Member of Congress

Robert Byrd

Role
Former Senator
State
WV
Party
Democrat

Speeches

INTERMODAL SURFACE TRANSPORTATION EFFICIENCY ACT1997-10-09

Mr. BYRD

Mr. BYRD. I am pleased to give the Senator the table. It will also be in the Congressional Record in the morning, for all to see.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, in the remaining time let me also thank the distinguished Senator from Rhode Island and others on the committee who worked long and hard, in putting together the bill that was reported. Now, I have discussed with the distinguished chairman of the committee, the need of the Appalachian corridor States for additional moneys, and that need hasn't been met by this bill. The distinguished chairman from Rhode Island, Mr. Chafee, came to my office and listened to my concerns. He listened courteously, and I thank him for the consideration that he gave me. But we have a bill here that does not meet those needs that have languished for 31 years. So I feel compelled to do what I can for the Appalachian States and the people therein who have been promised for 31 years that those Appalachian corridors would be funded. I feel the need to do what I can to advance their cause. And other Senators have come to me saying, ``We need more money. We need more money.'' Six years ago, when we had the ISTEA bill before the Senate, I found, as chairman of the Appropriations Committee, I found $8 billion, a little over $8 billion which enabled the Senate to get off the dime, as it were, where it was stalled. That bill wouldn't move. So we divided the $8 billion, half I think among the donor States and half to those States which had acted to increase the resources for transportation within their own borders, such as my own State, which had raised its gasoline tax. It had done more than many of the other States had done within the respective borders of those States to try to meet those needs. So, I was able in that instance to find that $8 billion, so Senators have again come to me and said listen, we need more money. We need more money. So I have done my best to find that money. There will be a time, as I have said, when we will debate this matter. But I did want to thank the distinguished chairman for his work and I hope he will understand the necessity that compelled me to try to get more contract authority for highway construction all over this country. I will be ready to do my best to defend the amendment when we are ready to introduce it. Mr. President, at this time I would like to state the names of additional Senators who have indicated they want to cosponsor the amendment: Mr. Akaka, Mr. Breaux, Mr. Ford, Mr. Inouye, Mr. Kennedy, Mr. Robert Kerrey, Mr. Harry Reid, Mr. Shelby. That completes the list as of now. I urge all Senators who, having heard this discussion today and who, feeling that they would like to be cosponsors--I urge them to be in touch with my office, Mr. Gramm's office, Mr. Warner's, or Mr. Baucus', and let us know that.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I will be very brief because we have other business that is going to come before the Senate. Before the Senator from New Mexico leaves, the Senator talks in terms of waiting, waiting until we can consider other competing needs. We are saying, ``Let's keep faith with the American people.'' If there are savings, let's spend the money in the trust fund for that which the American people think it is to be spent for, not other competing needs. That is just what we are saying it is being spent now for--for other competing needs. We are saying, stop it, keep faith with the American people. Spend it for highways if it is going to be spent. Other competing needs--like what? Cutting taxes? Is that what it is? The distinguished Senator mentioned how the budget is going to bulge when the baby boomers get on the scene. I voted against a tax cut, Senator. I said let's put it against the deficit, let's take what you would spend on a tax cut and apply it on the budget. Let's balance the budget with it. I said I'm against a tax cut that the Republicans proposed and I'm against the cuts that the President proposed. Now, we are simply saying, let's spend it for highways if it is going to be spent and if the savings are there. Of course, the chairman of the Budget Committee and the members of the Budget Committee are going to make that decision. But the people need to know something now. Why do we do it now? Because, we have a highway bill before the Senate, that is why. Now is the time. Don't wait until the opportunity has passed and say, ``Well, we should have done it when the highway bill was before the Senate.'' Let's do it now. The distinguished Senator says he will welcome the debate. I, too, welcome the debate, and we won't be running for the mountains crying for the rocks to fall on us. When the debate comes, we will be ready. As I say, we just wanted to put to rest some misunderstandings that were being spread. I don't blame anybody for that. They were jumping to unmerited conclusions. We wanted to set that straight. When the time comes, the amendment will be offered, and I welcome any and all cosponsors, as do the other sponsors. I don't intend to convince my friend from New Mexico. I honor and respect him. He is one of the brightest minds I have ever seen come in this Senate, but let's keep faith with the American people. Ananias dropped dead, and so did Sapphira, his wife. They lied, they lied to God. I'm not saying anybody has lied, but I am saying we are not keeping faith with the American people. The American people were told by us in 1956, Senator--I was here; I was over in that other body--they were told that the money was going into that trust fund and would be coming back home to meet the transportation needs of the people. So, let's keep faith with the American people. And we will renew this debate on another day, I say with great respect to all my friends. I yield the floor.

Mr. BYRD. I have two things to say. I hear that the distinguished Senator from New Mexico has an amendment. I hear that he has one. I have seen papers to that extent, memos, or letters something like that. I didn't read them, but I have seen them around the desks. So he, too, has an amendment. I haven't seen it. We four sponsors think that even though our amendment is not ready, we should clear the air and clear the record as to what it will not do, because many things are being said in the Senate about our amendment that are absolutely incorrect. I have seen some of the papers on the desks around here saying what this amendment purportedly will do. We Senators wanted to clear the record today to say that it will not do this and it will not do that and it will not do other things stated in the propaganda that is being spread. That is all. I thank the Chair.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BYRD. Will the Senator yield?

View in Record
Introductory Statement on S. 12921997-10-09

Mr. BYRD

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I am pleased and I am proud to join with the distinguished chairman of the Appropriations Committee, my friend, a friend in every sense of the word, Ted Stevens, in offering legislation to put back on the President's desk those projects which were line-item vetoed, at least those projects that Senators want to put back before the President for his consideration, and if he wants to veto that bill, he can do so, and then Congress can override or sustain his veto. Mr. President, I think that one of the most significant things that has happened in the history of this country was the passage of the Line-Item Veto Act. To me, it was one of the most shocking abdications of duty that Members of the Congress have committed. I am not here today to say ``I told you so,'' but I am here today to say that this pernicious act should be repealed. I hope that the Supreme Court of the United States will strike it down, but there has to be a case brought. I attempted that with other colleagues in both Houses, and the Supreme Court, as everybody knows, said we didn't have standing, even though the act itself anticipated that such a case would be brought by Members of Congress. I am not here today to argue that. But I am here today to just take a few minutes to point out for the record why the Line Item Veto Act is an unconstitutional act. No matter what the Supreme Court ultimately says, I will always think it is an unconstitutional act. The distinguished chairman has already stated the law and what the instructions were in that law as to what actions Congress may take and when, and all of that. So I will not attempt to go into that. He has already indicated what was brought out in the hearings this afternoon. One thing was that the administration's right hand doesn't know what the left hand is doing. I was called by Mr. Raines on Monday as to the one item that I had that was line-item vetoed. I was told that certain criteria governed the actions of the President in using the line-item veto pen. I was told that the one item that is to be located in West Virginia was, in the face of the governing criteria, to be line-item vetoed. I stated to Mr. Raines, ``That is an incorrect statement of the case. This item is in the Defense Department's 5-year plan, and the design has already been started. It is under way. So your criteria don't fit this project.'' And he indicated that he would have to take another look, therefore, and asked me to send down the papers from which I was reading, which I did, and he indicated that he would get back to me, which he did not. And I don't fault him for not getting back to me. He has other things to do, I am sure. But what I am saying is that this action on the part of the administration was an abuse even of a bad law; an abuse even of a bad law. In the very first section of the very first article of the Constitution these words are to be found. It is one sentence. Section 1: All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. That is very plain. It says that only the Congress has the constitutional authority to make laws. ``All legislative powers'' --not ``some powers''; not a ``few powers''; but ``All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States.'' It doesn't say the President may share in that. The President doesn't have any lawmaking power. He is limited to the veto power insofar as making the laws are concerned--the veto power as set forth in the Constitution of the United States. So he has no lawmaking power. The Constitution states the limits of his veto authority. It states in section 7 of article I that, and I read: Every bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; if he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. I will not read the rest of the language dealing with the veto. But Congress in the passing of the Line-Item Veto Act went far afield from the Constitution of the United States. Congress in the Line Item Veto Act said, in essence, that when the President signs an appropriation bill into law, he has 5 days thereafter during which time he can cancel out certain portions of that bill which has already become law. So that is what he did in this instance. He signed into law a bill, and then, unilaterally, he came along 5 days later and changed that law. He amended it. He struck out certain items. If that bill were before the Senate and if Senator Stevens or Senator Grassley or Senator Bennett or any other Senator wished to move to strike an item in the bill, which, in this case, was to be at Camp Dawson in Preston County, WV--if any one of those Senators moved to strike that item, they could do it. But before they could succeed in striking that item, they would have to have a majority of the Senate to support them by a vote. The vote could be by voice. It could be by division. It could be by rollcall. But they would have to have a majority of a quorum in the Senate in order to be successful in striking that item. They would not yet have fully accomplished their aim, however. A majority of the Members in a quorum of the other body would likewise have to support the striking of that item. If all 100 Senators were present, they would have to have 51 votes. If all 435 Members of the House were present, they would have to have at least 218 votes in order to successfully strike that item. A majority of each House would have to support the conference report. But in any event, in the first instance, a majority of each body would have to support the amendment in order to strike the item from the bill. Striking an item from a bill is amending a bill. After the President has signed a bill into law, then under this Line-Item Veto Act, a President--Democrat or Republican, it doesn't make any difference--may after the first 10 minutes, after the first 5 minutes, after the first 2 days, 3 days, or 4 days, even on the fifth day, he may go back and singlehandedly, unilaterally cancel out an item in the law; in other words, strike it out; change the law. He could, if he wished to, line- item out 90 percent of the law, which in that form, as a bill, would probably not have passed either body. But one man, or woman, if it should be, as the President of the United States may unilaterally amend a bill. That is amending a bill. The Senator from Iowa if he offers a motion to strike my item from the bill is moving to amend the bill. He is pursuing the legislative process. That is the lawmaking process. He is amending a bill. As I have already said, he can't do it alone. His vote only counts for 1 out of 100. He has to have a majority. But not so with the President. The President may amend unilaterally, after he signs the bill into law. According to the Constitution, if he approve the bill, he shall sign it. Well, he must have approved it, or he wouldn't have signed the bill. He approved it. He signed the bill into law. Up to 5 days later, he may go back and change that law unilaterally. And that is what he did in this instance. He changed the law unilaterally. He struck out Camp Dawson. Did Senators really intend to give one man in the White House that kind of power, that kind of legislative power? Can they really believe that the Framers who wrote this Constitution would have ever intended that that be done? It is mind-boggling--mind-boggling. It is mind- boggling to me to think that a majority of these two Houses would give any President--any President, Republican or Democrat--that kind of power. And with that kind of power the President, be he Republican or Democrat, holds the sword of Damocles over the head of every Senator and every House Member. Am I going to vote against a certain treaty, or some nomination? The President may say, ``Look, you have an item in the bill. You have done a great job. You have done a great job for the State of West Virginia. I am really proud of you. The people down in your State love you. You did this, you did that. And I want you to have this item. But can we bargain a little here? Can we negotiate a little bit? Can you help me on what I want that is in the bill? Can you help me on this nomination?'' Or whatever. ``Maybe we can reach an amicable agreement here where you will get your item, and I will get mine.'' Now, I do not want to say that I am not willing to listen to the administration. We do that all the time when the subcommittees bring these bills to the floor. The subcommittees on appropriations work for weeks in hearings. They listen to witnesses. They talk with their staffs. They look over the correspondence. They study the needs of the various agencies and departments. And then they get together and they mark up the bill in the subcommittee. Then it goes to the full committee. Then it comes to the Senate. During all of this time, the administration is telling us what they want and what they don't want. We understand that. We know all about that. We know what they want and what they don't want. But it may be the collective judgment of the subcommittee to do otherwise. So the subcommittee brings this bill to the full committee, and it is then brought to the Senate. And we act on it, and it goes to conference. Then what happens? Well, I have been treated to just a little bit of it lately. This is no surprise to me. We pass an amendment like this--a bill like this-- and give it to any President. He will hold over your head a hammer. So, as we go to conference, the administration people come into the conference, or they come into our offices, or wherever they meet with the leadership, and they say, ``Look, this item the President will veto. If that item is in there, the President is going to veto it. This item we want. This item the President will veto unless you modify it.'' I knew that would be the situation in which we were going to find ourselves once this Line-Item Veto Act was passed. So, as far as I am concerned, it impinges upon a Senator's or a House Member's freedom of speech. They have to be a little bit more careful about what they say about any administration. It impinges on a Senator's freedom to act in accordance with the wishes of the constituents who send him here. And to that extent he is that much less a free man, less able to exercise his own independence. The distinguished Senator from Alaska has said we do not intend to negotiate. We intend to send this down to the White House if the majority of each body will vote for it. Let me say here what I said in the committee today. If the President wants to line-item veto a West Virginia item, I am not going to negotiate with the administration. Negotiating is over as far as I am concerned. When the subcommittee works its will, has its hearings, marks up its legislation, brings it to the full committee, the full committee acts, amends, modifies, changes, or whatever, and when the House does the same, when the collective wisdom and judgment of the subcommittee and the full committee and both Houses has been reached, if the President wants to veto it, go to it. Why should we sit down and negotiate in order to keep him from wielding his line-item veto pen? Let him use his veto pen only as instructed in the original Constitution. Let him use it. And then Congress can work its will. It can either sustain his veto or override it, but there should be no negotiating. That is what every administration will want us to do. They want us to get in a position where we will continue to negotiate and they will continue to ratchet us down, they will continue to get what they want, but they want you to negotiate for whatever your constituents need. Whatever your constituents need, how you feel about your constituents, that is negotiable. Then they throw out that threat: ``Well, the President will veto that.'' The President will line item that out. Well, so what! ``Lay on, Macduff; And damn'd be him that first cries `Hold, enough.' '' We like to know what the administration is thinking. It is worthwhile to have their judgment. It helps to guide us in our deliberations. But once both bodies have acted and get into conference, then for the administration to come up here and say, ``Well, this is vetoable, if you don't change that. We don't like it,'' I am not for negotiating now. Let the President use his line-item veto pen. I hope that Senators and House Members who voted for the line-item veto will get their bellies full. I hope they get a bellyful of it and they probably will, because this is just a start. There are several other appropriations bills coming along. Think of the time that this costs. Senator Stevens held a hearing today, had a good attendance, a lot of Senators were there. They weren't elsewhere doing other things which were important likewise. It took a lot of their time. It took the time of the generals and admirals who were up from the Defense Department, and that is going to be repeated over and over and over again. Look at the time it is taking now. We have already taken time. The subcommittee took time. The full committee took time. And there are Members on those subcommittees and full committee who have great expertise in legislative areas under the jurisdiction of those subcommittees. And then all that goes for naught because a President, Republican or Democrat, wants this or wants that or does not want to go along with a Member whose constituents feel there are needs to be met and acts accordingly. The administration has been given a hammer to use over the heads of Senators and could threaten anything that a Senator wants as a way to get the President's way on unrelated matters. It greatly enhances the President's bargaining position in the legislative process. Go home tonight, all Senators, and before you close your eyes in slumber, think of what we have done. We have given one man, who puts his britches on just as I put mine on--one leg at a time--we have said you may amend a bill unilaterally. You do not have to worry about a majority in the other body or a majority here. You may amend a bill all by yourself. You may strike an item out. That is amending a bill. You are the super lawmaker. Not by this Constitution he isn't. I cannot understand how, or whatever got into the Members' minds when they voted to give any President the line-item veto. But it is done. It is done. I hope they will think now and that somebody will bring a case and the Supreme Court will strike down this infernal, pernicious, illegitimate gimmick. But in the meantime, I will follow the Senator from Alaska. If he gets ready to introduce legislation to repeal the Line Item Veto Act, I am ready. I am ready to join him. Just go home and read once again, Senators who are listening, section 1 of article I. ``All legislative powers herein granted''--and if those legislative powers are not herein granted, they do not exist. ``All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States . . .'' And then go over to section 7 of article I and read the language: ``Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; If he approve,'' meaning the bill, the resolution, ``he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it.'' It does not say he may amend it unilaterally. ``If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it.'' Now, that is the Constitution. And we have no right as Members by legislation to give any President the right unilaterally to amend a bill. We do not have that power. I do not think Congress has the power. I do not think it can give away its constitutional power to make all laws. There is only one other thing I would say, and then I am going to sit down. I have said already there is a strong probability that the Senate will have to consider items that it has already considered in the committee process over and over again, amounting to a tremendous waste of precious time. Senator Inouye cited a number of vital systems that have been added by the Congress to the defense bill over the years such as greatly increasing the purchase of stealth fighters, the Osprey helicopter, C-130 aircraft, C-17's and other systems which at the time were opposed by the administration and probably would have been subject to the line-item veto and killed. Where would we then have been during Desert Storm? This is a strong case that the administration does not have a corner on wisdom, and that if it uses the line-item veto to simply protect its budget as delivered, we will lose the great benefit of that wisdom and shortchange the historic contributions that have been made over the years. I thank all Senators for indulging me. I have fought this battle over and over and over again. And I am willing to fight it over and over and over again. I do not believe that I took an oath to support and defend the Constitution, then only to turn around and vote, in violation of that Constitution, to give any President the unilateral right, power or prerogative to, in essence, amend a law by striking an item. I hope more than anything else, before God sees fit to call me home, that the line-item veto will be struck down either by the Supreme Court or by the Congress itself. That is my prayer.

View in Record
STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS1997-10-09

Mr. BYRD

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I am pleased and I am proud to join with the distinguished chairman of the Appropriations Committee, my friend, a friend in every sense of the word, Ted Stevens, in offering legislation to put back on the President's desk those projects which were line-item vetoed, at least those projects that Senators want to put back before the President for his consideration, and if he wants to veto that bill, he can do so, and then Congress can override or sustain his veto. Mr. President, I think that one of the most significant things that has happened in the history of this country was the passage of the Line-Item Veto Act. To me, it was one of the most shocking abdications of duty that Members of the Congress have committed. I am not here today to say ``I told you so,'' but I am here today to say that this pernicious act should be repealed. I hope that the Supreme Court of the United States will strike it down, but there has to be a case brought. I attempted that with other colleagues in both Houses, and the Supreme Court, as everybody knows, said we didn't have standing, even though the act itself anticipated that such a case would be brought by Members of Congress. I am not here today to argue that. But I am here today to just take a few minutes to point out for the record why the Line Item Veto Act is an unconstitutional act. No matter what the Supreme Court ultimately says, I will always think it is an unconstitutional act. The distinguished chairman has already stated the law and what the instructions were in that law as to what actions Congress may take and when, and all of that. So I will not attempt to go into that. He has already indicated what was brought out in the hearings this afternoon. One thing was that the administration's right hand doesn't know what the left hand is doing. I was called by Mr. Raines on Monday as to the one item that I had that was line-item vetoed. I was told that certain criteria governed the actions of the President in using the line-item veto pen. I was told that the one item that is to be located in West Virginia was, in the face of the governing criteria, to be line-item vetoed. I stated to Mr. Raines, ``That is an incorrect statement of the case. This item is in the Defense Department's 5-year plan, and the design has already been started. It is under way. So your criteria don't fit this project.'' And he indicated that he would have to take another look, therefore, and asked me to send down the papers from which I was reading, which I did, and he indicated that he would get back to me, which he did not. And I don't fault him for not getting back to me. He has other things to do, I am sure. But what I am saying is that this action on the part of the administration was an abuse even of a bad law; an abuse even of a bad law. In the very first section of the very first article of the Constitution these words are to be found. It is one sentence. Section 1: All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. That is very plain. It says that only the Congress has the constitutional authority to make laws. ``All legislative powers'' --not ``some powers''; not a ``few powers''; but ``All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States.'' It doesn't say the President may share in that. The President doesn't have any lawmaking power. He is limited to the veto power insofar as making the laws are concerned--the veto power as set forth in the Constitution of the United States. So he has no lawmaking power. The Constitution states the limits of his veto authority. It states in section 7 of article I that, and I read: Every bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; if he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. I will not read the rest of the language dealing with the veto. But Congress in the passing of the Line-Item Veto Act went far afield from the Constitution of the United States. Congress in the Line Item Veto Act said, in essence, that when the President signs an appropriation bill into law, he has 5 days thereafter during which time he can cancel out certain portions of that bill which has already become law. So that is what he did in this instance. He signed into law a bill, and then, unilaterally, he came along 5 days later and changed that law. He amended it. He struck out certain items. If that bill were before the Senate and if Senator Stevens or Senator Grassley or Senator Bennett or any other Senator wished to move to strike an item in the bill, which, in this case, was to be at Camp Dawson in Preston County, WV--if any one of those Senators moved to strike that item, they could do it. But before they could succeed in striking that item, they would have to have a majority of the Senate to support them by a vote. The vote could be by voice. It could be by division. It could be by rollcall. But they would have to have a majority of a quorum in the Senate in order to be successful in striking that item. They would not yet have fully accomplished their aim, however. A majority of the Members in a quorum of the other body would likewise have to support the striking of that item. If all 100 Senators were present, they would have to have 51 votes. If all 435 Members of the House were present, they would have to have at least 218 votes in order to successfully strike that item. A majority of each House would have to support the conference report. But in any event, in the first instance, a majority of each body would have to support the amendment in order to strike the item from the bill. Striking an item from a bill is amending a bill. After the President has signed a bill into law, then under this Line-Item Veto Act, a President--Democrat or Republican, it doesn't make any difference--may after the first 10 minutes, after the first 5 minutes, after the first 2 days, 3 days, or 4 days, even on the fifth day, he may go back and singlehandedly, unilaterally cancel out an item in the law; in other words, strike it out; change the law. He could, if he wished to, line- item out 90 percent of the law, which in that form, as a bill, would probably not have passed either body. But one man, or woman, if it should be, as the President of the United States may unilaterally amend a bill. That is amending a bill. The Senator from Iowa if he offers a motion to strike my item from the bill is moving to amend the bill. He is pursuing the legislative process. That is the lawmaking process. He is amending a bill. As I have already said, he can't do it alone. His vote only counts for 1 out of 100. He has to have a majority. But not so with the President. The President may amend unilaterally, after he signs the bill into law. According to the Constitution, if he approve the bill, he shall sign it. Well, he must have approved it, or he wouldn't have signed the bill. He approved it. He signed the bill into law. Up to 5 days later, he may go back and change that law unilaterally. And that is what he did in this instance. He changed the law unilaterally. He struck out Camp Dawson. Did Senators really intend to give one man in the White House that kind of power, that kind of legislative power? Can they really believe that the Framers who wrote this Constitution would have ever intended that that be done? It is mind-boggling--mind-boggling. It is mind- boggling to me to think that a majority of these two Houses would give any President--any President, Republican or Democrat--that kind of power. And with that kind of power the President, be he Republican or Democrat, holds the sword of Damocles over the head of every Senator and every House Member. Am I going to vote against a certain treaty, or some nomination? The President may say, ``Look, you have an item in the bill. You have done a great job. You have done a great job for the State of West Virginia. I am really proud of you. The people down in your State love you. You did this, you did that. And I want you to have this item. But can we bargain a little here? Can we negotiate a little bit? Can you help me on what I want that is in the bill? Can you help me on this nomination?'' Or whatever. ``Maybe we can reach an amicable agreement here where you will get your item, and I will get mine.'' Now, I do not want to say that I am not willing to listen to the administration. We do that all the time when the subcommittees bring these bills to the floor. The subcommittees on appropriations work for weeks in hearings. They listen to witnesses. They talk with their staffs. They look over the correspondence. They study the needs of the various agencies and departments. And then they get together and they mark up the bill in the subcommittee. Then it goes to the full committee. Then it comes to the Senate. During all of this time, the administration is telling us what they want and what they don't want. We understand that. We know all about that. We know what they want and what they don't want. But it may be the collective judgment of the subcommittee to do otherwise. So the subcommittee brings this bill to the full committee, and it is then brought to the Senate. And we act on it, and it goes to conference. Then what happens? Well, I have been treated to just a little bit of it lately. This is no surprise to me. We pass an amendment like this--a bill like this-- and give it to any President. He will hold over your head a hammer. So, as we go to conference, the administration people come into the conference, or they come into our offices, or wherever they meet with the leadership, and they say, ``Look, this item the President will veto. If that item is in there, the President is going to veto it. This item we want. This item the President will veto unless you modify it.'' I knew that would be the situation in which we were going to find ourselves once this Line-Item Veto Act was passed. So, as far as I am concerned, it impinges upon a Senator's or a House Member's freedom of speech. They have to be a little bit more careful about what they say about any administration. It impinges on a Senator's freedom to act in accordance with the wishes of the constituents who send him here. And to that extent he is that much less a free man, less able to exercise his own independence. The distinguished Senator from Alaska has said we do not intend to negotiate. We intend to send this down to the White House if the majority of each body will vote for it. Let me say here what I said in the committee today. If the President wants to line-item veto a West Virginia item, I am not going to negotiate with the administration. Negotiating is over as far as I am concerned. When the subcommittee works its will, has its hearings, marks up its legislation, brings it to the full committee, the full committee acts, amends, modifies, changes, or whatever, and when the House does the same, when the collective wisdom and judgment of the subcommittee and the full committee and both Houses has been reached, if the President wants to veto it, go to it. Why should we sit down and negotiate in order to keep him from wielding his line-item veto pen? Let him use his veto pen only as instructed in the original Constitution. Let him use it. And then Congress can work its will. It can either sustain his veto or override it, but there should be no negotiating. That is what every administration will want us to do. They want us to get in a position where we will continue to negotiate and they will continue to ratchet us down, they will continue to get what they want, but they want you to negotiate for whatever your constituents need. Whatever your constituents need, how you feel about your constituents, that is negotiable. Then they throw out that threat: ``Well, the President will veto that.'' The President will line item that out. Well, so what! ``Lay on, Macduff; And damn'd be him that first cries `Hold, enough.' '' We like to know what the administration is thinking. It is worthwhile to have their judgment. It helps to guide us in our deliberations. But once both bodies have acted and get into conference, then for the administration to come up here and say, ``Well, this is vetoable, if you don't change that. We don't like it,'' I am not for negotiating now. Let the President use his line-item veto pen. I hope that Senators and House Members who voted for the line-item veto will get their bellies full. I hope they get a bellyful of it and they probably will, because this is just a start. There are several other appropriations bills coming along. Think of the time that this costs. Senator Stevens held a hearing today, had a good attendance, a lot of Senators were there. They weren't elsewhere doing other things which were important likewise. It took a lot of their time. It took the time of the generals and admirals who were up from the Defense Department, and that is going to be repeated over and over and over again. Look at the time it is taking now. We have already taken time. The subcommittee took time. The full committee took time. And there are Members on those subcommittees and full committee who have great expertise in legislative areas under the jurisdiction of those subcommittees. And then all that goes for naught because a President, Republican or Democrat, wants this or wants that or does not want to go along with a Member whose constituents feel there are needs to be met and acts accordingly. The administration has been given a hammer to use over the heads of Senators and could threaten anything that a Senator wants as a way to get the President's way on unrelated matters. It greatly enhances the President's bargaining position in the legislative process. Go home tonight, all Senators, and before you close your eyes in slumber, think of what we have done. We have given one man, who puts his britches on just as I put mine on--one leg at a time--we have said you may amend a bill unilaterally. You do not have to worry about a majority in the other body or a majority here. You may amend a bill all by yourself. You may strike an item out. That is amending a bill. You are the super lawmaker. Not by this Constitution he isn't. I cannot understand how, or whatever got into the Members' minds when they voted to give any President the line-item veto. But it is done. It is done. I hope they will think now and that somebody will bring a case and the Supreme Court will strike down this infernal, pernicious, illegitimate gimmick. But in the meantime, I will follow the Senator from Alaska. If he gets ready to introduce legislation to repeal the Line Item Veto Act, I am ready. I am ready to join him. Just go home and read once again, Senators who are listening, section 1 of article I. ``All legislative powers herein granted''--and if those legislative powers are not herein granted, they do not exist. ``All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States . . .'' And then go over to section 7 of article I and read the language: ``Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; If he approve,'' meaning the bill, the resolution, ``he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it.'' It does not say he may amend it unilaterally. ``If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it.'' Now, that is the Constitution. And we have no right as Members by legislation to give any President the right unilaterally to amend a bill. We do not have that power. I do not think Congress has the power. I do not think it can give away its constitutional power to make all laws. There is only one other thing I would say, and then I am going to sit down. I have said already there is a strong probability that the Senate will have to consider items that it has already considered in the committee process over and over again, amounting to a tremendous waste of precious time. Senator Inouye cited a number of vital systems that have been added by the Congress to the defense bill over the years such as greatly increasing the purchase of stealth fighters, the Osprey helicopter, C-130 aircraft, C-17's and other systems which at the time were opposed by the administration and probably would have been subject to the line-item veto and killed. Where would we then have been during Desert Storm? This is a strong case that the administration does not have a corner on wisdom, and that if it uses the line-item veto to simply protect its budget as delivered, we will lose the great benefit of that wisdom and shortchange the historic contributions that have been made over the years. I thank all Senators for indulging me. I have fought this battle over and over and over again. And I am willing to fight it over and over and over again. I do not believe that I took an oath to support and defend the Constitution, then only to turn around and vote, in violation of that Constitution, to give any President the unilateral right, power or prerogative to, in essence, amend a law by striking an item. I hope more than anything else, before God sees fit to call me home, that the line-item veto will be struck down either by the Supreme Court or by the Congress itself. That is my prayer.

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QUORUM CALL1997-10-08

Mr. BYRD

Mr. BYRD. I want my own leader first. And then I would like to----

Mr. BYRD. Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. BYRD. George Washington took the viewpoint that he had to veto the entire bill or sign it or let it become law without his signature. He could not do it piecemeal. Now the Senate and House have made it possible for any President to do just that. I do not think George Washington would have done that.

Mr. BYRD. Well, I am heartened by that. I thank the leader.

Mr. BYRD. No, I do not suggest you yield the floor. I just wanted the recognition to state for the record that I do have a measure to the bill, to the ISTEA bill. I wanted all Senators to be aware of that. I would like them to take a look at my amendment when it is ready. Before they make any judgment to go with anybody else's amendment, I have an amendment that I think will appeal to them, to every State. But the leader has already stated that I have an amendment, so that takes care of that situation. Secondly, I just want to say that whenever we can do our conference reports on appropriations, I would like to do them. They are privileged. I would like to get as many of those bills down as we can get down so we do not have to include them in a continuing resolution. If the President is going to item veto any of them, I want him to do that in ample time for us to offer a resolution to put those items right back on his desk. If he wants to veto that, OK. He has that right under the Constitution. We, likewise, have the right to either override or sustain. But I would like for him to have time to veto those. I hate that item veto with a passion. But it is there, until the Supreme Court knocks it down. I cannot see how the Supreme Court can avoid knocking that--killing that bill which most Senators voted for, which most Members voted for, but it is coming home to roost now.

Mr. BYRD. Are you finished?

Mr. BYRD. I do not want to go ahead of my own leader here. I prefer he go ahead of me.

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INTERMODAL SURFACE TRANSPORTATION EFFICIENCY ACT OF 19971997-10-08

Mr. BYRD

Mr. BYRD. I ask that the amendment be read.

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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 19981997-09-30

Mr. BYRD

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the amendments, en bloc, be set aside temporarily to a time when the leadership would find it most convenient for Members to have the vote.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I rise today to address an issue that concerns me and, in my opinion, does not receive enough attention, enough attention or enough action by the Congress. This is the issue of youth alcohol use. It is a serious problem in the District of Columbia, as it is throughout the Nation. Alcohol is the drug that is used most by teens. If we are concerned about drug use by teens, this is the drug that is used most by teens. Information compiled by the National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse indicates that, among children between the ages of 16 and 17, 69.3 percent have at one point in their lifetime experimented with alcohol. Let me say that again. Among children between the ages of 16 and 17, 69.3 percent have at one point in their lifetime experimented with alcohol. That is not a very good reflection on their parents, I would say. In the last month, approximately 8 percent of the Nation's eighth graders--now, get that--in the last month, approximately 8 percent of the Nation's eighth graders have been drunk. What are we coming to? Eighth graders--8 percent of the Nation's eighth graders have been drunk. What does that say about the parents? What does it say about this Nation of ours? Eighth graders are generally 13-year-olds. Every State has a law prohibiting the sale of alcohol to individuals under the age of 21. Unfortunately, though, two out of every three teenagers who drink report that they can buy their own alcoholic beverages. Alarmingly, junior and senior high school students drink 35 percent of all wine coolers and consume 1.1 billion cans of beer a year. Yet, again, every State and the District of Columbia have laws prohibiting the sale of alcohol to individuals under the age of 21. Alcohol is a factor in the three leading causes of death for 15- to 24-year-olds: accidents, homicides, and suicides. In approximately 50 to 60 percent of youth suicides, alcohol is a factor. Alcohol is involved. In 1995, there were 1,666 alcohol-related fatalities of children between the ages of 15 and 19. Drinking and driving kills. Links have also been shown between alcohol use and teen pregnancies. And links have been shown between alcohol use and sexually transmitted diseases. According to a Washington Post article from July 17, 1997, entitled, ``The Corner Store,'' the District outranks every State with regard to deaths and diseases related to alcohol. In addition, according to Joye M. Carter, chief D.C. medical examiner, in 1993, 50 percent of the homicide victims had consumed alcohol. In order to begin to address the distressing cost of alcohol to this city, and its children, I am offering three commonsense amendments to this bill, the District of Columbia Appropriations Act for fiscal year 1998. The amendments I have sent already to the desk. The first one would prohibit alcoholic beverage advertisements on billboards, signs, and posters and other forms of advertising in certain publicly visible locations in the District of Columbia where children are likely to walk to school or to play. I believe this is an important, commonsense measure to help to shelter innocent children of the District of Columbia from the daily bombardment of messages tempting them to partake of alcoholic beverages. There is a lot of fuss made about advertisements concerning smoking. Nothing is said about advertisements concerning alcohol. That, apparently, is taboo. Competitive Media Reporting estimates that the alcoholic beverage industry spent more than $1 billion on alcohol advertising in 1995. That is an enormous amount of money, and this advertising is often crafted to particularly appeal to impressionable children. Our children are bombarded with slick and ingenious messages that drinking alcohol will lead to popularity; you will be popular; it leads even to good looks, and leads to a magnetic personality. Nothing could be further from the truth, of course. Drinking alcohol more often leads to wrecked automobiles, unwanted sex, coarse and stupid behavior, and more often than we like to contemplate, a space in the cemetery with a tombstone resting above--especially in the case of young drinkers. Ads filled with singles playing exciting outdoor sports, or sophisticated adults combining alcohol with an elegant evening out, mask the darker view of children cringing and hiding when Daddy weaves drunkenly through the door from a bleary-eyed evening spent in the company of a bottle, or several bottles. Similar bans have been enacted in Baltimore and Chicago to protect children in those cities. Why not here? Given the large number of liquor stores in the District and the number of signs enticing children to try a substance that they are barred from using by law, it is important that we take action now. Let us not delay and miss this opportunity to make a positive difference for the District's children. It is my understanding that similar legislation is currently pending before the D.C. Council. It is not clear whether the council will act expeditiously on this important matter. Thus, it is incumbent upon the Congress to provide this important protection to the District of Columbia's children as they walk to school and as they play in their neighborhoods. In my opinion, the amendment, although I believe it is crafted to survive legal challenges, does not go as far as I would like in protecting the District's children. I urge the council to explore additional ways to expand this protection. I am sure that some will challenge this amendment, arguing that commercial speech is protected from such bans under the First Amendment. As a matter of fact, the beer industry challenged the Baltimore ordinance banning outdoor, stationary alcoholic beverage advertising which is almost identical to my amendment. The circuit court has upheld the Baltimore ordinance as constitutional. Children cannot readily interpret media messages. Their ability to analyze information is not yet fully developed, and, thus, they are more vulnerable to being swayed by advertisements. This fact is of particular concern when the substances being advertised are illegal for consumption by minors. According to the U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, in Anheuser-Busch, Incorporated versus Schmoke: This decision thus conforms to the Supreme Court's repeated recognition that children deserve special solicitude in the First Amendment balance because they lack the ability to assess and to analyze fully the information presented through commercial media. The Fourth Circuit decision goes on: After our own independent assessment, we recognized the reasonableness of Baltimore City's legislative finding that there is a ``definite correlation between alcoholic beverage advertising and underage drinking.'' We also concluded that the regulation of commercial speech is not more extensive than necessary to serve the governmental interest. . . Mr. President, in addition to its decision, the Court determined that Baltimore's ordinance was not more restrictive than necessary to accomplish the stated goal of protecting children from alcoholic beverage advertising. The Court of Appeals specifically cited the ordinance's inclusion of an exemption, which is also included in my amendment, for commercial and industrial areas. According to the decision, ``* * * Baltimore's efforts to tailor the ordinance by exempting commercial and industrial zones from its effort renders it not more extensive than is necessary to serve the governmental interest under consideration.'' The exceptions to the ban included in my amendment are numerous and result in a narrowly tailored approach to achieving the goal of protecting children in areas they frequent while staying within the confines of permissible restrictions on commercial speech under the Constitution. Banning billboard advertisements for alcoholic beverages where children play and go to school are reasonable safeguards that communities can take to address youth alcohol use. So, I urge my colleagues to join me in this worthwhile and narrowly tailored effort to protect the children of our Nation's Capital. My second amendment, Mr. President, would increase the number of Alcohol Beverage Control Board inspectors in the District and focus enforcement on the sale of alcoholic beverages to minors. The D.C. Alcohol Beverage Control Board has just three inspectors in the field in addition to their chief, who also performs inspections of alcohol outlets. These four inspectors are responsible for monitoring over 1,600 alcoholic beverage outlets. This is a sad state of affairs for a city that has more alcohol-influenced crime than any other city of comparable size. In contrast, Baltimore employs 18 regular inspectors in addition to a number of part-time inspectors. It is illegal for persons under the age of 21 to purchase, possess, or consume alcoholic beverages in the District. In addition, the sale of alcoholic beverages to minors is prohibited. However, these laws are not being adequately enforced. In May of this year, the Center for Science in the Public Interest [CSPI] conducted a sting operation at small grocery and convenience stores in which alcoholic beverages are sold. The sting operation used youthful looking twenty-one-year-olds to purchase beer. In 63 percent of the cases, the young looking subjects were able to buy beer without presenting age identification--63 percent of the cases. Clearly this is not good news. It is not legal to sell alcoholic beverages to minors. The low probability of enforcement of this law results in lax age identification checks. My amendment strengthens the District's ABC enforcement efforts by bringing the number of inspectors up to a level comparable to other cities of this size. It is my hope that my colleagues will join me in this important effort to address the serious issue of alcoholic beverage sales to minors. My third amendment calls for the General Accounting Office [GAO] to conduct a study on the District's alcoholic beverage excise taxes. It is my understanding that the level of taxation in the District is amongst the lowest in the Nation. According to local activists concerned about the effects of alcohol consumption on the District, raising the excise tax on alcohol could be the single most effective means of reducing alcohol consumption in the District. This amendment would require the General Accounting Office to study: (1) the District of Columbia's alcoholic beverage tax structure and its relation to surrounding jurisdictions; (2) the effect of D.C.'s lower excise taxes on alcoholic beverages on consumption of alcoholic beverages in D.C.; (3) ways in which the District of Columbia's tax structure can be revised to bring it into conformity with the higher levels in surrounding jurisdictions; and (4) ways in which those increased revenues can be used to lower consumption and promote abstention from alcohol amongst young people. The study would also explore whether alcohol is being sold in proximity to schools and other areas where children are likely to be. In addition, would the creation of alcohol free zones in areas frequented by children be useful in deterring under-age alcohol consumption? These are important issues. They are important issues that ought to be explored. The information obtained in the study will be useful in determining the need for possible future adjustments of the excise taxes in the District on alcohol that might reduce the high costs that alcohol abuse imposes on the District of Columbia. The District of Columbia is our Nation's Capital, a centerpiece for our Nation's Government, as well as a hometown for 600,000 people. It should be a shining star in the constellation of American cities, but it is not. Sadly, that star is tarnished by neglect, abuse, and by the complex forces that hold sway over and within it. The corrosive effects of alcohol abuse further erode its beauty and grandeur. I believe that these three amendments make a positive step toward repairing the District so that it might claim its rightful place at the pinnacle of American metropolitan areas. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the amendments en bloc.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I send three amendments to the desk. I ask unanimous consent they be considered en bloc. I have discussed this with the manager of the bill. He understands that I am going to make this request, and he has no objection.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendments be dispensed with.

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 1998--CONFERENCE REPORT1997-09-25

Mr. BYRD

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the President's National Security Advisor, Mr. Sandy Berger, two days ago made an important statement on U.S. policy toward Bosnia, in particular the question of keeping United States' ground forces in the region beyond June of 1998, in order to keep the peace in an area where political reconciliation has lagged behind the actual military separation of the opposing forces. It is not surprising that political, economic and social reconciliation would proceed at a pace commensurate with the levels of extensive brutality and violence which characterized the Bosnia conflict prior to the introduction of U.S.-led NATO forces two years ago. In what might be characterized as a trial balloon, Mr. Berger stated, according to the New York Times of yesterday, September 24, 1997, that the ``international community'' will be required to ``stay engaged in Bosnia in some fashion for a good while to come.'' The question is for how long should the United States remain while expending billions of defense dollars and risking the erosion of U.S. readiness by tying our forces down in Bosnia? The problem, as I see it, is that our European partners have said that they will not remain on the ground in Bosnia unless the United States does, and when we leave, they will. I find this to be a very unreasonable position, in that Bosnia is not paramount in the vital interests of the U.S., and at some point our European allies should consider taking the responsibility for acting as the military security force in that European country. This is not to say that the U.S. could not provide continued logistical, intelligence, and other supporting roles while the Europeans take their turn at bat in Bosnia. I call the attention of my colleagues to the provision in the Department of Defense conference report, Section 8132 which requires the President to certify, by May 15, 1998, his intentions regarding keeping our forces in Bosnia on the ground beyond June 30, 1998. The certification must include the reasons for the deployment, the size and duration of the deployment, the missions of our military forces, the exit strategy for our forces, the costs of the deployment, and the impact of it on the morale, retention, and effectiveness of U.S. forces. This is a very good, very complete provision, and it will trigger a debate, as it should, in this body, regarding the future policy of the United States in Bosnia.

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SMITH-WYDEN AMENDMENT ON COUNTY LAW ENFORCEMENT1997-09-18

Mr. BYRD

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I concur with the subcommittee chairman's assessment. DOE should evaluate the potential benefits of this technology when considering its allocation of fiscal year 1998 funds. ihs funding

Mr. BYRD. Yes, Mr. President, at this point I think that this is the best commitment that we can make to our colleagues from Nebraska and Arizona. If we are not able to accomplish this, however, we can consider including conference report language directing the IHS to include funding requests in the fiscal year 1999 budget to complete the design phase for these facilities; funding requests to begin first phase construction of these facilities might also be appropriate.

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FAST TRACK NEGOTIATING AUTHORITY ON TRADE AGREEMENTS1997-09-18

Mr. BYRD

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, The President this week submitted to the Congress the ``Export Expansion and Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act of 1997'', designed to renew so-called ``fast track'' procedures for trade agreements. There are many issues associated with this proposal, evidenced by the reports that the White House has essentially established a ``war room'' to marshall the votes in the Congress to support its proposal. We all know the United States needs to be competitive in foreign markets, and we all know the administration needs to strike the best deals it can with foreign nations on behalf of American business and consumers. There is no dispute over these goals. My concern today is over the procedure which the administration wishes to incorporate in considering this proposal which is driven by the insistence by the Clinton Administration that it can only be effective in promoting U.S. trade and negotiating such agreements if the legislative vehicle we consider is subject to one up-and-down vote, after a period of limited debate. The administration has elevated its desire to eliminate the opportunity for the Congress to amend such enacting legislation to the stature or degree of a religious mantra. The administration seems to think that any agreement it submits to the Congress will, in fact, be amended, forcing it to renegotiate agreements it has reached with foreign nations and thereby shredding its stature as a negotiator The argument goes that fast-track authority is critical because it sends to our negotiating partners a necessary promise of good faith, that is, they will know that the deals hammered out at the negotiating table won't be dismembered by amendments in the Congress. The proposition is now being stated and restated by the administration's legions ad nauseam that without fast track all is lost, American leadership is gone, nations won't negotiate with us, our strategy on trade as a nation will fail, the sky will go dark, all life forms will perish, and on and on. These assertions are repeated at every opportunity, as if repetition really makes them valid. I say they are wild exaggerations, wild exaggerations, wild exaggerations, which underestimate both the capabilities of our negotiators and the sound judgment of the Congress of the United States. Mr. President, the insistence on the no-amendment strategy reveals a staggering lack of confidence on the part of the administration in its own negotiating prowess. It suggests that, heaven forbid, possible weaknesses in the agreements that are reached will be discovered and acted upon by the Congress. It shows no sense of confidence--no sense of confidence--on the part of the administration that it can prevail in arguing the merits of a particular agreement to the Congress, thereby forcing the administration to return to the negotiating table to change an agreement. From what I understand, for instance, the relative tariff barriers between the U.S. and Chile are such that an agreement reducing the Chilean barriers is desirable. Why would the Congress not want to support an agreement that is in our interest in penetrating the Chilean market, to even out the playing field on trade matters between the U.S. and Chile? There is no inconsistency between supporting free trade, or freer trade, as negotiated by the administration around the world, and preserving the right of the Congress not only to scrutinize the agreements reached for their worthiness, but also to question, if necessary, parts of the agreement that might appear not to be in our overall interest. If the administration does its job and negotiates sound agreements, they should be approved by the Congress as such, intact, regardless if there is ``fast-track'' procedure or not. The Senate is not unresponsive to arguments made by the administration that an international agreement that it has negotiated is in the national interest and that amendments could unravel it. That is not to say that if there is a flaw in the agreement that is serious enough for renegotiation, it may just be in the American national interest for the negotiators to be forced to go back to the table by the people's elected representatives and get it right. If they do the job right in the first place, renegotiation should not be necessary. Mr. President, one could just as easily make the case that, if the Senate retained amending authority, our negotiators might just come up with a somewhat better product, knowing that the entire agreement will be scrutinized by the elected representatives of the American people. After all, the agreements that are negotiated are presumably on the behalf of the American people, the same constituency that is represented by this Senate. On the other hand, the Senate has a responsibility to turn back amendments that might be offered representing special interests, but not the overall American interest. That is the ``American Way.'' Would such amendments be offered? Possibly. Would they be approved by a majority of Senate? Not if the American interest in the overall agreement would be hurt. This body has the capability of exerting leadership on trade, just as on any other matter. It can do what is in the best interests of the nation and yet not kill trade agreements through special interest amendments. The administration, in its insistence on a no-amendment treaty on trade indicates either a lack of confidence in the integrity of this body, or a lack of confidence on the part of its own negotiators, or just simply a desire to have its way and not have to do the hard work of convincing the Senate of the value of the agreement that it has just negotiated. It wants to have it the easy way, no questions asked, just present the agreement to the Senate and the House of Representatives and both bodies just roll over and sleep, sleep, sleep; not have to do the hard work of convincing the Senate of the value of the agreement that it has just negotiated. None of these reasons seems to justify eliminating through a special procedure the power of this body to amend if a majority of this body, or the other body, finds it necessary to do so. None of this justifies Congress' handing off its exclusive power under Article I Section 8, of the Constitution, to ``regulate Commerce with foreign nations''. The amending potential is a healthy check on sloppy work. The amending potential can prevent a lazy presentation of the issues, or just plain bad negotiating results. Here is what one pundit says about the need for fast-track negotiating authority. According to David Rothkopf, in an article appearing in the current issue of ``The New Democrat'': ``If the United States doesn't have fast-track authority it cannot negotiate agreements.'' Piffle! That is sheer nonsense, ``If the United States doesn't have fast-track authority it cannot negotiate agreements.'' It goes on to say that this is supposedly a crucial tool that the ``administration needs,'' according to Mr. Rothkopf ``to ensure that U.S. businesses and workers are treated fairly in the global economy.'' I contend that this is all a non sequitur--it just does not follow that preserving the power of the Senate over legislation is inconsistent with America's ability to negotiate agreements. If the Congress does not want the trading environment supposedly created by particular agreements, it can vote the whole thing down. Fast track authority does not, somehow by itself, produce an immediate supporting of freer trade in the Congress. The administration has expended a huge amount of energy in an exercise to convince the Congress to foreswear its normal ability to amend legislation. And there will be some in here who will fall for that. The administration might be better served to put those tremendous energies into negotiating sound agreements with our negotiating partners and then selling the value of those agreements to the Congress on the merits of the agreements themselves. Mr. President, the highly respected head of the U.S. Trade Representative's office, Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky, who did such an excellent job in negotiating an intellectual property agreement with China, made a presentation before the Senate Finance committee on yesterday, Wednesday, in support of the administration's fast track proposal to the Senate. She asserted that fast track is ``critical to increase access to foreign markets.'' I would think, rather, that good solid provisions in a trade agreement, resulting from negotiations that focus on what is in our national interest, will increase America's access to foreign markets. Fast track consideration of poorly negotiated, badly constructed provisions would not necessarily give us increased access. Fast track of the Intellectual Property agreement with the Chinese did not make the negotiating process with the Chinese, always excruciatingly difficult, any easier. There is no substitute for tough implementation and policing of solid provisions, as Ambassador Barshefsky well knows. She is a fine negotiator, but had to negotiate that agreement twice, and it still is not clear that we have free access to the Chinese market and that the provisions safeguarding U.S. intellectual property are yet in place in the Chinese market. This has nothing whatever to do with fast track, slow track or any other track on the Senate floor. It has to do with the implementation of agreements to gain access to those markets, a very serious problem in the Pacific where the deficits we are running on our merchandise account are so huge, and growing, that they themselves are the single major factor jeopardizing the administration's so-called ``free trade'' philosophy. Mrs. Barshefsky stated in her testimony that, under fast track, the ``Congress and the President work together.'' We can, and do, certainly work together, day in and day out on legislation of all kinds and all subjects without, however, crippling our authority to amend those vehicles. Can one really say that we in the Senate are less serious about trade when we wish to scrutinize and carefully assess all parts of a trade agreement? Nonsense! Mrs. Barshefsky echoes the administration's line--here it is: ``if we do not renew fast track, . . . our trading partners are not willing to wait for us to pass another bill.'' Who believes that? Who will believe that? In other words they won't negotiate with us if we in the Congress don't grant the administration nonamendable rules and limited debate concessions. This is absurd! Absurd. If our trading partners believe that trade agreements with us are in their own national interest, it strains my credulity to hear that they will not negotiate trade agreements with us in the absence of fast track. From 1934 to 1974, there was no fast track, and Mrs. Barshefsky testified that in those 40 years, ``Congress gave the president authority to negotiate mutual tariff reductions with our trading partners. Congress renewed that authority repeatedly over the years and successive Presidents used that authority to dramatically reduce tariff barriers around the world.'' So, apparently over that 40-year period, our trading partners were willing to negotiate with us with no mention of truncated legislative rules. Everything was fine. Mrs. Barshefsky goes on to testify that to complete the negotiating agenda of the World Trade Organization, in government procurement, intellectual property rights, agriculture and services, where we seek enhanced global access to markets, ``we must have fast track authority to enter these various talks or countries will not put meaningful offers on the table.'' Now, who is so gullible as to believe that? I just do not believe this assertion, provided the agreements to be reached are in the interests of the negotiating countries. And we have to assume that that will be their goal, to reach agreements that are in their own interests. Countries seek to promote their self-interests, fast track or slow track, or whatever track, and it is the job of our negotiators to get the best deal possible. It is just a typical bargaining situation. Mr. President, Senators might well consider the impact of fast track- no amendment authority on the basic leverage available to U.S. negotiators. I believe the proposition that fast track enhances U.S. negotiators' capabilities is open to very serious question. It would be a matter of enhanced leverage for U.S. negotiators that a certain matter should be included in an agreement because it is a matter of strong concern to the Senate. The threat that a provision would not be supported by the Senate is a threat that I as a negotiator, if I were a negotiator, might like to have as additional leverage in a negotiation. Fast track eliminates this form of leverage. There is nobody watching over your shoulder. The administration maintains that fast track authority prohibiting amendments ``tells U.S. trading partners that the United States speaks at the bargaining table with one voice and that the Congress will not seek to reopen trade agreements after they are negotiated'', according to the documents accompanying the President's proposal delivered to the Senate yesterday. I think that, on the contrary, this basically weakens the leverage available to our negotiators in dealing with tough issues at the table vis-a-vis the representatives of other nations. It is our apparent inability to implement agreements which promise access abroad that is the central trouble in our trading situation, and the continued inability of the administration to address and begin to solve it will be the key problem--not fast track--over the next decade regarding the so-called global market. Indeed, the administration would do well to worry about congressional reaction over the next couple of years to this situation. It would do well to spend less time trying to manipulate protective devices around its agreements when they are considered by the Congress. Does the frenzied attempt by the administration to wrap a protective cover around the agreements it negotiates have anything to do with what has been generally acknowledged to be an overselling of the NAFTA--the North American Free Trade Agreement--a few years ago? That was oversold. The overpromising of the benefits of that agreement should instruct us that the administration needs to be more careful in evaluating what it has actually accomplished. A dose of reality and caution in marketing the prowess of our negotiators would be well advised. If the Senate provided the President the authority to negotiate trade agreements, but failed to give him protection against amendments, it would not be the end of the world. The skies would not fall, the mountains would not crumble, the waters in the oceans would not rise. It would not be the end. My bet is that a good agreement with Chile, for example, could be reached which would sail through the Congress. At the same time, one would hope that the era of the oversell would be ended. And we have had that oversell for many, many years. Every administration that comes in, Republican and Democrat, wants to have it all their way. They don't want Congress to have a say when it comes to amending a trade treaty. This extensive marketing job for fast track is a transparent attempt, using the most exaggerated series of assertions I have heard on any matter in a long time, to stampede the Senate into abandoning its constitutional right, its constitutional power, its constitutional prerogatives over fundamental legislation affecting the people of the United States in the market and at the mall. Now we hear a drumbeat that if you are for unlimited debate, if you are for amendable treatment of trade agreements and implementing legislation, like virtually all other kinds of legislation, you are a protectionist--you are a protectionist. What a bad word. That's what you are. If you want to uphold the powers of the Constitution vested in the Senate and House, if you want to uphold those powers when it comes to trade, you are a protectionist. Fie on you--a protectionist! If you are for shortchanging the legislative process, you are for free trade. That makes no sense whatever to me, for I am for free trade if it is fair to all parties, but I am for protecting Senate powers and responsibilities in the handling of legislation which is, after all, our constitutional duty. And what do we mean when we say, ``I am for protecting the Senate's power''? It means I am for protecting the rights of the people, because those rights are given life here in this forum of the States. That is our constitutional duty, as I say. We should think long and hard before we concede this authority. Senators need to read the fine print of the legislative proposal to understand just what broad powers are being relinquished and they need to go back and read the Constitution again. The administration, I think, has it exactly backwards: instead of concentrating its energies on accumulating as much leverage as it can vis-a-vis our trading partners, it is marshaling these energies in the opposite direction--wrong way Corrigan--inward, to convince the Congress to reduce its leverage, and by extension, the nation's vital leverage abroad. Mr. President, I yield the floor. Mr. HOLLINGS addressed the Chair.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 19981997-09-18

Mr. BYRD

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I am in agreement with the Chairman's remarks, and appreciate his cooperation in developing this amendment. I believe this will help move us further along toward completion of this bill. I support the amendment.

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