate his candor; we disagree very strongly about this, but I want to make it clear to him and others that this is not a matter of personal acrimony; it is a major policy difference. This is what the chairman said in the last go-round we were about to have. This is an article that appeared in the Las Vegas Sun, December 6, 1999: What we want is to make sure that the measuring is under a regulation that allows waste to go to Yucca. ``What we want is to make sure that the measuring is under a regulation that allows waste to go to Yucca.'' Not one word is expressed about public health and public safety, and that is precisely what they want. As my colleagues know, I will not be a Member of this august body this time next year, but I predict that if the nuclear utilities feel they need more legislation, they will be attempting to reduce the standards further. S. 1287, which is the vehicle we are debating, as it came out of committee had these kinds of standards. Let's talk about that because that is pretty important for our consideration. S. 1287 provided that 30 millirems per year would be the authorized dosage each individual can receive. For most of us who are not scientists--and I acknowledge that I am not--I do not know that I would recognize a millirem if I ran into one. Suffice it to say that millirems are the way in which we measure radioactivity, radioactive exposure. We all know that. Many of us who are getting a bit long in the tooth--and I exempt the distinguished occupant of the Chair from that categorization--can remember in our youth when we would go to the shoe store and there would be a little fluoroscope there. Your mom would be there, and that fluoroscope would flash on and your bones in your feet would be exposed. The shoe salesman would say: I think those are the right size for Richard because he can move his toes freely. As a kid, I revelled in it because I could see my feet--exposure, radioactivity. Do we do this today? The distinguished occupant of the Chair and I not only are parents but grandparents and are proud of that fact and are interested in their health and safety. That was abandoned a generation ago. Why? Because there are risks involved. In less than a decade after Roentgen developed the x ray, there had been a fatality. That process indicates that radiation poses some very real risks to human health and safety. The experience in my own lifetime has been that, by and large, those standards are tight. We do not have fluoroscopes for fitting shoes on youngsters or adults, there is a constant effort to reduce the amount of exposure, and x rays we get when we go to the dentist are much less invasive than they were a generation ago. Why? Because the cumulative impact of all of that has a profound impact on health and safety. We are not talking about some theoretical concern that might happen. That is the experience of more than a century, and although not completely applicable to this piece of legislation, we now know that workers who were a part of the nuclear industrial development that made it possible for us to produce the atomic weapons upon which our security has been predicated for more than half a century, the Department of Energy now acknowledges they were exposed to radiation and their health has been potentially impacted. They have acknowledged that for the first time decades later. We are talking about something that can have a profound, even a potentially deadly impact. Yet our friends in the Nuclear Energy Institute and their allies shoehorn the standard so that it fits Yucca Mountain, irrespective of what good scientists say about health and safety. Does that make me angry? You bet it does. Any parent, any grandparent, any responsible citizen should be absolutely appalled at the notion that this is being politicized, and it is. I will have more to say about that. In 1983, the year the legislation was signed into law by President Reagan, the Environmental Protection Agency was established as the individual Federal agency to set the standard. Nobody challenged that. In my first 6 years in the Senate, we had a decision with respect to the WIPP facility, a nuclear repository dealing with transuranic waste located in the State of New Mexico. The Environmental Protection Agency set the standard. What was the standard they set? It was 15 millirems. Was there an objection from the nuclear industry? No. Was there a contention that somehow this was an outrageous and unreasonable standard? Was it suggested somehow this was wild science? No. It was set at 15 millirems. At about that time, however, the nuclear energy crowd's interest in locating a high-level waste dump in our State began to be a little fretful. Could Yucca Mountain, which was developing a number of problems--a question of seismic activity, a question of volcanic activity, a question in terms of water table or thermoloads that were greater than expected, an earthquake which visited the site and created some damage--all of this began. So in the energy bill of 1992--never debated on the floor of the Senate or the House--that was going forward, all of a sudden a provision was inserted into the bill that sought in some way to maybe bracket or to limit the EPA in setting the standard. In effect, what was requested was that the National Academy of Sciences ought to take a look and see if whatever the Environmental Protection Agency came up with, to use a metaphor from the street, was in the ballpark: Are they being reasonable? That was the first assault upon the EPA and its standard-setting capability advocated by the proponents of the high-level nuclear waste dump at Yucca Mountain. This was not something the Senators from Nevada and those of us who have been concerned about health and safety advocated. This was what the nuclear utilities argued for. Let's go over the verdict. What was the cycle? The National Academy of Sciences did, in fact, take a look at the EPA standard that was proposed for us at Yucca Mountain. The EPA standard: 15 millirems, the same as WIPP. Pretty reasonable. The National Academy of Sciences, in looking at that standard, said: We think the standard with respect to the milliremic exposure rate per person per year is somewhere between 2 and 20. We think that is the range. So those are the brackets you see there on the chart: 2 and 20. Frankly, the EPA came right down in the middle. For those of us in Nevada, we would much prefer that they would be at 2 or 5 or 10 millirems. But it was set at 15. It was consistent with what had been done in WIPP. Let's talk about the agenda. What does the nuclear utility crowd want? They don't want the 15-millirem standard. That is science. What they want to do is to game the system--to, in effect, shoehorn in any kind of a standard that makes it possible for them to dump nuclear waste in Nevada. Their most recent iteration of this is S. 1287, the underlying vehicle, although the substitute amendment we are debating does have some changes. I want to make that clear for the record. What did they propose? Thirty millirems--twice as much. A moment ago, I stated it is my belief that next year, the year thereafter, we get to 2002, and all of a sudden they will say: Look, we can't build that site with a 30-millirem standard. They would be rushing onto the floor of the Senate, as they have year after year, to say: Look, we need a standard that allows an exposure rate of 60 millirems, or 90 millirems, or 100 millirems--whatever it takes. That is the underlying basis for this statement right here. This reflects the policy: What we want is to make sure that the measuring is under a regulation that allows waste to go to Yucca. There is not one reference to health, to safety, or to science. The shorthand view is: Look, whatever it takes to get it there, devil be whatever the standards will be, that is what we want. That is the risk we have. That is not responsible. I exhort my colleagues to be responsible. That is not scientific. I urge my colleagues to be scientific. That is not scientific. Why should there be a different standard set for WIPP than there is for Yucca? Why? Why is that necessary? No objection was raised to the WIPP standard. Why shouldn't it be the same? Logically, the EPA reached the scientific conclusion that it should be the same. The National Academy of Sciences--and there is nobody in Nevada who was part of that review process--said: Look, that is within the recommended range; that is fair. But fairness and science and responsibility is not what this bill is all about. Any fair-minded person would look at this and understand that it has a political overtone. In the last few days, the process has been extremely frustrating. On Friday, we received two different versions of the substitute. By 4:45 on Friday afternoon, we had received the version that has been offered today. Based upon that version, here is what we know: The EPA strenuously objects to the language as it relates to standards that are in the draft before us today. The Council of Environmental Quality strongly objects to that standard as set forth in the substitute. And the President of the United States has indicated he will veto such legislation if, indeed, the bill in that form reaches his desk. This Statement of Administration Policy is dated February 8, 2000: The Administration has reviewed a February 4, 2000, manager's amendment to S. 1287-- That is the substitute we are talking about now-- and understands that this amendment will be brought to the Senate floor. Indeed, it has and is what we are debating. Unfortunately, this amendment undermines EPA's existing statutory authority to set standards to protect public health and the environment from radioactive releases; therefore, it is unacceptable to the Administration. Although the amendment appears to allow EPA to exercise its existing authority to set appropriate radiation release standards for the Yucca Mountain repository, it will allow another entity to block EPA's authority until June 1, 2001. This may not be readily apparent to everyone, but the thrust of this new language would be to strip the EPA of the authority to promulgate, in final form, this 15-millirem standard and kick it over until next year. Why? Why would they do that? Is that science? Is there some scientific reason for that? No. This rule has been in the gestation process since the early 1980s. It has been out for public comment, which is certainly appropriate-- those who criticize it or support it make recommended changes to it; all of that has occurred. That is part of the process. That is not only good science but it is responsible public policy. Is it responsible to suggest that? No. What is involved? Well, as we all know--and I must say it has begun far too early for most of us, even those of us who have had a lifelong fascination with politics--this is about Presidential election politics. We are going to have a new President next year. President Clinton is constitutionally precluded from succeeding himself. We all know that we are going to have a new President. So this is a political, cynical effort to deprive EPA of the authority to do its job in accordance with science and in a responsible fashion, and to inject what into the process? Politics. That began in 1983 with the Northeast being taken out of the dialog, and in 1984 with the salt dome formations in the Southeast being taken out in 1987--if we look at the one-site and put-all-the-nuclear-eggs-in-one-basket approach. Again--it should come as no surprise to those who have followed the process--we have politics as usual. Kick this into next year, to a new President who may take a less protective view of health and public safety and responsibility and take a different approach. That is what we are being asked to do. This draft is replete with politics. Let me mention one of these provisions to give you an idea. This draft has no more to do with science or public responsibility; this is a political instrument; this is a political deal. Let's be honest about it. What do we have here? We have a little sentence that talks about transportation. Let me say that the concerns about transportation, shipping 77,000 metric tons of high- level nuclear waste on the interstate highway systems in America, on the rail transportation corridors of America, that will go through 43 States, 51 million Americans live within a mile or less. So lest those of you who may be observing this debate are thinking this only affects the good people of Nevada, let me assure you that your backyard can be affected, as well as your church and schools that may lie within that mile or less of the Interstate Highway System or rail. In looking at what those routes might be, one would think we ought to try to take the safest, most direct route. But no, no, we have politics in this. We are told we should avoid highways with downgrades of more than 7 percent. I know why that was put in there. He is a very good friend of mine, but the able Senator from Colorado, who voted with us last year in opposing this ill-conceived attempt--this is an attempt to acquire his support. I do not criticize him for it. He is trying to protect his State. I offer no criticism. But that is the cynicism that is involved. No science. No public responsibility. This is politics. Now, look, I happen to love politics. It has been a lifetime of mine. I am proud of my involvement. I have had experience at the local level and the State level, and I am proud to have been a Member of this august body. This is my twelfth year. So I do not shirk from or blanch at the thought that we are talking about political issues and public policy. That is why I came to the Senate. This is why I have devoted my career in public service to policy formation. But this is not public policy; this is public cynicism. That is what this is all about. We ought to reject this. So I guess I will simply return to the premise I began with, which is, is this piece of legislation necessary? The answer is no. If this legislation fails to be enacted into law, does it in any way impede the process occurring at Yucca Mountain? The answer is no. Parenthetically, I wish it did. But it does not impede it. That process goes forward. Does it do anything with respect to these guidelines in the sense of when the decisions are going to be made in the year 2001 and site recommendations? Does it deal with that guideline or the site application for licensure process? No. That all goes forward. That is in the law now and that is part of the planning process. It is not necessary. It is totally unnecessary. What we are talking about is a very artful attempt to circumvent the process in which good science and good public policy ought to be used in making these decisions. That will not be allowed to happen in this piece of legislation in this form. This is a moving target. I am talking about the substitute before us today. I alluded a bit ago to the frustration I have. This piece of legislation affects my State more than any other State, although--let me be clear--43 States will be affected by the transportation corridors. Yet we have largely been in the dark in terms of what kind of a substitute amendment we might face. Friday afternoon, we received the version that we are debating today. We are prepared to debate it. We are prepared to accept the President's veto, the support of all the environmental community, support of the EPA and Council on Environmental Quality, and all those charged with that responsibility. We are prepared. As we speak, a new substitute is being worked up. Whether or not there will be agreement, we don't know. Perhaps some of these comments, in the context of the new substitute, may have to be modified. But that is a sense of frustration I share with colleagues. Imagine, if you will, something that was particular to your own State, and the negotiations affecting your State excluded you from the process. And you kind of waited with bated breath each morning. You have a proposal; can we see it? What is it going to be? That, Mr. President, is where we in Nevada have been. I am deeply offended by that process. I was not sent to Washington by the people whom I represent to sit on the sidelines and be that potted plant somewhere in the back part of the Senate Chamber. I want to know what is going to happen because I know from bitter experience that good science and good public policy have absolutely nothing to do with the way this process has been implemented since its earlier auspicious beginning in January of 1983. So I recognize in these kinds of debates, I am sad to say, that unlike the days when the giants of the Senate took the floor and we saw each other and debated back and forth, that is not the way the process works. I understand that, in numbers, we are no match for the phalanx of lobbyists from the nuclear utilities. We do not have their financial resources; I acknowledge that. All we have is our honor, our integrity, and what is good science and public responsibility. I hope that argument will prevail because it ought to be the way we in this Chamber make the decision. It ought to be the process by which every piece of legislation is dealt with on the floor of the Senate and in its various standing committees. We are here debating the substitute. We will wait and see what other pieces of legislation there might be. But I implore my colleagues to look at this carefully and understand what is coming about. This is not necessary. It is not science. It is simply not responsible public policy. I urge you to oppose this legislation. I yield the floor. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. BRYAN

Mr. BRYAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that members of my staff be extended the privilege of the floor throughout the duration of the debate on this legislation, S. 1287; specifically, Joe Barry, Jean Marie Neal, Brock Richter, and Brent Heberlee.

Mr. BRYAN

Mr. BRYAN. Mr. President, I believe the record will reflect that the Senator from Nevada, pursuant to a unanimous consent agreement, has 30 minutes to speak. If I am so informed, I would like to yield myself a part of the time at this point.

Mr. BRYAN. I thank the Presiding Officer. Mr. President, and my colleagues, when we are talking about the financial institutions and affiliates and nonaffiliates, and international banking transactions, those are concepts which most of my constituents, and I daresay most of the constituents of all of my colleagues, see as having very little relevance to their lives. There are not too many people in the country whose lives are intimately involved, on a day-to-day basis, with affiliate sharing of information or involved in major financial transactions. Most of us have an insurance policy or two, and increasingly--about 50 percent--American families now have stock ownership in some form or another. Most of us have bank accounts, and that is probably the extent of the average American family in terms of financial information. So I think it may be instructive if I put some context into this debate we are having. We have experienced, in the decade of the 1990s, an extraordinary rapidity of change, if you will, in the way in which financial services--banking, insurance, and stock securities--are handled in this country. We have also seen an enormous number of mergers across the board in American business. To some extent, it is almost a sense of deja vu because at the end of the last century, in the 1890s, we saw a tremendous consolidation of industry in the country. Many will recall that was a period of time in which we had vast industrial cartels and trusts. So there was an enormous concentration of wealth and power in some of these large industrial concerns that were just taking shape in the latter part of the 19th century. In a sense, as the 20th century is coming to a close, that pace has quickened. The critics would say we are experiencing a sense of merger mania or merger frenzy. So many of the major financial institutions in the country are participating in that. Just a couple of examples: Citibank and Travelers have come together; NationsBank and Bank of America--and I could point out countless hundreds. What impact does that have on the average citizen in this country? I think it is fair to say, none of us really know. The advocates for these mergers and consolidations are saying: Look. We will provide new convenience to the American public, we will have one-stop shopping for insurance and banking and securities; that it will be less expensive; that more options will be provided. That may, in fact, be the case. I think none of us know for sure. The critics raise the specter that this concentration of power, this enormous business combine that is taking place across the whole range of financial services, may not be good for the country; that that kind of concentration of wealth, as we learned a century ago, may be bad for the public. I have not reached a judgment on that. I was fully prepared to support this legislation because I recognize another reality. Historically, from the 1930s, banking, insurance, and securities were separated in three discrete and separate categories: If you wanted to have a banking transaction, you went to the bank; if you wanted to get insurance coverage, you went to an insurance company; if you wanted to dabble in the stock market or wanted to buy stocks or bonds, you went to a stockbroker. That is the way most Americans have historically dealt with the financial services industry. That was as a result of legislation enacted after the great financial collapse of the Great Depression to protect against this consolidation of power that many thought was a contributing factor to the collapse of the financial industry in America in 1929. It is called Glass-Steagall. So if that name comes up, that is what that means. I think that reality and fairness would dictate that the model which regulates those industries as three separate and discrete industries has no longer relevance in America today. Whether it should, whether we wish that was still the case, in point of fact several things have occurred. Court decisions, decisions by administrative agencies, have, in effect, torn down those walls of separation. Increasingly, we are having a lot of those services, the banking and the insurance and the securities functions, kind of merged together. As a result of that, I think it is fair to say--and the advocates have made this point--the financial regulatory structure that emerged as a consequence of the Great Depression, the Glass-Steagall Act, no longer comports with the reality of the marketplace. That is fair and that is true. So we need a new regulatory model, a new framework. This legislation has much to commend it. And it provides that regulatory framework. Essentially, we are saying in this legislation: Look, if you are providing an insurance service, you ought to be regulated by the same regulator, whether you are a small independent insurance office in Winnemucca, NV, or whether you are operating in the ionosphere of some of the major Wall Street concerns in the financial center of our country in New York City. That is called functional regulation. So that is the background. As I said, I had hoped to be able to support this legislation. I recognize it has been worked on for many years. The reality of this also has to be tempered by another reality, and that is the right of privacy. For more than a century, we have recognized in America the right of privacy. That right of privacy, as we know it today, is threatened and endangered. It is threatened and endangered by some of the marvelous technologies of our time. Let's talk about financial services for a moment in terms of that technology. It was not too long ago that when you went to a bank, if you were going to make a bank deposit, you saw a teller, and he or she, by hand, posted, entered--there was kind of a carbon sheet--the deposit in the record. If you were applying for insurance, you manually filled out papers; your insurance agent compiled all of this, and he kind of kept a carbon copy. Twenty years ago, when we got into Xerox capability, he had duplication capability. The same thing was essentially true for securities. What has changed all of that? Some very positive and powerful forces: Computerization. As a result of some software programs, it is possible to gather data and profile it, whether you are a bank depositor, whether you are an individual who is an insurance customer, or whether you are a stock and bond owner and you have your account with a securities firm. Just a stroke of the key now can bring that data up. What does that mean? It means that if I am a marketer and I want to get a profile of somebody who, say, has an average bank account balance of $50,000, no longer would it be necessary for some poor devil in a green eye shade laboring in some dimly lit corner of some financial company to go through and pull the records manually. Today, a sophisticated software program can simply, with a key stroke, bring up that information. That information is very valuable. It is very comprehensive. Today, most Americans have an enormous amount of their personal financial data, the kind of thing that is very personal--their bank account, what checks they are writing and to whom, what kind of insurance coverages they have, their application indicating any health problems they might have--as part of a database. It is on a computer disk drive. What kind of stocks and bonds they have, what kind of certificates of deposit they may own and when they may come up--that database is there. I think most of us have this vague concept that when we are dealing with our bank, when we are dealing with our insurance company, when we are dealing with our stockbroker, that stuff is confidential. Isn't it? Isn't that similar to talking with your lawyer about a legal problem or your doctor about a medical problem or even sharing with your local pastor, your rabbi, your minister, your religious advisor? Isn't there a privilege there? It is kind of confidential. Certainly you, as an individual, think it is confidential. You certainly do not have the expectation that that information is going to be shared. If that was your expectation, I regret to tell you that you are wrong because today that information, even without this legislation--and I will talk about that--is freely exchanged. It is big money. It is big money in the sense that individuals who share that information--financial companies--share that information because they make substantial amounts of money as a result of that. Let me give an indication in terms of what the U.S. Comptroller of the Currency has said: Most large national banks--this is without this legislation--sell customer account information to marketing companies. Those are the lovely people who call you at home during the dinner hour frequently or who inundate your mailbox with some type of solicitation. The U.S. Comptroller of the Currency says: Most large national banks sell customer account information to marketing companies, and the banks typically get 20 percent to 25 percent of the revenue generated by marketers. Some banks have generated millions of dollars in revenue by providing third parties with information on millions of customers, including name and address, Social Security number, credit card numbers--all of this according to a Ms. Julie Williams, chief counsel to the U.S. Comptroller of the Currency. This enormous amount of financial information that is collected, which you give your bank, your insurance company, your security broker, is now being freely shared. It is valuable, and it is worth millions of dollars. That is the current law. What about this piece of legislation makes the privacy concerns even more heightened? The advocates of this bill will say there are no privacy restrictions now, and that is largely true. Banks, insurance companies, security houses are free to share this information. So they say: Look, we have some privacy provisions in there. We are taking some important protections. I will comment on that in a moment. But this bill tears down those walls of separation between banking, between insurance, and between securities functions, and it kind of merges them altogether. The advocates will say that is going to make it convenient for everyone. What it means is that a bank will now be able to own an affiliate, a sister company, an insurance company, and so that information from the bank and its sister affiliate, an insurance company or a security company, can now be freely exchanged. We are talking about the large brokerage houses in America. We are talking about the largest insurance companies in America. We are talking about the largest banks in America. In effect, that information the banks were selling and making substantial amounts of money on, as was pointed out by the Comptroller of the Currency that they were selling to marketers, now, as a result of this legislation, which will encourage the formation of these affiliate or sister banking, sister insurance, sister securities relationships, will expand exponentially. No question about that--cross-marketing, that is part of the intent. That is what drives this. There are some realities of the marketplace we all acknowledge. So that information that is in your bank account now can move to an insurance company affiliate, can move to a securities affiliate, and the converse of that is true; it can move in the other direction. You have a stock account; that information can be shared with an affiliate that is an insurance company or a bank. So this information that you would think--and I thought, until I became a member of this committee and became more familiar with the laws dealing with financial companies--is confidential is now going to be widely shared. And there are big dollars in this. That is why the privacy concerns are heightened, that more of this information is going to be shared with more people, the most personal and private kind of stuff in your financial history, your health record, as reflected by any information on your bank account. Now, what is happening currently before this new law? Let us talk about a couple of examples I think will prove to be particularly egregious. This is the kind of abuse that occurs. In one case, a 90-year-old woman who had been a customer of a bank for more than 50 years--that would be a trusted relationship; I cannot imagine this woman would believe this information would be shared with others, but it was--was billed by a telemarketer for a computer product. She didn't even own a computer. Before she died, it took her 11 months to get the telemarketer to remove the charges from her credit card account. Information which the bank had shared, her bank, a relationship of 50 years, one would have to think there was a trust relationship that the depositor had with that bank, but this information was shared. Let me point out, as has occurred during the course of our discussion, a situation with respect to the San Fernando Valley Bank. They sold a convicted felon 90 percent of the credit card numbers that the convicted felon used to run up $45.7 million in bogus charges against those customers. The bank sold that information to a telemarketer. That is what is occurring now, today, without this exponential expansion of the sharing of information. Let me talk about U.S. Bank. U.S. Bank was involved in sharing some information, as well. That, too, posed some major concerns because this information was being sold to a telemarketer that offered such things as travel and health care products. The bank received nearly $4 million in commissions for selling this information to nearly a million customers. These things are occurring. Here is a typical example of what this reflects. This is a deposit record. It appears that the last deposit was $109,451. What we know is that the lady who made this deposit, perhaps in an off-guarded moment of candor, shares with the teller--she is banking the old-fashioned way, sharing with the teller--that she is not really sure what to do with this money. One can assume that this money was recently acquired, through an inheritance or some change of circumstance in her life, and she had a good bit of money that came in, this $109,000. She shares this information with the teller. The teller writes on the bottom: ``She came in today and wasn't sure what she could do with her money.'' Look up here. It says ``David.'' He is one of these affiliates who is involved with a securities company. It says: ``David, see what you can do. Thank you, teller 12''--whoever teller 12 is. That information is then being shared with a securities company, and, undoubtedly, this lady received a call. She has absolutely no idea that anybody other than perhaps the closest members of her family know she has just come into some money and deposited $109,000. That is the kind of stuff that is occurring now. The point I am trying to make is that if those abuses are occurring now--and that is only the tip of the iceberg--imagine what is going to be happening with all of these fire walls having been taken down and the affiliates sharing information. There is one thing I did not make clear. I did point out that banks will be able to assist their affiliate that is an insurance or securities company, but these affiliates also own other companies, commercial firms that may sell a whole range of products, such as sporting goods, travel packages, vacation homes, you name it. So that is part of their business currently. With the affiliation sharing, all of that information moves downstream within the sister affiliate, which is a major concern in terms of these marketing efforts. Now, let's talk about what the bill purports to do. I inquire, how much time I have remaining?

Mr. BRYAN. OK. We will try to do this quickly. Let's talk about the expectation of what people think in terms of their privacy. I think this is an interesting number. The Wall Street Journal did a poll on what our expectations are and what we fear will happen most. Which one or two concerns are you most concerned about in the next century? Loss of personal privacy, 29 percent. This is not done by some do-gooder, ultraliberal social think tank; this is done by the Wall Street Journal, which is the voice of American business. And 29 percent fear loss of personal privacy. When you ask people, ``Would you mind if a company you did business with sold information about you to another company?'' 92 percent say yes. Yes, they mind. The American people care very much about that. They may not know the difference between an op-sub and an affiliate, or what a unitary thrift is, what a ``whoopie'' is. Those are all terms we have debated here. But they sure know what privacy is about. ``In the future, insurance companies and investment firms may be able to merge into a single company. If they do, would you support or oppose these newly merged companies internally sharing information?'' That is what this bill permits. Eighty-one percent say no. Here are some headlines across America: ``Banks Sell Your Secrets,'' USA Today. Los Angeles Times: ``Privacy? Don't bank on it.'' Los Angeles Times: ``Your Privacy Could Be a Thing of the Past.'' Let's talk about the bill because the bill provides minimal protection. First of all, it tells you the banks are required to post a policy of what their privacy policy is. Here is an existing web page with an existing bank in the country today: Question 4: If I request to be excluded from affiliate sharing of information, what information about me and my products and services with you will and will not be shared within your affiliated family of banks and companies? That is the question. Here is the answer: Answer 4: Even if you request to be excluded from affiliate sharing of information, we will share this other information about you and your products and services with each other to the extent permitted by law. This web page would be perfectly appropriate and legal under the new law. All that is required is a posting of the policy. Now, if anybody in America thinks that is an adequate protection for your privacy, I would like to talk about a little piece of property I have in New York called the Brooklyn Bridge, and we would like to talk about you buying it from me. Utterly absurd. That is what is happening. Now, there is absolutely no provision--none, zippo, nada, zero, nothing--that prevents the sharing of information from affiliate to affiliate. No privacy at all. That is freely exchanged; it is freely exchanged. With respect to the third party, the nonaffiliate, we are told, yes, there is an opt-out provision; that is, you can let people know you want that not to be done. OK, that sounds fine, except there are two major, glaring exceptions. Those are marketing agreements and joint marketing in which those provisions simply do not apply. So if the third party itself has a company that is involved in telemarketing, there is absolutely no prohibition against that information being shared. So in point of fact--and the USA Today, I think, has made a very telling commentary on that by pointing out that these provisions simply provide very little. I quote the October 28 edition: A consumer's right to opt out of data-swapping arrangements is severely restricted. Consumers would not, for instance, be able to stop banks from sharing information with third parties that market a bank's own products; nor could we block data-sharing deals that involve products sold under joint agreements. Further, it goes on to point out there is no protection against banks sharing information with financial or insurance companies they own. In fact, since the law would encourage such cross-ownership, a consumer's chance of stopping widespread information sharing likely would be minimal. I simply say for colleagues interested in privacy, receive no comfort, my friends--none--that these very transparent and illusory privacy provisions really provide much at all. They provide virtually nothing, no protection at all with respect to affiliate sharing. I think the protection with respect to a transfer to a third party with those two gaping loopholes--gaping--any attorney who has taken a single course in any kind of securities would easily be able to craft a loophole for his client that would make that activity perfectly permissible. The bottom line of all of this is that those of us on the committee who offered an amendment which would have simply said, look, you have to provide every customer with the right to opt out; that is, to be notified that: Look, you have a right to opt out if you don't want this to occur, we are told, no, that would destroy the dynamics, the synergy of the marketplace; it could not happen. Let me tell you, these very American companies--and they are premier companies and wonderful companies and successful, and as Americans we are vicariously proud of them--do business in Europe. But in doing business in Europe, the European Union requires the opt-out provision. And the same companies that say American citizens should not have that privacy, that it would destroy their opportunities in the market and the synergies of the marketplace to provide those same protections that those of us in committee sought to add to the European counterparts-- you will recall the U.S. bank situation. The attorney general of Minnesota took them to task. Guess what. As part of a settlement agreement that they entered into, they agreed as part of that settlement agreement to do what? To inform customers of the bank's privacy policy and to provide notice of customers' rights to opt out of the sharing of information with bank affiliates. Think about that. U.S. banks as part of a settlement said they could do it and it would not compromise their ability to take advantage of the dynamics and the synergies of the marketplace. The largest and most successful financial companies in America that do business daily in Europe have agreed to be bound by those provisions, but they will not be bound by the provisions in this country. So Americans have a very much depreciated right of privacy compared to their counterparts in Europe. I would simply say, Why? Why? I don't know what the answer is.

Mr. BRYAN. Will the Senator yield to me an additional 5 minutes?

Mr. BRYAN. Mr. President, I will wind this up because the Senator from Alabama has shared this fight with the Senator from Nevada in committee and in conference. I thank him for his leadership and his support. The point I was trying to make is this is not an unreasonable request. If one of the largest banks in America, as part of a settlement with the attorney general of Minnesota, can agree to the opt-out provisions which a number of us on the committee sought to add, every bank can live with those provisions. If the major banks in America that do business in Europe every day of the week can live with those provisions, I think we have to ask ourselves why would these companies not be prepared to provide the same kinds of privacy protections that either they have agreed to in a consent decree when they have been taken to court by the attorney general--in this case the attorney general of Minnesota--not be willing to provide the same kinds of protections provided to Europeans to people in America? There was some debate in the committee. ``We don't want to impose upon the American economy the European model.'' No; I don't either. None of us did. The question is not do we want to impose the European model. The question that has to be framed is, why should Americans be entitled to less protection as to their right to privacy from the same company that is doing business in Europe and providing those protections to their European customers? I must say that it was because of these overarching concerns--we have seen the examples; I believe they are simply the iceberg of examples today--the potential for abuse in terms of violating your fundamental right of privacy and the most sensitive information about your personal life will be widely shared and disseminated. I think if you look at it very carefully, there is no protection at all in the affiliate area-- none. A sister company can freely exchange that information with banks, insurance, stock brokerages, and the companies which those affiliates own. With respect to third parties, the so-called nonaffiliate, if you look at those marketing and joint agreement exceptions, I have to tell you there is not much there. What you get, in fact, is the whole of the doughnut. That is not much protection. My able colleague from Alabama and I and others, the distinguished ranking member of the committee, fought the good fight for this in the committee. We just believe those protections are inadequate. I thank my colleague for yielding me the time. I yield the floor.