Robert Byrd

Mr. BYRD

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BYRD. The Senator has indicated that the administration wants to go out and negotiate additional agreements. What is to keep them from it? They have that authority now. They can go out and negotiate. They are negotiating now. There is nothing here that anybody is doing to keep the administration from negotiating additional agreements, is there?

Mr. BYRD. No amendments in this body. That is not what the Constitution says. The Constitution says that the Senate may offer amendments to revenue bills, as on other bills, as on other legislation. So that is where the fast track comes in. Do we want to bind and gag ourselves and not be able to speak for our constituents and speak for our country? Do we want to illuminate the listening public as to what is really going on here? Is that what we are talking about? Fast track means we will hear nothing, say nothing, see nothing, right? We will offer no amendments. We can't do that on behalf of our constituents in the next 5 years; is that right? Am I right?

Mr. BYRD. Right.

Mr. BYRD. In a manner, this is just a continuation of the siphoning off of the legislative powers, as we saw in the Line-Item Veto Act. It was siphoned away. As a matter of fact, we just gave legislative power to the President. Aside from that subject, that is what is being done here. We are being asked to give up the people's power under the Constitution to legislate, to amend, and to debate. In other words, we are just to buy a pig in a poke and are not even supposed to look inside the poke --just rubberstamp whatever the administration sends up here.

Mr. BYRD. There is something in the poke; I am not sure what is in the poke. But I am not willing to bind and gag myself. I will be forced to do that, of course; they will do that, but we will be kicking and screaming. This administration wants more and more power, and other administrations have been the same. They have all been the same in wanting this fast track. But I compliment the Senator. I salute him for leading this fight. I am opposed to fast track, and I will be there when the roll is called. I thank the Senator. I ask unanimous consent that the time I have taken of the Senator's 10 minutes not be charged against the Senator.

Mr. BYRD. The fast track means that the Senate and the House are supposed to bind and gag themselves and not talk and not offer amendments, is that correct?

Mr. BYRD. The administration has the authority right now to negotiate additional agreements and is negotiating additional agreements.

Mr. BYRD

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. BYRD

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, earlier this week, Senators received a ``Dear Colleague'' letter and accompanying material from my friends and colleagues, Senators Chafee and Domenici. This letter included several representations regarding the substance and effect of the Byrd-Gramm- Baucus-Warner amendment in comparison to that of the Chafee-Domenici amendment to S. 1173, the ISTEA reauthorization bill. I have already addressed a number of these issues on the floor over the last two days. However, I thought it would be valuable for Senators to review a memorandum that evaluates in detail the representations made by Senators Chafee and Domenici in their ``Dear Colleague'' letter. This analysis was prepared by Dr. William Buechner, Director of Economics and Research at the American Road and Transportation Builders Association. I therefore ask unanimous consent that Dr. Buechner's analysis be printed in the Record at this point, and I hope all Members will carefully review this material and become cosponsors of the Byrd-Gramm- Baucus-Warner amendment.

Mr. BYRD

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. BYRD

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. BYRD

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. BYRD

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I yield the distinguished Senator from Virginia [Mr. Robb] 10 minutes.

Mr. BYRD. I yield to the Senator 10 minutes.

Mr. BYRD. I yield the Senator 5 minutes. I believe the Senator from New York wants 5 minutes also, and I will yield him that time when he comes in.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, how much time does the Senator need?

Mr. BYRD. I believe I am in control of time, am I not?

Mr. BYRD. Yes.

Mr. BYRD. Each side has 4\1/2\ minutes.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, Senator Sarbanes, the distinguished senior Senator from Maryland, is coming to the floor and he wants 5 minutes. I wish to have the Chair alert me when I have remaining 5 minutes. In the meantime, may I address a question to the distinguished Senator from Alaska? In the statement of administration policy, we are told, and I quote, ``The administration strongly opposes this disapproval bill.'' Well, if I understand it, the administration is willing to work with the Congress in restoring half of these items; half of the items. I cannot understand how it can disapprove the bill when it is willing to restore half of the items that are in the disapproval bill. Also, the statement of administration policy that comes from the Office of Management and Budget says, ``The President's action saves $287 million in budget authority in 1998.'' In the very next sentence, it says, ``* * * we are committed to working with Congress to restore funding for those projects that were canceled as a result of the data provided by the Department of Defense that was out of date.'' How much is the President's action really saving? He claims to save $287 million by virtue of the exercise of the line-item veto. But he follows in the next sentence, and says, ``* * * we are committed to working with Congress to restore funding * * *'' How much really can the administration claim to have saved?

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes. That will leave how much time?

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I am not willing to assume that the President has a monopoly on wisdom. I have represented the people of West Virginia now for 51 years in one office or another. I think I have a pretty good idea of what they need, what they want, and so on. But in this particular instance, the item that was vetoed for West Virginia was on the Department of Defense's 5-year plan. He vetoed the item that would have been in West Virginia, and I say, let's give it right back to him by his own criteria. He made a mistake in vetoing it. I say let's put it right back on the President's desk, let him exercise his constitutional veto, and then let the Congress exercise its constitutional option of either overriding that veto or sustaining it. I have sat right here and listened to three former Governors talk about the line-item veto. What is beyond my comprehension is how Senators can confuse the so-called line-item veto at the State level with the line-item veto at the Federal level. They are two different spheres of action. The distinguished Senator from Florida, the distinguished Senator from Virginia, and the distinguished Senator from Arkansas, all three of whom are former Governors, came from States that have the line-item veto. Well, so what? As Governors, they were acting under the constitutions of the State of Virginia, the State of Florida, and the State of Arkansas. But now they are operating under the aegis of the United States Constitution. They are two different things. I don't find the constitution of the State of Virginia written into the U.S. Constitution. I don't find the constitution of the State of Florida written into the U.S. Constitution. The U.S. Constitution refers to legislative powers ``vested in a Congress of the United States.''

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I don't intend to protract the debate. But I agree that if this is going to be done, if we are going to have the line-item veto, let it be done the way the framers provided that it be done; namely, through an amendment to the U.S. Constitution, not by statute. I don't think we can do it by law. I do hope that the High Court of the United States will uphold the contention that I am making and will strike this infernal and nefarious law dead, dead, dead! I thank the distinguished Senator. How much time does the Senator from New Mexico need?

Mr. BYRD

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may require. Mr. President, I am looking at the memorandum that is being distributed by the Executive Office of the President, the Office of Management and Budget, dated October 30, 1997. It carries the heading ``Statement of Administration Policy.'' I will read it. This statement of administration policy provides the administration's views on S. 1292, a bill disapproving the cancellations transmitted by the President on October 6, 1997. S. 1292 would disapprove 34 of the 38 projects that the President canceled from the fiscal year 1998 Military Construction Appropriations Act. The administration strongly opposes this disapproval bill. If it originally was presented to the President in its current form, the President would veto the bill. The President carefully reviewed the 145 projects that Congress funded that were not included in the fiscal year 1998 budget. The President used his authority responsibly to cancel projects that were not requested in the budget that would not substantially improve the quality of life of the military service members and their families and that would not begin construction in 1998 because the Defense Department reported that no architectural and engineering design work had been done. The President's action saves $287 million in budget authority in 1998. While we strongly oppose S. 1292, we are committed to working with Congress to restore funding for those projects that were canceled as a result of the data provided by the Department of Defense that was out of date. I have read the statement of administration policy in its entirety. Let me take a further look at this sentence which appears in the memorandum. ``The President used his authority responsibly to cancel projects that were not requested in the budget.'' Mr. President, I don't know of any authority anywhere engraved in stone or bronze or in granite that gives the President the authority to cancel projects that were not requested in his budget. Of course, he did it. There is no question about that. But I don't understand this statement; namely, ``The President used his authority responsibly to cancel projects that were not requested in the budget.'' Mr. President, we don't live under a king in this country. And I don't propose ever to live under a king. I have been in this Congress now--I suppose I am the dean of the entire Congress, unless Mr. Yates in the other body is, who served before I came to the House of Representatives. But he voluntarily terminated his service over there for a while. He ran for the U.S. Senate. He ran against Senator Dirksen, I believe, and lost. But, in any event, for the benefit of those who may or may not be interested, I have been in Congress quite a while. So I am the dean of both Houses. I will say it that way. Also, I am 29,200 days old today, October 30. This is not my birthday. It is just that I was born 29,200 days ago. I have taken an oath to uphold--to ``support and defend.'' Those are the words, ``support and defend'' the Constitution. I have taken an oath many times to support and defend the Constitution of the United States--many times, beginning with my service in the State Legislature of West Virginia 51 years ago. And I have never yet found, and I can't find the authority to which this memorandum from the Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget refers, I can't find the authority by which the President can cancel projects solely because they were not requested in the budget. I don't find that in the Constitution. I don't find that in the rules of the Senate. I don't find it in even in the Line-Item Veto Act. I don't find that criterion in there. And all who may doubt, let them take a look at the Line-Item Veto Act, against which I voted. But it is not in there. So much for that. It is just as I expected when I stood on this floor on several occasions and talked ad nauseam with respect to my opposition to the line-item veto. I yet cannot understand whatever got into the heads of the educated, intelligent men and women which would cause them to voluntarily cede to any President--not just this one. I don't have anything against this President in that particular. He wanted the line-item veto. But so did his predecessor, and so did his predecessor, and so did his predecessor, and so did his, going all the way back to President Taft. Taft didn't want it. George Washington didn't think much of it. But anyhow, here it is, the line-item veto. And I said, and so did a lot of my colleagues, the White House, not necessarily the President but the people who work under him, will expand this authority. I don't know who recommended to the President that he veto these items. One of the items happens to be for West Virginia. But let me hasten to say I would not negotiate with this President or any other President to keep him from vetoing that item for West Virginia. I am not going to negotiate with him to keep something for West Virginia. That is important to me, but more important to me than that is the constitutional system of separation of powers and checks and balances, and that is what we endangered in passing this illegitimate end run around the Constitution of the United States. We handed it to the President just as the Roman Senate handed to Caesar and handed to Sulla the control over the purse. The Roman Senate ceded voluntarily, handed to the dictators, Sulla, Caesar--they made Caesar dictator for 10 years and then turned right around and made him dictator for life. But they said, ``Here it is, the power of the purse.'' The Roman Senate had complete power over the public purse. But when the Roman Senate ceded to the dictators and later to the emperors the power over the purse, they gave away the Senate's check on the executive power. They gave away the Senate's check on executive tyranny. And that is what we have done. Let me make clear to all Senators that in voting on this resolution today they are not voting for or against the line-item veto. I am against the line item veto. We all know that. Everybody knows that. If they don't, they ought to have their head examined. But this vote today is not a vote for or against the line-item veto. I hope all Senators will understand that. I hope all Senators' offices will understand that. I hope all Senators' aides will understand that. And I hope that the press will understand that. This is not a vote for or against the line-item veto. This is a vote for or against the disapproval resolution. A Senator can be very much for the line-item veto, yet feel that the President exercised the line- item veto in this case in an arbitrary and unfair manner. That is what we are voting on today, whether or not we feel that the line-item veto was exercised in an arbitrary manner or whether it had a genuine basis, whether it ought to be upheld in this instance; whether or not these items that are in the resolution should go back to the President, hopefully for his signature this time. In this case, Senators are only voting whether or not you want to send these particular items that were line-item vetoed back to the President a second time. That is all. I happen to think that the line- item veto was used in this instance in a very arbitrary manner. I think the administration took this action without ample forethought, without a very careful analysis of the items and whether or not they, indeed, did fit into the criteria. I think the administration acted in an arbitrary manner, and they have said that they acted on incorrect data from the Defense Department. I hope all Senators will understand that they can vote for this resolution today and still be for the line-item veto. It doesn't make any difference as to what their position is on the line-item veto. The fact that they may vote for the disapproval resolution does not mean they are for the line-item veto. It doesn't mean that at all. It should not be taken as an indication that Senators are for or against the line-item veto. I hope all Senators will vote for the disapproval resolution. Senator Stevens, as chairman of the Appropriations Committee, conducted a hearing. It was well attended by Senators. And it thoroughly exposed the vulnerability of the administration's position. The Department of Defense witnesses did not uphold the administration in the information that it sent abroad in the land to the effect that this item or that item or some other item was not on the Defense Department's 5-year plan. Now, I hope that the Senate and House will send this resolution to the President. I hope it will be supported overwhelmingly. And, of course, the President will veto it. He has said he would. But let him veto it. That is an old scarecrow. That is a scare word. It doesn't scare everybody, but it may scare some people. He will veto it. So what. Go ahead. Veto it. Maybe the Senate and House will override the veto. They may not. But in that instance things will be operating according to the Constitution. Now, here it says in the final paragraph, ``While we''--I do not know who ``we'' is. That is the editorial pronoun ``we'' ``While we strongly oppose S. 1292, we are committed to working with Congress to restore funding for those projects that were canceled as a result of the data provided by the Department of Defense that was out of date.'' What is the matter with the administration? Why don't they make sure of what they are doing? They should have acted cautiously. They should have acted carefully because they are vulnerable on this. They have been exposed to have acted, I won't say with malice aforethought but certainly without careful aforethought. It is not to their credit. I don't happen to believe that the Sun rises in the west, Mr. President. It has never risen in the west a single day of the 29,200 days I have been on this Earth. It rises in the east. So I am not going to bow down to the west--to the western end of Constitution Avenue. I bow down to the Constitution. I took an oath to support and defend that Constitution. I am not above amending the Constitution. The forefathers saw a possible need to amend it and they made provision for that. But I am never going to join in dismantling the structure, the constitutional system of separation of powers and checks and balances. Count me out. Mr. President, it is with the dispassionate eye of a history student, it is with that kind of dispassionate eye that I have tried to view this subject matter. Everything I have said about this subject matter has come true. It comes with sadness, when we find that in the OMB's explanation of the President's veto it resorts to a statement to the effect that the President has authority responsibly to cancel projects that were not requested in the budget. But to me that statement demonstrates a superabundance of inflated arrogance. It demonstrates a superabundance of inflated arrogance for a President of the United States, any President--I am not just talking about this one--to feel that he has a right, and the power and the authority--apparently he does have the raw power now that Congress unwittingly gave him the line- item veto--to take the position that if it isn't in his budget, he will veto it. That is a supremely inflated arrogance, to assume that if it isn't in the budget, the President of the United States shall strike it out. ``Upon what meat [does] this our Caesar feed?'' When an administration arrogates to itself the sole determination that items that are in the President's budget are sacrosanct but those that may be added by the directly elected representatives of the American people are negotiable, and they are vetoable--this is plain, bloated arrogance. So, as a history student I have studied the practices and the customs and the traditions of the U.S. Senate during its over two centuries of existence, and I believe I can say with some authority that today is a landmark day in the Senate's history. For over 200 years the Senate has exercised its constitutional authority to write and pass the laws of the land. But today that tradition will be momentarily set aside as we consider legislation that asks--yes, asks the President to rethink his decision to erase provisions from a bill passed by Congress and signed into law by that same President. Today the Senate completes the abdication of legislative power that it began last spring when it adopted the conference report on the Line-Item Veto Act. The Senate acted upon the conference report on March 27, 1996. The Senate had originally passed the Line-Item Veto Act a year and 4 days previous to that, on March 23rd, 1995. Those are the two dark days in the constitutional history of this country. I would like to take a few moments to impress upon my colleagues the significance of today's vote and to implore them to reconsider the misguided course that they embarked upon a year-and-a-half ago. But in so doing, let me say again, your vote today is not a vote for or against the line-item veto. But I do think it's good for us to look back. Lot's wife looked back and she was turned into a pillar of salt, but Senators will not be turned into a pillar of salt. I think it's good for us to look back and have an opportunity to see where we have erred. We all need to look back once in a while and see where we made a mistake, where we left the straight path. And maybe we can find a way to mend ourselves in the future. So I begin my discussion, as always, with the Constitution of the United States of America. Any discussion of the line-item veto, indeed any discussion of the Federal Government, properly begins with the Constitution of the United States of America. And for those who may be watching the Senate, here it is--right out of my shirt pocket. Here it is: The Constitution of the United States of America. It cost me 15 cents when I first purchased it from the Government Printing Office. I think it's about $1.75 today, but it is worth every penny of it. I begin my discussion with that Constitution, as any consideration of the Federal Government should begin. For the Constitution is not some musty document expressing abstract concepts, a quaint if antiquated relic which only a few high school civics instructors deign to read. The Constitution is the users' manual of the Federal Government. It specifies how the branches of Government function, how they interact, how their powers overlap, and yet those powers are separated. It explains how the framers heeded the warnings set out in the Federalist Papers that ``[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands . . . may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.'' The solution that the framers hit upon was to divide powers between and among three equal and distinct branches of government. It is a marvelous, marvelous document. One, in my opinion, cannot truly understand the Constitution of the United States without also understanding the history of the ancient Romans, without understanding the history of England, and without understanding the American colonial experience, and without reading the Federalist Papers, in other words, without having a thorough grasp of the roots of the Constitution that lead back into the misty centuries. The solution that the framers hit upon was to divide powers between and among three equal and distinct branches of government. The Constitution sets forth a clear separation of powers between and among these three branches. Article I specifies that all--all--let's give what I say here 100 percent authenticity. I won't risk my memory. Abiyataka was the nickname of Artaxerxes II, of Persia. His memory was so fabulous and outstanding that he was given the nickname Abiyataka. So I won't depend on memory. I'll read it from the Constitution, so it has to be authentic. Section 1. All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives. Article II, by contrast--Article II, by contrast--let's be sure that it's authentic also, states in Section 1: The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. There it is. And one of the key functions of the President is to, ``take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.'' It's a matter of some bemusement to me, to think that the Constitution mandates that the President is to take care that the laws be faithfully executed and yet Congress passed the Line-Item Veto Act that allows the President to sign an appropriation bill into law and to not faithfully execute that law which he has just signed, but, instead, to turn right around and unilaterally repeal it, amend it, cancel or rescind this item or that item. Is that a faithful execution of the laws? The framers could not have made their intentions any plainer. Congress has the job of passing laws. The President has the job of executing them. What are the legislative powers ``herein granted'' that the Constitution assigns to Congress? Article I lists a number of these powers: they run the gamut from the power to ``lay and collect taxes'' to the power to ``fix the standard of Weights and Measures.'' Article I also takes great care to spell out in clear and precise language the process by which Congress is to make laws. The most important language is contained in the so-called ``Presentment Clause'' of the Constitution--Article I, section 7, clause 2--which I will accordingly quote at length. ``Every bill,'' not just some bills, not just a few bills: Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, [not maybe, not may-- shall; not might--shall] before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it. . . It doesn't say he may sign it. He shall sign it if he approve. . . . but, if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a Law. * * * * * If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within 10 Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law. That is from the Constitution of the United States. The Presentment Clause, then, offers the President three mutually exclusive alternatives in considering a bill passed by both houses of Congress: He may ``sign it,'' he may ``return it with his Objections'' to Congress, which may then pass the measure into law by a two-thirds vote of both Houses; or he may choose not to return the bill, whereupon ``the Same shall be Law,'' unless Congress has adjourned before the bill's 10-day return limit has expired. So, whatever path the President chooses, he is compelled to consider it. And, by ``it,'' the Constitution means the entire bill as passed by Congress in its entirety; not just parts of it. But, in defiance of the Presentment Clause, the Line-Item Veto Act creates a fourth option for the President. Under the Act, the President may take any bill ``that has been signed into law'' within the past 5 days and he may cancel--I am reading now, quoting from the Line-Item Veto Act, ``. . . cancel in whole (1) any dollar amount of discretionary budget authority; (2) any item of new direct spending; or (3) any limited tax benefit. . . .'' The 5-day provision is a figleaf designed to conceal the measure's brazen violation of the presentment clause. The drafters of the Line- Item Veto Act knew that they could not explicitly authorize the President to alter a bill passed by Congress before signing it, because to do so would violate the presentment clause's mandate that he send or return each bill in its entirety. Thus, the act inserts a gratuitous pause of up to 5 days between the President's signing a bill and then canceling certain items in the bill that he just signed. There can be 100 items in that bill, and he can strike out 99 of them. He has 5 days in which to do it. He can strike out 100 the first day, the second day strike out another 100, the third day strike out another 100, the next day strike out 100, the next day strike out 99. He already signed it into law. It is his little plaything then to do whatever he wants. Although the conference report justifies the 5-day allowance as giving the administration sufficient time to provide Congress with ``all supporting material'' justifying any cancellation, the report makes clear its intention ``that the President's cancellations be made as soon as possible.'' Nor should it be forgotten that while the President may take up to 5 days to cancel an item, he need not wait that long. He is free, free, free to cancel items the next second after he signs the bill into law, and he remains free to cancel items the next second after he signs the bill into law, and then he remains free to continue to do so for the next 119 hours and 59 minutes. He has 120 hours. I hope the High Court will say the presentment clause is not so easily evaded. The Supreme Court acknowledged the importance of strict adherence to the Constitution's procedural mandates when it declared that ``the prescription for legislative action in article I, sections 1 and 7, represents the Framers' decision that the legislative power of the Federal government be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure . . . With all the obvious flaws of delay, untidiness, and potential for abuse, we have not yet found''--this is the Supreme Court of the United States speaking--``we have not yet found a better way to preserve freedom than by making the exercise of power subject to carefully crafted restraints spelled out''--where?--``in the Constitution.'' That is what this line-item veto is all about. It is not about money, really. It is not about reducing the deficits. Fie upon such reasoning. It is just window dressing. It is not about reducing the budgets. It is not about balancing the budget. It is all about power. Where will the power over the purse lie? When it lies here, the power of the people is protected, and as long as that power over the purse is vested in the Congress, the people's freedoms are secure. Let's see what this Court says, again. This bears repeating. I am quoting from the Court's position itself: The prescription for legislative action in article I, sections 1 and 7, represents the Framers' decision that the legislative power of the Federal government be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure . . . With all of the obvious flaws of delay, untidiness, and potential for abuse, we have not yet found a better way to preserve freedom than by making the exercise of power subject to the carefully crafted restraints spelled out in the Constitution. Accordingly, it is not enough that the President may wait up to 5 days after signing a bill before he retroactively violates the presentment clause. The violation is just as egregious as if the President had crossed out the items he disliked before signing the bill into law. Supporters of the line-item veto argue that the veto complies fully with the presentment clause. Since the veto applies to bills that have already been enacted into law in compliance with the presentment clause, the supporters of the line-item veto say, and since the requirements of the presentment clause are fulfilled when the President signs the measure into law, the Constitution cannot have been violated. Well, even, Mr. President, if we accept this syllogism, it follows that the act, by empowering the President to rewrite certain laws, to repeal certain laws, to amend certain laws-- grants the President the most basic of Congress' legislative powers; namely, the power to make laws. The act defines the President's cancellation authority as, alternately ``with respect to any dollar amount of discretionary budget authority, to rescind''--to rescind--or, with respect to any item of new direct spending or any limited tax benefit, to prevent ``from having legal force or effect.'' As this definition indicates, ``cancellation'' is but another word for ``repeal.'' A rose by any other name smells just as sweet. So cancellation is but another word for repeal and, functionally, what the President is doing when he cancels certain parts of the law is repealing--unilaterally repealing--those same acts, those same parts for, if as veto advocates argue, only bills that have been previously, albeit recently, passed into law are subject to the line-item veto, then those same bills, like all other laws, may only be repealed by legislative action pursuant, again, to the presentment clause. After all, as the Supreme Court has recognized, ``[a]mendment and repeal of statutes, no less than enactment, must conform with Article I.'' I repeat, as the Supreme Court has recognized: [A]mendment and repeal of statutes, no less than enactment, must conform with Article I. The line-item veto advocates cannot have it both ways. Either the Line-Item Veto Act, as its very title indicates, gives the President the authority to alter a bill passed by Congress by effectively signing only certain parts of the bill into law, or the act allows the President to unilaterally repeal portions of an existing law. In either event, the act permits the President to encroach upon the legislative powers assigned to Congress and to Congress alone, by bypassing the procedures set forth in the presentment clause. Mr. President, I hope that I have impressed upon my colleagues, those who are listening, that the line-item veto offends the most clear and incontrovertible requirements of the Constitution. But if that isn't enough to sway my colleagues, let me point out that granting the President line-item veto power is not just unconstitutional, it is also bad policy. If anyone doubts what I am saying, and lest I be accused of forgetting the pretext for my speech today, let us consider the disapproval resolution before us. The disapproval bill is but a small attempt to repair the damage wrought by the President's misguided cancellations of 38 projects in the fiscal year 1998 military construction appropriations bill. A number of my colleagues have criticized those same cancellations: ``arbitrary,'' ``capricious,'' ``a raw abuse of political power.'' These are the words of those who voted for the line-item veto. Those who voted for the line-item veto now say that the President's exercise of the political tool which they handed to him, now they accuse him of being ``arbitrary,'' ``capricious,'' ``it was raw abuse of political power.'' Such criticisms are, of course, absolutely correct. There seems to be little logic underlying the President's cancellations. What logic can be found is so flawed as to scarcely warrant a response. I repeat, for example, the White House stated that it only vetoed projects that were not ``executable,'' meaning that construction could not begin in fiscal year 1998, but in truth, every one of the 38 vetoed projects was eligible for construction in fiscal year 1998. With regard to the West Virginia project, the design contract with ZMM, Inc., of Charleston, West Virginia was signed on August 29, 1997. Completion of the design contract is due in April 1998, and a construction contract could be let in the May-June timeframe. An amount of $965,214.39 has been obligated and an amount of $44,967.61 has been expended against the design contract. So clearly, the design work is underway and the project is executable in the current fiscal year. The White House also said that it only considered items that were not included in the President's fiscal year 1998 budget request. How arrogant! How arrogant! ``Upon what meat [does] this our [little] Caesar feed?'' Never mind that the Senate was careful to include projects that were already in the Department of Defense's 5-year plan. Never mind that the Senate moved up projects that were considered urgent or particularly meritorious, or that were necessary to remedy oversights in the Presidential budget that would have deprived our Armed Forces of needed quality-of-life improvements or denied funding to important Guard and Reserve projects. Never mind the many previous occasions on which Congress has safeguarded the preparedness and well-being of the Armed Forces by funding projects that various Presidents overlooked or shortchanged. Now, the rules have changed, and congressionally backed projects are targets for the Presidential blunderbuss that is the line-item veto. They are targets for his blunderbuss of the line-item veto if they are not in his budget. It is difficult for me to overstate my anger at the rank arrogance of the White House in relegating congressionally backed projects to such harsh scrutiny. Need I remind the administration that it was Congress that in 1921 assigned the Executive the task of submitting annual budget proposals? It was Congress that in 1921 assigned the Executive the task of submitting annual budget proposals. Need I also point out that those proposals are, by law, not binding and that Congress remains free to exercise its ``power of the purse'' however it sees fit? And so ``lay on, Macduff.'' It is the Congress that retains the freedom to exercise its power of the purse however it sees fit. My anger is not directed at William Jefferson Clinton. He is merely exercising the power that we--we--in our weak moments gave him. The ultimate blame lies here and across the corridor to the other end of the Capitol. The ultimate blame lies here, here in this Chamber, which gave away a portion of its most important power, with no strings attached. And I quoted upon the occasion when the Senate passed this ill- formed, deformed monstrosity, I quoted upon that occasion the words of Aaron Burr, who in 1805 said that if the Constitution be destined ever to be destroyed, ``its expiring agonies will be witnessed on this floor.'' And I said at the time that Burr's prophecy was being fulfilled. So the ultimate blame lies here, which gave away a portion of its most important power, with no strings attached. Here it is, Mr. President. We witnessed the expiring agonies of the Constitution on the floor, as Burr said we would, when we passed the Line-Item Veto Act. We had an opportunity to retrieve our honor and our commitment to our forefathers and our promises to our children at the time the conference report came here. But the Senate again stabbed itself in its back, and the expiring agonies of the Constitution were witnessed on this floor. ``Didn't we tell the President how the line-item veto should be used?'' some may protest. Yes, we did. But the restrictions we placed on the line-item veto were so vague and feeble as to give the President virtually unlimited cancellation authority. The Line-Item Veto Act states tautologically that any veto must ``reduce the Federal budget deficit''--a requirement that any cancellation of a spending measure or tax benefit would presumably meet. The act also insists that any cancellation must ``not impair essential Government functions'' or ``harm the national interest.'' Well, what are ``essential Government functions''? How should ``the national interest'' be protected? Those answers must rest with the President, for the act provides little guidance--the act provides little guidance. Moreover, even if the President determines that all three criteria have been met, he is still free to decide not to effect a cancellation. The act says only that ``the President may'' cancel certain items meeting those criteria. Mr. President, my colleagues protest that the President's cancellations are arbitrary and capricious. To this I respond: Of course they are, because we gave the President the authority to be arbitrary and capricious. And so let us not now, at this late moment--those of us who voted for the Line-Item Veto Act--let us not heap obloquy and scorn and condemnation and criticisms and castigations and imprecations upon the President because he is being ``arbitrary'' and ``capricious.'' We have given the President the power to strike any item he pleases and for any reason he pleases. He can say it was not in his budget. If he does not have any other reason, he can say, ``Well, it wasn't in my budget.'' Not according to the act, but he can do it. He has done it. And who is to blame? We have only ourselves to blame. By passing the line-item veto, we have deprived Congress of an effective say in which projects will be funded, we have denied ourselves the ability, which we exercised so often and so successfully in past budget cycles, to correct flaws or oversights in the President's budget proposal. In past years, Congress repeatedly ensured that essential defense projects were funded at the appropriate levels. It was Congress that insisted on adequate funding for the stealth fighter. It was Congress that insisted on the funding for the Osprey helicopter. It was Congress that insisted on adequate funding for the C-130 aircraft, and countless other valuable projects that the administration at the time opposed. It is no exaggeration to say that this country's defense capabilities would be significantly weakened today if not for Congress' vigilance and dedication in the fulfillment of its appropriations duties. Now, however, congressional vigilance is subject to indiscriminate line-item vetoes. No longer can Congress ensure proper investments in this country's defense and infrastructure, thus, safeguarding the present and future well-being of all Americans. The line-item veto has created a new order in which Members of Congress must resort to ``disapproval measures'' to restore funding that they already approved and that the President already signed into law, which under the Constitution would indicate that he had already approved the items. The Constitution says, if he approves, he shall sign it. And he signed it. Today is a black day for this institution whose Members must prostrate themselves on bended knee before the President and ask him-- ask him--to do what the Constitution requires: To respect and enforce and execute, faithfully execute, the laws passed by Congress. But this is also a black day for the Nation which now finds that its single most representative institution no longer possesses unqualified authority to make the law. That is the legislative branch. As Members of Congress, we represent the people of this great country. By abdicating a portion of our responsibility to pass laws-- that is exactly what we did--we have denied ourselves the ability to represent those people effectively. I apologize if my words today have seemed angry or vituperative. I apologize if my vehemence has offended any of my colleagues. I do not mean to provoke partisan dispute or internal dissent. I only wish to ask my colleagues to consider, as they ponder their vote on the disapproval bill before us--and go ahead vote as they wish on the disapproval bill; that is not an indication of whether they favor of disfavor the line-item veto--but they should ponder whether the Nation ought to continue down the shadowy trail that it embarked upon when we passed the Line-Item Veto Act. I pray that before we blunder too far down this misguided path, we will retrace our steps and return to the route laid out by the framers, the path that was lighted by the clear light of the Constitution. The President says, ``We'll say to any Member, we'll be happy to negotiate with you about your item.'' ``We might be able to work it out so the President won't veto it.'' Senators, do not do it. Do not act to legitimize this legislation. Do not act to legitimize this process by which we have, in part, emasculated the Constitution, the constitutional system with its checks and balances and separation of powers. Do not negotiate for a moment, because when you do, you are negotiating with respect to the Constitution, you are saying, ``Well, I'll negotiate with you. You can go ahead and line item the item out, but maybe we can work out something.'' I say that when one negotiates under those circumstances, he is negotiating something that the Constitution is pretty clear about, and that is the checks and balances and separation of powers. The Constitution is not to be negotiated. And I, for one, will not negotiate to save any item for West Virginia. I will not negotiate. I will negotiate with other Members until we are able to work out language, compromise language, in a bill, dealing with a matter, but when it comes to negotiating in order to keep the President from wielding his dreadful line-item veto pen, that's not for me. When we took it upon ourselves to correct some of the framers' mistakes by ignoring the clear language of the Constitution, we did not just display a breathtaking contempt for the rule of law and the principle of separation of powers; we also cast aside our own responsibility as Members of Congress to act as a check upon the executive branch, and we there and then deprived ourselves and deprived the people that we represent of the ability to ensure that the power of the purse is exercised in the best interests of the Nation. I yield the floor.