Robert Byrd

Mr. BYRD

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I have been more than patient. Under the majority leader's order earlier, I was to have spoken on this subject, the Defense Department appropriations bill. Under his order, I was to be recognized after the vote so as to accommodate Senators that they might catch their planes. Now there were other consents offered which I heard. I didn't object to them, but I believe the record will show that I was to be recognized immediately after the vote for the statement which I wanted to make on the homeland defense section of the DOD appropriations bill. I have been very patient. I understand the problems of the two leaders. I have been majority leader before I have been minority leader, and I have been majority whip. I understand all their problems. This is the end of the year. Everybody wants to get away for Christmas. I don't want to interject myself in between someone's wish to catch a plane. But I have been very patient. I have let other consent orders come up without objecting because my speech isn't all that important. But I wanted to make it. Now we are hearing consents offered for bills. I don't know who is watching the place on this bill. The distinguished Senator from Kansas is going to make a request on a bill. I want to be here when he makes it. He is entitled to make his request. But time is fast fleeting when this Senator is going to stand aside and just continue to wait and let everybody else speak, let everybody else object to the order of speaking, and just stand aside and let it be done. That is not a big thing. It won't change the history of the world one way or the other. But I just want to say this: Next year, the chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee is not going to stand aside for every other Senator's convenience in times like this. I shall proceed. The Senate has considered the conference report for the fiscal year 2002 Defense Department appropriations bill. It is a good bill, but it could have been much better. As Senators are aware, included in this legislation is the final allocation of the $40 billion emergency supplemental funding approved by this Senate just 3 days after the tragic attacks on the World Trade Center Towers and on the Pentagon. Quite simply, we wanted to respond to the attacks that occurred on September 11 and take steps to prevent attacks from occurring in the future. We didn't just want to respond to the attacks that had already occurred, but we wanted to take steps that could prevent attacks from occurring in the future. Just a few days ago, the Senate had before it a broader package, one that fulfilled the $20 billion commitment made by the President and the Congress to New York and the other attacked communities; one that provided the Defense Department with substantial funding for its mission overseas--we wanted to give the President every dollar he asked for, $21 billion--and one that met the many pressing needs for our homeland defense: Improved hospital capacity to respond to terrorist attacks, wide distribution of smallpox vaccine, more border agents, improved safety at airports and train stations, safer mail, better trained and equipped police and firefighters. That package, which was supported by a majority of this Senate in direct response to the September 11 disaster, succumbed to partisan politics. It fell when Republicans in this Chamber raised a procedural 60-vote point of order against the provision because they believed it was too expensive. They were within their rights to object. They were within their rights to propose a 60-vote point of order. But I don't understand how we can place an arbitrary price tag on protecting the safety of our citizens. Never in my memory can I recall a time when Congress became so partisan over a disaster response, whether it be from earthquakes, floods, tornados, fires, never before can I remember our lining up so rigidly along political party lines when it came to providing the American people with funds to recover from disaster. Unfortunately, the Senate minority and the White House used the 60- vote point of order against the homeland defense package. As I say, they have a perfect right to make that point of order. That is within the rules. We all recognize that you can't beat 60 votes when you only have 51 at most on this side. Our Republican friends didn't want to help us get the 60 votes. So it must be dismaying to the people who have heard so much about the pledges of bipartisanship, so much about a new tone in Washington, to see what should have been a united, bipartisan approach to defending our homeland dissolve into a partisan dispute. That is truly a shame. Since that vote, however, we have stepped back and worked on the smaller compromise plan that is before the Senate this afternoon. While it is not as comprehensive as the plan first proposed earlier this month, the allocation of the $20 billion emergency supplemental funding in this legislation provides support and resources that are needed right now for homeland defense, for national security, and for the recovery of New York City and the other communities directly affected by the September 11 attacks. For those communities, the supplemental provides $8.2 billion. This brings the total commitment to the recovery effort to $11.2 billion, when previously released funds are included. The bulk of this funding, $4.35 billion, will fund debris removal at the World Trade Center site, repair public infrastructure such as the damaged subways and commuter trains, and assist individuals with expenses for housing, burial, and relocation. Another $2 billion will work to restore the economic health of the area. This funding, to be provided in the form of community development block grants, will give businesses a much needed hand as they attempt to recover from the terrorist attacks. Other funding will improve security at transportation hubs and reimburse hospitals in New York that provided critical care on September 11 and for many days after. Some of the money will help children who continue to be haunted by the ghosts of the terrorist attacks. As do the businesses and the communities, these children need to be made whole again. This money will assist in that effort. As part of this supplemental allocation, the Defense Department will receive an additional $3.5 billion. When included with the funding in the regular Defense Appropriations bill, the Pentagon will receive a $43 billion increase over last year. This is the single largest one- year increase in Defense spending in more than two decades. It gives the military the resources necessary to battle terrorism overseas. It makes sure that our brave men and women who put themselves in harm's way will not fall short because of fiscal constraints. This package also provides for $775 million for repairs and reconstruction efforts at the Pentagon. As we rebuild Lower Manhattan, we must also repair the Pentagon. Finally, we have provided in this allocation $8.3 billion for defense efforts here at home. In the days and weeks that have followed the terrorist attacks, committees on both sides of this Capitol have heard from experts, from federal, state, and local officials, and from regular Americans who are concerned for their safety at home. We cannot ignore the gaps in our homeland defenses. We cannot put off until tomorrow investments that must be made today. The $8.3 billion for homeland defense that is included in this legislation takes immediate steps to bolster our local police and fire departments. It provides critical funding to expand hospital capacity and to train doctors and nurses on what to do in case of a biological, chemical, or nuclear attack. The funding closes some of the holes in our Northern Border and in our seaports. Under the leadership of the distinguished Senator from South Carolina, Mr. Holdings, we had $50 billion for port security. These things were knocked out under that 60-vote point of order. We are not going to forget that. It provides funds for improved cockpit security, to hire additional sky marshals and to purchase explosives detection equipment. It provides funds for the Postal Service to protect postal workers and purchase equipment to make our mail safer. The funding that we have included in this package will help Americans to know that we are not standing idly by, ignoring what are such obvious needs in our homeland defenses. We will take steps today to protect Americans and to try to prevent the tragedy we witnessed in September from occurring again. This package is a compromise. It is not a be-all and end-all package. This money will not fill all of the gaps that exist. But what this package will do is move us forward. It will fund those initiatives that we need to begin now, and lay the groundwork for priorities that every Senator knows await us in the spring. I want to thank my good friend, Senator Stevens, for his work on this package. We would not be standing here today if not for his steadfast efforts. I also want to thank our House counterparts, Chairman Bill Young of Florida. My, what a fine Congressman he is and a fine chairman of the Appropriation Committee now. I am sure that Bill Young wanted to do more, but under the constraints that were upon him, he could not do more. I also thank Congressman David Obey of Wisconsin. He is always a stalwart. He stood up for homeland defense. He tried in the House to move it forward and increase it, but he didn't have the votes. They and their staffs, led by Jim Dyer and Scott Lilly, worked closely with us to develop this package, and I appreciate their commitment to this successful conclusion. As I mentioned earlier, with the Senate's passage of this conference report, Congress will have completed work on each of the 13 individual appropriations bills. I congratulate Senator Inouye and Senator Stevens, and their staffs, Charlie Houy and Steve Cortese, for crafting what I believe is a good Defense bill. I also am pleased that we were able to pass the thirteen individual bills on a partisan basis, with an average vote in the Senate of 91-6. We did not have to resort to an omnibus bill as has been the case in some years past. And we worked to protect the prerogatives of Congress. We did not invite the White House to sit at the table and negotiate these bills. That is not the role of the executive branch, nor should it be. The Constitutional Framers vested the power of the purse in this legislative branch--the people's branch--and we have a firm grasp on the strings. I only hope that Congress never sees fit to loosen that hold and give away what is the greatest single power afforded to this branch of government by the Framers, in their great wisdom. Mr. President, before closing, I want to thank the members of my committee staff who have been so earnest and dedicated in their efforts this year. My staff director, Terry Sauvain, and my deputy staff director, Charles Kieffer, have done a remarkable job on these bills. They stayed at night. They stayed into the wee hours of the morning. They worked on the nuts and bolts. They worked and they grappled with problems and answered questions from disgruntled Senators and people on the outside and people on the inside. I don't see how they have been able to maintain their sanity. I congratulate them for the good work they did. This is their first year in these positions, and they have certainly set a high standard for the years to come. I also want to thank Edie Stanley and Kate Eltrich for their assistance, as well as the staffs of our 13 subcommittees. These appropriations bills are not written by magic. Rather they are the product of hard work, determination, and an understanding of the intricacies of each piece of legislation. The Senate is blessed to have such a fine group of men and women dedicated to the service of the nation. I also want to thank members of my personal staff who have been invaluable to me. My Chief of Staff, Barbara Videnieks, may Administrative Assistant, Ann Adler, my Legislative Director, Jane Mellow, my Press Secretary, Tom Gavin, my legislative assistant, David McMaster, and the entire Byrd team have done an outstanding job on these bills. Mr. President, the fiscal year 2002 Department of Defense appropriations bill is a good bill. I urge all Senators to support it. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record a document entitled ``Compromise on $20 Billion Defense/New York/ Homeland Defense Funding.''

Mr. BYRD

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. BYRD

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, during the past few weeks, the American people have learned more than they thought they would ever want to know about the ancient scourge of anthrax. From reading the morning newspaper, and watching the nightly news, we have learned much about what anthrax is, how it infects, the dangers it poses, and ways to treat it. But there was been very little attention given to the history of this dreaded and deadly disease that is on everyone's mind. From where did it come? What has been its impact on the world? Let me begin by pointing out that the disease derives its name from anthracis, the Latin transliteration of the Greek word for coal, and the name probably stems from the black scab-like crust that the anthrax lesion develops. But through the ages, anthrax has been called by a variety of names. In Russia, cutaneous anthrax--infection through the skin--has also been called ``Siberian ulcers'' because of the prevalence of the disease in that region. Inhalation anthrax has been called ``wool sorters'' disease because it comes most commonly from inhalation of spore-containing dust produced when animal hair or hides are handled. A colloquial German term for anthrax is ``ragpicker's disease.'' The exact origins of anthrax and the time of its arrival upon Earth are unknown. But, it is commonly accepted that anthrax has been killing animals, and humans too, for thousands of years, perhaps as much as 10,000 years, dating back to the beginnings of animal domestication. It is certainly a pestilence as old as pastoralism and the origins of civilization. It is believed that man probably became aware of anthrax when he turned from hunting to a life of farming and animal husbandry. The first recorded appearance of anthrax can be found in the Bible, where it appears that God may have used anthrax to punish the Pharaoh for holding the ancient Hebrews in bondage. The fifth Egyptian plague that affected livestock, and the sixth plague, known as the plague of boils, could well have been anthrax. These plagues are depicted in the Book of Exodus which reads: ``Behold thy hand shall be upon thy fields and a very grievous murrain upon thy horses, and asses, and camels and oxen, and sheep.'' Murrain, according to the dictionary, is a group of cattle diseases that includes anthrax. Anthrax may well have been Apollo's ``burning wind of plague'' that begins Homer's ``Iliad,'' a plague that attacked ``pack animals first, and dogs, but soldiers too.'' Ancient Greek physicians, Hippocrates and Galen, described skin lesions that were probably those of anthrax. Some medical historians believe that the ``plague of Athens,'' 430-427 B.C. as recorded in Thucydides's ``History of the Peloponnesian War,'' was probably anthrax. Thucydides describes symptoms of fever, bleeding, and ``small pustules and ulcers,'' all consistent with a severe form of the anthrax infection. In ancient Rome, Virgil's ``Georgics'' laments the shortage of animals caused by what appears to have been anthrax: ``Now in droves she deals out death, and in the very stalls, piles up the bodies, rotting with putrid foulness.'' For the next 2,000 years, animal and human anthrax ravaged Europe and Asia. At periodic intervals, plagues of anthrax swept across huge tracts of land killing massive numbers of livestock and people. In 1613, for example, 60,000 persons in southern Europe died of anthrax. The disease was first recognized in North America during the colonial days. In Santo Domingo in 1770, about 15,000 people are reported to have died from intestinal anthrax contracted by eating diseased meat. The first recorded human case of anthrax in the United States occurred in Philadelphia in 1834. In the late 19th century, anthrax contributed to two medical breakthroughs. The first came in 1876 when the German physician Robert Koch confirmed the bacterial origins of anthrax. Koch grew the organism bacillus anthracis in pure culture. He demonstrated its ability to form endospores, and produced experimental anthrax by injecting it into animals. This was the first microorganism ever specifically linked to a disease and demonstrated that germs cause disease. Just 5 years later, in 1881, anthrax again contributed to medical history when the legendary French chemist, Louis Pasteur, produced a vaccine that helped prevent anthrax infection in animals. This made anthrax the first disease to be prevented by a vaccine. Inspired by Pasteur's contributions to control anthrax in animals, in 1895, an Italian investigator named Achille Sclavo developed a serum for the treatment of anthrax in humans. Since then, the treatment of human anthrax has been further refined and the introduction of a succession of drugs, including penicillin, tetracycline, and, I must say, Cipro. Throughout the 20th century, despite all the progress that had been made in identifying and fighting the disease, naturally occurring anthrax has continued to take a heavy and widespread toll on the world's population, both animal and human. Cases of livestock being devastated by anthrax were reported every year throughout the world, with Spain, Albania, Italy, Romania, Turkey, Greece, and Russia suffering significant outbreaks on a regular basis. In 1945, an anthrax outbreak in Iran killed more than a million sheep. In the United States, an outbreak of anthrax in Kansas and Oklahoma in 1957 killed 1,500 head of cattle, numerous pigs, horses, and sheep. In the United States, there have also been scattered, fatal cases of inhalation anthrax. Between 1930 and 1960, there was a football player who may have contracted the disease from playing-field soil, a San Francisco woman who beat bongo drums made of infected skin, a construction worker who handled contaminated felt, and several gardeners whose infections were traced to contaminated bone meal fertilizer. In Manchester, New Hampshire, in 1957, inhalation anthrax killed four woolen-mill workers. In the same year, a man and a woman living near a Philadelphia tannery also died of inhalation anthrax. The most deadly human anthrax epidemic in the 20th century occurred in Zimbabwe between 1979 and 1985. More than 10,000 people were infected, and at least 182 cases were fatal. But, it was in the 20th century that the history of anthrax took on another lethal dimension--anthrax became a weapon of war. Biological warfare, of course, was not novel to the 20th century. The Romans fouled water supplies of their enemies by dumping the rotting corpses of people and animals into the wells of their enemies. The Mongols catapulted the cadavers of persons who had succumbed to bubonic plague inside the town walls of cities they had besieged. The British, and later white Americans, destroyed Indian tribes by giving them disease-infected clothing. But it was in the 20th century that mankind started developing, experimenting with, and then deploying anthrax as a weapon of war. World War I is well remembered for introducing poison gas into warfare. But, during that war, Germany also established a large biological weapons program that involved anthrax. They infected livestock exports, bound for Russia and Allied countries, with the disease. In Norway, police arrested German agents carrying vials of anthrax bacteria with which the agents intended to infect reindeer being used to carry supplies to the Allied forces in Europe. In the United States, German agents were reported to have injected horses, mules, and cattle with anthrax. International revulsion at the horrors of World War I included a revulsion against chemical and biological weapons, and this led to the Geneva Protocol of 1925. This treaty, which 28 nations signed, prohibited the use of both chemical and biological weapons in war. The high hopes for this treaty were never achieved because it only banned the use of biological weapons in war, and did not expressly forbid their production and development. Furthermore, several nations, including the United States, reserved the right to use biological weapons in reprisal if first used against them--thus implicitly maintaining the right to develop and stockpile the weapons. The failure of the treaty was revealed in the early stages of World War II, when imperial Japan began a massive, deadly biological warfare program in Manchuria, the infamous ``Unit 731,'' which included the development and use of anthrax. Japanese scientists conducted experiments on Chinese prisoners, while the Japanese military targeted both the Chinese military and civilians as well as Manchurian civilians with anthrax weapons, killing thousands. There is no indication that Nazi Germany had any investment in biological weapons capability. According to Jeanne Guillemin, who has researched and written extensively on anthrax, a directive from German dictator Adolph Hitler forbade research on offensive biological weapons. However, late in the war, Guillemin writes, it appears that some of Hitler's subordinates, notably Reich Marshal Herman Goring, began supporting research on biological weapons at a small secret facility in Poland, but the war ended before the effort produced any results. Meanwhile, Allied governments had stepped up full scale anthrax-based biological warfare programs. In 1942, the British military experimented with explosives testing involving anthrax spores on an island just off the coast of Scotland. It would take the British 36 years, 280 tons of formaldehyde, and 2000 tons of seawater to decontaminate the island. In 1943, the United States began developing anthrax weapons. By the next year, 1944, American engineers, at what is now Fort Detrick, MD, had produced 5,000 anthrax bombs for use by the Allied forces, but they were never deployed. After World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union engaged not only in a full-scale, nuclear arms race, but also in a biological weapons race as well. At times, the cost was high, in human as well as financial terms. In 1951, for example, two Fort Detrick employees died after exposure to anthrax. Neither country, however, was deterred. The cold war was underway and so was the effort to develop deadly weaponry. Therefore, both countries continued stockpiling germs as well as nukes. In 1969, President Richard Nixon had finally had enough. After reviewing the extensive U.S. investment in offensive biological weapons, he declared: ``Mankind already carries in its own hands too many of the seeds of its own destruction.'' He terminated the American offensive biological weapons program and began championing a British proposal that called for an international treaty to ban biological weapons, an effort that resulted in the Biological Weapons and Toxins Convention and Treaty of 1972. Since then, 140 states have signed the treaty agreeing to halt research directed at the offensive use of biological weapons. The high hopes for this treaty were smashed when both the United States and Soviet Union interpreted the treaty in such a way as to allow ongoing research on more than 200 projects. The failure of the treaty was vividly and tragically demonstrated in April, 1979, when an anthrax outbreak at a military microbiology facility in the Soviet Union killed about 70 people. The end of the cold war failed to end the threat of biological weapons. Because they are deadly, cost-effective weapons to produce--a major biological weapons program requires only about $10,000 worth of equipment and a 16x16 square-foot room--biological weapons became a weapon of choice for international terrorists. Domestic as well as foreign terrorist organizations have been caught attempting to unleash anthrax upon innocent civilians. In the 1990s, the Japanese terrorist cult that attacked the Tokyo subway system with sarin gas, also released anthrax on Tokyo near the imperial palace, the legislature, and a foreign embassy. Fortunately, no one was injured. What these terrorist groups or nations could not produce themselves, American companies have been ready to provide. According to a 1994 Senate report, private American suppliers, licensed by the U.S. Department of Commerce, exported biological and chemical materials to Iraq from 1985 through 1989. Newsday reported that one American company alone made 70 shipments of the anthrax- causing germs and other pathogenic agents to Iraq in the 1980s. Mr. President, I find it unfortunately ironic that American companies were supplying anthrax to a nation with which, just a few years later, we were at war, thus forcing American soldiers to face the prospects of encountering those same germs on the battlefield. I find it tragically ironic that American companies were selling anthrax to a country that the State Department now includes on its lists of states that sponsor terrorism--a nation that may now be participating in anthrax attacks upon the United States. I realize that Iraq had been at war with Iran, and Iran was our bigger enemy at the time. Therefore, it may have served our military and political interests to have been shipping supplies of anthrax to Iraq. But, I have to ask, shouldn't we have been a little more careful about which countries we supplied with such potentially deadly weapons? We realized the danger in the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Why shouldn't we have been as vigilant with biological weapons? We may now be paying the price for our negligence! I also realize that this is hindsight, and, as they say, hindsight is twenty-twenty. The worst private's hindsight, they say, is better than the best general's foresight. We have recently had foresight--warnings that have been ignored. A short time ago, the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, referred to as the Hart-Rudman Commission, pointed out: biological weapons are the most likely choice of means for disaffected states and groups of the 21st century. Two years ago, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, CIA Director George Tenet pointed out: There are a number of terrorist groups seeking to develop or acquire biological and chemical weapons capabilities. Some such groups--like Usama bin Ladin's--have international networks, adding to uncertainty and the danger of a surprise attack. Last April, the State Department, in its ``Patterns of Global Terrorism,'' pointed out: Most terrorists continue to rely on conventional tactics . . . but some terrorists--such as Usama bin Laden and his associates--continue to seek chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear capabilities. There were plenty of warnings that an archenemy of the United States, an archenemy determined to kill as many Americans as he could, could well unleash this ancient scourge upon America. Who among us could have truly comprehended beforehand the horror of September 11? It is difficult enough to understand even after the fact. But if history teaches us anything, it is that we should never underestimate the enduring power of evil. No science fiction writer ever wrote of anything as horrible as the Nazi Holocaust. It took an evil madman and his fanatical followers to make it a reality. Now we are faced with another madman and his fanatical followers. We cannot allow ourselves to ever again underestimate him or others like him.

Mr. BYRD

Mr. BYRD. But if the Senator will recall, let's go back to the time when we were considering the INF Treaty. Mr. Dole was the leader on that side of the aisle. I was the leader on this side. And the Reagan administration sought to reinterpret the ABM Treaty to its own way of thinking at that time. There was a big dispute about this. There was a lot of pressure on me, as the majority leader at that time--the Senator probably didn't realize that, but I have not forgotten--to bring up the INF Treaty. I said: Well, let's see what Mr. Nunn, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, has to say about that. And let's see what Mr. Boren, the chairman of the Intelligence Committee, has to say. And let's see what Mr. Pell has to say. Now, when they all come back to me and give a report to me that they are satisfied with this, then we will call it up. There was great pressure on me to bring up that treaty because President Reagan wanted to go to Moscow and sit down with Mr. Gorbachev and have an exchange of ratification papers on the INF. Mr. Baker, at the White House, was going to be there also. But I waited until those three chairmen of the Armed Services, Intelligence, and Foreign Relations Committees, respectively, were satisfied about the treaty. As the Senator will recall, out of that delay Mr. Shultz went to Paris, I guess it was, and met with Mr. Schevardnadze and brought back something in writing, and we all reached an agreement that any reinterpretation of the treaty had to be agreed upon and approved by the Senate. And we are talking about the ABM Treaty. I believe it was agreed that the interpretation of the treaty would be based on the testimony of witnesses, the actual language within the four corners of the treaty, and the interpretation by the then administration expressed through its witnesses in Senate hearings, and that any subsequent administration could not change that reinterpretation without going through this process and having the approval of the Senate. Now, I say all of that, and my memory may not be exactly accurate on every point. That was back in 1987 or 1988, somewhere along that line, a long time ago.

Mr. BYRD. At that time we were very concerned about a subsequent reinterpretation of the ABM Treaty, the ratification of which the Senate had approved, by a subsequent administration. Otherwise, a treaty would be without any value if a subsequent administration could come along and reinterpret a given treaty based on the way it saw things at that later time. I say all that to my good friend from Virginia because I have been involved in the ABM Treaty for a long time. At that time we saw it as a matter of grave importance that an administration be allowed to reinterpret that ABM Treaty without subsequent hearings and without subsequent approval by the Senate as to the interpretation. But here we are today, and we are walking away from that same treaty, and the administration--the President did announce this in the newspaper, but I saw nothing that was ever sent up. I do not remember ever seeing any letter from the President to the chairman of the Armed Services Committee or the Appropriations Committee or the Foreign Relations Committee or the Intelligence Committee. Now, there may have been such, but I was not aware of it. The President said, some time ago, he was thinking about doing this. He did not feel that anything needed to be put in writing. That, to me, is enough to keep me awake at night. When a President says he does not think something of this nature has to be put in writing, that a mere handshake is good enough, that is a rather scary way of looking at it as far as I am concerned. So this is why I say, I am sorry--I am not sorry we are reducing our arsenal. We ought to do that. It is costing too much, and we do not need it. But for the President just to walk away from the treaty, and the Senate not to have had any expression from the President in writing, or any formal expression at all--the Senate, as far as I am concerned, was ignored in this matter. This is what puzzles me. I am sorry that the Senate apparently is willing to just lie down, be quiet, and not ask any questions.

Mr. BYRD. Madam President, as I have stated, I don't question the President's legal right to do that. That is not the question. I think the question is, as I have tried to pose it, that the Senate, a body which, under the Constitution, approves or disapproves the ratification of treaties, should have an opportunity, in the case of the ABM Treaty--a treaty of such significance as this one has been and is--the Senate should have an opportunity to debate this. As I have indicated, I think the President should have asked for some advice from the Senate. He does not have to take the advice, but I have seen no evidence of the President seeking advice on this matter. He simply made up his mind to do it and did it.

Mr. BYRD. Yes.

Mr. BYRD. I say that he had the legal right.

Mr. BYRD. Yes.

Mr. BYRD. The Senator from Michigan, together with the then- distinguished Senator from New York, Mr. Moynihan, and the then-Senator from Oregon, Mr. Hatfield, and I sought to bring that case before the Court. The Court said we didn't have standing. But subsequent to that, other parties that did have standing, and were recognized as having standing by the Court, pursued that case. The Court, throughout that--I am trying to think of a word I can safely say here in the Senate about the line-item veto.

Mr. BYRD. I thank both Senators. Concerning the work, the diligence, the dedication, and the loyalty to our country that is constantly being demonstrated and exhibited by these two leaders of the Armed Services Committee, my words fall pitifully short in expressing my true respect for these two Senators. They leave nothing undone when it comes to the expenditure of hours, labor, toil, and sweat. I also say the same with regard to the staffs of both Senators. As a Member, I have been treated very fairly on both sides. I thank the Senators.

Mr. BYRD. It also requires reports from the President. I thank the distinguished Senator. Madam President, the conference report to the fiscal year 2002 Defense authorization bill before the Senate today contains many provisions that will help the men and women who serve our country in uniform. The bill provides for pay raises, increased educational benefits, and better housing for our military personnel. It authorizes important funds for the military services' counter-terrorism programs, and enhances efforts to improve the serious accounting problems of the Department of Defense. Unfortunately, as developments unfolded in our strategic relationship with Russia on nuclear weapons and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, it became clear to me that the conference report before us does not move us in the right direction on those two critical issues. It is the importance of our strategic relationship with Russia, and the rest of the world, that compelled me to oppose this conference report. The conference report eliminates a provision of law that forbids the President from reducing our nuclear stockpile below the levels laid out in the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty of 1991, which total about 6,000 warheads. Assuming that this conference report is enacted into law--and I assume it will be on its way to the President-- the President will then be accountable to no one on how much he would like to reduce our nuclear arsenal. The President could call for these cuts without so much as one minute of debate in Congress. Let me be perfectly clear for the third time: I do not oppose reductions in our nuclear arsenal. The cold war has passed into history, and to a great degree, so has the logic of maintaining thousands of nuclear weapons pointed at a country that no longer advocates the destruction of our way of life. In the next fiscal year, the Department of Energy will spend $5.4 billion on our nuclear stockpile. That is serious money. I do not know exactly how many nuclear warheads we need to maintain, but I cannot think of one good reason to continue spending that much to maintain far more nuclear warheads than what almost all experts believe to be appropriate to meet our national security requirements. However, we must consider the role of Congress in our national defense, as spelled out in the Constitution. To me that is the bedrock of the Republic, Congress, the people's plans, the control over the purse. Article I, Section 8, Clause 12 reads: ``The Congress shall have the power to raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years.'' The Constitution does not give the executive branch the power to raise armies. That is congressional power. The Constitution gives that power to the legislative branch, the Congress. The document that establishes our republic says that Congress, not the President, shall have the power to support armies, to maintain navies. Clearly, the Founding Fathers did not want the chief executive to have the sole power to determine the size and shape of our military. By eliminating the one statutory restriction on the President's action with regard to the size of our nuclear forces, we in Congress have turned our back on that responsibility. I have already spoken today on the President's announcement to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. I believe that it is an ill-timed move that should have been subject to consideration and debate in the Senate. I supported a provision that was included in the original version of the Defense authorization bill as passed by the Armed Services Committee to limit our missile defense testing for the next 9 months to those tests that are allowable under the ABM Treaty. Those restrictions could have been waived under two circumstances: first, if the United States and Russia reached a new agreement on missile defense testing, or if there was an affirmative vote in both houses of Congress to authorize the tests. This was a reasonable provision. It protected the constitutional duty of Congress in national defense and foreign affairs. I regret that, following the tragic events of September 11, this provision was dropped from the bill without so much as a vote. I can understand the great desire on the part of all of us to support the President in a moment like this. Considering the President's announcement this morning on withdrawal of the United States from the treaty, we should have had a fuller debate on the ABM Treaty provisions. What is history going to read? Where is history going to go? Where are the Senators of tomorrow going to look in the record for a debate on this very important matter? While I voted against this conference report, I appreciate the work that the chairman and ranking member of the Armed Services Committee, Senator Levin and Senator Warner, have put in on this bill. They have few peers in their knowledge of the challenges facing the armed services. For the 7 weeks that this bill was in conference, they have had an exhausting schedule of meetings with their House counterparts, often meeting several times each day. They have continued the tradition of bipartisanship on the Armed Services Committee, and their staffs likewise have labored day and night, hour after hour to bring forth this legislation. The issues of nuclear arms reductions and national missile defense should not disappear from our consciousness because of the President's announcement on the ABM Treaty. I hope that it will focus the attention of other Members of the Senate to the need to safeguard the role of Congress in defense and foreign affairs. While I look forward to future debates on these vital issues, I deeply regret that this Defense authorization bill did not tackle them head-on, have a debate, votes thereon, and for that reason I voted against its adoption. I yield the floor.

Mr. BYRD. It does.

Mr. BYRD. In the farthest stretches of the imagination, if I were President, I would not think of walking away from a treaty--the ABM Treaty--one that has served the Nation well, without at least having the Senate in on the action. I would find some way to get some expression and view from the Senate. As it is, no Senator here has pointed out to me, tonight at least, that that effort was made. I think the administration would be much wiser if it took the Senate into consideration and had some expression of support; let the American people hear some debate in the Senate. I think the administration would be much wiser if it let the Senate in on the matter and sought its advice.

Mr. BYRD. Yes.

Mr. BYRD. See, I do not see that nexus. I do not see that connection.

Mr. BYRD. I have already said the President did not do anything that is not in accordance with the law. He has not done anything that is illegal. But let's see if your imagination and mine might be stretched to the farthest limit. Let's imagine I became President. And that taxes the imagination.

Mr. BYRD. The Supreme Court, throughout that miserable piece of legislation, upheld the fact that, as the Senator said, the Congress cannot give away its powers as set forth under the Constitution.

Mr. BYRD. The Supreme Court ruled within the last couple of years that Congress could not give away its constitutional power.

Mr. BYRD. Madam President, I thank the Chair and I thank my distinguished colleague, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee. Madam President, I was troubled by President Bush's announcement this morning to withdraw the United States from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972. This development has earth-shaking implications for our national security, especially in considering the potential range of reactions from Russia and other nuclear powers, including China. Arms control is bound to become more difficult as these countries work to make sure that their nuclear deterrent can still work when--or if--we successfully deploy an anti-missile system. While bringing us no closer to realizing a workable national missile defense system, withdrawal from the ABM Treaty signals to the world that the United States seeks a dominant, not a stable, strategic nuclear position. I am not an expert on the technology used in nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles. But I do know that China has twenty missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons to our shores. China has been satisfied that these twenty missiles provided it a nuclear deterrence against other nuclear powers, including the United States. As a result of this move by the President against the ABM Treaty, I have no doubt that China will seek a larger, more sophisticated nuclear arsenal. Does that make the United States more or less secure? What about our allies and friends overseas? Does a larger Chinese nuclear arsenal help the President of South Korea sleep at night? What about the Prime Minister of Japan, or even the Prime Minister of Britain? Clearly, our friends have good cause to be concerned about U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. I do not believe it is an overstatement to say that withdrawing from the ABM Treaty will have serious consequences for our allies, and by extension, on our national security interests. I also know that many experts on missile technology have grave concerns about how easy it would be to build missiles that can fool a national missile defense system, rendering it useless. Russia has already developed a missile that could pierce our planned missile defense system, even if it worked. And I think that one can bet that China is working on similar technology. If China and Russia, two countries with past records of sending missile technology to the likes of Iran and North Korea, have the technology to fool our missile defense radars, how long do you think it will take for that technology to end up in the hands of rogue states? I understand the President's desire to develop a national missile defense system for the United States. I support that goal, as long as it produces a system that is feasible, affordable, and effective. However, we have no assurances at this point that an effective missile shield can be developed. We are operating on little more than conjecture and speculation. Can a reliable, workable missile shield be developed? We're not sure. How many missiles can a missile shield deflect? Good question. What will it ultimately cost? No idea. To jettison the ABM Treaty with no replacement agreement in hand and no better understanding of how or whether a missile defense system will work--and that is where we are right now--to bring additional turmoil to a world that is already reeling from the terrorist attacks on America is, in my opinion, a rash and ill-considered course of action. The United States has been engaged in intensive arms control talks with Russia over the past several months. These talks have focused on two key issues: first, altering the ABM Treaty to allow the United States to increase its missile defense testing, and second, negotiating reductions in the nuclear arsenals of both the United States and Russia. Russia has repeatedly expressed its belief that the ABM Treaty is the ``cornerstone of strategic stability.'' By limiting the development of missiles that could shoot down an opponent's nuclear missiles, the argument goes, both the United States and Russia understood the strategic capabilities of the other--of each other. Indeed, progress in first limiting the nuclear arms of the United States and the Soviet Union was concurrent to progress in limiting the development of anti-ballistic missiles. In the three decades since the ABM Treaty and the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty were ratified, the United States has been able to reach consensus with the Soviet Union-- and later Russia--on the principles of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties, commonly known as START, to steadily reduce the nuclear arsenals of both countries. These arms reduction treaties have slashed the nuclear arsenals of our two countries by over half over the last decade. All the while, the ABM Treaty provided the strategic stability to allow these cuts to occur without threatening the strategic balance between the two nuclear giants. Senator Biden, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, spoke very clearly yesterday on his concerns over a precipitous withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. I thank the Senator for his remarks, and for his valuable insight into this very troubling subject. The Constitution of this Nation deliberately established a clear separation of powers among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the Government. Article II, Section 2, gives the President the power to make treaties ``by and with the consent of the Senate.'' There is a reason for that caveat, and the reason is that treaties among nations are enormously important instruments of power. The framers of the Constitution recognized the importance of treaties, and saw the potential danger of allowing any individual to enter into a treaty with another nation. The required acquiescence to any treaty by two-thirds of the Senate is a fundamental part of the checks and balances of our Government. This is what disturbs me so greatly about the President's announcement of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty without seeking the advice or consent of Congress. And this announcement comes on the heels of the President's declaration a few weeks ago that he is willing to further reduce America's nuclear arsenal on the strength of a handshake from his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, instead of pursuing the START process. Again, the decision was made without seeking the advice or consent of Congress. To me, shutting Congress out of the decision- making process involving agreements among nations is a dangerous--a dangerous and corrosive course of action. It effectively undermines, I think, the intent of the framers of our Constitution. Monarchs make treaties. American Presidents propose treaties. They make treaties by and with the consent of the Senate. There is a tremendous difference between the two, and defining such differences is the essence of our Constitution. I recognize that under the terms of the treaty, the President has the legal right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty with six months notice. I recognize that, upon adoption of the Defense authorization conference report, which strikes an existing prohibition, he will have the legal authority to reduce the U.S. nuclear arsenal without the consent of Congress. But I also believe that it would be a violation of the spirit of our Constitution to take either course of action without seeking the endorsement of the Senate. I think that the President's contention that the ABM Treaty is a cold war relic merits some consideration. His belief that it is time to move onto a new framework for missile defense reflecting the new realities of a world with multiple nuclear powers and would-be nuclear powers, makes a great deal of sense. The President's ABM and weapons reductions proposals merit debate and consideration in the Senate. I know there are some in this body who agree with him wholeheartedly and others who disagree just as passionately. I would like to hear their views on both sides. The American people should have the opportunity to hear the views of each side. But by the President deciding unilaterally to withdraw from the ABM Treaty and to reduce America's nuclear stockpile on the strength of a wink and a nod, the American people are denied a voice in the decision--a voice by the Senate--a decision, by the way, that will affect the security of the American people and the stability of the world for years to come. Our hands are effectively tied at this point. The Defense authorization bill, in which we could have dealt with both of these issues, is for all intents and purposes signed, sealed and ready for delivery to the Senate for a vote in the Senate. A statutory prohibition preventing the President from reducing the U.S. nuclear arsenal below the levels established in START I is eliminated in that bill. A well-reasoned provision that would have conditioned the expenditure of FY 2002 missile defense funds on U.S. compliance with the ABM Treaty was thrown overboard before the Senate even took up debate on the Defense authorization bill. We are advancing headlong into committing our nation and our treasure to an untried and unproven missile defense system, which we may or may not need and which may or may not protect us, while at the same time we are in full retreat from arms control treaties and policies that have helped stabilize the world for decades. We are looking to expand our military might from the land, seas, and skies into the heavens. The Department of Defense is investigating ways to use space as the ``ultimate high ground'' in military operations, expanding upon the peaceful use of satellites for intelligence and surveillance. No one is sure exactly where this research is leading, but we ought to have a full debate on the weaponization of space before these types of technologies are realized. We are taking these major, major steps without the nearest scrap of debate, discussion, or decision in the United States Senate. You can be assured that I am as eager as anyone to reduce the number of unnecessary weapons in our country. But I am decidedly less than eager to pursue such a course of action without ensuring that Russia is on the same glidepath. Without a written agreement, without a treaty, such assurances cannot be made. We cannot verify intentions without a verification regime. We cannot measure progress without a formal system of monitoring. We cannot be assured of compliance without written guidelines spelling out what compliance means. A handshake, no matter how sincere or well-intentioned, is no substitute for a signature. A President may be here today and may be gone tomorrow. A President of Russia may be here today and may be gone tomorrow. A handshake was all right back in the old days when the Senator from Virginia and I decided that we would like to trade cows, or a couple of horses we would like to trade, or I would like to buy his crop of cane molasses. But when dealing between nations, we can't be content with a handshake or just looking into the other person's eyes and reading his soul. Things have to be put in writing. A handshake, no matter how sincere or well intentioned, is no substitute for a signature. As Ronald Reagan so famously exhorted, ``Trust, but verify.'' It may have been W.C. Fields who said something to the effect: Trust, but always cut the deck. It was something like that. Always cut the deck. Similarly, there is no vehicle before us for debate or a vote on the merits of withdrawing from the ABM Treaty. We gave away the opportunity to discuss this matter in the context of the Defense authorization bill in the interests of comity. We relinquished our right to even debate whether to condition missile defene funding on compliance with the ABM Treaty. Now, we are at the mercy of the President. He has to be aware that this is a contentious issue. He has to be aware that many members of this body have grave concerns over his decision. He has to be aware that a decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty will have global ramifications. As of this morning, it appears that withdrawal of the United States from the ABM Treaty is a done deal. I would have strongly preferred to have the President give more consideration to the role of Congress in foreign and defense affairs. He could have chosen to consult with Congress, and submitted to the Senate a formal resolution of withdrawal on which we could debate and have a vote. It appears that we are now past that point. But I would urge the President to put any agreement to reduce our nuclear arsenal in writing, as President Putin has requested, and to submit that agreement to the Senate so that the legislative branch, as intended by the framers, will have voice in the execution of such an important agreement between nations. The issue of missile defense, the future of the ABM Treaty, and the future of the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal are matters of the gravest importance. These are matters that deserve the full and undivided attention of the President, the Congress, and the Nation. These are not decisions that should be sprung on the nation in a speech or at press conference. I hope that the President will make the effort to include the legislative branch--the people's branch--in making any future, final decisions relating to these matters.

Mr. BYRD

Mr. BYRD. Reserving the right to object--I do not intend to object--I want Senators to know I intend to vote against this conference report, and I will explain why because I understand the problems that confront the leader and I am very willing to wait until after the vote to make that statement.

Mr. BYRD

Mr. BYRD. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. President.

Mr. BYRD. At 11:30.

Mr. BYRD. So the committee may not meet after 11:30 without the permission of the Senate?

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, for the information of the Senate, what is the rule with respect to the meeting of committees during the operation of the Senate while the Senate is in session?