Robert Byrd

Mr. BYRD

Mr. BYRD. Yes, absolutely.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield, just very quickly?

Mr. BYRD. I thank the Senator for his observations. I would be remiss if I did not likewise express my gratitude to Senator Levin and to Senator Biden and to other Senators who worked together to modify that language and to greatly improve the language over what it was when it was sent from the White House to the Senate.

Mr. BYRD

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, up until a few days ago, the Senate was moving with lightning-like speed to complete consideration of the Defense authorization bill. Complications arose last week and slowed the bill down, but it appears that the Senate may be poised to shift back into high gear--or something like it--tomorrow and attempt to finish the bill. A cloture motion was filed last week. If cloture is invoked on Tuesday, passage of the bill will be more nearly assured. Clearly, the Senate has many weighty matters to consider, both in this bill and in other measures waiting in the wings. We should proceed with all due haste to complete our work. The September 11 terrorist attack on the United States reordered our priorities and imposed a new measure of urgency on much of the business that is yet to come before the Senate. But in the heat of the moment, in the crush of recent events, I fear we may be losing sight of the larger obligations of the Senate. Our responsibility as Senators is to carefully consider and fully debate major policy matters, to air all sides of a given issue, and to act after full deliberation. Yes, we want to respond quickly to urgent needs, but a speedy response should not be used as an excuse to trample full and free debate. I am concerned that the Defense bill may be a victim of this rush to action, despite the respite offered by last week's delays. For example, the Defense bill, as reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee, contained language conditioning the expenditure of missile defense funds on U.S. compliance with the Antiballistic Missile Treaty, the ABM Treaty. I worry that that language--which was somewhat controversial in committee and which was only narrowly approved--was dropped without a word of debate being uttered on the Senate floor. I understand the reluctance to engage in divisive public debate at a time when we are all seeking unity, but I caution that debate over such an important subject as the ABM Treaty is not to be lightly dismissed. There is no question about the unity. The unity is here. And certainly, insofar as I am concerned, debate over an issue of this kind is not going to be an apple of discord thrown into the mix. We may just happen to disagree on some matters with respect to the ABM Treaty. So I cannot understand why there needs to be such ``unity'' that it would require keeping our voices completely mute on a matter of this kind. It would be no indication of disunity in this country and our need to be unified in dealing with the terrorists or nations that harbor terrorists. As a matter of fact, the mere fact that we would disagree on a matter before the Senate--the ABM Treaty, for example--is no indication of disunity when it comes to facing the common foe. Not to me, at least. The Defense authorization bill provides up to $8.3 billion for missile defense, including activities that may or may not violate the ABM Treaty in the coming months. Many experts believe the ABM Treaty is the cornerstone of international arms control and that to abrogate or withdraw from the treaty can only lead to a new, dangerous, and costly international arms race. Other experts, on the other hand, are of the opinion that the ABM Treaty has outlived its usefulness, that it is a relic of the cold war that makes it impossible for the United States to protect its citizens against a new world order of rogue nations armed with ballistic missiles and transnational terrorists who may very well be armed with chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. This is a major policy issue. That is what it is--a major policy issue. I am not sure where I stand on the ABM Treaty, but I do know I am not prepared to trade it in on a still-to-be-developed, still-to-be- proven national missile defense program without giving the matter a great deal of thought and consideration. The language that was dropped from the Defense bill would have provided Congress the opportunity to vote on funding any missile defense expenditure that would violate the ABM Treaty. It was a sensible provision, as I see it. I would have supported it, probably, and I would have been eager to engage in debate over it. Although I might have little to say, I would still like to hear it. I would like to hear others. That opportunity was given away to avoid what? To avoid a debate that some might have called divisive on this bill. So be it. But having postponed that debate on this bill, we have an obligation to find another venue in which to have that debate. And we should have that debate sooner rather than later. The resolution granting the President the authority to use force to respond to the September 11 terrorist attack is another example of Congress moving quickly to avoid the specter of acrimonious debate at a time of national crisis. The resolution Congress approved gives the President broad authority to go after the perpetrators of the terrorist attack regardless of who they are or where they are hiding. I am not saying we ought to debate that ad infinitum, but at least we could have had 3 hours or 6 hours of debate. Why do we have to put a zipper on our lips and have no debate at all? It also authorizes the President to take all appropriate actions against nations, organizations, or persons who aided or harbored those perpetrators. In his address to Congress following the attack, President Bush vowed to take the battle against terrorism to those persons, such as Osama bin Laden; to those organizations, such as the Taliban; to those networks, such as Al-Qaida, and to any nations that acted as conspirators in the attack on the United States. I supported the resolution granting the President the authority to use military force against the perpetrators of this terrible attack, and I applauded his address to Congress and to the Nation. I note that the President wisely drew lines of discrimination, specifying that the punishment must be directed against those who are guilty of this crime, so that we cannot be accused of broadening our response to those who were not involved in the September 11 attack. Our resolve and our ferocity of response must carefully discriminate against the guilty, and surely if we do so, all men of reason, all nations of conscience, will support and applaud us. I was reassured by the President's remarks. But as I delved more deeply into the resolution passed by Congress, I began to have some qualms over how broad a grant of authority Congress gave him in our rush to act quickly. Because of the speed with which it was passed, there was little discussion establishing a foundation for the resolution. Because of the paucity of debate, it would be difficult to glean from the record the specific intent of Congress in approving S.J. Res. 23. There were after-the-fact statements made in the Senate, and there was some debate in the House, but there was not the normal level of discussion or the normal level of analysis of the language prior to the vote that we have come to expect in the Senate. And so I think it is important to take a second look at S.J. Res. 23, to examine its strengths and weaknesses, and to put on record the intent of Congress in passing the resolution. I am not sure we are doing that. Just as this is my speech, just as it is one Senator's observations, those observations might have been worth a little more had we made them before we passed that resolution in such a great hurry. Two aspects of the resolution are key: First, the use of force authority granted to the President extends only to the perpetrators of the September 11 attack. It was not the intent of Congress to give the President unbridled authority--I hope it wasn't--to wage war against terrorism writ large without the advice and consent of Congress. That intent was made clear when Senators modified the text of the resolution proposed by the White House to limit the grant of authority to the September 11 attack. Let me at this point read into the Record the original text of proposed joint resolution submitted to the Senate leadership by the White House on September 12 this year of our Lord, 2001. And I read it: ``Joint resolution.'' The title: ``To authorize the use of United States Armed Forces Against Those Responsible for the Recent attacks Lunched Against the United States.'' Whereas, on September 11, 2001, acts of treacherous violence were committed against the United States and its citizens; and Whereas, such acts render it both necessary and appropriate that the United States exercise its rights to self-defense and to protect United States citizens both at home and abroad, and Whereas, in light of the threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States posed by these grave acts of violence, and Whereas, such acts continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States, Now, therefore, be it Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled-- And here is the resolving clause that was in the proposed legislation submitted by the White House to the Senate leadership-- That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations or persons he determines planned, authorized, harbored, committed, or aided in the planning or commission of the attacks against the United States that occurred on September 11, 2001, and to deter and pre-empt any future acts of terrorism or aggression against the United States. That completes the proposed resolution the White House submitted to the Senate leadership. Senators modified this text that was proposed by the White House to limit the grant of authority, and that limitation is extremely important because the resolution also gives the President unprecedented authority to wage war not only against nations involved in the September 11 terrorist attacks, but also against individuals and organizations. The resolution as passed by the Senate on September 14 is as follows: S.J. Res. 23. Whereas, on September 11, 2001, acts of treacherous violence were committed against the United States and its citizens; and Whereas, such acts render it both necessary and appropriate that the United States exercise its rights to self-defense and to protect United States citizens both at home and abroad, and Whereas, in light of the threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States posed by these grave acts of violence, and Whereas, such acts continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States, Whereas, the President has authority under the Constitution to take action to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the United States. Resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled: Section 1. Short Title. This joint resolution may be cited as the ``Authorization for Use of Military Force''. Sec. 2. Authorization for Use of United States Armed Forces. (a) That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons. (b) War Powers Resolution Requirements.-- (1) Specific Statutory Authorization.-- Consistent with section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, the Congress declares that this section is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution. (2) Applicability of Other Requirements.-- Nothing in this resolution supersedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution. So, S.J. Res. 23 invokes the War Powers Resolution. Quite an addition to the proposal that was sent to the Senate from the White House. The crux of the War Powers Resolution is that it provides specific procedures for Congress to participate with the President in decisions to send U.S. forces into hostilities. Section 2(b) of S.J. Res. 23 specifically invokes section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution and further declares that nothing in S.J. Res. 23 supercedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution. Section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution provides that the President must terminate any use of United States Armed Forces after 60 days unless Congress has declared war or has enacted a specific authorization for such use of United States Armed Forces. S.J. Res 23 provides that authorization within the context of the September 11th attack. Let me read that again because the emphasis is on the word ``that.'' I am going to redo this. S.J. Res. 23 provides that authorization--that we have just read about--within the context of the September 11 attack. Those persons, organizations or nations that were not involved in the September 11 attack are, by definition, outside the scope of this authorization. By signing S.J. Res 23 into law, as he did on September 18th, it would seem that the President explicitly, or at least implicitly, accepted the terms of the Resolution, including the constraints imposed by the War Powers Resolution. However, as clear as the language appears on its face, it is noteworthy that President Bush, like other presidents before him, including his father, specifically noted in the statement he issued when he signed the resolution that despite his signature, he maintains ``the longstanding position of the executive branch regarding the President's constitutional authority to use force, including the Armed Forces of the United States and regarding the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution.'' Every President since the enactment of the War Powers Resolution in 1973 has taken the position that the War Powers Resolution is an unconstitutional infringement of the President's constitutional authority as Commander in Chief to deploy U.S. forces into hostilities. This does not mean that President Bush will use that argument to completely shut Congress out of the process of deploying troops where hostilities are taking place or immediately threatened to take place. But it does mean that President Bush, like his predecessors, is likely to use that argument to consult with Congress and report to Congress on his own terms and his own timetable instead of the terms and timetable spelled out in the war powers resolution. Last week, President Bush submitted his first report to Congress on the new U.S. Campaign Against Terrorism. In his letter, the President said, ``I am providing this report as part of my efforts to keep the Congress informed, consistent with the war powers resolution and Senate Joint Resolution 23. . . .'' While the intent may have been to inform, the letter was decidedly lacking in details. Notwithstanding the requirement of the War Powers Resolution, the President provided no details on the proposed scope and duration of the deployment. The only indication of a timetable was the president's assertion that the campaign against terrorism ``Will be a lengthy one.'' Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a copy of the President's report to Congress be included in the Record following these remarks.

Mr. BYRD. If the Senator will yield, I thank my friend from Virginia, the State which gave to our country George Washington and James Madison, the father of the Constitution. I thank him very much.

Mr. BYRD

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. BYRD

Mr. BYRD. I thank the Chair. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that I may speak for not to exceed 40 minutes. I do so with the understanding, as I have already indicated, I will be very glad to suspend my remarks at any time the distinguished Senator from California wishes to take the floor.

Mr. BYRD. Madam President, will the distinguished Senator yield?

Mr. BYRD. I assure her that if she wants the opportunity to proceed, I will resist in my remarks and take my chair.

Mr. BYRD

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I support the nomination of Ms. Mary Peters to be the next Administrator of the Federal Highway Administration. I ask my colleagues to support her as well. Ms. Peters is a true transportation professional. She served in several senior positions within the Arizona Department of Transportation, including the position of Director of the Department. In that capacity, she was responsible not only for that state's highway system but also for several other aspects of the State's transportation program. I had the privilege of meeting with Ms. Peters this afternoon and found her to be an extraordinarily pleasant individual, well versed in the issues that will require her attention as Federal Highway Administrator. I specifically had the opportunity to discuss with her the importance of implementing measures that will expedite the completion of the numerous highway projects for which America's taxpayers have been waiting for a great many years. Ms. Peters explained that she is committed to pursuing efforts to streamline the federal approval process. I look forward to working with her in this effort. I again urge my colleagues to support the confirmation of Mary Peters to be our next Federal Highway Administrator.

Mr. BYRD

Mr. BYRD. Madam President, during the August recess, The New York Times Magazine ran a cover story entitled ``The Coming Space War'' The article caught my interest, as I am sure that it intrigued many other readers. The author's contention is that the U.S. military is considering a campaign to achieve military superiority in space similar to the kind of military superiority that U.S. forces seek in the air, on land, and from the sky. Military superiority in space is deemed critical in order to protect our increasing dependence on satellites for communications, surveillance, commercial and military purposes. On August 24, President Bush named Air Force General Richard Myers, a former chief of the U.S. Space Command and of the North American Aerospace Defense Command, as the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Myers' selection as Chairman is in keeping with President Bush's strong support for building a national missile defense, NMD, the follow-on to President Reagan's Star Wars Strategic Defense Initiative, SDI. It is certainly true that our dependence--and that of other developed and developing nations--on these winking, blinking objects winging through the night sky has increased exponentially over the last decade. It has rapidly become almost impossible to imagine a world without the Internet, the World Wide Web, electronic mail on handheld computers or cellular phones, automated teller machines, instantaneous worldwide credit card use, and other forms of global telecommunications and electronic commerce. This expansion and its dependence on satellite links will continue to increase in future decades. We are all dependent, and, therefore, we are all vulnerable, to the seamless and uninterrupted access to satellites. Most people, however, do not understand these technologies. I certainly do not. Like most people, I can understand that I may be vulnerable in ways that are new to me, a boy from the Mercer County hills in southern West Virginia. But how best to address this new vulnerability? The author of The New York Times Magazine article describes three fundamentally different philosophical approaches to this brave new realm of space. The first is a military approach, which opens up a Pandora's box of weapons in space. The military, it is reported, has looked into the future and come to the conclusion that space represents the ``ultimate military `high ground,' '' requiring the military to develop and deploy whatever technology is necessary to achieve what has been termed ``Global Battlespace Dominance,'' or ``Full Spectrum Dominance.'' The tools needed might include everything from National Missile Defense to antisatellite laser or high-powered microwave weapons, or clusters of microsatellites to hyperspectral surveillance satellites and other space sensors--or all of these things. Some of these systems are under development now or due for testing soon, according to the article, already undercutting the author's assertion that the weaponization of space is coming, when, in fact, it may already be upon us. Already--already--additional funding to the tune of $190 million is being sought in the defense authorization and appropriations bills for space weapons. Now, if I, like most people, do not really understand the technologies behind satellite communications and cell phones, it is even harder to understand the technologies behind hyperspectral surveillance satellites or space-based lasers. And that lack of technical expertise means, like most Americans, I must depend on the Pentagon to explain why these new technologies are needed, why no other alternatives will work, and what new questions and challenges might be unleashed by these choices. That is not, I suggest, the best way to perform oversight, but, unfortunately, there are few good alternatives. The second philosophical approach to space outlined by the author is that of the purist, seeking to unilaterally ban weapons from space and seeking to return the heavens to an earlier, unsullied era--an earlier unsullied era. This is not, in the author's view, a realistic hope. The final philosophical approach, the one seemingly favored by the author, is that of the ``pragmatist''--the ``pragmatist.'' This approach recognizes the inevitable migration of commerce and the military to space, but hopes to hold the line at surveillance. Weapons for space would, in this view, remain in the research and test phase, to be launched only in response to another nation's attempt to put weapons in space. This launch-on-warning approach would come in conjunction with further diplomatic efforts to establish operating rules for space modeled on those in place for blue-water ships on the open ocean. In the pragmatist's scenario, existing space treaties would be retained: the 1967 Outer Space Treaty banning nuclear weapons in space and the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty which, in addition to establishing the surveillance system to avoid nuclear conflict, also forbids most antimissile testing. One way of reducing competition and tensions in space proposed in the article is by ``mutually assured awareness'' in space. The U.S. would develop and make globally available direct video access to space, so that anyone could confirm any hostile action in space, as opposed to mishaps from natural causes. I am not sure that this is technologically feasible, but who am I to question it. The concept of greater openness is the point. It is interesting, in this light, to note that the 1975 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, operated by the United Nations, has not been very successful. In fact, the nation with the largest number, if not percentage, of unregistered payloads is the United States. The United States has failed to register 141 of some 2,000 satellite payloads. Only one nation is in full compliance-- Russia. And, of course, it is the Bush Administration advocating the abrogation of the ABM Treaty in order to commence construction on the first National Missile Defense ground site in Alaska. I cannot say at this point what philosophical camp that I might find myself. The author, Jack Hitt, closes his article by pointing out that if the United States is not successful at holding the line at surveillance, if we ``plan, test, and deploy aggressively as the lone superpower, we make certain that after a brief respite from the cold war's nuclear competition, we will once again embark on a fresh and costly arms race. And with it, assume the dark burden of policing a rapid evolution in battlespace.'' This specter rings true. It should concern us, and it should be debated by the people and the people's representatives. As it stands now, the U.S. military is moving ahead on a trajectory that is both costly and one that carries with it a kind of philosophical imperialism with dangerous ramifications. Now, what do I mean by philosophical imperialism? The military's plans for ``full spectrum dominance,'' and space superiority, if fully realized, would mean that in some not-so-distant future, the United States would be in a position to (in the words of the Air Force Strategic Master Plan) ``operate freely in space, deny the use of space to our adversaries, protect ourselves from an attack in and through space and develop and deploy a N[ational] M[issile] D[efense] capability.'' The U.S. would presumably, then, have information dominance in this arena as well. Thus, the U.S. would be in a position to know if a conflict between two nations, say India and Pakistan, was about to explode into open, even nuclear, warfare. The U.S. would also be in a position to act, but how? Would we shoot down the missiles from one side or the other, or both? If we shot down the missiles that each nation was firing at the other, what would happen if we missed one and it destroyed a city? What is our responsibility? What if we chose not to act because the conflict did not involve us, and tens of thousands or millions of innocent people died? What is our responsibility? If the United States achieves, at enormous expense, space superiority, how could we avoid becoming the space marshal on this dangerous new frontier? If we detect a threat against a third party, do we warn the third party? If we provide a warning, and are asked to interdict the attack because only we can, how do we say no? How do we avoid making our military personnel and our commercial enterprises overseas the targets of reprisals from those whose attacks we thwart? It is difficult for me to envision a future in which we could avoid such an imperialist, if benevolent, dictatorship in space. The role of global policeman and space marshal would not come cheaply, either, and in this period of shrinking or perhaps vanishing surpluses, we cannot ignore those costs. Space dominance would not replace air, land, or sea dominance, but would be additive. In fact, dominance in space might conceivably add to the cost of protecting forces on ground by making them targets for the kind of retaliation I mentioned previously. Gaining and maintaining a robust presence in space is technologically challenging. An airborne laser, reportedly operational sometime around 2010, is budgeted at $11 billion. It will cost still more to build and deploy a space-based laser. The estimated cost for a working space laser test is about $4 billion--that is $4 billion merely to get to a test of a laser in space. A test is expected as early as 2010. The defense budget already consumes a bit over half of the domestic discretionary budget that Congress must allocate among programs ranging from health research to agriculture, education to highway and air traffic safety, environmental protection to diplomacy. How much more are we willing to trade between guns and butter? How much must we trade, or might alternatives be found in the course of free and open debate? As most people are now well aware, those large budget surpluses so optimistically predicted just a few weeks ago--it is not funny--while the economy was booming--and so irresponsibly paid out in the form of vote-buying ``tax refunds'' before the actual surpluses materialized-- are now gone, gone. Indeed, the Administration has had to employ a few green-eyeshade accounting tricks just to find a few dollars beyond the Social Security surplus to spend on other priorities. And the administration's No. 1 priority seems to be the defense budget--well, that might be all right--but more particularly, the defense budget for National Missile Defense and space weapons. The President wants an additional $39 billion for defense--more, perhaps, now--including more than $8 billion to research and test his missile defense plan. I am troubled that this Administration's number one priority is a project whose scientific feasibility is in doubt. That is the problem. We could very well be rushing down a path that leads to spiraling costs and lengthy delays. In the 1960s, Congress was told that research of a Super Sonic Transport plane was essential to U.S. competitiveness in future decades. I was here. We spent nearly a billion dollars developing this aircraft before cancelling it in 1973, a billion dollars then would be much larger now. I do not think we have lost one whit of competitiveness because of the cancellation of that program. We traveled down the same path again when we considered funding the Superconducting Super Collider. The $8 billion program was supposed to fulfill a supposedly vital role in basic scientific research, but we learned that the true cost was nearly fifty percent greater than expected, and we were not even sure it could ever work. Congress had to step in to end this program in 1993. Again, I do not think that we have lost any crucial advantage by not going forward with that project. I can think of no one who believes that a national missile defense system will be deployed on-time and under budget. I am troubled, not because such weapons might be needed, but because we are spending huge sums on them without being sure in our own minds that the weaponization of space is the best course of action to ensure our security. If the United States builds a missile shield to shoot down enemy missiles as soon after they launch as possible, a smart adversary would attempt to shorten the amount of time that our defenses have to react, in addition to taking measures to fool our defenses. One way to shorten the time between launch and impact is to launch closer to the target-- either from a submarine offshore, or, as the seas become more transparent to new technologies, from space. Another alternative for a wily adversary would be to switch gears entirely and employ other forms of weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical or biological weapons, that could be dispersed without using long range or intercontinental missiles whose launch points make determining the adversary a simple exercise in geometry. We must be aware that our actions produce reactions. We can assume that if the United States deploys weapons in space, even in a purely defensive posture, even in a global policeman role, not all of our friends, allies, and competitors will see this as benign. We have only to consider the reaction of the world to the recent statements by the Administration concerning National Missile Defense and the potential abrogation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Just what would we do when some other nation--friend or competitor--threatens our space superiority by deploying their own weapons there, even if for avowedly defensive purposes? Again the vision of a space marshal comes to mind, this time facing off another gunman down the dusty main street of space. Does the U.S. Marshal fire first, second, or is it a long, tense stand-off with weapons cocked? None of the alternatives sounds particularly promising. Though it is difficult to conceive, would a military competition in space weaponry deter commercial satellite growth or the growth of e- business that depends on global satellite networked communications? Once weapons are in space, does the cost of doing business in space go up to the point that global commerce is stifled? That would be very bad news for business, for consumers, and for the prospects of returning our national budget to surplus or even to balance. These are all ramifications of our current course of action that merit discussion--broad, open, public discussion and debate. I do not wish for the United States to be left undefended--far from it--but neither do I wish for the military to be left, in the face of public silence, to make decisions that spend our treasure and which may create new problems for us in arenas yet unconsidered. In his farewell address on January 17, 1961, President Dwight D. Eisenhower looked upon the rising power and influence of armament producers and at the increasing share of technological research that is performed for the federal government. He warned the councils of government to ``guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex . . .,'' and to ``be alert to the . . . danger that public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific-technological elite.'' Mr. Eisenhower was concerned that, among other things, ``democracy . . . survive for all generations to come, not to become the insolvent phantom of tomorrow.'' He urged that ``[O]nly an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.'' Coming from a former supreme commander of the Allied military forces during World War II, President Eisenhower's words carry the weight of his experience. They are also uncomfortably prophetic. Just forty years after President Eisenhower gave his warning, President Bush proposes to invest many billions of dollars to achieve military superiority in a new realm, where there currently is no threat, jeopardizing the economic health of the nation and creating instability and mistrust in the hearts of other nations. This will occur unless the citizenry--and its elected representatives--we members of the House and U.S. Senate-- especially us--consider and agree upon this course of action. Silence does not equal assent. We must talk, and learn, and consider. Again, I am admittedly a layman when it comes to high-tech gadgetry on earth, let alone in space. But it seems to me that we must set aside the whizbang and drama of lasers and satellites to consider the real, age-old questions--those that have plagued the great generals throughout time. We should be taking stock of what we have to gain and what we have to lose by moving the lines of battle. We must consider whether or not we have the necessary weapons to protect ourselves and our land before we send our military into new and vastly different frontiers. We should assess the real, known threats to our Nation, and gauge whether we have the weapons and the resources to remain secure, and whether our time, talent, and treasure would be better spent fending off those most likely threats or devising new unproven plans of attack and fabulously expensive means of battle. And we should ponder the awesome responsibility of militarizing space and then being the world's space cop before we rush headlong into the twilight zone called national missile defense. Madam President, I believe that it would be both wise and prudent to back off just a little bit on the accelerator that is driving us in a headlong and fiscally spendthrift rush to deploy a national missile defense and to invest billions into putting weapons in space and building weapons designed to act in space. That heavy foot on the accelerator is merely the stamp and roar of rhetoric. The threat does not justify the pace. Our budget projections cannot support the pace. Let us continue to study the matter. Let us continue to conduct research. But the threat, as I say, does not justify the pace at which we are traveling. Our budget projections cannot support the pace, so let us slow down a bit, look at the map, and consider just where this path is taking us. Madam President, I thank the distinguished Senator from California who is here prepared to manage the appropriations bill. She is waiting patiently. I take this opportunity to congratulate her also for the excellent work she has done in preparing this legislation. It was moved through the full Committee on Appropriations yesterday. She is here today prepared to guide its way through this Senate. I thank her on behalf of the Senate and on behalf of the Nation for the service she has rendered and is rendering and will continue to give us. I yield the floor.

Mr. BYRD

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I rise to offer an amendment to address the serious accounting and financial management problems in the Department of Defense. These problems have been exhaustively detailed in reports by the General Accounting Office, the Department of Defense Inspector General's Office, and numerous independent reports on the Pentagon's books. The problems with the Department of Defense's books is not a new one. In 1990, Congress passed the Chief Financial Officers Act, which required the departments and agencies of the Federal Government to prepare annual audited financial statements. Eleven years later, the Pentagon has yet to prepare a single financial statement that can pass an audit. In fact, the books are so poorly kept that the folks with the green eye shades can't even begin to make an informed opinion on the Department's ledgers. As a result, no one has a clue how much the Department spends or what it owns. I first brought this issue to the attention of Secretary Rumsfeld during his confirmation hearing before the Armed Services Committee on January 11, 2001. He said at that time that he would take action on financial management, and he has since completed work on an important, comprehensive review of our military's bookkeeping. These are good steps, but sustained interest is needed to make progress on this issue. Until the problems are straightened out, this issue will need the personal attention of the Secretary of Defense, the secretaries of the military services, and many other high-level managers. The alternative is to have a financial management system that diverts the taxpayer's money from important budget items, such as training, procurement, and our fight against terrorism, to simply generating more waste, fraud, and abuse. My amendment capitalizes on the work done by the Armed Services Committee by strengthening the Senior Financial Management Oversight Council that is created by this bill. My amendment creates the Financial Management Modernization Executive Committee to establish guidelines for improvement of the computer systems that generate unreliable financial data, and makes the Executive Committee accountable directly to the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary, and the secretaries of the military services. It directs the Executive Committee to focus investments on improved financial systems, rather than continuing to spend money on systems that are hopelessly outdated. In this amendment, I also strengthen the reporting requirements to Congress. The Armed Services Committee and the Appropriations Committee needs to know how long it will take to implement financial reform, and how much it will cost. We also need to know if the Department is making progress in reform, or if it is falling behind. The reporting requirements in this amendment will allow Congress to exercise better oversight of the Department's financial management reforms, and they are an integral part of this amendment. I thank my colleague, Senator Grassley, for working with me on this important issue. He has long been an advocate of improving accounting and business practices in the Pentagon, and his knowledge and experience in financial management issues contributed greatly to the text of this amendment. I look forward to working with him in the future to see that the Department effectively implements the needed reforms. I ask my colleagues to support this important amendment.

Mr. BYRD

Mr. BYRD. Madam President, I oppose section 821 of the Fiscal Year 2002 Defense authorization bill because I fear that this section would undermine what has proved to be a successful program in helping to manage Federal prisoners. Section 821 would effectively eliminate the mandatory source requirement for the Department of Defense, which ensures that Federal prisoners are employed in sufficient numbers, and thus is fundamental to the security of our Federal prisons. Moreover, since this section would significantly affect our Federal prisons, it is an issue that the Senate Judiciary Committee should first consider before the Senate takes action on it after only 2 hours of debate. I support competition for the provision of goods and services to the Federal Government. However, this competition should not be sought at the expense of a successful prisoner management program, and that program should certainly not be repealed without some alternative program to replace it.

Mr. BYRD

Mr. BYRD. Madam President, the distinguished majority whip wishes me to yield time to him. How much time does he need?

Mr. BYRD. Madam President, the bill currently before the Senate provides $5 billion in immediate direct cash assistance to the airline industry. It also provides up to an additional $10 billion in loan guarantees for the airlines. This bill is not simply an authorization bill. It is also an appropriations bill which provides funding over and above the $40 billion Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Bill that the Senate passed one week ago today. The airline industry is essential to this Nation's commerce. It produces about $125 billion annually and creates work for thousands of manufacturers and other companies. The Federal Government cannot allow this industry to fold without seriously disrupting the United States economy. That fact is not lost on this Senator. However, we have now reached an important turning point in the relationship between the Federal Government and the airlines, and this should not go unnoticed. As of this day, the airlines are now required to live off the generosity of the general treasury. We are about to grant them several billion dollars of assistance, not from the Aviation Trust Fund, not from any ticket taxes from airline passengers, but from the general treasury. We are talking about money from people's income taxes, including the income taxes of millions of Americans who did not board a plane last year, who will not board a plane this year, and who will not board a plane next year perhaps. Twenty-three years ago, the Senate passed the conference report on the airline deregulation bill on October 14, 1978 by a vote of 82-4, I believe. I was Majority Leader at the time. I was among the 82 Senators who voted for that bill. And as I have mentioned on the Senate floor many times, I have regretted that vote ever since. My colleague at that time was Jennings Randolph. Jennings Randolph voted against deregulation. I voted for deregulation. He voted the right way at that time, and I voted the wrong way. I regret that vote because ever since deregulation, numerous airlines have pulled out of West Virginia and other rural states altogether. Many of them pulled out immediately following the vote. My constituents and millions of other Americans who live in smaller communities have been left with infrequent air service at astronomical prices. Indeed, today, it is often cheaper to fly from Washington D.C. to London, England, than it is to fly from Washington D.C. to Charleston, WV. The quality and cost of service to many of our smaller airports in West Virginia and across the Nation are even worse. Yesterday, as part of a Transportation Appropriations Subcommittee hearing with Secretary Mineta, I expressed my view that we should not be providing the airlines with billions of dollars from the income taxes of hard working Americans without requiring the air carriers to provide a reasonable level of service to those Americans. Now that this industry must live off the generosity of the U.S. taxpayer, at least for a while, I think we have a responsibility to ensure that the taxpayers are well served. But today, we find that the airlines are cutting back service and eliminating cities from their national network at the same time they have their hands out on Capitol Hill. I recognize that the airlines find themselves in such precarious financial condition because of a recent tragedy of massive proportion. However, the airlines were not doing so well before that time. I am determined to make sure that the airlines do not use this incident as a rationale for abandoning or dramatically reducing service to communities that depend on that service to connect with the national economy. Toward that end, I want to call the attention of the Senate to a critically important section of the bill. Under this bill, the Secretary of Transportation is granted broad new statutory authority to require an airline that receives direct financial assistance under this act to continue to provide service to any city that it was serving prior to the tragedy of September 11. The bill also grants the Secretary the authority to require any airline taking assistance under this act to enter into agreements to ensure that all communities that had scheduled air service before September 11 continue to receive adequate air service. These provisions, if applied appropriately, will ensure that the small cities and the rural airports of America are not cut off from our national aviation system as the industry endures a downturn. The Committee on Appropriations, which I chair, will monitor carefully how Secretary Mineta implements these critically important provisions. He has been granted important new powers in this time of crisis, and I expect him to use these powers. The committee will also monitor carefully the actions of the airlines when it comes to discontinuing routes and reducing service. We must see to it that the small communities of our country are not relegated to the status of an economic backwater as the jets keep flying from New York to Los Angeles to London and to other far away ports. I understand there are discussions that additional Federal assistance may be needed for the airlines in later bills. The airlines should be on notice and the Department of Transportation should be on notice that if the provisions in this bill are not applied appropriately, and we see a pattern wherein the small communities of our Nation are not being treated fairly, we will be back with stronger legislative measures to address this problem. This issue will not go away with the passage of this bill. As we stand poised to hand the airlines billions of dollars in general revenue tax dollars, we must ensure that taxpayers in all communities, small and large, have access to reasonable and affordable air service. During this time of national crises--during a time of war--we should require that there will be air service to all parts of America to ensure that there is mobility for all Americans. I want to thank my colleague, Senator Rockefeller, for the leadership he has demonstrated in this area of legislation. He has done a great piece of work. He is highly dedicated to the service of his constituents, who are my constituents, but in thinking of our constituents we are also thinking of Americans across this country who live in rural areas and who have been deprived of fairness in service and in connection with costs in flying. I yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. BYRD. I yield 3 minutes of my time to the Senator.

Mr. BYRD

Mr. BYRD. Has the Pastore rule run its course?

Mr. BYRD. I thank the Chair. That being the case, I can speak out of order. Are there any restrictions?

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, what question is before the Senate?

Mr. BYRD. I thank the Chair.

Mr. BYRD

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, this is Constitution Week. Of course, I am talking about the U.S. Constitution. A point that all Governors and Senators might well remember: No State constitution in this country is like the Federal Constitution. No State's constitution so clearly and so strictly delineates the separation of powers as precisely as does the U.S. Constitution. So it is here in the Senate that the Constitution is defended--the U.S. Constitution--and it is here that we support the separation of powers, the checks and balances; and the one Constitution that we are bound by in this institution is the U.S. Constitution, a copy of which I hold in my hand. I want to take a little while today to talk about this Federal Constitution. On Monday of this week we marked the 114th anniversary of the U.S. Constitution. Of course, the Senate was not in on Monday, and consequently I have been forced to wait until today to speak about the Constitution. Again, this is Constitution Week. In tragic and sad times, we instinctively reach for what matters most in our lives: Our faith, our families, and our fundamental rights as Americans. As we struggle with the horrific events of September 11, we should take a measure of strength from the events of another September day, an 18th century September day. On September 17, 1787, an extraordinary convention of American statesmen, meeting at Independence Hall in Philadelphia, adopted the Constitution of the United States of America. My memory may prove me wrong, but I believe that, too, was a Monday--as was September 17, in 2001, this year of our Lord. So today I wish to commemorate that singular event by discussing several of the constitutional provisions that shape the structure and guide the operations of the U.S. Senate. I think there will never be a better time, or a more propitious time, or a time when we more need to think and to speak of the Constitution of the United States, than this time, and amidst the circumstances that have attracted the attention and galvanized the attention of Americans, wherever they may live--in this country or elsewhere--as well as the people of other countries. So it is timely to think about the Constitution of the United States. Imagine a U.S. Senate in which the State of West Virginia was assigned three Members while California was entitled to 30. Or, consider a Senate in which Members served for life--or for just a single year. How about a system in which the House of Representatives elected the Senate? Or a Senate in which Members voted as a State block rather than as individuals? To our modern ear, these options sound preposterous, perhaps, but to the Framers of the Constitution, these proposals deserved serious consideration. There was nothing inevitable about the Constitution as we now know it. Every word required delicate construction, balancing, and refinement. In cases where the Framers could not fully agree on a particular point, they chose ambiguity--or even silence. Among that charter's 55 draftsmen--only 39 actually signed the document--there existed a vast fund, a vast reservoir of knowledge about the operation of legislative bodies. That knowledge served the Framers well as they struggled to fashion the institutional structure of the United States Senate. Let us examine some of the Senate-related options that the Convention's delegates confronted from the Convention's convening on May 25 until its adjournment on September 17. First the issue of representation. Delegates representing large States at the Constitutional Convention advocated a strong national government. In Edmund Randolph's Virginia Plan, the number of Senators in each State would be determined by that State's population of free citizens and slaves. Large States, then, stood to gain the most seats in the Senate. As justification for this advantage, these delegates noted that their States contributed more of the Nation's financial and defense resources than did small States, and therefore, deserved a greater say in Government. Small-State delegates countered with a plan designed to protect States' rights within a confederated system of government. Fearing the effects of majority rule, they, the small States, demanded equal representation in Congress. This was the system, they noted, that was then in effect under the Articles of Confederation. When the Convention agreed to divide the national legislature into two chambers, various Framers argued that every State should enjoy equal representation in both Chambers. In fact, some delegates threatened to withdraw from the Convention if it adopted any population-based representation plan. Other delegates sought a compromise between large State and small State interests. As early as 1776, Connecticut's Roger Sherman--he is one of the signers of the Constitution of the United States--Roger Sherman, as early as 1776 had suggested that the Continental Congress, in which each State had one vote, should be organized to represent people as well as States, and during the 1787 Convention, Sherman proposed the so-called ``Connecticut Compromise'' which provided population-based representation in the House of Representatives and equal State representation in the Senate. Benjamin Franklin agreed that each State should have an equal vote in the Senate except in matters concerning money. The Convention's grant committee reported Franklin's motion with some modifications to the delegates early in July. Madison led the debates against that measure believing it to be an injustice to the majority of Americans. Some small State delegates were reluctant even to support proportional representation in the House. On July 16, delegates narrowly adopted the mixed representation plan, the Great Compromise, giving States equal votes in the Senate. That is why we are here. The Presiding Officer would not be sitting where he is sitting today if there had not been a July 16 Great Compromise. The Official Reporter would not be here listening to me and taking down what I am saying. I would not be here. These young people who are our pages and who help us in so many ways to do our work for our constituencies would not be here. That was the Great Compromise, giving States equal votes in the Senate. The compromise resolved the Convention's most divisive issue and created a Federal system of Government. Senators already know what I am saying. Many people on the outside who are watching through that electronic eye up there know it. These things were taught long ago in the early years of a child's schooling, but this is Constitution Week. We need to be reminded, and now in the circumstances that confront this country and have confronted it especially since Tuesday, September 11, we must be reminded that we are to be guided by a constitution, the United States Constitution. We must zealously guard the powers of the legislative branch in times like these when there is a war, when there is a military conflict. Powers have a way of gravitating toward the Chief Executive, and it is in times like those, in times like these, that we must be very zealous and jealous of the constitutional prerogatives and powers that are vested in this body, the legislative branch. We must be on our guard more than ever because the Constitution lives and it will live when these circumstances are behind us, if and when they indeed are ever put behind us, and I assume that they will be put behind us at some point in time. It might be a good thing to point out here, just to remind Senators that the Continental Congress met behind closed doors. The Congress, under the Articles of Confederation, met behind closed doors. The Constitutional Convention, where the Framers gave us this Constitution, met behind closed doors, with sentries at the doors and the windows drawn. So, there we have food for another speech, another day. Be conscious of the Constitution and this institution (the Senate) and its prerogatives and its precedents, its rules. We need particularly now to be reminded of these things. A second major issue related to the number of Senators allotted to each State. Once the convention's delegates established the principle of equal State representation in the Senate, they needed to determine how many Senators a State would be allotted. Few, if any, delegates considered that one Senator per State would be sufficient representation. Lone Senators might leave their State unrepresented in times of illness or other absences, and they would have no colleague to consult with on State-related issues. Additional Senators would make the Senate a more knowledgeable body and, perhaps, better able to counter the influence of the House of Representatives. But, some believed a very large Senate would soon lose its distinctive character, would lack the agility needed to effectively counterbalance the House, and would make it easier for Senators to escape personal responsibility for their actions. Given these considerations, delegates had only a narrow choice regarding the number of Senators. During the Convention, they briefly discussed the advantages of two seats versus three. Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania, the man with the peg leg, stated that three Senators per State were necessary to form an acceptable quorum, while other delegates thought a third Senator would be too costly. On July 23, one week after the Great Compromise, only Pennsylvania voted in favor of three Senators. When the question turned to two Senators, Maryland alone voted against the measure, not because of the number, but because Luther Martin disagreed with the concept of per capita voting, which gave each Senator, rather than each State, one vote. Both the Congress under the Articles of Confederation and the Constitutional Convention used a voting method that gave each State one vote. This system of block voting was meant to reinforce State solidarity, but it often frustrated those State delegations divided by controversial issues. The alternative, of course, was for Members to vote as individuals. Those Framers who had served in State legislatures had ample experience with the per capita system. At the Convention, they spent little time debating the two proposed voting methods. On July 14, Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts stated that per capita voting in the Senate would ``prevent the delays and inconvenience that had been experienced in [the Continental] Congress and would give a national aspect and spirit to the management of business.'' One week later, Gouverneur Morris and Rufus King of Massachusetts added a per capita voting clause to their motion designating the number of Senators for each State. As I have already noted, Maryland's Luther Martin objected to the motion. A States' rights advocate, he regarded per capita voting as a departure ``from the idea of the States being represented in the second branch.'' Consequently, Martin convinced his fellow Maryland delegates to vote against the two-Senator, per capita measure. Supported by every State except Maryland, both the measure's clauses passed on July 23, allowing each State's two Senators to vote as individuals, though still subject to the influence of States, constituents, and party policies. Because they did not have parties in those days, but I am speaking within the context of the current moment, the Constitution's Framers understood that no matter which method they chose for electing Senators, it would have a significant impact on the Senate's future relationships with the House, the people, and the States. From the beginning, most delegates dismissed any notion of implementing the British House of Lords' peerage system based on heredity and title. This system contradicted the egalitarian notions outlined in the Declaration of Independence. The system set forth in the Virginia Plan received little support, as well. Had this measure passed, the House would have selected Members of the Senate from nominations offered by the State legislators. The Senate could not be expected to serve as an effective check on the very institution responsible for its Members' election. Senators will recall that the Virginia plan was introduced by Gov. Edmund Randolph, a delegate from the State of Virginia, on May 29, 1787. It is easy for me to remember the date of May 29 because it was on that date, 64 years ago, that I married my wife Erma; 64 years ago on May 29. The convention then considered a revised version of the Virginia Plan, which contained the clause, ``the Members of the Second Branch of the national Legislature ought to be chosen by the individual Legislatures.'' Most delegates easily accepted this election method, regarding it as the most ``congenial'' plan available. Only Pennsylvania's James Wilson criticized the idea. He believed that the State legislative method would ``introduce and cherish local interests and local prejudices.'' The alternative method, elections through popular vote, never gained the adherents it needed to become a viable option. In Federalist 63, Madison defended the plan of election by State legislatures against those who feared indirect elections would transform the Senate into a ``tyrannical aristocracy.'' For such an unlikely event to happen, the Senate, the State legislatures, the House of Representatives, and the people would all have to fall prey to corruption. Madison cited Maryland's successful experiment with indirect election. Elected by a unique electoral college system, the Senate in Maryland showed no symptoms of tyranny, and in fact, had built a reputation unrivaled by any other state in the Union. Despite Madison's assurances, the system of indirect elections ultimately proved vulnerable to corruption. Following the Civil War, newspaper reporters accused State legislatures of accepting bribes or remaining willfully ``deadlocked,'' and therefore, unable to elect a Senator into office. Reformers reacted to these allegations by advocating a constitutional amendment that would provide for the election of Senators by popular vote. This one substantive correction to the Framers' handiwork for the Senate went into effect in 1913 as the Constitution's 17th amendment. And, next, to the issue of term length. The 6-year Senate term represented a compromise between those Framers who wanted a strong, independent Senate and those who feared the possible tyranny of a Senate insulated from popular opinion. While few delegates to the 1787 Convention wanted to emulate the House of Lords' lifelong terms, or the Congress under the Articles Confederation's single-year terms, the Framers' reaction against these extremes helped shape their arguments for and against long terms in the Senate. Delegates examined the experience of the various State legislatures. Although the majority of States set 1-year terms for both legislative bodies, five State constitutions established longer terms for upper house members. South Carolina's senators received 2-year terms. In Delaware, the senate had 3-year terms with one-third of the senate's nine members up for reelection each year. New York and Virginia implemented a similar class system but with 4-year terms instead of 3. Only Maryland's Senate featured 5-year terms, making that legislative body the focus of the convention's Senate term debates. The delegates either praised Maryland's long terms for checking the excesses of lower-house democracy or feared them for the same reason. Some members of the Convention believed that even 5-year terms were too short to counteract the dangerous notions likely to emerge from the House of Representatives. In June, Madison, Edmund Randolph, and other convention delegates cited Maryland's experiences when they argued for long Senate terms. According to Madison, the senate of Maryland had never ``created just suspicions of danger.'' Far from being the more powerful branch, the senate had actually yielded too much, at times, to Maryland's House of Delegates. Unless the U.S. Senate obtained sufficient stability, Madison expected a similar situation under the new Constitution. He suggested terms of 7 years, or more, to counter the influence of the popularly chosen House of Representatives. Edmond Randolph believed that the primary object of an upper house was to control the larger lower house. He noted that Maryland's senate had followed this principle but had been ``scarcely able to stem the popular torrent.'' Seven-year terms, then, had a greater chance of checking the House than terms of 5 years or fewer. On June 13, the convention took up a provision for 7-year Senate terms. This encountered heated criticism from several Framers. For Alexander Hamilton, only lifelong terms could check the ``amazing violence and turbulence of the democratic spirit.'' Other delegates preferred 4-year terms. Madison devised a 9-year-term proposal with one-third of the seats subject to election every 3 years. He received little support for this plan, but he argued in its favor until the final votes on June 26. On that date, and following the failure of his own measure, Madison joined the majority of his colleagues in voting for a 6-year term. In the Federalist papers, Madison argued that Maryland's experiment with 5-year terms proved that slightly longer terms posed no danger to bicameral legislatures. In fact, he expected the agreed-upon 6-year terms to have a stabilizing effect on the new national government. Long terms would control turnover in the legislature. Long terms would allow Senators to take responsibility for measures over time. Long terms would make Senators largely independent of public opinion. The Articles of Confederation set no qualifications for delegates to the Continental Congress. It left these decisions up to the individual States. By contrast, convention delegates supported establishing membership limitations for House and Senate Members. Influenced by British and State precedents, they established age, citizenship, and residence qualifications for Senators, but voted against proposed religion and property requirements. There was a lot of sentiment especially on property requirements as to age. I might pay particular attention to that aspect. The Framers debated the minimum age for Members of the House of Representatives before they considered the same qualification for Senators. Although James Wilson of Pennsylvania State stated that ``there was no more reason for incapacitating youth than age, where the requisite qualifications were found,'' other delegates were in favor of age restrictions. I'm glad they did not have their way. They were familiar with England's law requiring members of Parliament to be 21 or older. Some lived in States that barred individuals from serving in their upper chambers who had not attained the age of 21 or 25. On June 25, 3 days after designating 25 as the minimum age for Representatives, delegates unanimously set a 30-year-minimum for Senators. In Federalist 62, Madison justified the higher age requirement for Senators. By its deliberative nature, the ``senatorial trust,'' called for a ``greater extent of information and stability of character,'' than would be needed in the more democratic House of Representatives. The Framers, not all of them by any means, trusted democracy. As to citizenship, under English law, no person ``born out[side] of the kingdoms of England, Scotland, or Ireland'' could be a member of either house of Parliament. While some delegates may have admired the ``strictness'' of this policy, no Framers advocated a blanket ban on foreign-born legislators. Instead, they debated the length of time Members of Congress should be citizens before taking office. The States' residency qualifications offered moderate guidelines in this regard. New Hampshire's State senators needed to be residents for at least 7 years prior to election. In other States, upper house members fulfilled a 5-, 3-, or 1-year requirement. The Virginia Plan introduced by Edmund Randolph, on May 29, made no mention of citizenship when it was introduced to the Convention. Two months later, the Committee of Detail reported a draft of the Constitution that included a 4-year citizenship requirement for all Senators. On August 9, Gouverneur Morris moved to substitute a 14-year minimum. Later that day, delegates voted against Senate citizenship requirements of 14, 13, and 10 years before settling on 9 years as a residency requirement. The issue of foreign birth was particularly important in the Senate, whose responsibilities would extend to the review of international treaties. While the Framers were concerned that the Senate, especially, might be subject to foreign influence, they did not wish to offend foreign allies or close the institution to meritorious naturalized citizens. The 9-year provision made the Senate requirement 2 years longer than that for the House of Representatives. On August 13, the Convention confirmed the 9-year requirement by a vote of 8 States to 3. Inhabitancy: Although the Parliament of Great Britain repealed its residency law in 1774, no Convention delegates spoke against a residency requirement for Members of Congress. The qualification first came under consideration on August 6 when the Committee of Detail reported its draft of the Constitution. Article V, section 3 stated, ``Every member of the Senate shall be * * * at the time of his election, a resident of the state from which he shall be chosen.'' Two days later, Roger Sherman moved to strike the word ``resident'' from the portion of the clause that related to the House, and insert in its place ``inhabitant,'' a term he considered to be ``less liable to misconstruction.'' Madison seconded the motion, noting that ``resident'' might exclude people occasionally absent on public or private business. Delegates agreed to the term, ``inhabitant,'' and voted against adding a time period to the requirement. The following day, they amended the Senate qualification to include the word, ``inhabitant'' and passed the clause by unanimous agreement. We now turn to the issue of who gets to make executive and judicial nominations. Argued over the course of several weeks, the Constitution's nomination clause split the delegates into two factions. The first faction wanted the executive to have the sole power of appointment. The second wanted the Senate to have that responsibility. The second faction followed precedents that the Articles of Confederation and most of the State constitutions had established favoring legislative appointment. The Massachusetts constitution offered yet another approach. This third way particularly interested the convention delegates. For over 100 years, Massachusetts had divided the appointment responsibilities between its Governor, who made the nominations, and its legislative council, which confirmed the appointments. Rather than adopt the Massachusetts model immediately, the delegates initially agreed to language that split the responsibility in a different way. The President would appoint executive branch officers, who would serve during his term, and the Senate would appoint members of the judiciary because they would hold their positions for life--a period most likely to exceed the tenure and authority of one President. However, the Framers in favor of a strong executive argued that Senate appointments would lead to government by a ``cabal'' swayed by the interests of constituents. Other delegates, fearful of monarchies, wanted to remove the President entirely from the appointment process. On September 4, the Committee of Eleven reported an amended appointment clause. Unanimously adopted on September 7, the clause, based on the Massachusetts model, provided that the President ``shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint'' the officers of the United States--certain officers. As they debated the controversial treaty-making clause, the Constitutional Convention's delegates considered, but did not follow in whole, those precedents with which they were most familiar. In Great Britain, treaties were made by the king and, in certain cases, had to be approved by a majority vote in Parliament. The Continental Congress, which had no executive branch, dispatched agents to negotiate treaties. The treaties only went into effect after two-thirds, 9 out of 13, of the States approved the documents. This inefficient process was further complicated by the States' ability to enter into their own treaties. While the delegates agreed that the States could not continue to make treaties with foreign powers, they disagreed over the manner in which the United States should negotiate, draft, and ratify international agreements. On August 6, the Committee of Detail reported a preliminary Constitution to the full Convention. Article IX, section 1 stated, ``The Senate of the United States shall have power to make treaties, and to appoint Ambassadors, and Judges of the Supreme Court.'' Throughout August and into the month of September, the delegates debated treaty-making as a separate issue from the rest of the clause. Several delegates opposed granting the Senate the sole control over treaty-making. It is a good thing that they did. While some wanted the executive to have that responsibility, others advocated involving both houses of Congress in the process. Small-State delegates, however, were inclined to keep the Committee of Detail's treaty clause because it gave each State an equal say in the adoption or rejection of treaties. On September 4, the Committee of Eleven reported a treaty clause that appeased many of the delegates. This is what it said: ``The President by and with the advice and Consent of the Senate, shall have power to make Treaties.'' After further debate, the delegates unanimously approved the clause on September 7. However, the clause was taken up again, this time to add to it the words, ``But no treaty shall be made without the consent of two-thirds of the members present.'' Shortly thereafter, the Convention passed James Madison's addition, ``except in treaties of peace,'' which would be ratified by a simple majority vote. The next day, the delegates struck out the peace treaty exception and considered dropping the Senate supermajority requirement as well. However, after two delegates cited the Continental Congress' ``two- thirds of the States'' example, they voted to keep the two-thirds of the Senate provision. Although adopted by the Convention, the treaty clause continued to stir debate in the period before the Constitution's ratification. As one of the clause's strongest proponents, Alexander Hamilton defended the provision in The Federalist 75. Remarkably, given the delegates' extreme dissension over treaty-making, he wrote, the clause ``is one of the best digested and unexceptionable parts of the plan.'' Let me pause here to say that we can witness the Convention as it worked. And we know that time after time after time the Convention would vote one way one day, and a few days later vote on the same matter again and vote a different way, and then perhaps vote again before the close of the Convention and arrive at an entirely different conclusion. If the Convention had been open to the public, the Framers would have been severely restricted and constrained, and would have paused and thought once, twice, and three times, and more, before they would have changed their votes. They might, on a later date, have come to believe that in the earlier vote they had voted the wrong way. By having the closed Convention, by meeting secretly, they were able to have full discussions of a matter, have a tentative vote, vote one way, perhaps a few days later vote a different way, and in the final analysis, in order to do the right thing, after considerable reflection and after hearing the arguments of others, vote again finally and, perhaps, differently. That would have been very difficult to do had there been galleries, had there been the media, newspapers, had there been television--which, of course, there could not have been. It would have been difficult. I say that to say that in some situations voting in executive session, in secret session, may, in the last analysis, be in the best interests of the country. Early in the Convention, most delegates agreed that the inclusion of an impeachment provision would help to hold national officers accountable for their actions. Throughout the summer of 1787, committee members reported impeachment plans to the full Convention. The Virginia Plan proposed a supreme tribunal to hear and determine cases including, among other concerns, the ``impeachments of any National officers.'' On June 13, the Committee of the Whole amended the plan to provide that the President could be ``removable on impeachment of malpractices or neglect of duty.'' The revised measure did not specify the procedures for trying the President. In June and July, the Framers debated whether Congress should have a role in the impeachment process. Roger Sherman-- there that Connecticut delegate is again--Roger Sherman asserted that the ``National Legislature should have the power to remove the Executive at pleasure.'' Virginia's George Mason objected to Sherman's plan, claiming that the President would become merely a ``creature of the Legislature.'' John Dickinson of Delaware countered with an unsuccessful motion to make the executive ``removable by National Legislature at request of majority of State Legislatures.'' You see, they were all over the place. On August 6, the Committee of Detail reported that the House of Representatives ``shall have the sole power of impeachment'' and the executive ``shall be removed from his office by ``conviction in the Supreme Court, of treason, bribery, or corruption.'' Two weeks later, the committee added that ``the judges of the supreme court be triable by the senate, on impeachment by the house of representatives.'' Can you imagine what it would be like in this day and time to have a Constitutional Convention with all the doors open, the windows open, the galleries open, the media there? After every vote, Members would rush out the door to get before a camera and explain their votes. Members would not later be able to easily change their minds and their votes upon more careful thought, upon more considered reflection. So there are those today who would hem and haw and holler: Oh, we must not do this. We cannot do this. The people are entitled to hear everything we say. Well, those Framers were very wise men. It was they who wrote this Constitution which I hold in my hand. Of course, there have been some amendments added later, but those men were wise men. And, remember, they were placing their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred honor on the barrelhead. Of course, we had fought a war, but many of them were among those who voted on the Declaration of Independence in 1776. The constitutional plan then went for review to a committee consisting of one member from every State represented at the Convention. The committee removed the full Supreme Court from the process. The report, influenced by the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, stated, ``The Senate of the U.S. shall have power to try all impeachments [by the House of Representatives]''--naturally--``but no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two thirds of the members present.'' Ah, there you have it now. Alexander Hamilton later explained this decision noting that no other institution would be sufficiently dignified--no other institution would be sufficiently dignified--or independent to handle the proceedings. The Framers debated the clause on September 8 and despite Madison's objection that the executive would become dependent on the legislature, the Convention, thank God, passed the final measure by a vote of eight States to two. Mr. President, there are, of course, other provisions in the Constitution that guide the operations of the Senate. But, those that I have just discussed serve to stoke our appreciation for this extraordinary charter of government that we are talking about. In closing, let us consider the words of James Wilson, one of Pennsylvania's eight delegates to the Convention. Here is what James Wilson told a meeting of Philadelphia citizens several weeks after September 17, 1787: Perhaps there never was a charge made with less reason, than that which predicts the institution of a baneful aristocracy in the federal Senate. This body branches into two characters, the one legislative, and the other executive. In its legislative character, it can effect no purpose without the co-operation of the house of representatives: and in its executive character, it can accomplish no object, without the concurrence of the president. Thus fettered, I do not know any act which the Senate can of itself perform: and such dependence necessarily precludes every idea of influence and superiority. But I will confess, that in the organization of this body, a comprise between contending interests is discernible: and when we reflect how various are the laws, commerce, habits, population, and extent of the confederated States, this evidence of mutual concession and accommodation ought rather to command a generous applause, than to excite jealousy and reproach. For my part, my admiration can only be equaled by my astonishment, in beholding so perfect a system formed from such heterogeneous materials. What a Constitution! I have often thought that the Creator of heaven and earth also had his hand in the creation of the Constitution of the United States. Whenever, wherever did such another illustrious gathering of men ever occur? And why at this particular time? Had it been 5 years earlier, the Framers may have lacked the experience that they ultimately had gained under the Articles of Confederation which enabled them to add provisions that would avoid some of the problems with which they had been confronted under the Articles. The country, such as it was at that time, the citizenry might not have yet had enough time--I say this particularly with reference to the leaders of the Convention and the other members--to so convincingly move them to the idea that mere amendments to the Articles of Confederation would not really be enough. There had to be a new start, a new beginning. They went outside the parameters of their authority to initiate that new beginning. Had it been 5 years later, it might have been impossible, because by then we were seeing the excesses of the French Revolution, with men and women being hauled to the guillotine. And so perhaps that is where God had His hand. It happened at the right time. It brought together the right men, learned men, wise men, experienced men. I thank Providence for this Constitution and for the men who had the foresight and the vision, the courage, the ability to listen to others and to change their minds. We can be thankful. But we should also be fully aware of our responsibilities to preserve that great document and to amend it only with great care and after great deliberation. At this perplexing time in this year of our Lord 2001, we must be ever more on guard that we, as the elected Representatives of a great people, as we go forth, hold in our hands, as it were, the Constitution of the United States; that we resist any temptation because of the demands of the moment, the exigencies of the day, we resist the temptation to put that Constitution aside in order to avoid debate and expedite the business before the Senate. Let's not hesitate to ask questions. Let's look before we leap. I yield the floor.

Mr. BYRD

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Oklahoma for his courtesy toward me. He was prepared to speak before I speak. I offered to wait and have him go ahead but he said no, so I thank him. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be permitted to speak for not to exceed 7 minutes, and I ask the Chair indicate when I have 1 minute left.

Mr. BYRD. It is my understanding that New Jersey is eligible to apply for any authorized disaster relief program in the same manner and under the same conditions as New York, Connecticut, Virginia, and other affected States.

Mr. BYRD. Absolutely.

Mr. BYRD. There are many more examples of the selflessness and sacrifice taking place, not just from New Jersey but across the country. I appreciate that the physical attack did not occur on New Jersey soil and that is why New Jersey is not referenced in this emergency appropriation as a location where the terrorist attack occurred as New York, Virginia, and Pennsylvania are listed. However, it is important to acknowledge and fully appreciate the human and financial expenses being incurred by the neighboring areas and that these areas be able to apply directly to the Federal Government for reimbursement. Mr. President, it is my understanding that the specific State listings in the supplemental specifically refer only to the physical locations where the attacks occurred and do not establish an exclusive list of areas eligible for financial assistance from this Federal aid package.